2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/security.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
55 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
57 #include <net/netlabel.h>
58 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
59 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
60 #include <linux/atomic.h>
61 #include <linux/bitops.h>
62 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
63 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
64 #include <net/netlink.h>
65 #include <linux/tcp.h>
66 #include <linux/udp.h>
67 #include <linux/dccp.h>
68 #include <linux/quota.h>
69 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71 #include <linux/parser.h>
72 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
74 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
75 #include <linux/personality.h>
76 #include <linux/audit.h>
77 #include <linux/string.h>
78 #include <linux/selinux.h>
79 #include <linux/mutex.h>
80 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
81 #include <linux/syslog.h>
82 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
83 #include <linux/export.h>
84 #include <linux/security.h>
85 #include <linux/msg.h>
86 #include <linux/shm.h>
98 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
100 extern struct security_operations
*security_ops
;
102 /* SECMARK reference count */
103 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount
= ATOMIC_INIT(0);
105 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
106 int selinux_enforcing
;
108 static int __init
enforcing_setup(char *str
)
110 unsigned long enforcing
;
111 if (!strict_strtoul(str
, 0, &enforcing
))
112 selinux_enforcing
= enforcing
? 1 : 0;
115 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup
);
118 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
119 int selinux_enabled
= CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
;
121 static int __init
selinux_enabled_setup(char *str
)
123 unsigned long enabled
;
124 if (!strict_strtoul(str
, 0, &enabled
))
125 selinux_enabled
= enabled
? 1 : 0;
128 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup
);
130 int selinux_enabled
= 1;
133 static struct kmem_cache
*sel_inode_cache
;
136 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
139 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
140 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
141 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
142 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
145 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
147 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount
) > 0);
151 * initialise the security for the init task
153 static void cred_init_security(void)
155 struct cred
*cred
= (struct cred
*) current
->real_cred
;
156 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
158 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
160 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
162 tsec
->osid
= tsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
163 cred
->security
= tsec
;
167 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
169 static inline u32
cred_sid(const struct cred
*cred
)
171 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
173 tsec
= cred
->security
;
178 * get the objective security ID of a task
180 static inline u32
task_sid(const struct task_struct
*task
)
185 sid
= cred_sid(__task_cred(task
));
191 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
193 static inline u32
current_sid(void)
195 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
200 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
202 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
204 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
205 u32 sid
= current_sid();
207 isec
= kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache
, GFP_NOFS
);
211 mutex_init(&isec
->lock
);
212 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec
->list
);
214 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
215 isec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_FILE
;
216 isec
->task_sid
= sid
;
217 inode
->i_security
= isec
;
222 static void inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
224 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
225 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
227 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
228 if (!list_empty(&isec
->list
))
229 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
230 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
232 inode
->i_security
= NULL
;
233 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache
, isec
);
236 static int file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
238 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
239 u32 sid
= current_sid();
241 fsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
246 fsec
->fown_sid
= sid
;
247 file
->f_security
= fsec
;
252 static void file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
254 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
255 file
->f_security
= NULL
;
259 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
261 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
263 sbsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
267 mutex_init(&sbsec
->lock
);
268 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec
->isec_head
);
269 spin_lock_init(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
271 sbsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
272 sbsec
->def_sid
= SECINITSID_FILE
;
273 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
274 sb
->s_security
= sbsec
;
279 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
281 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
282 sb
->s_security
= NULL
;
286 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
288 static const char *labeling_behaviors
[7] = {
290 "uses transition SIDs",
292 "uses genfs_contexts",
293 "not configured for labeling",
294 "uses mountpoint labeling",
295 "uses native labeling",
298 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
);
300 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode
*inode
)
302 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, NULL
);
311 Opt_labelsupport
= 5,
314 static const match_table_t tokens
= {
315 {Opt_context
, CONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
316 {Opt_fscontext
, FSCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
317 {Opt_defcontext
, DEFCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
318 {Opt_rootcontext
, ROOTCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
319 {Opt_labelsupport
, LABELSUPP_STR
},
323 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
325 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid
,
326 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
327 const struct cred
*cred
)
329 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
332 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
333 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
337 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
338 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
342 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid
,
343 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
344 const struct cred
*cred
)
346 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
348 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
349 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
353 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
354 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, NULL
);
358 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block
*sb
)
360 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
361 struct dentry
*root
= sb
->s_root
;
362 struct inode
*root_inode
= root
->d_inode
;
365 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
) {
366 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
367 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
368 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
369 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
370 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
371 if (!root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
372 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
373 "xattr support\n", sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
377 rc
= root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr(root
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, NULL
, 0);
378 if (rc
< 0 && rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
379 if (rc
== -EOPNOTSUPP
)
380 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
381 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
382 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
384 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
385 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb
->s_id
,
386 sb
->s_type
->name
, -rc
);
391 sbsec
->flags
|= (SE_SBINITIALIZED
| SE_SBLABELSUPP
);
393 if (sbsec
->behavior
> ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors
))
394 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
395 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
397 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
398 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
,
399 labeling_behaviors
[sbsec
->behavior
-1]);
401 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS
||
402 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
||
403 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE
||
404 sbsec
->behavior
> ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors
))
405 sbsec
->flags
&= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP
;
407 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
408 if (strncmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
409 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBLABELSUPP
;
411 /* Initialize the root inode. */
412 rc
= inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode
, root
);
414 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
415 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
416 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
418 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
420 if (!list_empty(&sbsec
->isec_head
)) {
421 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
=
422 list_entry(sbsec
->isec_head
.next
,
423 struct inode_security_struct
, list
);
424 struct inode
*inode
= isec
->inode
;
425 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
426 inode
= igrab(inode
);
428 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode
))
432 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
433 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
436 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
442 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
443 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
444 * mount options, or whatever.
446 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*sb
,
447 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
450 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
451 char *context
= NULL
;
455 security_init_mnt_opts(opts
);
457 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
463 tmp
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
464 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
465 for (i
= 0; i
< 8; i
++) {
467 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
470 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
471 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
)
472 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
474 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
475 if (!opts
->mnt_opts
) {
480 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
481 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
487 if (sbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) {
488 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
491 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
492 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
494 if (sbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) {
495 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, &context
, &len
);
498 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
499 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
501 if (sbsec
->flags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) {
502 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->def_sid
, &context
, &len
);
505 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
506 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
508 if (sbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
509 struct inode
*root
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
510 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= root
->i_security
;
512 rc
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
515 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
516 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
518 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
) {
519 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = NULL
;
520 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP
;
523 BUG_ON(i
!= opts
->num_mnt_opts
);
528 security_free_mnt_opts(opts
);
532 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
, char flag
,
533 u32 old_sid
, u32 new_sid
)
535 char mnt_flags
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
537 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
538 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
539 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& flag
) ||
540 (old_sid
!= new_sid
))
543 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
544 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
546 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
547 if (mnt_flags
& flag
)
553 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
554 * labeling information.
556 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block
*sb
,
557 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
,
558 unsigned long kern_flags
,
559 unsigned long *set_kern_flags
)
561 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
563 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
564 const char *name
= sb
->s_type
->name
;
565 struct inode
*inode
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
566 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
= inode
->i_security
;
567 u32 fscontext_sid
= 0, context_sid
= 0, rootcontext_sid
= 0;
568 u32 defcontext_sid
= 0;
569 char **mount_options
= opts
->mnt_opts
;
570 int *flags
= opts
->mnt_opts_flags
;
571 int num_opts
= opts
->num_mnt_opts
;
573 mutex_lock(&sbsec
->lock
);
575 if (!ss_initialized
) {
577 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
578 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
579 server is ready to handle calls. */
583 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
584 "before the security server is initialized\n");
587 if (kern_flags
&& !set_kern_flags
) {
588 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
589 * place the results is not allowed */
595 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
596 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
597 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
598 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
600 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
601 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
602 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
603 * will be used for both mounts)
605 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) && (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
610 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
611 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
612 * than once with different security options.
614 for (i
= 0; i
< num_opts
; i
++) {
617 if (flags
[i
] == SE_SBLABELSUPP
)
619 rc
= security_context_to_sid(mount_options
[i
],
620 strlen(mount_options
[i
]), &sid
);
622 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
623 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
624 mount_options
[i
], sb
->s_id
, name
, rc
);
631 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
,
633 goto out_double_mount
;
635 sbsec
->flags
|= FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
640 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
,
642 goto out_double_mount
;
644 sbsec
->flags
|= CONTEXT_MNT
;
646 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
647 rootcontext_sid
= sid
;
649 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
,
651 goto out_double_mount
;
653 sbsec
->flags
|= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
657 defcontext_sid
= sid
;
659 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
,
661 goto out_double_mount
;
663 sbsec
->flags
|= DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
672 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
673 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
674 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
) && !num_opts
)
675 goto out_double_mount
;
680 if (strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "proc") == 0)
681 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBPROC
;
683 if (!sbsec
->behavior
) {
685 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
688 rc
= security_fs_use((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBPROC
) ?
689 "proc" : sb
->s_type
->name
,
690 &sbsec
->behavior
, &sbsec
->sid
);
693 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
694 __func__
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
698 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
700 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid
, sbsec
, cred
);
704 sbsec
->sid
= fscontext_sid
;
708 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
709 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
710 * the superblock context if not already set.
712 if (kern_flags
& SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
&& !context_sid
) {
713 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
;
714 *set_kern_flags
|= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
;
718 if (!fscontext_sid
) {
719 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
723 sbsec
->sid
= context_sid
;
725 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
730 if (!rootcontext_sid
)
731 rootcontext_sid
= context_sid
;
733 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= context_sid
;
734 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
;
737 if (rootcontext_sid
) {
738 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid
, sbsec
,
743 root_isec
->sid
= rootcontext_sid
;
744 root_isec
->initialized
= 1;
747 if (defcontext_sid
) {
748 if (sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
&&
749 sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
) {
751 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: defcontext option is "
752 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
756 if (defcontext_sid
!= sbsec
->def_sid
) {
757 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid
,
763 sbsec
->def_sid
= defcontext_sid
;
766 rc
= sb_finish_set_opts(sb
);
768 mutex_unlock(&sbsec
->lock
);
772 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
773 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb
->s_id
, name
);
777 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
778 const struct super_block
*newsb
)
780 struct superblock_security_struct
*old
= oldsb
->s_security
;
781 struct superblock_security_struct
*new = newsb
->s_security
;
782 char oldflags
= old
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
783 char newflags
= new->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
785 if (oldflags
!= newflags
)
787 if ((oldflags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->sid
!= new->sid
)
789 if ((oldflags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->mntpoint_sid
!= new->mntpoint_sid
)
791 if ((oldflags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->def_sid
!= new->def_sid
)
793 if (oldflags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
794 struct inode_security_struct
*oldroot
= oldsb
->s_root
->d_inode
->i_security
;
795 struct inode_security_struct
*newroot
= newsb
->s_root
->d_inode
->i_security
;
796 if (oldroot
->sid
!= newroot
->sid
)
801 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
802 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
803 "type %s)\n", newsb
->s_id
, newsb
->s_type
->name
);
807 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
808 struct super_block
*newsb
)
810 const struct superblock_security_struct
*oldsbsec
= oldsb
->s_security
;
811 struct superblock_security_struct
*newsbsec
= newsb
->s_security
;
813 int set_fscontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
);
814 int set_context
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
);
815 int set_rootcontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
);
818 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
819 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
824 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
825 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
));
827 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
828 if (newsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
829 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb
, newsb
);
831 mutex_lock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
833 newsbsec
->flags
= oldsbsec
->flags
;
835 newsbsec
->sid
= oldsbsec
->sid
;
836 newsbsec
->def_sid
= oldsbsec
->def_sid
;
837 newsbsec
->behavior
= oldsbsec
->behavior
;
840 u32 sid
= oldsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
844 if (!set_rootcontext
) {
845 struct inode
*newinode
= newsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
846 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= newinode
->i_security
;
849 newsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= sid
;
851 if (set_rootcontext
) {
852 const struct inode
*oldinode
= oldsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
853 const struct inode_security_struct
*oldisec
= oldinode
->i_security
;
854 struct inode
*newinode
= newsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
855 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= newinode
->i_security
;
857 newisec
->sid
= oldisec
->sid
;
860 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb
);
861 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
865 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options
,
866 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
869 char *context
= NULL
, *defcontext
= NULL
;
870 char *fscontext
= NULL
, *rootcontext
= NULL
;
871 int rc
, num_mnt_opts
= 0;
873 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= 0;
875 /* Standard string-based options. */
876 while ((p
= strsep(&options
, "|")) != NULL
) {
878 substring_t args
[MAX_OPT_ARGS
];
883 token
= match_token(p
, tokens
, args
);
887 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
889 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
892 context
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
902 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
905 fscontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
912 case Opt_rootcontext
:
915 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
918 rootcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
926 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
928 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
931 defcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
937 case Opt_labelsupport
:
941 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
948 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
952 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
953 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
954 kfree(opts
->mnt_opts
);
959 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = fscontext
;
960 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
963 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = context
;
964 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
967 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = rootcontext
;
968 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
971 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = defcontext
;
972 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
975 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= num_mnt_opts
;
986 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
988 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
991 char *options
= data
;
992 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
994 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts
);
999 BUG_ON(sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
);
1001 rc
= selinux_parse_opts_str(options
, &opts
);
1006 rc
= selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
, 0, NULL
);
1009 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1013 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file
*m
,
1014 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
1019 for (i
= 0; i
< opts
->num_mnt_opts
; i
++) {
1022 if (opts
->mnt_opts
[i
])
1023 has_comma
= strchr(opts
->mnt_opts
[i
], ',');
1027 switch (opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
]) {
1029 prefix
= CONTEXT_STR
;
1032 prefix
= FSCONTEXT_STR
;
1034 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
1035 prefix
= ROOTCONTEXT_STR
;
1037 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT
:
1038 prefix
= DEFCONTEXT_STR
;
1040 case SE_SBLABELSUPP
:
1042 seq_puts(m
, LABELSUPP_STR
);
1048 /* we need a comma before each option */
1050 seq_puts(m
, prefix
);
1053 seq_puts(m
, opts
->mnt_opts
[i
]);
1059 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file
*m
, struct super_block
*sb
)
1061 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
1064 rc
= selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
);
1066 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1072 selinux_write_opts(m
, &opts
);
1074 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1079 static inline u16
inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode
)
1081 switch (mode
& S_IFMT
) {
1083 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE
;
1085 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
;
1087 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1089 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE
;
1091 return SECCLASS_DIR
;
1093 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE
;
1095 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE
;
1099 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1102 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol
)
1104 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_TCP
);
1107 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol
)
1109 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_UDP
);
1112 static inline u16
socket_type_to_security_class(int family
, int type
, int protocol
)
1118 case SOCK_SEQPACKET
:
1119 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
;
1121 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET
;
1128 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol
))
1129 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
;
1131 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1133 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol
))
1134 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
;
1136 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1138 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
;
1140 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1146 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET
;
1147 case NETLINK_FIREWALL
:
1148 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET
;
1149 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG
:
1150 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET
;
1152 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET
;
1154 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET
;
1155 case NETLINK_SELINUX
:
1156 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET
;
1158 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET
;
1159 case NETLINK_IP6_FW
:
1160 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET
;
1161 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG
:
1162 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET
;
1163 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT
:
1164 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET
;
1166 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET
;
1169 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET
;
1171 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET
;
1173 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET
;
1176 return SECCLASS_SOCKET
;
1179 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1180 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry
*dentry
,
1185 char *buffer
, *path
;
1187 buffer
= (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
1191 path
= dentry_path_raw(dentry
, buffer
, PAGE_SIZE
);
1195 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1196 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1197 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1198 while (path
[1] >= '0' && path
[1] <= '9') {
1202 rc
= security_genfs_sid("proc", path
, tclass
, sid
);
1204 free_page((unsigned long)buffer
);
1208 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry
*dentry
,
1216 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1217 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
)
1219 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= NULL
;
1220 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1222 struct dentry
*dentry
;
1223 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1224 char *context
= NULL
;
1228 if (isec
->initialized
)
1231 mutex_lock(&isec
->lock
);
1232 if (isec
->initialized
)
1235 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1236 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)) {
1237 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1238 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1239 server is ready to handle calls. */
1240 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1241 if (list_empty(&isec
->list
))
1242 list_add(&isec
->list
, &sbsec
->isec_head
);
1243 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1247 switch (sbsec
->behavior
) {
1248 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
:
1250 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
:
1251 if (!inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
1252 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1256 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1257 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1259 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1260 dentry
= dget(opt_dentry
);
1262 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1263 dentry
= d_find_alias(inode
);
1267 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1268 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1269 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1270 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1271 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1272 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1273 * be used again by userspace.
1278 len
= INITCONTEXTLEN
;
1279 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1285 context
[len
] = '\0';
1286 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1288 if (rc
== -ERANGE
) {
1291 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1292 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1299 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1305 context
[len
] = '\0';
1306 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
,
1312 if (rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
1313 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1314 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__
,
1315 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
1319 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1320 sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1323 rc
= security_context_to_sid_default(context
, rc
, &sid
,
1327 char *dev
= inode
->i_sb
->s_id
;
1328 unsigned long ino
= inode
->i_ino
;
1330 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
1331 if (printk_ratelimit())
1332 printk(KERN_NOTICE
"SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1333 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1334 "filesystem in question.\n", ino
, dev
, context
);
1336 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1337 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1338 __func__
, context
, -rc
, dev
, ino
);
1341 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1349 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK
:
1350 isec
->sid
= isec
->task_sid
;
1352 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS
:
1353 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1354 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1356 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1357 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1358 rc
= security_transition_sid(isec
->task_sid
, sbsec
->sid
,
1359 isec
->sclass
, NULL
, &sid
);
1364 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
:
1365 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
1368 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1369 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1371 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBPROC
) && !S_ISLNK(inode
->i_mode
)) {
1373 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1374 rc
= selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry
,
1385 isec
->initialized
= 1;
1388 mutex_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
1390 if (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_FILE
)
1391 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1395 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1396 static inline u32
signal_to_av(int sig
)
1402 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1403 perm
= PROCESS__SIGCHLD
;
1406 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1407 perm
= PROCESS__SIGKILL
;
1410 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1411 perm
= PROCESS__SIGSTOP
;
1414 /* All other signals. */
1415 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNAL
;
1423 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1424 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1426 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred
*actor
,
1427 const struct cred
*target
,
1430 u32 asid
= cred_sid(actor
), tsid
= cred_sid(target
);
1432 return avc_has_perm(asid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1436 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1437 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1438 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1439 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1441 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk1
,
1442 const struct task_struct
*tsk2
,
1445 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec1
, *__tsec2
;
1449 __tsec1
= __task_cred(tsk1
)->security
; sid1
= __tsec1
->sid
;
1450 __tsec2
= __task_cred(tsk2
)->security
; sid2
= __tsec2
->sid
;
1452 return avc_has_perm(sid1
, sid2
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1456 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1457 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1458 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1459 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1461 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1466 sid
= current_sid();
1467 tsid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1468 return avc_has_perm(sid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1471 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1472 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1475 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1476 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred
*cred
,
1479 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1480 struct av_decision avd
;
1482 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1483 u32 av
= CAP_TO_MASK(cap
);
1486 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP
;
1489 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap
)) {
1491 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY
;
1494 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2
;
1498 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap
);
1503 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, 0, &avd
);
1504 if (audit
== SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
) {
1505 int rc2
= avc_audit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, &avd
, rc
, &ad
, 0);
1512 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1513 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1516 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1518 return avc_has_perm(sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
1519 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, perms
, NULL
);
1522 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1523 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1524 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1525 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1526 struct inode
*inode
,
1528 struct common_audit_data
*adp
,
1531 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
1534 validate_creds(cred
);
1536 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
1539 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1540 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1542 return avc_has_perm_flags(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, adp
, flags
);
1545 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1546 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1547 pathname if needed. */
1548 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1549 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1552 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
1553 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1555 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1556 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1557 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
, 0);
1560 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1561 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1562 pathname if needed. */
1563 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1567 struct inode
*inode
= path
->dentry
->d_inode
;
1568 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1570 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1572 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
, 0);
1575 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1576 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1577 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1578 check a particular permission to the file.
1579 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1580 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1581 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1582 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1583 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1587 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
1588 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
1589 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1590 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1593 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1594 ad
.u
.path
= file
->f_path
;
1596 if (sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
1597 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, fsec
->sid
,
1605 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1608 rc
= inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
, 0);
1614 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1615 static int may_create(struct inode
*dir
,
1616 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1619 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
1620 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
1621 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1623 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1626 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
1627 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1630 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
1632 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1633 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1635 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1636 DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
,
1641 if (!newsid
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
)) {
1642 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, dsec
->sid
, tclass
,
1643 &dentry
->d_name
, &newsid
);
1648 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, tclass
, FILE__CREATE
, &ad
);
1652 return avc_has_perm(newsid
, sbsec
->sid
,
1653 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
1654 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
1657 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1658 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid
,
1659 struct task_struct
*ctx
)
1661 u32 sid
= task_sid(ctx
);
1663 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, KEY__CREATE
, NULL
);
1667 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1670 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1671 static int may_link(struct inode
*dir
,
1672 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1676 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
, *isec
;
1677 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1678 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1682 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
1683 isec
= dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1685 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1686 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1689 av
|= (kind
? DIR__REMOVE_NAME
: DIR__ADD_NAME
);
1690 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1705 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1710 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, av
, &ad
);
1714 static inline int may_rename(struct inode
*old_dir
,
1715 struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
1716 struct inode
*new_dir
,
1717 struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
1719 struct inode_security_struct
*old_dsec
, *new_dsec
, *old_isec
, *new_isec
;
1720 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1721 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1723 int old_is_dir
, new_is_dir
;
1726 old_dsec
= old_dir
->i_security
;
1727 old_isec
= old_dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1728 old_is_dir
= S_ISDIR(old_dentry
->d_inode
->i_mode
);
1729 new_dsec
= new_dir
->i_security
;
1731 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1733 ad
.u
.dentry
= old_dentry
;
1734 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1735 DIR__REMOVE_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
, &ad
);
1738 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1739 old_isec
->sclass
, FILE__RENAME
, &ad
);
1742 if (old_is_dir
&& new_dir
!= old_dir
) {
1743 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1744 old_isec
->sclass
, DIR__REPARENT
, &ad
);
1749 ad
.u
.dentry
= new_dentry
;
1750 av
= DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
;
1751 if (new_dentry
->d_inode
)
1752 av
|= DIR__REMOVE_NAME
;
1753 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1756 if (new_dentry
->d_inode
) {
1757 new_isec
= new_dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1758 new_is_dir
= S_ISDIR(new_dentry
->d_inode
->i_mode
);
1759 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_isec
->sid
,
1761 (new_is_dir
? DIR__RMDIR
: FILE__UNLINK
), &ad
);
1769 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1770 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1771 struct super_block
*sb
,
1773 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
1775 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1776 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1778 sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
1779 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
, perms
, ad
);
1782 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1783 static inline u32
file_mask_to_av(int mode
, int mask
)
1787 if (!S_ISDIR(mode
)) {
1788 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1789 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
1790 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1793 if (mask
& MAY_APPEND
)
1795 else if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1799 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1801 if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1803 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1810 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1811 static inline u32
file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1815 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_READ
)
1817 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_WRITE
) {
1818 if (file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
)
1825 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1834 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1837 static inline u32
open_file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1839 u32 av
= file_to_av(file
);
1841 if (selinux_policycap_openperm
)
1847 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1849 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct
*child
,
1854 rc
= cap_ptrace_access_check(child
, mode
);
1858 if (mode
& PTRACE_MODE_READ
) {
1859 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1860 u32 csid
= task_sid(child
);
1861 return avc_has_perm(sid
, csid
, SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__READ
, NULL
);
1864 return current_has_perm(child
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
1867 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct
*parent
)
1871 rc
= cap_ptrace_traceme(parent
);
1875 return task_has_perm(parent
, current
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
1878 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct
*target
, kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
1879 kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
, kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
1883 error
= current_has_perm(target
, PROCESS__GETCAP
);
1887 return cap_capget(target
, effective
, inheritable
, permitted
);
1890 static int selinux_capset(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
1891 const kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
1892 const kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
,
1893 const kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
1897 error
= cap_capset(new, old
,
1898 effective
, inheritable
, permitted
);
1902 return cred_has_perm(old
, new, PROCESS__SETCAP
);
1906 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1907 * which was removed).
1909 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1910 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1911 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1912 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1915 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred
*cred
, struct user_namespace
*ns
,
1920 rc
= cap_capable(cred
, ns
, cap
, audit
);
1924 return cred_has_capability(cred
, cap
, audit
);
1927 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds
, int type
, int id
, struct super_block
*sb
)
1929 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
1941 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD
, NULL
);
1946 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET
, NULL
);
1949 rc
= 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1955 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry
*dentry
)
1957 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
1959 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__QUOTAON
);
1962 static int selinux_syslog(int type
)
1967 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL
: /* Read last kernel messages */
1968 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER
: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1969 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ
);
1971 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF
: /* Disable logging to console */
1972 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON
: /* Enable logging to console */
1973 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1974 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL
:
1975 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE
);
1977 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE
: /* Close log */
1978 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN
: /* Open log */
1979 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ
: /* Read from log */
1980 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR
: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1981 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR
: /* Clear ring buffer */
1983 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD
);
1990 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1991 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1992 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1994 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1995 * processes that allocate mappings.
1997 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct
*mm
, long pages
)
1999 int rc
, cap_sys_admin
= 0;
2001 rc
= selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns
, CAP_SYS_ADMIN
,
2002 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
2006 return __vm_enough_memory(mm
, pages
, cap_sys_admin
);
2009 /* binprm security operations */
2011 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2013 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
2014 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2015 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2016 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2017 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(bprm
->file
);
2020 rc
= cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm
);
2024 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2025 * the script interpreter */
2026 if (bprm
->cred_prepared
)
2029 old_tsec
= current_security();
2030 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2031 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2033 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2034 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2035 new_tsec
->osid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2037 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2038 new_tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
2039 new_tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
2040 new_tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
2042 if (old_tsec
->exec_sid
) {
2043 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->exec_sid
;
2044 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2045 new_tsec
->exec_sid
= 0;
2048 * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs and a transition is
2049 * explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
2051 if (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS
)
2054 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2055 rc
= security_transition_sid(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2056 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, NULL
,
2062 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
2063 ad
.u
.path
= bprm
->file
->f_path
;
2065 if ((bprm
->file
->f_path
.mnt
->mnt_flags
& MNT_NOSUID
) ||
2066 (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS
))
2067 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2069 if (new_tsec
->sid
== old_tsec
->sid
) {
2070 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2071 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS
, &ad
);
2075 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2076 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2077 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__TRANSITION
, &ad
);
2081 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2082 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__ENTRYPOINT
, &ad
);
2086 /* Check for shared state */
2087 if (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE
) {
2088 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2089 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SHARE
,
2095 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2096 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2098 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE
| LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
)) {
2099 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
2100 struct task_security_struct
*sec
;
2104 tracer
= ptrace_parent(current
);
2105 if (likely(tracer
!= NULL
)) {
2106 sec
= __task_cred(tracer
)->security
;
2112 rc
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2114 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
2120 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2121 bprm
->per_clear
|= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID
;
2127 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2129 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2137 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2138 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2139 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2140 atsecure
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
,
2142 PROCESS__NOATSECURE
, NULL
);
2145 return (atsecure
|| cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm
));
2148 static int match_file(const void *p
, struct file
*file
, unsigned fd
)
2150 return file_has_perm(p
, file
, file_to_av(file
)) ? fd
+ 1 : 0;
2153 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2154 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred
*cred
,
2155 struct files_struct
*files
)
2157 struct file
*file
, *devnull
= NULL
;
2158 struct tty_struct
*tty
;
2162 tty
= get_current_tty();
2164 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock
);
2165 if (!list_empty(&tty
->tty_files
)) {
2166 struct tty_file_private
*file_priv
;
2168 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2169 Use path_has_perm on the tty path directly rather
2170 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2171 file may belong to another process and we are only
2172 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2173 file_priv
= list_first_entry(&tty
->tty_files
,
2174 struct tty_file_private
, list
);
2175 file
= file_priv
->file
;
2176 if (path_has_perm(cred
, &file
->f_path
, FILE__READ
| FILE__WRITE
))
2179 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock
);
2182 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2186 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2187 n
= iterate_fd(files
, 0, match_file
, cred
);
2188 if (!n
) /* none found? */
2191 devnull
= dentry_open(&selinux_null
, O_RDWR
, cred
);
2192 if (IS_ERR(devnull
))
2194 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2196 replace_fd(n
- 1, devnull
, 0);
2197 } while ((n
= iterate_fd(files
, n
, match_file
, cred
)) != 0);
2203 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2205 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2207 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2208 struct rlimit
*rlim
, *initrlim
;
2211 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2212 if (new_tsec
->sid
== new_tsec
->osid
)
2215 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2216 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm
->cred
, current
->files
);
2218 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2219 current
->pdeath_signal
= 0;
2221 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2222 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2223 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2225 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2226 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2227 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2228 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2229 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2231 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->osid
, new_tsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2232 PROCESS__RLIMITINH
, NULL
);
2234 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2236 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++) {
2237 rlim
= current
->signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2238 initrlim
= init_task
.signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2239 rlim
->rlim_cur
= min(rlim
->rlim_max
, initrlim
->rlim_cur
);
2241 task_unlock(current
);
2242 update_rlimit_cpu(current
, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU
));
2247 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2250 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2252 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2253 struct itimerval itimer
;
2263 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2264 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2265 * flush and unblock signals.
2267 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2268 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2270 rc
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SIGINH
, NULL
);
2272 memset(&itimer
, 0, sizeof itimer
);
2273 for (i
= 0; i
< 3; i
++)
2274 do_setitimer(i
, &itimer
, NULL
);
2275 spin_lock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2276 if (!(current
->signal
->flags
& SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT
)) {
2277 __flush_signals(current
);
2278 flush_signal_handlers(current
, 1);
2279 sigemptyset(¤t
->blocked
);
2281 spin_unlock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2284 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2285 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2286 read_lock(&tasklist_lock
);
2287 __wake_up_parent(current
, current
->real_parent
);
2288 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock
);
2291 /* superblock security operations */
2293 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2295 return superblock_alloc_security(sb
);
2298 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2300 superblock_free_security(sb
);
2303 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix
, int plen
, char *option
, int olen
)
2308 return !memcmp(prefix
, option
, plen
);
2311 static inline int selinux_option(char *option
, int len
)
2313 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2314 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2315 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2316 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2317 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR
, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR
)-1, option
, len
));
2320 static inline void take_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
, int len
)
2327 memcpy(*to
, from
, len
);
2331 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
,
2334 int current_size
= 0;
2342 while (current_size
< len
) {
2352 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig
, char *copy
)
2354 int fnosec
, fsec
, rc
= 0;
2355 char *in_save
, *in_curr
, *in_end
;
2356 char *sec_curr
, *nosec_save
, *nosec
;
2362 nosec
= (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
2370 in_save
= in_end
= orig
;
2374 open_quote
= !open_quote
;
2375 if ((*in_end
== ',' && open_quote
== 0) ||
2377 int len
= in_end
- in_curr
;
2379 if (selinux_option(in_curr
, len
))
2380 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr
, in_curr
, &fsec
, len
);
2382 take_option(&nosec
, in_curr
, &fnosec
, len
);
2384 in_curr
= in_end
+ 1;
2386 } while (*in_end
++);
2388 strcpy(in_save
, nosec_save
);
2389 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save
);
2394 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
2397 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
2398 char *secdata
, **mount_options
;
2399 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
2401 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
2407 if (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
2410 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts
);
2411 secdata
= alloc_secdata();
2414 rc
= selinux_sb_copy_data(data
, secdata
);
2416 goto out_free_secdata
;
2418 rc
= selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata
, &opts
);
2420 goto out_free_secdata
;
2422 mount_options
= opts
.mnt_opts
;
2423 flags
= opts
.mnt_opts_flags
;
2425 for (i
= 0; i
< opts
.num_mnt_opts
; i
++) {
2429 if (flags
[i
] == SE_SBLABELSUPP
)
2431 len
= strlen(mount_options
[i
]);
2432 rc
= security_context_to_sid(mount_options
[i
], len
, &sid
);
2434 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2435 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2436 mount_options
[i
], sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
2442 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
, sid
))
2443 goto out_bad_option
;
2446 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, sid
))
2447 goto out_bad_option
;
2449 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
: {
2450 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
;
2451 root_isec
= sb
->s_root
->d_inode
->i_security
;
2453 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
, sid
))
2454 goto out_bad_option
;
2457 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT
:
2458 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
, sid
))
2459 goto out_bad_option
;
2468 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
2470 free_secdata(secdata
);
2473 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unable to change security options "
2474 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb
->s_id
,
2479 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block
*sb
, int flags
, void *data
)
2481 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2482 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2485 rc
= superblock_doinit(sb
, data
);
2489 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2490 if (flags
& MS_KERNMOUNT
)
2493 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2494 ad
.u
.dentry
= sb
->s_root
;
2495 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT
, &ad
);
2498 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2500 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2501 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2503 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2504 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
->d_sb
->s_root
;
2505 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, dentry
->d_sb
, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR
, &ad
);
2508 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name
,
2511 unsigned long flags
,
2514 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2516 if (flags
& MS_REMOUNT
)
2517 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, path
->dentry
->d_sb
,
2518 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT
, NULL
);
2520 return path_has_perm(cred
, path
, FILE__MOUNTON
);
2523 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, int flags
)
2525 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2527 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, mnt
->mnt_sb
,
2528 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT
, NULL
);
2531 /* inode security operations */
2533 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2535 return inode_alloc_security(inode
);
2538 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2540 inode_free_security(inode
);
2543 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry
*dentry
, int mode
,
2544 struct qstr
*name
, void **ctx
,
2547 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2548 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
2549 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
2550 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2551 struct inode
*dir
= dentry
->d_parent
->d_inode
;
2555 tsec
= cred
->security
;
2556 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
2557 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2559 if (tsec
->create_sid
&& sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
) {
2560 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
2562 rc
= security_transition_sid(tsec
->sid
, dsec
->sid
,
2563 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
),
2568 "%s: security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d\n",
2574 return security_sid_to_context(newsid
, (char **)ctx
, ctxlen
);
2577 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode
*inode
, struct inode
*dir
,
2578 const struct qstr
*qstr
, char **name
,
2579 void **value
, size_t *len
)
2581 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2582 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
2583 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2584 u32 sid
, newsid
, clen
;
2586 char *namep
= NULL
, *context
;
2588 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
2589 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2592 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
2594 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) &&
2595 (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
))
2596 newsid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
2597 else if (!newsid
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
)) {
2598 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, dsec
->sid
,
2599 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
),
2602 printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: "
2603 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2606 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
2611 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2612 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
2613 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2614 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
2616 isec
->initialized
= 1;
2619 if (!ss_initialized
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
))
2623 namep
= kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
, GFP_NOFS
);
2630 rc
= security_sid_to_context_force(newsid
, &context
, &clen
);
2642 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mode
)
2644 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_FILE
);
2647 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry
*old_dentry
, struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2649 return may_link(dir
, old_dentry
, MAY_LINK
);
2652 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2654 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_UNLINK
);
2657 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2659 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
);
2662 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mask
)
2664 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_DIR
);
2667 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2669 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_RMDIR
);
2672 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mode
, dev_t dev
)
2674 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
));
2677 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode
*old_inode
, struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
2678 struct inode
*new_inode
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2680 return may_rename(old_inode
, old_dentry
, new_inode
, new_dentry
);
2683 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2685 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2687 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2690 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct nameidata
*nameidata
)
2692 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2694 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2697 static noinline
int audit_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
,
2698 u32 perms
, u32 audited
, u32 denied
,
2701 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2702 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2705 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE
;
2708 rc
= slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
,
2709 audited
, denied
, &ad
, flags
);
2715 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
, int mask
)
2717 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2720 unsigned flags
= mask
& MAY_NOT_BLOCK
;
2721 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2723 struct av_decision avd
;
2725 u32 audited
, denied
;
2727 from_access
= mask
& MAY_ACCESS
;
2728 mask
&= (MAY_READ
|MAY_WRITE
|MAY_EXEC
|MAY_APPEND
);
2730 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2734 validate_creds(cred
);
2736 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
2739 perms
= file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
);
2741 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
2742 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2744 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, 0, &avd
);
2745 audited
= avc_audit_required(perms
, &avd
, rc
,
2746 from_access
? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS
: 0,
2748 if (likely(!audited
))
2751 rc2
= audit_inode_permission(inode
, perms
, audited
, denied
, flags
);
2757 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct iattr
*iattr
)
2759 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2760 unsigned int ia_valid
= iattr
->ia_valid
;
2761 __u32 av
= FILE__WRITE
;
2763 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2764 if (ia_valid
& ATTR_FORCE
) {
2765 ia_valid
&= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID
| ATTR_KILL_SGID
| ATTR_MODE
|
2771 if (ia_valid
& (ATTR_MODE
| ATTR_UID
| ATTR_GID
|
2772 ATTR_ATIME_SET
| ATTR_MTIME_SET
| ATTR_TIMES_SET
))
2773 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2775 if (selinux_policycap_openperm
&& (ia_valid
& ATTR_SIZE
))
2778 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, av
);
2781 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2783 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2786 path
.dentry
= dentry
;
2789 return path_has_perm(cred
, &path
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2792 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2794 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2796 if (!strncmp(name
, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
,
2797 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
- 1)) {
2798 if (!strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_CAPS
)) {
2799 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP
))
2801 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
2802 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2803 Restrict to administrator. */
2808 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2809 ordinary setattr permission. */
2810 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2813 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
2814 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
2816 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2817 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2818 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2819 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2820 u32 newsid
, sid
= current_sid();
2823 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
2824 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
2826 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2827 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
))
2830 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode
))
2833 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2834 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
2836 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
,
2837 FILE__RELABELFROM
, &ad
);
2841 rc
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2842 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
2843 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
)) {
2844 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2848 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
2849 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
2852 if (str
[size
- 1] == '\0')
2853 audit_size
= size
- 1;
2860 ab
= audit_log_start(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
);
2861 audit_log_format(ab
, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
2862 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, value
, audit_size
);
2867 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2872 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, isec
->sclass
,
2873 FILE__RELABELTO
, &ad
);
2877 rc
= security_validate_transition(isec
->sid
, newsid
, sid
,
2882 return avc_has_perm(newsid
,
2884 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
2885 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
,
2889 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
2890 const void *value
, size_t size
,
2893 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2894 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2898 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
)) {
2899 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2903 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2905 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2906 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2907 inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
, -rc
);
2915 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2917 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2919 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2922 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2924 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2926 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2929 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2931 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
2932 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
2934 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2935 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2940 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2942 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2944 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
, void **buffer
, bool alloc
)
2948 char *context
= NULL
;
2949 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2951 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
2955 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2956 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2957 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2958 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2959 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2960 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2961 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2963 error
= selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns
, CAP_MAC_ADMIN
,
2964 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
2966 error
= security_sid_to_context_force(isec
->sid
, &context
,
2969 error
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &size
);
2982 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
,
2983 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
2985 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2989 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
2992 if (!value
|| !size
)
2995 rc
= security_context_to_sid((void *)value
, size
, &newsid
);
3000 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3004 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, char *buffer
, size_t buffer_size
)
3006 const int len
= sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
);
3007 if (buffer
&& len
<= buffer_size
)
3008 memcpy(buffer
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, len
);
3012 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode
*inode
, u32
*secid
)
3014 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3018 /* file security operations */
3020 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
3022 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3023 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
3025 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3026 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && (mask
& MAY_WRITE
))
3029 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
,
3030 file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
));
3033 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
3035 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
3036 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3037 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3038 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3041 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3044 if (sid
== fsec
->sid
&& fsec
->isid
== isec
->sid
&&
3045 fsec
->pseqno
== avc_policy_seqno())
3046 /* No change since file_open check. */
3049 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file
, mask
);
3052 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
3054 return file_alloc_security(file
);
3057 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
3059 file_free_security(file
);
3062 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3065 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3075 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
:
3077 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION
:
3078 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3081 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
:
3083 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION
:
3084 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__SETATTR
);
3087 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3091 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3096 error
= cred_has_capability(cred
, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG
,
3097 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
);
3100 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3101 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3104 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__IOCTL
);
3109 static int default_noexec
;
3111 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file
*file
, unsigned long prot
, int shared
)
3113 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3116 if (default_noexec
&&
3117 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && (!file
|| (!shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
)))) {
3119 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3120 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3121 * This has an additional check.
3123 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECMEM
);
3129 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3130 u32 av
= FILE__READ
;
3132 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3133 if (shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
))
3136 if (prot
& PROT_EXEC
)
3137 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
3139 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, av
);
3146 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr
)
3149 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3152 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3153 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3154 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3155 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3157 if (addr
< CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
) {
3158 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT
,
3159 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO
, NULL
);
3164 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3165 return cap_mmap_addr(addr
);
3168 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file
*file
, unsigned long reqprot
,
3169 unsigned long prot
, unsigned long flags
)
3171 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3174 return file_map_prot_check(file
, prot
,
3175 (flags
& MAP_TYPE
) == MAP_SHARED
);
3178 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct
*vma
,
3179 unsigned long reqprot
,
3182 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3184 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3187 if (default_noexec
&&
3188 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && !(vma
->vm_flags
& VM_EXEC
)) {
3190 if (vma
->vm_start
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_brk
&&
3191 vma
->vm_end
<= vma
->vm_mm
->brk
) {
3192 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECHEAP
);
3193 } else if (!vma
->vm_file
&&
3194 vma
->vm_start
<= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
&&
3195 vma
->vm_end
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
) {
3196 rc
= current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__EXECSTACK
);
3197 } else if (vma
->vm_file
&& vma
->anon_vma
) {
3199 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3200 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3201 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3202 * modified content. This typically should only
3203 * occur for text relocations.
3205 rc
= file_has_perm(cred
, vma
->vm_file
, FILE__EXECMOD
);
3211 return file_map_prot_check(vma
->vm_file
, prot
, vma
->vm_flags
&VM_SHARED
);
3214 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
)
3216 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3218 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3221 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3224 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3229 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && !(arg
& O_APPEND
)) {
3230 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__WRITE
);
3239 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS
:
3240 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3241 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3246 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3251 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3258 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file
*file
)
3260 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3262 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3263 fsec
->fown_sid
= current_sid();
3268 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
3269 struct fown_struct
*fown
, int signum
)
3272 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
3274 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3276 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3277 file
= container_of(fown
, struct file
, f_owner
);
3279 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3282 perm
= signal_to_av(SIGIO
); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3284 perm
= signal_to_av(signum
);
3286 return avc_has_perm(fsec
->fown_sid
, sid
,
3287 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3290 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file
*file
)
3292 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3294 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, file_to_av(file
));
3297 static int selinux_file_open(struct file
*file
, const struct cred
*cred
)
3299 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3300 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3302 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3303 isec
= file_inode(file
)->i_security
;
3305 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3306 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3307 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3308 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3309 * struct as its SID.
3311 fsec
->isid
= isec
->sid
;
3312 fsec
->pseqno
= avc_policy_seqno();
3314 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3315 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3316 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3317 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3318 * new inode label or new policy.
3319 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3321 return path_has_perm(cred
, &file
->f_path
, open_file_to_av(file
));
3324 /* task security operations */
3326 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags
)
3328 return current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__FORK
);
3332 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3334 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred
*cred
, gfp_t gfp
)
3336 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3338 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3342 cred
->security
= tsec
;
3347 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3349 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred
*cred
)
3351 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
3354 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3355 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3357 BUG_ON(cred
->security
&& (unsigned long) cred
->security
< PAGE_SIZE
);
3358 cred
->security
= (void *) 0x7UL
;
3363 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3365 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
3368 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
3369 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3371 old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3373 tsec
= kmemdup(old_tsec
, sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3377 new->security
= tsec
;
3382 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3384 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
3386 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3387 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3393 * set the security data for a kernel service
3394 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3396 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred
*new, u32 secid
)
3398 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3399 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3402 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, secid
,
3403 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3404 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE
,
3408 tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
3409 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
3410 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
3416 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3417 * objective context of the specified inode
3419 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred
*new, struct inode
*inode
)
3421 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3422 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3423 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3426 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
3427 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3428 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS
,
3432 tsec
->create_sid
= isec
->sid
;
3436 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name
)
3439 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3441 sid
= task_sid(current
);
3443 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD
;
3444 ad
.u
.kmod_name
= kmod_name
;
3446 return avc_has_perm(sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
, SECCLASS_SYSTEM
,
3447 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST
, &ad
);
3450 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct
*p
, pid_t pgid
)
3452 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETPGID
);
3455 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3457 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETPGID
);
3460 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3462 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSESSION
);
3465 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct
*p
, u32
*secid
)
3467 *secid
= task_sid(p
);
3470 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct
*p
, int nice
)
3474 rc
= cap_task_setnice(p
, nice
);
3478 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3481 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct
*p
, int ioprio
)
3485 rc
= cap_task_setioprio(p
, ioprio
);
3489 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3492 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct
*p
)
3494 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3497 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct
*p
, unsigned int resource
,
3498 struct rlimit
*new_rlim
)
3500 struct rlimit
*old_rlim
= p
->signal
->rlim
+ resource
;
3502 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3503 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3504 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3505 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3506 if (old_rlim
->rlim_max
!= new_rlim
->rlim_max
)
3507 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT
);
3512 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
3516 rc
= cap_task_setscheduler(p
);
3520 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3523 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
3525 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3528 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct
*p
)
3530 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3533 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct
*p
, struct siginfo
*info
,
3540 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNULL
; /* null signal; existence test */
3542 perm
= signal_to_av(sig
);
3544 rc
= avc_has_perm(secid
, task_sid(p
),
3545 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3547 rc
= current_has_perm(p
, perm
);
3551 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct
*p
)
3553 return task_has_perm(p
, current
, PROCESS__SIGCHLD
);
3556 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct
*p
,
3557 struct inode
*inode
)
3559 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3560 u32 sid
= task_sid(p
);
3563 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3566 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3567 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3568 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3570 int offset
, ihlen
, ret
= -EINVAL
;
3571 struct iphdr _iph
, *ih
;
3573 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3574 ih
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_iph
), &_iph
);
3578 ihlen
= ih
->ihl
* 4;
3579 if (ihlen
< sizeof(_iph
))
3582 ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
= ih
->saddr
;
3583 ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.daddr
= ih
->daddr
;
3587 *proto
= ih
->protocol
;
3589 switch (ih
->protocol
) {
3591 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3593 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3597 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3601 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= th
->source
;
3602 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= th
->dest
;
3607 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3609 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3613 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3617 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= uh
->source
;
3618 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= uh
->dest
;
3622 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3623 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3625 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3629 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3633 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3634 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3645 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3647 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3648 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3649 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3652 int ret
= -EINVAL
, offset
;
3653 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h
, *ip6
;
3656 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3657 ip6
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_ipv6h
), &_ipv6h
);
3661 ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
= ip6
->saddr
;
3662 ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.daddr
= ip6
->daddr
;
3665 nexthdr
= ip6
->nexthdr
;
3666 offset
+= sizeof(_ipv6h
);
3667 offset
= ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb
, offset
, &nexthdr
, &frag_off
);
3676 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3678 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3682 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= th
->source
;
3683 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= th
->dest
;
3688 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3690 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3694 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= uh
->source
;
3695 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= uh
->dest
;
3699 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3700 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3702 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3706 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3707 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3711 /* includes fragments */
3721 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff
*skb
, struct common_audit_data
*ad
,
3722 char **_addrp
, int src
, u8
*proto
)
3727 switch (ad
->u
.net
->family
) {
3729 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3732 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
:
3733 &ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.daddr
);
3736 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3738 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3741 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
:
3742 &ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.daddr
);
3752 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3753 " unable to parse packet\n");
3763 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3765 * @family: protocol family
3766 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3769 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3770 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3771 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3772 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3773 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3777 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff
*skb
, u16 family
, u32
*sid
)
3784 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb
, &xfrm_sid
);
3785 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb
, family
, &nlbl_type
, &nlbl_sid
);
3787 err
= security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid
, nlbl_type
, xfrm_sid
, sid
);
3788 if (unlikely(err
)) {
3790 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3791 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3798 /* socket security operations */
3800 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
,
3801 u16 secclass
, u32
*socksid
)
3803 if (tsec
->sockcreate_sid
> SECSID_NULL
) {
3804 *socksid
= tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
3808 return security_transition_sid(tsec
->sid
, tsec
->sid
, secclass
, NULL
,
3812 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct
*task
, struct sock
*sk
, u32 perms
)
3814 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
3815 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3816 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
3817 u32 tsid
= task_sid(task
);
3819 if (sksec
->sid
== SECINITSID_KERNEL
)
3822 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
3826 return avc_has_perm(tsid
, sksec
->sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
3829 static int selinux_socket_create(int family
, int type
,
3830 int protocol
, int kern
)
3832 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
3840 secclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
3841 rc
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
, secclass
, &newsid
);
3845 return avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, newsid
, secclass
, SOCKET__CREATE
, NULL
);
3848 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket
*sock
, int family
,
3849 int type
, int protocol
, int kern
)
3851 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
3852 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3853 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
3856 isec
->sclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
3859 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
3861 err
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
, isec
->sclass
, &(isec
->sid
));
3866 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3869 sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
3870 sksec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
3871 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
3872 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock
->sk
, family
);
3878 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3879 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3880 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3882 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
3884 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
3888 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, SOCKET__BIND
);
3893 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3894 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3895 * check the first address now.
3897 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
3898 if (family
== PF_INET
|| family
== PF_INET6
) {
3900 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
3901 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3902 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
3903 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
3904 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
3905 unsigned short snum
;
3908 if (family
== PF_INET
) {
3909 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
3910 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
3911 addrp
= (char *)&addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
3913 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
3914 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
3915 addrp
= (char *)&addr6
->sin6_addr
.s6_addr
;
3921 inet_get_local_port_range(&low
, &high
);
3923 if (snum
< max(PROT_SOCK
, low
) || snum
> high
) {
3924 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
,
3928 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
3930 ad
.u
.net
->sport
= htons(snum
);
3931 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
3932 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
,
3934 SOCKET__NAME_BIND
, &ad
);
3940 switch (sksec
->sclass
) {
3941 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
:
3942 node_perm
= TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3945 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
:
3946 node_perm
= UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3949 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
:
3950 node_perm
= DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3954 node_perm
= RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3958 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &sid
);
3962 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
3964 ad
.u
.net
->sport
= htons(snum
);
3965 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
3967 if (family
== PF_INET
)
3968 ad
.u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
= addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
3970 ad
.u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
= addr6
->sin6_addr
;
3972 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
,
3973 sksec
->sclass
, node_perm
, &ad
);
3981 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
3983 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
3984 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
3987 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, SOCKET__CONNECT
);
3992 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3994 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
||
3995 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
) {
3996 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3997 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
3998 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
3999 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
4000 unsigned short snum
;
4003 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
) {
4004 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
4005 if (addrlen
< sizeof(struct sockaddr_in
))
4007 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
4009 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
4010 if (addrlen
< SIN6_LEN_RFC2133
)
4012 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
4015 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
, snum
, &sid
);
4019 perm
= (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
) ?
4020 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
: DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
;
4022 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4024 ad
.u
.net
->dport
= htons(snum
);
4025 ad
.u
.net
->family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4026 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perm
, &ad
);
4031 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk
, address
);
4037 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket
*sock
, int backlog
)
4039 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__LISTEN
);
4042 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket
*sock
, struct socket
*newsock
)
4045 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
4046 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
;
4048 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__ACCEPT
);
4052 newisec
= SOCK_INODE(newsock
)->i_security
;
4054 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
4055 newisec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4056 newisec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
4057 newisec
->initialized
= 1;
4062 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
4065 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__WRITE
);
4068 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
4069 int size
, int flags
)
4071 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__READ
);
4074 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket
*sock
)
4076 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
4079 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket
*sock
)
4081 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
4084 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
, int optname
)
4088 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SETOPT
);
4092 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock
, level
, optname
);
4095 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
,
4098 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETOPT
);
4101 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket
*sock
, int how
)
4103 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN
);
4106 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock
*sock
,
4110 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_sock
= sock
->sk_security
;
4111 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_other
= other
->sk_security
;
4112 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_new
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4113 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4114 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4117 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4119 ad
.u
.net
->sk
= other
;
4121 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec_sock
->sid
, sksec_other
->sid
,
4122 sksec_other
->sclass
,
4123 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO
, &ad
);
4127 /* server child socket */
4128 sksec_new
->peer_sid
= sksec_sock
->sid
;
4129 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other
->sid
, sksec_sock
->sid
,
4134 /* connecting socket */
4135 sksec_sock
->peer_sid
= sksec_new
->sid
;
4140 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket
*sock
,
4141 struct socket
*other
)
4143 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4144 struct sk_security_struct
*osec
= other
->sk
->sk_security
;
4145 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4146 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4148 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4150 ad
.u
.net
->sk
= other
->sk
;
4152 return avc_has_perm(ssec
->sid
, osec
->sid
, osec
->sclass
, SOCKET__SENDTO
,
4156 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex
, char *addrp
, u16 family
,
4158 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
4164 err
= sel_netif_sid(ifindex
, &if_sid
);
4167 err
= avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
4168 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__INGRESS
, ad
);
4172 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
);
4175 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
4176 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__RECVFROM
, ad
);
4179 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4183 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4184 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4185 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4186 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4189 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4191 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4192 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4193 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4197 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4198 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4204 err
= selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
, skb
, family
, &ad
);
4207 err
= selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
);
4212 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4215 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4216 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4217 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4218 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4219 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4224 if (family
!= PF_INET
&& family
!= PF_INET6
)
4227 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4228 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4231 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4232 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4233 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4234 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4235 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4236 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk
, skb
, family
);
4238 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4239 peerlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4240 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4243 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4245 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4246 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4247 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4251 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4254 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
);
4257 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb
->skb_iif
, addrp
, family
,
4260 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4263 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, peer_sid
, SECCLASS_PEER
,
4266 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4269 if (secmark_active
) {
4270 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4279 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket
*sock
, char __user
*optval
,
4280 int __user
*optlen
, unsigned len
)
4285 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4286 u32 peer_sid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4288 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
||
4289 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
)
4290 peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
4291 if (peer_sid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4292 return -ENOPROTOOPT
;
4294 err
= security_sid_to_context(peer_sid
, &scontext
, &scontext_len
);
4298 if (scontext_len
> len
) {
4303 if (copy_to_user(optval
, scontext
, scontext_len
))
4307 if (put_user(scontext_len
, optlen
))
4313 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket
*sock
, struct sk_buff
*skb
, u32
*secid
)
4315 u32 peer_secid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4318 if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4320 else if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IPV6
))
4323 family
= sock
->sk
->sk_family
;
4327 if (sock
&& family
== PF_UNIX
)
4328 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock
), &peer_secid
);
4330 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_secid
);
4333 *secid
= peer_secid
;
4334 if (peer_secid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4339 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock
*sk
, int family
, gfp_t priority
)
4341 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4343 sksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec
), priority
);
4347 sksec
->peer_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4348 sksec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4349 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec
);
4350 sk
->sk_security
= sksec
;
4355 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock
*sk
)
4357 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4359 sk
->sk_security
= NULL
;
4360 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec
);
4364 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock
*sk
, struct sock
*newsk
)
4366 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4367 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4369 newsksec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4370 newsksec
->peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
4371 newsksec
->sclass
= sksec
->sclass
;
4373 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec
);
4376 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock
*sk
, u32
*secid
)
4379 *secid
= SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET
;
4381 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4383 *secid
= sksec
->sid
;
4387 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock
*sk
, struct socket
*parent
)
4389 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= SOCK_INODE(parent
)->i_security
;
4390 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4392 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
|| sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET6
||
4393 sk
->sk_family
== PF_UNIX
)
4394 isec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4395 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4398 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4399 struct request_sock
*req
)
4401 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4403 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4407 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4408 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4411 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peersid
);
4414 if (peersid
== SECSID_NULL
) {
4415 req
->secid
= sksec
->sid
;
4416 req
->peer_secid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4418 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sksec
->sid
, peersid
, &newsid
);
4421 req
->secid
= newsid
;
4422 req
->peer_secid
= peersid
;
4425 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req
, family
);
4428 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock
*newsk
,
4429 const struct request_sock
*req
)
4431 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4433 newsksec
->sid
= req
->secid
;
4434 newsksec
->peer_sid
= req
->peer_secid
;
4435 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4436 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4437 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4438 time it will have been created and available. */
4440 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4441 * thread with access to newsksec */
4442 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk
, req
->rsk_ops
->family
);
4445 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4447 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4448 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4450 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4451 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4454 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &sksec
->peer_sid
);
4457 static void selinux_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff
*skb
, struct sock
*sk
)
4459 skb_set_owner_w(skb
, sk
);
4462 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid
)
4464 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
4467 __tsec
= current_security();
4470 return avc_has_perm(tsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
4473 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4475 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount
);
4478 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4480 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount
);
4483 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock
*req
,
4486 fl
->flowi_secid
= req
->secid
;
4489 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security
)
4491 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
;
4493 tunsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec
), GFP_KERNEL
);
4496 tunsec
->sid
= current_sid();
4502 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security
)
4507 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4509 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4511 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4512 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4513 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4514 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4515 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4516 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4518 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE
,
4522 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security
)
4524 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
4526 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4527 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE
, NULL
);
4530 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock
*sk
, void *security
)
4532 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
4533 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4535 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4536 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4537 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4538 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4539 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4540 * protocols were being used */
4542 sksec
->sid
= tunsec
->sid
;
4543 sksec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
;
4548 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security
)
4550 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
4551 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4554 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, tunsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4555 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
4558 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4559 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
4567 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4571 struct nlmsghdr
*nlh
;
4572 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4574 if (skb
->len
< NLMSG_HDRLEN
) {
4578 nlh
= nlmsg_hdr(skb
);
4580 err
= selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec
->sclass
, nlh
->nlmsg_type
, &perm
);
4582 if (err
== -EINVAL
) {
4583 audit_log(current
->audit_context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
,
4584 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4585 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4586 nlh
->nlmsg_type
, sksec
->sclass
);
4587 if (!selinux_enforcing
|| security_get_allow_unknown())
4597 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, perm
);
4602 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4604 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int ifindex
,
4610 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4611 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4616 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4619 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4620 netlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled();
4621 peerlbl_active
= netlbl_active
|| selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4622 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4625 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
) != 0)
4628 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4630 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
4631 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4632 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
) != 0)
4635 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4636 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex
, addrp
, family
,
4639 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 1);
4645 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4646 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__FORWARD_IN
, &ad
))
4650 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4651 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4652 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4654 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, peer_sid
) != 0)
4660 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum
,
4661 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4662 const struct net_device
*in
,
4663 const struct net_device
*out
,
4664 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4666 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, in
->ifindex
, PF_INET
);
4669 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4670 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum
,
4671 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4672 const struct net_device
*in
,
4673 const struct net_device
*out
,
4674 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4676 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, in
->ifindex
, PF_INET6
);
4680 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4685 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4688 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4689 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4690 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4692 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= skb
->sk
->sk_security
;
4695 sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4696 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, sid
) != 0)
4702 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum
,
4703 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4704 const struct net_device
*in
,
4705 const struct net_device
*out
,
4706 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4708 return selinux_ip_output(skb
, PF_INET
);
4711 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4715 struct sock
*sk
= skb
->sk
;
4716 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4717 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4718 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4724 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4726 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4728 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
4729 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4730 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, &proto
))
4733 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4734 if (avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4735 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__SEND
, &ad
))
4736 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4738 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
, proto
))
4739 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4744 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int ifindex
,
4750 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4751 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4756 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4757 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4758 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4759 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4760 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4761 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb
, ifindex
, family
);
4763 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4764 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4765 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4766 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4767 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4768 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4769 if (skb_dst(skb
) != NULL
&& skb_dst(skb
)->xfrm
!= NULL
)
4772 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4773 peerlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4774 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4777 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4778 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4779 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4780 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4784 secmark_perm
= PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
;
4785 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
))
4788 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4789 peer_sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4792 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4793 peer_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4794 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4797 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4799 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
4800 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4801 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, NULL
))
4805 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4806 SECCLASS_PACKET
, secmark_perm
, &ad
))
4807 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4809 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4813 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex
, &if_sid
))
4815 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
4816 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__EGRESS
, &ad
))
4817 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4819 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
))
4821 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
4822 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__SENDTO
, &ad
))
4823 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4829 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum
,
4830 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4831 const struct net_device
*in
,
4832 const struct net_device
*out
,
4833 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4835 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, out
->ifindex
, PF_INET
);
4838 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4839 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum
,
4840 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4841 const struct net_device
*in
,
4842 const struct net_device
*out
,
4843 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4845 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, out
->ifindex
, PF_INET6
);
4849 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4851 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4855 err
= cap_netlink_send(sk
, skb
);
4859 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk
, skb
);
4862 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct
*task
,
4863 struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
,
4866 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4869 isec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
4873 sid
= task_sid(task
);
4874 isec
->sclass
= sclass
;
4876 perm
->security
= isec
;
4881 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
)
4883 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= perm
->security
;
4884 perm
->security
= NULL
;
4888 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4890 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
4892 msec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
4896 msec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4897 msg
->security
= msec
;
4902 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4904 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
= msg
->security
;
4906 msg
->security
= NULL
;
4910 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipc_perms
,
4913 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4914 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4915 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4917 isec
= ipc_perms
->security
;
4919 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
4920 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= ipc_perms
->key
;
4922 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
4925 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4927 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg
);
4930 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4932 msg_msg_free_security(msg
);
4935 /* message queue security operations */
4936 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
4938 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4939 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4940 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4943 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &msq
->q_perm
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
);
4947 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4949 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
4950 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4952 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4955 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
4961 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
4963 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
4966 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int msqflg
)
4968 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4969 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4970 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4972 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4974 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
4975 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4977 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4978 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
4981 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int cmd
)
4989 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4990 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
4993 perms
= MSGQ__GETATTR
| MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
;
4996 perms
= MSGQ__SETATTR
;
4999 perms
= MSGQ__DESTROY
;
5005 err
= ipc_has_perm(&msq
->q_perm
, perms
);
5009 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
, int msqflg
)
5011 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5012 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
5013 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5014 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5017 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5018 msec
= msg
->security
;
5021 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5023 if (msec
->sid
== SECINITSID_UNLABELED
) {
5025 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5026 * message queue this message will be stored in
5028 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
5034 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5035 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5037 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5038 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5041 /* Can this process send the message */
5042 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
5045 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5046 rc
= avc_has_perm(msec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5047 MSGQ__ENQUEUE
, &ad
);
5052 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
,
5053 struct task_struct
*target
,
5054 long type
, int mode
)
5056 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5057 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
5058 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5059 u32 sid
= task_sid(target
);
5062 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5063 msec
= msg
->security
;
5065 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5066 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5068 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
5069 SECCLASS_MSGQ
, MSGQ__READ
, &ad
);
5071 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
,
5072 SECCLASS_MSG
, MSG__RECEIVE
, &ad
);
5076 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5077 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
5079 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5080 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5081 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5084 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &shp
->shm_perm
, SECCLASS_SHM
);
5088 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
5090 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5091 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
5093 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
5096 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
5102 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
5104 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
5107 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int shmflg
)
5109 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5110 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5111 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5113 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
5115 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5116 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
5118 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
5119 SHM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5122 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5123 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int cmd
)
5131 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5132 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5135 perms
= SHM__GETATTR
| SHM__ASSOCIATE
;
5138 perms
= SHM__SETATTR
;
5145 perms
= SHM__DESTROY
;
5151 err
= ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5155 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
,
5156 char __user
*shmaddr
, int shmflg
)
5160 if (shmflg
& SHM_RDONLY
)
5163 perms
= SHM__READ
| SHM__WRITE
;
5165 return ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5168 /* Semaphore security operations */
5169 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5171 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5172 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5173 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5176 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &sma
->sem_perm
, SECCLASS_SEM
);
5180 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5182 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5183 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5185 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5188 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5194 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5196 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5199 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array
*sma
, int semflg
)
5201 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5202 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5203 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5205 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5207 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5208 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5210 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5211 SEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5214 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5215 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array
*sma
, int cmd
)
5223 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5224 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5228 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
;
5239 perms
= SEM__DESTROY
;
5242 perms
= SEM__SETATTR
;
5246 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
| SEM__ASSOCIATE
;
5252 err
= ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5256 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array
*sma
,
5257 struct sembuf
*sops
, unsigned nsops
, int alter
)
5262 perms
= SEM__READ
| SEM__WRITE
;
5266 return ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5269 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, short flag
)
5275 av
|= IPC__UNIX_READ
;
5277 av
|= IPC__UNIX_WRITE
;
5282 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp
, av
);
5285 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, u32
*secid
)
5287 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= ipcp
->security
;
5291 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct inode
*inode
)
5294 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, dentry
);
5297 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5298 char *name
, char **value
)
5300 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
5306 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETATTR
);
5312 __tsec
= __task_cred(p
)->security
;
5314 if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5316 else if (!strcmp(name
, "prev"))
5318 else if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5319 sid
= __tsec
->exec_sid
;
5320 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5321 sid
= __tsec
->create_sid
;
5322 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5323 sid
= __tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5324 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5325 sid
= __tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
5333 error
= security_sid_to_context(sid
, value
, &len
);
5343 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5344 char *name
, void *value
, size_t size
)
5346 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5347 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
5354 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5355 security attributes. */
5360 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5361 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5362 * above restriction is ever removed.
5364 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5365 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETEXEC
);
5366 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5367 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE
);
5368 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5369 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE
);
5370 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5371 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE
);
5372 else if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5373 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETCURRENT
);
5379 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5380 if (size
&& str
[1] && str
[1] != '\n') {
5381 if (str
[size
-1] == '\n') {
5385 error
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &sid
);
5386 if (error
== -EINVAL
&& !strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5387 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
)) {
5388 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
5391 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5392 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5393 if (str
[size
- 1] == '\0')
5394 audit_size
= size
- 1;
5397 ab
= audit_log_start(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
);
5398 audit_log_format(ab
, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5399 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, value
, audit_size
);
5404 error
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
,
5411 new = prepare_creds();
5415 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5416 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5417 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5418 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5419 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5420 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5421 tsec
= new->security
;
5422 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec")) {
5423 tsec
->exec_sid
= sid
;
5424 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5425 tsec
->create_sid
= sid
;
5426 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate")) {
5427 error
= may_create_key(sid
, p
);
5430 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= sid
;
5431 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate")) {
5432 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= sid
;
5433 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "current")) {
5438 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5440 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5441 error
= security_bounded_transition(tsec
->sid
, sid
);
5446 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5447 error
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5448 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION
, NULL
);
5452 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5453 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5456 tracer
= ptrace_parent(p
);
5458 ptsid
= task_sid(tracer
);
5462 error
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5463 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
5482 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name
)
5484 return (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
) == 0);
5487 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid
, char **secdata
, u32
*seclen
)
5489 return security_sid_to_context(secid
, secdata
, seclen
);
5492 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata
, u32 seclen
, u32
*secid
)
5494 return security_context_to_sid(secdata
, seclen
, secid
);
5497 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata
, u32 seclen
)
5503 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5505 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5507 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5511 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5513 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry
*dentry
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5515 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5518 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void **ctx
, u32
*ctxlen
)
5521 len
= selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
,
5530 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key
*k
, const struct cred
*cred
,
5531 unsigned long flags
)
5533 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5534 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5536 ksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5540 tsec
= cred
->security
;
5541 if (tsec
->keycreate_sid
)
5542 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5544 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->sid
;
5550 static void selinux_key_free(struct key
*k
)
5552 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= k
->security
;
5558 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref
,
5559 const struct cred
*cred
,
5563 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5566 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5567 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5568 appear to be created. */
5572 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
5574 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
5575 ksec
= key
->security
;
5577 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksec
->sid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, perm
, NULL
);
5580 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key
*key
, char **_buffer
)
5582 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= key
->security
;
5583 char *context
= NULL
;
5587 rc
= security_sid_to_context(ksec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
5596 static struct security_operations selinux_ops
= {
5599 .ptrace_access_check
= selinux_ptrace_access_check
,
5600 .ptrace_traceme
= selinux_ptrace_traceme
,
5601 .capget
= selinux_capget
,
5602 .capset
= selinux_capset
,
5603 .capable
= selinux_capable
,
5604 .quotactl
= selinux_quotactl
,
5605 .quota_on
= selinux_quota_on
,
5606 .syslog
= selinux_syslog
,
5607 .vm_enough_memory
= selinux_vm_enough_memory
,
5609 .netlink_send
= selinux_netlink_send
,
5611 .bprm_set_creds
= selinux_bprm_set_creds
,
5612 .bprm_committing_creds
= selinux_bprm_committing_creds
,
5613 .bprm_committed_creds
= selinux_bprm_committed_creds
,
5614 .bprm_secureexec
= selinux_bprm_secureexec
,
5616 .sb_alloc_security
= selinux_sb_alloc_security
,
5617 .sb_free_security
= selinux_sb_free_security
,
5618 .sb_copy_data
= selinux_sb_copy_data
,
5619 .sb_remount
= selinux_sb_remount
,
5620 .sb_kern_mount
= selinux_sb_kern_mount
,
5621 .sb_show_options
= selinux_sb_show_options
,
5622 .sb_statfs
= selinux_sb_statfs
,
5623 .sb_mount
= selinux_mount
,
5624 .sb_umount
= selinux_umount
,
5625 .sb_set_mnt_opts
= selinux_set_mnt_opts
,
5626 .sb_clone_mnt_opts
= selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts
,
5627 .sb_parse_opts_str
= selinux_parse_opts_str
,
5629 .dentry_init_security
= selinux_dentry_init_security
,
5631 .inode_alloc_security
= selinux_inode_alloc_security
,
5632 .inode_free_security
= selinux_inode_free_security
,
5633 .inode_init_security
= selinux_inode_init_security
,
5634 .inode_create
= selinux_inode_create
,
5635 .inode_link
= selinux_inode_link
,
5636 .inode_unlink
= selinux_inode_unlink
,
5637 .inode_symlink
= selinux_inode_symlink
,
5638 .inode_mkdir
= selinux_inode_mkdir
,
5639 .inode_rmdir
= selinux_inode_rmdir
,
5640 .inode_mknod
= selinux_inode_mknod
,
5641 .inode_rename
= selinux_inode_rename
,
5642 .inode_readlink
= selinux_inode_readlink
,
5643 .inode_follow_link
= selinux_inode_follow_link
,
5644 .inode_permission
= selinux_inode_permission
,
5645 .inode_setattr
= selinux_inode_setattr
,
5646 .inode_getattr
= selinux_inode_getattr
,
5647 .inode_setxattr
= selinux_inode_setxattr
,
5648 .inode_post_setxattr
= selinux_inode_post_setxattr
,
5649 .inode_getxattr
= selinux_inode_getxattr
,
5650 .inode_listxattr
= selinux_inode_listxattr
,
5651 .inode_removexattr
= selinux_inode_removexattr
,
5652 .inode_getsecurity
= selinux_inode_getsecurity
,
5653 .inode_setsecurity
= selinux_inode_setsecurity
,
5654 .inode_listsecurity
= selinux_inode_listsecurity
,
5655 .inode_getsecid
= selinux_inode_getsecid
,
5657 .file_permission
= selinux_file_permission
,
5658 .file_alloc_security
= selinux_file_alloc_security
,
5659 .file_free_security
= selinux_file_free_security
,
5660 .file_ioctl
= selinux_file_ioctl
,
5661 .mmap_file
= selinux_mmap_file
,
5662 .mmap_addr
= selinux_mmap_addr
,
5663 .file_mprotect
= selinux_file_mprotect
,
5664 .file_lock
= selinux_file_lock
,
5665 .file_fcntl
= selinux_file_fcntl
,
5666 .file_set_fowner
= selinux_file_set_fowner
,
5667 .file_send_sigiotask
= selinux_file_send_sigiotask
,
5668 .file_receive
= selinux_file_receive
,
5670 .file_open
= selinux_file_open
,
5672 .task_create
= selinux_task_create
,
5673 .cred_alloc_blank
= selinux_cred_alloc_blank
,
5674 .cred_free
= selinux_cred_free
,
5675 .cred_prepare
= selinux_cred_prepare
,
5676 .cred_transfer
= selinux_cred_transfer
,
5677 .kernel_act_as
= selinux_kernel_act_as
,
5678 .kernel_create_files_as
= selinux_kernel_create_files_as
,
5679 .kernel_module_request
= selinux_kernel_module_request
,
5680 .task_setpgid
= selinux_task_setpgid
,
5681 .task_getpgid
= selinux_task_getpgid
,
5682 .task_getsid
= selinux_task_getsid
,
5683 .task_getsecid
= selinux_task_getsecid
,
5684 .task_setnice
= selinux_task_setnice
,
5685 .task_setioprio
= selinux_task_setioprio
,
5686 .task_getioprio
= selinux_task_getioprio
,
5687 .task_setrlimit
= selinux_task_setrlimit
,
5688 .task_setscheduler
= selinux_task_setscheduler
,
5689 .task_getscheduler
= selinux_task_getscheduler
,
5690 .task_movememory
= selinux_task_movememory
,
5691 .task_kill
= selinux_task_kill
,
5692 .task_wait
= selinux_task_wait
,
5693 .task_to_inode
= selinux_task_to_inode
,
5695 .ipc_permission
= selinux_ipc_permission
,
5696 .ipc_getsecid
= selinux_ipc_getsecid
,
5698 .msg_msg_alloc_security
= selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security
,
5699 .msg_msg_free_security
= selinux_msg_msg_free_security
,
5701 .msg_queue_alloc_security
= selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security
,
5702 .msg_queue_free_security
= selinux_msg_queue_free_security
,
5703 .msg_queue_associate
= selinux_msg_queue_associate
,
5704 .msg_queue_msgctl
= selinux_msg_queue_msgctl
,
5705 .msg_queue_msgsnd
= selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd
,
5706 .msg_queue_msgrcv
= selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv
,
5708 .shm_alloc_security
= selinux_shm_alloc_security
,
5709 .shm_free_security
= selinux_shm_free_security
,
5710 .shm_associate
= selinux_shm_associate
,
5711 .shm_shmctl
= selinux_shm_shmctl
,
5712 .shm_shmat
= selinux_shm_shmat
,
5714 .sem_alloc_security
= selinux_sem_alloc_security
,
5715 .sem_free_security
= selinux_sem_free_security
,
5716 .sem_associate
= selinux_sem_associate
,
5717 .sem_semctl
= selinux_sem_semctl
,
5718 .sem_semop
= selinux_sem_semop
,
5720 .d_instantiate
= selinux_d_instantiate
,
5722 .getprocattr
= selinux_getprocattr
,
5723 .setprocattr
= selinux_setprocattr
,
5725 .ismaclabel
= selinux_ismaclabel
,
5726 .secid_to_secctx
= selinux_secid_to_secctx
,
5727 .secctx_to_secid
= selinux_secctx_to_secid
,
5728 .release_secctx
= selinux_release_secctx
,
5729 .inode_notifysecctx
= selinux_inode_notifysecctx
,
5730 .inode_setsecctx
= selinux_inode_setsecctx
,
5731 .inode_getsecctx
= selinux_inode_getsecctx
,
5733 .unix_stream_connect
= selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect
,
5734 .unix_may_send
= selinux_socket_unix_may_send
,
5736 .socket_create
= selinux_socket_create
,
5737 .socket_post_create
= selinux_socket_post_create
,
5738 .socket_bind
= selinux_socket_bind
,
5739 .socket_connect
= selinux_socket_connect
,
5740 .socket_listen
= selinux_socket_listen
,
5741 .socket_accept
= selinux_socket_accept
,
5742 .socket_sendmsg
= selinux_socket_sendmsg
,
5743 .socket_recvmsg
= selinux_socket_recvmsg
,
5744 .socket_getsockname
= selinux_socket_getsockname
,
5745 .socket_getpeername
= selinux_socket_getpeername
,
5746 .socket_getsockopt
= selinux_socket_getsockopt
,
5747 .socket_setsockopt
= selinux_socket_setsockopt
,
5748 .socket_shutdown
= selinux_socket_shutdown
,
5749 .socket_sock_rcv_skb
= selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb
,
5750 .socket_getpeersec_stream
= selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream
,
5751 .socket_getpeersec_dgram
= selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram
,
5752 .sk_alloc_security
= selinux_sk_alloc_security
,
5753 .sk_free_security
= selinux_sk_free_security
,
5754 .sk_clone_security
= selinux_sk_clone_security
,
5755 .sk_getsecid
= selinux_sk_getsecid
,
5756 .sock_graft
= selinux_sock_graft
,
5757 .inet_conn_request
= selinux_inet_conn_request
,
5758 .inet_csk_clone
= selinux_inet_csk_clone
,
5759 .inet_conn_established
= selinux_inet_conn_established
,
5760 .secmark_relabel_packet
= selinux_secmark_relabel_packet
,
5761 .secmark_refcount_inc
= selinux_secmark_refcount_inc
,
5762 .secmark_refcount_dec
= selinux_secmark_refcount_dec
,
5763 .req_classify_flow
= selinux_req_classify_flow
,
5764 .tun_dev_alloc_security
= selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security
,
5765 .tun_dev_free_security
= selinux_tun_dev_free_security
,
5766 .tun_dev_create
= selinux_tun_dev_create
,
5767 .tun_dev_attach_queue
= selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue
,
5768 .tun_dev_attach
= selinux_tun_dev_attach
,
5769 .tun_dev_open
= selinux_tun_dev_open
,
5770 .skb_owned_by
= selinux_skb_owned_by
,
5772 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5773 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc
,
5774 .xfrm_policy_clone_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_clone
,
5775 .xfrm_policy_free_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_free
,
5776 .xfrm_policy_delete_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_delete
,
5777 .xfrm_state_alloc_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_alloc
,
5778 .xfrm_state_free_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_free
,
5779 .xfrm_state_delete_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_delete
,
5780 .xfrm_policy_lookup
= selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup
,
5781 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
= selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
,
5782 .xfrm_decode_session
= selinux_xfrm_decode_session
,
5786 .key_alloc
= selinux_key_alloc
,
5787 .key_free
= selinux_key_free
,
5788 .key_permission
= selinux_key_permission
,
5789 .key_getsecurity
= selinux_key_getsecurity
,
5793 .audit_rule_init
= selinux_audit_rule_init
,
5794 .audit_rule_known
= selinux_audit_rule_known
,
5795 .audit_rule_match
= selinux_audit_rule_match
,
5796 .audit_rule_free
= selinux_audit_rule_free
,
5800 static __init
int selinux_init(void)
5802 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops
)) {
5803 selinux_enabled
= 0;
5807 if (!selinux_enabled
) {
5808 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5812 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5814 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5815 cred_init_security();
5817 default_noexec
= !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS
& VM_EXEC
);
5819 sel_inode_cache
= kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5820 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct
),
5821 0, SLAB_PANIC
, NULL
);
5824 if (register_security(&selinux_ops
))
5825 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5827 if (selinux_enforcing
)
5828 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5830 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5835 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block
*sb
, void *unused
)
5837 superblock_doinit(sb
, NULL
);
5840 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5842 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5844 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5845 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5846 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init
, NULL
);
5849 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5850 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5851 security_initcall(selinux_init
);
5853 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5855 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops
[] = {
5857 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_postroute
,
5858 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5860 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
5861 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
5864 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_forward
,
5865 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5867 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
5868 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
5871 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_output
,
5872 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5874 .hooknum
= NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT
,
5875 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
5879 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5881 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops
[] = {
5883 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_postroute
,
5884 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5886 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
5887 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
5890 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_forward
,
5891 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5893 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
5894 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
5900 static int __init
selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5904 if (!selinux_enabled
)
5907 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5909 err
= nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops
));
5911 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err
);
5913 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5914 err
= nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops
));
5916 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err
);
5923 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init
);
5925 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5926 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5928 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5930 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops
));
5931 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5932 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops
));
5937 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5939 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5940 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5943 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5945 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5946 static int selinux_disabled
;
5948 int selinux_disable(void)
5950 if (ss_initialized
) {
5951 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5955 if (selinux_disabled
) {
5956 /* Only do this once. */
5960 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5962 selinux_disabled
= 1;
5963 selinux_enabled
= 0;
5965 reset_security_ops();
5967 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5970 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5971 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5973 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */