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1 #
2 # Security configuration
3 #
4
5 menu "Security options"
6
7 source security/keys/Kconfig
8
9 config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
10 bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
11 default n
12 help
13 This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
14 syslog via dmesg(8).
15
16 If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
17 unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
18
19 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
20
21 config SECURITY
22 bool "Enable different security models"
23 depends on SYSFS
24 depends on MULTIUSER
25 help
26 This allows you to choose different security modules to be
27 configured into your kernel.
28
29 If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
30 model will be used.
31
32 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
33
34 config SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
35 depends on SECURITY
36 bool
37 default n
38
39 config SECURITYFS
40 bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
41 help
42 This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by
43 the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider. It is
44 not used by SELinux or SMACK.
45
46 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
47
48 config SECURITY_NETWORK
49 bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
50 depends on SECURITY
51 help
52 This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
53 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
54 implement socket and networking access controls.
55 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
56
57 config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
58 bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode"
59 depends on X86_64 && !UML
60 help
61 This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by
62 ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped
63 into userspace.
64
65 See Documentation/x86/pagetable-isolation.txt for more details.
66
67 config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
68 bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"
69 depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND
70 help
71 This enables the Infiniband security hooks.
72 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
73 implement Infiniband access controls.
74 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
75
76 config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
77 bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
78 depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
79 help
80 This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
81 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
82 implement per-packet access controls based on labels
83 derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are
84 designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
85 to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
86 IPSec.
87 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
88
89 config SECURITY_PATH
90 bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
91 depends on SECURITY
92 help
93 This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
94 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
95 implement pathname based access controls.
96 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
97
98 config INTEL_TXT
99 bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
100 depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
101 help
102 This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
103 Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
104 Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
105 of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
106 will have no effect.
107
108 Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
109 initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to
110 create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
111 helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
112 correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
113 of the kernel itself.
114
115 Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
116 confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
117 it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
118 providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.
119
120 See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
121 about Intel(R) TXT.
122 See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
123 See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable
124 Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
125
126 If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
127
128 config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
129 int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
130 depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
131 default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
132 default 65536
133 help
134 This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
135 from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
136 can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
137
138 For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
139 a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
140 On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
141 Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map
142 this low address space will need the permission specific to the
143 systems running LSM.
144
145 config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
146 bool
147 help
148 The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for
149 validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in
150 support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
151
152 config HARDENED_USERCOPY
153 bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
154 depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
155 select BUG
156 help
157 This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
158 copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
159 copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
160 are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
161 separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack,
162 or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes
163 of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
164
165 config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
166 bool "Refuse to copy allocations that span multiple pages"
167 depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
168 depends on EXPERT
169 help
170 When a multi-page allocation is done without __GFP_COMP,
171 hardened usercopy will reject attempts to copy it. There are,
172 however, several cases of this in the kernel that have not all
173 been removed. This config is intended to be used only while
174 trying to find such users.
175
176 config FORTIFY_SOURCE
177 bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
178 depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
179 help
180 Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
181 where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
182
183 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
184 bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
185 help
186 By default, the kernel can call many different userspace
187 binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel
188 interface. Some of these binaries are statically defined
189 either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration
190 option. However, some of these are dynamically created at
191 runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up.
192 To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these
193 calls through a single executable that can not have its name
194 changed.
195
196 Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant
197 "real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument
198 passed to it. If desired, this program can filter and pick
199 and choose what real programs are called.
200
201 If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be
202 disabled, choose this option and then set
203 STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string.
204
205 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
206 string "Path to the static usermode helper binary"
207 depends on STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
208 default "/sbin/usermode-helper"
209 help
210 The binary called by the kernel when any usermode helper
211 program is wish to be run. The "real" application's name will
212 be in the first argument passed to this program on the command
213 line.
214
215 If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
216 specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
217
218 source security/selinux/Kconfig
219 source security/smack/Kconfig
220 source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
221 source security/apparmor/Kconfig
222 source security/loadpin/Kconfig
223 source security/yama/Kconfig
224
225 source security/integrity/Kconfig
226
227 choice
228 prompt "Default security module"
229 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
230 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
231 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
232 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
233 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
234
235 help
236 Select the security module that will be used by default if the
237 kernel parameter security= is not specified.
238
239 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
240 bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
241
242 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
243 bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
244
245 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
246 bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
247
248 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
249 bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
250
251 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
252 bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
253
254 endchoice
255
256 config DEFAULT_SECURITY
257 string
258 default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
259 default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
260 default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
261 default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
262 default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
263
264 endmenu
265