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1 /*
2 * AppArmor security module
3 *
4 * This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation
5 *
6 * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
7 * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
10 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
11 * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
12 * License.
13 */
14
15 #include <linux/gfp.h>
16 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
17
18 #include "include/audit.h"
19 #include "include/capability.h"
20 #include "include/context.h"
21 #include "include/policy.h"
22 #include "include/ipc.h"
23 #include "include/sig_names.h"
24
25 /**
26 * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string
27 * @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL)
28 * @mask: permission mask to convert
29 */
30 static void audit_ptrace_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask)
31 {
32 switch (mask) {
33 case MAY_READ:
34 audit_log_string(ab, "read");
35 break;
36 case MAY_WRITE:
37 audit_log_string(ab, "trace");
38 break;
39 case AA_MAY_BE_READ:
40 audit_log_string(ab, "readby");
41 break;
42 case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED:
43 audit_log_string(ab, "tracedby");
44 break;
45 }
46 }
47
48 /* call back to audit ptrace fields */
49 static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
50 {
51 struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
52
53 if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
54 audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
55 audit_ptrace_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request);
56
57 if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
58 audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
59 audit_ptrace_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied);
60 }
61 }
62 audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
63 aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
64 FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
65 }
66
67 /* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
68 /* TODO: conditionals */
69 static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
70 struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
71 struct common_audit_data *sa)
72 {
73 struct aa_perms perms = { };
74
75 aad(sa)->peer = peer;
76 aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
77 &perms);
78 aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
79 return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
80 }
81
82 static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
83 struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
84 struct common_audit_data *sa)
85 {
86 if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
87 !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
88 return 0;
89
90 return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
91 }
92
93 static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
94 struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
95 struct common_audit_data *sa)
96 {
97 if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
98 return 0;
99
100 if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
101 return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
102
103 /* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
104 if (&tracer->label == tracee)
105 return 0;
106
107 aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
108 aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
109 aad(sa)->request = 0;
110 aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
111
112 return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
113 }
114
115 /**
116 * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
117 * @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing (NOT NULL)
118 * @tracee: task label to be traced
119 * @request: permission request
120 *
121 * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
122 */
123 int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
124 u32 request)
125 {
126 struct aa_profile *profile;
127 u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
128 DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
129
130 return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
131 profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
132 profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
133 }
134
135
136 static inline int map_signal_num(int sig)
137 {
138 if (sig > SIGRTMAX)
139 return SIGUNKNOWN;
140 else if (sig >= SIGRTMIN)
141 return sig - SIGRTMIN + 128; /* rt sigs mapped to 128 */
142 else if (sig < MAXMAPPED_SIG)
143 return sig_map[sig];
144 return SIGUNKNOWN;
145 }
146
147 /**
148 * audit_file_mask - convert mask to permission string
149 * @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL)
150 * @mask: permission mask to convert
151 */
152 static void audit_signal_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask)
153 {
154 if (mask & MAY_READ)
155 audit_log_string(ab, "receive");
156 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
157 audit_log_string(ab, "send");
158 }
159
160 /**
161 * audit_cb - call back for signal specific audit fields
162 * @ab: audit_buffer (NOT NULL)
163 * @va: audit struct to audit values of (NOT NULL)
164 */
165 static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
166 {
167 struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
168
169 if (aad(sa)->request & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
170 audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
171 audit_signal_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request);
172 if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
173 audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
174 audit_signal_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied);
175 }
176 }
177 if (aad(sa)->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIG)
178 audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[aad(sa)->signal]);
179 else
180 audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d",
181 aad(sa)->signal - 128);
182 audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
183 aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
184 FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
185 }
186
187 /* TODO: update to handle compound name&name2, conditionals */
188 static void profile_match_signal(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *label,
189 int signal, struct aa_perms *perms)
190 {
191 unsigned int state;
192
193 /* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */
194 state = aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa,
195 profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL],
196 signal);
197 state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, label);
198 aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, perms);
199 }
200
201 static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
202 struct aa_profile *peer, u32 request,
203 struct common_audit_data *sa)
204 {
205 struct aa_perms perms;
206
207 if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
208 !PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL))
209 return 0;
210
211 aad(sa)->peer = &peer->label;
212 profile_match_signal(profile, peer->base.hname, aad(sa)->signal,
213 &perms);
214 aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
215 return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_signal_cb);
216 }
217
218 static int aa_signal_cross_perm(struct aa_profile *sender,
219 struct aa_profile *target,
220 struct common_audit_data *sa)
221 {
222 return xcheck(profile_signal_perm(sender, target, MAY_WRITE, sa),
223 profile_signal_perm(target, sender, MAY_READ, sa));
224 }
225
226 int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig)
227 {
228 DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SIGNAL);
229
230 aad(&sa)->signal = map_signal_num(sig);
231 return xcheck_labels_profiles(sender, target, aa_signal_cross_perm,
232 &sa);
233 }