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1 /*
2 * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
3 * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
4 *
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7 * published by the Free Software Foundation.
8 */
9
10 #include <linux/netdevice.h>
11 #include <linux/types.h>
12 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
13 #include <linux/compiler.h>
14 #include <linux/ieee80211.h>
15 #include <linux/gfp.h>
16 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
17 #include <net/mac80211.h>
18 #include <crypto/aes.h>
19
20 #include "ieee80211_i.h"
21 #include "michael.h"
22 #include "tkip.h"
23 #include "aes_ccm.h"
24 #include "aes_cmac.h"
25 #include "wpa.h"
26
27 ieee80211_tx_result
28 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
29 {
30 u8 *data, *key, *mic;
31 size_t data_len;
32 unsigned int hdrlen;
33 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
34 struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
35 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
36 int tail;
37
38 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
39 if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
40 skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
41 return TX_CONTINUE;
42
43 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
44 if (skb->len < hdrlen)
45 return TX_DROP;
46
47 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
48 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen;
49
50 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) {
51 /* Need to use software crypto for the test */
52 info->control.hw_key = NULL;
53 }
54
55 if (info->control.hw_key &&
56 (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_DONTFRAG ||
57 tx->local->ops->set_frag_threshold) &&
58 !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC)) {
59 /* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC */
60 return TX_CONTINUE;
61 }
62
63 tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
64 if (!info->control.hw_key)
65 tail += TKIP_ICV_LEN;
66
67 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
68 skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN))
69 return TX_DROP;
70
71 key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY];
72 mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
73 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
74 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE))
75 mic[0]++;
76
77 return TX_CONTINUE;
78 }
79
80
81 ieee80211_rx_result
82 ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
83 {
84 u8 *data, *key = NULL;
85 size_t data_len;
86 unsigned int hdrlen;
87 u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN];
88 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
89 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
90 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
91
92 /*
93 * it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other
94 * than data frames.
95 */
96 if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
97 return RX_CONTINUE;
98
99 /*
100 * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or
101 * the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely
102 * on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a
103 * MIC failure report.
104 */
105 if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
106 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
107 goto mic_fail;
108
109 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))
110 goto update_iv;
111
112 return RX_CONTINUE;
113 }
114
115 /*
116 * Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even
117 * though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no
118 * MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures.
119 */
120 if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
121 !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
122 return RX_CONTINUE;
123
124 if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) {
125 /*
126 * APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC
127 * errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for
128 * group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast
129 * frames in the BSS. (
130 */
131 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
132 }
133
134 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
135 goto mic_fail;
136
137 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
138 if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
139 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
140
141 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
142 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
143 key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
144 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
145 if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0)
146 goto mic_fail;
147
148 /* remove Michael MIC from payload */
149 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
150
151 update_iv:
152 /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
153 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
154 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
155
156 return RX_CONTINUE;
157
158 mic_fail:
159 /*
160 * In some cases the key can be unset - e.g. a multicast packet, in
161 * a driver that supports HW encryption. Send up the key idx only if
162 * the key is set.
163 */
164 mac80211_ev_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata,
165 rx->key ? rx->key->conf.keyidx : -1,
166 (void *) skb->data, NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
167 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
168 }
169
170
171 static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
172 {
173 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
174 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
175 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
176 unsigned long flags;
177 unsigned int hdrlen;
178 int len, tail;
179 u8 *pos;
180
181 if (info->control.hw_key &&
182 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) {
183 /* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */
184 return 0;
185 }
186
187 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
188 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
189
190 if (info->control.hw_key)
191 tail = 0;
192 else
193 tail = TKIP_ICV_LEN;
194
195 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
196 skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN))
197 return -1;
198
199 pos = skb_push(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN);
200 memmove(pos, pos + TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
201 pos += hdrlen;
202
203 /* Increase IV for the frame */
204 spin_lock_irqsave(&key->u.tkip.txlock, flags);
205 key->u.tkip.tx.iv16++;
206 if (key->u.tkip.tx.iv16 == 0)
207 key->u.tkip.tx.iv32++;
208 pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, key);
209 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&key->u.tkip.txlock, flags);
210
211 /* hwaccel - with software IV */
212 if (info->control.hw_key)
213 return 0;
214
215 /* Add room for ICV */
216 skb_put(skb, TKIP_ICV_LEN);
217
218 return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(tx->local->wep_tx_tfm,
219 key, skb, pos, len);
220 }
221
222
223 ieee80211_tx_result
224 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
225 {
226 struct sk_buff *skb;
227
228 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
229
230 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
231 if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
232 return TX_DROP;
233 }
234
235 return TX_CONTINUE;
236 }
237
238
239 ieee80211_rx_result
240 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
241 {
242 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data;
243 int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0;
244 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
245 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
246 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
247
248 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
249
250 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
251 return RX_CONTINUE;
252
253 if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
254 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
255
256 /*
257 * Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption.
258 * In the case where hardware checks the IV as well,
259 * we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt()
260 */
261 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)
262 hwaccel = 1;
263
264 res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(rx->local->wep_rx_tfm,
265 key, skb->data + hdrlen,
266 skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
267 hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx,
268 &rx->tkip_iv32,
269 &rx->tkip_iv16);
270 if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
271 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
272
273 /* Trim ICV */
274 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - TKIP_ICV_LEN);
275
276 /* Remove IV */
277 memmove(skb->data + TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
278 skb_pull(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN);
279
280 return RX_CONTINUE;
281 }
282
283
284 static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *scratch,
285 int encrypted)
286 {
287 __le16 mask_fc;
288 int a4_included, mgmt;
289 u8 qos_tid;
290 u8 *b_0, *aad;
291 u16 data_len, len_a;
292 unsigned int hdrlen;
293 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
294
295 memset(scratch, 0, 6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
296
297 b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
298 aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
299
300 /*
301 * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
302 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
303 */
304 mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control);
305 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
306 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
307 IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
308 if (!mgmt)
309 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
310 mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
311
312 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
313 len_a = hdrlen - 2;
314 a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control);
315
316 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
317 qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) & IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
318 else
319 qos_tid = 0;
320
321 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - CCMP_HDR_LEN;
322 if (encrypted)
323 data_len -= CCMP_MIC_LEN;
324
325 /* First block, b_0 */
326 b_0[0] = 0x59; /* flags: Adata: 1, M: 011, L: 001 */
327 /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
328 * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
329 */
330 b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
331 memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
332 memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
333 /* l(m) */
334 put_unaligned_be16(data_len, &b_0[14]);
335
336 /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
337 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
338 put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]);
339 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
340 memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
341
342 /* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
343 aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
344 aad[23] = 0;
345
346 if (a4_included) {
347 memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
348 aad[30] = qos_tid;
349 aad[31] = 0;
350 } else {
351 memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
352 aad[24] = qos_tid;
353 }
354 }
355
356
357 static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id)
358 {
359 hdr[0] = pn[5];
360 hdr[1] = pn[4];
361 hdr[2] = 0;
362 hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
363 hdr[4] = pn[3];
364 hdr[5] = pn[2];
365 hdr[6] = pn[1];
366 hdr[7] = pn[0];
367 }
368
369
370 static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
371 {
372 pn[0] = hdr[7];
373 pn[1] = hdr[6];
374 pn[2] = hdr[5];
375 pn[3] = hdr[4];
376 pn[4] = hdr[1];
377 pn[5] = hdr[0];
378 }
379
380
381 static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
382 {
383 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
384 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
385 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
386 int hdrlen, len, tail;
387 u8 *pos;
388 u8 pn[6];
389 u64 pn64;
390 u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
391
392 if (info->control.hw_key &&
393 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
394 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
395 /*
396 * hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP
397 * header or MIC fields
398 */
399 return 0;
400 }
401
402 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
403 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
404
405 if (info->control.hw_key)
406 tail = 0;
407 else
408 tail = CCMP_MIC_LEN;
409
410 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
411 skb_headroom(skb) < CCMP_HDR_LEN))
412 return -1;
413
414 pos = skb_push(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN);
415 memmove(pos, pos + CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
416
417 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
418 if (info->control.hw_key &&
419 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
420 return 0;
421
422 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) pos;
423 pos += hdrlen;
424
425 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.ccmp.tx_pn);
426
427 pn[5] = pn64;
428 pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
429 pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
430 pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
431 pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
432 pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
433
434 ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
435
436 /* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */
437 if (info->control.hw_key)
438 return 0;
439
440 pos += CCMP_HDR_LEN;
441 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 0);
442 ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch, pos, len,
443 pos, skb_put(skb, CCMP_MIC_LEN));
444
445 return 0;
446 }
447
448
449 ieee80211_tx_result
450 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
451 {
452 struct sk_buff *skb;
453
454 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
455
456 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
457 if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
458 return TX_DROP;
459 }
460
461 return TX_CONTINUE;
462 }
463
464
465 ieee80211_rx_result
466 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
467 {
468 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
469 int hdrlen;
470 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
471 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
472 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
473 u8 pn[CCMP_PN_LEN];
474 int data_len;
475 int queue;
476
477 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
478
479 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
480 !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(hdr))
481 return RX_CONTINUE;
482
483 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - CCMP_HDR_LEN - CCMP_MIC_LEN;
484 if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
485 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
486
487 ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
488
489 queue = rx->security_idx;
490
491 if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) {
492 key->u.ccmp.replays++;
493 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
494 }
495
496 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
497 u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
498 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
499 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 1);
500
501 if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
502 key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch,
503 skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN, data_len,
504 skb->data + skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN,
505 skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN))
506 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
507 }
508
509 memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
510
511 /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
512 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN);
513 memmove(skb->data + CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
514 skb_pull(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN);
515
516 return RX_CONTINUE;
517 }
518
519
520 static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad)
521 {
522 /* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */
523
524 /* FC type/subtype */
525 aad[0] = skb->data[0];
526 /* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */
527 aad[1] = skb->data[1] & ~(BIT(4) | BIT(5) | BIT(6));
528 /* A1 || A2 || A3 */
529 memcpy(aad + 2, skb->data + 4, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
530 }
531
532
533 static inline void bip_ipn_set64(u8 *d, u64 pn)
534 {
535 *d++ = pn;
536 *d++ = pn >> 8;
537 *d++ = pn >> 16;
538 *d++ = pn >> 24;
539 *d++ = pn >> 32;
540 *d = pn >> 40;
541 }
542
543 static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s)
544 {
545 *d++ = s[5];
546 *d++ = s[4];
547 *d++ = s[3];
548 *d++ = s[2];
549 *d++ = s[1];
550 *d = s[0];
551 }
552
553
554 ieee80211_tx_result
555 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
556 {
557 struct sk_buff *skb;
558 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
559 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
560 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
561 u8 aad[20];
562 u64 pn64;
563
564 if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
565 return TX_DROP;
566
567 skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
568
569 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
570
571 if (info->control.hw_key)
572 return TX_CONTINUE;
573
574 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
575 return TX_DROP;
576
577 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
578 mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
579 mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
580 mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
581
582 /* PN = PN + 1 */
583 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn);
584
585 bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
586
587 bip_aad(skb, aad);
588
589 /*
590 * MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64)
591 */
592 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
593 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
594
595 return TX_CONTINUE;
596 }
597
598
599 ieee80211_rx_result
600 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
601 {
602 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
603 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
604 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
605 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
606 u8 aad[20], mic[8], ipn[6];
607 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
608
609 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
610 return RX_CONTINUE;
611
612 if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
613 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
614
615 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *)
616 (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
617 if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
618 mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
619 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
620
621 bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
622
623 if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
624 key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
625 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
626 }
627
628 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
629 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
630 bip_aad(skb, aad);
631 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
632 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
633 if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
634 key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
635 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
636 }
637 }
638
639 memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
640
641 /* Remove MMIE */
642 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
643
644 return RX_CONTINUE;
645 }