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1 /*
2 * AppArmor security module
3 *
4 * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks.
5 *
6 * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
7 * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
10 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
11 * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
12 * License.
13 */
14
15 #include <linux/security.h>
16 #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
17 #include <linux/mm.h>
18 #include <linux/mman.h>
19 #include <linux/mount.h>
20 #include <linux/namei.h>
21 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
22 #include <linux/ctype.h>
23 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
24 #include <linux/audit.h>
25 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
26 #include <net/sock.h>
27
28 #include "include/apparmor.h"
29 #include "include/apparmorfs.h"
30 #include "include/audit.h"
31 #include "include/capability.h"
32 #include "include/context.h"
33 #include "include/file.h"
34 #include "include/ipc.h"
35 #include "include/path.h"
36 #include "include/policy.h"
37 #include "include/procattr.h"
38
39 /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
40 int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
41
42 /*
43 * LSM hook functions
44 */
45
46 /*
47 * free the associated aa_task_cxt and put its profiles
48 */
49 static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
50 {
51 aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
52 cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
53 }
54
55 /*
56 * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials
57 */
58 static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
59 {
60 /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
61 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
62 if (!cxt)
63 return -ENOMEM;
64
65 cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
66 return 0;
67 }
68
69 /*
70 * prepare new aa_task_cxt for modification by prepare_cred block
71 */
72 static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
73 gfp_t gfp)
74 {
75 /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
76 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
77 if (!cxt)
78 return -ENOMEM;
79
80 aa_dup_task_context(cxt, cred_cxt(old));
81 cred_cxt(new) = cxt;
82 return 0;
83 }
84
85 /*
86 * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds
87 */
88 static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
89 {
90 const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = cred_cxt(old);
91 struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = cred_cxt(new);
92
93 aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt);
94 }
95
96 static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
97 unsigned int mode)
98 {
99 int error = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
100 if (error)
101 return error;
102
103 return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode);
104 }
105
106 static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
107 {
108 int error = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
109 if (error)
110 return error;
111
112 return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
113 }
114
115 /* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */
116 static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
117 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
118 {
119 struct aa_profile *profile;
120 const struct cred *cred;
121
122 rcu_read_lock();
123 cred = __task_cred(target);
124 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
125
126 *effective = cred->cap_effective;
127 *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
128 *permitted = cred->cap_permitted;
129
130 if (!unconfined(profile) && !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
131 *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow);
132 *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow);
133 }
134 rcu_read_unlock();
135
136 return 0;
137 }
138
139 static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
140 int cap, int audit)
141 {
142 struct aa_profile *profile;
143 /* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
144 int error = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
145 if (!error) {
146 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
147 if (!unconfined(profile))
148 error = aa_capable(profile, cap, audit);
149 }
150 return error;
151 }
152
153 /**
154 * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths
155 * @op: operation being checked
156 * @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL)
157 * @mask: requested permissions mask
158 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
159 *
160 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
161 */
162 static int common_perm(int op, struct path *path, u32 mask,
163 struct path_cond *cond)
164 {
165 struct aa_profile *profile;
166 int error = 0;
167
168 profile = __aa_current_profile();
169 if (!unconfined(profile))
170 error = aa_path_perm(op, profile, path, 0, mask, cond);
171
172 return error;
173 }
174
175 /**
176 * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
177 * @op: operation being checked
178 * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL)
179 * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
180 * @mask: requested permissions mask
181 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
182 *
183 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
184 */
185 static int common_perm_dir_dentry(int op, struct path *dir,
186 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
187 struct path_cond *cond)
188 {
189 struct path path = { dir->mnt, dentry };
190
191 return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
192 }
193
194 /**
195 * common_perm_mnt_dentry - common permission wrapper when mnt, dentry
196 * @op: operation being checked
197 * @mnt: mount point of dentry (NOT NULL)
198 * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
199 * @mask: requested permissions mask
200 *
201 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
202 */
203 static int common_perm_mnt_dentry(int op, struct vfsmount *mnt,
204 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
205 {
206 struct path path = { mnt, dentry };
207 struct path_cond cond = { dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
208 dentry->d_inode->i_mode
209 };
210
211 return common_perm(op, &path, mask, &cond);
212 }
213
214 /**
215 * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm
216 * @op: operation being checked
217 * @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL)
218 * @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL)
219 * @mask: requested permission mask
220 *
221 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
222 */
223 static int common_perm_rm(int op, struct path *dir,
224 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
225 {
226 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
227 struct path_cond cond = { };
228
229 if (!inode || !dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dentry))
230 return 0;
231
232 cond.uid = inode->i_uid;
233 cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
234
235 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
236 }
237
238 /**
239 * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create
240 * @op: operation being checked
241 * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL)
242 * @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL)
243 * @mask: request permission mask
244 * @mode: created file mode
245 *
246 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
247 */
248 static int common_perm_create(int op, struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
249 u32 mask, umode_t mode)
250 {
251 struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
252
253 if (!dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dir->dentry))
254 return 0;
255
256 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
257 }
258
259 static int apparmor_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
260 {
261 return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
262 }
263
264 static int apparmor_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
265 umode_t mode)
266 {
267 return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
268 S_IFDIR);
269 }
270
271 static int apparmor_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
272 {
273 return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
274 }
275
276 static int apparmor_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
277 umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
278 {
279 return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode);
280 }
281
282 static int apparmor_path_truncate(struct path *path)
283 {
284 struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
285 path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode
286 };
287
288 if (!path->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(path->dentry))
289 return 0;
290
291 return common_perm(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE,
292 &cond);
293 }
294
295 static int apparmor_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
296 const char *old_name)
297 {
298 return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
299 S_IFLNK);
300 }
301
302 static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
303 struct dentry *new_dentry)
304 {
305 struct aa_profile *profile;
306 int error = 0;
307
308 if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry))
309 return 0;
310
311 profile = aa_current_profile();
312 if (!unconfined(profile))
313 error = aa_path_link(profile, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
314 return error;
315 }
316
317 static int apparmor_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
318 struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
319 {
320 struct aa_profile *profile;
321 int error = 0;
322
323 if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry))
324 return 0;
325
326 profile = aa_current_profile();
327 if (!unconfined(profile)) {
328 struct path old_path = { old_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
329 struct path new_path = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
330 struct path_cond cond = { old_dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
331 old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode
332 };
333
334 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, profile, &old_path, 0,
335 MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ | MAY_WRITE |
336 AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_DELETE,
337 &cond);
338 if (!error)
339 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, profile, &new_path,
340 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE |
341 AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
342
343 }
344 return error;
345 }
346
347 static int apparmor_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode)
348 {
349 if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry))
350 return 0;
351
352 return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_CHMOD, path->mnt, path->dentry, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
353 }
354
355 static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
356 {
357 struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
358 path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode
359 };
360
361 if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry))
362 return 0;
363
364 return common_perm(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN, &cond);
365 }
366
367 static int apparmor_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
368 {
369 if (!mediated_filesystem(dentry))
370 return 0;
371
372 return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_GETATTR, mnt, dentry,
373 AA_MAY_META_READ);
374 }
375
376 static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
377 {
378 struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
379 struct aa_profile *profile;
380 int error = 0;
381
382 if (!mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry))
383 return 0;
384
385 /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
386 * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
387 * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
388 * actually execute the image.
389 */
390 if (current->in_execve) {
391 fcxt->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
392 return 0;
393 }
394
395 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
396 if (!unconfined(profile)) {
397 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
398 struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode };
399
400 error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, profile, &file->f_path, 0,
401 aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
402 /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
403 fcxt->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
404 }
405
406 return error;
407 }
408
409 static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
410 {
411 /* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */
412 file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_context(GFP_KERNEL);
413 if (!file->f_security)
414 return -ENOMEM;
415 return 0;
416
417 }
418
419 static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
420 {
421 struct aa_file_cxt *cxt = file->f_security;
422
423 aa_free_file_context(cxt);
424 }
425
426 static int common_file_perm(int op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
427 {
428 struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
429 struct aa_profile *profile, *fprofile = aa_cred_profile(file->f_cred);
430 int error = 0;
431
432 BUG_ON(!fprofile);
433
434 if (!file->f_path.mnt ||
435 !mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry))
436 return 0;
437
438 profile = __aa_current_profile();
439
440 /* revalidate access, if task is unconfined, or the cached cred
441 * doesn't match or if the request is for more permissions than
442 * was granted.
443 *
444 * Note: the test for !unconfined(fprofile) is to handle file
445 * delegation from unconfined tasks
446 */
447 if (!unconfined(profile) && !unconfined(fprofile) &&
448 ((fprofile != profile) || (mask & ~fcxt->allow)))
449 error = aa_file_perm(op, profile, file, mask);
450
451 return error;
452 }
453
454 static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
455 {
456 return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask);
457 }
458
459 static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
460 {
461 u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK;
462
463 if (cmd == F_WRLCK)
464 mask |= MAY_WRITE;
465
466 return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask);
467 }
468
469 static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
470 unsigned long flags)
471 {
472 int mask = 0;
473
474 if (!file || !file->f_security)
475 return 0;
476
477 if (prot & PROT_READ)
478 mask |= MAY_READ;
479 /*
480 * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
481 * write back to the files
482 */
483 if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
484 mask |= MAY_WRITE;
485 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
486 mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
487
488 return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
489 }
490
491 static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
492 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
493 {
494 return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
495 }
496
497 static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
498 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
499 {
500 return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot,
501 !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
502 }
503
504 static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
505 char **value)
506 {
507 int error = -ENOENT;
508 /* released below */
509 const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
510 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
511 struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
512
513 if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
514 profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->profile);
515 else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && cxt->previous)
516 profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->previous);
517 else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec)
518 profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->onexec);
519 else
520 error = -EINVAL;
521
522 if (profile)
523 error = aa_getprocattr(profile, value);
524
525 aa_put_profile(profile);
526 put_cred(cred);
527
528 return error;
529 }
530
531 static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
532 void *value, size_t size)
533 {
534 struct common_audit_data sa;
535 struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
536 char *command, *args = value;
537 size_t arg_size;
538 int error;
539
540 if (size == 0)
541 return -EINVAL;
542 /* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that
543 * the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1
544 * so that AppArmor can null terminate them
545 */
546 if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
547 if (size == PAGE_SIZE)
548 return -EINVAL;
549 args[size] = '\0';
550 }
551
552 /* task can only write its own attributes */
553 if (current != task)
554 return -EACCES;
555
556 args = value;
557 args = strim(args);
558 command = strsep(&args, " ");
559 if (!args)
560 return -EINVAL;
561 args = skip_spaces(args);
562 if (!*args)
563 return -EINVAL;
564
565 arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value);
566 if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
567 if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
568 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
569 !AA_DO_TEST);
570 } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
571 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
572 AA_DO_TEST);
573 } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
574 error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
575 !AA_DO_TEST);
576 } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
577 error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
578 AA_DO_TEST);
579 } else
580 goto fail;
581 } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
582 if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
583 error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
584 !AA_DO_TEST);
585 else
586 goto fail;
587 } else
588 /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
589 return -EINVAL;
590
591 if (!error)
592 error = size;
593 return error;
594
595 fail:
596 sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
597 sa.aad = &aad;
598 aad.profile = aa_current_profile();
599 aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
600 aad.info = name;
601 aad.error = -EINVAL;
602 aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL);
603 return -EINVAL;
604 }
605
606 static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
607 unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
608 {
609 struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
610 int error = 0;
611
612 if (!unconfined(profile))
613 error = aa_task_setrlimit(profile, task, resource, new_rlim);
614
615 return error;
616 }
617
618 static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
619 .name = "apparmor",
620
621 .ptrace_access_check = apparmor_ptrace_access_check,
622 .ptrace_traceme = apparmor_ptrace_traceme,
623 .capget = apparmor_capget,
624 .capable = apparmor_capable,
625
626 .path_link = apparmor_path_link,
627 .path_unlink = apparmor_path_unlink,
628 .path_symlink = apparmor_path_symlink,
629 .path_mkdir = apparmor_path_mkdir,
630 .path_rmdir = apparmor_path_rmdir,
631 .path_mknod = apparmor_path_mknod,
632 .path_rename = apparmor_path_rename,
633 .path_chmod = apparmor_path_chmod,
634 .path_chown = apparmor_path_chown,
635 .path_truncate = apparmor_path_truncate,
636 .inode_getattr = apparmor_inode_getattr,
637
638 .file_open = apparmor_file_open,
639 .file_permission = apparmor_file_permission,
640 .file_alloc_security = apparmor_file_alloc_security,
641 .file_free_security = apparmor_file_free_security,
642 .mmap_file = apparmor_mmap_file,
643 .mmap_addr = cap_mmap_addr,
644 .file_mprotect = apparmor_file_mprotect,
645 .file_lock = apparmor_file_lock,
646
647 .getprocattr = apparmor_getprocattr,
648 .setprocattr = apparmor_setprocattr,
649
650 .cred_alloc_blank = apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
651 .cred_free = apparmor_cred_free,
652 .cred_prepare = apparmor_cred_prepare,
653 .cred_transfer = apparmor_cred_transfer,
654
655 .bprm_set_creds = apparmor_bprm_set_creds,
656 .bprm_committing_creds = apparmor_bprm_committing_creds,
657 .bprm_committed_creds = apparmor_bprm_committed_creds,
658 .bprm_secureexec = apparmor_bprm_secureexec,
659
660 .task_setrlimit = apparmor_task_setrlimit,
661 };
662
663 /*
664 * AppArmor sysfs module parameters
665 */
666
667 static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
668 static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
669 #define param_check_aabool param_check_bool
670 static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
671 .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
672 .set = param_set_aabool,
673 .get = param_get_aabool
674 };
675
676 static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
677 static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
678 #define param_check_aauint param_check_uint
679 static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
680 .set = param_set_aauint,
681 .get = param_get_aauint
682 };
683
684 static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
685 static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
686 #define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool
687 static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
688 .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
689 .set = param_set_aalockpolicy,
690 .get = param_get_aalockpolicy
691 };
692
693 static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
694 static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
695
696 static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
697 static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
698
699 /* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
700 * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
701 */
702
703 /* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
704 enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
705 module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
706 &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
707
708 /* Debug mode */
709 bool aa_g_debug;
710 module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
711
712 /* Audit mode */
713 enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
714 module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
715 &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
716
717 /* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This
718 * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
719 */
720 bool aa_g_audit_header = 1;
721 module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
722 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
723
724 /* lock out loading/removal of policy
725 * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
726 * load policy, if lock_policy is set
727 */
728 bool aa_g_lock_policy;
729 module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
730 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
731
732 /* Syscall logging mode */
733 bool aa_g_logsyscall;
734 module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
735
736 /* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
737 unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
738 module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
739
740 /* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
741 * on the loaded policy is done.
742 */
743 bool aa_g_paranoid_load = 1;
744 module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool,
745 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
746
747 /* Boot time disable flag */
748 static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
749 module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO);
750
751 static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
752 {
753 unsigned long enabled;
754 int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
755 if (!error)
756 apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
757 return 1;
758 }
759
760 __setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
761
762 /* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
763 static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
764 {
765 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
766 return -EPERM;
767 if (aa_g_lock_policy)
768 return -EACCES;
769 return param_set_bool(val, kp);
770 }
771
772 static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
773 {
774 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
775 return -EPERM;
776 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
777 }
778
779 static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
780 {
781 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
782 return -EPERM;
783 return param_set_bool(val, kp);
784 }
785
786 static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
787 {
788 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
789 return -EPERM;
790 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
791 }
792
793 static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
794 {
795 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
796 return -EPERM;
797 return param_set_uint(val, kp);
798 }
799
800 static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
801 {
802 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
803 return -EPERM;
804 return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
805 }
806
807 static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
808 {
809 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
810 return -EPERM;
811
812 if (!apparmor_enabled)
813 return -EINVAL;
814
815 return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]);
816 }
817
818 static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
819 {
820 int i;
821 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
822 return -EPERM;
823
824 if (!apparmor_enabled)
825 return -EINVAL;
826
827 if (!val)
828 return -EINVAL;
829
830 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
831 if (strcmp(val, audit_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
832 aa_g_audit = i;
833 return 0;
834 }
835 }
836
837 return -EINVAL;
838 }
839
840 static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
841 {
842 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
843 return -EPERM;
844
845 if (!apparmor_enabled)
846 return -EINVAL;
847
848 return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]);
849 }
850
851 static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
852 {
853 int i;
854 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
855 return -EPERM;
856
857 if (!apparmor_enabled)
858 return -EINVAL;
859
860 if (!val)
861 return -EINVAL;
862
863 for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
864 if (strcmp(val, aa_profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
865 aa_g_profile_mode = i;
866 return 0;
867 }
868 }
869
870 return -EINVAL;
871 }
872
873 /*
874 * AppArmor init functions
875 */
876
877 /**
878 * set_init_cxt - set a task context and profile on the first task.
879 *
880 * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined
881 */
882 static int __init set_init_cxt(void)
883 {
884 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
885 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
886
887 cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
888 if (!cxt)
889 return -ENOMEM;
890
891 cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined);
892 cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
893
894 return 0;
895 }
896
897 static int __init apparmor_init(void)
898 {
899 int error;
900
901 if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable(&apparmor_ops)) {
902 aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter");
903 apparmor_enabled = 0;
904 return 0;
905 }
906
907 error = aa_alloc_root_ns();
908 if (error) {
909 AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
910 goto alloc_out;
911 }
912
913 error = set_init_cxt();
914 if (error) {
915 AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
916 goto register_security_out;
917 }
918
919 error = register_security(&apparmor_ops);
920 if (error) {
921 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
922 aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
923 cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
924 AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n");
925 goto register_security_out;
926 }
927
928 /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
929 apparmor_initialized = 1;
930 if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
931 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled");
932 else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL)
933 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled");
934 else
935 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized");
936
937 return error;
938
939 register_security_out:
940 aa_free_root_ns();
941
942 alloc_out:
943 aa_destroy_aafs();
944
945 apparmor_enabled = 0;
946 return error;
947 }
948
949 security_initcall(apparmor_init);