watch_queue: Free the page array when watch_queue is dismantled

[mirror_ubuntu-jammy-kernel.git] / kernel / cred.c

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/* Task credentials management - see Documentation/security/credentials.rst
 *
 * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
 * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
 */
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sched/coredump.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/keyctl.h>
#include <linux/init_task.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/cn_proc.h>
#include <linux/uidgid.h>

#if 0
#define kdebug(FMT, ...)                                                \
        printk("[%-5.5s%5u] " FMT "\n",                                 \
               current->comm, current->pid, ##__VA_ARGS__)
#else
#define kdebug(FMT, ...)                                                \
do {                                                                    \
        if (0)                                                          \
                no_printk("[%-5.5s%5u] " FMT "\n",                      \
                          current->comm, current->pid, ##__VA_ARGS__);  \
} while (0)
#endif

static struct kmem_cache *cred_jar;

/* init to 2 - one for init_task, one to ensure it is never freed */
static struct group_info init_groups = { .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(2) };

/*
 * The initial credentials for the initial task
 */
struct cred init_cred = {
        .usage                  = ATOMIC_INIT(4),
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
        .subscribers            = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
        .magic                  = CRED_MAGIC,
#endif
        .uid                    = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
        .gid                    = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
        .suid                   = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
        .sgid                   = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
        .euid                   = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
        .egid                   = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
        .fsuid                  = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
        .fsgid                  = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
        .securebits             = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT,
        .cap_inheritable        = CAP_EMPTY_SET,
        .cap_permitted          = CAP_FULL_SET,
        .cap_effective          = CAP_FULL_SET,
        .cap_bset               = CAP_FULL_SET,
        .user                   = INIT_USER,
        .user_ns                = &init_user_ns,
        .group_info             = &init_groups,
        .ucounts                = &init_ucounts,
};

static inline void set_cred_subscribers(struct cred *cred, int n)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
        atomic_set(&cred->subscribers, n);
#endif
}

static inline int read_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *cred)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
        return atomic_read(&cred->subscribers);
#else
        return 0;
#endif
}

static inline void alter_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *_cred, int n)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
        struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) _cred;

        atomic_add(n, &cred->subscribers);
#endif
}

/*
 * The RCU callback to actually dispose of a set of credentials
 */
static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
{
        struct cred *cred = container_of(rcu, struct cred, rcu);

        kdebug("put_cred_rcu(%p)", cred);

#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
        if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC_DEAD ||
            atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0 ||
            read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0)
                panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with"
                      " mag %x, put %p, usage %d, subscr %d\n",
                      cred, cred->magic, cred->put_addr,
                      atomic_read(&cred->usage),
                      read_cred_subscribers(cred));
#else
        if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0)
                panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with usage %d\n",
                      cred, atomic_read(&cred->usage));
#endif

        security_cred_free(cred);
        key_put(cred->session_keyring);
        key_put(cred->process_keyring);
        key_put(cred->thread_keyring);
        key_put(cred->request_key_auth);
        if (cred->group_info)
                put_group_info(cred->group_info);
        free_uid(cred->user);
        if (cred->ucounts)
                put_ucounts(cred->ucounts);
        put_user_ns(cred->user_ns);
        kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, cred);
}

/**
 * __put_cred - Destroy a set of credentials
 * @cred: The record to release
 *
 * Destroy a set of credentials on which no references remain.
 */
void __put_cred(struct cred *cred)
{
        kdebug("__put_cred(%p{%d,%d})", cred,
               atomic_read(&cred->usage),
               read_cred_subscribers(cred));

        BUG_ON(atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0);
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
        BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0);
        cred->magic = CRED_MAGIC_DEAD;
        cred->put_addr = __builtin_return_address(0);
#endif
        BUG_ON(cred == current->cred);
        BUG_ON(cred == current->real_cred);

        if (cred->non_rcu)
                put_cred_rcu(&cred->rcu);
        else
                call_rcu(&cred->rcu, put_cred_rcu);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_cred);

/*
 * Clean up a task's credentials when it exits
 */
void exit_creds(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
        struct cred *cred;

        kdebug("exit_creds(%u,%p,%p,{%d,%d})", tsk->pid, tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred,
               atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage),
               read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred));

        cred = (struct cred *) tsk->real_cred;
        tsk->real_cred = NULL;
        validate_creds(cred);
        alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1);
        put_cred(cred);

        cred = (struct cred *) tsk->cred;
        tsk->cred = NULL;
        validate_creds(cred);
        alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1);
        put_cred(cred);

#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE
        key_put(tsk->cached_requested_key);
        tsk->cached_requested_key = NULL;
#endif
}

/**
 * get_task_cred - Get another task's objective credentials
 * @task: The task to query
 *
 * Get the objective credentials of a task, pinning them so that they can't go
 * away.  Accessing a task's credentials directly is not permitted.
 *
 * The caller must also make sure task doesn't get deleted, either by holding a
 * ref on task or by holding tasklist_lock to prevent it from being unlinked.
 */
const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *task)
{
        const struct cred *cred;

        rcu_read_lock();

        do {
                cred = __task_cred((task));
                BUG_ON(!cred);
        } while (!get_cred_rcu(cred));

        rcu_read_unlock();
        return cred;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_task_cred);

/*
 * Allocate blank credentials, such that the credentials can be filled in at a
 * later date without risk of ENOMEM.
 */
struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void)
{
        struct cred *new;

        new = kmem_cache_zalloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
        if (!new)
                return NULL;

        atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
        new->magic = CRED_MAGIC;
#endif
        if (security_cred_alloc_blank(new, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT) < 0)
                goto error;

        return new;

error:
        abort_creds(new);
        return NULL;
}

/**
 * prepare_creds - Prepare a new set of credentials for modification
 *
 * Prepare a new set of task credentials for modification.  A task's creds
 * shouldn't generally be modified directly, therefore this function is used to
 * prepare a new copy, which the caller then modifies and then commits by
 * calling commit_creds().
 *
 * Preparation involves making a copy of the objective creds for modification.
 *
 * Returns a pointer to the new creds-to-be if successful, NULL otherwise.
 *
 * Call commit_creds() or abort_creds() to clean up.
 */
struct cred *prepare_creds(void)
{
        struct task_struct *task = current;
        const struct cred *old;
        struct cred *new;

        validate_process_creds();

        new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
        if (!new)
                return NULL;

        kdebug("prepare_creds() alloc %p", new);

        old = task->cred;
        memcpy(new, old, sizeof(struct cred));

        new->non_rcu = 0;
        atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
        set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
        get_group_info(new->group_info);
        get_uid(new->user);
        get_user_ns(new->user_ns);

#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
        key_get(new->session_keyring);
        key_get(new->process_keyring);
        key_get(new->thread_keyring);
        key_get(new->request_key_auth);
#endif

#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
        new->security = NULL;
#endif

        new->ucounts = get_ucounts(new->ucounts);
        if (!new->ucounts)
                goto error;

        if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT) < 0)
                goto error;

        validate_creds(new);
        return new;

error:
        abort_creds(new);
        return NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_creds);

/*
 * Prepare credentials for current to perform an execve()
 * - The caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex
 */
struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void)
{
        struct cred *new;

        new = prepare_creds();
        if (!new)
                return new;

#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
        /* newly exec'd tasks don't get a thread keyring */
        key_put(new->thread_keyring);
        new->thread_keyring = NULL;

        /* inherit the session keyring; new process keyring */
        key_put(new->process_keyring);
        new->process_keyring = NULL;
#endif

        new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;
        new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;

        return new;
}

/*
 * Copy credentials for the new process created by fork()
 *
 * We share if we can, but under some circumstances we have to generate a new
 * set.
 *
 * The new process gets the current process's subjective credentials as its
 * objective and subjective credentials
 */
int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
{
        struct cred *new;
        int ret;

#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE
        p->cached_requested_key = NULL;
#endif

        if (
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
                !p->cred->thread_keyring &&
#endif
                clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD
            ) {
                p->real_cred = get_cred(p->cred);
                get_cred(p->cred);
                alter_cred_subscribers(p->cred, 2);
                kdebug("share_creds(%p{%d,%d})",
                       p->cred, atomic_read(&p->cred->usage),
                       read_cred_subscribers(p->cred));
                inc_rlimit_ucounts(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1);
                return 0;
        }

        new = prepare_creds();
        if (!new)
                return -ENOMEM;

        if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) {
                ret = create_user_ns(new);
                if (ret < 0)
                        goto error_put;
                ret = set_cred_ucounts(new);
                if (ret < 0)
                        goto error_put;
        }

#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
        /* new threads get their own thread keyrings if their parent already
         * had one */
        if (new->thread_keyring) {
                key_put(new->thread_keyring);
                new->thread_keyring = NULL;
                if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
                        install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
        }

        /* The process keyring is only shared between the threads in a process;
         * anything outside of those threads doesn't inherit.
         */
        if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) {
                key_put(new->process_keyring);
                new->process_keyring = NULL;
        }
#endif

        p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new);
        inc_rlimit_ucounts(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1);
        alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
        validate_creds(new);
        return 0;

error_put:
        put_cred(new);
        return ret;
}

static bool cred_cap_issubset(const struct cred *set, const struct cred *subset)
{
        const struct user_namespace *set_ns = set->user_ns;
        const struct user_namespace *subset_ns = subset->user_ns;

        /* If the two credentials are in the same user namespace see if
         * the capabilities of subset are a subset of set.
         */
        if (set_ns == subset_ns)
                return cap_issubset(subset->cap_permitted, set->cap_permitted);

        /* The credentials are in a different user namespaces
         * therefore one is a subset of the other only if a set is an
         * ancestor of subset and set->euid is owner of subset or one
         * of subsets ancestors.
         */
        for (;subset_ns != &init_user_ns; subset_ns = subset_ns->parent) {
                if ((set_ns == subset_ns->parent)  &&
                    uid_eq(subset_ns->owner, set->euid))
                        return true;
        }

        return false;
}

/**
 * commit_creds - Install new credentials upon the current task
 * @new: The credentials to be assigned
 *
 * Install a new set of credentials to the current task, using RCU to replace
 * the old set.  Both the objective and the subjective credentials pointers are
 * updated.  This function may not be called if the subjective credentials are
 * in an overridden state.
 *
 * This function eats the caller's reference to the new credentials.
 *
 * Always returns 0 thus allowing this function to be tail-called at the end
 * of, say, sys_setgid().
 */
int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
{
        struct task_struct *task = current;
        const struct cred *old = task->real_cred;

        kdebug("commit_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
               atomic_read(&new->usage),
               read_cred_subscribers(new));

        BUG_ON(task->cred != old);
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
        BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(old) < 2);
        validate_creds(old);
        validate_creds(new);
#endif
        BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);

        get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */

        /* dumpability changes */
        if (!uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) ||
            !gid_eq(old->egid, new->egid) ||
            !uid_eq(old->fsuid, new->fsuid) ||
            !gid_eq(old->fsgid, new->fsgid) ||
            !cred_cap_issubset(old, new)) {
                if (task->mm)
                        set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable);
                task->pdeath_signal = 0;
                /*
                 * If a task drops privileges and becomes nondumpable,
                 * the dumpability change must become visible before
                 * the credential change; otherwise, a __ptrace_may_access()
                 * racing with this change may be able to attach to a task it
                 * shouldn't be able to attach to (as if the task had dropped
                 * privileges without becoming nondumpable).
                 * Pairs with a read barrier in __ptrace_may_access().
                 */
                smp_wmb();
        }

        /* alter the thread keyring */
        if (!uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->fsuid))
                key_fsuid_changed(new);
        if (!gid_eq(new->fsgid, old->fsgid))
                key_fsgid_changed(new);

        /* do it
         * RLIMIT_NPROC limits on user->processes have already been checked
         * in set_user().
         */
        alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
        if (new->user != old->user || new->user_ns != old->user_ns)
                inc_rlimit_ucounts(new->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1);
        rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new);
        rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new);
        if (new->user != old->user || new->user_ns != old->user_ns)
                dec_rlimit_ucounts(old->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1);
        alter_cred_subscribers(old, -2);

        /* send notifications */
        if (!uid_eq(new->uid,   old->uid)  ||
            !uid_eq(new->euid,  old->euid) ||
            !uid_eq(new->suid,  old->suid) ||
            !uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->fsuid))
                proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_UID);

        if (!gid_eq(new->gid,   old->gid)  ||
            !gid_eq(new->egid,  old->egid) ||
            !gid_eq(new->sgid,  old->sgid) ||
            !gid_eq(new->fsgid, old->fsgid))
                proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_GID);

        /* release the old obj and subj refs both */
        put_cred(old);
        put_cred(old);
        return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(commit_creds);

/**
 * abort_creds - Discard a set of credentials and unlock the current task
 * @new: The credentials that were going to be applied
 *
 * Discard a set of credentials that were under construction and unlock the
 * current task.
 */
void abort_creds(struct cred *new)
{
        kdebug("abort_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
               atomic_read(&new->usage),
               read_cred_subscribers(new));

#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
        BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(new) != 0);
#endif
        BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
        put_cred(new);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(abort_creds);

/**
 * override_creds - Override the current process's subjective credentials
 * @new: The credentials to be assigned
 *
 * Install a set of temporary override subjective credentials on the current
 * process, returning the old set for later reversion.
 */
const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *new)
{
        const struct cred *old = current->cred;

        kdebug("override_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
               atomic_read(&new->usage),
               read_cred_subscribers(new));

        validate_creds(old);
        validate_creds(new);

        /*
         * NOTE! This uses 'get_new_cred()' rather than 'get_cred()'.
         *
         * That means that we do not clear the 'non_rcu' flag, since
         * we are only installing the cred into the thread-synchronous
         * '->cred' pointer, not the '->real_cred' pointer that is
         * visible to other threads under RCU.
         *
         * Also note that we did validate_creds() manually, not depending
         * on the validation in 'get_cred()'.
         */
        get_new_cred((struct cred *)new);
        alter_cred_subscribers(new, 1);
        rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, new);
        alter_cred_subscribers(old, -1);

        kdebug("override_creds() = %p{%d,%d}", old,
               atomic_read(&old->usage),
               read_cred_subscribers(old));
        return old;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(override_creds);

/**
 * revert_creds - Revert a temporary subjective credentials override
 * @old: The credentials to be restored
 *
 * Revert a temporary set of override subjective credentials to an old set,
 * discarding the override set.
 */
void revert_creds(const struct cred *old)
{
        const struct cred *override = current->cred;

        kdebug("revert_creds(%p{%d,%d})", old,
               atomic_read(&old->usage),
               read_cred_subscribers(old));

        validate_creds(old);
        validate_creds(override);
        alter_cred_subscribers(old, 1);
        rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, old);
        alter_cred_subscribers(override, -1);
        put_cred(override);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(revert_creds);

/**
 * cred_fscmp - Compare two credentials with respect to filesystem access.
 * @a: The first credential
 * @b: The second credential
 *
 * cred_cmp() will return zero if both credentials have the same
 * fsuid, fsgid, and supplementary groups.  That is, if they will both
 * provide the same access to files based on mode/uid/gid.
 * If the credentials are different, then either -1 or 1 will
 * be returned depending on whether @a comes before or after @b
 * respectively in an arbitrary, but stable, ordering of credentials.
 *
 * Return: -1, 0, or 1 depending on comparison
 */
int cred_fscmp(const struct cred *a, const struct cred *b)
{
        struct group_info *ga, *gb;
        int g;

        if (a == b)
                return 0;
        if (uid_lt(a->fsuid, b->fsuid))
                return -1;
        if (uid_gt(a->fsuid, b->fsuid))
                return 1;

        if (gid_lt(a->fsgid, b->fsgid))
                return -1;
        if (gid_gt(a->fsgid, b->fsgid))
                return 1;

        ga = a->group_info;
        gb = b->group_info;
        if (ga == gb)
                return 0;
        if (ga == NULL)
                return -1;
        if (gb == NULL)
                return 1;
        if (ga->ngroups < gb->ngroups)
                return -1;
        if (ga->ngroups > gb->ngroups)
                return 1;

        for (g = 0; g < ga->ngroups; g++) {
                if (gid_lt(ga->gid[g], gb->gid[g]))
                        return -1;
                if (gid_gt(ga->gid[g], gb->gid[g]))
                        return 1;
        }
        return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cred_fscmp);

int set_cred_ucounts(struct cred *new)
{
        struct ucounts *new_ucounts, *old_ucounts = new->ucounts;

        /*
         * This optimization is needed because alloc_ucounts() uses locks
         * for table lookups.
         */
        if (old_ucounts->ns == new->user_ns && uid_eq(old_ucounts->uid, new->uid))
                return 0;

        if (!(new_ucounts = alloc_ucounts(new->user_ns, new->uid)))
                return -EAGAIN;

        new->ucounts = new_ucounts;
        put_ucounts(old_ucounts);

        return 0;
}

/*
 * initialise the credentials stuff
 */
void __init cred_init(void)
{
        /* allocate a slab in which we can store credentials */
        cred_jar = kmem_cache_create("cred_jar", sizeof(struct cred), 0,
                        SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL);
}

/**
 * prepare_kernel_cred - Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service
 * @daemon: A userspace daemon to be used as a reference
 *
 * Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service.  This can then be used to
 * override a task's own credentials so that work can be done on behalf of that
 * task that requires a different subjective context.
 *
 * @daemon is used to provide a base for the security record, but can be NULL.
 * If @daemon is supplied, then the security data will be derived from that;
 * otherwise they'll be set to 0 and no groups, full capabilities and no keys.
 *
 * The caller may change these controls afterwards if desired.
 *
 * Returns the new credentials or NULL if out of memory.
 */
struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
{
        const struct cred *old;
        struct cred *new;

        new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
        if (!new)
                return NULL;

        kdebug("prepare_kernel_cred() alloc %p", new);

        if (daemon)
                old = get_task_cred(daemon);
        else
                old = get_cred(&init_cred);

        validate_creds(old);

        *new = *old;
        new->non_rcu = 0;
        atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
        set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
        get_uid(new->user);
        get_user_ns(new->user_ns);
        get_group_info(new->group_info);

#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
        new->session_keyring = NULL;
        new->process_keyring = NULL;
        new->thread_keyring = NULL;
        new->request_key_auth = NULL;
        new->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING;
#endif

#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
        new->security = NULL;
#endif
        new->ucounts = get_ucounts(new->ucounts);
        if (!new->ucounts)
                goto error;

        if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT) < 0)
                goto error;

        put_cred(old);
        validate_creds(new);
        return new;

error:
        put_cred(new);
        put_cred(old);
        return NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);

/**
 * set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
 * @new: The credentials to alter
 * @blob: The LSM security information to set
 *
 * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
 * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
 */
int set_security_override(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
        return security_kernel_act_as(new, blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);

/**
 * set_security_override_from_ctx - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
 * @new: The credentials to alter
 * @secctx: The LSM security context to generate the security ID from.
 *
 * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
 * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.  The
 * security ID is specified in string form as a security context to be
 * interpreted by the LSM.
 */
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
        struct lsmblob blob;
        int ret;

        ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &blob);
        if (ret < 0)
                return ret;

        return set_security_override(new, &blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);

/**
 * set_create_files_as - Set the LSM file create context in a set of credentials
 * @new: The credentials to alter
 * @inode: The inode to take the context from
 *
 * Change the LSM file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same
 * as the object context of the specified inode, so that the new inodes have
 * the same MAC context as that inode.
 */
int set_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
{
        if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid))
                return -EINVAL;
        new->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
        new->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
        return security_kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_create_files_as);

#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS

bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred)
{
        if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC)
                return true;
        return false;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(creds_are_invalid);

/*
 * dump invalid credentials
 */
static void dump_invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *label,
                               const struct task_struct *tsk)
{
        printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: %s credentials: %p %s%s%s\n",
               label, cred,
               cred == &init_cred ? "[init]" : "",
               cred == tsk->real_cred ? "[real]" : "",
               cred == tsk->cred ? "[eff]" : "");
        printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->magic=%x, put_addr=%p\n",
               cred->magic, cred->put_addr);
        printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->usage=%d, subscr=%d\n",
               atomic_read(&cred->usage),
               read_cred_subscribers(cred));
        printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->*uid = { %d,%d,%d,%d }\n",
                from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->uid),
                from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->euid),
                from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->suid),
                from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid));
        printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->*gid = { %d,%d,%d,%d }\n",
                from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->gid),
                from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->egid),
                from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->sgid),
                from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid));
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
        printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->security is %p\n", cred->security);
        if ((unsigned long) cred->security >= PAGE_SIZE &&
            (((unsigned long) cred->security & 0xffffff00) !=
             (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8)))
                printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->security {%x, %x}\n",
                       ((u32*)cred->security)[0],
                       ((u32*)cred->security)[1]);
#endif
}

/*
 * report use of invalid credentials
 */
void __invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *file, unsigned line)
{
        printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid credentials\n");
        printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u\n", file, line);
        dump_invalid_creds(cred, "Specified", current);
        BUG();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__invalid_creds);

/*
 * check the credentials on a process
 */
void __validate_process_creds(struct task_struct *tsk,
                              const char *file, unsigned line)
{
        if (tsk->cred == tsk->real_cred) {
                if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 2 ||
                             creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred)))
                        goto invalid_creds;
        } else {
                if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->real_cred) < 1 ||
                             read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 1 ||
                             creds_are_invalid(tsk->real_cred) ||
                             creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred)))
                        goto invalid_creds;
        }
        return;

invalid_creds:
        printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid process credentials\n");
        printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u\n", file, line);

        dump_invalid_creds(tsk->real_cred, "Real", tsk);
        if (tsk->cred != tsk->real_cred)
                dump_invalid_creds(tsk->cred, "Effective", tsk);
        else
                printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Effective creds == Real creds\n");
        BUG();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__validate_process_creds);

/*
 * check creds for do_exit()
 */
void validate_creds_for_do_exit(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
        kdebug("validate_creds_for_do_exit(%p,%p{%d,%d})",
               tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred,
               atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage),
               read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred));

        __validate_process_creds(tsk, __FILE__, __LINE__);
}

#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS */