2 * linux/kernel/seccomp.c
4 * Copyright 2004-2005 Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com>
6 * Copyright (C) 2012 Google, Inc.
7 * Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
9 * This defines a simple but solid secure-computing facility.
11 * Mode 1 uses a fixed list of allowed system calls.
12 * Mode 2 allows user-defined system call filters in the form
13 * of Berkeley Packet Filters/Linux Socket Filters.
16 #include <linux/refcount.h>
17 #include <linux/audit.h>
18 #include <linux/compat.h>
19 #include <linux/coredump.h>
20 #include <linux/sched.h>
21 #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
22 #include <linux/seccomp.h>
23 #include <linux/slab.h>
24 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
26 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
27 #include <asm/syscall.h>
30 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
31 #include <linux/filter.h>
32 #include <linux/pid.h>
33 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
34 #include <linux/security.h>
35 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
36 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
39 * struct seccomp_filter - container for seccomp BPF programs
41 * @usage: reference count to manage the object lifetime.
42 * get/put helpers should be used when accessing an instance
43 * outside of a lifetime-guarded section. In general, this
44 * is only needed for handling filters shared across tasks.
45 * @prev: points to a previously installed, or inherited, filter
46 * @prog: the BPF program to evaluate
48 * seccomp_filter objects are organized in a tree linked via the @prev
49 * pointer. For any task, it appears to be a singly-linked list starting
50 * with current->seccomp.filter, the most recently attached or inherited filter.
51 * However, multiple filters may share a @prev node, by way of fork(), which
52 * results in a unidirectional tree existing in memory. This is similar to
53 * how namespaces work.
55 * seccomp_filter objects should never be modified after being attached
56 * to a task_struct (other than @usage).
58 struct seccomp_filter
{
60 struct seccomp_filter
*prev
;
61 struct bpf_prog
*prog
;
64 /* Limit any path through the tree to 256KB worth of instructions. */
65 #define MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH ((1 << 18) / sizeof(struct sock_filter))
68 * Endianness is explicitly ignored and left for BPF program authors to manage
69 * as per the specific architecture.
71 static void populate_seccomp_data(struct seccomp_data
*sd
)
73 struct task_struct
*task
= current
;
74 struct pt_regs
*regs
= task_pt_regs(task
);
75 unsigned long args
[6];
77 sd
->nr
= syscall_get_nr(task
, regs
);
78 sd
->arch
= syscall_get_arch();
79 syscall_get_arguments(task
, regs
, 0, 6, args
);
80 sd
->args
[0] = args
[0];
81 sd
->args
[1] = args
[1];
82 sd
->args
[2] = args
[2];
83 sd
->args
[3] = args
[3];
84 sd
->args
[4] = args
[4];
85 sd
->args
[5] = args
[5];
86 sd
->instruction_pointer
= KSTK_EIP(task
);
90 * seccomp_check_filter - verify seccomp filter code
91 * @filter: filter to verify
92 * @flen: length of filter
94 * Takes a previously checked filter (by bpf_check_classic) and
95 * redirects all filter code that loads struct sk_buff data
96 * and related data through seccomp_bpf_load. It also
97 * enforces length and alignment checking of those loads.
99 * Returns 0 if the rule set is legal or -EINVAL if not.
101 static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter
*filter
, unsigned int flen
)
104 for (pc
= 0; pc
< flen
; pc
++) {
105 struct sock_filter
*ftest
= &filter
[pc
];
106 u16 code
= ftest
->code
;
110 case BPF_LD
| BPF_W
| BPF_ABS
:
111 ftest
->code
= BPF_LDX
| BPF_W
| BPF_ABS
;
112 /* 32-bit aligned and not out of bounds. */
113 if (k
>= sizeof(struct seccomp_data
) || k
& 3)
116 case BPF_LD
| BPF_W
| BPF_LEN
:
117 ftest
->code
= BPF_LD
| BPF_IMM
;
118 ftest
->k
= sizeof(struct seccomp_data
);
120 case BPF_LDX
| BPF_W
| BPF_LEN
:
121 ftest
->code
= BPF_LDX
| BPF_IMM
;
122 ftest
->k
= sizeof(struct seccomp_data
);
124 /* Explicitly include allowed calls. */
125 case BPF_RET
| BPF_K
:
126 case BPF_RET
| BPF_A
:
127 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_ADD
| BPF_K
:
128 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_ADD
| BPF_X
:
129 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_SUB
| BPF_K
:
130 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_SUB
| BPF_X
:
131 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_MUL
| BPF_K
:
132 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_MUL
| BPF_X
:
133 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_DIV
| BPF_K
:
134 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_DIV
| BPF_X
:
135 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_AND
| BPF_K
:
136 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_AND
| BPF_X
:
137 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_OR
| BPF_K
:
138 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_OR
| BPF_X
:
139 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_XOR
| BPF_K
:
140 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_XOR
| BPF_X
:
141 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_LSH
| BPF_K
:
142 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_LSH
| BPF_X
:
143 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_RSH
| BPF_K
:
144 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_RSH
| BPF_X
:
145 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_NEG
:
146 case BPF_LD
| BPF_IMM
:
147 case BPF_LDX
| BPF_IMM
:
148 case BPF_MISC
| BPF_TAX
:
149 case BPF_MISC
| BPF_TXA
:
150 case BPF_LD
| BPF_MEM
:
151 case BPF_LDX
| BPF_MEM
:
154 case BPF_JMP
| BPF_JA
:
155 case BPF_JMP
| BPF_JEQ
| BPF_K
:
156 case BPF_JMP
| BPF_JEQ
| BPF_X
:
157 case BPF_JMP
| BPF_JGE
| BPF_K
:
158 case BPF_JMP
| BPF_JGE
| BPF_X
:
159 case BPF_JMP
| BPF_JGT
| BPF_K
:
160 case BPF_JMP
| BPF_JGT
| BPF_X
:
161 case BPF_JMP
| BPF_JSET
| BPF_K
:
162 case BPF_JMP
| BPF_JSET
| BPF_X
:
172 * seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @sd
173 * @sd: optional seccomp data to be passed to filters
174 * @match: stores struct seccomp_filter that resulted in the return value,
175 * unless filter returned SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, in which case it will
178 * Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes.
180 static u32
seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data
*sd
,
181 struct seccomp_filter
**match
)
183 struct seccomp_data sd_local
;
184 u32 ret
= SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW
;
185 /* Make sure cross-thread synced filter points somewhere sane. */
186 struct seccomp_filter
*f
=
187 lockless_dereference(current
->seccomp
.filter
);
189 /* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
190 if (unlikely(WARN_ON(f
== NULL
)))
191 return SECCOMP_RET_KILL
;
194 populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local
);
199 * All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return
200 * value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA).
202 for (; f
; f
= f
->prev
) {
203 u32 cur_ret
= BPF_PROG_RUN(f
->prog
, sd
);
205 if ((cur_ret
& SECCOMP_RET_ACTION
) < (ret
& SECCOMP_RET_ACTION
)) {
212 #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
214 static inline bool seccomp_may_assign_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode
)
216 assert_spin_locked(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
218 if (current
->seccomp
.mode
&& current
->seccomp
.mode
!= seccomp_mode
)
224 static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct
*task
,
225 unsigned long seccomp_mode
)
227 assert_spin_locked(&task
->sighand
->siglock
);
229 task
->seccomp
.mode
= seccomp_mode
;
231 * Make sure TIF_SECCOMP cannot be set before the mode (and
234 smp_mb__before_atomic();
235 set_tsk_thread_flag(task
, TIF_SECCOMP
);
238 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
239 /* Returns 1 if the parent is an ancestor of the child. */
240 static int is_ancestor(struct seccomp_filter
*parent
,
241 struct seccomp_filter
*child
)
243 /* NULL is the root ancestor. */
246 for (; child
; child
= child
->prev
)
253 * seccomp_can_sync_threads: checks if all threads can be synchronized
255 * Expects sighand and cred_guard_mutex locks to be held.
257 * Returns 0 on success, -ve on error, or the pid of a thread which was
258 * either not in the correct seccomp mode or it did not have an ancestral
261 static inline pid_t
seccomp_can_sync_threads(void)
263 struct task_struct
*thread
, *caller
;
265 BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(¤t
->signal
->cred_guard_mutex
));
266 assert_spin_locked(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
268 /* Validate all threads being eligible for synchronization. */
270 for_each_thread(caller
, thread
) {
273 /* Skip current, since it is initiating the sync. */
274 if (thread
== caller
)
277 if (thread
->seccomp
.mode
== SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED
||
278 (thread
->seccomp
.mode
== SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
&&
279 is_ancestor(thread
->seccomp
.filter
,
280 caller
->seccomp
.filter
)))
283 /* Return the first thread that cannot be synchronized. */
284 failed
= task_pid_vnr(thread
);
285 /* If the pid cannot be resolved, then return -ESRCH */
286 if (unlikely(WARN_ON(failed
== 0)))
295 * seccomp_sync_threads: sets all threads to use current's filter
297 * Expects sighand and cred_guard_mutex locks to be held, and for
298 * seccomp_can_sync_threads() to have returned success already
299 * without dropping the locks.
302 static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(void)
304 struct task_struct
*thread
, *caller
;
306 BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(¤t
->signal
->cred_guard_mutex
));
307 assert_spin_locked(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
309 /* Synchronize all threads. */
311 for_each_thread(caller
, thread
) {
312 /* Skip current, since it needs no changes. */
313 if (thread
== caller
)
316 /* Get a task reference for the new leaf node. */
317 get_seccomp_filter(caller
);
319 * Drop the task reference to the shared ancestor since
320 * current's path will hold a reference. (This also
321 * allows a put before the assignment.)
323 put_seccomp_filter(thread
);
324 smp_store_release(&thread
->seccomp
.filter
,
325 caller
->seccomp
.filter
);
328 * Don't let an unprivileged task work around
329 * the no_new_privs restriction by creating
330 * a thread that sets it up, enters seccomp,
333 if (task_no_new_privs(caller
))
334 task_set_no_new_privs(thread
);
337 * Opt the other thread into seccomp if needed.
338 * As threads are considered to be trust-realm
339 * equivalent (see ptrace_may_access), it is safe to
340 * allow one thread to transition the other.
342 if (thread
->seccomp
.mode
== SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED
)
343 seccomp_assign_mode(thread
, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
);
348 * seccomp_prepare_filter: Prepares a seccomp filter for use.
349 * @fprog: BPF program to install
351 * Returns filter on success or an ERR_PTR on failure.
353 static struct seccomp_filter
*seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog
*fprog
)
355 struct seccomp_filter
*sfilter
;
357 const bool save_orig
= IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
);
359 if (fprog
->len
== 0 || fprog
->len
> BPF_MAXINSNS
)
360 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL
);
362 BUG_ON(INT_MAX
/ fprog
->len
< sizeof(struct sock_filter
));
365 * Installing a seccomp filter requires that the task has
366 * CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace or be running with no_new_privs.
367 * This avoids scenarios where unprivileged tasks can affect the
368 * behavior of privileged children.
370 if (!task_no_new_privs(current
) &&
371 security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
373 return ERR_PTR(-EACCES
);
375 /* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */
376 sfilter
= kzalloc(sizeof(*sfilter
), GFP_KERNEL
| __GFP_NOWARN
);
378 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM
);
380 ret
= bpf_prog_create_from_user(&sfilter
->prog
, fprog
,
381 seccomp_check_filter
, save_orig
);
387 refcount_set(&sfilter
->usage
, 1);
393 * seccomp_prepare_user_filter - prepares a user-supplied sock_fprog
394 * @user_filter: pointer to the user data containing a sock_fprog.
396 * Returns 0 on success and non-zero otherwise.
398 static struct seccomp_filter
*
399 seccomp_prepare_user_filter(const char __user
*user_filter
)
401 struct sock_fprog fprog
;
402 struct seccomp_filter
*filter
= ERR_PTR(-EFAULT
);
405 if (in_compat_syscall()) {
406 struct compat_sock_fprog fprog32
;
407 if (copy_from_user(&fprog32
, user_filter
, sizeof(fprog32
)))
409 fprog
.len
= fprog32
.len
;
410 fprog
.filter
= compat_ptr(fprog32
.filter
);
411 } else /* falls through to the if below. */
413 if (copy_from_user(&fprog
, user_filter
, sizeof(fprog
)))
415 filter
= seccomp_prepare_filter(&fprog
);
421 * seccomp_attach_filter: validate and attach filter
422 * @flags: flags to change filter behavior
423 * @filter: seccomp filter to add to the current process
425 * Caller must be holding current->sighand->siglock lock.
427 * Returns 0 on success, -ve on error.
429 static long seccomp_attach_filter(unsigned int flags
,
430 struct seccomp_filter
*filter
)
432 unsigned long total_insns
;
433 struct seccomp_filter
*walker
;
435 assert_spin_locked(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
437 /* Validate resulting filter length. */
438 total_insns
= filter
->prog
->len
;
439 for (walker
= current
->seccomp
.filter
; walker
; walker
= walker
->prev
)
440 total_insns
+= walker
->prog
->len
+ 4; /* 4 instr penalty */
441 if (total_insns
> MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH
)
444 /* If thread sync has been requested, check that it is possible. */
445 if (flags
& SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
) {
448 ret
= seccomp_can_sync_threads();
454 * If there is an existing filter, make it the prev and don't drop its
457 filter
->prev
= current
->seccomp
.filter
;
458 current
->seccomp
.filter
= filter
;
460 /* Now that the new filter is in place, synchronize to all threads. */
461 if (flags
& SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
)
462 seccomp_sync_threads();
467 /* get_seccomp_filter - increments the reference count of the filter on @tsk */
468 void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
470 struct seccomp_filter
*orig
= tsk
->seccomp
.filter
;
473 /* Reference count is bounded by the number of total processes. */
474 refcount_inc(&orig
->usage
);
477 static inline void seccomp_filter_free(struct seccomp_filter
*filter
)
480 bpf_prog_destroy(filter
->prog
);
485 /* put_seccomp_filter - decrements the ref count of tsk->seccomp.filter */
486 void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
488 struct seccomp_filter
*orig
= tsk
->seccomp
.filter
;
489 /* Clean up single-reference branches iteratively. */
490 while (orig
&& refcount_dec_and_test(&orig
->usage
)) {
491 struct seccomp_filter
*freeme
= orig
;
493 seccomp_filter_free(freeme
);
497 static void seccomp_init_siginfo(siginfo_t
*info
, int syscall
, int reason
)
499 memset(info
, 0, sizeof(*info
));
500 info
->si_signo
= SIGSYS
;
501 info
->si_code
= SYS_SECCOMP
;
502 info
->si_call_addr
= (void __user
*)KSTK_EIP(current
);
503 info
->si_errno
= reason
;
504 info
->si_arch
= syscall_get_arch();
505 info
->si_syscall
= syscall
;
509 * seccomp_send_sigsys - signals the task to allow in-process syscall emulation
510 * @syscall: syscall number to send to userland
511 * @reason: filter-supplied reason code to send to userland (via si_errno)
513 * Forces a SIGSYS with a code of SYS_SECCOMP and related sigsys info.
515 static void seccomp_send_sigsys(int syscall
, int reason
)
518 seccomp_init_siginfo(&info
, syscall
, reason
);
519 force_sig_info(SIGSYS
, &info
, current
);
521 #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
524 * Secure computing mode 1 allows only read/write/exit/sigreturn.
525 * To be fully secure this must be combined with rlimit
526 * to limit the stack allocations too.
528 static const int mode1_syscalls
[] = {
529 __NR_seccomp_read
, __NR_seccomp_write
, __NR_seccomp_exit
, __NR_seccomp_sigreturn
,
530 0, /* null terminated */
533 static void __secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall
)
535 const int *syscall_whitelist
= mode1_syscalls
;
537 if (in_compat_syscall())
538 syscall_whitelist
= get_compat_mode1_syscalls();
541 if (*syscall_whitelist
== this_syscall
)
543 } while (*++syscall_whitelist
);
548 audit_seccomp(this_syscall
, SIGKILL
, SECCOMP_RET_KILL
);
552 #ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
553 void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall
)
555 int mode
= current
->seccomp
.mode
;
557 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
) &&
558 unlikely(current
->ptrace
& PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP
))
561 if (mode
== SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED
)
563 else if (mode
== SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT
)
564 __secure_computing_strict(this_syscall
);
570 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
571 static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall
, const struct seccomp_data
*sd
,
572 const bool recheck_after_trace
)
574 u32 filter_ret
, action
;
575 struct seccomp_filter
*match
= NULL
;
579 * Make sure that any changes to mode from another thread have
580 * been seen after TIF_SECCOMP was seen.
584 filter_ret
= seccomp_run_filters(sd
, &match
);
585 data
= filter_ret
& SECCOMP_RET_DATA
;
586 action
= filter_ret
& SECCOMP_RET_ACTION
;
589 case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO
:
590 /* Set low-order bits as an errno, capped at MAX_ERRNO. */
591 if (data
> MAX_ERRNO
)
593 syscall_set_return_value(current
, task_pt_regs(current
),
597 case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
:
598 /* Show the handler the original registers. */
599 syscall_rollback(current
, task_pt_regs(current
));
600 /* Let the filter pass back 16 bits of data. */
601 seccomp_send_sigsys(this_syscall
, data
);
604 case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE
:
605 /* We've been put in this state by the ptracer already. */
606 if (recheck_after_trace
)
609 /* ENOSYS these calls if there is no tracer attached. */
610 if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current
, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP
)) {
611 syscall_set_return_value(current
,
612 task_pt_regs(current
),
617 /* Allow the BPF to provide the event message */
618 ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP
, data
);
620 * The delivery of a fatal signal during event
621 * notification may silently skip tracer notification,
622 * which could leave us with a potentially unmodified
623 * syscall that the tracer would have liked to have
624 * changed. Since the process is about to die, we just
625 * force the syscall to be skipped and let the signal
626 * kill the process and correctly handle any tracer exit
629 if (fatal_signal_pending(current
))
631 /* Check if the tracer forced the syscall to be skipped. */
632 this_syscall
= syscall_get_nr(current
, task_pt_regs(current
));
633 if (this_syscall
< 0)
637 * Recheck the syscall, since it may have changed. This
638 * intentionally uses a NULL struct seccomp_data to force
639 * a reload of all registers. This does not goto skip since
640 * a skip would have already been reported.
642 if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall
, NULL
, true))
647 case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW
:
649 * Note that the "match" filter will always be NULL for
650 * this action since SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW is the starting
651 * state in seccomp_run_filters().
655 case SECCOMP_RET_KILL
:
657 audit_seccomp(this_syscall
, SIGSYS
, action
);
658 /* Dump core only if this is the last remaining thread. */
659 if (get_nr_threads(current
) == 1) {
662 /* Show the original registers in the dump. */
663 syscall_rollback(current
, task_pt_regs(current
));
664 /* Trigger a manual coredump since do_exit skips it. */
665 seccomp_init_siginfo(&info
, this_syscall
, data
);
674 audit_seccomp(this_syscall
, 0, action
);
678 static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall
, const struct seccomp_data
*sd
,
679 const bool recheck_after_trace
)
685 int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data
*sd
)
687 int mode
= current
->seccomp
.mode
;
690 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
) &&
691 unlikely(current
->ptrace
& PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP
))
694 this_syscall
= sd
? sd
->nr
:
695 syscall_get_nr(current
, task_pt_regs(current
));
698 case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT
:
699 __secure_computing_strict(this_syscall
); /* may call do_exit */
701 case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
:
702 return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall
, sd
, false);
707 #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER */
709 long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
711 return current
->seccomp
.mode
;
715 * seccomp_set_mode_strict: internal function for setting strict seccomp
717 * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
719 * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
721 static long seccomp_set_mode_strict(void)
723 const unsigned long seccomp_mode
= SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT
;
726 spin_lock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
728 if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode
))
734 seccomp_assign_mode(current
, seccomp_mode
);
738 spin_unlock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
743 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
745 * seccomp_set_mode_filter: internal function for setting seccomp filter
746 * @flags: flags to change filter behavior
747 * @filter: struct sock_fprog containing filter
749 * This function may be called repeatedly to install additional filters.
750 * Every filter successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order)
751 * for each system call the task makes.
753 * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
755 * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
757 static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags
,
758 const char __user
*filter
)
760 const unsigned long seccomp_mode
= SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
;
761 struct seccomp_filter
*prepared
= NULL
;
764 /* Validate flags. */
765 if (flags
& ~SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK
)
768 /* Prepare the new filter before holding any locks. */
769 prepared
= seccomp_prepare_user_filter(filter
);
770 if (IS_ERR(prepared
))
771 return PTR_ERR(prepared
);
774 * Make sure we cannot change seccomp or nnp state via TSYNC
775 * while another thread is in the middle of calling exec.
777 if (flags
& SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
&&
778 mutex_lock_killable(¤t
->signal
->cred_guard_mutex
))
781 spin_lock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
783 if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode
))
786 ret
= seccomp_attach_filter(flags
, prepared
);
789 /* Do not free the successfully attached filter. */
792 seccomp_assign_mode(current
, seccomp_mode
);
794 spin_unlock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
795 if (flags
& SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
)
796 mutex_unlock(¤t
->signal
->cred_guard_mutex
);
798 seccomp_filter_free(prepared
);
802 static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags
,
803 const char __user
*filter
)
809 /* Common entry point for both prctl and syscall. */
810 static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op
, unsigned int flags
,
811 const char __user
*uargs
)
814 case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT
:
815 if (flags
!= 0 || uargs
!= NULL
)
817 return seccomp_set_mode_strict();
818 case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER
:
819 return seccomp_set_mode_filter(flags
, uargs
);
825 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(seccomp
, unsigned int, op
, unsigned int, flags
,
826 const char __user
*, uargs
)
828 return do_seccomp(op
, flags
, uargs
);
832 * prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode
833 * @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use
834 * @filter: optional struct sock_fprog for use with SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
836 * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
838 long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode
, char __user
*filter
)
843 switch (seccomp_mode
) {
844 case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT
:
845 op
= SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT
;
847 * Setting strict mode through prctl always ignored filter,
848 * so make sure it is always NULL here to pass the internal
849 * check in do_seccomp().
853 case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
:
854 op
= SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER
;
861 /* prctl interface doesn't have flags, so they are always zero. */
862 return do_seccomp(op
, 0, uargs
);
865 #if defined(CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER) && defined(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE)
866 long seccomp_get_filter(struct task_struct
*task
, unsigned long filter_off
,
869 struct seccomp_filter
*filter
;
870 struct sock_fprog_kern
*fprog
;
872 unsigned long count
= 0;
874 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
) ||
875 current
->seccomp
.mode
!= SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED
) {
879 spin_lock_irq(&task
->sighand
->siglock
);
880 if (task
->seccomp
.mode
!= SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
) {
885 filter
= task
->seccomp
.filter
;
887 filter
= filter
->prev
;
891 if (filter_off
>= count
) {
897 filter
= task
->seccomp
.filter
;
898 while (filter
&& count
> 1) {
899 filter
= filter
->prev
;
903 if (WARN_ON(count
!= 1 || !filter
)) {
904 /* The filter tree shouldn't shrink while we're using it. */
909 fprog
= filter
->prog
->orig_prog
;
911 /* This must be a new non-cBPF filter, since we save
912 * every cBPF filter's orig_prog above when
913 * CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is enabled.
923 get_seccomp_filter(task
);
924 spin_unlock_irq(&task
->sighand
->siglock
);
926 if (copy_to_user(data
, fprog
->filter
, bpf_classic_proglen(fprog
)))
929 put_seccomp_filter(task
);
933 spin_unlock_irq(&task
->sighand
->siglock
);