]> git.proxmox.com Git - mirror_ubuntu-bionic-kernel.git/blob - security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next
[mirror_ubuntu-bionic-kernel.git] / security / integrity / ima / ima_main.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
3 *
4 * Authors:
5 * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
6 * Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
7 * Kylene Hall <kylene@us.ibm.com>
8 * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
9 *
10 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
11 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
12 * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
13 * License.
14 *
15 * File: ima_main.c
16 * implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap,
17 * and ima_file_check.
18 */
19 #include <linux/module.h>
20 #include <linux/file.h>
21 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
22 #include <linux/mount.h>
23 #include <linux/mman.h>
24 #include <linux/slab.h>
25 #include <linux/xattr.h>
26 #include <linux/ima.h>
27 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
28
29 #include "ima.h"
30
31 int ima_initialized;
32
33 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
34 int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
35 #else
36 int ima_appraise;
37 #endif
38
39 int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
40 static int hash_setup_done;
41
42 static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
43 {
44 struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
45 int i;
46
47 if (hash_setup_done)
48 return 1;
49
50 if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) {
51 if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) == 0)
52 ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
53 else if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0)
54 ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
55 goto out;
56 }
57
58 for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
59 if (strcmp(str, hash_algo_name[i]) == 0) {
60 ima_hash_algo = i;
61 break;
62 }
63 }
64 out:
65 hash_setup_done = 1;
66 return 1;
67 }
68 __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
69
70 /*
71 * ima_rdwr_violation_check
72 *
73 * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files:
74 * - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
75 * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
76 * - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
77 * could result in a file measurement error.
78 *
79 */
80 static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
81 {
82 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
83 fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
84 int must_measure;
85 bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
86 char *pathbuf = NULL;
87 const char *pathname;
88
89 if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !ima_initialized)
90 return;
91
92 mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); /* file metadata: permissions, xattr */
93
94 if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
95 if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode))
96 send_tomtou = true;
97 goto out;
98 }
99
100 must_measure = ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
101 if (!must_measure)
102 goto out;
103
104 if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0)
105 send_writers = true;
106 out:
107 mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
108
109 if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers)
110 return;
111
112 pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
113
114 if (send_tomtou)
115 ima_add_violation(file, pathname, "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
116 if (send_writers)
117 ima_add_violation(file, pathname,
118 "invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
119 kfree(pathbuf);
120 }
121
122 static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
123 struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
124 {
125 fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
126
127 if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE))
128 return;
129
130 mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
131 if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 &&
132 iint->version != inode->i_version) {
133 iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
134 if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE)
135 ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
136 }
137 mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
138 }
139
140 /**
141 * ima_file_free - called on __fput()
142 * @file: pointer to file structure being freed
143 *
144 * Flag files that changed, based on i_version
145 */
146 void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
147 {
148 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
149 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
150
151 if (!iint_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
152 return;
153
154 iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
155 if (!iint)
156 return;
157
158 ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
159 }
160
161 static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
162 int mask, int function)
163 {
164 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
165 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
166 struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
167 char *pathbuf = NULL;
168 const char *pathname = NULL;
169 int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise, _func;
170 struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL, **xattr_ptr = NULL;
171 int xattr_len = 0;
172
173 if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
174 return 0;
175
176 /* Return an IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT action
177 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
178 * Included is the appraise submask.
179 */
180 action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, function);
181 if (!action)
182 return 0;
183
184 must_appraise = action & IMA_APPRAISE;
185
186 /* Is the appraise rule hook specific? */
187 _func = (action & IMA_FILE_APPRAISE) ? FILE_CHECK : function;
188
189 mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
190
191 iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
192 if (!iint)
193 goto out;
194
195 /* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
196 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED,
197 * IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED)
198 */
199 iint->flags |= action;
200 action &= IMA_DO_MASK;
201 action &= ~((iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK) >> 1);
202
203 /* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
204 if (!action) {
205 if (must_appraise)
206 rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, _func);
207 goto out_digsig;
208 }
209
210 if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) {
211 if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
212 xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
213 } else
214 xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
215
216 rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, xattr_ptr, &xattr_len);
217 if (rc != 0) {
218 if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
219 rc = (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) ? 0 : -EACCES;
220 goto out_digsig;
221 }
222
223 pathname = filename ?: ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
224
225 if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
226 ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
227 xattr_value, xattr_len);
228 if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
229 rc = ima_appraise_measurement(_func, iint, file, pathname,
230 xattr_value, xattr_len);
231 if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
232 ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
233 kfree(pathbuf);
234 out_digsig:
235 if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG))
236 rc = -EACCES;
237 out:
238 mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
239 kfree(xattr_value);
240 if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
241 return -EACCES;
242 return 0;
243 }
244
245 /**
246 * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
247 * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL)
248 * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
249 *
250 * Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure()
251 * policy decision.
252 *
253 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
254 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
255 */
256 int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
257 {
258 if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC))
259 return process_measurement(file, NULL, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
260 return 0;
261 }
262
263 /**
264 * ima_bprm_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
265 * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
266 *
267 * The OS protects against an executable file, already open for write,
268 * from being executed in deny_write_access() and an executable file,
269 * already open for execute, from being modified in get_write_access().
270 * So we can be certain that what we verify and measure here is actually
271 * what is being executed.
272 *
273 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
274 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
275 */
276 int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
277 {
278 return process_measurement(bprm->file,
279 (strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) == 0) ?
280 bprm->filename : bprm->interp,
281 MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
282 }
283
284 /**
285 * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
286 * @file: pointer to the file to be measured
287 * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE
288 *
289 * Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision.
290 *
291 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
292 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
293 */
294 int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
295 {
296 ima_rdwr_violation_check(file);
297 return process_measurement(file, NULL,
298 mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
299 FILE_CHECK);
300 }
301 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
302
303 /**
304 * ima_module_check - based on policy, collect/store/appraise measurement.
305 * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised
306 *
307 * Measure/appraise kernel modules based on policy.
308 *
309 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
310 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
311 */
312 int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
313 {
314 if (!file) {
315 #ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
316 if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) &&
317 (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
318 return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
319 #endif
320 return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */
321 }
322 return process_measurement(file, NULL, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK);
323 }
324
325 static int __init init_ima(void)
326 {
327 int error;
328
329 hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
330 error = ima_init();
331 if (!error)
332 ima_initialized = 1;
333 return error;
334 }
335
336 late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
337
338 MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Integrity Measurement Architecture");
339 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");