1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
3 * linux/kernel/seccomp.c
5 * Copyright 2004-2005 Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com>
7 * Copyright (C) 2012 Google, Inc.
8 * Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
10 * This defines a simple but solid secure-computing facility.
12 * Mode 1 uses a fixed list of allowed system calls.
13 * Mode 2 allows user-defined system call filters in the form
14 * of Berkeley Packet Filters/Linux Socket Filters.
16 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "seccomp: " fmt
18 #include <linux/refcount.h>
19 #include <linux/audit.h>
20 #include <linux/compat.h>
21 #include <linux/coredump.h>
22 #include <linux/kmemleak.h>
23 #include <linux/nospec.h>
24 #include <linux/prctl.h>
25 #include <linux/sched.h>
26 #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
27 #include <linux/seccomp.h>
28 #include <linux/slab.h>
29 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
30 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
32 /* Not exposed in headers: strictly internal use only. */
33 #define SECCOMP_MODE_DEAD (SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER + 1)
35 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
36 #include <asm/syscall.h>
39 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
40 #include <linux/file.h>
41 #include <linux/filter.h>
42 #include <linux/pid.h>
43 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
44 #include <linux/capability.h>
45 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
46 #include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
47 #include <linux/lockdep.h>
50 * When SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID was first introduced, it had the
51 * wrong direction flag in the ioctl number. This is the broken one,
52 * which the kernel needs to keep supporting until all userspaces stop
53 * using the wrong command number.
55 #define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID_WRONG_DIR SECCOMP_IOR(2, __u64)
60 SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED
,
63 struct seccomp_knotif
{
64 /* The struct pid of the task whose filter triggered the notification */
65 struct task_struct
*task
;
67 /* The "cookie" for this request; this is unique for this filter. */
71 * The seccomp data. This pointer is valid the entire time this
72 * notification is active, since it comes from __seccomp_filter which
73 * eclipses the entire lifecycle here.
75 const struct seccomp_data
*data
;
78 * Notification states. When SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF is returned, a
79 * struct seccomp_knotif is created and starts out in INIT. Once the
80 * handler reads the notification off of an FD, it transitions to SENT.
81 * If a signal is received the state transitions back to INIT and
82 * another message is sent. When the userspace handler replies, state
83 * transitions to REPLIED.
85 enum notify_state state
;
87 /* The return values, only valid when in SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED */
93 * Signals when this has changed states, such as the listener
94 * dying, a new seccomp addfd message, or changing to REPLIED
96 struct completion ready
;
98 struct list_head list
;
100 /* outstanding addfd requests */
101 struct list_head addfd
;
105 * struct seccomp_kaddfd - container for seccomp_addfd ioctl messages
107 * @file: A reference to the file to install in the other task
108 * @fd: The fd number to install it at. If the fd number is -1, it means the
109 * installing process should allocate the fd as normal.
110 * @flags: The flags for the new file descriptor. At the moment, only O_CLOEXEC
112 * @ioctl_flags: The flags used for the seccomp_addfd ioctl.
113 * @ret: The return value of the installing process. It is set to the fd num
114 * upon success (>= 0).
115 * @completion: Indicates that the installing process has completed fd
116 * installation, or gone away (either due to successful
120 struct seccomp_kaddfd
{
128 /* To only be set on reply */
131 struct completion completion
;
132 struct list_head list
;
136 * struct notification - container for seccomp userspace notifications. Since
137 * most seccomp filters will not have notification listeners attached and this
138 * structure is fairly large, we store the notification-specific stuff in a
139 * separate structure.
141 * @request: A semaphore that users of this notification can wait on for
142 * changes. Actual reads and writes are still controlled with
143 * filter->notify_lock.
144 * @next_id: The id of the next request.
145 * @notifications: A list of struct seccomp_knotif elements.
147 struct notification
{
148 struct semaphore request
;
150 struct list_head notifications
;
153 #ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE
155 * struct action_cache - per-filter cache of seccomp actions per
158 * @allow_native: A bitmap where each bit represents whether the
159 * filter will always allow the syscall, for the
160 * native architecture.
161 * @allow_compat: A bitmap where each bit represents whether the
162 * filter will always allow the syscall, for the
163 * compat architecture.
165 struct action_cache
{
166 DECLARE_BITMAP(allow_native
, SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR
);
167 #ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT
168 DECLARE_BITMAP(allow_compat
, SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR
);
172 struct action_cache
{ };
174 static inline bool seccomp_cache_check_allow(const struct seccomp_filter
*sfilter
,
175 const struct seccomp_data
*sd
)
180 static inline void seccomp_cache_prepare(struct seccomp_filter
*sfilter
)
183 #endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE */
186 * struct seccomp_filter - container for seccomp BPF programs
188 * @refs: Reference count to manage the object lifetime.
189 * A filter's reference count is incremented for each directly
190 * attached task, once for the dependent filter, and if
191 * requested for the user notifier. When @refs reaches zero,
192 * the filter can be freed.
193 * @users: A filter's @users count is incremented for each directly
194 * attached task (filter installation, fork(), thread_sync),
195 * and once for the dependent filter (tracked in filter->prev).
196 * When it reaches zero it indicates that no direct or indirect
197 * users of that filter exist. No new tasks can get associated with
198 * this filter after reaching 0. The @users count is always smaller
199 * or equal to @refs. Hence, reaching 0 for @users does not mean
200 * the filter can be freed.
201 * @cache: cache of arch/syscall mappings to actions
202 * @log: true if all actions except for SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW should be logged
203 * @wait_killable_recv: Put notifying process in killable state once the
204 * notification is received by the userspace listener.
205 * @prev: points to a previously installed, or inherited, filter
206 * @prog: the BPF program to evaluate
207 * @notif: the struct that holds all notification related information
208 * @notify_lock: A lock for all notification-related accesses.
209 * @wqh: A wait queue for poll if a notifier is in use.
211 * seccomp_filter objects are organized in a tree linked via the @prev
212 * pointer. For any task, it appears to be a singly-linked list starting
213 * with current->seccomp.filter, the most recently attached or inherited filter.
214 * However, multiple filters may share a @prev node, by way of fork(), which
215 * results in a unidirectional tree existing in memory. This is similar to
216 * how namespaces work.
218 * seccomp_filter objects should never be modified after being attached
219 * to a task_struct (other than @refs).
221 struct seccomp_filter
{
225 bool wait_killable_recv
;
226 struct action_cache cache
;
227 struct seccomp_filter
*prev
;
228 struct bpf_prog
*prog
;
229 struct notification
*notif
;
230 struct mutex notify_lock
;
231 wait_queue_head_t wqh
;
234 /* Limit any path through the tree to 256KB worth of instructions. */
235 #define MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH ((1 << 18) / sizeof(struct sock_filter))
238 * Endianness is explicitly ignored and left for BPF program authors to manage
239 * as per the specific architecture.
241 static void populate_seccomp_data(struct seccomp_data
*sd
)
244 * Instead of using current_pt_reg(), we're already doing the work
245 * to safely fetch "current", so just use "task" everywhere below.
247 struct task_struct
*task
= current
;
248 struct pt_regs
*regs
= task_pt_regs(task
);
249 unsigned long args
[6];
251 sd
->nr
= syscall_get_nr(task
, regs
);
252 sd
->arch
= syscall_get_arch(task
);
253 syscall_get_arguments(task
, regs
, args
);
254 sd
->args
[0] = args
[0];
255 sd
->args
[1] = args
[1];
256 sd
->args
[2] = args
[2];
257 sd
->args
[3] = args
[3];
258 sd
->args
[4] = args
[4];
259 sd
->args
[5] = args
[5];
260 sd
->instruction_pointer
= KSTK_EIP(task
);
264 * seccomp_check_filter - verify seccomp filter code
265 * @filter: filter to verify
266 * @flen: length of filter
268 * Takes a previously checked filter (by bpf_check_classic) and
269 * redirects all filter code that loads struct sk_buff data
270 * and related data through seccomp_bpf_load. It also
271 * enforces length and alignment checking of those loads.
273 * Returns 0 if the rule set is legal or -EINVAL if not.
275 static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter
*filter
, unsigned int flen
)
278 for (pc
= 0; pc
< flen
; pc
++) {
279 struct sock_filter
*ftest
= &filter
[pc
];
280 u16 code
= ftest
->code
;
284 case BPF_LD
| BPF_W
| BPF_ABS
:
285 ftest
->code
= BPF_LDX
| BPF_W
| BPF_ABS
;
286 /* 32-bit aligned and not out of bounds. */
287 if (k
>= sizeof(struct seccomp_data
) || k
& 3)
290 case BPF_LD
| BPF_W
| BPF_LEN
:
291 ftest
->code
= BPF_LD
| BPF_IMM
;
292 ftest
->k
= sizeof(struct seccomp_data
);
294 case BPF_LDX
| BPF_W
| BPF_LEN
:
295 ftest
->code
= BPF_LDX
| BPF_IMM
;
296 ftest
->k
= sizeof(struct seccomp_data
);
298 /* Explicitly include allowed calls. */
299 case BPF_RET
| BPF_K
:
300 case BPF_RET
| BPF_A
:
301 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_ADD
| BPF_K
:
302 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_ADD
| BPF_X
:
303 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_SUB
| BPF_K
:
304 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_SUB
| BPF_X
:
305 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_MUL
| BPF_K
:
306 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_MUL
| BPF_X
:
307 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_DIV
| BPF_K
:
308 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_DIV
| BPF_X
:
309 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_AND
| BPF_K
:
310 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_AND
| BPF_X
:
311 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_OR
| BPF_K
:
312 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_OR
| BPF_X
:
313 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_XOR
| BPF_K
:
314 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_XOR
| BPF_X
:
315 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_LSH
| BPF_K
:
316 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_LSH
| BPF_X
:
317 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_RSH
| BPF_K
:
318 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_RSH
| BPF_X
:
319 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_NEG
:
320 case BPF_LD
| BPF_IMM
:
321 case BPF_LDX
| BPF_IMM
:
322 case BPF_MISC
| BPF_TAX
:
323 case BPF_MISC
| BPF_TXA
:
324 case BPF_LD
| BPF_MEM
:
325 case BPF_LDX
| BPF_MEM
:
328 case BPF_JMP
| BPF_JA
:
329 case BPF_JMP
| BPF_JEQ
| BPF_K
:
330 case BPF_JMP
| BPF_JEQ
| BPF_X
:
331 case BPF_JMP
| BPF_JGE
| BPF_K
:
332 case BPF_JMP
| BPF_JGE
| BPF_X
:
333 case BPF_JMP
| BPF_JGT
| BPF_K
:
334 case BPF_JMP
| BPF_JGT
| BPF_X
:
335 case BPF_JMP
| BPF_JSET
| BPF_K
:
336 case BPF_JMP
| BPF_JSET
| BPF_X
:
345 #ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE
346 static inline bool seccomp_cache_check_allow_bitmap(const void *bitmap
,
350 if (unlikely(syscall_nr
< 0 || syscall_nr
>= bitmap_size
))
352 syscall_nr
= array_index_nospec(syscall_nr
, bitmap_size
);
354 return test_bit(syscall_nr
, bitmap
);
358 * seccomp_cache_check_allow - lookup seccomp cache
359 * @sfilter: The seccomp filter
360 * @sd: The seccomp data to lookup the cache with
362 * Returns true if the seccomp_data is cached and allowed.
364 static inline bool seccomp_cache_check_allow(const struct seccomp_filter
*sfilter
,
365 const struct seccomp_data
*sd
)
367 int syscall_nr
= sd
->nr
;
368 const struct action_cache
*cache
= &sfilter
->cache
;
370 #ifndef SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT
371 /* A native-only architecture doesn't need to check sd->arch. */
372 return seccomp_cache_check_allow_bitmap(cache
->allow_native
,
373 SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR
,
376 if (likely(sd
->arch
== SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE
))
377 return seccomp_cache_check_allow_bitmap(cache
->allow_native
,
378 SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR
,
380 if (likely(sd
->arch
== SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT
))
381 return seccomp_cache_check_allow_bitmap(cache
->allow_compat
,
382 SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR
,
384 #endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT */
389 #endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE */
392 * seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @sd
393 * @sd: optional seccomp data to be passed to filters
394 * @match: stores struct seccomp_filter that resulted in the return value,
395 * unless filter returned SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, in which case it will
398 * Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes.
400 #define ACTION_ONLY(ret) ((s32)((ret) & (SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL)))
401 static u32
seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data
*sd
,
402 struct seccomp_filter
**match
)
404 u32 ret
= SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW
;
405 /* Make sure cross-thread synced filter points somewhere sane. */
406 struct seccomp_filter
*f
=
407 READ_ONCE(current
->seccomp
.filter
);
409 /* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
410 if (WARN_ON(f
== NULL
))
411 return SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS
;
413 if (seccomp_cache_check_allow(f
, sd
))
414 return SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW
;
417 * All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return
418 * value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA).
420 for (; f
; f
= f
->prev
) {
421 u32 cur_ret
= bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu(f
->prog
, sd
);
423 if (ACTION_ONLY(cur_ret
) < ACTION_ONLY(ret
)) {
430 #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
432 static inline bool seccomp_may_assign_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode
)
434 assert_spin_locked(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
436 if (current
->seccomp
.mode
&& current
->seccomp
.mode
!= seccomp_mode
)
442 void __weak
arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct
*task
) { }
444 static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct
*task
,
445 unsigned long seccomp_mode
,
448 assert_spin_locked(&task
->sighand
->siglock
);
450 task
->seccomp
.mode
= seccomp_mode
;
452 * Make sure SYSCALL_WORK_SECCOMP cannot be set before the mode (and
455 smp_mb__before_atomic();
456 /* Assume default seccomp processes want spec flaw mitigation. */
457 if ((flags
& SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW
) == 0)
458 arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(task
);
459 set_task_syscall_work(task
, SECCOMP
);
462 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
463 /* Returns 1 if the parent is an ancestor of the child. */
464 static int is_ancestor(struct seccomp_filter
*parent
,
465 struct seccomp_filter
*child
)
467 /* NULL is the root ancestor. */
470 for (; child
; child
= child
->prev
)
477 * seccomp_can_sync_threads: checks if all threads can be synchronized
479 * Expects sighand and cred_guard_mutex locks to be held.
481 * Returns 0 on success, -ve on error, or the pid of a thread which was
482 * either not in the correct seccomp mode or did not have an ancestral
485 static inline pid_t
seccomp_can_sync_threads(void)
487 struct task_struct
*thread
, *caller
;
489 BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(¤t
->signal
->cred_guard_mutex
));
490 assert_spin_locked(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
492 /* Validate all threads being eligible for synchronization. */
494 for_each_thread(caller
, thread
) {
497 /* Skip current, since it is initiating the sync. */
498 if (thread
== caller
)
501 if (thread
->seccomp
.mode
== SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED
||
502 (thread
->seccomp
.mode
== SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
&&
503 is_ancestor(thread
->seccomp
.filter
,
504 caller
->seccomp
.filter
)))
507 /* Return the first thread that cannot be synchronized. */
508 failed
= task_pid_vnr(thread
);
509 /* If the pid cannot be resolved, then return -ESRCH */
510 if (WARN_ON(failed
== 0))
518 static inline void seccomp_filter_free(struct seccomp_filter
*filter
)
521 bpf_prog_destroy(filter
->prog
);
526 static void __seccomp_filter_orphan(struct seccomp_filter
*orig
)
528 while (orig
&& refcount_dec_and_test(&orig
->users
)) {
529 if (waitqueue_active(&orig
->wqh
))
530 wake_up_poll(&orig
->wqh
, EPOLLHUP
);
535 static void __put_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter
*orig
)
537 /* Clean up single-reference branches iteratively. */
538 while (orig
&& refcount_dec_and_test(&orig
->refs
)) {
539 struct seccomp_filter
*freeme
= orig
;
541 seccomp_filter_free(freeme
);
545 static void __seccomp_filter_release(struct seccomp_filter
*orig
)
547 /* Notify about any unused filters in the task's former filter tree. */
548 __seccomp_filter_orphan(orig
);
549 /* Finally drop all references to the task's former tree. */
550 __put_seccomp_filter(orig
);
554 * seccomp_filter_release - Detach the task from its filter tree,
555 * drop its reference count, and notify
556 * about unused filters
558 * This function should only be called when the task is exiting as
559 * it detaches it from its filter tree. As such, READ_ONCE() and
560 * barriers are not needed here, as would normally be needed.
562 void seccomp_filter_release(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
564 struct seccomp_filter
*orig
= tsk
->seccomp
.filter
;
566 /* We are effectively holding the siglock by not having any sighand. */
567 WARN_ON(tsk
->sighand
!= NULL
);
569 /* Detach task from its filter tree. */
570 tsk
->seccomp
.filter
= NULL
;
571 __seccomp_filter_release(orig
);
575 * seccomp_sync_threads: sets all threads to use current's filter
577 * Expects sighand and cred_guard_mutex locks to be held, and for
578 * seccomp_can_sync_threads() to have returned success already
579 * without dropping the locks.
582 static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(unsigned long flags
)
584 struct task_struct
*thread
, *caller
;
586 BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(¤t
->signal
->cred_guard_mutex
));
587 assert_spin_locked(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
589 /* Synchronize all threads. */
591 for_each_thread(caller
, thread
) {
592 /* Skip current, since it needs no changes. */
593 if (thread
== caller
)
596 /* Get a task reference for the new leaf node. */
597 get_seccomp_filter(caller
);
600 * Drop the task reference to the shared ancestor since
601 * current's path will hold a reference. (This also
602 * allows a put before the assignment.)
604 __seccomp_filter_release(thread
->seccomp
.filter
);
606 /* Make our new filter tree visible. */
607 smp_store_release(&thread
->seccomp
.filter
,
608 caller
->seccomp
.filter
);
609 atomic_set(&thread
->seccomp
.filter_count
,
610 atomic_read(&caller
->seccomp
.filter_count
));
613 * Don't let an unprivileged task work around
614 * the no_new_privs restriction by creating
615 * a thread that sets it up, enters seccomp,
618 if (task_no_new_privs(caller
))
619 task_set_no_new_privs(thread
);
622 * Opt the other thread into seccomp if needed.
623 * As threads are considered to be trust-realm
624 * equivalent (see ptrace_may_access), it is safe to
625 * allow one thread to transition the other.
627 if (thread
->seccomp
.mode
== SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED
)
628 seccomp_assign_mode(thread
, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
,
634 * seccomp_prepare_filter: Prepares a seccomp filter for use.
635 * @fprog: BPF program to install
637 * Returns filter on success or an ERR_PTR on failure.
639 static struct seccomp_filter
*seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog
*fprog
)
641 struct seccomp_filter
*sfilter
;
643 const bool save_orig
=
644 #if defined(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) || defined(SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE)
650 if (fprog
->len
== 0 || fprog
->len
> BPF_MAXINSNS
)
651 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL
);
653 BUG_ON(INT_MAX
/ fprog
->len
< sizeof(struct sock_filter
));
656 * Installing a seccomp filter requires that the task has
657 * CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace or be running with no_new_privs.
658 * This avoids scenarios where unprivileged tasks can affect the
659 * behavior of privileged children.
661 if (!task_no_new_privs(current
) &&
662 !ns_capable_noaudit(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN
))
663 return ERR_PTR(-EACCES
);
665 /* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */
666 sfilter
= kzalloc(sizeof(*sfilter
), GFP_KERNEL
| __GFP_NOWARN
);
668 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM
);
670 mutex_init(&sfilter
->notify_lock
);
671 ret
= bpf_prog_create_from_user(&sfilter
->prog
, fprog
,
672 seccomp_check_filter
, save_orig
);
678 refcount_set(&sfilter
->refs
, 1);
679 refcount_set(&sfilter
->users
, 1);
680 init_waitqueue_head(&sfilter
->wqh
);
686 * seccomp_prepare_user_filter - prepares a user-supplied sock_fprog
687 * @user_filter: pointer to the user data containing a sock_fprog.
689 * Returns 0 on success and non-zero otherwise.
691 static struct seccomp_filter
*
692 seccomp_prepare_user_filter(const char __user
*user_filter
)
694 struct sock_fprog fprog
;
695 struct seccomp_filter
*filter
= ERR_PTR(-EFAULT
);
698 if (in_compat_syscall()) {
699 struct compat_sock_fprog fprog32
;
700 if (copy_from_user(&fprog32
, user_filter
, sizeof(fprog32
)))
702 fprog
.len
= fprog32
.len
;
703 fprog
.filter
= compat_ptr(fprog32
.filter
);
704 } else /* falls through to the if below. */
706 if (copy_from_user(&fprog
, user_filter
, sizeof(fprog
)))
708 filter
= seccomp_prepare_filter(&fprog
);
713 #ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE
715 * seccomp_is_const_allow - check if filter is constant allow with given data
716 * @fprog: The BPF programs
717 * @sd: The seccomp data to check against, only syscall number and arch
718 * number are considered constant.
720 static bool seccomp_is_const_allow(struct sock_fprog_kern
*fprog
,
721 struct seccomp_data
*sd
)
723 unsigned int reg_value
= 0;
727 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!fprog
))
730 for (pc
= 0; pc
< fprog
->len
; pc
++) {
731 struct sock_filter
*insn
= &fprog
->filter
[pc
];
732 u16 code
= insn
->code
;
736 case BPF_LD
| BPF_W
| BPF_ABS
:
738 case offsetof(struct seccomp_data
, nr
):
741 case offsetof(struct seccomp_data
, arch
):
742 reg_value
= sd
->arch
;
745 /* can't optimize (non-constant value load) */
749 case BPF_RET
| BPF_K
:
750 /* reached return with constant values only, check allow */
751 return k
== SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW
;
752 case BPF_JMP
| BPF_JA
:
755 case BPF_JMP
| BPF_JEQ
| BPF_K
:
756 case BPF_JMP
| BPF_JGE
| BPF_K
:
757 case BPF_JMP
| BPF_JGT
| BPF_K
:
758 case BPF_JMP
| BPF_JSET
| BPF_K
:
759 switch (BPF_OP(code
)) {
761 op_res
= reg_value
== k
;
764 op_res
= reg_value
>= k
;
767 op_res
= reg_value
> k
;
770 op_res
= !!(reg_value
& k
);
773 /* can't optimize (unknown jump) */
777 pc
+= op_res
? insn
->jt
: insn
->jf
;
779 case BPF_ALU
| BPF_AND
| BPF_K
:
783 /* can't optimize (unknown insn) */
788 /* ran off the end of the filter?! */
793 static void seccomp_cache_prepare_bitmap(struct seccomp_filter
*sfilter
,
794 void *bitmap
, const void *bitmap_prev
,
795 size_t bitmap_size
, int arch
)
797 struct sock_fprog_kern
*fprog
= sfilter
->prog
->orig_prog
;
798 struct seccomp_data sd
;
802 /* The new filter must be as restrictive as the last. */
803 bitmap_copy(bitmap
, bitmap_prev
, bitmap_size
);
805 /* Before any filters, all syscalls are always allowed. */
806 bitmap_fill(bitmap
, bitmap_size
);
809 for (nr
= 0; nr
< bitmap_size
; nr
++) {
810 /* No bitmap change: not a cacheable action. */
811 if (!test_bit(nr
, bitmap
))
817 /* No bitmap change: continue to always allow. */
818 if (seccomp_is_const_allow(fprog
, &sd
))
822 * Not a cacheable action: always run filters.
823 * atomic clear_bit() not needed, filter not visible yet.
825 __clear_bit(nr
, bitmap
);
830 * seccomp_cache_prepare - emulate the filter to find cacheable syscalls
831 * @sfilter: The seccomp filter
833 * Returns 0 if successful or -errno if error occurred.
835 static void seccomp_cache_prepare(struct seccomp_filter
*sfilter
)
837 struct action_cache
*cache
= &sfilter
->cache
;
838 const struct action_cache
*cache_prev
=
839 sfilter
->prev
? &sfilter
->prev
->cache
: NULL
;
841 seccomp_cache_prepare_bitmap(sfilter
, cache
->allow_native
,
842 cache_prev
? cache_prev
->allow_native
: NULL
,
843 SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR
,
844 SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE
);
846 #ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT
847 seccomp_cache_prepare_bitmap(sfilter
, cache
->allow_compat
,
848 cache_prev
? cache_prev
->allow_compat
: NULL
,
849 SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR
,
850 SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT
);
851 #endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT */
853 #endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE */
856 * seccomp_attach_filter: validate and attach filter
857 * @flags: flags to change filter behavior
858 * @filter: seccomp filter to add to the current process
860 * Caller must be holding current->sighand->siglock lock.
862 * Returns 0 on success, -ve on error, or
863 * - in TSYNC mode: the pid of a thread which was either not in the correct
864 * seccomp mode or did not have an ancestral seccomp filter
865 * - in NEW_LISTENER mode: the fd of the new listener
867 static long seccomp_attach_filter(unsigned int flags
,
868 struct seccomp_filter
*filter
)
870 unsigned long total_insns
;
871 struct seccomp_filter
*walker
;
873 assert_spin_locked(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
875 /* Validate resulting filter length. */
876 total_insns
= filter
->prog
->len
;
877 for (walker
= current
->seccomp
.filter
; walker
; walker
= walker
->prev
)
878 total_insns
+= walker
->prog
->len
+ 4; /* 4 instr penalty */
879 if (total_insns
> MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH
)
882 /* If thread sync has been requested, check that it is possible. */
883 if (flags
& SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
) {
886 ret
= seccomp_can_sync_threads();
888 if (flags
& SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC_ESRCH
)
895 /* Set log flag, if present. */
896 if (flags
& SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG
)
899 /* Set wait killable flag, if present. */
900 if (flags
& SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_WAIT_KILLABLE_RECV
)
901 filter
->wait_killable_recv
= true;
904 * If there is an existing filter, make it the prev and don't drop its
907 filter
->prev
= current
->seccomp
.filter
;
908 seccomp_cache_prepare(filter
);
909 current
->seccomp
.filter
= filter
;
910 atomic_inc(¤t
->seccomp
.filter_count
);
912 /* Now that the new filter is in place, synchronize to all threads. */
913 if (flags
& SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
)
914 seccomp_sync_threads(flags
);
919 static void __get_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter
*filter
)
921 refcount_inc(&filter
->refs
);
924 /* get_seccomp_filter - increments the reference count of the filter on @tsk */
925 void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
927 struct seccomp_filter
*orig
= tsk
->seccomp
.filter
;
930 __get_seccomp_filter(orig
);
931 refcount_inc(&orig
->users
);
934 #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
936 /* For use with seccomp_actions_logged */
937 #define SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_PROCESS (1 << 0)
938 #define SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD (1 << 1)
939 #define SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP (1 << 2)
940 #define SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO (1 << 3)
941 #define SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE (1 << 4)
942 #define SECCOMP_LOG_LOG (1 << 5)
943 #define SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW (1 << 6)
944 #define SECCOMP_LOG_USER_NOTIF (1 << 7)
946 static u32 seccomp_actions_logged
= SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_PROCESS
|
947 SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD
|
950 SECCOMP_LOG_USER_NOTIF
|
954 static inline void seccomp_log(unsigned long syscall
, long signr
, u32 action
,
960 case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW
:
962 case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
:
963 log
= requested
&& seccomp_actions_logged
& SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP
;
965 case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO
:
966 log
= requested
&& seccomp_actions_logged
& SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO
;
968 case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE
:
969 log
= requested
&& seccomp_actions_logged
& SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE
;
971 case SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF
:
972 log
= requested
&& seccomp_actions_logged
& SECCOMP_LOG_USER_NOTIF
;
974 case SECCOMP_RET_LOG
:
975 log
= seccomp_actions_logged
& SECCOMP_LOG_LOG
;
977 case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD
:
978 log
= seccomp_actions_logged
& SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD
;
980 case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS
:
982 log
= seccomp_actions_logged
& SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_PROCESS
;
986 * Emit an audit message when the action is RET_KILL_*, RET_LOG, or the
987 * FILTER_FLAG_LOG bit was set. The admin has the ability to silence
988 * any action from being logged by removing the action name from the
989 * seccomp_actions_logged sysctl.
994 audit_seccomp(syscall
, signr
, action
);
998 * Secure computing mode 1 allows only read/write/exit/sigreturn.
999 * To be fully secure this must be combined with rlimit
1000 * to limit the stack allocations too.
1002 static const int mode1_syscalls
[] = {
1003 __NR_seccomp_read
, __NR_seccomp_write
, __NR_seccomp_exit
, __NR_seccomp_sigreturn
,
1004 -1, /* negative terminated */
1007 static void __secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall
)
1009 const int *allowed_syscalls
= mode1_syscalls
;
1010 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
1011 if (in_compat_syscall())
1012 allowed_syscalls
= get_compat_mode1_syscalls();
1015 if (*allowed_syscalls
== this_syscall
)
1017 } while (*++allowed_syscalls
!= -1);
1019 #ifdef SECCOMP_DEBUG
1022 current
->seccomp
.mode
= SECCOMP_MODE_DEAD
;
1023 seccomp_log(this_syscall
, SIGKILL
, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD
, true);
1027 #ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
1028 void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall
)
1030 int mode
= current
->seccomp
.mode
;
1032 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
) &&
1033 unlikely(current
->ptrace
& PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP
))
1036 if (mode
== SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED
)
1038 else if (mode
== SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT
)
1039 __secure_computing_strict(this_syscall
);
1045 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
1046 static u64
seccomp_next_notify_id(struct seccomp_filter
*filter
)
1049 * Note: overflow is ok here, the id just needs to be unique per
1052 lockdep_assert_held(&filter
->notify_lock
);
1053 return filter
->notif
->next_id
++;
1056 static void seccomp_handle_addfd(struct seccomp_kaddfd
*addfd
, struct seccomp_knotif
*n
)
1061 * Remove the notification, and reset the list pointers, indicating
1062 * that it has been handled.
1064 list_del_init(&addfd
->list
);
1066 fd
= receive_fd(addfd
->file
, addfd
->flags
);
1068 fd
= receive_fd_replace(addfd
->fd
, addfd
->file
, addfd
->flags
);
1071 if (addfd
->ioctl_flags
& SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SEND
) {
1072 /* If we fail reset and return an error to the notifier */
1074 n
->state
= SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT
;
1076 /* Return the FD we just added */
1084 * Mark the notification as completed. From this point, addfd mem
1085 * might be invalidated and we can't safely read it anymore.
1087 complete(&addfd
->completion
);
1090 static bool should_sleep_killable(struct seccomp_filter
*match
,
1091 struct seccomp_knotif
*n
)
1093 return match
->wait_killable_recv
&& n
->state
== SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT
;
1096 static int seccomp_do_user_notification(int this_syscall
,
1097 struct seccomp_filter
*match
,
1098 const struct seccomp_data
*sd
)
1103 struct seccomp_knotif n
= {};
1104 struct seccomp_kaddfd
*addfd
, *tmp
;
1106 mutex_lock(&match
->notify_lock
);
1112 n
.state
= SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT
;
1114 n
.id
= seccomp_next_notify_id(match
);
1115 init_completion(&n
.ready
);
1116 list_add_tail(&n
.list
, &match
->notif
->notifications
);
1117 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&n
.addfd
);
1119 up(&match
->notif
->request
);
1120 wake_up_poll(&match
->wqh
, EPOLLIN
| EPOLLRDNORM
);
1123 * This is where we wait for a reply from userspace.
1126 bool wait_killable
= should_sleep_killable(match
, &n
);
1128 mutex_unlock(&match
->notify_lock
);
1130 err
= wait_for_completion_killable(&n
.ready
);
1132 err
= wait_for_completion_interruptible(&n
.ready
);
1133 mutex_lock(&match
->notify_lock
);
1137 * Check to see if the notifcation got picked up and
1138 * whether we should switch to wait killable.
1140 if (!wait_killable
&& should_sleep_killable(match
, &n
))
1146 addfd
= list_first_entry_or_null(&n
.addfd
,
1147 struct seccomp_kaddfd
, list
);
1148 /* Check if we were woken up by a addfd message */
1150 seccomp_handle_addfd(addfd
, &n
);
1152 } while (n
.state
!= SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED
);
1159 /* If there were any pending addfd calls, clear them out */
1160 list_for_each_entry_safe(addfd
, tmp
, &n
.addfd
, list
) {
1161 /* The process went away before we got a chance to handle it */
1162 addfd
->ret
= -ESRCH
;
1163 list_del_init(&addfd
->list
);
1164 complete(&addfd
->completion
);
1168 * Note that it's possible the listener died in between the time when
1169 * we were notified of a response (or a signal) and when we were able to
1170 * re-acquire the lock, so only delete from the list if the
1171 * notification actually exists.
1173 * Also note that this test is only valid because there's no way to
1174 * *reattach* to a notifier right now. If one is added, we'll need to
1175 * keep track of the notif itself and make sure they match here.
1180 mutex_unlock(&match
->notify_lock
);
1182 /* Userspace requests to continue the syscall. */
1183 if (flags
& SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE
)
1186 syscall_set_return_value(current
, current_pt_regs(),
1191 static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall
, const struct seccomp_data
*sd
,
1192 const bool recheck_after_trace
)
1194 u32 filter_ret
, action
;
1195 struct seccomp_filter
*match
= NULL
;
1197 struct seccomp_data sd_local
;
1200 * Make sure that any changes to mode from another thread have
1201 * been seen after SYSCALL_WORK_SECCOMP was seen.
1206 populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local
);
1210 filter_ret
= seccomp_run_filters(sd
, &match
);
1211 data
= filter_ret
& SECCOMP_RET_DATA
;
1212 action
= filter_ret
& SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL
;
1215 case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO
:
1216 /* Set low-order bits as an errno, capped at MAX_ERRNO. */
1217 if (data
> MAX_ERRNO
)
1219 syscall_set_return_value(current
, current_pt_regs(),
1223 case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
:
1224 /* Show the handler the original registers. */
1225 syscall_rollback(current
, current_pt_regs());
1226 /* Let the filter pass back 16 bits of data. */
1227 force_sig_seccomp(this_syscall
, data
, false);
1230 case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE
:
1231 /* We've been put in this state by the ptracer already. */
1232 if (recheck_after_trace
)
1235 /* ENOSYS these calls if there is no tracer attached. */
1236 if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current
, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP
)) {
1237 syscall_set_return_value(current
,
1243 /* Allow the BPF to provide the event message */
1244 ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP
, data
);
1246 * The delivery of a fatal signal during event
1247 * notification may silently skip tracer notification,
1248 * which could leave us with a potentially unmodified
1249 * syscall that the tracer would have liked to have
1250 * changed. Since the process is about to die, we just
1251 * force the syscall to be skipped and let the signal
1252 * kill the process and correctly handle any tracer exit
1255 if (fatal_signal_pending(current
))
1257 /* Check if the tracer forced the syscall to be skipped. */
1258 this_syscall
= syscall_get_nr(current
, current_pt_regs());
1259 if (this_syscall
< 0)
1263 * Recheck the syscall, since it may have changed. This
1264 * intentionally uses a NULL struct seccomp_data to force
1265 * a reload of all registers. This does not goto skip since
1266 * a skip would have already been reported.
1268 if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall
, NULL
, true))
1273 case SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF
:
1274 if (seccomp_do_user_notification(this_syscall
, match
, sd
))
1279 case SECCOMP_RET_LOG
:
1280 seccomp_log(this_syscall
, 0, action
, true);
1283 case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW
:
1285 * Note that the "match" filter will always be NULL for
1286 * this action since SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW is the starting
1287 * state in seccomp_run_filters().
1291 case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD
:
1292 case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS
:
1294 current
->seccomp
.mode
= SECCOMP_MODE_DEAD
;
1295 seccomp_log(this_syscall
, SIGSYS
, action
, true);
1296 /* Dump core only if this is the last remaining thread. */
1297 if (action
!= SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD
||
1298 (atomic_read(¤t
->signal
->live
) == 1)) {
1299 /* Show the original registers in the dump. */
1300 syscall_rollback(current
, current_pt_regs());
1301 /* Trigger a coredump with SIGSYS */
1302 force_sig_seccomp(this_syscall
, data
, true);
1306 return -1; /* skip the syscall go directly to signal handling */
1312 seccomp_log(this_syscall
, 0, action
, match
? match
->log
: false);
1316 static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall
, const struct seccomp_data
*sd
,
1317 const bool recheck_after_trace
)
1325 int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data
*sd
)
1327 int mode
= current
->seccomp
.mode
;
1330 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
) &&
1331 unlikely(current
->ptrace
& PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP
))
1334 this_syscall
= sd
? sd
->nr
:
1335 syscall_get_nr(current
, current_pt_regs());
1338 case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT
:
1339 __secure_computing_strict(this_syscall
); /* may call do_exit */
1341 case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
:
1342 return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall
, sd
, false);
1343 /* Surviving SECCOMP_RET_KILL_* must be proactively impossible. */
1344 case SECCOMP_MODE_DEAD
:
1352 #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER */
1354 long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
1356 return current
->seccomp
.mode
;
1360 * seccomp_set_mode_strict: internal function for setting strict seccomp
1362 * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
1364 * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
1366 static long seccomp_set_mode_strict(void)
1368 const unsigned long seccomp_mode
= SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT
;
1371 spin_lock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
1373 if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode
))
1379 seccomp_assign_mode(current
, seccomp_mode
, 0);
1383 spin_unlock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
1388 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
1389 static void seccomp_notify_free(struct seccomp_filter
*filter
)
1391 kfree(filter
->notif
);
1392 filter
->notif
= NULL
;
1395 static void seccomp_notify_detach(struct seccomp_filter
*filter
)
1397 struct seccomp_knotif
*knotif
;
1402 mutex_lock(&filter
->notify_lock
);
1405 * If this file is being closed because e.g. the task who owned it
1406 * died, let's wake everyone up who was waiting on us.
1408 list_for_each_entry(knotif
, &filter
->notif
->notifications
, list
) {
1409 if (knotif
->state
== SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED
)
1412 knotif
->state
= SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED
;
1413 knotif
->error
= -ENOSYS
;
1417 * We do not need to wake up any pending addfd messages, as
1418 * the notifier will do that for us, as this just looks
1419 * like a standard reply.
1421 complete(&knotif
->ready
);
1424 seccomp_notify_free(filter
);
1425 mutex_unlock(&filter
->notify_lock
);
1428 static int seccomp_notify_release(struct inode
*inode
, struct file
*file
)
1430 struct seccomp_filter
*filter
= file
->private_data
;
1432 seccomp_notify_detach(filter
);
1433 __put_seccomp_filter(filter
);
1437 /* must be called with notif_lock held */
1438 static inline struct seccomp_knotif
*
1439 find_notification(struct seccomp_filter
*filter
, u64 id
)
1441 struct seccomp_knotif
*cur
;
1443 lockdep_assert_held(&filter
->notify_lock
);
1445 list_for_each_entry(cur
, &filter
->notif
->notifications
, list
) {
1454 static long seccomp_notify_recv(struct seccomp_filter
*filter
,
1457 struct seccomp_knotif
*knotif
= NULL
, *cur
;
1458 struct seccomp_notif unotif
;
1461 /* Verify that we're not given garbage to keep struct extensible. */
1462 ret
= check_zeroed_user(buf
, sizeof(unotif
));
1468 memset(&unotif
, 0, sizeof(unotif
));
1470 ret
= down_interruptible(&filter
->notif
->request
);
1474 mutex_lock(&filter
->notify_lock
);
1475 list_for_each_entry(cur
, &filter
->notif
->notifications
, list
) {
1476 if (cur
->state
== SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT
) {
1483 * If we didn't find a notification, it could be that the task was
1484 * interrupted by a fatal signal between the time we were woken and
1485 * when we were able to acquire the rw lock.
1492 unotif
.id
= knotif
->id
;
1493 unotif
.pid
= task_pid_vnr(knotif
->task
);
1494 unotif
.data
= *(knotif
->data
);
1496 knotif
->state
= SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT
;
1497 wake_up_poll(&filter
->wqh
, EPOLLOUT
| EPOLLWRNORM
);
1500 mutex_unlock(&filter
->notify_lock
);
1502 if (ret
== 0 && copy_to_user(buf
, &unotif
, sizeof(unotif
))) {
1506 * Userspace screwed up. To make sure that we keep this
1507 * notification alive, let's reset it back to INIT. It
1508 * may have died when we released the lock, so we need to make
1509 * sure it's still around.
1511 mutex_lock(&filter
->notify_lock
);
1512 knotif
= find_notification(filter
, unotif
.id
);
1514 /* Reset the process to make sure it's not stuck */
1515 if (should_sleep_killable(filter
, knotif
))
1516 complete(&knotif
->ready
);
1517 knotif
->state
= SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT
;
1518 up(&filter
->notif
->request
);
1520 mutex_unlock(&filter
->notify_lock
);
1526 static long seccomp_notify_send(struct seccomp_filter
*filter
,
1529 struct seccomp_notif_resp resp
= {};
1530 struct seccomp_knotif
*knotif
;
1533 if (copy_from_user(&resp
, buf
, sizeof(resp
)))
1536 if (resp
.flags
& ~SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE
)
1539 if ((resp
.flags
& SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE
) &&
1540 (resp
.error
|| resp
.val
))
1543 ret
= mutex_lock_interruptible(&filter
->notify_lock
);
1547 knotif
= find_notification(filter
, resp
.id
);
1553 /* Allow exactly one reply. */
1554 if (knotif
->state
!= SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT
) {
1560 knotif
->state
= SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED
;
1561 knotif
->error
= resp
.error
;
1562 knotif
->val
= resp
.val
;
1563 knotif
->flags
= resp
.flags
;
1564 complete(&knotif
->ready
);
1566 mutex_unlock(&filter
->notify_lock
);
1570 static long seccomp_notify_id_valid(struct seccomp_filter
*filter
,
1573 struct seccomp_knotif
*knotif
;
1577 if (copy_from_user(&id
, buf
, sizeof(id
)))
1580 ret
= mutex_lock_interruptible(&filter
->notify_lock
);
1584 knotif
= find_notification(filter
, id
);
1585 if (knotif
&& knotif
->state
== SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT
)
1590 mutex_unlock(&filter
->notify_lock
);
1594 static long seccomp_notify_addfd(struct seccomp_filter
*filter
,
1595 struct seccomp_notif_addfd __user
*uaddfd
,
1598 struct seccomp_notif_addfd addfd
;
1599 struct seccomp_knotif
*knotif
;
1600 struct seccomp_kaddfd kaddfd
;
1603 BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(addfd
) < SECCOMP_NOTIFY_ADDFD_SIZE_VER0
);
1604 BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(addfd
) != SECCOMP_NOTIFY_ADDFD_SIZE_LATEST
);
1606 if (size
< SECCOMP_NOTIFY_ADDFD_SIZE_VER0
|| size
>= PAGE_SIZE
)
1609 ret
= copy_struct_from_user(&addfd
, sizeof(addfd
), uaddfd
, size
);
1613 if (addfd
.newfd_flags
& ~O_CLOEXEC
)
1616 if (addfd
.flags
& ~(SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD
| SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SEND
))
1619 if (addfd
.newfd
&& !(addfd
.flags
& SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD
))
1622 kaddfd
.file
= fget(addfd
.srcfd
);
1626 kaddfd
.ioctl_flags
= addfd
.flags
;
1627 kaddfd
.flags
= addfd
.newfd_flags
;
1628 kaddfd
.setfd
= addfd
.flags
& SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD
;
1629 kaddfd
.fd
= addfd
.newfd
;
1630 init_completion(&kaddfd
.completion
);
1632 ret
= mutex_lock_interruptible(&filter
->notify_lock
);
1636 knotif
= find_notification(filter
, addfd
.id
);
1643 * We do not want to allow for FD injection to occur before the
1644 * notification has been picked up by a userspace handler, or after
1645 * the notification has been replied to.
1647 if (knotif
->state
!= SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT
) {
1652 if (addfd
.flags
& SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SEND
) {
1654 * Disallow queuing an atomic addfd + send reply while there are
1655 * some addfd requests still to process.
1657 * There is no clear reason to support it and allows us to keep
1658 * the loop on the other side straight-forward.
1660 if (!list_empty(&knotif
->addfd
)) {
1665 /* Allow exactly only one reply */
1666 knotif
->state
= SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED
;
1669 list_add(&kaddfd
.list
, &knotif
->addfd
);
1670 complete(&knotif
->ready
);
1671 mutex_unlock(&filter
->notify_lock
);
1673 /* Now we wait for it to be processed or be interrupted */
1674 ret
= wait_for_completion_interruptible(&kaddfd
.completion
);
1677 * We had a successful completion. The other side has already
1678 * removed us from the addfd queue, and
1679 * wait_for_completion_interruptible has a memory barrier upon
1680 * success that lets us read this value directly without
1687 mutex_lock(&filter
->notify_lock
);
1689 * Even though we were woken up by a signal and not a successful
1690 * completion, a completion may have happened in the mean time.
1692 * We need to check again if the addfd request has been handled,
1693 * and if not, we will remove it from the queue.
1695 if (list_empty(&kaddfd
.list
))
1698 list_del(&kaddfd
.list
);
1701 mutex_unlock(&filter
->notify_lock
);
1708 static long seccomp_notify_ioctl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
1711 struct seccomp_filter
*filter
= file
->private_data
;
1712 void __user
*buf
= (void __user
*)arg
;
1714 /* Fixed-size ioctls */
1716 case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV
:
1717 return seccomp_notify_recv(filter
, buf
);
1718 case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND
:
1719 return seccomp_notify_send(filter
, buf
);
1720 case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID_WRONG_DIR
:
1721 case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID
:
1722 return seccomp_notify_id_valid(filter
, buf
);
1725 /* Extensible Argument ioctls */
1726 #define EA_IOCTL(cmd) ((cmd) & ~(IOC_INOUT | IOCSIZE_MASK))
1727 switch (EA_IOCTL(cmd
)) {
1728 case EA_IOCTL(SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD
):
1729 return seccomp_notify_addfd(filter
, buf
, _IOC_SIZE(cmd
));
1735 static __poll_t
seccomp_notify_poll(struct file
*file
,
1736 struct poll_table_struct
*poll_tab
)
1738 struct seccomp_filter
*filter
= file
->private_data
;
1740 struct seccomp_knotif
*cur
;
1742 poll_wait(file
, &filter
->wqh
, poll_tab
);
1744 if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&filter
->notify_lock
) < 0)
1747 list_for_each_entry(cur
, &filter
->notif
->notifications
, list
) {
1748 if (cur
->state
== SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT
)
1749 ret
|= EPOLLIN
| EPOLLRDNORM
;
1750 if (cur
->state
== SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT
)
1751 ret
|= EPOLLOUT
| EPOLLWRNORM
;
1752 if ((ret
& EPOLLIN
) && (ret
& EPOLLOUT
))
1756 mutex_unlock(&filter
->notify_lock
);
1758 if (refcount_read(&filter
->users
) == 0)
1764 static const struct file_operations seccomp_notify_ops
= {
1765 .poll
= seccomp_notify_poll
,
1766 .release
= seccomp_notify_release
,
1767 .unlocked_ioctl
= seccomp_notify_ioctl
,
1768 .compat_ioctl
= seccomp_notify_ioctl
,
1771 static struct file
*init_listener(struct seccomp_filter
*filter
)
1775 ret
= ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM
);
1776 filter
->notif
= kzalloc(sizeof(*(filter
->notif
)), GFP_KERNEL
);
1780 sema_init(&filter
->notif
->request
, 0);
1781 filter
->notif
->next_id
= get_random_u64();
1782 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&filter
->notif
->notifications
);
1784 ret
= anon_inode_getfile("seccomp notify", &seccomp_notify_ops
,
1789 /* The file has a reference to it now */
1790 __get_seccomp_filter(filter
);
1794 seccomp_notify_free(filter
);
1800 * Does @new_child have a listener while an ancestor also has a listener?
1801 * If so, we'll want to reject this filter.
1802 * This only has to be tested for the current process, even in the TSYNC case,
1803 * because TSYNC installs @child with the same parent on all threads.
1804 * Note that @new_child is not hooked up to its parent at this point yet, so
1805 * we use current->seccomp.filter.
1807 static bool has_duplicate_listener(struct seccomp_filter
*new_child
)
1809 struct seccomp_filter
*cur
;
1811 /* must be protected against concurrent TSYNC */
1812 lockdep_assert_held(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
1814 if (!new_child
->notif
)
1816 for (cur
= current
->seccomp
.filter
; cur
; cur
= cur
->prev
) {
1825 * seccomp_set_mode_filter: internal function for setting seccomp filter
1826 * @flags: flags to change filter behavior
1827 * @filter: struct sock_fprog containing filter
1829 * This function may be called repeatedly to install additional filters.
1830 * Every filter successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order)
1831 * for each system call the task makes.
1833 * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
1835 * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
1837 static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags
,
1838 const char __user
*filter
)
1840 const unsigned long seccomp_mode
= SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
;
1841 struct seccomp_filter
*prepared
= NULL
;
1844 struct file
*listener_f
= NULL
;
1846 /* Validate flags. */
1847 if (flags
& ~SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK
)
1851 * In the successful case, NEW_LISTENER returns the new listener fd.
1852 * But in the failure case, TSYNC returns the thread that died. If you
1853 * combine these two flags, there's no way to tell whether something
1854 * succeeded or failed. So, let's disallow this combination if the user
1855 * has not explicitly requested no errors from TSYNC.
1857 if ((flags
& SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
) &&
1858 (flags
& SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER
) &&
1859 ((flags
& SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC_ESRCH
) == 0))
1863 * The SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_WAIT_KILLABLE_SENT flag doesn't make sense
1864 * without the SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER flag.
1866 if ((flags
& SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_WAIT_KILLABLE_RECV
) &&
1867 ((flags
& SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER
) == 0))
1870 /* Prepare the new filter before holding any locks. */
1871 prepared
= seccomp_prepare_user_filter(filter
);
1872 if (IS_ERR(prepared
))
1873 return PTR_ERR(prepared
);
1875 if (flags
& SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER
) {
1876 listener
= get_unused_fd_flags(O_CLOEXEC
);
1882 listener_f
= init_listener(prepared
);
1883 if (IS_ERR(listener_f
)) {
1884 put_unused_fd(listener
);
1885 ret
= PTR_ERR(listener_f
);
1891 * Make sure we cannot change seccomp or nnp state via TSYNC
1892 * while another thread is in the middle of calling exec.
1894 if (flags
& SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
&&
1895 mutex_lock_killable(¤t
->signal
->cred_guard_mutex
))
1898 spin_lock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
1900 if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode
))
1903 if (has_duplicate_listener(prepared
)) {
1908 ret
= seccomp_attach_filter(flags
, prepared
);
1911 /* Do not free the successfully attached filter. */
1914 seccomp_assign_mode(current
, seccomp_mode
, flags
);
1916 spin_unlock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
1917 if (flags
& SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
)
1918 mutex_unlock(¤t
->signal
->cred_guard_mutex
);
1920 if (flags
& SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER
) {
1922 listener_f
->private_data
= NULL
;
1924 put_unused_fd(listener
);
1925 seccomp_notify_detach(prepared
);
1927 fd_install(listener
, listener_f
);
1932 seccomp_filter_free(prepared
);
1936 static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags
,
1937 const char __user
*filter
)
1943 static long seccomp_get_action_avail(const char __user
*uaction
)
1947 if (copy_from_user(&action
, uaction
, sizeof(action
)))
1951 case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS
:
1952 case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD
:
1953 case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
:
1954 case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO
:
1955 case SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF
:
1956 case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE
:
1957 case SECCOMP_RET_LOG
:
1958 case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW
:
1967 static long seccomp_get_notif_sizes(void __user
*usizes
)
1969 struct seccomp_notif_sizes sizes
= {
1970 .seccomp_notif
= sizeof(struct seccomp_notif
),
1971 .seccomp_notif_resp
= sizeof(struct seccomp_notif_resp
),
1972 .seccomp_data
= sizeof(struct seccomp_data
),
1975 if (copy_to_user(usizes
, &sizes
, sizeof(sizes
)))
1981 /* Common entry point for both prctl and syscall. */
1982 static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op
, unsigned int flags
,
1986 case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT
:
1987 if (flags
!= 0 || uargs
!= NULL
)
1989 return seccomp_set_mode_strict();
1990 case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER
:
1991 return seccomp_set_mode_filter(flags
, uargs
);
1992 case SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL
:
1996 return seccomp_get_action_avail(uargs
);
1997 case SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES
:
2001 return seccomp_get_notif_sizes(uargs
);
2007 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(seccomp
, unsigned int, op
, unsigned int, flags
,
2008 void __user
*, uargs
)
2010 return do_seccomp(op
, flags
, uargs
);
2014 * prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode
2015 * @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use
2016 * @filter: optional struct sock_fprog for use with SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
2018 * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
2020 long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode
, void __user
*filter
)
2025 switch (seccomp_mode
) {
2026 case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT
:
2027 op
= SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT
;
2029 * Setting strict mode through prctl always ignored filter,
2030 * so make sure it is always NULL here to pass the internal
2031 * check in do_seccomp().
2035 case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
:
2036 op
= SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER
;
2043 /* prctl interface doesn't have flags, so they are always zero. */
2044 return do_seccomp(op
, 0, uargs
);
2047 #if defined(CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER) && defined(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE)
2048 static struct seccomp_filter
*get_nth_filter(struct task_struct
*task
,
2049 unsigned long filter_off
)
2051 struct seccomp_filter
*orig
, *filter
;
2052 unsigned long count
;
2055 * Note: this is only correct because the caller should be the (ptrace)
2056 * tracer of the task, otherwise lock_task_sighand is needed.
2058 spin_lock_irq(&task
->sighand
->siglock
);
2060 if (task
->seccomp
.mode
!= SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
) {
2061 spin_unlock_irq(&task
->sighand
->siglock
);
2062 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL
);
2065 orig
= task
->seccomp
.filter
;
2066 __get_seccomp_filter(orig
);
2067 spin_unlock_irq(&task
->sighand
->siglock
);
2070 for (filter
= orig
; filter
; filter
= filter
->prev
)
2073 if (filter_off
>= count
) {
2074 filter
= ERR_PTR(-ENOENT
);
2078 count
-= filter_off
;
2079 for (filter
= orig
; filter
&& count
> 1; filter
= filter
->prev
)
2082 if (WARN_ON(count
!= 1 || !filter
)) {
2083 filter
= ERR_PTR(-ENOENT
);
2087 __get_seccomp_filter(filter
);
2090 __put_seccomp_filter(orig
);
2094 long seccomp_get_filter(struct task_struct
*task
, unsigned long filter_off
,
2097 struct seccomp_filter
*filter
;
2098 struct sock_fprog_kern
*fprog
;
2101 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
) ||
2102 current
->seccomp
.mode
!= SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED
) {
2106 filter
= get_nth_filter(task
, filter_off
);
2108 return PTR_ERR(filter
);
2110 fprog
= filter
->prog
->orig_prog
;
2112 /* This must be a new non-cBPF filter, since we save
2113 * every cBPF filter's orig_prog above when
2114 * CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is enabled.
2124 if (copy_to_user(data
, fprog
->filter
, bpf_classic_proglen(fprog
)))
2128 __put_seccomp_filter(filter
);
2132 long seccomp_get_metadata(struct task_struct
*task
,
2133 unsigned long size
, void __user
*data
)
2136 struct seccomp_filter
*filter
;
2137 struct seccomp_metadata kmd
= {};
2139 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
) ||
2140 current
->seccomp
.mode
!= SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED
) {
2144 size
= min_t(unsigned long, size
, sizeof(kmd
));
2146 if (size
< sizeof(kmd
.filter_off
))
2149 if (copy_from_user(&kmd
.filter_off
, data
, sizeof(kmd
.filter_off
)))
2152 filter
= get_nth_filter(task
, kmd
.filter_off
);
2154 return PTR_ERR(filter
);
2157 kmd
.flags
|= SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG
;
2160 if (copy_to_user(data
, &kmd
, size
))
2163 __put_seccomp_filter(filter
);
2168 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
2170 /* Human readable action names for friendly sysctl interaction */
2171 #define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS_NAME "kill_process"
2172 #define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME "kill_thread"
2173 #define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME "trap"
2174 #define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME "errno"
2175 #define SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF_NAME "user_notif"
2176 #define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME "trace"
2177 #define SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME "log"
2178 #define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME "allow"
2180 static const char seccomp_actions_avail
[] =
2181 SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS_NAME
" "
2182 SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME
" "
2183 SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME
" "
2184 SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME
" "
2185 SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF_NAME
" "
2186 SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME
" "
2187 SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME
" "
2188 SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME
;
2190 struct seccomp_log_name
{
2195 static const struct seccomp_log_name seccomp_log_names
[] = {
2196 { SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_PROCESS
, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS_NAME
},
2197 { SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD
, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME
},
2198 { SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP
, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME
},
2199 { SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO
, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME
},
2200 { SECCOMP_LOG_USER_NOTIF
, SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF_NAME
},
2201 { SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE
, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME
},
2202 { SECCOMP_LOG_LOG
, SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME
},
2203 { SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW
, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME
},
2207 static bool seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(char *names
, size_t size
,
2211 const struct seccomp_log_name
*cur
;
2212 bool append_sep
= false;
2214 for (cur
= seccomp_log_names
; cur
->name
&& size
; cur
++) {
2217 if (!(actions_logged
& cur
->log
))
2221 ret
= strscpy(names
, sep
, size
);
2230 ret
= strscpy(names
, cur
->name
, size
);
2241 static bool seccomp_action_logged_from_name(u32
*action_logged
,
2244 const struct seccomp_log_name
*cur
;
2246 for (cur
= seccomp_log_names
; cur
->name
; cur
++) {
2247 if (!strcmp(cur
->name
, name
)) {
2248 *action_logged
= cur
->log
;
2256 static bool seccomp_actions_logged_from_names(u32
*actions_logged
, char *names
)
2260 *actions_logged
= 0;
2261 while ((name
= strsep(&names
, " ")) && *name
) {
2262 u32 action_logged
= 0;
2264 if (!seccomp_action_logged_from_name(&action_logged
, name
))
2267 *actions_logged
|= action_logged
;
2273 static int read_actions_logged(struct ctl_table
*ro_table
, void *buffer
,
2274 size_t *lenp
, loff_t
*ppos
)
2276 char names
[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail
)];
2277 struct ctl_table table
;
2279 memset(names
, 0, sizeof(names
));
2281 if (!seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(names
, sizeof(names
),
2282 seccomp_actions_logged
, " "))
2287 table
.maxlen
= sizeof(names
);
2288 return proc_dostring(&table
, 0, buffer
, lenp
, ppos
);
2291 static int write_actions_logged(struct ctl_table
*ro_table
, void *buffer
,
2292 size_t *lenp
, loff_t
*ppos
, u32
*actions_logged
)
2294 char names
[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail
)];
2295 struct ctl_table table
;
2298 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
))
2301 memset(names
, 0, sizeof(names
));
2305 table
.maxlen
= sizeof(names
);
2306 ret
= proc_dostring(&table
, 1, buffer
, lenp
, ppos
);
2310 if (!seccomp_actions_logged_from_names(actions_logged
, table
.data
))
2313 if (*actions_logged
& SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW
)
2316 seccomp_actions_logged
= *actions_logged
;
2320 static void audit_actions_logged(u32 actions_logged
, u32 old_actions_logged
,
2323 char names
[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail
)];
2324 char old_names
[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail
)];
2325 const char *new = names
;
2326 const char *old
= old_names
;
2331 memset(names
, 0, sizeof(names
));
2332 memset(old_names
, 0, sizeof(old_names
));
2336 else if (!actions_logged
)
2338 else if (!seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(names
, sizeof(names
),
2339 actions_logged
, ","))
2342 if (!old_actions_logged
)
2344 else if (!seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(old_names
,
2346 old_actions_logged
, ","))
2349 return audit_seccomp_actions_logged(new, old
, !ret
);
2352 static int seccomp_actions_logged_handler(struct ctl_table
*ro_table
, int write
,
2353 void *buffer
, size_t *lenp
,
2359 u32 actions_logged
= 0;
2360 u32 old_actions_logged
= seccomp_actions_logged
;
2362 ret
= write_actions_logged(ro_table
, buffer
, lenp
, ppos
,
2364 audit_actions_logged(actions_logged
, old_actions_logged
, ret
);
2366 ret
= read_actions_logged(ro_table
, buffer
, lenp
, ppos
);
2371 static struct ctl_path seccomp_sysctl_path
[] = {
2372 { .procname
= "kernel", },
2373 { .procname
= "seccomp", },
2377 static struct ctl_table seccomp_sysctl_table
[] = {
2379 .procname
= "actions_avail",
2380 .data
= (void *) &seccomp_actions_avail
,
2381 .maxlen
= sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail
),
2383 .proc_handler
= proc_dostring
,
2386 .procname
= "actions_logged",
2388 .proc_handler
= seccomp_actions_logged_handler
,
2393 static int __init
seccomp_sysctl_init(void)
2395 struct ctl_table_header
*hdr
;
2397 hdr
= register_sysctl_paths(seccomp_sysctl_path
, seccomp_sysctl_table
);
2399 pr_warn("sysctl registration failed\n");
2401 kmemleak_not_leak(hdr
);
2406 device_initcall(seccomp_sysctl_init
)
2408 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
2410 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG
2411 /* Currently CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG implies SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE */
2412 static void proc_pid_seccomp_cache_arch(struct seq_file
*m
, const char *name
,
2413 const void *bitmap
, size_t bitmap_size
)
2417 for (nr
= 0; nr
< bitmap_size
; nr
++) {
2418 bool cached
= test_bit(nr
, bitmap
);
2419 char *status
= cached
? "ALLOW" : "FILTER";
2421 seq_printf(m
, "%s %d %s\n", name
, nr
, status
);
2425 int proc_pid_seccomp_cache(struct seq_file
*m
, struct pid_namespace
*ns
,
2426 struct pid
*pid
, struct task_struct
*task
)
2428 struct seccomp_filter
*f
;
2429 unsigned long flags
;
2432 * We don't want some sandboxed process to know what their seccomp
2433 * filters consist of.
2435 if (!file_ns_capable(m
->file
, &init_user_ns
, CAP_SYS_ADMIN
))
2438 if (!lock_task_sighand(task
, &flags
))
2441 f
= READ_ONCE(task
->seccomp
.filter
);
2443 unlock_task_sighand(task
, &flags
);
2447 /* prevent filter from being freed while we are printing it */
2448 __get_seccomp_filter(f
);
2449 unlock_task_sighand(task
, &flags
);
2451 proc_pid_seccomp_cache_arch(m
, SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME
,
2452 f
->cache
.allow_native
,
2453 SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR
);
2455 #ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT
2456 proc_pid_seccomp_cache_arch(m
, SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NAME
,
2457 f
->cache
.allow_compat
,
2458 SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR
);
2459 #endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT */
2461 __put_seccomp_filter(f
);
2464 #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG */