2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
54 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
55 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
56 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
57 #include <net/netlabel.h>
58 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
59 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
60 #include <linux/atomic.h>
61 #include <linux/bitops.h>
62 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
63 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
64 #include <net/netlink.h>
65 #include <linux/tcp.h>
66 #include <linux/udp.h>
67 #include <linux/dccp.h>
68 #include <linux/quota.h>
69 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71 #include <linux/parser.h>
72 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
74 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
75 #include <linux/personality.h>
76 #include <linux/audit.h>
77 #include <linux/string.h>
78 #include <linux/selinux.h>
79 #include <linux/mutex.h>
80 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
81 #include <linux/syslog.h>
82 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
83 #include <linux/export.h>
84 #include <linux/msg.h>
85 #include <linux/shm.h>
97 /* SECMARK reference count */
98 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount
= ATOMIC_INIT(0);
100 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
101 int selinux_enforcing
;
103 static int __init
enforcing_setup(char *str
)
105 unsigned long enforcing
;
106 if (!kstrtoul(str
, 0, &enforcing
))
107 selinux_enforcing
= enforcing
? 1 : 0;
110 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup
);
113 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
114 int selinux_enabled
= CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
;
116 static int __init
selinux_enabled_setup(char *str
)
118 unsigned long enabled
;
119 if (!kstrtoul(str
, 0, &enabled
))
120 selinux_enabled
= enabled
? 1 : 0;
123 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup
);
125 int selinux_enabled
= 1;
128 static struct kmem_cache
*sel_inode_cache
;
131 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
134 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
135 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
136 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
137 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
138 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
141 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
143 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork
|| atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount
));
147 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
150 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
151 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
152 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
153 * is always considered enabled.
156 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
158 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork
|| netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
161 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event
)
163 if (event
== AVC_CALLBACK_RESET
) {
173 * initialise the security for the init task
175 static void cred_init_security(void)
177 struct cred
*cred
= (struct cred
*) current
->real_cred
;
178 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
180 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
182 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
184 tsec
->osid
= tsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
185 cred
->security
= tsec
;
189 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
191 static inline u32
cred_sid(const struct cred
*cred
)
193 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
195 tsec
= cred
->security
;
200 * get the objective security ID of a task
202 static inline u32
task_sid(const struct task_struct
*task
)
207 sid
= cred_sid(__task_cred(task
));
213 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
215 static inline u32
current_sid(void)
217 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
222 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
224 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
226 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
227 u32 sid
= current_sid();
229 isec
= kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache
, GFP_NOFS
);
233 mutex_init(&isec
->lock
);
234 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec
->list
);
236 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
237 isec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_FILE
;
238 isec
->task_sid
= sid
;
239 inode
->i_security
= isec
;
244 static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head
*head
)
246 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
248 isec
= container_of(head
, struct inode_security_struct
, rcu
);
249 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache
, isec
);
252 static void inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
254 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
255 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
257 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
258 if (!list_empty(&isec
->list
))
259 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
260 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
263 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
264 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
265 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
266 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
267 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
268 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
269 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
271 call_rcu(&isec
->rcu
, inode_free_rcu
);
274 static int file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
276 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
277 u32 sid
= current_sid();
279 fsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
284 fsec
->fown_sid
= sid
;
285 file
->f_security
= fsec
;
290 static void file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
292 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
293 file
->f_security
= NULL
;
297 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
299 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
301 sbsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
305 mutex_init(&sbsec
->lock
);
306 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec
->isec_head
);
307 spin_lock_init(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
309 sbsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
310 sbsec
->def_sid
= SECINITSID_FILE
;
311 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
312 sb
->s_security
= sbsec
;
317 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
319 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
320 sb
->s_security
= NULL
;
324 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
326 static const char *labeling_behaviors
[7] = {
328 "uses transition SIDs",
330 "uses genfs_contexts",
331 "not configured for labeling",
332 "uses mountpoint labeling",
333 "uses native labeling",
336 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
);
338 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode
*inode
)
340 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, NULL
);
349 Opt_labelsupport
= 5,
353 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
355 static const match_table_t tokens
= {
356 {Opt_context
, CONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
357 {Opt_fscontext
, FSCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
358 {Opt_defcontext
, DEFCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
359 {Opt_rootcontext
, ROOTCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
360 {Opt_labelsupport
, LABELSUPP_STR
},
364 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
366 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid
,
367 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
368 const struct cred
*cred
)
370 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
373 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
374 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
378 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
379 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
383 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid
,
384 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
385 const struct cred
*cred
)
387 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
389 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
390 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
394 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
395 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, NULL
);
399 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block
*sb
)
401 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
403 return sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
||
404 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS
||
405 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK
||
406 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
||
407 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
408 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "sysfs") ||
409 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "pstore") ||
410 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "debugfs") ||
411 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "rootfs");
414 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block
*sb
)
416 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
417 struct dentry
*root
= sb
->s_root
;
418 struct inode
*root_inode
= d_backing_inode(root
);
421 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
) {
422 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
423 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
424 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
425 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
426 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
427 if (!root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
428 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
429 "xattr support\n", sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
433 rc
= root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr(root
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, NULL
, 0);
434 if (rc
< 0 && rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
435 if (rc
== -EOPNOTSUPP
)
436 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
437 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
438 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
440 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
441 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb
->s_id
,
442 sb
->s_type
->name
, -rc
);
447 if (sbsec
->behavior
> ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors
))
448 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
449 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
451 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBINITIALIZED
;
452 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb
))
453 sbsec
->flags
|= SBLABEL_MNT
;
455 /* Initialize the root inode. */
456 rc
= inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode
, root
);
458 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
459 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
460 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
462 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
464 if (!list_empty(&sbsec
->isec_head
)) {
465 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
=
466 list_entry(sbsec
->isec_head
.next
,
467 struct inode_security_struct
, list
);
468 struct inode
*inode
= isec
->inode
;
469 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
470 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
471 inode
= igrab(inode
);
473 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode
))
477 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
480 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
486 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
487 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
488 * mount options, or whatever.
490 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*sb
,
491 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
494 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
495 char *context
= NULL
;
499 security_init_mnt_opts(opts
);
501 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
507 /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
508 BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK
>= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
));
510 tmp
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
511 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
512 for (i
= 0; i
< NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
; i
++) {
514 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
517 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
518 if (sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
)
519 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
521 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
522 if (!opts
->mnt_opts
) {
527 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
528 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
534 if (sbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) {
535 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
538 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
539 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
541 if (sbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) {
542 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, &context
, &len
);
545 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
546 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
548 if (sbsec
->flags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) {
549 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->def_sid
, &context
, &len
);
552 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
553 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
555 if (sbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
556 struct inode
*root
= d_backing_inode(sbsec
->sb
->s_root
);
557 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= root
->i_security
;
559 rc
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
562 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
563 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
565 if (sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
) {
566 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = NULL
;
567 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = SBLABEL_MNT
;
570 BUG_ON(i
!= opts
->num_mnt_opts
);
575 security_free_mnt_opts(opts
);
579 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
, char flag
,
580 u32 old_sid
, u32 new_sid
)
582 char mnt_flags
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
584 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
585 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
586 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& flag
) ||
587 (old_sid
!= new_sid
))
590 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
591 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
593 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
594 if (mnt_flags
& flag
)
600 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
601 * labeling information.
603 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block
*sb
,
604 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
,
605 unsigned long kern_flags
,
606 unsigned long *set_kern_flags
)
608 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
610 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
611 const char *name
= sb
->s_type
->name
;
612 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(sbsec
->sb
->s_root
);
613 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
= inode
->i_security
;
614 u32 fscontext_sid
= 0, context_sid
= 0, rootcontext_sid
= 0;
615 u32 defcontext_sid
= 0;
616 char **mount_options
= opts
->mnt_opts
;
617 int *flags
= opts
->mnt_opts_flags
;
618 int num_opts
= opts
->num_mnt_opts
;
620 mutex_lock(&sbsec
->lock
);
622 if (!ss_initialized
) {
624 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
625 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
626 server is ready to handle calls. */
630 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
631 "before the security server is initialized\n");
634 if (kern_flags
&& !set_kern_flags
) {
635 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
636 * place the results is not allowed */
642 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
643 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
644 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
645 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
647 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
648 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
649 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
650 * will be used for both mounts)
652 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) && (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
657 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
658 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
659 * than once with different security options.
661 for (i
= 0; i
< num_opts
; i
++) {
664 if (flags
[i
] == SBLABEL_MNT
)
666 rc
= security_context_to_sid(mount_options
[i
],
667 strlen(mount_options
[i
]), &sid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
669 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
670 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
671 mount_options
[i
], sb
->s_id
, name
, rc
);
678 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
,
680 goto out_double_mount
;
682 sbsec
->flags
|= FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
687 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
,
689 goto out_double_mount
;
691 sbsec
->flags
|= CONTEXT_MNT
;
693 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
694 rootcontext_sid
= sid
;
696 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
,
698 goto out_double_mount
;
700 sbsec
->flags
|= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
704 defcontext_sid
= sid
;
706 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
,
708 goto out_double_mount
;
710 sbsec
->flags
|= DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
719 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
720 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
721 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
) && !num_opts
)
722 goto out_double_mount
;
727 if (strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "proc") == 0)
728 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBPROC
| SE_SBGENFS
;
730 if (!strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "debugfs") ||
731 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "sysfs") ||
732 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "pstore"))
733 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBGENFS
;
735 if (!sbsec
->behavior
) {
737 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
740 rc
= security_fs_use(sb
);
743 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
744 __func__
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
748 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
750 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid
, sbsec
, cred
);
754 sbsec
->sid
= fscontext_sid
;
758 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
759 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
760 * the superblock context if not already set.
762 if (kern_flags
& SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
&& !context_sid
) {
763 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
;
764 *set_kern_flags
|= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
;
768 if (!fscontext_sid
) {
769 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
773 sbsec
->sid
= context_sid
;
775 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
780 if (!rootcontext_sid
)
781 rootcontext_sid
= context_sid
;
783 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= context_sid
;
784 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
;
787 if (rootcontext_sid
) {
788 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid
, sbsec
,
793 root_isec
->sid
= rootcontext_sid
;
794 root_isec
->initialized
= 1;
797 if (defcontext_sid
) {
798 if (sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
&&
799 sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
) {
801 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: defcontext option is "
802 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
806 if (defcontext_sid
!= sbsec
->def_sid
) {
807 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid
,
813 sbsec
->def_sid
= defcontext_sid
;
816 rc
= sb_finish_set_opts(sb
);
818 mutex_unlock(&sbsec
->lock
);
822 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
823 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb
->s_id
, name
);
827 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
828 const struct super_block
*newsb
)
830 struct superblock_security_struct
*old
= oldsb
->s_security
;
831 struct superblock_security_struct
*new = newsb
->s_security
;
832 char oldflags
= old
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
833 char newflags
= new->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
835 if (oldflags
!= newflags
)
837 if ((oldflags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->sid
!= new->sid
)
839 if ((oldflags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->mntpoint_sid
!= new->mntpoint_sid
)
841 if ((oldflags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->def_sid
!= new->def_sid
)
843 if (oldflags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
844 struct inode_security_struct
*oldroot
= d_backing_inode(oldsb
->s_root
)->i_security
;
845 struct inode_security_struct
*newroot
= d_backing_inode(newsb
->s_root
)->i_security
;
846 if (oldroot
->sid
!= newroot
->sid
)
851 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
852 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
853 "type %s)\n", newsb
->s_id
, newsb
->s_type
->name
);
857 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
858 struct super_block
*newsb
)
860 const struct superblock_security_struct
*oldsbsec
= oldsb
->s_security
;
861 struct superblock_security_struct
*newsbsec
= newsb
->s_security
;
863 int set_fscontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
);
864 int set_context
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
);
865 int set_rootcontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
);
868 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
869 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
874 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
875 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
));
877 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
878 if (newsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
879 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb
, newsb
);
881 mutex_lock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
883 newsbsec
->flags
= oldsbsec
->flags
;
885 newsbsec
->sid
= oldsbsec
->sid
;
886 newsbsec
->def_sid
= oldsbsec
->def_sid
;
887 newsbsec
->behavior
= oldsbsec
->behavior
;
890 u32 sid
= oldsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
894 if (!set_rootcontext
) {
895 struct inode
*newinode
= d_backing_inode(newsb
->s_root
);
896 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= newinode
->i_security
;
899 newsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= sid
;
901 if (set_rootcontext
) {
902 const struct inode
*oldinode
= d_backing_inode(oldsb
->s_root
);
903 const struct inode_security_struct
*oldisec
= oldinode
->i_security
;
904 struct inode
*newinode
= d_backing_inode(newsb
->s_root
);
905 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= newinode
->i_security
;
907 newisec
->sid
= oldisec
->sid
;
910 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb
);
911 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
915 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options
,
916 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
919 char *context
= NULL
, *defcontext
= NULL
;
920 char *fscontext
= NULL
, *rootcontext
= NULL
;
921 int rc
, num_mnt_opts
= 0;
923 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= 0;
925 /* Standard string-based options. */
926 while ((p
= strsep(&options
, "|")) != NULL
) {
928 substring_t args
[MAX_OPT_ARGS
];
933 token
= match_token(p
, tokens
, args
);
937 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
939 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
942 context
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
952 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
955 fscontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
962 case Opt_rootcontext
:
965 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
968 rootcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
976 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
978 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
981 defcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
987 case Opt_labelsupport
:
991 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
998 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
1002 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
1003 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
1004 kfree(opts
->mnt_opts
);
1009 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = fscontext
;
1010 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
1013 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = context
;
1014 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
1017 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = rootcontext
;
1018 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
1021 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = defcontext
;
1022 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
1025 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= num_mnt_opts
;
1036 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1038 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
1041 char *options
= data
;
1042 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
1044 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1049 BUG_ON(sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
);
1051 rc
= selinux_parse_opts_str(options
, &opts
);
1056 rc
= selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
, 0, NULL
);
1059 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1063 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file
*m
,
1064 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
1069 for (i
= 0; i
< opts
->num_mnt_opts
; i
++) {
1072 if (opts
->mnt_opts
[i
])
1073 has_comma
= strchr(opts
->mnt_opts
[i
], ',');
1077 switch (opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
]) {
1079 prefix
= CONTEXT_STR
;
1082 prefix
= FSCONTEXT_STR
;
1084 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
1085 prefix
= ROOTCONTEXT_STR
;
1087 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT
:
1088 prefix
= DEFCONTEXT_STR
;
1092 seq_puts(m
, LABELSUPP_STR
);
1098 /* we need a comma before each option */
1100 seq_puts(m
, prefix
);
1103 seq_puts(m
, opts
->mnt_opts
[i
]);
1109 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file
*m
, struct super_block
*sb
)
1111 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
1114 rc
= selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
);
1116 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1122 selinux_write_opts(m
, &opts
);
1124 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1129 static inline u16
inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode
)
1131 switch (mode
& S_IFMT
) {
1133 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE
;
1135 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
;
1137 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1139 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE
;
1141 return SECCLASS_DIR
;
1143 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE
;
1145 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE
;
1149 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1152 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol
)
1154 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_TCP
);
1157 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol
)
1159 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_UDP
);
1162 static inline u16
socket_type_to_security_class(int family
, int type
, int protocol
)
1168 case SOCK_SEQPACKET
:
1169 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
;
1171 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET
;
1178 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol
))
1179 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
;
1181 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1183 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol
))
1184 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
;
1186 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1188 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
;
1190 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1196 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET
;
1197 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG
:
1198 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET
;
1200 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET
;
1202 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET
;
1203 case NETLINK_SELINUX
:
1204 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET
;
1206 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET
;
1208 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET
;
1209 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP
:
1210 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET
;
1211 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR
:
1212 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET
;
1213 case NETLINK_NETFILTER
:
1214 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET
;
1215 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG
:
1216 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET
;
1217 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT
:
1218 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET
;
1219 case NETLINK_GENERIC
:
1220 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET
;
1221 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT
:
1222 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET
;
1224 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET
;
1225 case NETLINK_CRYPTO
:
1226 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET
;
1228 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET
;
1231 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET
;
1233 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET
;
1235 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET
;
1238 return SECCLASS_SOCKET
;
1241 static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry
*dentry
,
1247 struct super_block
*sb
= dentry
->d_inode
->i_sb
;
1248 char *buffer
, *path
;
1250 buffer
= (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
1254 path
= dentry_path_raw(dentry
, buffer
, PAGE_SIZE
);
1258 if (flags
& SE_SBPROC
) {
1259 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1260 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1261 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1262 while (path
[1] >= '0' && path
[1] <= '9') {
1267 rc
= security_genfs_sid(sb
->s_type
->name
, path
, tclass
, sid
);
1269 free_page((unsigned long)buffer
);
1273 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1274 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
)
1276 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= NULL
;
1277 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1279 struct dentry
*dentry
;
1280 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1281 char *context
= NULL
;
1285 if (isec
->initialized
)
1288 mutex_lock(&isec
->lock
);
1289 if (isec
->initialized
)
1292 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1293 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)) {
1294 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1295 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1296 server is ready to handle calls. */
1297 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1298 if (list_empty(&isec
->list
))
1299 list_add(&isec
->list
, &sbsec
->isec_head
);
1300 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1304 switch (sbsec
->behavior
) {
1305 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
:
1307 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
:
1308 if (!inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
1309 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1313 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1314 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1316 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1317 dentry
= dget(opt_dentry
);
1319 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1320 dentry
= d_find_alias(inode
);
1324 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1325 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1326 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1327 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1328 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1329 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1330 * be used again by userspace.
1335 len
= INITCONTEXTLEN
;
1336 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1342 context
[len
] = '\0';
1343 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1345 if (rc
== -ERANGE
) {
1348 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1349 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1356 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1362 context
[len
] = '\0';
1363 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
,
1369 if (rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
1370 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1371 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__
,
1372 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
1376 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1377 sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1380 rc
= security_context_to_sid_default(context
, rc
, &sid
,
1384 char *dev
= inode
->i_sb
->s_id
;
1385 unsigned long ino
= inode
->i_ino
;
1387 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
1388 if (printk_ratelimit())
1389 printk(KERN_NOTICE
"SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1390 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1391 "filesystem in question.\n", ino
, dev
, context
);
1393 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1394 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1395 __func__
, context
, -rc
, dev
, ino
);
1398 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1406 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK
:
1407 isec
->sid
= isec
->task_sid
;
1409 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS
:
1410 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1411 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1413 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1414 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1415 rc
= security_transition_sid(isec
->task_sid
, sbsec
->sid
,
1416 isec
->sclass
, NULL
, &sid
);
1421 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
:
1422 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
1425 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1426 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1428 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBGENFS
) && !S_ISLNK(inode
->i_mode
)) {
1429 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1432 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1433 * d_splice_alias. */
1434 dentry
= dget(opt_dentry
);
1436 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1438 dentry
= d_find_alias(inode
);
1440 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1441 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1442 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1443 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1444 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1445 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1446 * could be used again by userspace.
1450 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1451 rc
= selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry
, isec
->sclass
,
1452 sbsec
->flags
, &sid
);
1461 isec
->initialized
= 1;
1464 mutex_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
1466 if (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_FILE
)
1467 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1471 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1472 static inline u32
signal_to_av(int sig
)
1478 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1479 perm
= PROCESS__SIGCHLD
;
1482 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1483 perm
= PROCESS__SIGKILL
;
1486 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1487 perm
= PROCESS__SIGSTOP
;
1490 /* All other signals. */
1491 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNAL
;
1499 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1500 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1502 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred
*actor
,
1503 const struct cred
*target
,
1506 u32 asid
= cred_sid(actor
), tsid
= cred_sid(target
);
1508 return avc_has_perm(asid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1512 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1513 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1514 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1515 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1517 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk1
,
1518 const struct task_struct
*tsk2
,
1521 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec1
, *__tsec2
;
1525 __tsec1
= __task_cred(tsk1
)->security
; sid1
= __tsec1
->sid
;
1526 __tsec2
= __task_cred(tsk2
)->security
; sid2
= __tsec2
->sid
;
1528 return avc_has_perm(sid1
, sid2
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1532 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1533 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1534 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1535 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1537 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1542 sid
= current_sid();
1543 tsid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1544 return avc_has_perm(sid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1547 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1548 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1551 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1552 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred
*cred
,
1555 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1556 struct av_decision avd
;
1558 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1559 u32 av
= CAP_TO_MASK(cap
);
1562 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP
;
1565 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap
)) {
1567 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY
;
1570 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2
;
1574 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap
);
1579 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, 0, &avd
);
1580 if (audit
== SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
) {
1581 int rc2
= avc_audit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, &avd
, rc
, &ad
);
1588 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1589 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1592 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1594 return avc_has_perm(sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
1595 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, perms
, NULL
);
1598 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1599 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1600 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1601 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1602 struct inode
*inode
,
1604 struct common_audit_data
*adp
)
1606 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
1609 validate_creds(cred
);
1611 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
1614 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1615 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1617 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, adp
);
1620 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1621 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1622 pathname if needed. */
1623 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1624 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1627 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
1628 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1630 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1631 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1632 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1635 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1636 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1637 pathname if needed. */
1638 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1639 const struct path
*path
,
1642 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(path
->dentry
);
1643 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1645 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1647 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1650 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1651 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1655 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1657 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1658 ad
.u
.path
= file
->f_path
;
1659 return inode_has_perm(cred
, file_inode(file
), av
, &ad
);
1662 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1663 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1664 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1665 check a particular permission to the file.
1666 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1667 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1668 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1669 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1670 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1674 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
1675 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
1676 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1677 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1680 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1681 ad
.u
.path
= file
->f_path
;
1683 if (sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
1684 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, fsec
->sid
,
1692 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1695 rc
= inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1701 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1702 static int may_create(struct inode
*dir
,
1703 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1706 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
1707 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
1708 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1710 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1713 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
1714 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1717 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
1719 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1720 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1722 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1723 DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
,
1728 if (!newsid
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
)) {
1729 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, dsec
->sid
, tclass
,
1730 &dentry
->d_name
, &newsid
);
1735 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, tclass
, FILE__CREATE
, &ad
);
1739 return avc_has_perm(newsid
, sbsec
->sid
,
1740 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
1741 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
1744 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1745 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid
,
1746 struct task_struct
*ctx
)
1748 u32 sid
= task_sid(ctx
);
1750 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, KEY__CREATE
, NULL
);
1754 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1757 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1758 static int may_link(struct inode
*dir
,
1759 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1763 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
, *isec
;
1764 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1765 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1769 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
1770 isec
= d_backing_inode(dentry
)->i_security
;
1772 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1773 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1776 av
|= (kind
? DIR__REMOVE_NAME
: DIR__ADD_NAME
);
1777 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1792 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1797 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, av
, &ad
);
1801 static inline int may_rename(struct inode
*old_dir
,
1802 struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
1803 struct inode
*new_dir
,
1804 struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
1806 struct inode_security_struct
*old_dsec
, *new_dsec
, *old_isec
, *new_isec
;
1807 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1808 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1810 int old_is_dir
, new_is_dir
;
1813 old_dsec
= old_dir
->i_security
;
1814 old_isec
= d_backing_inode(old_dentry
)->i_security
;
1815 old_is_dir
= d_is_dir(old_dentry
);
1816 new_dsec
= new_dir
->i_security
;
1818 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1820 ad
.u
.dentry
= old_dentry
;
1821 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1822 DIR__REMOVE_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
, &ad
);
1825 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1826 old_isec
->sclass
, FILE__RENAME
, &ad
);
1829 if (old_is_dir
&& new_dir
!= old_dir
) {
1830 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1831 old_isec
->sclass
, DIR__REPARENT
, &ad
);
1836 ad
.u
.dentry
= new_dentry
;
1837 av
= DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
;
1838 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry
))
1839 av
|= DIR__REMOVE_NAME
;
1840 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1843 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry
)) {
1844 new_isec
= d_backing_inode(new_dentry
)->i_security
;
1845 new_is_dir
= d_is_dir(new_dentry
);
1846 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_isec
->sid
,
1848 (new_is_dir
? DIR__RMDIR
: FILE__UNLINK
), &ad
);
1856 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1857 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1858 struct super_block
*sb
,
1860 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
1862 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1863 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1865 sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
1866 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
, perms
, ad
);
1869 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1870 static inline u32
file_mask_to_av(int mode
, int mask
)
1874 if (!S_ISDIR(mode
)) {
1875 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1876 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
1877 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1880 if (mask
& MAY_APPEND
)
1882 else if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1886 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1888 if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1890 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1897 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1898 static inline u32
file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1902 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_READ
)
1904 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_WRITE
) {
1905 if (file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
)
1912 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1921 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1924 static inline u32
open_file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1926 u32 av
= file_to_av(file
);
1928 if (selinux_policycap_openperm
)
1934 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1936 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct
*mgr
)
1938 u32 mysid
= current_sid();
1939 u32 mgrsid
= task_sid(mgr
);
1941 return avc_has_perm(mysid
, mgrsid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
,
1942 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR
, NULL
);
1945 static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct
*from
,
1946 struct task_struct
*to
)
1948 u32 mysid
= current_sid();
1949 u32 fromsid
= task_sid(from
);
1950 u32 tosid
= task_sid(to
);
1953 if (mysid
!= fromsid
) {
1954 rc
= avc_has_perm(mysid
, fromsid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
,
1955 BINDER__IMPERSONATE
, NULL
);
1960 return avc_has_perm(fromsid
, tosid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
, BINDER__CALL
,
1964 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct
*from
,
1965 struct task_struct
*to
)
1967 u32 fromsid
= task_sid(from
);
1968 u32 tosid
= task_sid(to
);
1970 return avc_has_perm(fromsid
, tosid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
, BINDER__TRANSFER
,
1974 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct
*from
,
1975 struct task_struct
*to
,
1978 u32 sid
= task_sid(to
);
1979 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
1980 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(file
->f_path
.dentry
);
1981 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1982 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1985 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1986 ad
.u
.path
= file
->f_path
;
1988 if (sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
1989 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, fsec
->sid
,
1997 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
2000 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, file_to_av(file
),
2004 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct
*child
,
2007 if (mode
& PTRACE_MODE_READ
) {
2008 u32 sid
= current_sid();
2009 u32 csid
= task_sid(child
);
2010 return avc_has_perm(sid
, csid
, SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__READ
, NULL
);
2013 return current_has_perm(child
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
2016 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct
*parent
)
2018 return task_has_perm(parent
, current
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
2021 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct
*target
, kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
2022 kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
, kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
2024 return current_has_perm(target
, PROCESS__GETCAP
);
2027 static int selinux_capset(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
2028 const kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
2029 const kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
,
2030 const kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
2032 return cred_has_perm(old
, new, PROCESS__SETCAP
);
2036 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2037 * which was removed).
2039 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2040 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2041 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2042 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2045 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred
*cred
, struct user_namespace
*ns
,
2048 return cred_has_capability(cred
, cap
, audit
);
2051 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds
, int type
, int id
, struct super_block
*sb
)
2053 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2065 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD
, NULL
);
2070 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET
, NULL
);
2073 rc
= 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2079 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2081 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2083 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__QUOTAON
);
2086 static int selinux_syslog(int type
)
2091 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL
: /* Read last kernel messages */
2092 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER
: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2093 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ
);
2095 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF
: /* Disable logging to console */
2096 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON
: /* Enable logging to console */
2097 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2098 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL
:
2099 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE
);
2101 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE
: /* Close log */
2102 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN
: /* Open log */
2103 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ
: /* Read from log */
2104 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR
: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2105 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR
: /* Clear ring buffer */
2107 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD
);
2114 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2115 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2116 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2118 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2119 * processes that allocate mappings.
2121 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct
*mm
, long pages
)
2123 int rc
, cap_sys_admin
= 0;
2125 rc
= cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN
,
2126 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
2130 return cap_sys_admin
;
2133 /* binprm security operations */
2135 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm
*bprm
,
2136 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
,
2137 const struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
)
2139 int nnp
= (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS
);
2140 int nosuid
= (bprm
->file
->f_path
.mnt
->mnt_flags
& MNT_NOSUID
);
2143 if (!nnp
&& !nosuid
)
2144 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2146 if (new_tsec
->sid
== old_tsec
->sid
)
2147 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2150 * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid
2151 * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are
2152 * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions
2153 * of the current SID.
2155 rc
= security_bounded_transition(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
);
2158 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2159 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2160 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2170 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2172 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
2173 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2174 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2175 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2176 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(bprm
->file
);
2179 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2180 * the script interpreter */
2181 if (bprm
->cred_prepared
)
2184 old_tsec
= current_security();
2185 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2186 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2188 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2189 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2190 new_tsec
->osid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2192 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2193 new_tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
2194 new_tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
2195 new_tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
2197 if (old_tsec
->exec_sid
) {
2198 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->exec_sid
;
2199 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2200 new_tsec
->exec_sid
= 0;
2202 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2203 rc
= check_nnp_nosuid(bprm
, old_tsec
, new_tsec
);
2207 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2208 rc
= security_transition_sid(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2209 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, NULL
,
2215 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2218 rc
= check_nnp_nosuid(bprm
, old_tsec
, new_tsec
);
2220 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2223 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
2224 ad
.u
.path
= bprm
->file
->f_path
;
2226 if (new_tsec
->sid
== old_tsec
->sid
) {
2227 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2228 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS
, &ad
);
2232 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2233 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2234 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__TRANSITION
, &ad
);
2238 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2239 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__ENTRYPOINT
, &ad
);
2243 /* Check for shared state */
2244 if (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE
) {
2245 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2246 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SHARE
,
2252 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2253 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2255 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE
| LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
)) {
2256 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
2257 struct task_security_struct
*sec
;
2261 tracer
= ptrace_parent(current
);
2262 if (likely(tracer
!= NULL
)) {
2263 sec
= __task_cred(tracer
)->security
;
2269 rc
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2271 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
2277 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2278 bprm
->per_clear
|= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID
;
2284 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2286 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2294 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2295 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2296 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2297 atsecure
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
,
2299 PROCESS__NOATSECURE
, NULL
);
2305 static int match_file(const void *p
, struct file
*file
, unsigned fd
)
2307 return file_has_perm(p
, file
, file_to_av(file
)) ? fd
+ 1 : 0;
2310 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2311 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred
*cred
,
2312 struct files_struct
*files
)
2314 struct file
*file
, *devnull
= NULL
;
2315 struct tty_struct
*tty
;
2319 tty
= get_current_tty();
2321 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock
);
2322 if (!list_empty(&tty
->tty_files
)) {
2323 struct tty_file_private
*file_priv
;
2325 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2326 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2327 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2328 open file may belong to another process and we are
2329 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2330 file_priv
= list_first_entry(&tty
->tty_files
,
2331 struct tty_file_private
, list
);
2332 file
= file_priv
->file
;
2333 if (file_path_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__READ
| FILE__WRITE
))
2336 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock
);
2339 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2343 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2344 n
= iterate_fd(files
, 0, match_file
, cred
);
2345 if (!n
) /* none found? */
2348 devnull
= dentry_open(&selinux_null
, O_RDWR
, cred
);
2349 if (IS_ERR(devnull
))
2351 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2353 replace_fd(n
- 1, devnull
, 0);
2354 } while ((n
= iterate_fd(files
, n
, match_file
, cred
)) != 0);
2360 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2362 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2364 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2365 struct rlimit
*rlim
, *initrlim
;
2368 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2369 if (new_tsec
->sid
== new_tsec
->osid
)
2372 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2373 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm
->cred
, current
->files
);
2375 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2376 current
->pdeath_signal
= 0;
2378 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2379 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2380 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2382 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2383 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2384 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2385 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2386 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2388 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->osid
, new_tsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2389 PROCESS__RLIMITINH
, NULL
);
2391 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2393 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++) {
2394 rlim
= current
->signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2395 initrlim
= init_task
.signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2396 rlim
->rlim_cur
= min(rlim
->rlim_max
, initrlim
->rlim_cur
);
2398 task_unlock(current
);
2399 update_rlimit_cpu(current
, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU
));
2404 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2407 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2409 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2410 struct itimerval itimer
;
2420 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2421 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2422 * flush and unblock signals.
2424 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2425 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2427 rc
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SIGINH
, NULL
);
2429 memset(&itimer
, 0, sizeof itimer
);
2430 for (i
= 0; i
< 3; i
++)
2431 do_setitimer(i
, &itimer
, NULL
);
2432 spin_lock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2433 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current
)) {
2434 flush_sigqueue(¤t
->pending
);
2435 flush_sigqueue(¤t
->signal
->shared_pending
);
2436 flush_signal_handlers(current
, 1);
2437 sigemptyset(¤t
->blocked
);
2438 recalc_sigpending();
2440 spin_unlock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2443 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2444 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2445 read_lock(&tasklist_lock
);
2446 __wake_up_parent(current
, current
->real_parent
);
2447 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock
);
2450 /* superblock security operations */
2452 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2454 return superblock_alloc_security(sb
);
2457 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2459 superblock_free_security(sb
);
2462 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix
, int plen
, char *option
, int olen
)
2467 return !memcmp(prefix
, option
, plen
);
2470 static inline int selinux_option(char *option
, int len
)
2472 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2473 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2474 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2475 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2476 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR
, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR
)-1, option
, len
));
2479 static inline void take_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
, int len
)
2486 memcpy(*to
, from
, len
);
2490 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
,
2493 int current_size
= 0;
2501 while (current_size
< len
) {
2511 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig
, char *copy
)
2513 int fnosec
, fsec
, rc
= 0;
2514 char *in_save
, *in_curr
, *in_end
;
2515 char *sec_curr
, *nosec_save
, *nosec
;
2521 nosec
= (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
2529 in_save
= in_end
= orig
;
2533 open_quote
= !open_quote
;
2534 if ((*in_end
== ',' && open_quote
== 0) ||
2536 int len
= in_end
- in_curr
;
2538 if (selinux_option(in_curr
, len
))
2539 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr
, in_curr
, &fsec
, len
);
2541 take_option(&nosec
, in_curr
, &fnosec
, len
);
2543 in_curr
= in_end
+ 1;
2545 } while (*in_end
++);
2547 strcpy(in_save
, nosec_save
);
2548 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save
);
2553 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
2556 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
2557 char *secdata
, **mount_options
;
2558 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
2560 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
2566 if (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
2569 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts
);
2570 secdata
= alloc_secdata();
2573 rc
= selinux_sb_copy_data(data
, secdata
);
2575 goto out_free_secdata
;
2577 rc
= selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata
, &opts
);
2579 goto out_free_secdata
;
2581 mount_options
= opts
.mnt_opts
;
2582 flags
= opts
.mnt_opts_flags
;
2584 for (i
= 0; i
< opts
.num_mnt_opts
; i
++) {
2588 if (flags
[i
] == SBLABEL_MNT
)
2590 len
= strlen(mount_options
[i
]);
2591 rc
= security_context_to_sid(mount_options
[i
], len
, &sid
,
2594 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2595 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2596 mount_options
[i
], sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
2602 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
, sid
))
2603 goto out_bad_option
;
2606 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, sid
))
2607 goto out_bad_option
;
2609 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
: {
2610 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
;
2611 root_isec
= d_backing_inode(sb
->s_root
)->i_security
;
2613 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
, sid
))
2614 goto out_bad_option
;
2617 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT
:
2618 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
, sid
))
2619 goto out_bad_option
;
2628 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
2630 free_secdata(secdata
);
2633 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unable to change security options "
2634 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb
->s_id
,
2639 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block
*sb
, int flags
, void *data
)
2641 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2642 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2645 rc
= superblock_doinit(sb
, data
);
2649 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2650 if (flags
& MS_KERNMOUNT
)
2653 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2654 ad
.u
.dentry
= sb
->s_root
;
2655 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT
, &ad
);
2658 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2660 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2661 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2663 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2664 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
->d_sb
->s_root
;
2665 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, dentry
->d_sb
, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR
, &ad
);
2668 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name
,
2671 unsigned long flags
,
2674 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2676 if (flags
& MS_REMOUNT
)
2677 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, path
->dentry
->d_sb
,
2678 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT
, NULL
);
2680 return path_has_perm(cred
, path
, FILE__MOUNTON
);
2683 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, int flags
)
2685 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2687 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, mnt
->mnt_sb
,
2688 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT
, NULL
);
2691 /* inode security operations */
2693 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2695 return inode_alloc_security(inode
);
2698 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2700 inode_free_security(inode
);
2703 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry
*dentry
, int mode
,
2704 struct qstr
*name
, void **ctx
,
2707 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2708 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
2709 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
2710 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2711 struct inode
*dir
= d_backing_inode(dentry
->d_parent
);
2715 tsec
= cred
->security
;
2716 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
2717 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2719 if (tsec
->create_sid
&& sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
) {
2720 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
2722 rc
= security_transition_sid(tsec
->sid
, dsec
->sid
,
2723 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
),
2728 "%s: security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d\n",
2734 return security_sid_to_context(newsid
, (char **)ctx
, ctxlen
);
2737 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode
*inode
, struct inode
*dir
,
2738 const struct qstr
*qstr
,
2740 void **value
, size_t *len
)
2742 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2743 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
2744 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2745 u32 sid
, newsid
, clen
;
2749 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
2750 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2753 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
2755 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) &&
2756 (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
))
2757 newsid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
2758 else if (!newsid
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
)) {
2759 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, dsec
->sid
,
2760 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
),
2763 printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: "
2764 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2767 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
2772 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2773 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
2774 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2775 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
2777 isec
->initialized
= 1;
2780 if (!ss_initialized
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
))
2784 *name
= XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
;
2787 rc
= security_sid_to_context_force(newsid
, &context
, &clen
);
2797 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mode
)
2799 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_FILE
);
2802 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry
*old_dentry
, struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2804 return may_link(dir
, old_dentry
, MAY_LINK
);
2807 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2809 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_UNLINK
);
2812 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2814 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
);
2817 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mask
)
2819 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_DIR
);
2822 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2824 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_RMDIR
);
2827 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mode
, dev_t dev
)
2829 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
));
2832 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode
*old_inode
, struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
2833 struct inode
*new_inode
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2835 return may_rename(old_inode
, old_dentry
, new_inode
, new_dentry
);
2838 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2840 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2842 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2845 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct nameidata
*nameidata
)
2847 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2849 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2852 static noinline
int audit_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
,
2853 u32 perms
, u32 audited
, u32 denied
,
2857 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2858 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2861 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE
;
2864 rc
= slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
,
2865 audited
, denied
, result
, &ad
, flags
);
2871 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
, int mask
)
2873 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2876 unsigned flags
= mask
& MAY_NOT_BLOCK
;
2877 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2879 struct av_decision avd
;
2881 u32 audited
, denied
;
2883 from_access
= mask
& MAY_ACCESS
;
2884 mask
&= (MAY_READ
|MAY_WRITE
|MAY_EXEC
|MAY_APPEND
);
2886 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2890 validate_creds(cred
);
2892 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
2895 perms
= file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
);
2897 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
2898 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2900 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, 0, &avd
);
2901 audited
= avc_audit_required(perms
, &avd
, rc
,
2902 from_access
? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS
: 0,
2904 if (likely(!audited
))
2907 rc2
= audit_inode_permission(inode
, perms
, audited
, denied
, rc
, flags
);
2913 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct iattr
*iattr
)
2915 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2916 unsigned int ia_valid
= iattr
->ia_valid
;
2917 __u32 av
= FILE__WRITE
;
2919 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2920 if (ia_valid
& ATTR_FORCE
) {
2921 ia_valid
&= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID
| ATTR_KILL_SGID
| ATTR_MODE
|
2927 if (ia_valid
& (ATTR_MODE
| ATTR_UID
| ATTR_GID
|
2928 ATTR_ATIME_SET
| ATTR_MTIME_SET
| ATTR_TIMES_SET
))
2929 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2931 if (selinux_policycap_openperm
&& (ia_valid
& ATTR_SIZE
))
2934 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, av
);
2937 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path
*path
)
2939 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2942 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2944 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2946 if (!strncmp(name
, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
,
2947 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
- 1)) {
2948 if (!strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_CAPS
)) {
2949 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP
))
2951 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
2952 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2953 Restrict to administrator. */
2958 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2959 ordinary setattr permission. */
2960 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2963 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
2964 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
2966 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
2967 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2968 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2969 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2970 u32 newsid
, sid
= current_sid();
2973 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
2974 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
2976 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2977 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
))
2980 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode
))
2983 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2984 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
2986 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
,
2987 FILE__RELABELFROM
, &ad
);
2991 rc
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &newsid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
2992 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
2993 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
)) {
2994 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2998 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
2999 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3002 if (str
[size
- 1] == '\0')
3003 audit_size
= size
- 1;
3010 ab
= audit_log_start(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
);
3011 audit_log_format(ab
, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3012 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, value
, audit_size
);
3017 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
3022 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, isec
->sclass
,
3023 FILE__RELABELTO
, &ad
);
3027 rc
= security_validate_transition(isec
->sid
, newsid
, sid
,
3032 return avc_has_perm(newsid
,
3034 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
3035 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
,
3039 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
3040 const void *value
, size_t size
,
3043 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
3044 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3048 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
)) {
3049 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3053 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
3055 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3056 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3057 inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
, -rc
);
3061 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
3063 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3068 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
3070 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3072 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3075 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
)
3077 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3079 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3082 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
3084 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
3085 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
3087 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3088 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3093 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3095 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3097 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
, void **buffer
, bool alloc
)
3101 char *context
= NULL
;
3102 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3104 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
3108 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3109 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3110 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3111 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3112 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3113 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3114 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3116 error
= cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns
, CAP_MAC_ADMIN
,
3117 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
3119 error
= cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN
,
3120 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
3122 error
= security_sid_to_context_force(isec
->sid
, &context
,
3125 error
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &size
);
3138 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
,
3139 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
3141 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3145 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
3148 if (!value
|| !size
)
3151 rc
= security_context_to_sid((void *)value
, size
, &newsid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
3155 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
3157 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3161 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, char *buffer
, size_t buffer_size
)
3163 const int len
= sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
);
3164 if (buffer
&& len
<= buffer_size
)
3165 memcpy(buffer
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, len
);
3169 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode
*inode
, u32
*secid
)
3171 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3175 /* file security operations */
3177 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
3179 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3180 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
3182 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3183 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && (mask
& MAY_WRITE
))
3186 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
,
3187 file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
));
3190 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
3192 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
3193 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3194 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3195 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3198 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3201 if (sid
== fsec
->sid
&& fsec
->isid
== isec
->sid
&&
3202 fsec
->pseqno
== avc_policy_seqno())
3203 /* No change since file_open check. */
3206 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file
, mask
);
3209 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
3211 return file_alloc_security(file
);
3214 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
3216 file_free_security(file
);
3219 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3222 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3232 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
:
3234 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION
:
3235 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3238 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
:
3240 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION
:
3241 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__SETATTR
);
3244 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3248 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3253 error
= cred_has_capability(cred
, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG
,
3254 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
);
3257 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3258 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3261 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__IOCTL
);
3266 static int default_noexec
;
3268 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file
*file
, unsigned long prot
, int shared
)
3270 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3273 if (default_noexec
&&
3274 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && (!file
|| IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file
)) ||
3275 (!shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
)))) {
3277 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3278 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3279 * This has an additional check.
3281 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECMEM
);
3287 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3288 u32 av
= FILE__READ
;
3290 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3291 if (shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
))
3294 if (prot
& PROT_EXEC
)
3295 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
3297 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, av
);
3304 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr
)
3308 if (addr
< CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
) {
3309 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3310 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT
,
3311 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO
, NULL
);
3317 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file
*file
, unsigned long reqprot
,
3318 unsigned long prot
, unsigned long flags
)
3320 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3323 return file_map_prot_check(file
, prot
,
3324 (flags
& MAP_TYPE
) == MAP_SHARED
);
3327 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct
*vma
,
3328 unsigned long reqprot
,
3331 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3333 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3336 if (default_noexec
&&
3337 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && !(vma
->vm_flags
& VM_EXEC
)) {
3339 if (vma
->vm_start
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_brk
&&
3340 vma
->vm_end
<= vma
->vm_mm
->brk
) {
3341 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECHEAP
);
3342 } else if (!vma
->vm_file
&&
3343 vma
->vm_start
<= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
&&
3344 vma
->vm_end
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
) {
3345 rc
= current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__EXECSTACK
);
3346 } else if (vma
->vm_file
&& vma
->anon_vma
) {
3348 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3349 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3350 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3351 * modified content. This typically should only
3352 * occur for text relocations.
3354 rc
= file_has_perm(cred
, vma
->vm_file
, FILE__EXECMOD
);
3360 return file_map_prot_check(vma
->vm_file
, prot
, vma
->vm_flags
&VM_SHARED
);
3363 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
)
3365 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3367 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3370 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3373 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3378 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && !(arg
& O_APPEND
)) {
3379 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__WRITE
);
3388 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS
:
3389 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3390 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3398 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3403 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3410 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file
*file
)
3412 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3414 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3415 fsec
->fown_sid
= current_sid();
3418 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
3419 struct fown_struct
*fown
, int signum
)
3422 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
3424 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3426 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3427 file
= container_of(fown
, struct file
, f_owner
);
3429 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3432 perm
= signal_to_av(SIGIO
); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3434 perm
= signal_to_av(signum
);
3436 return avc_has_perm(fsec
->fown_sid
, sid
,
3437 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3440 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file
*file
)
3442 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3444 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, file_to_av(file
));
3447 static int selinux_file_open(struct file
*file
, const struct cred
*cred
)
3449 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3450 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3452 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3453 isec
= file_inode(file
)->i_security
;
3455 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3456 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3457 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3458 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3459 * struct as its SID.
3461 fsec
->isid
= isec
->sid
;
3462 fsec
->pseqno
= avc_policy_seqno();
3464 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3465 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3466 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3467 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3468 * new inode label or new policy.
3469 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3471 return file_path_has_perm(cred
, file
, open_file_to_av(file
));
3474 /* task security operations */
3476 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags
)
3478 return current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__FORK
);
3482 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3484 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred
*cred
, gfp_t gfp
)
3486 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3488 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3492 cred
->security
= tsec
;
3497 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3499 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred
*cred
)
3501 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
3504 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3505 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3507 BUG_ON(cred
->security
&& (unsigned long) cred
->security
< PAGE_SIZE
);
3508 cred
->security
= (void *) 0x7UL
;
3513 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3515 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
3518 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
3519 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3521 old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3523 tsec
= kmemdup(old_tsec
, sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3527 new->security
= tsec
;
3532 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3534 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
3536 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3537 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3543 * set the security data for a kernel service
3544 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3546 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred
*new, u32 secid
)
3548 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3549 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3552 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, secid
,
3553 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3554 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE
,
3558 tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
3559 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
3560 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
3566 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3567 * objective context of the specified inode
3569 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred
*new, struct inode
*inode
)
3571 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3572 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3573 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3576 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
3577 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3578 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS
,
3582 tsec
->create_sid
= isec
->sid
;
3586 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name
)
3589 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3591 sid
= task_sid(current
);
3593 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD
;
3594 ad
.u
.kmod_name
= kmod_name
;
3596 return avc_has_perm(sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
, SECCLASS_SYSTEM
,
3597 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST
, &ad
);
3600 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct
*p
, pid_t pgid
)
3602 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETPGID
);
3605 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3607 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETPGID
);
3610 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3612 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSESSION
);
3615 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct
*p
, u32
*secid
)
3617 *secid
= task_sid(p
);
3620 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct
*p
, int nice
)
3622 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3625 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct
*p
, int ioprio
)
3627 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3630 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct
*p
)
3632 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3635 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct
*p
, unsigned int resource
,
3636 struct rlimit
*new_rlim
)
3638 struct rlimit
*old_rlim
= p
->signal
->rlim
+ resource
;
3640 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3641 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3642 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3643 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3644 if (old_rlim
->rlim_max
!= new_rlim
->rlim_max
)
3645 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT
);
3650 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
3652 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3655 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
3657 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3660 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct
*p
)
3662 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3665 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct
*p
, struct siginfo
*info
,
3672 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNULL
; /* null signal; existence test */
3674 perm
= signal_to_av(sig
);
3676 rc
= avc_has_perm(secid
, task_sid(p
),
3677 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3679 rc
= current_has_perm(p
, perm
);
3683 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct
*p
)
3685 return task_has_perm(p
, current
, PROCESS__SIGCHLD
);
3688 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct
*p
,
3689 struct inode
*inode
)
3691 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3692 u32 sid
= task_sid(p
);
3695 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3698 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3699 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3700 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3702 int offset
, ihlen
, ret
= -EINVAL
;
3703 struct iphdr _iph
, *ih
;
3705 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3706 ih
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_iph
), &_iph
);
3710 ihlen
= ih
->ihl
* 4;
3711 if (ihlen
< sizeof(_iph
))
3714 ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
= ih
->saddr
;
3715 ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.daddr
= ih
->daddr
;
3719 *proto
= ih
->protocol
;
3721 switch (ih
->protocol
) {
3723 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3725 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3729 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3733 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= th
->source
;
3734 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= th
->dest
;
3739 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3741 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3745 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3749 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= uh
->source
;
3750 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= uh
->dest
;
3754 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3755 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3757 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3761 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3765 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3766 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3777 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3779 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3780 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3781 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3784 int ret
= -EINVAL
, offset
;
3785 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h
, *ip6
;
3788 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3789 ip6
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_ipv6h
), &_ipv6h
);
3793 ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
= ip6
->saddr
;
3794 ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.daddr
= ip6
->daddr
;
3797 nexthdr
= ip6
->nexthdr
;
3798 offset
+= sizeof(_ipv6h
);
3799 offset
= ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb
, offset
, &nexthdr
, &frag_off
);
3808 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3810 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3814 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= th
->source
;
3815 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= th
->dest
;
3820 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3822 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3826 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= uh
->source
;
3827 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= uh
->dest
;
3831 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3832 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3834 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3838 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3839 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3843 /* includes fragments */
3853 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff
*skb
, struct common_audit_data
*ad
,
3854 char **_addrp
, int src
, u8
*proto
)
3859 switch (ad
->u
.net
->family
) {
3861 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3864 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
:
3865 &ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.daddr
);
3868 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3870 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3873 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
:
3874 &ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.daddr
);
3884 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3885 " unable to parse packet\n");
3895 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3897 * @family: protocol family
3898 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3901 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3902 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3903 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3904 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3905 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3909 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff
*skb
, u16 family
, u32
*sid
)
3916 err
= selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb
, &xfrm_sid
);
3919 err
= selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb
, family
, &nlbl_type
, &nlbl_sid
);
3923 err
= security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid
, nlbl_type
, xfrm_sid
, sid
);
3924 if (unlikely(err
)) {
3926 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3927 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3935 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
3936 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
3937 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
3938 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
3940 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
3941 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
3942 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
3943 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3946 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid
, u32 skb_sid
, u32
*conn_sid
)
3950 if (skb_sid
!= SECSID_NULL
)
3951 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid
, skb_sid
, conn_sid
);
3958 /* socket security operations */
3960 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
,
3961 u16 secclass
, u32
*socksid
)
3963 if (tsec
->sockcreate_sid
> SECSID_NULL
) {
3964 *socksid
= tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
3968 return security_transition_sid(tsec
->sid
, tsec
->sid
, secclass
, NULL
,
3972 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct
*task
, struct sock
*sk
, u32 perms
)
3974 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
3975 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3976 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
3977 u32 tsid
= task_sid(task
);
3979 if (sksec
->sid
== SECINITSID_KERNEL
)
3982 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
3986 return avc_has_perm(tsid
, sksec
->sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
3989 static int selinux_socket_create(int family
, int type
,
3990 int protocol
, int kern
)
3992 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
4000 secclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
4001 rc
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
, secclass
, &newsid
);
4005 return avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, newsid
, secclass
, SOCKET__CREATE
, NULL
);
4008 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket
*sock
, int family
,
4009 int type
, int protocol
, int kern
)
4011 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
4012 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
4013 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4016 isec
->sclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
4019 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4021 err
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
, isec
->sclass
, &(isec
->sid
));
4026 isec
->initialized
= 1;
4029 sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4030 sksec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
4031 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4032 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock
->sk
, family
);
4038 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4039 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4040 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4042 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
4044 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
4048 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, SOCKET__BIND
);
4053 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
4054 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
4055 * check the first address now.
4057 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4058 if (family
== PF_INET
|| family
== PF_INET6
) {
4060 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4061 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4062 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4063 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
4064 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
4065 unsigned short snum
;
4068 if (family
== PF_INET
) {
4069 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
4070 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
4071 addrp
= (char *)&addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
4073 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
4074 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
4075 addrp
= (char *)&addr6
->sin6_addr
.s6_addr
;
4081 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk
), &low
, &high
);
4083 if (snum
< max(PROT_SOCK
, low
) || snum
> high
) {
4084 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
,
4088 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4090 ad
.u
.net
->sport
= htons(snum
);
4091 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4092 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
,
4094 SOCKET__NAME_BIND
, &ad
);
4100 switch (sksec
->sclass
) {
4101 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
:
4102 node_perm
= TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4105 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
:
4106 node_perm
= UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4109 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
:
4110 node_perm
= DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4114 node_perm
= RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4118 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &sid
);
4122 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4124 ad
.u
.net
->sport
= htons(snum
);
4125 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4127 if (family
== PF_INET
)
4128 ad
.u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
= addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
4130 ad
.u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
= addr6
->sin6_addr
;
4132 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
,
4133 sksec
->sclass
, node_perm
, &ad
);
4141 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
4143 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
4144 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4147 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, SOCKET__CONNECT
);
4152 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
4154 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
||
4155 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
) {
4156 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4157 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4158 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
4159 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
4160 unsigned short snum
;
4163 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
) {
4164 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
4165 if (addrlen
< sizeof(struct sockaddr_in
))
4167 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
4169 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
4170 if (addrlen
< SIN6_LEN_RFC2133
)
4172 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
4175 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
, snum
, &sid
);
4179 perm
= (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
) ?
4180 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
: DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
;
4182 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4184 ad
.u
.net
->dport
= htons(snum
);
4185 ad
.u
.net
->family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4186 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perm
, &ad
);
4191 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk
, address
);
4197 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket
*sock
, int backlog
)
4199 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__LISTEN
);
4202 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket
*sock
, struct socket
*newsock
)
4205 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
4206 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
;
4208 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__ACCEPT
);
4212 newisec
= SOCK_INODE(newsock
)->i_security
;
4214 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
4215 newisec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4216 newisec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
4217 newisec
->initialized
= 1;
4222 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
4225 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__WRITE
);
4228 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
4229 int size
, int flags
)
4231 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__READ
);
4234 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket
*sock
)
4236 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
4239 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket
*sock
)
4241 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
4244 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
, int optname
)
4248 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SETOPT
);
4252 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock
, level
, optname
);
4255 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
,
4258 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETOPT
);
4261 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket
*sock
, int how
)
4263 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN
);
4266 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock
*sock
,
4270 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_sock
= sock
->sk_security
;
4271 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_other
= other
->sk_security
;
4272 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_new
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4273 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4274 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4277 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4279 ad
.u
.net
->sk
= other
;
4281 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec_sock
->sid
, sksec_other
->sid
,
4282 sksec_other
->sclass
,
4283 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO
, &ad
);
4287 /* server child socket */
4288 sksec_new
->peer_sid
= sksec_sock
->sid
;
4289 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other
->sid
, sksec_sock
->sid
,
4294 /* connecting socket */
4295 sksec_sock
->peer_sid
= sksec_new
->sid
;
4300 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket
*sock
,
4301 struct socket
*other
)
4303 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4304 struct sk_security_struct
*osec
= other
->sk
->sk_security
;
4305 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4306 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4308 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4310 ad
.u
.net
->sk
= other
->sk
;
4312 return avc_has_perm(ssec
->sid
, osec
->sid
, osec
->sclass
, SOCKET__SENDTO
,
4316 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net
*ns
, int ifindex
,
4317 char *addrp
, u16 family
, u32 peer_sid
,
4318 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
4324 err
= sel_netif_sid(ns
, ifindex
, &if_sid
);
4327 err
= avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
4328 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__INGRESS
, ad
);
4332 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
);
4335 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
4336 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__RECVFROM
, ad
);
4339 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4343 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4344 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4345 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4346 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4349 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4351 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4352 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4353 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4357 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4358 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4364 err
= selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
, skb
, family
, &ad
);
4367 err
= selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
);
4372 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4375 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4376 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4377 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4378 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4379 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4384 if (family
!= PF_INET
&& family
!= PF_INET6
)
4387 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4388 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4391 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4392 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4393 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4394 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4395 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4396 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk
, skb
, family
);
4398 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4399 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4400 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4403 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4405 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4406 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4407 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4411 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4414 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
);
4417 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk
), skb
->skb_iif
,
4418 addrp
, family
, peer_sid
, &ad
);
4420 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4423 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, peer_sid
, SECCLASS_PEER
,
4426 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4431 if (secmark_active
) {
4432 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4441 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket
*sock
, char __user
*optval
,
4442 int __user
*optlen
, unsigned len
)
4447 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4448 u32 peer_sid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4450 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
||
4451 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
)
4452 peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
4453 if (peer_sid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4454 return -ENOPROTOOPT
;
4456 err
= security_sid_to_context(peer_sid
, &scontext
, &scontext_len
);
4460 if (scontext_len
> len
) {
4465 if (copy_to_user(optval
, scontext
, scontext_len
))
4469 if (put_user(scontext_len
, optlen
))
4475 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket
*sock
, struct sk_buff
*skb
, u32
*secid
)
4477 u32 peer_secid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4480 if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4482 else if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IPV6
))
4485 family
= sock
->sk
->sk_family
;
4489 if (sock
&& family
== PF_UNIX
)
4490 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock
), &peer_secid
);
4492 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_secid
);
4495 *secid
= peer_secid
;
4496 if (peer_secid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4501 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock
*sk
, int family
, gfp_t priority
)
4503 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4505 sksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec
), priority
);
4509 sksec
->peer_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4510 sksec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4511 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec
);
4512 sk
->sk_security
= sksec
;
4517 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock
*sk
)
4519 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4521 sk
->sk_security
= NULL
;
4522 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec
);
4526 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock
*sk
, struct sock
*newsk
)
4528 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4529 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4531 newsksec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4532 newsksec
->peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
4533 newsksec
->sclass
= sksec
->sclass
;
4535 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec
);
4538 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock
*sk
, u32
*secid
)
4541 *secid
= SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET
;
4543 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4545 *secid
= sksec
->sid
;
4549 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock
*sk
, struct socket
*parent
)
4551 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= SOCK_INODE(parent
)->i_security
;
4552 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4554 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
|| sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET6
||
4555 sk
->sk_family
== PF_UNIX
)
4556 isec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4557 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4560 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4561 struct request_sock
*req
)
4563 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4565 u16 family
= req
->rsk_ops
->family
;
4569 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peersid
);
4572 err
= selinux_conn_sid(sksec
->sid
, peersid
, &connsid
);
4575 req
->secid
= connsid
;
4576 req
->peer_secid
= peersid
;
4578 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req
, family
);
4581 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock
*newsk
,
4582 const struct request_sock
*req
)
4584 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4586 newsksec
->sid
= req
->secid
;
4587 newsksec
->peer_sid
= req
->peer_secid
;
4588 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4589 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4590 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4591 time it will have been created and available. */
4593 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4594 * thread with access to newsksec */
4595 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk
, req
->rsk_ops
->family
);
4598 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4600 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4601 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4603 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4604 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4607 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &sksec
->peer_sid
);
4610 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid
)
4612 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
4615 __tsec
= current_security();
4618 return avc_has_perm(tsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
4621 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4623 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount
);
4626 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4628 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount
);
4631 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock
*req
,
4634 fl
->flowi_secid
= req
->secid
;
4637 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security
)
4639 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
;
4641 tunsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec
), GFP_KERNEL
);
4644 tunsec
->sid
= current_sid();
4650 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security
)
4655 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4657 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4659 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4660 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4661 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4662 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4663 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4664 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4666 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE
,
4670 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security
)
4672 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
4674 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4675 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE
, NULL
);
4678 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock
*sk
, void *security
)
4680 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
4681 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4683 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4684 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4685 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4686 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4687 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4688 * protocols were being used */
4690 sksec
->sid
= tunsec
->sid
;
4691 sksec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
;
4696 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security
)
4698 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
4699 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4702 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, tunsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4703 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
4706 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4707 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
4715 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4719 struct nlmsghdr
*nlh
;
4720 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4722 if (skb
->len
< NLMSG_HDRLEN
) {
4726 nlh
= nlmsg_hdr(skb
);
4728 err
= selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec
->sclass
, nlh
->nlmsg_type
, &perm
);
4730 if (err
== -EINVAL
) {
4732 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:"
4733 " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s\n",
4734 sk
->sk_protocol
, nlh
->nlmsg_type
,
4735 secclass_map
[sksec
->sclass
- 1].name
);
4736 if (!selinux_enforcing
|| security_get_allow_unknown())
4746 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, perm
);
4751 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4753 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4754 const struct net_device
*indev
,
4760 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4761 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4766 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4769 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4770 netlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled();
4771 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4772 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4775 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
) != 0)
4778 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4780 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= indev
->ifindex
;
4781 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4782 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
) != 0)
4785 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4786 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev
), indev
->ifindex
,
4787 addrp
, family
, peer_sid
, &ad
);
4789 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 1);
4795 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4796 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__FORWARD_IN
, &ad
))
4800 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4801 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4802 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4804 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, peer_sid
) != 0)
4810 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops
*ops
,
4811 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4812 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
4814 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, state
->in
, PF_INET
);
4817 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4818 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops
*ops
,
4819 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4820 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
4822 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, state
->in
, PF_INET6
);
4826 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4832 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4835 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4836 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4837 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4840 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4842 if (sk
->sk_state
== TCP_LISTEN
)
4843 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
4844 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
4845 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
4846 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
4847 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
4848 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
4849 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
4850 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
4851 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
4852 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
4853 * security label in the packet itself this is the
4854 * best we can do. */
4857 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
4858 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4861 sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4862 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, sid
) != 0)
4868 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(const struct nf_hook_ops
*ops
,
4869 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4870 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
4872 return selinux_ip_output(skb
, PF_INET
);
4875 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4879 struct sock
*sk
= skb
->sk
;
4880 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4881 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4882 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4888 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4890 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4892 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
4893 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4894 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, &proto
))
4897 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4898 if (avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4899 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__SEND
, &ad
))
4900 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4902 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
, proto
))
4903 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4908 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4909 const struct net_device
*outdev
,
4914 int ifindex
= outdev
->ifindex
;
4916 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4917 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4922 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4923 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4924 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4925 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4926 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4927 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb
, ifindex
, family
);
4929 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4930 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4931 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4937 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4938 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4939 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4940 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4941 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4942 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
4943 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
4944 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
4945 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
4946 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
4948 if (skb_dst(skb
) != NULL
&& skb_dst(skb
)->xfrm
!= NULL
&&
4949 !(sk
!= NULL
&& sk
->sk_state
== TCP_LISTEN
))
4954 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
4955 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
4956 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
4957 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
4959 secmark_perm
= PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
;
4960 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
))
4963 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4964 peer_sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4966 } else if (sk
->sk_state
== TCP_LISTEN
) {
4967 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
4968 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
4969 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
4970 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
4971 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
4972 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
4973 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
4974 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
4975 * for similar problems. */
4977 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4978 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &skb_sid
))
4980 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
4981 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
4982 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
4983 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
4984 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
4985 * pass the packet. */
4986 if (skb_sid
== SECSID_NULL
) {
4989 if (IPCB(skb
)->flags
& IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED
)
4993 if (IP6CB(skb
)->flags
& IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED
)
4997 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5000 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec
->sid
, skb_sid
, &peer_sid
))
5002 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
5004 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5005 * associated socket. */
5006 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5007 peer_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
5008 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
5011 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
5013 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
5014 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
5015 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, NULL
))
5019 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
5020 SECCLASS_PACKET
, secmark_perm
, &ad
))
5021 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5023 if (peerlbl_active
) {
5027 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev
), ifindex
, &if_sid
))
5029 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
5030 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__EGRESS
, &ad
))
5031 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5033 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
))
5035 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
5036 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__SENDTO
, &ad
))
5037 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5043 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops
*ops
,
5044 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5045 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
5047 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, state
->out
, PF_INET
);
5050 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5051 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops
*ops
,
5052 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5053 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
5055 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, state
->out
, PF_INET6
);
5059 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5061 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
5063 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk
, skb
);
5066 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct
*task
,
5067 struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
,
5070 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5073 isec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5077 sid
= task_sid(task
);
5078 isec
->sclass
= sclass
;
5080 perm
->security
= isec
;
5085 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
)
5087 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= perm
->security
;
5088 perm
->security
= NULL
;
5092 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5094 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
5096 msec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5100 msec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
5101 msg
->security
= msec
;
5106 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5108 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
= msg
->security
;
5110 msg
->security
= NULL
;
5114 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipc_perms
,
5117 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5118 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5119 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5121 isec
= ipc_perms
->security
;
5123 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5124 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= ipc_perms
->key
;
5126 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
5129 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5131 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg
);
5134 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5136 msg_msg_free_security(msg
);
5139 /* message queue security operations */
5140 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
5142 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5143 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5144 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5147 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &msq
->q_perm
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
);
5151 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5153 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5154 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5156 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5159 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
5165 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
5167 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
5170 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int msqflg
)
5172 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5173 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5174 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5176 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5178 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5179 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5181 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5182 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5185 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int cmd
)
5193 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5194 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5197 perms
= MSGQ__GETATTR
| MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
;
5200 perms
= MSGQ__SETATTR
;
5203 perms
= MSGQ__DESTROY
;
5209 err
= ipc_has_perm(&msq
->q_perm
, perms
);
5213 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
, int msqflg
)
5215 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5216 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
5217 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5218 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5221 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5222 msec
= msg
->security
;
5225 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5227 if (msec
->sid
== SECINITSID_UNLABELED
) {
5229 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5230 * message queue this message will be stored in
5232 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
5238 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5239 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5241 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5242 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5245 /* Can this process send the message */
5246 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
5249 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5250 rc
= avc_has_perm(msec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5251 MSGQ__ENQUEUE
, &ad
);
5256 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
,
5257 struct task_struct
*target
,
5258 long type
, int mode
)
5260 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5261 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
5262 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5263 u32 sid
= task_sid(target
);
5266 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5267 msec
= msg
->security
;
5269 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5270 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5272 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
5273 SECCLASS_MSGQ
, MSGQ__READ
, &ad
);
5275 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
,
5276 SECCLASS_MSG
, MSG__RECEIVE
, &ad
);
5280 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5281 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
5283 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5284 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5285 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5288 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &shp
->shm_perm
, SECCLASS_SHM
);
5292 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
5294 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5295 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
5297 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
5300 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
5306 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
5308 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
5311 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int shmflg
)
5313 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5314 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5315 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5317 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
5319 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5320 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
5322 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
5323 SHM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5326 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5327 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int cmd
)
5335 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5336 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5339 perms
= SHM__GETATTR
| SHM__ASSOCIATE
;
5342 perms
= SHM__SETATTR
;
5349 perms
= SHM__DESTROY
;
5355 err
= ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5359 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
,
5360 char __user
*shmaddr
, int shmflg
)
5364 if (shmflg
& SHM_RDONLY
)
5367 perms
= SHM__READ
| SHM__WRITE
;
5369 return ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5372 /* Semaphore security operations */
5373 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5375 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5376 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5377 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5380 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &sma
->sem_perm
, SECCLASS_SEM
);
5384 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5386 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5387 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5389 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5392 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5398 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5400 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5403 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array
*sma
, int semflg
)
5405 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5406 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5407 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5409 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5411 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5412 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5414 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5415 SEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5418 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5419 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array
*sma
, int cmd
)
5427 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5428 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5432 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
;
5443 perms
= SEM__DESTROY
;
5446 perms
= SEM__SETATTR
;
5450 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
| SEM__ASSOCIATE
;
5456 err
= ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5460 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array
*sma
,
5461 struct sembuf
*sops
, unsigned nsops
, int alter
)
5466 perms
= SEM__READ
| SEM__WRITE
;
5470 return ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5473 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, short flag
)
5479 av
|= IPC__UNIX_READ
;
5481 av
|= IPC__UNIX_WRITE
;
5486 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp
, av
);
5489 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, u32
*secid
)
5491 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= ipcp
->security
;
5495 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct inode
*inode
)
5498 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, dentry
);
5501 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5502 char *name
, char **value
)
5504 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
5510 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETATTR
);
5516 __tsec
= __task_cred(p
)->security
;
5518 if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5520 else if (!strcmp(name
, "prev"))
5522 else if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5523 sid
= __tsec
->exec_sid
;
5524 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5525 sid
= __tsec
->create_sid
;
5526 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5527 sid
= __tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5528 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5529 sid
= __tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
5537 error
= security_sid_to_context(sid
, value
, &len
);
5547 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5548 char *name
, void *value
, size_t size
)
5550 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5551 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
5558 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5559 security attributes. */
5564 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5565 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5566 * above restriction is ever removed.
5568 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5569 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETEXEC
);
5570 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5571 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE
);
5572 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5573 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE
);
5574 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5575 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE
);
5576 else if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5577 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETCURRENT
);
5583 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5584 if (size
&& str
[1] && str
[1] != '\n') {
5585 if (str
[size
-1] == '\n') {
5589 error
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &sid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
5590 if (error
== -EINVAL
&& !strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5591 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
)) {
5592 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
5595 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5596 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5597 if (str
[size
- 1] == '\0')
5598 audit_size
= size
- 1;
5601 ab
= audit_log_start(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
);
5602 audit_log_format(ab
, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5603 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, value
, audit_size
);
5608 error
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
,
5615 new = prepare_creds();
5619 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5620 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5621 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5622 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5623 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5624 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5625 tsec
= new->security
;
5626 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec")) {
5627 tsec
->exec_sid
= sid
;
5628 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5629 tsec
->create_sid
= sid
;
5630 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate")) {
5631 error
= may_create_key(sid
, p
);
5634 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= sid
;
5635 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate")) {
5636 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= sid
;
5637 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "current")) {
5642 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5644 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5645 error
= security_bounded_transition(tsec
->sid
, sid
);
5650 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5651 error
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5652 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION
, NULL
);
5656 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5657 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5660 tracer
= ptrace_parent(p
);
5662 ptsid
= task_sid(tracer
);
5666 error
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5667 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
5686 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name
)
5688 return (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
) == 0);
5691 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid
, char **secdata
, u32
*seclen
)
5693 return security_sid_to_context(secid
, secdata
, seclen
);
5696 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata
, u32 seclen
, u32
*secid
)
5698 return security_context_to_sid(secdata
, seclen
, secid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
5701 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata
, u32 seclen
)
5707 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5709 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5711 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5715 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5717 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry
*dentry
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5719 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5722 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void **ctx
, u32
*ctxlen
)
5725 len
= selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
,
5734 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key
*k
, const struct cred
*cred
,
5735 unsigned long flags
)
5737 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5738 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5740 ksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5744 tsec
= cred
->security
;
5745 if (tsec
->keycreate_sid
)
5746 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5748 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->sid
;
5754 static void selinux_key_free(struct key
*k
)
5756 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= k
->security
;
5762 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref
,
5763 const struct cred
*cred
,
5767 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5770 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5771 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5772 appear to be created. */
5776 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
5778 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
5779 ksec
= key
->security
;
5781 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksec
->sid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, perm
, NULL
);
5784 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key
*key
, char **_buffer
)
5786 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= key
->security
;
5787 char *context
= NULL
;
5791 rc
= security_sid_to_context(ksec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
5800 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks
[] = {
5801 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr
, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr
),
5802 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction
, selinux_binder_transaction
),
5803 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder
, selinux_binder_transfer_binder
),
5804 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file
, selinux_binder_transfer_file
),
5806 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check
, selinux_ptrace_access_check
),
5807 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme
, selinux_ptrace_traceme
),
5808 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget
, selinux_capget
),
5809 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset
, selinux_capset
),
5810 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable
, selinux_capable
),
5811 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl
, selinux_quotactl
),
5812 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on
, selinux_quota_on
),
5813 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog
, selinux_syslog
),
5814 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory
, selinux_vm_enough_memory
),
5816 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send
, selinux_netlink_send
),
5818 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds
, selinux_bprm_set_creds
),
5819 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds
, selinux_bprm_committing_creds
),
5820 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds
, selinux_bprm_committed_creds
),
5821 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec
, selinux_bprm_secureexec
),
5823 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security
, selinux_sb_alloc_security
),
5824 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security
, selinux_sb_free_security
),
5825 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data
, selinux_sb_copy_data
),
5826 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount
, selinux_sb_remount
),
5827 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount
, selinux_sb_kern_mount
),
5828 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options
, selinux_sb_show_options
),
5829 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs
, selinux_sb_statfs
),
5830 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount
, selinux_mount
),
5831 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount
, selinux_umount
),
5832 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts
, selinux_set_mnt_opts
),
5833 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts
, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts
),
5834 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str
, selinux_parse_opts_str
),
5836 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security
, selinux_dentry_init_security
),
5838 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security
, selinux_inode_alloc_security
),
5839 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security
, selinux_inode_free_security
),
5840 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security
, selinux_inode_init_security
),
5841 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create
, selinux_inode_create
),
5842 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link
, selinux_inode_link
),
5843 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink
, selinux_inode_unlink
),
5844 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink
, selinux_inode_symlink
),
5845 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir
, selinux_inode_mkdir
),
5846 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir
, selinux_inode_rmdir
),
5847 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod
, selinux_inode_mknod
),
5848 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename
, selinux_inode_rename
),
5849 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink
, selinux_inode_readlink
),
5850 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link
, selinux_inode_follow_link
),
5851 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission
, selinux_inode_permission
),
5852 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr
, selinux_inode_setattr
),
5853 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr
, selinux_inode_getattr
),
5854 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr
, selinux_inode_setxattr
),
5855 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr
, selinux_inode_post_setxattr
),
5856 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr
, selinux_inode_getxattr
),
5857 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr
, selinux_inode_listxattr
),
5858 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr
, selinux_inode_removexattr
),
5859 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity
, selinux_inode_getsecurity
),
5860 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity
, selinux_inode_setsecurity
),
5861 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity
, selinux_inode_listsecurity
),
5862 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid
, selinux_inode_getsecid
),
5864 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission
, selinux_file_permission
),
5865 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security
, selinux_file_alloc_security
),
5866 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security
, selinux_file_free_security
),
5867 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl
, selinux_file_ioctl
),
5868 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file
, selinux_mmap_file
),
5869 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr
, selinux_mmap_addr
),
5870 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect
, selinux_file_mprotect
),
5871 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock
, selinux_file_lock
),
5872 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl
, selinux_file_fcntl
),
5873 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner
, selinux_file_set_fowner
),
5874 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask
, selinux_file_send_sigiotask
),
5875 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive
, selinux_file_receive
),
5877 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open
, selinux_file_open
),
5879 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_create
, selinux_task_create
),
5880 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank
, selinux_cred_alloc_blank
),
5881 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free
, selinux_cred_free
),
5882 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare
, selinux_cred_prepare
),
5883 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer
, selinux_cred_transfer
),
5884 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as
, selinux_kernel_act_as
),
5885 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as
, selinux_kernel_create_files_as
),
5886 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request
, selinux_kernel_module_request
),
5887 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid
, selinux_task_setpgid
),
5888 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid
, selinux_task_getpgid
),
5889 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid
, selinux_task_getsid
),
5890 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid
, selinux_task_getsecid
),
5891 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice
, selinux_task_setnice
),
5892 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio
, selinux_task_setioprio
),
5893 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio
, selinux_task_getioprio
),
5894 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit
, selinux_task_setrlimit
),
5895 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler
, selinux_task_setscheduler
),
5896 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler
, selinux_task_getscheduler
),
5897 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory
, selinux_task_movememory
),
5898 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill
, selinux_task_kill
),
5899 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait
, selinux_task_wait
),
5900 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode
, selinux_task_to_inode
),
5902 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission
, selinux_ipc_permission
),
5903 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid
, selinux_ipc_getsecid
),
5905 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security
, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security
),
5906 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security
, selinux_msg_msg_free_security
),
5908 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security
,
5909 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security
),
5910 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security
, selinux_msg_queue_free_security
),
5911 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate
, selinux_msg_queue_associate
),
5912 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl
, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl
),
5913 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd
, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd
),
5914 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv
, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv
),
5916 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security
, selinux_shm_alloc_security
),
5917 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security
, selinux_shm_free_security
),
5918 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate
, selinux_shm_associate
),
5919 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl
, selinux_shm_shmctl
),
5920 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat
, selinux_shm_shmat
),
5922 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security
, selinux_sem_alloc_security
),
5923 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security
, selinux_sem_free_security
),
5924 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate
, selinux_sem_associate
),
5925 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl
, selinux_sem_semctl
),
5926 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop
, selinux_sem_semop
),
5928 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate
, selinux_d_instantiate
),
5930 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr
, selinux_getprocattr
),
5931 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr
, selinux_setprocattr
),
5933 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel
, selinux_ismaclabel
),
5934 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx
, selinux_secid_to_secctx
),
5935 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid
, selinux_secctx_to_secid
),
5936 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx
, selinux_release_secctx
),
5937 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx
, selinux_inode_notifysecctx
),
5938 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx
, selinux_inode_setsecctx
),
5939 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx
, selinux_inode_getsecctx
),
5941 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect
, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect
),
5942 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send
, selinux_socket_unix_may_send
),
5944 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create
, selinux_socket_create
),
5945 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create
, selinux_socket_post_create
),
5946 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind
, selinux_socket_bind
),
5947 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect
, selinux_socket_connect
),
5948 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen
, selinux_socket_listen
),
5949 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept
, selinux_socket_accept
),
5950 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg
, selinux_socket_sendmsg
),
5951 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg
, selinux_socket_recvmsg
),
5952 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname
, selinux_socket_getsockname
),
5953 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername
, selinux_socket_getpeername
),
5954 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt
, selinux_socket_getsockopt
),
5955 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt
, selinux_socket_setsockopt
),
5956 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown
, selinux_socket_shutdown
),
5957 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb
, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb
),
5958 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream
,
5959 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream
),
5960 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram
, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram
),
5961 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security
, selinux_sk_alloc_security
),
5962 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security
, selinux_sk_free_security
),
5963 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security
, selinux_sk_clone_security
),
5964 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid
, selinux_sk_getsecid
),
5965 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft
, selinux_sock_graft
),
5966 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request
, selinux_inet_conn_request
),
5967 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone
, selinux_inet_csk_clone
),
5968 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established
, selinux_inet_conn_established
),
5969 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet
, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet
),
5970 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc
, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc
),
5971 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec
, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec
),
5972 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow
, selinux_req_classify_flow
),
5973 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security
, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security
),
5974 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security
, selinux_tun_dev_free_security
),
5975 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create
, selinux_tun_dev_create
),
5976 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue
, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue
),
5977 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach
, selinux_tun_dev_attach
),
5978 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open
, selinux_tun_dev_open
),
5980 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5981 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc
),
5982 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone
),
5983 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_free
),
5984 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete
),
5985 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc
, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc
),
5986 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire
,
5987 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire
),
5988 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security
, selinux_xfrm_state_free
),
5989 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security
, selinux_xfrm_state_delete
),
5990 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup
, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup
),
5991 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
,
5992 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
),
5993 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session
, selinux_xfrm_decode_session
),
5997 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc
, selinux_key_alloc
),
5998 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free
, selinux_key_free
),
5999 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission
, selinux_key_permission
),
6000 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity
, selinux_key_getsecurity
),
6004 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init
, selinux_audit_rule_init
),
6005 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known
, selinux_audit_rule_known
),
6006 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match
, selinux_audit_rule_match
),
6007 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free
, selinux_audit_rule_free
),
6011 static __init
int selinux_init(void)
6013 if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) {
6014 selinux_enabled
= 0;
6018 if (!selinux_enabled
) {
6019 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
6023 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Initializing.\n");
6025 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
6026 cred_init_security();
6028 default_noexec
= !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS
& VM_EXEC
);
6030 sel_inode_cache
= kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
6031 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct
),
6032 0, SLAB_PANIC
, NULL
);
6035 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks
));
6037 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback
, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET
))
6038 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
6040 if (selinux_enforcing
)
6041 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
6043 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
6048 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block
*sb
, void *unused
)
6050 superblock_doinit(sb
, NULL
);
6053 void selinux_complete_init(void)
6055 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
6057 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
6058 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
6059 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init
, NULL
);
6062 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
6063 all processes and objects when they are created. */
6064 security_initcall(selinux_init
);
6066 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
6068 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops
[] = {
6070 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_postroute
,
6071 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
6073 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
6074 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
6077 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_forward
,
6078 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
6080 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
6081 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
6084 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_output
,
6085 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
6087 .hooknum
= NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT
,
6088 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
6090 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
6092 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_postroute
,
6093 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
6095 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
6096 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
6099 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_forward
,
6100 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
6102 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
6103 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
6108 static int __init
selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
6112 if (!selinux_enabled
)
6115 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
6117 err
= nf_register_hooks(selinux_nf_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops
));
6119 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err
);
6124 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init
);
6126 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6127 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
6129 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
6131 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_nf_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops
));
6135 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6137 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6138 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
6141 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6143 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6144 static int selinux_disabled
;
6146 int selinux_disable(void)
6148 if (ss_initialized
) {
6149 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
6153 if (selinux_disabled
) {
6154 /* Only do this once. */
6158 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
6160 selinux_disabled
= 1;
6161 selinux_enabled
= 0;
6163 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks
));
6165 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
6168 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
6169 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
6171 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */