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git.proxmox.com Git - mirror_ubuntu-bionic-kernel.git/blob - security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
2 * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
5 * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
6 * Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
7 * Kylene Hall <kylene@us.ibm.com>
8 * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
10 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
11 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
12 * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
16 * implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap,
19 #include <linux/module.h>
20 #include <linux/file.h>
21 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
22 #include <linux/mount.h>
23 #include <linux/mman.h>
24 #include <linux/slab.h>
25 #include <linux/xattr.h>
26 #include <linux/ima.h>
27 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
33 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
34 int ima_appraise
= IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE
;
39 int ima_hash_algo
= HASH_ALGO_SHA1
;
40 static int hash_setup_done
;
42 static int __init
hash_setup(char *str
)
44 struct ima_template_desc
*template_desc
= ima_template_desc_current();
50 if (strcmp(template_desc
->name
, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME
) == 0) {
51 if (strncmp(str
, "sha1", 4) == 0)
52 ima_hash_algo
= HASH_ALGO_SHA1
;
53 else if (strncmp(str
, "md5", 3) == 0)
54 ima_hash_algo
= HASH_ALGO_MD5
;
58 for (i
= 0; i
< HASH_ALGO__LAST
; i
++) {
59 if (strcmp(str
, hash_algo_name
[i
]) == 0) {
68 __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup
);
71 * ima_rdwr_violation_check
73 * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files:
74 * - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
75 * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
76 * - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
77 * could result in a file measurement error.
80 static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file
*file
)
82 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
83 fmode_t mode
= file
->f_mode
;
85 bool send_tomtou
= false, send_writers
= false;
89 if (!S_ISREG(inode
->i_mode
) || !ima_initialized
)
92 mutex_lock(&inode
->i_mutex
); /* file metadata: permissions, xattr */
94 if (mode
& FMODE_WRITE
) {
95 if (atomic_read(&inode
->i_readcount
) && IS_IMA(inode
))
100 must_measure
= ima_must_measure(inode
, MAY_READ
, FILE_CHECK
);
104 if (atomic_read(&inode
->i_writecount
) > 0)
107 mutex_unlock(&inode
->i_mutex
);
109 if (!send_tomtou
&& !send_writers
)
112 pathname
= ima_d_path(&file
->f_path
, &pathbuf
);
115 ima_add_violation(file
, pathname
, "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
117 ima_add_violation(file
, pathname
,
118 "invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
122 static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache
*iint
,
123 struct inode
*inode
, struct file
*file
)
125 fmode_t mode
= file
->f_mode
;
127 if (!(mode
& FMODE_WRITE
))
130 mutex_lock(&inode
->i_mutex
);
131 if (atomic_read(&inode
->i_writecount
) == 1 &&
132 iint
->version
!= inode
->i_version
) {
133 iint
->flags
&= ~IMA_DONE_MASK
;
134 if (iint
->flags
& IMA_APPRAISE
)
135 ima_update_xattr(iint
, file
);
137 mutex_unlock(&inode
->i_mutex
);
141 * ima_file_free - called on __fput()
142 * @file: pointer to file structure being freed
144 * Flag files that changed, based on i_version
146 void ima_file_free(struct file
*file
)
148 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
149 struct integrity_iint_cache
*iint
;
151 if (!iint_initialized
|| !S_ISREG(inode
->i_mode
))
154 iint
= integrity_iint_find(inode
);
158 ima_check_last_writer(iint
, inode
, file
);
161 static int process_measurement(struct file
*file
, const char *filename
,
162 int mask
, int function
)
164 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
165 struct integrity_iint_cache
*iint
;
166 struct ima_template_desc
*template_desc
= ima_template_desc_current();
167 char *pathbuf
= NULL
;
168 const char *pathname
= NULL
;
169 int rc
= -ENOMEM
, action
, must_appraise
, _func
;
170 struct evm_ima_xattr_data
*xattr_value
= NULL
, **xattr_ptr
= NULL
;
173 if (!ima_initialized
|| !S_ISREG(inode
->i_mode
))
176 /* Return an IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT action
177 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
178 * Included is the appraise submask.
180 action
= ima_get_action(inode
, mask
, function
);
184 must_appraise
= action
& IMA_APPRAISE
;
186 /* Is the appraise rule hook specific? */
187 _func
= (action
& IMA_FILE_APPRAISE
) ? FILE_CHECK
: function
;
189 mutex_lock(&inode
->i_mutex
);
191 iint
= integrity_inode_get(inode
);
195 /* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
196 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED,
197 * IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED)
199 iint
->flags
|= action
;
200 action
&= IMA_DO_MASK
;
201 action
&= ~((iint
->flags
& IMA_DONE_MASK
) >> 1);
203 /* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
206 rc
= ima_get_cache_status(iint
, _func
);
210 if (strcmp(template_desc
->name
, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME
) == 0) {
211 if (action
& IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK
)
212 xattr_ptr
= &xattr_value
;
214 xattr_ptr
= &xattr_value
;
216 rc
= ima_collect_measurement(iint
, file
, xattr_ptr
, &xattr_len
);
218 if (file
->f_flags
& O_DIRECT
)
219 rc
= (iint
->flags
& IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO
) ? 0 : -EACCES
;
223 pathname
= filename
?: ima_d_path(&file
->f_path
, &pathbuf
);
225 if (action
& IMA_MEASURE
)
226 ima_store_measurement(iint
, file
, pathname
,
227 xattr_value
, xattr_len
);
228 if (action
& IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK
)
229 rc
= ima_appraise_measurement(_func
, iint
, file
, pathname
,
230 xattr_value
, xattr_len
);
231 if (action
& IMA_AUDIT
)
232 ima_audit_measurement(iint
, pathname
);
235 if ((mask
& MAY_WRITE
) && (iint
->flags
& IMA_DIGSIG
))
238 mutex_unlock(&inode
->i_mutex
);
240 if ((rc
&& must_appraise
) && (ima_appraise
& IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE
))
246 * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
247 * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL)
248 * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
250 * Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure()
253 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
254 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
256 int ima_file_mmap(struct file
*file
, unsigned long prot
)
258 if (file
&& (prot
& PROT_EXEC
))
259 return process_measurement(file
, NULL
, MAY_EXEC
, MMAP_CHECK
);
264 * ima_bprm_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
265 * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
267 * The OS protects against an executable file, already open for write,
268 * from being executed in deny_write_access() and an executable file,
269 * already open for execute, from being modified in get_write_access().
270 * So we can be certain that what we verify and measure here is actually
271 * what is being executed.
273 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
274 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
276 int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
278 return process_measurement(bprm
->file
,
279 (strcmp(bprm
->filename
, bprm
->interp
) == 0) ?
280 bprm
->filename
: bprm
->interp
,
281 MAY_EXEC
, BPRM_CHECK
);
285 * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
286 * @file: pointer to the file to be measured
287 * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE
289 * Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision.
291 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
292 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
294 int ima_file_check(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
296 ima_rdwr_violation_check(file
);
297 return process_measurement(file
, NULL
,
298 mask
& (MAY_READ
| MAY_WRITE
| MAY_EXEC
),
301 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check
);
304 * ima_module_check - based on policy, collect/store/appraise measurement.
305 * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised
307 * Measure/appraise kernel modules based on policy.
309 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
310 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
312 int ima_module_check(struct file
*file
)
315 #ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
316 if ((ima_appraise
& IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES
) &&
317 (ima_appraise
& IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE
))
318 return -EACCES
; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
320 return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */
322 return process_measurement(file
, NULL
, MAY_EXEC
, MODULE_CHECK
);
325 static int __init
init_ima(void)
329 hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH
);
336 late_initcall(init_ima
); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
338 MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Integrity Measurement Architecture");
339 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");