security/safesetid/lsm.c

   1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
   2 /*
   3  * SafeSetID Linux Security Module
   4  *
   5  * Author: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
   6  *
   7  * Copyright (C) 2018 The Chromium OS Authors.
   8  *
   9  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  10  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as
  11  * published by the Free Software Foundation.
  12  *
  13  */
  14
  15 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "SafeSetID: " fmt
  16
  17 #include <linux/hashtable.h>
  18 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
  19 #include <linux/module.h>
  20 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
  21 #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
  22 #include <linux/security.h>
  23
  24 /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
  25 int safesetid_initialized;
  26
  27 #define NUM_BITS 8 /* 128 buckets in hash table */
  28
  29 static DEFINE_HASHTABLE(safesetid_whitelist_hashtable, NUM_BITS);
  30
  31 /*
  32  * Hash table entry to store safesetid policy signifying that 'parent' user
  33  * can setid to 'child' user.
  34  */
  35 struct entry {
  36         struct hlist_node next;
  37         struct hlist_node dlist; /* for deletion cleanup */
  38         uint64_t parent_kuid;
  39         uint64_t child_kuid;
  40 };
  41
  42 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(safesetid_whitelist_hashtable_spinlock);
  43
  44 static bool check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key(kuid_t parent)
  45 {
  46         struct entry *entry;
  47
  48         rcu_read_lock();
  49         hash_for_each_possible_rcu(safesetid_whitelist_hashtable,
  50                                    entry, next, __kuid_val(parent)) {
  51                 if (entry->parent_kuid == __kuid_val(parent)) {
  52                         rcu_read_unlock();
  53                         return true;
  54                 }
  55         }
  56         rcu_read_unlock();
  57
  58         return false;
  59 }
  60
  61 static bool check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key_value(kuid_t parent,
  62                                                     kuid_t child)
  63 {
  64         struct entry *entry;
  65
  66         rcu_read_lock();
  67         hash_for_each_possible_rcu(safesetid_whitelist_hashtable,
  68                                    entry, next, __kuid_val(parent)) {
  69                 if (entry->parent_kuid == __kuid_val(parent) &&
  70                     entry->child_kuid == __kuid_val(child)) {
  71                         rcu_read_unlock();
  72                         return true;
  73                 }
  74         }
  75         rcu_read_unlock();
  76
  77         return false;
  78 }
  79
  80 static int safesetid_security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
  81                                       struct user_namespace *ns,
  82                                       int cap,
  83                                       unsigned int opts)
  84 {
  85         if (cap == CAP_SETUID &&
  86             check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key(cred->uid)) {
  87                 if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_INSETID)) {
  88                         /*
  89                          * Deny if we're not in a set*uid() syscall to avoid
  90                          * giving powers gated by CAP_SETUID that are related
  91                          * to functionality other than calling set*uid() (e.g.
  92                          * allowing user to set up userns uid mappings).
  93                          */
  94                         pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETUID, which is not available to UID %u for operations besides approved set*uid transitions",
  95                                 __kuid_val(cred->uid));
  96                         return -1;
  97                 }
  98         }
  99         return 0;
 100 }
 101
 102 static int check_uid_transition(kuid_t parent, kuid_t child)
 103 {
 104         if (check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key_value(parent, child))
 105                 return 0;
 106         pr_warn("UID transition (%d -> %d) blocked",
 107                 __kuid_val(parent),
 108                 __kuid_val(child));
 109         /*
 110          * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
 111          * that could arise from a missing whitelist entry preventing a
 112          * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
 113          */
 114         force_sig(SIGKILL);
 115         return -EACCES;
 116 }
 117
 118 /*
 119  * Check whether there is either an exception for user under old cred struct to
 120  * set*uid to user under new cred struct, or the UID transition is allowed (by
 121  * Linux set*uid rules) even without CAP_SETUID.
 122  */
 123 static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
 124                                      const struct cred *old,
 125                                      int flags)
 126 {
 127
 128         /* Do nothing if there are no setuid restrictions for this UID. */
 129         if (!check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key(old->uid))
 130                 return 0;
 131
 132         switch (flags) {
 133         case LSM_SETID_RE:
 134                 /*
 135                  * Users for which setuid restrictions exist can only set the
 136                  * real UID to the real UID or the effective UID, unless an
 137                  * explicit whitelist policy allows the transition.
 138                  */
 139                 if (!uid_eq(old->uid, new->uid) &&
 140                         !uid_eq(old->euid, new->uid)) {
 141                         return check_uid_transition(old->uid, new->uid);
 142                 }
 143                 /*
 144                  * Users for which setuid restrictions exist can only set the
 145                  * effective UID to the real UID, the effective UID, or the
 146                  * saved set-UID, unless an explicit whitelist policy allows
 147                  * the transition.
 148                  */
 149                 if (!uid_eq(old->uid, new->euid) &&
 150                         !uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) &&
 151                         !uid_eq(old->suid, new->euid)) {
 152                         return check_uid_transition(old->euid, new->euid);
 153                 }
 154                 break;
 155         case LSM_SETID_ID:
 156                 /*
 157                  * Users for which setuid restrictions exist cannot change the
 158                  * real UID or saved set-UID unless an explicit whitelist
 159                  * policy allows the transition.
 160                  */
 161                 if (!uid_eq(old->uid, new->uid))
 162                         return check_uid_transition(old->uid, new->uid);
 163                 if (!uid_eq(old->suid, new->suid))
 164                         return check_uid_transition(old->suid, new->suid);
 165                 break;
 166         case LSM_SETID_RES:
 167                 /*
 168                  * Users for which setuid restrictions exist cannot change the
 169                  * real UID, effective UID, or saved set-UID to anything but
 170                  * one of: the current real UID, the current effective UID or
 171                  * the current saved set-user-ID unless an explicit whitelist
 172                  * policy allows the transition.
 173                  */
 174                 if (!uid_eq(new->uid, old->uid) &&
 175                         !uid_eq(new->uid, old->euid) &&
 176                         !uid_eq(new->uid, old->suid)) {
 177                         return check_uid_transition(old->uid, new->uid);
 178                 }
 179                 if (!uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) &&
 180                         !uid_eq(new->euid, old->euid) &&
 181                         !uid_eq(new->euid, old->suid)) {
 182                         return check_uid_transition(old->euid, new->euid);
 183                 }
 184                 if (!uid_eq(new->suid, old->uid) &&
 185                         !uid_eq(new->suid, old->euid) &&
 186                         !uid_eq(new->suid, old->suid)) {
 187                         return check_uid_transition(old->suid, new->suid);
 188                 }
 189                 break;
 190         case LSM_SETID_FS:
 191                 /*
 192                  * Users for which setuid restrictions exist cannot change the
 193                  * filesystem UID to anything but one of: the current real UID,
 194                  * the current effective UID or the current saved set-UID
 195                  * unless an explicit whitelist policy allows the transition.
 196                  */
 197                 if (!uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->uid)  &&
 198                         !uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->euid)  &&
 199                         !uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->suid) &&
 200                         !uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->fsuid)) {
 201                         return check_uid_transition(old->fsuid, new->fsuid);
 202                 }
 203                 break;
 204         default:
 205                 pr_warn("Unknown setid state %d\n", flags);
 206                 force_sig(SIGKILL);
 207                 return -EINVAL;
 208         }
 209         return 0;
 210 }
 211
 212 int add_safesetid_whitelist_entry(kuid_t parent, kuid_t child)
 213 {
 214         struct entry *new;
 215
 216         /* Return if entry already exists */
 217         if (check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key_value(parent, child))
 218                 return 0;
 219
 220         new = kzalloc(sizeof(struct entry), GFP_KERNEL);
 221         if (!new)
 222                 return -ENOMEM;
 223         new->parent_kuid = __kuid_val(parent);
 224         new->child_kuid = __kuid_val(child);
 225         spin_lock(&safesetid_whitelist_hashtable_spinlock);
 226         hash_add_rcu(safesetid_whitelist_hashtable,
 227                      &new->next,
 228                      __kuid_val(parent));
 229         spin_unlock(&safesetid_whitelist_hashtable_spinlock);
 230         return 0;
 231 }
 232
 233 void flush_safesetid_whitelist_entries(void)
 234 {
 235         struct entry *entry;
 236         struct hlist_node *hlist_node;
 237         unsigned int bkt_loop_cursor;
 238         HLIST_HEAD(free_list);
 239
 240         /*
 241          * Could probably use hash_for_each_rcu here instead, but this should
 242          * be fine as well.
 243          */
 244         spin_lock(&safesetid_whitelist_hashtable_spinlock);
 245         hash_for_each_safe(safesetid_whitelist_hashtable, bkt_loop_cursor,
 246                            hlist_node, entry, next) {
 247                 hash_del_rcu(&entry->next);
 248                 hlist_add_head(&entry->dlist, &free_list);
 249         }
 250         spin_unlock(&safesetid_whitelist_hashtable_spinlock);
 251         synchronize_rcu();
 252         hlist_for_each_entry_safe(entry, hlist_node, &free_list, dlist) {
 253                 hlist_del(&entry->dlist);
 254                 kfree(entry);
 255         }
 256 }
 257
 258 static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
 259         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
 260         LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, safesetid_security_capable)
 261 };
 262
 263 static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
 264 {
 265         security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
 266                            ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
 267
 268         /* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
 269         safesetid_initialized = 1;
 270
 271         return 0;
 272 }
 273
 274 DEFINE_LSM(safesetid_security_init) = {
 275         .init = safesetid_security_init,
 276         .name = "safesetid",
 277 };