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[mirror_ubuntu-jammy-kernel.git] / security / integrity / evm / evm_crypto.c
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2 /*
3 * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
4 *
5 * Authors:
6 * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
7 * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
8 *
9 * File: evm_crypto.c
10 * Using root's kernel master key (kmk), calculate the HMAC
11 */
12
13 #include <linux/export.h>
14 #include <linux/crypto.h>
15 #include <linux/xattr.h>
16 #include <linux/evm.h>
17 #include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
18 #include <crypto/hash.h>
19 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
20 #include "evm.h"
21
22 #define EVMKEY "evm-key"
23 #define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128
24 static unsigned char evmkey[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
25 static const int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE;
26
27 struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
28 static struct crypto_shash *evm_tfm[HASH_ALGO__LAST];
29
30 static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex);
31
32 #define EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY 0
33
34 static unsigned long evm_set_key_flags;
35
36 static const char evm_hmac[] = "hmac(sha1)";
37
38 /**
39 * evm_set_key() - set EVM HMAC key from the kernel
40 * @key: pointer to a buffer with the key data
41 * @size: length of the key data
42 *
43 * This function allows setting the EVM HMAC key from the kernel
44 * without using the "encrypted" key subsystem keys. It can be used
45 * by the crypto HW kernel module which has its own way of managing
46 * keys.
47 *
48 * key length should be between 32 and 128 bytes long
49 */
50 int evm_set_key(void *key, size_t keylen)
51 {
52 int rc;
53
54 rc = -EBUSY;
55 if (test_and_set_bit(EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY, &evm_set_key_flags))
56 goto busy;
57 rc = -EINVAL;
58 if (keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
59 goto inval;
60 memcpy(evmkey, key, keylen);
61 evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_HMAC;
62 pr_info("key initialized\n");
63 return 0;
64 inval:
65 clear_bit(EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY, &evm_set_key_flags);
66 busy:
67 pr_err("key initialization failed\n");
68 return rc;
69 }
70 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_set_key);
71
72 static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo)
73 {
74 long rc;
75 const char *algo;
76 struct crypto_shash **tfm, *tmp_tfm = NULL;
77 struct shash_desc *desc;
78
79 if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
80 if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) {
81 pr_err_once("HMAC key is not set\n");
82 return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
83 }
84 tfm = &hmac_tfm;
85 algo = evm_hmac;
86 } else {
87 if (hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
88 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
89
90 tfm = &evm_tfm[hash_algo];
91 algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo];
92 }
93
94 if (*tfm)
95 goto alloc;
96 mutex_lock(&mutex);
97 if (*tfm)
98 goto unlock;
99
100 tmp_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD);
101 if (IS_ERR(tmp_tfm)) {
102 pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo,
103 PTR_ERR(tmp_tfm));
104 mutex_unlock(&mutex);
105 return ERR_CAST(tmp_tfm);
106 }
107 if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
108 rc = crypto_shash_setkey(tmp_tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len);
109 if (rc) {
110 crypto_free_shash(tmp_tfm);
111 mutex_unlock(&mutex);
112 return ERR_PTR(rc);
113 }
114 }
115 *tfm = tmp_tfm;
116 unlock:
117 mutex_unlock(&mutex);
118 alloc:
119 desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm),
120 GFP_KERNEL);
121 if (!desc) {
122 crypto_free_shash(tmp_tfm);
123 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
124 }
125
126 desc->tfm = *tfm;
127
128 rc = crypto_shash_init(desc);
129 if (rc) {
130 crypto_free_shash(tmp_tfm);
131 kfree(desc);
132 return ERR_PTR(rc);
133 }
134 return desc;
135 }
136
137 /* Protect against 'cutting & pasting' security.evm xattr, include inode
138 * specific info.
139 *
140 * (Additional directory/file metadata needs to be added for more complete
141 * protection.)
142 */
143 static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
144 char type, char *digest)
145 {
146 struct h_misc {
147 unsigned long ino;
148 __u32 generation;
149 uid_t uid;
150 gid_t gid;
151 umode_t mode;
152 } hmac_misc;
153
154 memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc));
155 /* Don't include the inode or generation number in portable
156 * signatures
157 */
158 if (type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) {
159 hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
160 hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
161 }
162 /* The hmac uid and gid must be encoded in the initial user
163 * namespace (not the filesystems user namespace) as encoding
164 * them in the filesystems user namespace allows an attack
165 * where first they are written in an unprivileged fuse mount
166 * of a filesystem and then the system is tricked to mount the
167 * filesystem for real on next boot and trust it because
168 * everything is signed.
169 */
170 hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid);
171 hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid);
172 hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
173 crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc));
174 if ((evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID) &&
175 type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
176 crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid, UUID_SIZE);
177 crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
178 }
179
180 /*
181 * Calculate the HMAC value across the set of protected security xattrs.
182 *
183 * Instead of retrieving the requested xattr, for performance, calculate
184 * the hmac using the requested xattr value. Don't alloc/free memory for
185 * each xattr, but attempt to re-use the previously allocated memory.
186 */
187 static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
188 const char *req_xattr_name,
189 const char *req_xattr_value,
190 size_t req_xattr_value_len,
191 uint8_t type, struct evm_digest *data)
192 {
193 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
194 struct xattr_list *xattr;
195 struct shash_desc *desc;
196 size_t xattr_size = 0;
197 char *xattr_value = NULL;
198 int error;
199 int size;
200 bool ima_present = false;
201
202 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) ||
203 inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns)
204 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
205
206 desc = init_desc(type, data->hdr.algo);
207 if (IS_ERR(desc))
208 return PTR_ERR(desc);
209
210 data->hdr.length = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
211
212 error = -ENODATA;
213 list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
214 bool is_ima = false;
215
216 if (strcmp(xattr->name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0)
217 is_ima = true;
218
219 if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value)
220 && !strcmp(xattr->name, req_xattr_name)) {
221 error = 0;
222 crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value,
223 req_xattr_value_len);
224 if (is_ima)
225 ima_present = true;
226 continue;
227 }
228 size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, xattr->name,
229 &xattr_value, xattr_size, GFP_NOFS);
230 if (size == -ENOMEM) {
231 error = -ENOMEM;
232 goto out;
233 }
234 if (size < 0)
235 continue;
236
237 error = 0;
238 xattr_size = size;
239 crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size);
240 if (is_ima)
241 ima_present = true;
242 }
243 hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, type, data->digest);
244
245 /* Portable EVM signatures must include an IMA hash */
246 if (type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && !ima_present)
247 error = -EPERM;
248 out:
249 kfree(xattr_value);
250 kfree(desc);
251 return error;
252 }
253
254 int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
255 const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
256 struct evm_digest *data)
257 {
258 return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
259 req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, data);
260 }
261
262 int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
263 const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
264 char type, struct evm_digest *data)
265 {
266 return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
267 req_xattr_value_len, type, data);
268 }
269
270 static int evm_is_immutable(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
271 {
272 const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
273 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
274 int rc = 0;
275
276 iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
277 if (iint && (iint->flags & EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG))
278 return 1;
279
280 /* Do this the hard way */
281 rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
282 (char **)&xattr_data, 0, GFP_NOFS);
283 if (rc <= 0) {
284 if (rc == -ENODATA)
285 return 0;
286 return rc;
287 }
288 if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
289 rc = 1;
290 else
291 rc = 0;
292
293 kfree(xattr_data);
294 return rc;
295 }
296
297
298 /*
299 * Calculate the hmac and update security.evm xattr
300 *
301 * Expects to be called with i_mutex locked.
302 */
303 int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
304 const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
305 {
306 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
307 struct evm_digest data;
308 int rc = 0;
309
310 /*
311 * Don't permit any transformation of the EVM xattr if the signature
312 * is of an immutable type
313 */
314 rc = evm_is_immutable(dentry, inode);
315 if (rc < 0)
316 return rc;
317 if (rc)
318 return -EPERM;
319
320 data.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
321 rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
322 xattr_value_len, &data);
323 if (rc == 0) {
324 data.hdr.xattr.sha1.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
325 rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&init_user_ns, dentry,
326 XATTR_NAME_EVM,
327 &data.hdr.xattr.data[1],
328 SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1, 0);
329 } else if (rc == -ENODATA && (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
330 rc = __vfs_removexattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM);
331 }
332 return rc;
333 }
334
335 int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
336 char *hmac_val)
337 {
338 struct shash_desc *desc;
339
340 desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC, HASH_ALGO_SHA1);
341 if (IS_ERR(desc)) {
342 pr_info("init_desc failed\n");
343 return PTR_ERR(desc);
344 }
345
346 crypto_shash_update(desc, lsm_xattr->value, lsm_xattr->value_len);
347 hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, hmac_val);
348 kfree(desc);
349 return 0;
350 }
351
352 /*
353 * Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC
354 */
355 int evm_init_key(void)
356 {
357 struct key *evm_key;
358 struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;
359 int rc;
360
361 evm_key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, EVMKEY, NULL);
362 if (IS_ERR(evm_key))
363 return -ENOENT;
364
365 down_read(&evm_key->sem);
366 ekp = evm_key->payload.data[0];
367
368 rc = evm_set_key(ekp->decrypted_data, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
369
370 /* burn the original key contents */
371 memset(ekp->decrypted_data, 0, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
372 up_read(&evm_key->sem);
373 key_put(evm_key);
374 return rc;
375 }