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Merge branch 'drm-next-4.8' of git://people.freedesktop.org/~agd5f/linux into drm...
[mirror_ubuntu-zesty-kernel.git] / security / apparmor / lsm.c
1 /*
2 * AppArmor security module
3 *
4 * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks.
5 *
6 * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
7 * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
10 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
11 * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
12 * License.
13 */
14
15 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
16 #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
17 #include <linux/mm.h>
18 #include <linux/mman.h>
19 #include <linux/mount.h>
20 #include <linux/namei.h>
21 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
22 #include <linux/ctype.h>
23 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
24 #include <linux/audit.h>
25 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
26 #include <net/sock.h>
27
28 #include "include/apparmor.h"
29 #include "include/apparmorfs.h"
30 #include "include/audit.h"
31 #include "include/capability.h"
32 #include "include/context.h"
33 #include "include/file.h"
34 #include "include/ipc.h"
35 #include "include/path.h"
36 #include "include/policy.h"
37 #include "include/procattr.h"
38
39 /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
40 int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
41
42 /*
43 * LSM hook functions
44 */
45
46 /*
47 * free the associated aa_task_cxt and put its profiles
48 */
49 static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
50 {
51 aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
52 cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
53 }
54
55 /*
56 * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials
57 */
58 static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
59 {
60 /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
61 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
62 if (!cxt)
63 return -ENOMEM;
64
65 cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
66 return 0;
67 }
68
69 /*
70 * prepare new aa_task_cxt for modification by prepare_cred block
71 */
72 static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
73 gfp_t gfp)
74 {
75 /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
76 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
77 if (!cxt)
78 return -ENOMEM;
79
80 aa_dup_task_context(cxt, cred_cxt(old));
81 cred_cxt(new) = cxt;
82 return 0;
83 }
84
85 /*
86 * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds
87 */
88 static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
89 {
90 const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = cred_cxt(old);
91 struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = cred_cxt(new);
92
93 aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt);
94 }
95
96 static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
97 unsigned int mode)
98 {
99 return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode);
100 }
101
102 static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
103 {
104 return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
105 }
106
107 /* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */
108 static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
109 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
110 {
111 struct aa_profile *profile;
112 const struct cred *cred;
113
114 rcu_read_lock();
115 cred = __task_cred(target);
116 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
117
118 /*
119 * cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will
120 * initialize effective and permitted.
121 */
122 if (!unconfined(profile) && !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
123 *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow);
124 *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow);
125 }
126 rcu_read_unlock();
127
128 return 0;
129 }
130
131 static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
132 int cap, int audit)
133 {
134 struct aa_profile *profile;
135 int error = 0;
136
137 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
138 if (!unconfined(profile))
139 error = aa_capable(profile, cap, audit);
140 return error;
141 }
142
143 /**
144 * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths
145 * @op: operation being checked
146 * @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL)
147 * @mask: requested permissions mask
148 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
149 *
150 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
151 */
152 static int common_perm(int op, const struct path *path, u32 mask,
153 struct path_cond *cond)
154 {
155 struct aa_profile *profile;
156 int error = 0;
157
158 profile = __aa_current_profile();
159 if (!unconfined(profile))
160 error = aa_path_perm(op, profile, path, 0, mask, cond);
161
162 return error;
163 }
164
165 /**
166 * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
167 * @op: operation being checked
168 * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL)
169 * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
170 * @mask: requested permissions mask
171 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
172 *
173 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
174 */
175 static int common_perm_dir_dentry(int op, const struct path *dir,
176 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
177 struct path_cond *cond)
178 {
179 struct path path = { dir->mnt, dentry };
180
181 return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
182 }
183
184 /**
185 * common_perm_path - common permission wrapper when mnt, dentry
186 * @op: operation being checked
187 * @path: location to check (NOT NULL)
188 * @mask: requested permissions mask
189 *
190 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
191 */
192 static inline int common_perm_path(int op, const struct path *path, u32 mask)
193 {
194 struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_uid,
195 d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode
196 };
197 if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry))
198 return 0;
199
200 return common_perm(op, path, mask, &cond);
201 }
202
203 /**
204 * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm
205 * @op: operation being checked
206 * @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL)
207 * @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL)
208 * @mask: requested permission mask
209 *
210 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
211 */
212 static int common_perm_rm(int op, const struct path *dir,
213 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
214 {
215 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
216 struct path_cond cond = { };
217
218 if (!inode || !mediated_filesystem(dentry))
219 return 0;
220
221 cond.uid = inode->i_uid;
222 cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
223
224 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
225 }
226
227 /**
228 * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create
229 * @op: operation being checked
230 * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL)
231 * @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL)
232 * @mask: request permission mask
233 * @mode: created file mode
234 *
235 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
236 */
237 static int common_perm_create(int op, const struct path *dir,
238 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, umode_t mode)
239 {
240 struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
241
242 if (!mediated_filesystem(dir->dentry))
243 return 0;
244
245 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
246 }
247
248 static int apparmor_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
249 {
250 return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
251 }
252
253 static int apparmor_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
254 umode_t mode)
255 {
256 return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
257 S_IFDIR);
258 }
259
260 static int apparmor_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
261 {
262 return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
263 }
264
265 static int apparmor_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
266 umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
267 {
268 return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode);
269 }
270
271 static int apparmor_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
272 {
273 return common_perm_path(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE);
274 }
275
276 static int apparmor_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
277 const char *old_name)
278 {
279 return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
280 S_IFLNK);
281 }
282
283 static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
284 struct dentry *new_dentry)
285 {
286 struct aa_profile *profile;
287 int error = 0;
288
289 if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry))
290 return 0;
291
292 profile = aa_current_profile();
293 if (!unconfined(profile))
294 error = aa_path_link(profile, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
295 return error;
296 }
297
298 static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
299 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
300 {
301 struct aa_profile *profile;
302 int error = 0;
303
304 if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry))
305 return 0;
306
307 profile = aa_current_profile();
308 if (!unconfined(profile)) {
309 struct path old_path = { old_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
310 struct path new_path = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
311 struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_uid,
312 d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode
313 };
314
315 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, profile, &old_path, 0,
316 MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ | MAY_WRITE |
317 AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_DELETE,
318 &cond);
319 if (!error)
320 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, profile, &new_path,
321 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE |
322 AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
323
324 }
325 return error;
326 }
327
328 static int apparmor_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
329 {
330 return common_perm_path(OP_CHMOD, path, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
331 }
332
333 static int apparmor_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
334 {
335 return common_perm_path(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN);
336 }
337
338 static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
339 {
340 return common_perm_path(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_META_READ);
341 }
342
343 static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
344 {
345 struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
346 struct aa_profile *profile;
347 int error = 0;
348
349 if (!mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry))
350 return 0;
351
352 /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
353 * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
354 * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
355 * actually execute the image.
356 */
357 if (current->in_execve) {
358 fcxt->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
359 return 0;
360 }
361
362 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
363 if (!unconfined(profile)) {
364 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
365 struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode };
366
367 error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, profile, &file->f_path, 0,
368 aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
369 /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
370 fcxt->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
371 }
372
373 return error;
374 }
375
376 static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
377 {
378 /* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */
379 file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_context(GFP_KERNEL);
380 if (!file->f_security)
381 return -ENOMEM;
382 return 0;
383
384 }
385
386 static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
387 {
388 struct aa_file_cxt *cxt = file->f_security;
389
390 aa_free_file_context(cxt);
391 }
392
393 static int common_file_perm(int op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
394 {
395 struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
396 struct aa_profile *profile, *fprofile = aa_cred_profile(file->f_cred);
397 int error = 0;
398
399 BUG_ON(!fprofile);
400
401 if (!file->f_path.mnt ||
402 !mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry))
403 return 0;
404
405 profile = __aa_current_profile();
406
407 /* revalidate access, if task is unconfined, or the cached cred
408 * doesn't match or if the request is for more permissions than
409 * was granted.
410 *
411 * Note: the test for !unconfined(fprofile) is to handle file
412 * delegation from unconfined tasks
413 */
414 if (!unconfined(profile) && !unconfined(fprofile) &&
415 ((fprofile != profile) || (mask & ~fcxt->allow)))
416 error = aa_file_perm(op, profile, file, mask);
417
418 return error;
419 }
420
421 static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
422 {
423 return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask);
424 }
425
426 static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
427 {
428 u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK;
429
430 if (cmd == F_WRLCK)
431 mask |= MAY_WRITE;
432
433 return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask);
434 }
435
436 static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
437 unsigned long flags)
438 {
439 int mask = 0;
440
441 if (!file || !file->f_security)
442 return 0;
443
444 if (prot & PROT_READ)
445 mask |= MAY_READ;
446 /*
447 * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
448 * write back to the files
449 */
450 if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
451 mask |= MAY_WRITE;
452 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
453 mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
454
455 return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
456 }
457
458 static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
459 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
460 {
461 return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
462 }
463
464 static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
465 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
466 {
467 return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot,
468 !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
469 }
470
471 static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
472 char **value)
473 {
474 int error = -ENOENT;
475 /* released below */
476 const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
477 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
478 struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
479
480 if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
481 profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->profile);
482 else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && cxt->previous)
483 profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->previous);
484 else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec)
485 profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->onexec);
486 else
487 error = -EINVAL;
488
489 if (profile)
490 error = aa_getprocattr(profile, value);
491
492 aa_put_profile(profile);
493 put_cred(cred);
494
495 return error;
496 }
497
498 static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
499 void *value, size_t size)
500 {
501 struct common_audit_data sa;
502 struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
503 char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value;
504 size_t arg_size;
505 int error;
506
507 if (size == 0)
508 return -EINVAL;
509 /* task can only write its own attributes */
510 if (current != task)
511 return -EACCES;
512
513 /* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
514 if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
515 /* null terminate */
516 largs = args = kmalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
517 if (!args)
518 return -ENOMEM;
519 memcpy(args, value, size);
520 args[size] = '\0';
521 }
522
523 error = -EINVAL;
524 args = strim(args);
525 command = strsep(&args, " ");
526 if (!args)
527 goto out;
528 args = skip_spaces(args);
529 if (!*args)
530 goto out;
531
532 arg_size = size - (args - (largs ? largs : (char *) value));
533 if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
534 if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
535 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
536 !AA_DO_TEST);
537 } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
538 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
539 AA_DO_TEST);
540 } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
541 error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
542 !AA_DO_TEST);
543 } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
544 error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
545 AA_DO_TEST);
546 } else
547 goto fail;
548 } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
549 if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
550 error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
551 !AA_DO_TEST);
552 else
553 goto fail;
554 } else
555 /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
556 goto fail;
557
558 if (!error)
559 error = size;
560 out:
561 kfree(largs);
562 return error;
563
564 fail:
565 sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
566 sa.aad = &aad;
567 aad.profile = aa_current_profile();
568 aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
569 aad.info = name;
570 aad.error = error = -EINVAL;
571 aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL);
572 goto out;
573 }
574
575 static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
576 unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
577 {
578 struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
579 int error = 0;
580
581 if (!unconfined(profile))
582 error = aa_task_setrlimit(profile, task, resource, new_rlim);
583
584 return error;
585 }
586
587 static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
588 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
589 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
590 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
591 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
592
593 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
594 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
595 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
596 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir),
597 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir),
598 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod),
599 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename),
600 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod),
601 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown),
602 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate),
603 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr),
604
605 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open),
606 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission),
607 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security),
608 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security),
609 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file),
610 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect),
611 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock),
612
613 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
614 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
615
616 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
617 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
618 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
619 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer),
620
621 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, apparmor_bprm_set_creds),
622 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds),
623 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds),
624 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, apparmor_bprm_secureexec),
625
626 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
627 };
628
629 /*
630 * AppArmor sysfs module parameters
631 */
632
633 static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
634 static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
635 #define param_check_aabool param_check_bool
636 static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
637 .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
638 .set = param_set_aabool,
639 .get = param_get_aabool
640 };
641
642 static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
643 static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
644 #define param_check_aauint param_check_uint
645 static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
646 .set = param_set_aauint,
647 .get = param_get_aauint
648 };
649
650 static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
651 static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
652 #define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool
653 static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
654 .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
655 .set = param_set_aalockpolicy,
656 .get = param_get_aalockpolicy
657 };
658
659 static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
660 static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
661
662 static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
663 static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
664
665 /* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
666 * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
667 */
668
669 /* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
670 enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
671 module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
672 &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
673
674 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
675 /* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */
676 bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT);
677 module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
678 #endif
679
680 /* Debug mode */
681 bool aa_g_debug;
682 module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
683
684 /* Audit mode */
685 enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
686 module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
687 &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
688
689 /* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This
690 * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
691 */
692 bool aa_g_audit_header = 1;
693 module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
694 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
695
696 /* lock out loading/removal of policy
697 * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
698 * load policy, if lock_policy is set
699 */
700 bool aa_g_lock_policy;
701 module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
702 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
703
704 /* Syscall logging mode */
705 bool aa_g_logsyscall;
706 module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
707
708 /* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
709 unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
710 module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
711
712 /* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
713 * on the loaded policy is done.
714 */
715 bool aa_g_paranoid_load = 1;
716 module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool,
717 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
718
719 /* Boot time disable flag */
720 static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
721 module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO);
722
723 static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
724 {
725 unsigned long enabled;
726 int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
727 if (!error)
728 apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
729 return 1;
730 }
731
732 __setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
733
734 /* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
735 static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
736 {
737 if (!policy_admin_capable())
738 return -EPERM;
739 return param_set_bool(val, kp);
740 }
741
742 static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
743 {
744 if (!policy_view_capable())
745 return -EPERM;
746 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
747 }
748
749 static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
750 {
751 if (!policy_admin_capable())
752 return -EPERM;
753 return param_set_bool(val, kp);
754 }
755
756 static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
757 {
758 if (!policy_view_capable())
759 return -EPERM;
760 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
761 }
762
763 static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
764 {
765 if (!policy_admin_capable())
766 return -EPERM;
767 return param_set_uint(val, kp);
768 }
769
770 static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
771 {
772 if (!policy_view_capable())
773 return -EPERM;
774 return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
775 }
776
777 static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
778 {
779 if (!policy_view_capable())
780 return -EPERM;
781
782 if (!apparmor_enabled)
783 return -EINVAL;
784
785 return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]);
786 }
787
788 static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
789 {
790 int i;
791 if (!policy_admin_capable())
792 return -EPERM;
793
794 if (!apparmor_enabled)
795 return -EINVAL;
796
797 if (!val)
798 return -EINVAL;
799
800 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
801 if (strcmp(val, audit_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
802 aa_g_audit = i;
803 return 0;
804 }
805 }
806
807 return -EINVAL;
808 }
809
810 static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
811 {
812 if (!policy_admin_capable())
813 return -EPERM;
814
815 if (!apparmor_enabled)
816 return -EINVAL;
817
818 return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]);
819 }
820
821 static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
822 {
823 int i;
824 if (!policy_admin_capable())
825 return -EPERM;
826
827 if (!apparmor_enabled)
828 return -EINVAL;
829
830 if (!val)
831 return -EINVAL;
832
833 for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
834 if (strcmp(val, aa_profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
835 aa_g_profile_mode = i;
836 return 0;
837 }
838 }
839
840 return -EINVAL;
841 }
842
843 /*
844 * AppArmor init functions
845 */
846
847 /**
848 * set_init_cxt - set a task context and profile on the first task.
849 *
850 * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined
851 */
852 static int __init set_init_cxt(void)
853 {
854 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
855 struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
856
857 cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
858 if (!cxt)
859 return -ENOMEM;
860
861 cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined);
862 cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
863
864 return 0;
865 }
866
867 static int __init apparmor_init(void)
868 {
869 int error;
870
871 if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable("apparmor")) {
872 aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter");
873 apparmor_enabled = 0;
874 return 0;
875 }
876
877 error = aa_alloc_root_ns();
878 if (error) {
879 AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
880 goto alloc_out;
881 }
882
883 error = set_init_cxt();
884 if (error) {
885 AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
886 aa_free_root_ns();
887 goto alloc_out;
888 }
889 security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks));
890
891 /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
892 apparmor_initialized = 1;
893 if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
894 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled");
895 else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL)
896 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled");
897 else
898 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized");
899
900 return error;
901
902 alloc_out:
903 aa_destroy_aafs();
904
905 apparmor_enabled = 0;
906 return error;
907 }
908
909 security_initcall(apparmor_init);