1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
5 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
7 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
8 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
9 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
10 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
12 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
13 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
14 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
16 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
18 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
19 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
20 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
24 #include <linux/init.h>
26 #include <linux/kernel.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
31 #include <linux/sched/task.h>
32 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/fs_context.h>
50 #include <linux/fs_parser.h>
51 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
52 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
53 #include <linux/tty.h>
55 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
56 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
57 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
58 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
59 #include <net/netlabel.h>
60 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
61 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
62 #include <linux/atomic.h>
63 #include <linux/bitops.h>
64 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
65 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
66 #include <net/netlink.h>
67 #include <linux/tcp.h>
68 #include <linux/udp.h>
69 #include <linux/dccp.h>
70 #include <linux/sctp.h>
71 #include <net/sctp/structs.h>
72 #include <linux/quota.h>
73 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
74 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
75 #include <linux/parser.h>
76 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
78 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
79 #include <linux/personality.h>
80 #include <linux/audit.h>
81 #include <linux/string.h>
82 #include <linux/mutex.h>
83 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
84 #include <linux/syslog.h>
85 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
86 #include <linux/export.h>
87 #include <linux/msg.h>
88 #include <linux/shm.h>
89 #include <linux/bpf.h>
90 #include <linux/kernfs.h>
91 #include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */
92 #include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
93 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
94 #include <linux/fanotify.h>
103 #include "netlabel.h"
107 struct selinux_state selinux_state
;
109 /* SECMARK reference count */
110 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount
= ATOMIC_INIT(0);
112 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
113 static int selinux_enforcing_boot __initdata
;
115 static int __init
enforcing_setup(char *str
)
117 unsigned long enforcing
;
118 if (!kstrtoul(str
, 0, &enforcing
))
119 selinux_enforcing_boot
= enforcing
? 1 : 0;
122 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup
);
124 #define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
127 int selinux_enabled_boot __initdata
= 1;
128 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
129 static int __init
selinux_enabled_setup(char *str
)
131 unsigned long enabled
;
132 if (!kstrtoul(str
, 0, &enabled
))
133 selinux_enabled_boot
= enabled
? 1 : 0;
136 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup
);
139 static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot
=
140 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE
;
142 static int __init
checkreqprot_setup(char *str
)
144 unsigned long checkreqprot
;
146 if (!kstrtoul(str
, 0, &checkreqprot
)) {
147 selinux_checkreqprot_boot
= checkreqprot
? 1 : 0;
149 pr_warn("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n");
153 __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup
);
156 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
159 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
160 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
161 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
162 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
163 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
166 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
168 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
169 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount
));
173 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
176 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
177 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
178 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
179 * is always considered enabled.
182 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
184 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
185 netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
188 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event
)
190 if (event
== AVC_CALLBACK_RESET
) {
199 static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event
)
201 if (event
== AVC_CALLBACK_RESET
) {
203 call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE
, NULL
);
210 * initialise the security for the init task
212 static void cred_init_security(void)
214 struct cred
*cred
= (struct cred
*) current
->real_cred
;
215 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
217 tsec
= selinux_cred(cred
);
218 tsec
->osid
= tsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
222 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
224 static inline u32
cred_sid(const struct cred
*cred
)
226 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
228 tsec
= selinux_cred(cred
);
233 * get the objective security ID of a task
235 static inline u32
task_sid(const struct task_struct
*task
)
240 sid
= cred_sid(__task_cred(task
));
245 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
);
248 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
249 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
250 * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
251 * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
253 static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode
*inode
,
254 struct dentry
*dentry
,
257 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= selinux_inode(inode
);
259 might_sleep_if(may_sleep
);
261 if (selinux_initialized(&selinux_state
) &&
262 isec
->initialized
!= LABEL_INITIALIZED
) {
267 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
268 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
269 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
271 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, dentry
);
276 static struct inode_security_struct
*inode_security_novalidate(struct inode
*inode
)
278 return selinux_inode(inode
);
281 static struct inode_security_struct
*inode_security_rcu(struct inode
*inode
, bool rcu
)
285 error
= __inode_security_revalidate(inode
, NULL
, !rcu
);
287 return ERR_PTR(error
);
288 return selinux_inode(inode
);
292 * Get the security label of an inode.
294 static struct inode_security_struct
*inode_security(struct inode
*inode
)
296 __inode_security_revalidate(inode
, NULL
, true);
297 return selinux_inode(inode
);
300 static struct inode_security_struct
*backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry
*dentry
)
302 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
304 return selinux_inode(inode
);
308 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
310 static struct inode_security_struct
*backing_inode_security(struct dentry
*dentry
)
312 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
314 __inode_security_revalidate(inode
, dentry
, true);
315 return selinux_inode(inode
);
318 static void inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
320 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= selinux_inode(inode
);
321 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
325 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
327 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
328 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
329 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
331 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
332 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
333 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
334 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
336 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec
->list
)) {
337 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
338 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
339 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
343 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
345 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
346 sb
->s_security
= NULL
;
350 struct selinux_mnt_opts
{
351 const char *fscontext
, *context
, *rootcontext
, *defcontext
;
354 static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts
)
356 struct selinux_mnt_opts
*opts
= mnt_opts
;
357 kfree(opts
->fscontext
);
358 kfree(opts
->context
);
359 kfree(opts
->rootcontext
);
360 kfree(opts
->defcontext
);
373 #define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
383 A(rootcontext
, true),
388 static int match_opt_prefix(char *s
, int l
, char **arg
)
392 for (i
= 0; i
< ARRAY_SIZE(tokens
); i
++) {
393 size_t len
= tokens
[i
].len
;
394 if (len
> l
|| memcmp(s
, tokens
[i
].name
, len
))
396 if (tokens
[i
].has_arg
) {
397 if (len
== l
|| s
[len
] != '=')
402 return tokens
[i
].opt
;
407 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
409 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid
,
410 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
411 const struct cred
*cred
)
413 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= selinux_cred(cred
);
416 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
417 tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
418 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
422 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
423 tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
424 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
428 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid
,
429 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
430 const struct cred
*cred
)
432 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= selinux_cred(cred
);
434 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
435 tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
436 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
440 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
441 sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
442 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, NULL
);
446 static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block
*sb
)
448 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
449 return !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "sysfs") ||
450 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "pstore") ||
451 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "debugfs") ||
452 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "tracefs") ||
453 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "rootfs") ||
454 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
455 (!strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "cgroup") ||
456 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "cgroup2")));
459 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block
*sb
)
461 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
464 * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
465 * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition!
467 BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX
!= 7);
469 switch (sbsec
->behavior
) {
470 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
:
471 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS
:
472 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK
:
473 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
:
476 case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS
:
477 return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb
);
479 /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */
480 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
:
481 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE
:
487 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block
*sb
)
489 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
490 struct dentry
*root
= sb
->s_root
;
491 struct inode
*root_inode
= d_backing_inode(root
);
494 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
) {
495 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
496 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
497 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
498 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
499 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
500 if (!(root_inode
->i_opflags
& IOP_XATTR
)) {
501 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
502 "xattr support\n", sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
507 rc
= __vfs_getxattr(root
, root_inode
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, NULL
, 0);
508 if (rc
< 0 && rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
509 if (rc
== -EOPNOTSUPP
)
510 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type "
511 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
512 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
514 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type "
515 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb
->s_id
,
516 sb
->s_type
->name
, -rc
);
521 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBINITIALIZED
;
524 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
525 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
526 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
528 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb
))
529 sbsec
->flags
|= SBLABEL_MNT
;
531 sbsec
->flags
&= ~SBLABEL_MNT
;
533 /* Initialize the root inode. */
534 rc
= inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode
, root
);
536 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
537 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
538 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
540 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
541 while (!list_empty(&sbsec
->isec_head
)) {
542 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
=
543 list_first_entry(&sbsec
->isec_head
,
544 struct inode_security_struct
, list
);
545 struct inode
*inode
= isec
->inode
;
546 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
547 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
548 inode
= igrab(inode
);
550 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode
))
551 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, NULL
);
554 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
556 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
561 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
, char flag
,
562 u32 old_sid
, u32 new_sid
)
564 char mnt_flags
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
566 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
567 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
568 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& flag
) ||
569 (old_sid
!= new_sid
))
572 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
573 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
575 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
576 if (mnt_flags
& flag
)
581 static int parse_sid(struct super_block
*sb
, const char *s
, u32
*sid
)
583 int rc
= security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state
, s
,
586 pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
587 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
588 s
, sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
593 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
594 * labeling information.
596 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block
*sb
,
598 unsigned long kern_flags
,
599 unsigned long *set_kern_flags
)
601 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
602 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
603 struct dentry
*root
= sb
->s_root
;
604 struct selinux_mnt_opts
*opts
= mnt_opts
;
605 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
;
606 u32 fscontext_sid
= 0, context_sid
= 0, rootcontext_sid
= 0;
607 u32 defcontext_sid
= 0;
610 mutex_lock(&sbsec
->lock
);
612 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state
)) {
614 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
615 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
616 server is ready to handle calls. */
620 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
621 "before the security server is initialized\n");
624 if (kern_flags
&& !set_kern_flags
) {
625 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
626 * place the results is not allowed */
632 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
633 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
634 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
635 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
637 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
638 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
639 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
640 * will be used for both mounts)
642 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) && (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
646 root_isec
= backing_inode_security_novalidate(root
);
649 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
650 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
651 * than once with different security options.
654 if (opts
->fscontext
) {
655 rc
= parse_sid(sb
, opts
->fscontext
, &fscontext_sid
);
658 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
,
660 goto out_double_mount
;
661 sbsec
->flags
|= FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
664 rc
= parse_sid(sb
, opts
->context
, &context_sid
);
667 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
,
669 goto out_double_mount
;
670 sbsec
->flags
|= CONTEXT_MNT
;
672 if (opts
->rootcontext
) {
673 rc
= parse_sid(sb
, opts
->rootcontext
, &rootcontext_sid
);
676 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
,
678 goto out_double_mount
;
679 sbsec
->flags
|= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
681 if (opts
->defcontext
) {
682 rc
= parse_sid(sb
, opts
->defcontext
, &defcontext_sid
);
685 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
,
687 goto out_double_mount
;
688 sbsec
->flags
|= DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
692 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
693 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
694 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
) && !opts
)
695 goto out_double_mount
;
700 if (strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "proc") == 0)
701 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBPROC
| SE_SBGENFS
;
703 if (!strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "debugfs") ||
704 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "tracefs") ||
705 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "binder") ||
706 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "bpf") ||
707 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "pstore"))
708 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBGENFS
;
710 if (!strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "sysfs") ||
711 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "cgroup") ||
712 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "cgroup2"))
713 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBGENFS
| SE_SBGENFS_XATTR
;
715 if (!sbsec
->behavior
) {
717 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
720 rc
= security_fs_use(&selinux_state
, sb
);
722 pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
723 __func__
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
729 * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
730 * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
731 * line and security labels must be ignored.
733 if (sb
->s_user_ns
!= &init_user_ns
&&
734 strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "tmpfs") &&
735 strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "ramfs") &&
736 strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "devpts")) {
737 if (context_sid
|| fscontext_sid
|| rootcontext_sid
||
742 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
) {
743 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
;
744 rc
= security_transition_sid(&selinux_state
,
748 &sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
);
755 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
757 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid
, sbsec
, cred
);
761 sbsec
->sid
= fscontext_sid
;
765 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
766 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
767 * the superblock context if not already set.
769 if (kern_flags
& SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
&& !context_sid
) {
770 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
;
771 *set_kern_flags
|= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
;
775 if (!fscontext_sid
) {
776 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
780 sbsec
->sid
= context_sid
;
782 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
787 if (!rootcontext_sid
)
788 rootcontext_sid
= context_sid
;
790 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= context_sid
;
791 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
;
794 if (rootcontext_sid
) {
795 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid
, sbsec
,
800 root_isec
->sid
= rootcontext_sid
;
801 root_isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
804 if (defcontext_sid
) {
805 if (sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
&&
806 sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
) {
808 pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is "
809 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
813 if (defcontext_sid
!= sbsec
->def_sid
) {
814 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid
,
820 sbsec
->def_sid
= defcontext_sid
;
824 rc
= sb_finish_set_opts(sb
);
826 mutex_unlock(&sbsec
->lock
);
830 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
831 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb
->s_id
,
836 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
837 const struct super_block
*newsb
)
839 struct superblock_security_struct
*old
= oldsb
->s_security
;
840 struct superblock_security_struct
*new = newsb
->s_security
;
841 char oldflags
= old
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
842 char newflags
= new->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
844 if (oldflags
!= newflags
)
846 if ((oldflags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->sid
!= new->sid
)
848 if ((oldflags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->mntpoint_sid
!= new->mntpoint_sid
)
850 if ((oldflags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->def_sid
!= new->def_sid
)
852 if (oldflags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
853 struct inode_security_struct
*oldroot
= backing_inode_security(oldsb
->s_root
);
854 struct inode_security_struct
*newroot
= backing_inode_security(newsb
->s_root
);
855 if (oldroot
->sid
!= newroot
->sid
)
860 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
861 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
862 "type %s)\n", newsb
->s_id
, newsb
->s_type
->name
);
866 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
867 struct super_block
*newsb
,
868 unsigned long kern_flags
,
869 unsigned long *set_kern_flags
)
872 const struct superblock_security_struct
*oldsbsec
= oldsb
->s_security
;
873 struct superblock_security_struct
*newsbsec
= newsb
->s_security
;
875 int set_fscontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
);
876 int set_context
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
);
877 int set_rootcontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
);
880 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
881 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
883 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state
))
887 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
888 * place the results is not allowed.
890 if (kern_flags
&& !set_kern_flags
)
893 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
894 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
));
896 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
897 if (newsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
898 if ((kern_flags
& SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
) && !set_context
)
899 *set_kern_flags
|= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
;
900 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb
, newsb
);
903 mutex_lock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
905 newsbsec
->flags
= oldsbsec
->flags
;
907 newsbsec
->sid
= oldsbsec
->sid
;
908 newsbsec
->def_sid
= oldsbsec
->def_sid
;
909 newsbsec
->behavior
= oldsbsec
->behavior
;
911 if (newsbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
&&
912 !(kern_flags
& SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
) && !set_context
) {
913 rc
= security_fs_use(&selinux_state
, newsb
);
918 if (kern_flags
& SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
&& !set_context
) {
919 newsbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
;
920 *set_kern_flags
|= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
;
924 u32 sid
= oldsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
928 if (!set_rootcontext
) {
929 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= backing_inode_security(newsb
->s_root
);
932 newsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= sid
;
934 if (set_rootcontext
) {
935 const struct inode_security_struct
*oldisec
= backing_inode_security(oldsb
->s_root
);
936 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= backing_inode_security(newsb
->s_root
);
938 newisec
->sid
= oldisec
->sid
;
941 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb
);
943 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
947 static int selinux_add_opt(int token
, const char *s
, void **mnt_opts
)
949 struct selinux_mnt_opts
*opts
= *mnt_opts
;
951 if (token
== Opt_seclabel
) /* eaten and completely ignored */
955 opts
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts
), GFP_KERNEL
);
964 if (opts
->context
|| opts
->defcontext
)
973 case Opt_rootcontext
:
974 if (opts
->rootcontext
)
976 opts
->rootcontext
= s
;
979 if (opts
->context
|| opts
->defcontext
)
981 opts
->defcontext
= s
;
986 pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
990 static int selinux_add_mnt_opt(const char *option
, const char *val
, int len
,
993 int token
= Opt_error
;
996 for (i
= 0; i
< ARRAY_SIZE(tokens
); i
++) {
997 if (strcmp(option
, tokens
[i
].name
) == 0) {
998 token
= tokens
[i
].opt
;
1003 if (token
== Opt_error
)
1006 if (token
!= Opt_seclabel
) {
1007 val
= kmemdup_nul(val
, len
, GFP_KERNEL
);
1013 rc
= selinux_add_opt(token
, val
, mnt_opts
);
1022 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts
);
1028 static int show_sid(struct seq_file
*m
, u32 sid
)
1030 char *context
= NULL
;
1034 rc
= security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state
, sid
,
1037 bool has_comma
= context
&& strchr(context
, ',');
1042 seq_escape(m
, context
, "\"\n\\");
1050 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file
*m
, struct super_block
*sb
)
1052 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
1055 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
1058 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state
))
1061 if (sbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) {
1063 seq_puts(m
, FSCONTEXT_STR
);
1064 rc
= show_sid(m
, sbsec
->sid
);
1068 if (sbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) {
1070 seq_puts(m
, CONTEXT_STR
);
1071 rc
= show_sid(m
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
);
1075 if (sbsec
->flags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) {
1077 seq_puts(m
, DEFCONTEXT_STR
);
1078 rc
= show_sid(m
, sbsec
->def_sid
);
1082 if (sbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
1083 struct dentry
*root
= sb
->s_root
;
1084 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= backing_inode_security(root
);
1086 seq_puts(m
, ROOTCONTEXT_STR
);
1087 rc
= show_sid(m
, isec
->sid
);
1091 if (sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
) {
1093 seq_puts(m
, SECLABEL_STR
);
1098 static inline u16
inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode
)
1100 switch (mode
& S_IFMT
) {
1102 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE
;
1104 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
;
1106 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1108 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE
;
1110 return SECCLASS_DIR
;
1112 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE
;
1114 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE
;
1118 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1121 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol
)
1123 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_TCP
);
1126 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol
)
1128 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_UDP
);
1131 static inline u16
socket_type_to_security_class(int family
, int type
, int protocol
)
1133 int extsockclass
= selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
1139 case SOCK_SEQPACKET
:
1140 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
;
1143 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET
;
1150 case SOCK_SEQPACKET
:
1151 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol
))
1152 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
;
1153 else if (extsockclass
&& protocol
== IPPROTO_SCTP
)
1154 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET
;
1156 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1158 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol
))
1159 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
;
1160 else if (extsockclass
&& (protocol
== IPPROTO_ICMP
||
1161 protocol
== IPPROTO_ICMPV6
))
1162 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET
;
1164 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1166 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
;
1168 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1174 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET
;
1175 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG
:
1176 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET
;
1178 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET
;
1180 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET
;
1181 case NETLINK_SELINUX
:
1182 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET
;
1184 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET
;
1186 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET
;
1187 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP
:
1188 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET
;
1189 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR
:
1190 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET
;
1191 case NETLINK_NETFILTER
:
1192 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET
;
1193 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG
:
1194 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET
;
1195 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT
:
1196 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET
;
1197 case NETLINK_GENERIC
:
1198 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET
;
1199 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT
:
1200 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET
;
1202 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET
;
1203 case NETLINK_CRYPTO
:
1204 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET
;
1206 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET
;
1209 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET
;
1211 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET
;
1213 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET
;
1219 return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET
;
1221 return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET
;
1223 return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET
;
1225 return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET
;
1227 return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET
;
1229 return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET
;
1231 return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET
;
1233 return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET
;
1235 return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET
;
1237 return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET
;
1239 return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET
;
1241 return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET
;
1243 return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET
;
1245 return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET
;
1247 return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET
;
1249 return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET
;
1251 return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET
;
1253 return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET
;
1255 return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET
;
1257 return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET
;
1259 return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET
;
1261 return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET
;
1263 return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET
;
1265 return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET
;
1267 return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET
;
1269 return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET
;
1271 return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET
;
1273 return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET
;
1275 #error New address family defined, please update this function.
1280 return SECCLASS_SOCKET
;
1283 static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry
*dentry
,
1289 struct super_block
*sb
= dentry
->d_sb
;
1290 char *buffer
, *path
;
1292 buffer
= (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
1296 path
= dentry_path_raw(dentry
, buffer
, PAGE_SIZE
);
1300 if (flags
& SE_SBPROC
) {
1301 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1302 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1303 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1304 while (path
[1] >= '0' && path
[1] <= '9') {
1309 rc
= security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state
, sb
->s_type
->name
,
1311 if (rc
== -ENOENT
) {
1312 /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
1313 *sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
1317 free_page((unsigned long)buffer
);
1321 static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*dentry
,
1322 u32 def_sid
, u32
*sid
)
1324 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1329 len
= INITCONTEXTLEN
;
1330 context
= kmalloc(len
+ 1, GFP_NOFS
);
1334 context
[len
] = '\0';
1335 rc
= __vfs_getxattr(dentry
, inode
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, context
, len
);
1336 if (rc
== -ERANGE
) {
1339 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1340 rc
= __vfs_getxattr(dentry
, inode
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, NULL
, 0);
1345 context
= kmalloc(len
+ 1, GFP_NOFS
);
1349 context
[len
] = '\0';
1350 rc
= __vfs_getxattr(dentry
, inode
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1355 if (rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
1356 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1357 __func__
, -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
1364 rc
= security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state
, context
, rc
, sid
,
1367 char *dev
= inode
->i_sb
->s_id
;
1368 unsigned long ino
= inode
->i_ino
;
1370 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
1371 pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
1374 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1375 __func__
, context
, -rc
, dev
, ino
);
1382 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1383 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
)
1385 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= NULL
;
1386 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= selinux_inode(inode
);
1387 u32 task_sid
, sid
= 0;
1389 struct dentry
*dentry
;
1392 if (isec
->initialized
== LABEL_INITIALIZED
)
1395 spin_lock(&isec
->lock
);
1396 if (isec
->initialized
== LABEL_INITIALIZED
)
1399 if (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_FILE
)
1400 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1402 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1403 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)) {
1404 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1405 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1406 server is ready to handle calls. */
1407 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1408 if (list_empty(&isec
->list
))
1409 list_add(&isec
->list
, &sbsec
->isec_head
);
1410 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1414 sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
1415 task_sid
= isec
->task_sid
;
1417 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_PENDING
;
1418 spin_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
1420 switch (sbsec
->behavior
) {
1421 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
:
1423 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
:
1424 if (!(inode
->i_opflags
& IOP_XATTR
)) {
1425 sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1428 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1429 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1431 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1432 dentry
= dget(opt_dentry
);
1435 * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
1436 * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
1437 * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
1438 * two, depending upon that...
1440 dentry
= d_find_alias(inode
);
1442 dentry
= d_find_any_alias(inode
);
1446 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1447 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1448 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1449 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1450 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1451 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1452 * be used again by userspace.
1457 rc
= inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode
, dentry
, sbsec
->def_sid
,
1463 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK
:
1466 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS
:
1467 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1470 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1471 rc
= security_transition_sid(&selinux_state
, task_sid
, sid
,
1472 sclass
, NULL
, &sid
);
1476 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
:
1477 sid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
1480 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1483 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBGENFS
) &&
1484 (!S_ISLNK(inode
->i_mode
) ||
1485 selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) {
1486 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1489 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1490 * d_splice_alias. */
1491 dentry
= dget(opt_dentry
);
1493 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1494 * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want
1495 * a connected one, so try that first.
1497 dentry
= d_find_alias(inode
);
1499 dentry
= d_find_any_alias(inode
);
1502 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1503 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1504 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1505 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1506 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1507 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1508 * could be used again by userspace.
1512 rc
= selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry
, sclass
,
1513 sbsec
->flags
, &sid
);
1519 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBGENFS_XATTR
) &&
1520 (inode
->i_opflags
& IOP_XATTR
)) {
1521 rc
= inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode
, dentry
,
1534 spin_lock(&isec
->lock
);
1535 if (isec
->initialized
== LABEL_PENDING
) {
1537 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INVALID
;
1540 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
1545 spin_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
1549 spin_lock(&isec
->lock
);
1550 if (isec
->initialized
== LABEL_PENDING
) {
1551 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INVALID
;
1554 spin_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
1558 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1559 static inline u32
signal_to_av(int sig
)
1565 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1566 perm
= PROCESS__SIGCHLD
;
1569 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1570 perm
= PROCESS__SIGKILL
;
1573 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1574 perm
= PROCESS__SIGSTOP
;
1577 /* All other signals. */
1578 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNAL
;
1585 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1586 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1589 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1590 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred
*cred
,
1591 int cap
, unsigned int opts
, bool initns
)
1593 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1594 struct av_decision avd
;
1596 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1597 u32 av
= CAP_TO_MASK(cap
);
1600 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP
;
1603 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap
)) {
1605 sclass
= initns
? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY
: SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS
;
1608 sclass
= initns
? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2
: SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS
;
1611 pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap
);
1616 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state
,
1617 sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, 0, &avd
);
1618 if (!(opts
& CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT
)) {
1619 int rc2
= avc_audit(&selinux_state
,
1620 sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, &avd
, rc
, &ad
, 0);
1627 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1628 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1629 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1630 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1631 struct inode
*inode
,
1633 struct common_audit_data
*adp
)
1635 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
1638 validate_creds(cred
);
1640 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
1643 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1644 isec
= selinux_inode(inode
);
1646 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
1647 sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, adp
);
1650 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1651 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1652 pathname if needed. */
1653 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1654 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1657 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
1658 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1660 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1661 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1662 __inode_security_revalidate(inode
, dentry
, true);
1663 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1666 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1667 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1668 pathname if needed. */
1669 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1670 const struct path
*path
,
1673 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(path
->dentry
);
1674 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1676 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1678 __inode_security_revalidate(inode
, path
->dentry
, true);
1679 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1682 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1683 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1687 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1689 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE
;
1691 return inode_has_perm(cred
, file_inode(file
), av
, &ad
);
1694 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1695 static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file
*file
, u32 sid
);
1698 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1699 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1700 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1701 check a particular permission to the file.
1702 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1703 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1704 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1705 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1706 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1710 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= selinux_file(file
);
1711 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
1712 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1713 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1716 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE
;
1719 if (sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
1720 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
1729 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1730 rc
= bpf_fd_pass(file
, cred_sid(cred
));
1735 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1738 rc
= inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1745 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1748 selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
,
1750 const struct qstr
*name
, u16 tclass
,
1753 const struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1755 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) &&
1756 (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
)) {
1757 *_new_isid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
1758 } else if ((sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
) &&
1760 *_new_isid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
1762 const struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
= inode_security(dir
);
1763 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state
, tsec
->sid
,
1771 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1772 static int may_create(struct inode
*dir
,
1773 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1776 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= selinux_cred(current_cred());
1777 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
1778 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1780 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1783 dsec
= inode_security(dir
);
1784 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1788 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1789 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1791 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
1792 sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1793 DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
,
1798 rc
= selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec
, dir
, &dentry
->d_name
, tclass
,
1803 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
1804 sid
, newsid
, tclass
, FILE__CREATE
, &ad
);
1808 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
1810 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
1811 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
1815 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1818 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1819 static int may_link(struct inode
*dir
,
1820 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1824 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
, *isec
;
1825 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1826 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1830 dsec
= inode_security(dir
);
1831 isec
= backing_inode_security(dentry
);
1833 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1834 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1837 av
|= (kind
? DIR__REMOVE_NAME
: DIR__ADD_NAME
);
1838 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
1839 sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1854 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1859 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
1860 sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, av
, &ad
);
1864 static inline int may_rename(struct inode
*old_dir
,
1865 struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
1866 struct inode
*new_dir
,
1867 struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
1869 struct inode_security_struct
*old_dsec
, *new_dsec
, *old_isec
, *new_isec
;
1870 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1871 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1873 int old_is_dir
, new_is_dir
;
1876 old_dsec
= inode_security(old_dir
);
1877 old_isec
= backing_inode_security(old_dentry
);
1878 old_is_dir
= d_is_dir(old_dentry
);
1879 new_dsec
= inode_security(new_dir
);
1881 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1883 ad
.u
.dentry
= old_dentry
;
1884 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
1885 sid
, old_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1886 DIR__REMOVE_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
, &ad
);
1889 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
1891 old_isec
->sclass
, FILE__RENAME
, &ad
);
1894 if (old_is_dir
&& new_dir
!= old_dir
) {
1895 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
1897 old_isec
->sclass
, DIR__REPARENT
, &ad
);
1902 ad
.u
.dentry
= new_dentry
;
1903 av
= DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
;
1904 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry
))
1905 av
|= DIR__REMOVE_NAME
;
1906 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
1907 sid
, new_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1910 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry
)) {
1911 new_isec
= backing_inode_security(new_dentry
);
1912 new_is_dir
= d_is_dir(new_dentry
);
1913 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
1916 (new_is_dir
? DIR__RMDIR
: FILE__UNLINK
), &ad
);
1924 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1925 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1926 struct super_block
*sb
,
1928 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
1930 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1931 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1933 sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
1934 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
1935 sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
, perms
, ad
);
1938 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1939 static inline u32
file_mask_to_av(int mode
, int mask
)
1943 if (!S_ISDIR(mode
)) {
1944 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1945 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
1946 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1949 if (mask
& MAY_APPEND
)
1951 else if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1955 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1957 if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1959 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1966 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1967 static inline u32
file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1971 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_READ
)
1973 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_WRITE
) {
1974 if (file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
)
1981 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1990 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct
1993 static inline u32
open_file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1995 u32 av
= file_to_av(file
);
1996 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
1998 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
1999 inode
->i_sb
->s_magic
!= SOCKFS_MAGIC
)
2005 /* Hook functions begin here. */
2007 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct
*mgr
)
2009 u32 mysid
= current_sid();
2010 u32 mgrsid
= task_sid(mgr
);
2012 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
2013 mysid
, mgrsid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
,
2014 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR
, NULL
);
2017 static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct
*from
,
2018 struct task_struct
*to
)
2020 u32 mysid
= current_sid();
2021 u32 fromsid
= task_sid(from
);
2022 u32 tosid
= task_sid(to
);
2025 if (mysid
!= fromsid
) {
2026 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
2027 mysid
, fromsid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
,
2028 BINDER__IMPERSONATE
, NULL
);
2033 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
2034 fromsid
, tosid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
, BINDER__CALL
,
2038 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct
*from
,
2039 struct task_struct
*to
)
2041 u32 fromsid
= task_sid(from
);
2042 u32 tosid
= task_sid(to
);
2044 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
2045 fromsid
, tosid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
, BINDER__TRANSFER
,
2049 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct
*from
,
2050 struct task_struct
*to
,
2053 u32 sid
= task_sid(to
);
2054 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= selinux_file(file
);
2055 struct dentry
*dentry
= file
->f_path
.dentry
;
2056 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2057 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2060 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
2061 ad
.u
.path
= file
->f_path
;
2063 if (sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
2064 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
2073 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
2074 rc
= bpf_fd_pass(file
, sid
);
2079 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry
))))
2082 isec
= backing_inode_security(dentry
);
2083 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
2084 sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, file_to_av(file
),
2088 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct
*child
,
2091 u32 sid
= current_sid();
2092 u32 csid
= task_sid(child
);
2094 if (mode
& PTRACE_MODE_READ
)
2095 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
2096 sid
, csid
, SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__READ
, NULL
);
2098 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
2099 sid
, csid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
2102 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct
*parent
)
2104 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
2105 task_sid(parent
), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2106 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
2109 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct
*target
, kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
2110 kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
, kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
2112 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
2113 current_sid(), task_sid(target
), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2114 PROCESS__GETCAP
, NULL
);
2117 static int selinux_capset(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
2118 const kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
2119 const kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
,
2120 const kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
2122 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
2123 cred_sid(old
), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2124 PROCESS__SETCAP
, NULL
);
2128 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2129 * which was removed).
2131 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2132 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2133 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2134 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2137 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred
*cred
, struct user_namespace
*ns
,
2138 int cap
, unsigned int opts
)
2140 return cred_has_capability(cred
, cap
, opts
, ns
== &init_user_ns
);
2143 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds
, int type
, int id
, struct super_block
*sb
)
2145 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2160 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD
, NULL
);
2168 case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA
:
2169 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET
, NULL
);
2172 rc
= 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2178 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2180 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2182 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__QUOTAON
);
2185 static int selinux_syslog(int type
)
2188 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL
: /* Read last kernel messages */
2189 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER
: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2190 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
2191 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
2192 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ
, NULL
);
2193 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF
: /* Disable logging to console */
2194 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON
: /* Enable logging to console */
2195 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2196 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL
:
2197 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
2198 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
2199 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE
,
2202 /* All other syslog types */
2203 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
2204 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
2205 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD
, NULL
);
2209 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2210 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2211 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2213 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2214 * processes that allocate mappings.
2216 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct
*mm
, long pages
)
2218 int rc
, cap_sys_admin
= 0;
2220 rc
= cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN
,
2221 CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT
, true);
2225 return cap_sys_admin
;
2228 /* binprm security operations */
2230 static u32
ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2233 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
2236 tracer
= ptrace_parent(current
);
2238 sid
= task_sid(tracer
);
2244 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm
*bprm
,
2245 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
,
2246 const struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
)
2248 int nnp
= (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS
);
2249 int nosuid
= !mnt_may_suid(bprm
->file
->f_path
.mnt
);
2253 if (!nnp
&& !nosuid
)
2254 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2256 if (new_tsec
->sid
== old_tsec
->sid
)
2257 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2260 * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
2261 * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
2262 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
2263 * the old and new contexts.
2265 if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
2268 av
|= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION
;
2270 av
|= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION
;
2271 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
2272 old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2273 SECCLASS_PROCESS2
, av
, NULL
);
2279 * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
2280 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
2281 * of the permissions of the current SID.
2283 rc
= security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state
, old_tsec
->sid
,
2289 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2290 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2291 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2298 static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2300 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
2301 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2302 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2303 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2304 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(bprm
->file
);
2307 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2308 * the script interpreter */
2310 old_tsec
= selinux_cred(current_cred());
2311 new_tsec
= selinux_cred(bprm
->cred
);
2312 isec
= inode_security(inode
);
2314 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2315 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2316 new_tsec
->osid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2318 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2319 new_tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
2320 new_tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
2321 new_tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
2323 if (old_tsec
->exec_sid
) {
2324 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->exec_sid
;
2325 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2326 new_tsec
->exec_sid
= 0;
2328 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2329 rc
= check_nnp_nosuid(bprm
, old_tsec
, new_tsec
);
2333 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2334 rc
= security_transition_sid(&selinux_state
, old_tsec
->sid
,
2335 isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, NULL
,
2341 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2344 rc
= check_nnp_nosuid(bprm
, old_tsec
, new_tsec
);
2346 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2349 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE
;
2350 ad
.u
.file
= bprm
->file
;
2352 if (new_tsec
->sid
== old_tsec
->sid
) {
2353 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
2354 old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2355 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS
, &ad
);
2359 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2360 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
2361 old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2362 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__TRANSITION
, &ad
);
2366 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
2367 new_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2368 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__ENTRYPOINT
, &ad
);
2372 /* Check for shared state */
2373 if (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE
) {
2374 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
2375 old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2376 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SHARE
,
2382 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2383 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2384 if (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE
) {
2385 u32 ptsid
= ptrace_parent_sid();
2387 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
2388 ptsid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2390 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
2396 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2397 bprm
->per_clear
|= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID
;
2399 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2400 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2401 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2402 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
2403 old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2404 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__NOATSECURE
,
2406 bprm
->secureexec
|= !!rc
;
2412 static int match_file(const void *p
, struct file
*file
, unsigned fd
)
2414 return file_has_perm(p
, file
, file_to_av(file
)) ? fd
+ 1 : 0;
2417 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2418 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred
*cred
,
2419 struct files_struct
*files
)
2421 struct file
*file
, *devnull
= NULL
;
2422 struct tty_struct
*tty
;
2426 tty
= get_current_tty();
2428 spin_lock(&tty
->files_lock
);
2429 if (!list_empty(&tty
->tty_files
)) {
2430 struct tty_file_private
*file_priv
;
2432 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2433 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2434 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2435 open file may belong to another process and we are
2436 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2437 file_priv
= list_first_entry(&tty
->tty_files
,
2438 struct tty_file_private
, list
);
2439 file
= file_priv
->file
;
2440 if (file_path_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__READ
| FILE__WRITE
))
2443 spin_unlock(&tty
->files_lock
);
2446 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2450 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2451 n
= iterate_fd(files
, 0, match_file
, cred
);
2452 if (!n
) /* none found? */
2455 devnull
= dentry_open(&selinux_null
, O_RDWR
, cred
);
2456 if (IS_ERR(devnull
))
2458 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2460 replace_fd(n
- 1, devnull
, 0);
2461 } while ((n
= iterate_fd(files
, n
, match_file
, cred
)) != 0);
2467 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2469 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2471 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2472 struct rlimit
*rlim
, *initrlim
;
2475 new_tsec
= selinux_cred(bprm
->cred
);
2476 if (new_tsec
->sid
== new_tsec
->osid
)
2479 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2480 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm
->cred
, current
->files
);
2482 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2483 current
->pdeath_signal
= 0;
2485 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2486 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2487 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2489 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2490 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2491 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2492 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2493 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2495 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
2496 new_tsec
->osid
, new_tsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2497 PROCESS__RLIMITINH
, NULL
);
2499 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2501 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++) {
2502 rlim
= current
->signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2503 initrlim
= init_task
.signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2504 rlim
->rlim_cur
= min(rlim
->rlim_max
, initrlim
->rlim_cur
);
2506 task_unlock(current
);
2507 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS
))
2508 update_rlimit_cpu(current
, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU
));
2513 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2516 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2518 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= selinux_cred(current_cred());
2528 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2529 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2530 * flush and unblock signals.
2532 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2533 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2535 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
2536 osid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SIGINH
, NULL
);
2540 spin_lock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2541 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current
)) {
2542 flush_sigqueue(¤t
->pending
);
2543 flush_sigqueue(¤t
->signal
->shared_pending
);
2544 flush_signal_handlers(current
, 1);
2545 sigemptyset(¤t
->blocked
);
2546 recalc_sigpending();
2548 spin_unlock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2551 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2552 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2553 read_lock(&tasklist_lock
);
2554 __wake_up_parent(current
, current
->real_parent
);
2555 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock
);
2558 /* superblock security operations */
2560 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2562 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2564 sbsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2568 mutex_init(&sbsec
->lock
);
2569 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec
->isec_head
);
2570 spin_lock_init(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
2571 sbsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
2572 sbsec
->def_sid
= SECINITSID_FILE
;
2573 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
2574 sb
->s_security
= sbsec
;
2579 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2581 superblock_free_security(sb
);
2584 static inline int opt_len(const char *s
)
2586 bool open_quote
= false;
2590 for (len
= 0; (c
= s
[len
]) != '\0'; len
++) {
2592 open_quote
= !open_quote
;
2593 if (c
== ',' && !open_quote
)
2599 static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options
, void **mnt_opts
)
2601 char *from
= options
;
2607 int len
= opt_len(from
);
2611 token
= match_opt_prefix(from
, len
, &arg
);
2613 if (token
!= Opt_error
) {
2618 for (p
= q
= arg
; p
< from
+ len
; p
++) {
2623 arg
= kmemdup_nul(arg
, q
- arg
, GFP_KERNEL
);
2629 rc
= selinux_add_opt(token
, arg
, mnt_opts
);
2635 if (!first
) { // copy with preceding comma
2640 memmove(to
, from
, len
);
2653 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts
);
2659 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block
*sb
, void *mnt_opts
)
2661 struct selinux_mnt_opts
*opts
= mnt_opts
;
2662 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
2666 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
2672 if (opts
->fscontext
) {
2673 rc
= parse_sid(sb
, opts
->fscontext
, &sid
);
2676 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
, sid
))
2677 goto out_bad_option
;
2679 if (opts
->context
) {
2680 rc
= parse_sid(sb
, opts
->context
, &sid
);
2683 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, sid
))
2684 goto out_bad_option
;
2686 if (opts
->rootcontext
) {
2687 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
;
2688 root_isec
= backing_inode_security(sb
->s_root
);
2689 rc
= parse_sid(sb
, opts
->rootcontext
, &sid
);
2692 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
, sid
))
2693 goto out_bad_option
;
2695 if (opts
->defcontext
) {
2696 rc
= parse_sid(sb
, opts
->defcontext
, &sid
);
2699 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
, sid
))
2700 goto out_bad_option
;
2705 pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
2706 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb
->s_id
,
2711 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block
*sb
)
2713 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2714 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2716 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2717 ad
.u
.dentry
= sb
->s_root
;
2718 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT
, &ad
);
2721 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2723 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2724 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2726 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2727 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
->d_sb
->s_root
;
2728 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, dentry
->d_sb
, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR
, &ad
);
2731 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name
,
2732 const struct path
*path
,
2734 unsigned long flags
,
2737 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2739 if (flags
& MS_REMOUNT
)
2740 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, path
->dentry
->d_sb
,
2741 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT
, NULL
);
2743 return path_has_perm(cred
, path
, FILE__MOUNTON
);
2746 static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path
*from_path
,
2747 const struct path
*to_path
)
2749 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2751 return path_has_perm(cred
, to_path
, FILE__MOUNTON
);
2754 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, int flags
)
2756 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2758 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, mnt
->mnt_sb
,
2759 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT
, NULL
);
2762 static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context
*fc
,
2763 struct fs_context
*src_fc
)
2765 const struct selinux_mnt_opts
*src
= src_fc
->security
;
2766 struct selinux_mnt_opts
*opts
;
2771 fc
->security
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2775 opts
= fc
->security
;
2777 if (src
->fscontext
) {
2778 opts
->fscontext
= kstrdup(src
->fscontext
, GFP_KERNEL
);
2779 if (!opts
->fscontext
)
2783 opts
->context
= kstrdup(src
->context
, GFP_KERNEL
);
2787 if (src
->rootcontext
) {
2788 opts
->rootcontext
= kstrdup(src
->rootcontext
, GFP_KERNEL
);
2789 if (!opts
->rootcontext
)
2792 if (src
->defcontext
) {
2793 opts
->defcontext
= kstrdup(src
->defcontext
, GFP_KERNEL
);
2794 if (!opts
->defcontext
)
2800 static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters
[] = {
2801 fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR
, Opt_context
),
2802 fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR
, Opt_defcontext
),
2803 fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR
, Opt_fscontext
),
2804 fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
, Opt_rootcontext
),
2805 fsparam_flag (SECLABEL_STR
, Opt_seclabel
),
2809 static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context
*fc
,
2810 struct fs_parameter
*param
)
2812 struct fs_parse_result result
;
2815 opt
= fs_parse(fc
, selinux_fs_parameters
, param
, &result
);
2819 rc
= selinux_add_opt(opt
, param
->string
, &fc
->security
);
2821 param
->string
= NULL
;
2827 /* inode security operations */
2829 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2831 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= selinux_inode(inode
);
2832 u32 sid
= current_sid();
2834 spin_lock_init(&isec
->lock
);
2835 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec
->list
);
2836 isec
->inode
= inode
;
2837 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
2838 isec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_FILE
;
2839 isec
->task_sid
= sid
;
2840 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INVALID
;
2845 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2847 inode_free_security(inode
);
2850 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry
*dentry
, int mode
,
2851 const struct qstr
*name
, void **ctx
,
2857 rc
= selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
2858 d_inode(dentry
->d_parent
), name
,
2859 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
),
2864 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state
, newsid
, (char **)ctx
,
2868 static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry
*dentry
, int mode
,
2870 const struct cred
*old
,
2875 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
2877 rc
= selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old
),
2878 d_inode(dentry
->d_parent
), name
,
2879 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
),
2884 tsec
= selinux_cred(new);
2885 tsec
->create_sid
= newsid
;
2889 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode
*inode
, struct inode
*dir
,
2890 const struct qstr
*qstr
,
2892 void **value
, size_t *len
)
2894 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= selinux_cred(current_cred());
2895 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2900 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2902 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
2904 rc
= selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec
, dir
, qstr
,
2905 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
),
2910 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2911 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
2912 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= selinux_inode(inode
);
2913 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
2915 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
2918 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state
) ||
2919 !(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
))
2923 *name
= XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
;
2926 rc
= security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state
, newsid
,
2937 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mode
)
2939 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_FILE
);
2942 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry
*old_dentry
, struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2944 return may_link(dir
, old_dentry
, MAY_LINK
);
2947 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2949 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_UNLINK
);
2952 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2954 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
);
2957 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mask
)
2959 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_DIR
);
2962 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2964 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_RMDIR
);
2967 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mode
, dev_t dev
)
2969 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
));
2972 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode
*old_inode
, struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
2973 struct inode
*new_inode
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2975 return may_rename(old_inode
, old_dentry
, new_inode
, new_dentry
);
2978 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2980 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2982 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2985 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct inode
*inode
,
2988 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2989 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2990 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2993 validate_creds(cred
);
2995 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2996 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
2997 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
2998 isec
= inode_security_rcu(inode
, rcu
);
3000 return PTR_ERR(isec
);
3002 return avc_has_perm_flags(&selinux_state
,
3003 sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, FILE__READ
, &ad
,
3004 rcu
? MAY_NOT_BLOCK
: 0);
3007 static noinline
int audit_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
,
3008 u32 perms
, u32 audited
, u32 denied
,
3011 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3012 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= selinux_inode(inode
);
3015 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE
;
3018 rc
= slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state
,
3019 current_sid(), isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
,
3020 audited
, denied
, result
, &ad
);
3026 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
, int mask
)
3028 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3031 bool no_block
= mask
& MAY_NOT_BLOCK
;
3032 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3034 struct av_decision avd
;
3036 u32 audited
, denied
;
3038 from_access
= mask
& MAY_ACCESS
;
3039 mask
&= (MAY_READ
|MAY_WRITE
|MAY_EXEC
|MAY_APPEND
);
3041 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3045 validate_creds(cred
);
3047 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
3050 perms
= file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
);
3052 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
3053 isec
= inode_security_rcu(inode
, no_block
);
3055 return PTR_ERR(isec
);
3057 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state
,
3058 sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
,
3059 no_block
? AVC_NONBLOCKING
: 0,
3061 audited
= avc_audit_required(perms
, &avd
, rc
,
3062 from_access
? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS
: 0,
3064 if (likely(!audited
))
3067 /* fall back to ref-walk if we have to generate audit */
3071 rc2
= audit_inode_permission(inode
, perms
, audited
, denied
, rc
);
3077 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct iattr
*iattr
)
3079 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3080 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
3081 unsigned int ia_valid
= iattr
->ia_valid
;
3082 __u32 av
= FILE__WRITE
;
3084 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3085 if (ia_valid
& ATTR_FORCE
) {
3086 ia_valid
&= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID
| ATTR_KILL_SGID
| ATTR_MODE
|
3092 if (ia_valid
& (ATTR_MODE
| ATTR_UID
| ATTR_GID
|
3093 ATTR_ATIME_SET
| ATTR_MTIME_SET
| ATTR_TIMES_SET
))
3094 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
3096 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
3097 inode
->i_sb
->s_magic
!= SOCKFS_MAGIC
&&
3098 (ia_valid
& ATTR_SIZE
) &&
3099 !(ia_valid
& ATTR_FILE
))
3102 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, av
);
3105 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path
*path
)
3107 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3110 static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit
)
3112 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3113 unsigned int opts
= audit
? CAP_OPT_NONE
: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT
;
3115 if (cap_capable(cred
, &init_user_ns
, CAP_MAC_ADMIN
, opts
))
3117 if (cred_has_capability(cred
, CAP_MAC_ADMIN
, opts
, true))
3122 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
3123 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
3125 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
3126 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3127 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
3128 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3129 u32 newsid
, sid
= current_sid();
3132 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
)) {
3133 rc
= cap_inode_setxattr(dentry
, name
, value
, size
, flags
);
3137 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3138 ordinary setattr permission. */
3139 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
3142 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state
))
3143 return (inode_owner_or_capable(inode
) ? 0 : -EPERM
);
3145 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
3146 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
))
3149 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode
))
3152 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
3153 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
3155 isec
= backing_inode_security(dentry
);
3156 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
3157 sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
,
3158 FILE__RELABELFROM
, &ad
);
3162 rc
= security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state
, value
, size
, &newsid
,
3164 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
3165 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3166 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
3169 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3170 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3172 const char *str
= value
;
3174 if (str
[size
- 1] == '\0')
3175 audit_size
= size
- 1;
3181 ab
= audit_log_start(audit_context(),
3182 GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
);
3183 audit_log_format(ab
, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3184 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, value
, audit_size
);
3189 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state
, value
,
3195 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
3196 sid
, newsid
, isec
->sclass
,
3197 FILE__RELABELTO
, &ad
);
3201 rc
= security_validate_transition(&selinux_state
, isec
->sid
, newsid
,
3206 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
3209 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
3210 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
,
3214 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
3215 const void *value
, size_t size
,
3218 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
3219 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3223 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
)) {
3224 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3228 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state
)) {
3229 /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate
3230 * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may
3231 * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if
3232 * we've since initialized.
3237 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state
, value
, size
,
3240 pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3241 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3242 inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
, -rc
);
3246 isec
= backing_inode_security(dentry
);
3247 spin_lock(&isec
->lock
);
3248 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
3250 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
3251 spin_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
3256 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
3258 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3260 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3263 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
)
3265 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3267 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3270 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
3272 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
)) {
3273 int rc
= cap_inode_removexattr(dentry
, name
);
3277 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3278 ordinary setattr permission. */
3279 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
3282 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state
))
3285 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3286 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3290 static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path
*path
, u64 mask
,
3291 unsigned int obj_type
)
3296 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3298 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
3302 * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set.
3303 * Performs an additional check for sb watches.
3306 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT
:
3307 perm
= FILE__WATCH_MOUNT
;
3309 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB
:
3310 perm
= FILE__WATCH_SB
;
3311 ret
= superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path
->dentry
->d_sb
,
3312 FILESYSTEM__WATCH
, &ad
);
3316 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE
:
3323 /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */
3324 if (mask
& (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS
))
3325 perm
|= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM
;
3327 /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */
3328 if (mask
& (FS_ACCESS
| FS_ACCESS_PERM
| FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE
))
3329 perm
|= FILE__WATCH_READS
;
3331 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path
, perm
);
3335 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3337 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3339 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
, void **buffer
, bool alloc
)
3343 char *context
= NULL
;
3344 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3347 * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so
3348 * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr.
3350 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state
) ||
3351 strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
3355 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3356 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3357 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3358 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3359 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3360 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3361 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3363 isec
= inode_security(inode
);
3364 if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3365 error
= security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state
,
3366 isec
->sid
, &context
,
3369 error
= security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state
, isec
->sid
,
3383 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
,
3384 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
3386 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode_security_novalidate(inode
);
3387 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
3391 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
3394 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
))
3397 if (!value
|| !size
)
3400 rc
= security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state
, value
, size
, &newsid
,
3405 spin_lock(&isec
->lock
);
3406 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
3408 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
3409 spin_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
3413 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, char *buffer
, size_t buffer_size
)
3415 const int len
= sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
);
3416 if (buffer
&& len
<= buffer_size
)
3417 memcpy(buffer
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, len
);
3421 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode
*inode
, u32
*secid
)
3423 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode_security_novalidate(inode
);
3427 static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry
*src
, struct cred
**new)
3430 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3431 struct cred
*new_creds
= *new;
3433 if (new_creds
== NULL
) {
3434 new_creds
= prepare_creds();
3439 tsec
= selinux_cred(new_creds
);
3440 /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3441 selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src
), &sid
);
3442 tsec
->create_sid
= sid
;
3447 static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name
)
3449 /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3450 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3451 * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
3453 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
) == 0)
3454 return 1; /* Discard */
3456 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3462 /* kernfs node operations */
3464 static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node
*kn_dir
,
3465 struct kernfs_node
*kn
)
3467 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= selinux_cred(current_cred());
3468 u32 parent_sid
, newsid
, clen
;
3472 rc
= kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, NULL
, 0);
3479 context
= kmalloc(clen
, GFP_KERNEL
);
3483 rc
= kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, context
, clen
);
3489 rc
= security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state
, context
, clen
, &parent_sid
,
3495 if (tsec
->create_sid
) {
3496 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
3498 u16 secclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(kn
->mode
);
3502 q
.hash_len
= hashlen_string(kn_dir
, kn
->name
);
3504 rc
= security_transition_sid(&selinux_state
, tsec
->sid
,
3505 parent_sid
, secclass
, &q
,
3511 rc
= security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state
, newsid
,
3516 rc
= kernfs_xattr_set(kn
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, context
, clen
,
3523 /* file security operations */
3525 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
3527 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3528 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
3530 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3531 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && (mask
& MAY_WRITE
))
3534 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
,
3535 file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
));
3538 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
3540 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
3541 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= selinux_file(file
);
3542 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3543 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3546 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3549 isec
= inode_security(inode
);
3550 if (sid
== fsec
->sid
&& fsec
->isid
== isec
->sid
&&
3551 fsec
->pseqno
== avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state
))
3552 /* No change since file_open check. */
3555 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file
, mask
);
3558 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
3560 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= selinux_file(file
);
3561 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3564 fsec
->fown_sid
= sid
;
3570 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3571 * operation to an inode.
3573 static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
, struct file
*file
,
3574 u32 requested
, u16 cmd
)
3576 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3577 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= selinux_file(file
);
3578 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
3579 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3580 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl
;
3581 u32 ssid
= cred_sid(cred
);
3583 u8 driver
= cmd
>> 8;
3584 u8 xperm
= cmd
& 0xff;
3586 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP
;
3589 ad
.u
.op
->path
= file
->f_path
;
3591 if (ssid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
3592 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
3601 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
3604 isec
= inode_security(inode
);
3605 rc
= avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state
,
3606 ssid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
,
3607 requested
, driver
, xperm
, &ad
);
3612 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3615 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3622 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
:
3623 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION
:
3624 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3627 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
:
3628 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION
:
3629 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__SETATTR
);
3632 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3635 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3640 error
= cred_has_capability(cred
, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG
,
3641 CAP_OPT_NONE
, true);
3644 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3645 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3648 error
= ioctl_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__IOCTL
, (u16
) cmd
);
3653 static int default_noexec __ro_after_init
;
3655 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file
*file
, unsigned long prot
, int shared
)
3657 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3658 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
3661 if (default_noexec
&&
3662 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && (!file
|| IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file
)) ||
3663 (!shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
)))) {
3665 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3666 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3667 * This has an additional check.
3669 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
3670 sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
3671 PROCESS__EXECMEM
, NULL
);
3677 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3678 u32 av
= FILE__READ
;
3680 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3681 if (shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
))
3684 if (prot
& PROT_EXEC
)
3685 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
3687 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, av
);
3694 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr
)
3698 if (addr
< CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
) {
3699 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3700 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
3701 sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT
,
3702 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO
, NULL
);
3708 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file
*file
, unsigned long reqprot
,
3709 unsigned long prot
, unsigned long flags
)
3711 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3715 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE
;
3717 rc
= inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file
),
3723 if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state
))
3726 return file_map_prot_check(file
, prot
,
3727 (flags
& MAP_TYPE
) == MAP_SHARED
);
3730 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct
*vma
,
3731 unsigned long reqprot
,
3734 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3735 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
3737 if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state
))
3740 if (default_noexec
&&
3741 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && !(vma
->vm_flags
& VM_EXEC
)) {
3743 if (vma
->vm_start
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_brk
&&
3744 vma
->vm_end
<= vma
->vm_mm
->brk
) {
3745 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
3746 sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
3747 PROCESS__EXECHEAP
, NULL
);
3748 } else if (!vma
->vm_file
&&
3749 ((vma
->vm_start
<= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
&&
3750 vma
->vm_end
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
) ||
3751 vma_is_stack_for_current(vma
))) {
3752 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
3753 sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
3754 PROCESS__EXECSTACK
, NULL
);
3755 } else if (vma
->vm_file
&& vma
->anon_vma
) {
3757 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3758 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3759 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3760 * modified content. This typically should only
3761 * occur for text relocations.
3763 rc
= file_has_perm(cred
, vma
->vm_file
, FILE__EXECMOD
);
3769 return file_map_prot_check(vma
->vm_file
, prot
, vma
->vm_flags
&VM_SHARED
);
3772 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
)
3774 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3776 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3779 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3782 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3787 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && !(arg
& O_APPEND
)) {
3788 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__WRITE
);
3797 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS
:
3798 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3799 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3807 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3812 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3819 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file
*file
)
3821 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3823 fsec
= selinux_file(file
);
3824 fsec
->fown_sid
= current_sid();
3827 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
3828 struct fown_struct
*fown
, int signum
)
3831 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
3833 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3835 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3836 file
= container_of(fown
, struct file
, f_owner
);
3838 fsec
= selinux_file(file
);
3841 perm
= signal_to_av(SIGIO
); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3843 perm
= signal_to_av(signum
);
3845 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
3846 fsec
->fown_sid
, sid
,
3847 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3850 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file
*file
)
3852 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3854 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, file_to_av(file
));
3857 static int selinux_file_open(struct file
*file
)
3859 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3860 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3862 fsec
= selinux_file(file
);
3863 isec
= inode_security(file_inode(file
));
3865 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3866 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3867 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3868 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3869 * struct as its SID.
3871 fsec
->isid
= isec
->sid
;
3872 fsec
->pseqno
= avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state
);
3874 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3875 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3876 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3877 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3878 * new inode label or new policy.
3879 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3881 return file_path_has_perm(file
->f_cred
, file
, open_file_to_av(file
));
3884 /* task security operations */
3886 static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct
*task
,
3887 unsigned long clone_flags
)
3889 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3891 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
3892 sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__FORK
, NULL
);
3896 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3898 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
3901 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
= selinux_cred(old
);
3902 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= selinux_cred(new);
3909 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3911 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
3913 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
= selinux_cred(old
);
3914 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= selinux_cred(new);
3919 static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred
*c
, u32
*secid
)
3921 *secid
= cred_sid(c
);
3925 * set the security data for a kernel service
3926 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3928 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred
*new, u32 secid
)
3930 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= selinux_cred(new);
3931 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3934 ret
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
3936 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3937 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE
,
3941 tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
3942 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
3943 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
3949 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3950 * objective context of the specified inode
3952 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred
*new, struct inode
*inode
)
3954 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode_security(inode
);
3955 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= selinux_cred(new);
3956 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3959 ret
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
3961 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3962 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS
,
3966 tsec
->create_sid
= isec
->sid
;
3970 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name
)
3972 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3974 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD
;
3975 ad
.u
.kmod_name
= kmod_name
;
3977 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
3978 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL
, SECCLASS_SYSTEM
,
3979 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST
, &ad
);
3982 static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file
*file
)
3984 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3985 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3986 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3987 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3992 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
3993 sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_SYSTEM
,
3994 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD
, NULL
);
3998 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE
;
4001 fsec
= selinux_file(file
);
4002 if (sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
4003 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4004 sid
, fsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FD
, FD__USE
, &ad
);
4009 isec
= inode_security(file_inode(file
));
4010 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4011 sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SYSTEM
,
4012 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD
, &ad
);
4015 static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file
*file
,
4016 enum kernel_read_file_id id
,
4022 case READING_MODULE
:
4023 rc
= selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents
? file
: NULL
);
4032 static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id
, bool contents
)
4037 case LOADING_MODULE
:
4038 rc
= selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL
);
4047 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct
*p
, pid_t pgid
)
4049 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4050 current_sid(), task_sid(p
), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
4051 PROCESS__SETPGID
, NULL
);
4054 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct
*p
)
4056 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4057 current_sid(), task_sid(p
), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
4058 PROCESS__GETPGID
, NULL
);
4061 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct
*p
)
4063 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4064 current_sid(), task_sid(p
), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
4065 PROCESS__GETSESSION
, NULL
);
4068 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct
*p
, u32
*secid
)
4070 *secid
= task_sid(p
);
4073 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct
*p
, int nice
)
4075 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4076 current_sid(), task_sid(p
), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
4077 PROCESS__SETSCHED
, NULL
);
4080 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct
*p
, int ioprio
)
4082 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4083 current_sid(), task_sid(p
), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
4084 PROCESS__SETSCHED
, NULL
);
4087 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct
*p
)
4089 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4090 current_sid(), task_sid(p
), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
4091 PROCESS__GETSCHED
, NULL
);
4094 static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred
*cred
, const struct cred
*tcred
,
4101 if (flags
& LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE
)
4102 av
|= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT
;
4103 if (flags
& LSM_PRLIMIT_READ
)
4104 av
|= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT
;
4105 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4106 cred_sid(cred
), cred_sid(tcred
),
4107 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, av
, NULL
);
4110 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct
*p
, unsigned int resource
,
4111 struct rlimit
*new_rlim
)
4113 struct rlimit
*old_rlim
= p
->signal
->rlim
+ resource
;
4115 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
4116 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
4117 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
4118 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
4119 if (old_rlim
->rlim_max
!= new_rlim
->rlim_max
)
4120 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4121 current_sid(), task_sid(p
),
4122 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT
, NULL
);
4127 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
4129 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4130 current_sid(), task_sid(p
), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
4131 PROCESS__SETSCHED
, NULL
);
4134 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
4136 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4137 current_sid(), task_sid(p
), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
4138 PROCESS__GETSCHED
, NULL
);
4141 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct
*p
)
4143 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4144 current_sid(), task_sid(p
), SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
4145 PROCESS__SETSCHED
, NULL
);
4148 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct
*p
, struct kernel_siginfo
*info
,
4149 int sig
, const struct cred
*cred
)
4155 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNULL
; /* null signal; existence test */
4157 perm
= signal_to_av(sig
);
4159 secid
= current_sid();
4161 secid
= cred_sid(cred
);
4162 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4163 secid
, task_sid(p
), SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
4166 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct
*p
,
4167 struct inode
*inode
)
4169 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= selinux_inode(inode
);
4170 u32 sid
= task_sid(p
);
4172 spin_lock(&isec
->lock
);
4173 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
4175 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
4176 spin_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
4179 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4180 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4181 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
4183 int offset
, ihlen
, ret
= -EINVAL
;
4184 struct iphdr _iph
, *ih
;
4186 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
4187 ih
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_iph
), &_iph
);
4191 ihlen
= ih
->ihl
* 4;
4192 if (ihlen
< sizeof(_iph
))
4195 ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
= ih
->saddr
;
4196 ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.daddr
= ih
->daddr
;
4200 *proto
= ih
->protocol
;
4202 switch (ih
->protocol
) {
4204 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
4206 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
4210 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
4214 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= th
->source
;
4215 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= th
->dest
;
4220 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
4222 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
4226 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
4230 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= uh
->source
;
4231 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= uh
->dest
;
4235 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
4236 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
4238 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
4242 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
4246 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
4247 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
4251 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4252 case IPPROTO_SCTP
: {
4253 struct sctphdr _sctph
, *sh
;
4255 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
4259 sh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_sctph
), &_sctph
);
4263 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= sh
->source
;
4264 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= sh
->dest
;
4275 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4277 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4278 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4279 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
4282 int ret
= -EINVAL
, offset
;
4283 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h
, *ip6
;
4286 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
4287 ip6
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_ipv6h
), &_ipv6h
);
4291 ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
= ip6
->saddr
;
4292 ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.daddr
= ip6
->daddr
;
4295 nexthdr
= ip6
->nexthdr
;
4296 offset
+= sizeof(_ipv6h
);
4297 offset
= ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb
, offset
, &nexthdr
, &frag_off
);
4306 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
4308 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
4312 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= th
->source
;
4313 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= th
->dest
;
4318 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
4320 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
4324 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= uh
->source
;
4325 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= uh
->dest
;
4329 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
4330 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
4332 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
4336 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
4337 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
4341 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4342 case IPPROTO_SCTP
: {
4343 struct sctphdr _sctph
, *sh
;
4345 sh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_sctph
), &_sctph
);
4349 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= sh
->source
;
4350 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= sh
->dest
;
4354 /* includes fragments */
4364 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff
*skb
, struct common_audit_data
*ad
,
4365 char **_addrp
, int src
, u8
*proto
)
4370 switch (ad
->u
.net
->family
) {
4372 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb
, ad
, proto
);
4375 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
:
4376 &ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.daddr
);
4379 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4381 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb
, ad
, proto
);
4384 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
:
4385 &ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.daddr
);
4395 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4396 " unable to parse packet\n");
4406 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4408 * @family: protocol family
4409 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4412 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4413 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4414 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4415 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4416 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4420 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff
*skb
, u16 family
, u32
*sid
)
4427 err
= selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb
, &xfrm_sid
);
4430 err
= selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb
, family
, &nlbl_type
, &nlbl_sid
);
4434 err
= security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state
, nlbl_sid
,
4435 nlbl_type
, xfrm_sid
, sid
);
4436 if (unlikely(err
)) {
4438 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4439 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4447 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4448 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4449 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4450 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4452 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4453 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4454 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4455 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4458 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid
, u32 skb_sid
, u32
*conn_sid
)
4462 if (skb_sid
!= SECSID_NULL
)
4463 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state
, sk_sid
, skb_sid
,
4471 /* socket security operations */
4473 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
,
4474 u16 secclass
, u32
*socksid
)
4476 if (tsec
->sockcreate_sid
> SECSID_NULL
) {
4477 *socksid
= tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
4481 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state
, tsec
->sid
, tsec
->sid
,
4482 secclass
, NULL
, socksid
);
4485 static int sock_has_perm(struct sock
*sk
, u32 perms
)
4487 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4488 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4489 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4491 if (sksec
->sid
== SECINITSID_KERNEL
)
4494 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4498 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4499 current_sid(), sksec
->sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perms
,
4503 static int selinux_socket_create(int family
, int type
,
4504 int protocol
, int kern
)
4506 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= selinux_cred(current_cred());
4514 secclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
4515 rc
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
, secclass
, &newsid
);
4519 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4520 tsec
->sid
, newsid
, secclass
, SOCKET__CREATE
, NULL
);
4523 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket
*sock
, int family
,
4524 int type
, int protocol
, int kern
)
4526 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= selinux_cred(current_cred());
4527 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock
));
4528 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4529 u16 sclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
4530 u32 sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4534 err
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
, sclass
, &sid
);
4539 isec
->sclass
= sclass
;
4541 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
4544 sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4545 sksec
->sclass
= sclass
;
4547 /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
4548 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET
)
4549 sksec
->sctp_assoc_state
= SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET
;
4551 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock
->sk
, family
);
4557 static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket
*socka
,
4558 struct socket
*sockb
)
4560 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_a
= socka
->sk
->sk_security
;
4561 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_b
= sockb
->sk
->sk_security
;
4563 sksec_a
->peer_sid
= sksec_b
->sid
;
4564 sksec_b
->peer_sid
= sksec_a
->sid
;
4569 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4570 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4571 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4573 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
4575 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
4576 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4580 err
= sock_has_perm(sk
, SOCKET__BIND
);
4584 /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
4585 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4586 if (family
== PF_INET
|| family
== PF_INET6
) {
4588 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4589 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4590 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
4591 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
4593 unsigned short snum
;
4597 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4598 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
4599 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4600 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4602 if (addrlen
< offsetofend(struct sockaddr
, sa_family
))
4604 family_sa
= address
->sa_family
;
4605 switch (family_sa
) {
4608 if (addrlen
< sizeof(struct sockaddr_in
))
4610 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
4611 if (family_sa
== AF_UNSPEC
) {
4612 /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
4613 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
4615 if (addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
!= htonl(INADDR_ANY
))
4617 family_sa
= AF_INET
;
4619 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
4620 addrp
= (char *)&addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
4623 if (addrlen
< SIN6_LEN_RFC2133
)
4625 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
4626 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
4627 addrp
= (char *)&addr6
->sin6_addr
.s6_addr
;
4633 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4635 ad
.u
.net
->sport
= htons(snum
);
4636 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family_sa
;
4641 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk
), &low
, &high
);
4643 if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk
), snum
) ||
4644 snum
< low
|| snum
> high
) {
4645 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
,
4649 err
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4652 SOCKET__NAME_BIND
, &ad
);
4658 switch (sksec
->sclass
) {
4659 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
:
4660 node_perm
= TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4663 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
:
4664 node_perm
= UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4667 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
:
4668 node_perm
= DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4671 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET
:
4672 node_perm
= SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4676 node_perm
= RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4680 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family_sa
, &sid
);
4684 if (family_sa
== AF_INET
)
4685 ad
.u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
= addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
4687 ad
.u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
= addr6
->sin6_addr
;
4689 err
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4691 sksec
->sclass
, node_perm
, &ad
);
4698 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
4699 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET
)
4701 return -EAFNOSUPPORT
;
4704 /* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
4705 * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst
4707 static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket
*sock
,
4708 struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
4710 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
4711 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4714 err
= sock_has_perm(sk
, SOCKET__CONNECT
);
4717 if (addrlen
< offsetofend(struct sockaddr
, sa_family
))
4720 /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented
4721 * way to disconnect the socket
4723 if (address
->sa_family
== AF_UNSPEC
)
4727 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
4730 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
||
4731 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
||
4732 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET
) {
4733 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4734 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4735 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
4736 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
4737 unsigned short snum
;
4740 /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4741 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
4742 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4743 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4745 switch (address
->sa_family
) {
4747 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
4748 if (addrlen
< sizeof(struct sockaddr_in
))
4750 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
4753 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
4754 if (addrlen
< SIN6_LEN_RFC2133
)
4756 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
4759 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
4760 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
4762 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET
)
4765 return -EAFNOSUPPORT
;
4768 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
, snum
, &sid
);
4772 switch (sksec
->sclass
) {
4773 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
:
4774 perm
= TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
;
4776 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
:
4777 perm
= DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
;
4779 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET
:
4780 perm
= SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
;
4784 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4786 ad
.u
.net
->dport
= htons(snum
);
4787 ad
.u
.net
->family
= address
->sa_family
;
4788 err
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4789 sksec
->sid
, sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perm
, &ad
);
4797 /* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
4798 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket
*sock
,
4799 struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
4802 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
4804 err
= selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock
, address
, addrlen
);
4808 return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk
, address
);
4811 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket
*sock
, int backlog
)
4813 return sock_has_perm(sock
->sk
, SOCKET__LISTEN
);
4816 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket
*sock
, struct socket
*newsock
)
4819 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
4820 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
;
4824 err
= sock_has_perm(sock
->sk
, SOCKET__ACCEPT
);
4828 isec
= inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock
));
4829 spin_lock(&isec
->lock
);
4830 sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4832 spin_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
4834 newisec
= inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock
));
4835 newisec
->sclass
= sclass
;
4837 newisec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
4842 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
4845 return sock_has_perm(sock
->sk
, SOCKET__WRITE
);
4848 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
4849 int size
, int flags
)
4851 return sock_has_perm(sock
->sk
, SOCKET__READ
);
4854 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket
*sock
)
4856 return sock_has_perm(sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
4859 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket
*sock
)
4861 return sock_has_perm(sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
4864 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
, int optname
)
4868 err
= sock_has_perm(sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SETOPT
);
4872 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock
, level
, optname
);
4875 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
,
4878 return sock_has_perm(sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETOPT
);
4881 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket
*sock
, int how
)
4883 return sock_has_perm(sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN
);
4886 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock
*sock
,
4890 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_sock
= sock
->sk_security
;
4891 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_other
= other
->sk_security
;
4892 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_new
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4893 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4894 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4897 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4899 ad
.u
.net
->sk
= other
;
4901 err
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4902 sksec_sock
->sid
, sksec_other
->sid
,
4903 sksec_other
->sclass
,
4904 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO
, &ad
);
4908 /* server child socket */
4909 sksec_new
->peer_sid
= sksec_sock
->sid
;
4910 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state
, sksec_other
->sid
,
4911 sksec_sock
->sid
, &sksec_new
->sid
);
4915 /* connecting socket */
4916 sksec_sock
->peer_sid
= sksec_new
->sid
;
4921 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket
*sock
,
4922 struct socket
*other
)
4924 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4925 struct sk_security_struct
*osec
= other
->sk
->sk_security
;
4926 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4927 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4929 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4931 ad
.u
.net
->sk
= other
->sk
;
4933 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4934 ssec
->sid
, osec
->sid
, osec
->sclass
, SOCKET__SENDTO
,
4938 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net
*ns
, int ifindex
,
4939 char *addrp
, u16 family
, u32 peer_sid
,
4940 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
4946 err
= sel_netif_sid(ns
, ifindex
, &if_sid
);
4949 err
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4951 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__INGRESS
, ad
);
4955 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
);
4958 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4960 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__RECVFROM
, ad
);
4963 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4967 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4968 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4969 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4970 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4973 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4975 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4976 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4977 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4981 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4982 err
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
4983 sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4989 err
= selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
, skb
, family
, &ad
);
4992 err
= selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
);
4997 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
5000 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5001 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
5002 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
5003 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5004 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
5009 if (family
!= PF_INET
&& family
!= PF_INET6
)
5012 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5013 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
5016 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5017 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
5018 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5019 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5020 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5021 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk
, skb
, family
);
5023 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
5024 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5025 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
5028 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
5030 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
5031 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
5032 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
5036 if (peerlbl_active
) {
5039 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
);
5042 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk
), skb
->skb_iif
,
5043 addrp
, family
, peer_sid
, &ad
);
5045 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, family
, err
, 0);
5048 err
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
5049 sk_sid
, peer_sid
, SECCLASS_PEER
,
5052 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, family
, err
, 0);
5057 if (secmark_active
) {
5058 err
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
5059 sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
5068 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket
*sock
, char __user
*optval
,
5069 int __user
*optlen
, unsigned len
)
5074 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
5075 u32 peer_sid
= SECSID_NULL
;
5077 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
||
5078 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
||
5079 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET
)
5080 peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
5081 if (peer_sid
== SECSID_NULL
)
5082 return -ENOPROTOOPT
;
5084 err
= security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state
, peer_sid
, &scontext
,
5089 if (scontext_len
> len
) {
5094 if (copy_to_user(optval
, scontext
, scontext_len
))
5098 if (put_user(scontext_len
, optlen
))
5104 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket
*sock
, struct sk_buff
*skb
, u32
*secid
)
5106 u32 peer_secid
= SECSID_NULL
;
5108 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
5110 if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
5112 else if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IPV6
))
5115 family
= sock
->sk
->sk_family
;
5119 if (sock
&& family
== PF_UNIX
) {
5120 isec
= inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock
));
5121 peer_secid
= isec
->sid
;
5123 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_secid
);
5126 *secid
= peer_secid
;
5127 if (peer_secid
== SECSID_NULL
)
5132 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock
*sk
, int family
, gfp_t priority
)
5134 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
5136 sksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec
), priority
);
5140 sksec
->peer_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
5141 sksec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
5142 sksec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_SOCKET
;
5143 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec
);
5144 sk
->sk_security
= sksec
;
5149 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock
*sk
)
5151 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5153 sk
->sk_security
= NULL
;
5154 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec
);
5158 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock
*sk
, struct sock
*newsk
)
5160 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5161 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
5163 newsksec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
5164 newsksec
->peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
5165 newsksec
->sclass
= sksec
->sclass
;
5167 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec
);
5170 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock
*sk
, u32
*secid
)
5173 *secid
= SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET
;
5175 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5177 *secid
= sksec
->sid
;
5181 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock
*sk
, struct socket
*parent
)
5183 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
=
5184 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent
));
5185 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5187 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
|| sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET6
||
5188 sk
->sk_family
== PF_UNIX
)
5189 isec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
5190 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
5193 /* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming
5194 * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association
5197 static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint
*ep
,
5198 struct sk_buff
*skb
)
5200 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= ep
->base
.sk
->sk_security
;
5201 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5202 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
5204 u32 peer_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
5208 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5211 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5213 if (peerlbl_active
) {
5214 /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
5215 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
5217 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, ep
->base
.sk
->sk_family
,
5222 if (peer_sid
== SECSID_NULL
)
5223 peer_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
5226 if (sksec
->sctp_assoc_state
== SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET
) {
5227 sksec
->sctp_assoc_state
= SCTP_ASSOC_SET
;
5229 /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
5230 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
5231 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
5232 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
5234 sksec
->peer_sid
= peer_sid
;
5235 } else if (sksec
->peer_sid
!= peer_sid
) {
5236 /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
5237 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
5239 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
5241 ad
.u
.net
->sk
= ep
->base
.sk
;
5242 err
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
5243 sksec
->peer_sid
, peer_sid
, sksec
->sclass
,
5244 SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION
, &ad
);
5249 /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
5250 * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
5251 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
5252 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
5253 * plug this into the new socket.
5255 err
= selinux_conn_sid(sksec
->sid
, peer_sid
, &conn_sid
);
5259 ep
->secid
= conn_sid
;
5260 ep
->peer_secid
= peer_sid
;
5262 /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
5263 return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep
, skb
);
5266 /* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
5267 * based on their @optname.
5269 static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock
*sk
, int optname
,
5270 struct sockaddr
*address
,
5273 int len
, err
= 0, walk_size
= 0;
5275 struct sockaddr
*addr
;
5276 struct socket
*sock
;
5278 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5281 /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
5282 sock
= sk
->sk_socket
;
5285 while (walk_size
< addrlen
) {
5286 if (walk_size
+ sizeof(sa_family_t
) > addrlen
)
5290 switch (addr
->sa_family
) {
5293 len
= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in
);
5296 len
= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6
);
5302 if (walk_size
+ len
> addrlen
)
5308 case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR
:
5309 case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR
:
5310 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD
:
5311 err
= selinux_socket_bind(sock
, addr
, len
);
5313 /* Connect checks */
5314 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX
:
5315 case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY
:
5316 case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP
:
5317 case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT
:
5318 err
= selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock
, addr
, len
);
5322 /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
5323 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
5324 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked()
5325 * is called here. The situations handled are:
5326 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
5327 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
5328 * primary address is selected.
5329 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
5330 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
5331 * selinux_socket_connect().
5333 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk
, addr
);
5347 /* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
5348 static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint
*ep
, struct sock
*sk
,
5351 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5352 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
5354 /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
5355 * the non-sctp clone version.
5357 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5358 return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk
, newsk
);
5360 newsksec
->sid
= ep
->secid
;
5361 newsksec
->peer_sid
= ep
->peer_secid
;
5362 newsksec
->sclass
= sksec
->sclass
;
5363 selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk
, newsk
);
5366 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5367 struct request_sock
*req
)
5369 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5371 u16 family
= req
->rsk_ops
->family
;
5375 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peersid
);
5378 err
= selinux_conn_sid(sksec
->sid
, peersid
, &connsid
);
5381 req
->secid
= connsid
;
5382 req
->peer_secid
= peersid
;
5384 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req
, family
);
5387 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock
*newsk
,
5388 const struct request_sock
*req
)
5390 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
5392 newsksec
->sid
= req
->secid
;
5393 newsksec
->peer_sid
= req
->peer_secid
;
5394 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
5395 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
5396 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
5397 time it will have been created and available. */
5399 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
5400 * thread with access to newsksec */
5401 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk
, req
->rsk_ops
->family
);
5404 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
5406 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
5407 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5409 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5410 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
5413 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &sksec
->peer_sid
);
5416 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid
)
5418 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
5421 __tsec
= selinux_cred(current_cred());
5424 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
5425 tsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__RELABELTO
,
5429 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
5431 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount
);
5434 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
5436 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount
);
5439 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock
*req
,
5440 struct flowi_common
*flic
)
5442 flic
->flowic_secid
= req
->secid
;
5445 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security
)
5447 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
;
5449 tunsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5452 tunsec
->sid
= current_sid();
5458 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security
)
5463 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5465 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5467 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5468 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5469 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5470 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5471 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5472 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5474 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
5475 sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE
,
5479 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security
)
5481 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
5483 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
5484 current_sid(), tunsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
5485 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE
, NULL
);
5488 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock
*sk
, void *security
)
5490 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
5491 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5493 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5494 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5495 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5496 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5497 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5498 * protocols were being used */
5500 sksec
->sid
= tunsec
->sid
;
5501 sksec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
;
5506 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security
)
5508 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
5509 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5512 err
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
5513 sid
, tunsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
5514 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
5517 err
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
5518 sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
5519 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
5527 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5529 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5530 const struct net_device
*indev
,
5536 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5537 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
5542 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5545 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
5546 netlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled();
5547 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5548 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
5551 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
) != 0)
5554 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
5556 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= indev
->ifindex
;
5557 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
5558 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
) != 0)
5561 if (peerlbl_active
) {
5562 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev
), indev
->ifindex
,
5563 addrp
, family
, peer_sid
, &ad
);
5565 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, family
, err
, 1);
5571 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
5572 peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
5573 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__FORWARD_IN
, &ad
))
5577 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5578 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5579 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5581 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, peer_sid
) != 0)
5587 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv
,
5588 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5589 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
5591 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, state
->in
, PF_INET
);
5594 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5595 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv
,
5596 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5597 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
5599 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, state
->in
, PF_INET6
);
5603 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5609 if (!netlbl_enabled())
5612 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5613 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5614 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5617 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
5619 if (sk_listener(sk
))
5620 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5621 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5622 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5623 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
5624 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5625 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5626 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5627 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5628 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5629 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5630 * security label in the packet itself this is the
5631 * best we can do. */
5634 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5635 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5638 sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
5639 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, sid
) != 0)
5645 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv
,
5646 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5647 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
5649 return selinux_ip_output(skb
, PF_INET
);
5652 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5653 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv
,
5654 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5655 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
5657 return selinux_ip_output(skb
, PF_INET6
);
5661 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5665 struct sock
*sk
= skb_to_full_sk(skb
);
5666 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
5667 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5668 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
5674 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5676 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
5678 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
5679 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
5680 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, &proto
))
5683 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5684 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
5685 sksec
->sid
, skb
->secmark
,
5686 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__SEND
, &ad
))
5687 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5689 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
, proto
))
5690 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5695 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5696 const struct net_device
*outdev
,
5701 int ifindex
= outdev
->ifindex
;
5703 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5704 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
5709 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5710 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5711 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5712 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5713 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5714 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb
, ifindex
, family
);
5716 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
5717 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5718 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
5721 sk
= skb_to_full_sk(skb
);
5724 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5725 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5726 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5727 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5728 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5729 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5730 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5731 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5732 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5733 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5735 if (skb_dst(skb
) != NULL
&& skb_dst(skb
)->xfrm
!= NULL
&&
5736 !(sk
&& sk_listener(sk
)))
5741 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5742 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5743 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5744 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5746 secmark_perm
= PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
;
5747 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
))
5750 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
5751 peer_sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
5753 } else if (sk_listener(sk
)) {
5754 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5755 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5756 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5757 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5758 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5759 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5760 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5761 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5762 * for similar problems. */
5764 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
5766 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5767 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &skb_sid
))
5769 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5770 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5771 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5772 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5773 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5774 * pass the packet. */
5775 if (skb_sid
== SECSID_NULL
) {
5778 if (IPCB(skb
)->flags
& IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED
)
5782 if (IP6CB(skb
)->flags
& IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED
)
5786 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5789 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec
->sid
, skb_sid
, &peer_sid
))
5791 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
5793 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5794 * associated socket. */
5795 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5796 peer_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
5797 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
5800 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
5802 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
5803 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
5804 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, NULL
))
5808 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
5809 peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
5810 SECCLASS_PACKET
, secmark_perm
, &ad
))
5811 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5813 if (peerlbl_active
) {
5817 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev
), ifindex
, &if_sid
))
5819 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
5821 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__EGRESS
, &ad
))
5822 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5824 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
))
5826 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
5828 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__SENDTO
, &ad
))
5829 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5835 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv
,
5836 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5837 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
5839 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, state
->out
, PF_INET
);
5842 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5843 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv
,
5844 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5845 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
5847 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, state
->out
, PF_INET6
);
5851 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5853 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
5856 unsigned int msg_len
;
5857 unsigned int data_len
= skb
->len
;
5858 unsigned char *data
= skb
->data
;
5859 struct nlmsghdr
*nlh
;
5860 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5861 u16 sclass
= sksec
->sclass
;
5864 while (data_len
>= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
5865 nlh
= (struct nlmsghdr
*)data
;
5867 /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
5868 * users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
5869 * length fields; our solution is to follow what
5870 * netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
5871 * messages with length fields that are clearly junk
5873 if (nlh
->nlmsg_len
< NLMSG_HDRLEN
|| nlh
->nlmsg_len
> data_len
)
5876 rc
= selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass
, nlh
->nlmsg_type
, &perm
);
5878 rc
= sock_has_perm(sk
, perm
);
5881 } else if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
5882 /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
5883 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
5884 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
5885 " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
5886 sk
->sk_protocol
, nlh
->nlmsg_type
,
5887 secclass_map
[sclass
- 1].name
,
5888 task_pid_nr(current
), current
->comm
);
5889 if (enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state
) &&
5890 !security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state
))
5893 } else if (rc
== -ENOENT
) {
5894 /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
5900 /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
5901 msg_len
= NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh
->nlmsg_len
);
5902 if (msg_len
>= data_len
)
5904 data_len
-= msg_len
;
5911 static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
, u16 sclass
)
5913 isec
->sclass
= sclass
;
5914 isec
->sid
= current_sid();
5917 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipc_perms
,
5920 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5921 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5922 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5924 isec
= selinux_ipc(ipc_perms
);
5926 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5927 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= ipc_perms
->key
;
5929 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
5930 sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
5933 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5935 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
5937 msec
= selinux_msg_msg(msg
);
5938 msec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
5943 /* message queue security operations */
5944 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm
*msq
)
5946 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5947 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5948 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5951 isec
= selinux_ipc(msq
);
5952 ipc_init_security(isec
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
);
5954 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5955 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->key
;
5957 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
5958 sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5963 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm
*msq
, int msqflg
)
5965 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5966 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5967 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5969 isec
= selinux_ipc(msq
);
5971 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5972 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->key
;
5974 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
5975 sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5976 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5979 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm
*msq
, int cmd
)
5987 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5988 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
5989 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
5990 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
, NULL
);
5994 perms
= MSGQ__GETATTR
| MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
;
5997 perms
= MSGQ__SETATTR
;
6000 perms
= MSGQ__DESTROY
;
6006 err
= ipc_has_perm(msq
, perms
);
6010 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
, int msqflg
)
6012 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
6013 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
6014 struct common_audit_data ad
;
6015 u32 sid
= current_sid();
6018 isec
= selinux_ipc(msq
);
6019 msec
= selinux_msg_msg(msg
);
6022 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
6024 if (msec
->sid
== SECINITSID_UNLABELED
) {
6026 * Compute new sid based on current process and
6027 * message queue this message will be stored in
6029 rc
= security_transition_sid(&selinux_state
, sid
, isec
->sid
,
6030 SECCLASS_MSG
, NULL
, &msec
->sid
);
6035 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
6036 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->key
;
6038 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
6039 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6040 sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
6043 /* Can this process send the message */
6044 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6045 sid
, msec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
6048 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
6049 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6050 msec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
6051 MSGQ__ENQUEUE
, &ad
);
6056 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
,
6057 struct task_struct
*target
,
6058 long type
, int mode
)
6060 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
6061 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
6062 struct common_audit_data ad
;
6063 u32 sid
= task_sid(target
);
6066 isec
= selinux_ipc(msq
);
6067 msec
= selinux_msg_msg(msg
);
6069 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
6070 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->key
;
6072 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6074 SECCLASS_MSGQ
, MSGQ__READ
, &ad
);
6076 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6078 SECCLASS_MSG
, MSG__RECEIVE
, &ad
);
6082 /* Shared Memory security operations */
6083 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm
*shp
)
6085 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
6086 struct common_audit_data ad
;
6087 u32 sid
= current_sid();
6090 isec
= selinux_ipc(shp
);
6091 ipc_init_security(isec
, SECCLASS_SHM
);
6093 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
6094 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->key
;
6096 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6097 sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
6102 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm
*shp
, int shmflg
)
6104 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
6105 struct common_audit_data ad
;
6106 u32 sid
= current_sid();
6108 isec
= selinux_ipc(shp
);
6110 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
6111 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->key
;
6113 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6114 sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
6115 SHM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
6118 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
6119 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm
*shp
, int cmd
)
6127 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6128 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6129 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
6130 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
, NULL
);
6134 perms
= SHM__GETATTR
| SHM__ASSOCIATE
;
6137 perms
= SHM__SETATTR
;
6144 perms
= SHM__DESTROY
;
6150 err
= ipc_has_perm(shp
, perms
);
6154 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm
*shp
,
6155 char __user
*shmaddr
, int shmflg
)
6159 if (shmflg
& SHM_RDONLY
)
6162 perms
= SHM__READ
| SHM__WRITE
;
6164 return ipc_has_perm(shp
, perms
);
6167 /* Semaphore security operations */
6168 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm
*sma
)
6170 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
6171 struct common_audit_data ad
;
6172 u32 sid
= current_sid();
6175 isec
= selinux_ipc(sma
);
6176 ipc_init_security(isec
, SECCLASS_SEM
);
6178 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
6179 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->key
;
6181 rc
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6182 sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
6187 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm
*sma
, int semflg
)
6189 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
6190 struct common_audit_data ad
;
6191 u32 sid
= current_sid();
6193 isec
= selinux_ipc(sma
);
6195 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
6196 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->key
;
6198 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6199 sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
6200 SEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
6203 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
6204 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm
*sma
, int cmd
)
6212 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6213 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6214 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
6215 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
, NULL
);
6219 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
;
6230 perms
= SEM__DESTROY
;
6233 perms
= SEM__SETATTR
;
6238 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
| SEM__ASSOCIATE
;
6244 err
= ipc_has_perm(sma
, perms
);
6248 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm
*sma
,
6249 struct sembuf
*sops
, unsigned nsops
, int alter
)
6254 perms
= SEM__READ
| SEM__WRITE
;
6258 return ipc_has_perm(sma
, perms
);
6261 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, short flag
)
6267 av
|= IPC__UNIX_READ
;
6269 av
|= IPC__UNIX_WRITE
;
6274 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp
, av
);
6277 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, u32
*secid
)
6279 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= selinux_ipc(ipcp
);
6283 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct inode
*inode
)
6286 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, dentry
);
6289 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
6290 char *name
, char **value
)
6292 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
6298 __tsec
= selinux_cred(__task_cred(p
));
6301 error
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6302 current_sid(), __tsec
->sid
,
6303 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__GETATTR
, NULL
);
6308 if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
6310 else if (!strcmp(name
, "prev"))
6312 else if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
6313 sid
= __tsec
->exec_sid
;
6314 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
6315 sid
= __tsec
->create_sid
;
6316 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
6317 sid
= __tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
6318 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
6319 sid
= __tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
6329 error
= security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state
, sid
, value
, &len
);
6339 static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name
, void *value
, size_t size
)
6341 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
6343 u32 mysid
= current_sid(), sid
= 0, ptsid
;
6348 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
6350 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
6351 error
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6352 mysid
, mysid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
6353 PROCESS__SETEXEC
, NULL
);
6354 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
6355 error
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6356 mysid
, mysid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
6357 PROCESS__SETFSCREATE
, NULL
);
6358 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
6359 error
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6360 mysid
, mysid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
6361 PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE
, NULL
);
6362 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
6363 error
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6364 mysid
, mysid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
6365 PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE
, NULL
);
6366 else if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
6367 error
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6368 mysid
, mysid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
6369 PROCESS__SETCURRENT
, NULL
);
6375 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
6376 if (size
&& str
[0] && str
[0] != '\n') {
6377 if (str
[size
-1] == '\n') {
6381 error
= security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state
, value
, size
,
6383 if (error
== -EINVAL
&& !strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
6384 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
6385 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
6388 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
6389 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
6390 if (str
[size
- 1] == '\0')
6391 audit_size
= size
- 1;
6394 ab
= audit_log_start(audit_context(),
6397 audit_log_format(ab
, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
6398 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, value
, audit_size
);
6403 error
= security_context_to_sid_force(
6411 new = prepare_creds();
6415 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6416 performed during the actual operation (execve,
6417 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6418 operation. See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve
6419 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6420 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6421 tsec
= selinux_cred(new);
6422 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec")) {
6423 tsec
->exec_sid
= sid
;
6424 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
6425 tsec
->create_sid
= sid
;
6426 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate")) {
6428 error
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
, mysid
, sid
,
6429 SECCLASS_KEY
, KEY__CREATE
, NULL
);
6433 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= sid
;
6434 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate")) {
6435 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= sid
;
6436 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "current")) {
6441 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
6443 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6444 error
= security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state
,
6450 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6451 error
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6452 tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
6453 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION
, NULL
);
6457 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6458 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6459 ptsid
= ptrace_parent_sid();
6461 error
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6462 ptsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
6463 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
6482 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name
)
6484 return (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
) == 0);
6487 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid
, char **secdata
, u32
*seclen
)
6489 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state
, secid
,
6493 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata
, u32 seclen
, u32
*secid
)
6495 return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state
, secdata
, seclen
,
6499 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata
, u32 seclen
)
6504 static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode
*inode
)
6506 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= selinux_inode(inode
);
6508 spin_lock(&isec
->lock
);
6509 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INVALID
;
6510 spin_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
6514 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6516 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
6518 int rc
= selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
,
6520 /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
6521 return rc
== -EOPNOTSUPP
? 0 : rc
;
6525 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6527 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry
*dentry
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
6529 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
6532 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void **ctx
, u32
*ctxlen
)
6535 len
= selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
,
6544 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key
*k
, const struct cred
*cred
,
6545 unsigned long flags
)
6547 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
6548 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
6550 ksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
6554 tsec
= selinux_cred(cred
);
6555 if (tsec
->keycreate_sid
)
6556 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
6558 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->sid
;
6564 static void selinux_key_free(struct key
*k
)
6566 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= k
->security
;
6572 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref
,
6573 const struct cred
*cred
,
6574 enum key_need_perm need_perm
)
6577 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
6580 switch (need_perm
) {
6587 case KEY_NEED_WRITE
:
6590 case KEY_NEED_SEARCH
:
6596 case KEY_NEED_SETATTR
:
6597 perm
= KEY__SETATTR
;
6599 case KEY_NEED_UNLINK
:
6600 case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE
:
6601 case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE
:
6602 case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK
:
6610 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
6611 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
6612 ksec
= key
->security
;
6614 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6615 sid
, ksec
->sid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, perm
, NULL
);
6618 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key
*key
, char **_buffer
)
6620 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= key
->security
;
6621 char *context
= NULL
;
6625 rc
= security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state
, ksec
->sid
,
6633 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
6634 static int selinux_watch_key(struct key
*key
)
6636 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= key
->security
;
6637 u32 sid
= current_sid();
6639 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6640 sid
, ksec
->sid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, KEY__VIEW
, NULL
);
6645 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6646 static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec
, u64 subnet_prefix
, u16 pkey_val
)
6648 struct common_audit_data ad
;
6651 struct ib_security_struct
*sec
= ib_sec
;
6652 struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey
;
6654 err
= sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix
, pkey_val
, &sid
);
6658 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY
;
6659 ibpkey
.subnet_prefix
= subnet_prefix
;
6660 ibpkey
.pkey
= pkey_val
;
6661 ad
.u
.ibpkey
= &ibpkey
;
6662 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6664 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY
,
6665 INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS
, &ad
);
6668 static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec
, const char *dev_name
,
6671 struct common_audit_data ad
;
6674 struct ib_security_struct
*sec
= ib_sec
;
6675 struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport
;
6677 err
= security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state
, dev_name
, port_num
,
6683 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT
;
6684 strncpy(ibendport
.dev_name
, dev_name
, sizeof(ibendport
.dev_name
));
6685 ibendport
.port
= port_num
;
6686 ad
.u
.ibendport
= &ibendport
;
6687 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6689 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT
,
6690 INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET
, &ad
);
6693 static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec
)
6695 struct ib_security_struct
*sec
;
6697 sec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*sec
), GFP_KERNEL
);
6700 sec
->sid
= current_sid();
6706 static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec
)
6712 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
6713 static int selinux_bpf(int cmd
, union bpf_attr
*attr
,
6716 u32 sid
= current_sid();
6720 case BPF_MAP_CREATE
:
6721 ret
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6722 sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_BPF
, BPF__MAP_CREATE
,
6726 ret
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6727 sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_BPF
, BPF__PROG_LOAD
,
6738 static u32
bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode
)
6742 if (fmode
& FMODE_READ
)
6743 av
|= BPF__MAP_READ
;
6744 if (fmode
& FMODE_WRITE
)
6745 av
|= BPF__MAP_WRITE
;
6749 /* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
6750 * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf
6751 * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
6752 * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
6753 * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
6754 * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
6755 * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
6757 static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file
*file
, u32 sid
)
6759 struct bpf_security_struct
*bpfsec
;
6760 struct bpf_prog
*prog
;
6761 struct bpf_map
*map
;
6764 if (file
->f_op
== &bpf_map_fops
) {
6765 map
= file
->private_data
;
6766 bpfsec
= map
->security
;
6767 ret
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6768 sid
, bpfsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_BPF
,
6769 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file
->f_mode
), NULL
);
6772 } else if (file
->f_op
== &bpf_prog_fops
) {
6773 prog
= file
->private_data
;
6774 bpfsec
= prog
->aux
->security
;
6775 ret
= avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6776 sid
, bpfsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_BPF
,
6777 BPF__PROG_RUN
, NULL
);
6784 static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map
*map
, fmode_t fmode
)
6786 u32 sid
= current_sid();
6787 struct bpf_security_struct
*bpfsec
;
6789 bpfsec
= map
->security
;
6790 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6791 sid
, bpfsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_BPF
,
6792 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode
), NULL
);
6795 static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog
*prog
)
6797 u32 sid
= current_sid();
6798 struct bpf_security_struct
*bpfsec
;
6800 bpfsec
= prog
->aux
->security
;
6801 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6802 sid
, bpfsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_BPF
,
6803 BPF__PROG_RUN
, NULL
);
6806 static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map
*map
)
6808 struct bpf_security_struct
*bpfsec
;
6810 bpfsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec
), GFP_KERNEL
);
6814 bpfsec
->sid
= current_sid();
6815 map
->security
= bpfsec
;
6820 static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map
*map
)
6822 struct bpf_security_struct
*bpfsec
= map
->security
;
6824 map
->security
= NULL
;
6828 static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux
*aux
)
6830 struct bpf_security_struct
*bpfsec
;
6832 bpfsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec
), GFP_KERNEL
);
6836 bpfsec
->sid
= current_sid();
6837 aux
->security
= bpfsec
;
6842 static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux
*aux
)
6844 struct bpf_security_struct
*bpfsec
= aux
->security
;
6846 aux
->security
= NULL
;
6851 static int selinux_lockdown(enum lockdown_reason what
)
6853 struct common_audit_data ad
;
6854 u32 sid
= current_sid();
6855 int invalid_reason
= (what
<= LOCKDOWN_NONE
) ||
6856 (what
== LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX
) ||
6857 (what
>= LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX
);
6859 if (WARN(invalid_reason
, "Invalid lockdown reason")) {
6860 audit_log(audit_context(),
6861 GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
,
6862 "lockdown_reason=invalid");
6866 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_LOCKDOWN
;
6869 if (what
<= LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX
)
6870 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6871 sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN
,
6872 LOCKDOWN__INTEGRITY
, &ad
);
6874 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
,
6875 sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN
,
6876 LOCKDOWN__CONFIDENTIALITY
, &ad
);
6879 struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init
= {
6880 .lbs_cred
= sizeof(struct task_security_struct
),
6881 .lbs_file
= sizeof(struct file_security_struct
),
6882 .lbs_inode
= sizeof(struct inode_security_struct
),
6883 .lbs_ipc
= sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct
),
6884 .lbs_msg_msg
= sizeof(struct msg_security_struct
),
6887 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
6888 static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr
*attr
, int type
)
6890 u32 requested
, sid
= current_sid();
6892 if (type
== PERF_SECURITY_OPEN
)
6893 requested
= PERF_EVENT__OPEN
;
6894 else if (type
== PERF_SECURITY_CPU
)
6895 requested
= PERF_EVENT__CPU
;
6896 else if (type
== PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL
)
6897 requested
= PERF_EVENT__KERNEL
;
6898 else if (type
== PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT
)
6899 requested
= PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT
;
6903 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
, sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT
,
6907 static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event
*event
)
6909 struct perf_event_security_struct
*perfsec
;
6911 perfsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec
), GFP_KERNEL
);
6915 perfsec
->sid
= current_sid();
6916 event
->security
= perfsec
;
6921 static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event
*event
)
6923 struct perf_event_security_struct
*perfsec
= event
->security
;
6925 event
->security
= NULL
;
6929 static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event
*event
)
6931 struct perf_event_security_struct
*perfsec
= event
->security
;
6932 u32 sid
= current_sid();
6934 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
, sid
, perfsec
->sid
,
6935 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT
, PERF_EVENT__READ
, NULL
);
6938 static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event
*event
)
6940 struct perf_event_security_struct
*perfsec
= event
->security
;
6941 u32 sid
= current_sid();
6943 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state
, sid
, perfsec
->sid
,
6944 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT
, PERF_EVENT__WRITE
, NULL
);
6949 * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
6950 * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
6951 * 2. hooks that both access structures allocated by other hooks, and allocate
6952 * structures that can be later accessed by other hooks (mostly "cloning"
6954 * 3. hooks that only allocate structures that can be later accessed by other
6955 * hooks ("allocating" hooks).
6957 * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order.
6959 * This ordering is needed for SELinux runtime disable to work at least somewhat
6960 * safely. Breaking the ordering rules above might lead to NULL pointer derefs
6961 * when disabling SELinux at runtime.
6963 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks
[] __lsm_ro_after_init
= {
6964 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr
, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr
),
6965 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction
, selinux_binder_transaction
),
6966 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder
, selinux_binder_transfer_binder
),
6967 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file
, selinux_binder_transfer_file
),
6969 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check
, selinux_ptrace_access_check
),
6970 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme
, selinux_ptrace_traceme
),
6971 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget
, selinux_capget
),
6972 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset
, selinux_capset
),
6973 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable
, selinux_capable
),
6974 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl
, selinux_quotactl
),
6975 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on
, selinux_quota_on
),
6976 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog
, selinux_syslog
),
6977 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory
, selinux_vm_enough_memory
),
6979 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send
, selinux_netlink_send
),
6981 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec
, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec
),
6982 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds
, selinux_bprm_committing_creds
),
6983 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds
, selinux_bprm_committed_creds
),
6985 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security
, selinux_sb_free_security
),
6986 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts
, selinux_free_mnt_opts
),
6987 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount
, selinux_sb_remount
),
6988 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount
, selinux_sb_kern_mount
),
6989 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options
, selinux_sb_show_options
),
6990 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs
, selinux_sb_statfs
),
6991 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount
, selinux_mount
),
6992 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount
, selinux_umount
),
6993 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts
, selinux_set_mnt_opts
),
6994 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts
, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts
),
6996 LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount
, selinux_move_mount
),
6998 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security
, selinux_dentry_init_security
),
6999 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as
, selinux_dentry_create_files_as
),
7001 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security
, selinux_inode_free_security
),
7002 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security
, selinux_inode_init_security
),
7003 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create
, selinux_inode_create
),
7004 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link
, selinux_inode_link
),
7005 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink
, selinux_inode_unlink
),
7006 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink
, selinux_inode_symlink
),
7007 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir
, selinux_inode_mkdir
),
7008 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir
, selinux_inode_rmdir
),
7009 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod
, selinux_inode_mknod
),
7010 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename
, selinux_inode_rename
),
7011 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink
, selinux_inode_readlink
),
7012 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link
, selinux_inode_follow_link
),
7013 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission
, selinux_inode_permission
),
7014 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr
, selinux_inode_setattr
),
7015 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr
, selinux_inode_getattr
),
7016 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr
, selinux_inode_setxattr
),
7017 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr
, selinux_inode_post_setxattr
),
7018 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr
, selinux_inode_getxattr
),
7019 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr
, selinux_inode_listxattr
),
7020 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr
, selinux_inode_removexattr
),
7021 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity
, selinux_inode_getsecurity
),
7022 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity
, selinux_inode_setsecurity
),
7023 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity
, selinux_inode_listsecurity
),
7024 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid
, selinux_inode_getsecid
),
7025 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up
, selinux_inode_copy_up
),
7026 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr
, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr
),
7027 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify
, selinux_path_notify
),
7029 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security
, selinux_kernfs_init_security
),
7031 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission
, selinux_file_permission
),
7032 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security
, selinux_file_alloc_security
),
7033 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl
, selinux_file_ioctl
),
7034 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file
, selinux_mmap_file
),
7035 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr
, selinux_mmap_addr
),
7036 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect
, selinux_file_mprotect
),
7037 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock
, selinux_file_lock
),
7038 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl
, selinux_file_fcntl
),
7039 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner
, selinux_file_set_fowner
),
7040 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask
, selinux_file_send_sigiotask
),
7041 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive
, selinux_file_receive
),
7043 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open
, selinux_file_open
),
7045 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc
, selinux_task_alloc
),
7046 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare
, selinux_cred_prepare
),
7047 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer
, selinux_cred_transfer
),
7048 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid
, selinux_cred_getsecid
),
7049 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as
, selinux_kernel_act_as
),
7050 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as
, selinux_kernel_create_files_as
),
7051 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request
, selinux_kernel_module_request
),
7052 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data
, selinux_kernel_load_data
),
7053 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file
, selinux_kernel_read_file
),
7054 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid
, selinux_task_setpgid
),
7055 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid
, selinux_task_getpgid
),
7056 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid
, selinux_task_getsid
),
7057 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid
, selinux_task_getsecid
),
7058 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice
, selinux_task_setnice
),
7059 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio
, selinux_task_setioprio
),
7060 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio
, selinux_task_getioprio
),
7061 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit
, selinux_task_prlimit
),
7062 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit
, selinux_task_setrlimit
),
7063 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler
, selinux_task_setscheduler
),
7064 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler
, selinux_task_getscheduler
),
7065 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory
, selinux_task_movememory
),
7066 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill
, selinux_task_kill
),
7067 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode
, selinux_task_to_inode
),
7069 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission
, selinux_ipc_permission
),
7070 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid
, selinux_ipc_getsecid
),
7072 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate
, selinux_msg_queue_associate
),
7073 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl
, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl
),
7074 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd
, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd
),
7075 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv
, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv
),
7077 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate
, selinux_shm_associate
),
7078 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl
, selinux_shm_shmctl
),
7079 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat
, selinux_shm_shmat
),
7081 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate
, selinux_sem_associate
),
7082 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl
, selinux_sem_semctl
),
7083 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop
, selinux_sem_semop
),
7085 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate
, selinux_d_instantiate
),
7087 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr
, selinux_getprocattr
),
7088 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr
, selinux_setprocattr
),
7090 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel
, selinux_ismaclabel
),
7091 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid
, selinux_secctx_to_secid
),
7092 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx
, selinux_release_secctx
),
7093 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx
, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx
),
7094 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx
, selinux_inode_notifysecctx
),
7095 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx
, selinux_inode_setsecctx
),
7097 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect
, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect
),
7098 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send
, selinux_socket_unix_may_send
),
7100 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create
, selinux_socket_create
),
7101 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create
, selinux_socket_post_create
),
7102 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair
, selinux_socket_socketpair
),
7103 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind
, selinux_socket_bind
),
7104 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect
, selinux_socket_connect
),
7105 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen
, selinux_socket_listen
),
7106 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept
, selinux_socket_accept
),
7107 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg
, selinux_socket_sendmsg
),
7108 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg
, selinux_socket_recvmsg
),
7109 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname
, selinux_socket_getsockname
),
7110 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername
, selinux_socket_getpeername
),
7111 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt
, selinux_socket_getsockopt
),
7112 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt
, selinux_socket_setsockopt
),
7113 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown
, selinux_socket_shutdown
),
7114 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb
, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb
),
7115 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream
,
7116 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream
),
7117 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram
, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram
),
7118 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security
, selinux_sk_free_security
),
7119 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security
, selinux_sk_clone_security
),
7120 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid
, selinux_sk_getsecid
),
7121 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft
, selinux_sock_graft
),
7122 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request
, selinux_sctp_assoc_request
),
7123 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone
, selinux_sctp_sk_clone
),
7124 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect
, selinux_sctp_bind_connect
),
7125 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request
, selinux_inet_conn_request
),
7126 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone
, selinux_inet_csk_clone
),
7127 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established
, selinux_inet_conn_established
),
7128 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet
, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet
),
7129 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc
, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc
),
7130 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec
, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec
),
7131 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow
, selinux_req_classify_flow
),
7132 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security
, selinux_tun_dev_free_security
),
7133 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create
, selinux_tun_dev_create
),
7134 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue
, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue
),
7135 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach
, selinux_tun_dev_attach
),
7136 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open
, selinux_tun_dev_open
),
7137 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7138 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access
, selinux_ib_pkey_access
),
7139 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet
,
7140 selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet
),
7141 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security
, selinux_ib_free_security
),
7143 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7144 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_free
),
7145 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete
),
7146 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security
, selinux_xfrm_state_free
),
7147 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security
, selinux_xfrm_state_delete
),
7148 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup
, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup
),
7149 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
,
7150 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
),
7151 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session
, selinux_xfrm_decode_session
),
7155 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free
, selinux_key_free
),
7156 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission
, selinux_key_permission
),
7157 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity
, selinux_key_getsecurity
),
7158 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
7159 LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key
, selinux_watch_key
),
7164 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known
, selinux_audit_rule_known
),
7165 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match
, selinux_audit_rule_match
),
7166 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free
, selinux_audit_rule_free
),
7169 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7170 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf
, selinux_bpf
),
7171 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map
, selinux_bpf_map
),
7172 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog
, selinux_bpf_prog
),
7173 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security
, selinux_bpf_map_free
),
7174 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security
, selinux_bpf_prog_free
),
7177 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7178 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open
, selinux_perf_event_open
),
7179 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free
, selinux_perf_event_free
),
7180 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read
, selinux_perf_event_read
),
7181 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write
, selinux_perf_event_write
),
7184 LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down
, selinux_lockdown
),
7187 * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE
7189 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup
, selinux_fs_context_dup
),
7190 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param
, selinux_fs_context_parse_param
),
7191 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts
, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts
),
7192 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_add_mnt_opt
, selinux_add_mnt_opt
),
7193 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7194 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone
),
7198 * PUT "ALLOCATING" HOOKS HERE
7200 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security
, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security
),
7201 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security
,
7202 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security
),
7203 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security
, selinux_shm_alloc_security
),
7204 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security
, selinux_sb_alloc_security
),
7205 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security
, selinux_inode_alloc_security
),
7206 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security
, selinux_sem_alloc_security
),
7207 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx
, selinux_secid_to_secctx
),
7208 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx
, selinux_inode_getsecctx
),
7209 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security
, selinux_sk_alloc_security
),
7210 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security
, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security
),
7211 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7212 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security
, selinux_ib_alloc_security
),
7214 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7215 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc
),
7216 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc
, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc
),
7217 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire
,
7218 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire
),
7221 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc
, selinux_key_alloc
),
7224 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init
, selinux_audit_rule_init
),
7226 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7227 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security
, selinux_bpf_map_alloc
),
7228 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security
, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc
),
7230 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7231 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc
, selinux_perf_event_alloc
),
7235 static __init
int selinux_init(void)
7237 pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n");
7239 memset(&selinux_state
, 0, sizeof(selinux_state
));
7240 enforcing_set(&selinux_state
, selinux_enforcing_boot
);
7241 checkreqprot_set(&selinux_state
, selinux_checkreqprot_boot
);
7242 selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state
.avc
);
7243 mutex_init(&selinux_state
.status_lock
);
7244 mutex_init(&selinux_state
.policy_mutex
);
7246 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
7247 cred_init_security();
7249 default_noexec
= !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS
& VM_EXEC
);
7255 ebitmap_cache_init();
7257 hashtab_cache_init();
7259 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks
), "selinux");
7261 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback
, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET
))
7262 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
7264 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback
, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET
))
7265 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
7267 if (selinux_enforcing_boot
)
7268 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
7270 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
7272 fs_validate_description("selinux", selinux_fs_parameters
);
7277 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block
*sb
, void *unused
)
7279 selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb
, NULL
, 0, NULL
);
7282 void selinux_complete_init(void)
7284 pr_debug("SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
7286 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
7287 pr_debug("SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
7288 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init
, NULL
);
7291 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
7292 all processes and objects when they are created. */
7293 DEFINE_LSM(selinux
) = {
7295 .flags
= LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR
| LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE
,
7296 .enabled
= &selinux_enabled_boot
,
7297 .blobs
= &selinux_blob_sizes
,
7298 .init
= selinux_init
,
7301 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
7303 static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops
[] = {
7305 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_postroute
,
7307 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
7308 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
7311 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_forward
,
7313 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
7314 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
7317 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_output
,
7319 .hooknum
= NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT
,
7320 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
7322 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
7324 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_postroute
,
7326 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
7327 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
7330 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_forward
,
7332 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
7333 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
7336 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_output
,
7338 .hooknum
= NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT
,
7339 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
7344 static int __net_init
selinux_nf_register(struct net
*net
)
7346 return nf_register_net_hooks(net
, selinux_nf_ops
,
7347 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops
));
7350 static void __net_exit
selinux_nf_unregister(struct net
*net
)
7352 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net
, selinux_nf_ops
,
7353 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops
));
7356 static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops
= {
7357 .init
= selinux_nf_register
,
7358 .exit
= selinux_nf_unregister
,
7361 static int __init
selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
7365 if (!selinux_enabled_boot
)
7368 pr_debug("SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
7370 err
= register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops
);
7372 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err
);
7376 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init
);
7378 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7379 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
7381 pr_debug("SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
7383 unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops
);
7387 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7389 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7390 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
7393 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7395 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7396 int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state
*state
)
7398 if (selinux_initialized(state
)) {
7399 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
7403 if (selinux_disabled(state
)) {
7404 /* Only do this once. */
7408 selinux_mark_disabled(state
);
7410 pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
7413 * Unregister netfilter hooks.
7414 * Must be done before security_delete_hooks() to avoid breaking
7417 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
7419 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks
));
7421 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
7424 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */