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1 /*
2 * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
3 * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
4 * Copyright (C) 2016 Intel Deutschland GmbH
5 *
6 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
7 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
8 * published by the Free Software Foundation.
9 */
10
11 #include <linux/netdevice.h>
12 #include <linux/types.h>
13 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
14 #include <linux/compiler.h>
15 #include <linux/ieee80211.h>
16 #include <linux/gfp.h>
17 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
18 #include <net/mac80211.h>
19 #include <crypto/aes.h>
20
21 #include "ieee80211_i.h"
22 #include "michael.h"
23 #include "tkip.h"
24 #include "aes_ccm.h"
25 #include "aes_cmac.h"
26 #include "aes_gmac.h"
27 #include "aes_gcm.h"
28 #include "wpa.h"
29
30 ieee80211_tx_result
31 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
32 {
33 u8 *data, *key, *mic;
34 size_t data_len;
35 unsigned int hdrlen;
36 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
37 struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
38 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
39 int tail;
40
41 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
42 if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
43 skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
44 return TX_CONTINUE;
45
46 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
47 if (skb->len < hdrlen)
48 return TX_DROP;
49
50 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
51 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen;
52
53 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) {
54 /* Need to use software crypto for the test */
55 info->control.hw_key = NULL;
56 }
57
58 if (info->control.hw_key &&
59 (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_DONTFRAG ||
60 ieee80211_hw_check(&tx->local->hw, SUPPORTS_TX_FRAG)) &&
61 !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC)) {
62 /* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC */
63 return TX_CONTINUE;
64 }
65
66 tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
67 if (!info->control.hw_key)
68 tail += IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
69
70 if (WARN(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
71 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN,
72 "mmic: not enough head/tail (%d/%d,%d/%d)\n",
73 skb_headroom(skb), IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN,
74 skb_tailroom(skb), tail))
75 return TX_DROP;
76
77 key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY];
78 mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
79 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
80 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE))
81 mic[0]++;
82
83 return TX_CONTINUE;
84 }
85
86
87 ieee80211_rx_result
88 ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
89 {
90 u8 *data, *key = NULL;
91 size_t data_len;
92 unsigned int hdrlen;
93 u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN];
94 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
95 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
96 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
97
98 /*
99 * it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other
100 * than data frames.
101 */
102 if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
103 return RX_CONTINUE;
104
105 /*
106 * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or
107 * the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely
108 * on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a
109 * MIC failure report.
110 */
111 if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
112 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
113 goto mic_fail_no_key;
114
115 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) && rx->key &&
116 rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP)
117 goto update_iv;
118
119 return RX_CONTINUE;
120 }
121
122 /*
123 * Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even
124 * though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no
125 * MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures.
126 */
127 if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
128 !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
129 return RX_CONTINUE;
130
131 if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) {
132 /*
133 * APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC
134 * errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for
135 * group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast
136 * frames in the BSS.
137 */
138 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
139 }
140
141 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
142 goto mic_fail;
143
144 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
145 if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
146 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
147
148 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
149 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
150 hdr = (void *)skb->data;
151
152 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
153 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
154 key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
155 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
156 if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0)
157 goto mic_fail;
158
159 /* remove Michael MIC from payload */
160 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
161
162 update_iv:
163 /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
164 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
165 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
166
167 return RX_CONTINUE;
168
169 mic_fail:
170 rx->key->u.tkip.mic_failures++;
171
172 mic_fail_no_key:
173 /*
174 * In some cases the key can be unset - e.g. a multicast packet, in
175 * a driver that supports HW encryption. Send up the key idx only if
176 * the key is set.
177 */
178 cfg80211_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata->dev, hdr->addr2,
179 is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) ?
180 NL80211_KEYTYPE_GROUP :
181 NL80211_KEYTYPE_PAIRWISE,
182 rx->key ? rx->key->conf.keyidx : -1,
183 NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
184 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
185 }
186
187 static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
188 {
189 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
190 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
191 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
192 unsigned int hdrlen;
193 int len, tail;
194 u64 pn;
195 u8 *pos;
196
197 if (info->control.hw_key &&
198 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
199 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
200 /* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */
201 return 0;
202 }
203
204 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
205 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
206
207 if (info->control.hw_key)
208 tail = 0;
209 else
210 tail = IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
211
212 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
213 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN))
214 return -1;
215
216 pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
217 memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
218 pos += hdrlen;
219
220 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
221 if (info->control.hw_key &&
222 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
223 return 0;
224
225 /* Increase IV for the frame */
226 pn = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
227 pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, &key->conf, pn);
228
229 /* hwaccel - with software IV */
230 if (info->control.hw_key)
231 return 0;
232
233 /* Add room for ICV */
234 skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
235
236 return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(tx->local->wep_tx_tfm,
237 key, skb, pos, len);
238 }
239
240
241 ieee80211_tx_result
242 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
243 {
244 struct sk_buff *skb;
245
246 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
247
248 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
249 if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
250 return TX_DROP;
251 }
252
253 return TX_CONTINUE;
254 }
255
256
257 ieee80211_rx_result
258 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
259 {
260 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data;
261 int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0;
262 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
263 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
264 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
265
266 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
267
268 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
269 return RX_CONTINUE;
270
271 if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
272 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
273
274 /* it may be possible to optimize this a bit more */
275 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
276 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
277 hdr = (void *)skb->data;
278
279 /*
280 * Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption.
281 * In the case where hardware checks the IV as well,
282 * we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt()
283 */
284 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)
285 hwaccel = 1;
286
287 res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(rx->local->wep_rx_tfm,
288 key, skb->data + hdrlen,
289 skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
290 hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx,
291 &rx->tkip_iv32,
292 &rx->tkip_iv16);
293 if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
294 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
295
296 /* Trim ICV */
297 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ICV_STRIPPED))
298 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
299
300 /* Remove IV */
301 memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
302 skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
303
304 return RX_CONTINUE;
305 }
306
307
308 static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad)
309 {
310 __le16 mask_fc;
311 int a4_included, mgmt;
312 u8 qos_tid;
313 u16 len_a;
314 unsigned int hdrlen;
315 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
316
317 /*
318 * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
319 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
320 */
321 mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control);
322 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
323 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
324 IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
325 if (!mgmt)
326 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
327 mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
328
329 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
330 len_a = hdrlen - 2;
331 a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control);
332
333 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
334 qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) & IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
335 else
336 qos_tid = 0;
337
338 /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC
339 * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived
340 * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the
341 * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take
342 * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting
343 * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs.
344 */
345 b_0[0] = 0x1;
346
347 /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
348 * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
349 */
350 b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
351 memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
352 memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
353
354 /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
355 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
356 put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]);
357 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
358 memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
359
360 /* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
361 aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
362 aad[23] = 0;
363
364 if (a4_included) {
365 memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
366 aad[30] = qos_tid;
367 aad[31] = 0;
368 } else {
369 memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
370 aad[24] = qos_tid;
371 }
372 }
373
374
375 static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id)
376 {
377 hdr[0] = pn[5];
378 hdr[1] = pn[4];
379 hdr[2] = 0;
380 hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
381 hdr[4] = pn[3];
382 hdr[5] = pn[2];
383 hdr[6] = pn[1];
384 hdr[7] = pn[0];
385 }
386
387
388 static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
389 {
390 pn[0] = hdr[7];
391 pn[1] = hdr[6];
392 pn[2] = hdr[5];
393 pn[3] = hdr[4];
394 pn[4] = hdr[1];
395 pn[5] = hdr[0];
396 }
397
398
399 static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb,
400 unsigned int mic_len)
401 {
402 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
403 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
404 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
405 int hdrlen, len, tail;
406 u8 *pos;
407 u8 pn[6];
408 u64 pn64;
409 u8 aad[CCM_AAD_LEN];
410 u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
411
412 if (info->control.hw_key &&
413 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
414 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
415 !((info->control.hw_key->flags &
416 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) &&
417 ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) {
418 /*
419 * hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP
420 * header or MIC fields
421 */
422 return 0;
423 }
424
425 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
426 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
427
428 if (info->control.hw_key)
429 tail = 0;
430 else
431 tail = mic_len;
432
433 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
434 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
435 return -1;
436
437 pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
438 memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
439
440 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
441 if (info->control.hw_key &&
442 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
443 return 0;
444
445 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) pos;
446 pos += hdrlen;
447
448 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
449
450 pn[5] = pn64;
451 pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
452 pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
453 pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
454 pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
455 pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
456
457 ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
458
459 /* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */
460 if (info->control.hw_key)
461 return 0;
462
463 pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
464 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
465 return ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len,
466 skb_put(skb, mic_len), mic_len);
467 }
468
469
470 ieee80211_tx_result
471 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
472 unsigned int mic_len)
473 {
474 struct sk_buff *skb;
475
476 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
477
478 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
479 if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb, mic_len) < 0)
480 return TX_DROP;
481 }
482
483 return TX_CONTINUE;
484 }
485
486
487 ieee80211_rx_result
488 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx,
489 unsigned int mic_len)
490 {
491 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
492 int hdrlen;
493 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
494 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
495 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
496 u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN];
497 int data_len;
498 int queue;
499
500 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
501
502 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
503 !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb))
504 return RX_CONTINUE;
505
506 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
507 if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
508 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
509 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED)
510 mic_len = 0;
511 } else {
512 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
513 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
514 }
515
516 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len;
517 if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
518 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
519
520 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_PN_VALIDATED)) {
521 int res;
522
523 ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
524
525 queue = rx->security_idx;
526
527 res = memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue],
528 IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
529 if (res < 0 ||
530 (!res && !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN))) {
531 key->u.ccmp.replays++;
532 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
533 }
534
535 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
536 u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
537 u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
538 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
539 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
540
541 if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
542 key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad,
543 skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN,
544 data_len,
545 skb->data + skb->len - mic_len, mic_len))
546 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
547 }
548
549 memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
550 }
551
552 /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
553 if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - mic_len))
554 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
555 memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
556 skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
557
558 return RX_CONTINUE;
559 }
560
561 static void gcmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad)
562 {
563 __le16 mask_fc;
564 u8 qos_tid;
565 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
566
567 memcpy(j_0, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
568 memcpy(&j_0[ETH_ALEN], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
569 j_0[13] = 0;
570 j_0[14] = 0;
571 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] = 0x01;
572
573 /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
574 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC]
575 */
576 put_unaligned_be16(ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control) - 2, &aad[0]);
577 /* Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
578 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
579 */
580 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
581 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
582 IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
583 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
584 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
585 mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
586
587 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
588 memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
589
590 /* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
591 aad[22] = *((u8 *)&hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
592 aad[23] = 0;
593
594 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
595 qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) &
596 IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
597 else
598 qos_tid = 0;
599
600 if (ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control)) {
601 memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
602 aad[30] = qos_tid;
603 aad[31] = 0;
604 } else {
605 memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
606 aad[24] = qos_tid;
607 }
608 }
609
610 static inline void gcmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, const u8 *pn, int key_id)
611 {
612 hdr[0] = pn[5];
613 hdr[1] = pn[4];
614 hdr[2] = 0;
615 hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
616 hdr[4] = pn[3];
617 hdr[5] = pn[2];
618 hdr[6] = pn[1];
619 hdr[7] = pn[0];
620 }
621
622 static inline void gcmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, const u8 *hdr)
623 {
624 pn[0] = hdr[7];
625 pn[1] = hdr[6];
626 pn[2] = hdr[5];
627 pn[3] = hdr[4];
628 pn[4] = hdr[1];
629 pn[5] = hdr[0];
630 }
631
632 static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
633 {
634 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
635 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
636 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
637 int hdrlen, len, tail;
638 u8 *pos;
639 u8 pn[6];
640 u64 pn64;
641 u8 aad[GCM_AAD_LEN];
642 u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
643
644 if (info->control.hw_key &&
645 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
646 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
647 !((info->control.hw_key->flags &
648 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) &&
649 ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) {
650 /* hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for GCMP
651 * header or MIC fields
652 */
653 return 0;
654 }
655
656 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
657 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
658
659 if (info->control.hw_key)
660 tail = 0;
661 else
662 tail = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN;
663
664 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
665 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN))
666 return -1;
667
668 pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
669 memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
670 skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) +
671 IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
672
673 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
674 if (info->control.hw_key &&
675 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
676 return 0;
677
678 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)pos;
679 pos += hdrlen;
680
681 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
682
683 pn[5] = pn64;
684 pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
685 pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
686 pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
687 pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
688 pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
689
690 gcmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
691
692 /* hwaccel - with software GCMP header */
693 if (info->control.hw_key)
694 return 0;
695
696 pos += IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN;
697 gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad);
698 return ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, pos, len,
699 skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN));
700 }
701
702 ieee80211_tx_result
703 ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
704 {
705 struct sk_buff *skb;
706
707 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
708
709 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
710 if (gcmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
711 return TX_DROP;
712 }
713
714 return TX_CONTINUE;
715 }
716
717 ieee80211_rx_result
718 ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
719 {
720 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
721 int hdrlen;
722 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
723 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
724 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
725 u8 pn[IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN];
726 int data_len, queue, mic_len = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN;
727
728 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
729
730 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
731 !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb))
732 return RX_CONTINUE;
733
734 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
735 if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN))
736 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
737 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED)
738 mic_len = 0;
739 } else {
740 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
741 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
742 }
743
744 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len;
745 if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
746 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
747
748 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_PN_VALIDATED)) {
749 int res;
750
751 gcmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
752
753 queue = rx->security_idx;
754
755 res = memcmp(pn, key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue],
756 IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
757 if (res < 0 ||
758 (!res && !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN))) {
759 key->u.gcmp.replays++;
760 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
761 }
762
763 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
764 u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
765 u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
766 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
767 gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad);
768
769 if (ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(
770 key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad,
771 skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN,
772 data_len,
773 skb->data + skb->len -
774 IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN))
775 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
776 }
777
778 memcpy(key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
779 }
780
781 /* Remove GCMP header and MIC */
782 if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - mic_len))
783 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
784 memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
785 skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
786
787 return RX_CONTINUE;
788 }
789
790 static ieee80211_tx_result
791 ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
792 struct sk_buff *skb)
793 {
794 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
795 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
796 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
797 int hdrlen;
798 u8 *pos, iv_len = key->conf.iv_len;
799
800 if (info->control.hw_key &&
801 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
802 /* hwaccel has no need for preallocated head room */
803 return TX_CONTINUE;
804 }
805
806 if (unlikely(skb_headroom(skb) < iv_len &&
807 pskb_expand_head(skb, iv_len, 0, GFP_ATOMIC)))
808 return TX_DROP;
809
810 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
811
812 pos = skb_push(skb, iv_len);
813 memmove(pos, pos + iv_len, hdrlen);
814
815 return TX_CONTINUE;
816 }
817
818 static inline int ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(u8 *pn1, u8 *pn2, int len)
819 {
820 int i;
821
822 /* pn is little endian */
823 for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
824 if (pn1[i] < pn2[i])
825 return -1;
826 else if (pn1[i] > pn2[i])
827 return 1;
828 }
829
830 return 0;
831 }
832
833 static ieee80211_rx_result
834 ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
835 {
836 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
837 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
838 const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs = NULL;
839 int hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
840 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb);
841 int data_len;
842 u8 *rx_pn;
843 u8 *skb_pn;
844 u8 qos_tid;
845
846 if (!rx->sta || !rx->sta->cipher_scheme ||
847 !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
848 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
849
850 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
851 return RX_CONTINUE;
852
853 cs = rx->sta->cipher_scheme;
854
855 data_len = rx->skb->len - hdrlen - cs->hdr_len;
856
857 if (data_len < 0)
858 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
859
860 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
861 qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) &
862 IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
863 else
864 qos_tid = 0;
865
866 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
867 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
868
869 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
870
871 rx_pn = key->u.gen.rx_pn[qos_tid];
872 skb_pn = rx->skb->data + hdrlen + cs->pn_off;
873
874 if (ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(skb_pn, rx_pn, cs->pn_len) <= 0)
875 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
876
877 memcpy(rx_pn, skb_pn, cs->pn_len);
878
879 /* remove security header and MIC */
880 if (pskb_trim(rx->skb, rx->skb->len - cs->mic_len))
881 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
882
883 memmove(rx->skb->data + cs->hdr_len, rx->skb->data, hdrlen);
884 skb_pull(rx->skb, cs->hdr_len);
885
886 return RX_CONTINUE;
887 }
888
889 static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad)
890 {
891 __le16 mask_fc;
892 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
893
894 /* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */
895
896 /* FC type/subtype */
897 /* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */
898 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
899 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | IEEE80211_FCTL_PM |
900 IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
901 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *) &aad[0]);
902 /* A1 || A2 || A3 */
903 memcpy(aad + 2, &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
904 }
905
906
907 static inline void bip_ipn_set64(u8 *d, u64 pn)
908 {
909 *d++ = pn;
910 *d++ = pn >> 8;
911 *d++ = pn >> 16;
912 *d++ = pn >> 24;
913 *d++ = pn >> 32;
914 *d = pn >> 40;
915 }
916
917 static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s)
918 {
919 *d++ = s[5];
920 *d++ = s[4];
921 *d++ = s[3];
922 *d++ = s[2];
923 *d++ = s[1];
924 *d = s[0];
925 }
926
927
928 ieee80211_tx_result
929 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
930 {
931 struct sk_buff *skb;
932 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
933 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
934 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
935 u8 aad[20];
936 u64 pn64;
937
938 if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
939 return TX_DROP;
940
941 skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
942
943 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
944
945 if (info->control.hw_key)
946 return TX_CONTINUE;
947
948 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
949 return TX_DROP;
950
951 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
952 mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
953 mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
954 mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
955
956 /* PN = PN + 1 */
957 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
958
959 bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
960
961 bip_aad(skb, aad);
962
963 /*
964 * MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64)
965 */
966 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
967 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
968
969 return TX_CONTINUE;
970 }
971
972 ieee80211_tx_result
973 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
974 {
975 struct sk_buff *skb;
976 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
977 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
978 struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
979 u8 aad[20];
980 u64 pn64;
981
982 if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
983 return TX_DROP;
984
985 skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
986
987 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
988
989 if (info->control.hw_key)
990 return TX_CONTINUE;
991
992 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
993 return TX_DROP;
994
995 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *)skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
996 mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
997 mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
998 mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
999
1000 /* PN = PN + 1 */
1001 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
1002
1003 bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
1004
1005 bip_aad(skb, aad);
1006
1007 /* MIC = AES-256-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128)
1008 */
1009 ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
1010 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
1011
1012 return TX_CONTINUE;
1013 }
1014
1015 ieee80211_rx_result
1016 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
1017 {
1018 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
1019 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
1020 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
1021 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
1022 u8 aad[20], mic[8], ipn[6];
1023 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
1024
1025 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
1026 return RX_CONTINUE;
1027
1028 /* management frames are already linear */
1029
1030 if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
1031 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1032
1033 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *)
1034 (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
1035 if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
1036 mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
1037 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
1038
1039 bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
1040
1041 if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
1042 key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
1043 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1044 }
1045
1046 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
1047 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
1048 bip_aad(skb, aad);
1049 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
1050 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
1051 if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
1052 key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
1053 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1054 }
1055 }
1056
1057 memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
1058
1059 /* Remove MMIE */
1060 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
1061
1062 return RX_CONTINUE;
1063 }
1064
1065 ieee80211_rx_result
1066 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
1067 {
1068 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
1069 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
1070 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
1071 struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
1072 u8 aad[20], mic[16], ipn[6];
1073 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
1074
1075 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
1076 return RX_CONTINUE;
1077
1078 /* management frames are already linear */
1079
1080 if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
1081 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1082
1083 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *)
1084 (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
1085 if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
1086 mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
1087 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
1088
1089 bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
1090
1091 if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
1092 key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
1093 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1094 }
1095
1096 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
1097 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
1098 bip_aad(skb, aad);
1099 ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
1100 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
1101 if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
1102 key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
1103 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1104 }
1105 }
1106
1107 memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
1108
1109 /* Remove MMIE */
1110 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
1111
1112 return RX_CONTINUE;
1113 }
1114
1115 ieee80211_tx_result
1116 ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
1117 {
1118 struct sk_buff *skb;
1119 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
1120 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
1121 struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
1122 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
1123 u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN];
1124 u64 pn64;
1125 u8 nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN];
1126
1127 if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
1128 return TX_DROP;
1129
1130 skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
1131
1132 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
1133
1134 if (info->control.hw_key)
1135 return TX_CONTINUE;
1136
1137 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
1138 return TX_DROP;
1139
1140 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *)skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
1141 mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
1142 mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
1143 mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
1144
1145 /* PN = PN + 1 */
1146 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
1147
1148 bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
1149
1150 bip_aad(skb, aad);
1151
1152 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
1153 memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
1154 bip_ipn_swap(nonce + ETH_ALEN, mmie->sequence_number);
1155
1156 /* MIC = AES-GMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128) */
1157 if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce,
1158 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic) < 0)
1159 return TX_DROP;
1160
1161 return TX_CONTINUE;
1162 }
1163
1164 ieee80211_rx_result
1165 ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
1166 {
1167 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
1168 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
1169 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
1170 struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
1171 u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN], mic[GMAC_MIC_LEN], ipn[6], nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN];
1172 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
1173
1174 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
1175 return RX_CONTINUE;
1176
1177 /* management frames are already linear */
1178
1179 if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
1180 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1181
1182 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *)
1183 (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
1184 if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
1185 mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
1186 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
1187
1188 bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
1189
1190 if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
1191 key->u.aes_gmac.replays++;
1192 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1193 }
1194
1195 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
1196 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
1197 bip_aad(skb, aad);
1198
1199 memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
1200 memcpy(nonce + ETH_ALEN, ipn, 6);
1201
1202 if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce,
1203 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24,
1204 mic) < 0 ||
1205 memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
1206 key->u.aes_gmac.icverrors++;
1207 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1208 }
1209 }
1210
1211 memcpy(key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
1212
1213 /* Remove MMIE */
1214 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
1215
1216 return RX_CONTINUE;
1217 }
1218
1219 ieee80211_tx_result
1220 ieee80211_crypto_hw_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
1221 {
1222 struct sk_buff *skb;
1223 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = NULL;
1224 ieee80211_tx_result res;
1225
1226 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
1227 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
1228
1229 /* handle hw-only algorithm */
1230 if (!info->control.hw_key)
1231 return TX_DROP;
1232
1233 if (tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_CIPHER_SCHEME) {
1234 res = ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(tx, skb);
1235 if (res != TX_CONTINUE)
1236 return res;
1237 }
1238 }
1239
1240 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
1241
1242 return TX_CONTINUE;
1243 }
1244
1245 ieee80211_rx_result
1246 ieee80211_crypto_hw_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
1247 {
1248 if (rx->sta && rx->sta->cipher_scheme)
1249 return ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(rx);
1250
1251 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
1252 }