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[mirror_ubuntu-hirsute-kernel.git] / security / apparmor / ipc.c
1 /*
2 * AppArmor security module
3 *
4 * This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation
5 *
6 * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
7 * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
10 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
11 * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
12 * License.
13 */
14
15 #include <linux/gfp.h>
16 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
17
18 #include "include/audit.h"
19 #include "include/capability.h"
20 #include "include/cred.h"
21 #include "include/policy.h"
22 #include "include/ipc.h"
23 #include "include/sig_names.h"
24
25 /**
26 * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string
27 * @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL)
28 * @mask: permission mask to convert
29 */
30 static void audit_ptrace_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask)
31 {
32 switch (mask) {
33 case MAY_READ:
34 audit_log_string(ab, "read");
35 break;
36 case MAY_WRITE:
37 audit_log_string(ab, "trace");
38 break;
39 case AA_MAY_BE_READ:
40 audit_log_string(ab, "readby");
41 break;
42 case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED:
43 audit_log_string(ab, "tracedby");
44 break;
45 }
46 }
47
48 /* call back to audit ptrace fields */
49 static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
50 {
51 struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
52
53 if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
54 audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
55 audit_ptrace_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request);
56
57 if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
58 audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
59 audit_ptrace_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied);
60 }
61 }
62 audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
63 aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
64 FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
65 }
66
67 /* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
68 /* TODO: conditionals */
69 static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
70 struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
71 struct common_audit_data *sa)
72 {
73 struct aa_perms perms = { };
74
75 aad(sa)->peer = peer;
76 aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
77 &perms);
78 aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
79 return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
80 }
81
82 static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
83 struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
84 struct common_audit_data *sa)
85 {
86 if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
87 !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
88 return 0;
89
90 return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
91 }
92
93 static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
94 struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
95 struct common_audit_data *sa)
96 {
97 if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
98 return 0;
99
100 if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
101 return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
102
103 /* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
104 if (&tracer->label == tracee)
105 return 0;
106
107 aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
108 aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
109 aad(sa)->request = 0;
110 aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
111 CAP_OPT_NONE);
112
113 return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
114 }
115
116 /**
117 * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
118 * @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing (NOT NULL)
119 * @tracee: task label to be traced
120 * @request: permission request
121 *
122 * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
123 */
124 int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
125 u32 request)
126 {
127 struct aa_profile *profile;
128 u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
129 DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
130
131 return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
132 profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
133 profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
134 }
135
136
137 static inline int map_signal_num(int sig)
138 {
139 if (sig > SIGRTMAX)
140 return SIGUNKNOWN;
141 else if (sig >= SIGRTMIN)
142 return sig - SIGRTMIN + SIGRT_BASE;
143 else if (sig < MAXMAPPED_SIG)
144 return sig_map[sig];
145 return SIGUNKNOWN;
146 }
147
148 /**
149 * audit_file_mask - convert mask to permission string
150 * @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL)
151 * @mask: permission mask to convert
152 */
153 static void audit_signal_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask)
154 {
155 if (mask & MAY_READ)
156 audit_log_string(ab, "receive");
157 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
158 audit_log_string(ab, "send");
159 }
160
161 /**
162 * audit_cb - call back for signal specific audit fields
163 * @ab: audit_buffer (NOT NULL)
164 * @va: audit struct to audit values of (NOT NULL)
165 */
166 static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
167 {
168 struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
169
170 if (aad(sa)->request & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
171 audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
172 audit_signal_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request);
173 if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
174 audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
175 audit_signal_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied);
176 }
177 }
178 if (aad(sa)->signal == SIGUNKNOWN)
179 audit_log_format(ab, "signal=unknown(%d)",
180 aad(sa)->unmappedsig);
181 else if (aad(sa)->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME)
182 audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[aad(sa)->signal]);
183 else
184 audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d",
185 aad(sa)->signal - SIGRT_BASE);
186 audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
187 aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
188 FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
189 }
190
191 static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
192 struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
193 struct common_audit_data *sa)
194 {
195 struct aa_perms perms;
196 unsigned int state;
197
198 if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
199 !PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL))
200 return 0;
201
202 aad(sa)->peer = peer;
203 /* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */
204 state = aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa,
205 profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL],
206 aad(sa)->signal);
207 aa_label_match(profile, peer, state, false, request, &perms);
208 aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
209 return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_signal_cb);
210 }
211
212 int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig)
213 {
214 struct aa_profile *profile;
215 DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SIGNAL);
216
217 aad(&sa)->signal = map_signal_num(sig);
218 aad(&sa)->unmappedsig = sig;
219 return xcheck_labels(sender, target, profile,
220 profile_signal_perm(profile, target, MAY_WRITE, &sa),
221 profile_signal_perm(profile, sender, MAY_READ, &sa));
222 }