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1 /*
2 * AppArmor security module
3 *
4 * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
5 *
6 * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
7 * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
10 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
11 * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
12 * License.
13 */
14
15 #include "include/apparmor.h"
16 #include "include/audit.h"
17 #include "include/file.h"
18 #include "include/match.h"
19 #include "include/path.h"
20 #include "include/policy.h"
21
22 struct file_perms nullperms;
23
24
25 /**
26 * audit_file_mask - convert mask to permission string
27 * @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL)
28 * @mask: permission mask to convert
29 */
30 static void audit_file_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask)
31 {
32 char str[10];
33
34 char *m = str;
35
36 if (mask & AA_EXEC_MMAP)
37 *m++ = 'm';
38 if (mask & (MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ))
39 *m++ = 'r';
40 if (mask & (MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_CHMOD |
41 AA_MAY_CHOWN))
42 *m++ = 'w';
43 else if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
44 *m++ = 'a';
45 if (mask & AA_MAY_CREATE)
46 *m++ = 'c';
47 if (mask & AA_MAY_DELETE)
48 *m++ = 'd';
49 if (mask & AA_MAY_LINK)
50 *m++ = 'l';
51 if (mask & AA_MAY_LOCK)
52 *m++ = 'k';
53 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
54 *m++ = 'x';
55 *m = '\0';
56
57 audit_log_string(ab, str);
58 }
59
60 /**
61 * file_audit_cb - call back for file specific audit fields
62 * @ab: audit_buffer (NOT NULL)
63 * @va: audit struct to audit values of (NOT NULL)
64 */
65 static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
66 {
67 struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
68 kuid_t fsuid = current_fsuid();
69
70 if (aad(sa)->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
71 audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
72 audit_file_mask(ab, aad(sa)->fs.request);
73 }
74 if (aad(sa)->fs.denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
75 audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
76 audit_file_mask(ab, aad(sa)->fs.denied);
77 }
78 if (aad(sa)->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
79 audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d",
80 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, fsuid));
81 audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d",
82 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, aad(sa)->fs.ouid));
83 }
84
85 if (aad(sa)->fs.target) {
86 audit_log_format(ab, " target=");
87 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->fs.target);
88 }
89 }
90
91 /**
92 * aa_audit_file - handle the auditing of file operations
93 * @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
94 * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
95 * @gfp: allocation flags
96 * @op: operation being mediated
97 * @request: permissions requested
98 * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
99 * @target: name of target (MAYBE NULL)
100 * @ouid: object uid
101 * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL)
102 * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code
103 *
104 * Returns: %0 or error on failure
105 */
106 int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms,
107 const char *op, u32 request, const char *name,
108 const char *target, kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error)
109 {
110 int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
111 DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK, op);
112
113 sa.u.tsk = NULL;
114 aad(&sa)->fs.request = request;
115 aad(&sa)->name = name;
116 aad(&sa)->fs.target = target;
117 aad(&sa)->fs.ouid = ouid;
118 aad(&sa)->info = info;
119 aad(&sa)->error = error;
120 sa.u.tsk = NULL;
121
122 if (likely(!aad(&sa)->error)) {
123 u32 mask = perms->audit;
124
125 if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
126 mask = 0xffff;
127
128 /* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
129 aad(&sa)->fs.request &= mask;
130
131 if (likely(!aad(&sa)->fs.request))
132 return 0;
133 type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
134 } else {
135 /* only report permissions that were denied */
136 aad(&sa)->fs.request = aad(&sa)->fs.request & ~perms->allow;
137 AA_BUG(!aad(&sa)->fs.request);
138
139 if (aad(&sa)->fs.request & perms->kill)
140 type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
141
142 /* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
143 if ((aad(&sa)->fs.request & perms->quiet) &&
144 AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
145 AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
146 aad(&sa)->fs.request &= ~perms->quiet;
147
148 if (!aad(&sa)->fs.request)
149 return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : aad(&sa)->error;
150 }
151
152 aad(&sa)->fs.denied = aad(&sa)->fs.request & ~perms->allow;
153 return aa_audit(type, profile, &sa, file_audit_cb);
154 }
155
156 /**
157 * map_old_perms - map old file perms layout to the new layout
158 * @old: permission set in old mapping
159 *
160 * Returns: new permission mapping
161 */
162 static u32 map_old_perms(u32 old)
163 {
164 u32 new = old & 0xf;
165 if (old & MAY_READ)
166 new |= AA_MAY_META_READ;
167 if (old & MAY_WRITE)
168 new |= AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_CREATE | AA_MAY_DELETE |
169 AA_MAY_CHMOD | AA_MAY_CHOWN;
170 if (old & 0x10)
171 new |= AA_MAY_LINK;
172 /* the old mapping lock and link_subset flags where overlaid
173 * and use was determined by part of a pair that they were in
174 */
175 if (old & 0x20)
176 new |= AA_MAY_LOCK | AA_LINK_SUBSET;
177 if (old & 0x40) /* AA_EXEC_MMAP */
178 new |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
179
180 return new;
181 }
182
183 /**
184 * compute_perms - convert dfa compressed perms to internal perms
185 * @dfa: dfa to compute perms for (NOT NULL)
186 * @state: state in dfa
187 * @cond: conditions to consider (NOT NULL)
188 *
189 * TODO: convert from dfa + state to permission entry, do computation conversion
190 * at load time.
191 *
192 * Returns: computed permission set
193 */
194 static struct file_perms compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
195 struct path_cond *cond)
196 {
197 struct file_perms perms;
198
199 /* FIXME: change over to new dfa format
200 * currently file perms are encoded in the dfa, new format
201 * splits the permissions from the dfa. This mapping can be
202 * done at profile load
203 */
204 perms.kill = 0;
205
206 if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), cond->uid)) {
207 perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_user_allow(dfa, state));
208 perms.audit = map_old_perms(dfa_user_audit(dfa, state));
209 perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state));
210 perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state);
211 } else {
212 perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_other_allow(dfa, state));
213 perms.audit = map_old_perms(dfa_other_audit(dfa, state));
214 perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_other_quiet(dfa, state));
215 perms.xindex = dfa_other_xindex(dfa, state);
216 }
217 perms.allow |= AA_MAY_META_READ;
218
219 /* change_profile wasn't determined by ownership in old mapping */
220 if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x80000000)
221 perms.allow |= AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE;
222 if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x40000000)
223 perms.allow |= AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
224
225 return perms;
226 }
227
228 /**
229 * aa_str_perms - find permission that match @name
230 * @dfa: to match against (MAYBE NULL)
231 * @state: state to start matching in
232 * @name: string to match against dfa (NOT NULL)
233 * @cond: conditions to consider for permission set computation (NOT NULL)
234 * @perms: Returns - the permissions found when matching @name
235 *
236 * Returns: the final state in @dfa when beginning @start and walking @name
237 */
238 unsigned int aa_str_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
239 const char *name, struct path_cond *cond,
240 struct file_perms *perms)
241 {
242 unsigned int state;
243 if (!dfa) {
244 *perms = nullperms;
245 return DFA_NOMATCH;
246 }
247
248 state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, name);
249 *perms = compute_perms(dfa, state, cond);
250
251 return state;
252 }
253
254 /**
255 * is_deleted - test if a file has been completely unlinked
256 * @dentry: dentry of file to test for deletion (NOT NULL)
257 *
258 * Returns: %1 if deleted else %0
259 */
260 static inline bool is_deleted(struct dentry *dentry)
261 {
262 if (d_unlinked(dentry) && d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_nlink == 0)
263 return 1;
264 return 0;
265 }
266
267 /**
268 * aa_path_perm - do permissions check & audit for @path
269 * @op: operation being checked
270 * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
271 * @path: path to check permissions of (NOT NULL)
272 * @flags: any additional path flags beyond what the profile specifies
273 * @request: requested permissions
274 * @cond: conditional info for this request (NOT NULL)
275 *
276 * Returns: %0 else error if access denied or other error
277 */
278 int aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile,
279 const struct path *path, int flags, u32 request,
280 struct path_cond *cond)
281 {
282 char *buffer = NULL;
283 struct file_perms perms = {};
284 const char *name, *info = NULL;
285 int error;
286
287 flags |= profile->path_flags | (S_ISDIR(cond->mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0);
288 error = aa_path_name(path, flags, &buffer, &name, &info);
289 if (error) {
290 if (error == -ENOENT && is_deleted(path->dentry)) {
291 /* Access to open files that are deleted are
292 * give a pass (implicit delegation)
293 */
294 error = 0;
295 info = NULL;
296 perms.allow = request;
297 }
298 } else {
299 aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, name, cond,
300 &perms);
301 if (request & ~perms.allow)
302 error = -EACCES;
303 }
304 error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, op, request, name, NULL,
305 cond->uid, info, error);
306 kfree(buffer);
307
308 return error;
309 }
310
311 /**
312 * xindex_is_subset - helper for aa_path_link
313 * @link: link permission set
314 * @target: target permission set
315 *
316 * test target x permissions are equal OR a subset of link x permissions
317 * this is done as part of the subset test, where a hardlink must have
318 * a subset of permissions that the target has.
319 *
320 * Returns: %1 if subset else %0
321 */
322 static inline bool xindex_is_subset(u32 link, u32 target)
323 {
324 if (((link & ~AA_X_UNSAFE) != (target & ~AA_X_UNSAFE)) ||
325 ((link & AA_X_UNSAFE) && !(target & AA_X_UNSAFE)))
326 return 0;
327
328 return 1;
329 }
330
331 /**
332 * aa_path_link - Handle hard link permission check
333 * @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
334 * @old_dentry: the target dentry (NOT NULL)
335 * @new_dir: directory the new link will be created in (NOT NULL)
336 * @new_dentry: the link being created (NOT NULL)
337 *
338 * Handle the permission test for a link & target pair. Permission
339 * is encoded as a pair where the link permission is determined
340 * first, and if allowed, the target is tested. The target test
341 * is done from the point of the link match (not start of DFA)
342 * making the target permission dependent on the link permission match.
343 *
344 * The subset test if required forces that permissions granted
345 * on link are a subset of the permission granted to target.
346 *
347 * Returns: %0 if allowed else error
348 */
349 int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry,
350 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
351 {
352 struct path link = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt, .dentry = new_dentry };
353 struct path target = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt, .dentry = old_dentry };
354 struct path_cond cond = {
355 d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_uid,
356 d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode
357 };
358 char *buffer = NULL, *buffer2 = NULL;
359 const char *lname, *tname = NULL, *info = NULL;
360 struct file_perms lperms, perms;
361 u32 request = AA_MAY_LINK;
362 unsigned int state;
363 int error;
364
365 lperms = nullperms;
366
367 /* buffer freed below, lname is pointer in buffer */
368 error = aa_path_name(&link, profile->path_flags, &buffer, &lname,
369 &info);
370 if (error)
371 goto audit;
372
373 /* buffer2 freed below, tname is pointer in buffer2 */
374 error = aa_path_name(&target, profile->path_flags, &buffer2, &tname,
375 &info);
376 if (error)
377 goto audit;
378
379 error = -EACCES;
380 /* aa_str_perms - handles the case of the dfa being NULL */
381 state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, lname,
382 &cond, &lperms);
383
384 if (!(lperms.allow & AA_MAY_LINK))
385 goto audit;
386
387 /* test to see if target can be paired with link */
388 state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file.dfa, state);
389 aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, tname, &cond, &perms);
390
391 /* force audit/quiet masks for link are stored in the second entry
392 * in the link pair.
393 */
394 lperms.audit = perms.audit;
395 lperms.quiet = perms.quiet;
396 lperms.kill = perms.kill;
397
398 if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_LINK)) {
399 info = "target restricted";
400 goto audit;
401 }
402
403 /* done if link subset test is not required */
404 if (!(perms.allow & AA_LINK_SUBSET))
405 goto done_tests;
406
407 /* Do link perm subset test requiring allowed permission on link are a
408 * subset of the allowed permissions on target.
409 */
410 aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, tname, &cond,
411 &perms);
412
413 /* AA_MAY_LINK is not considered in the subset test */
414 request = lperms.allow & ~AA_MAY_LINK;
415 lperms.allow &= perms.allow | AA_MAY_LINK;
416
417 request |= AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK & (lperms.allow & ~perms.allow);
418 if (request & ~lperms.allow) {
419 goto audit;
420 } else if ((lperms.allow & MAY_EXEC) &&
421 !xindex_is_subset(lperms.xindex, perms.xindex)) {
422 lperms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
423 request |= MAY_EXEC;
424 info = "link not subset of target";
425 goto audit;
426 }
427
428 done_tests:
429 error = 0;
430
431 audit:
432 error = aa_audit_file(profile, &lperms, OP_LINK, request,
433 lname, tname, cond.uid, info, error);
434 kfree(buffer);
435 kfree(buffer2);
436
437 return error;
438 }
439
440 /**
441 * aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file
442 * @op: operation being checked
443 * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
444 * @file: file to revalidate access permissions on (NOT NULL)
445 * @request: requested permissions
446 *
447 * Returns: %0 if access allowed else error
448 */
449 int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct file *file,
450 u32 request)
451 {
452 struct path_cond cond = {
453 .uid = file_inode(file)->i_uid,
454 .mode = file_inode(file)->i_mode
455 };
456
457 return aa_path_perm(op, profile, &file->f_path, PATH_DELEGATE_DELETED,
458 request, &cond);
459 }