2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/security.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
55 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
57 #include <net/netlabel.h>
58 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
59 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
60 #include <linux/atomic.h>
61 #include <linux/bitops.h>
62 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
63 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
64 #include <net/netlink.h>
65 #include <linux/tcp.h>
66 #include <linux/udp.h>
67 #include <linux/dccp.h>
68 #include <linux/quota.h>
69 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71 #include <linux/parser.h>
72 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
74 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
75 #include <linux/personality.h>
76 #include <linux/audit.h>
77 #include <linux/string.h>
78 #include <linux/selinux.h>
79 #include <linux/mutex.h>
80 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
81 #include <linux/syslog.h>
82 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
83 #include <linux/export.h>
84 #include <linux/security.h>
85 #include <linux/msg.h>
86 #include <linux/shm.h>
98 extern struct security_operations
*security_ops
;
100 /* SECMARK reference count */
101 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount
= ATOMIC_INIT(0);
103 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
104 int selinux_enforcing
;
106 static int __init
enforcing_setup(char *str
)
108 unsigned long enforcing
;
109 if (!strict_strtoul(str
, 0, &enforcing
))
110 selinux_enforcing
= enforcing
? 1 : 0;
113 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup
);
116 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
117 int selinux_enabled
= CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
;
119 static int __init
selinux_enabled_setup(char *str
)
121 unsigned long enabled
;
122 if (!strict_strtoul(str
, 0, &enabled
))
123 selinux_enabled
= enabled
? 1 : 0;
126 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup
);
128 int selinux_enabled
= 1;
131 static struct kmem_cache
*sel_inode_cache
;
134 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
137 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
138 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
139 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
140 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
141 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
144 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
146 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork
|| atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount
));
150 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
153 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
154 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
155 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
156 * is always considered enabled.
159 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
161 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork
|| netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
165 * initialise the security for the init task
167 static void cred_init_security(void)
169 struct cred
*cred
= (struct cred
*) current
->real_cred
;
170 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
172 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
174 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
176 tsec
->osid
= tsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
177 cred
->security
= tsec
;
181 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
183 static inline u32
cred_sid(const struct cred
*cred
)
185 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
187 tsec
= cred
->security
;
192 * get the objective security ID of a task
194 static inline u32
task_sid(const struct task_struct
*task
)
199 sid
= cred_sid(__task_cred(task
));
205 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
207 static inline u32
current_sid(void)
209 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
214 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
216 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
218 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
219 u32 sid
= current_sid();
221 isec
= kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache
, GFP_NOFS
);
225 mutex_init(&isec
->lock
);
226 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec
->list
);
228 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
229 isec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_FILE
;
230 isec
->task_sid
= sid
;
231 inode
->i_security
= isec
;
236 static void inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
238 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
239 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
241 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
242 if (!list_empty(&isec
->list
))
243 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
244 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
246 inode
->i_security
= NULL
;
247 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache
, isec
);
250 static int file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
252 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
253 u32 sid
= current_sid();
255 fsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
260 fsec
->fown_sid
= sid
;
261 file
->f_security
= fsec
;
266 static void file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
268 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
269 file
->f_security
= NULL
;
273 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
275 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
277 sbsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
281 mutex_init(&sbsec
->lock
);
282 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec
->isec_head
);
283 spin_lock_init(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
285 sbsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
286 sbsec
->def_sid
= SECINITSID_FILE
;
287 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
288 sb
->s_security
= sbsec
;
293 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
295 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
296 sb
->s_security
= NULL
;
300 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
302 static const char *labeling_behaviors
[7] = {
304 "uses transition SIDs",
306 "uses genfs_contexts",
307 "not configured for labeling",
308 "uses mountpoint labeling",
309 "uses native labeling",
312 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
);
314 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode
*inode
)
316 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, NULL
);
325 Opt_labelsupport
= 5,
329 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
331 static const match_table_t tokens
= {
332 {Opt_context
, CONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
333 {Opt_fscontext
, FSCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
334 {Opt_defcontext
, DEFCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
335 {Opt_rootcontext
, ROOTCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
336 {Opt_labelsupport
, LABELSUPP_STR
},
340 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
342 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid
,
343 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
344 const struct cred
*cred
)
346 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
349 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
350 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
354 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
355 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
359 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid
,
360 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
361 const struct cred
*cred
)
363 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
365 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
366 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
370 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
371 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, NULL
);
375 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block
*sb
)
377 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
379 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
||
380 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS
||
381 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK
)
384 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
385 if (strncmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
389 * Special handling for rootfs. Is genfs but supports
390 * setting SELinux context on in-core inodes.
392 if (strncmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "rootfs", sizeof("rootfs")) == 0)
398 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block
*sb
)
400 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
401 struct dentry
*root
= sb
->s_root
;
402 struct inode
*root_inode
= root
->d_inode
;
405 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
) {
406 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
407 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
408 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
409 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
410 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
411 if (!root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
412 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
413 "xattr support\n", sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
417 rc
= root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr(root
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, NULL
, 0);
418 if (rc
< 0 && rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
419 if (rc
== -EOPNOTSUPP
)
420 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
421 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
422 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
424 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
425 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb
->s_id
,
426 sb
->s_type
->name
, -rc
);
431 if (sbsec
->behavior
> ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors
))
432 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
433 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
435 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
436 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
,
437 labeling_behaviors
[sbsec
->behavior
-1]);
439 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBINITIALIZED
;
440 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb
))
441 sbsec
->flags
|= SBLABEL_MNT
;
443 /* Initialize the root inode. */
444 rc
= inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode
, root
);
446 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
447 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
448 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
450 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
452 if (!list_empty(&sbsec
->isec_head
)) {
453 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
=
454 list_entry(sbsec
->isec_head
.next
,
455 struct inode_security_struct
, list
);
456 struct inode
*inode
= isec
->inode
;
457 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
458 inode
= igrab(inode
);
460 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode
))
464 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
465 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
468 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
474 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
475 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
476 * mount options, or whatever.
478 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*sb
,
479 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
482 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
483 char *context
= NULL
;
487 security_init_mnt_opts(opts
);
489 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
495 /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
496 BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK
>= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
));
498 tmp
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
499 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
500 for (i
= 0; i
< NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
; i
++) {
502 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
505 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
506 if (sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
)
507 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
509 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
510 if (!opts
->mnt_opts
) {
515 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
516 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
522 if (sbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) {
523 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
526 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
527 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
529 if (sbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) {
530 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, &context
, &len
);
533 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
534 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
536 if (sbsec
->flags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) {
537 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->def_sid
, &context
, &len
);
540 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
541 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
543 if (sbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
544 struct inode
*root
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
545 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= root
->i_security
;
547 rc
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
550 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
551 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
553 if (sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
) {
554 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = NULL
;
555 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = SBLABEL_MNT
;
558 BUG_ON(i
!= opts
->num_mnt_opts
);
563 security_free_mnt_opts(opts
);
567 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
, char flag
,
568 u32 old_sid
, u32 new_sid
)
570 char mnt_flags
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
572 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
573 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
574 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& flag
) ||
575 (old_sid
!= new_sid
))
578 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
579 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
581 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
582 if (mnt_flags
& flag
)
588 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
589 * labeling information.
591 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block
*sb
,
592 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
,
593 unsigned long kern_flags
,
594 unsigned long *set_kern_flags
)
596 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
598 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
599 const char *name
= sb
->s_type
->name
;
600 struct inode
*inode
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
601 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
= inode
->i_security
;
602 u32 fscontext_sid
= 0, context_sid
= 0, rootcontext_sid
= 0;
603 u32 defcontext_sid
= 0;
604 char **mount_options
= opts
->mnt_opts
;
605 int *flags
= opts
->mnt_opts_flags
;
606 int num_opts
= opts
->num_mnt_opts
;
608 mutex_lock(&sbsec
->lock
);
610 if (!ss_initialized
) {
612 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
613 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
614 server is ready to handle calls. */
618 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
619 "before the security server is initialized\n");
622 if (kern_flags
&& !set_kern_flags
) {
623 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
624 * place the results is not allowed */
630 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
631 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
632 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
633 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
635 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
636 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
637 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
638 * will be used for both mounts)
640 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) && (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
645 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
646 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
647 * than once with different security options.
649 for (i
= 0; i
< num_opts
; i
++) {
652 if (flags
[i
] == SBLABEL_MNT
)
654 rc
= security_context_to_sid(mount_options
[i
],
655 strlen(mount_options
[i
]), &sid
);
657 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
658 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
659 mount_options
[i
], sb
->s_id
, name
, rc
);
666 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
,
668 goto out_double_mount
;
670 sbsec
->flags
|= FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
675 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
,
677 goto out_double_mount
;
679 sbsec
->flags
|= CONTEXT_MNT
;
681 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
682 rootcontext_sid
= sid
;
684 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
,
686 goto out_double_mount
;
688 sbsec
->flags
|= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
692 defcontext_sid
= sid
;
694 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
,
696 goto out_double_mount
;
698 sbsec
->flags
|= DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
707 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
708 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
709 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
) && !num_opts
)
710 goto out_double_mount
;
715 if (strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "proc") == 0)
716 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBPROC
;
718 if (!sbsec
->behavior
) {
720 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
723 rc
= security_fs_use(sb
);
726 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
727 __func__
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
731 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
733 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid
, sbsec
, cred
);
737 sbsec
->sid
= fscontext_sid
;
741 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
742 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
743 * the superblock context if not already set.
745 if (kern_flags
& SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
&& !context_sid
) {
746 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
;
747 *set_kern_flags
|= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
;
751 if (!fscontext_sid
) {
752 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
756 sbsec
->sid
= context_sid
;
758 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
763 if (!rootcontext_sid
)
764 rootcontext_sid
= context_sid
;
766 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= context_sid
;
767 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
;
770 if (rootcontext_sid
) {
771 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid
, sbsec
,
776 root_isec
->sid
= rootcontext_sid
;
777 root_isec
->initialized
= 1;
780 if (defcontext_sid
) {
781 if (sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
&&
782 sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
) {
784 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: defcontext option is "
785 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
789 if (defcontext_sid
!= sbsec
->def_sid
) {
790 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid
,
796 sbsec
->def_sid
= defcontext_sid
;
799 rc
= sb_finish_set_opts(sb
);
801 mutex_unlock(&sbsec
->lock
);
805 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
806 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb
->s_id
, name
);
810 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
811 const struct super_block
*newsb
)
813 struct superblock_security_struct
*old
= oldsb
->s_security
;
814 struct superblock_security_struct
*new = newsb
->s_security
;
815 char oldflags
= old
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
816 char newflags
= new->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
818 if (oldflags
!= newflags
)
820 if ((oldflags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->sid
!= new->sid
)
822 if ((oldflags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->mntpoint_sid
!= new->mntpoint_sid
)
824 if ((oldflags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->def_sid
!= new->def_sid
)
826 if (oldflags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
827 struct inode_security_struct
*oldroot
= oldsb
->s_root
->d_inode
->i_security
;
828 struct inode_security_struct
*newroot
= newsb
->s_root
->d_inode
->i_security
;
829 if (oldroot
->sid
!= newroot
->sid
)
834 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
835 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
836 "type %s)\n", newsb
->s_id
, newsb
->s_type
->name
);
840 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
841 struct super_block
*newsb
)
843 const struct superblock_security_struct
*oldsbsec
= oldsb
->s_security
;
844 struct superblock_security_struct
*newsbsec
= newsb
->s_security
;
846 int set_fscontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
);
847 int set_context
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
);
848 int set_rootcontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
);
851 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
852 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
857 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
858 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
));
860 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
861 if (newsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
862 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb
, newsb
);
864 mutex_lock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
866 newsbsec
->flags
= oldsbsec
->flags
;
868 newsbsec
->sid
= oldsbsec
->sid
;
869 newsbsec
->def_sid
= oldsbsec
->def_sid
;
870 newsbsec
->behavior
= oldsbsec
->behavior
;
873 u32 sid
= oldsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
877 if (!set_rootcontext
) {
878 struct inode
*newinode
= newsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
879 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= newinode
->i_security
;
882 newsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= sid
;
884 if (set_rootcontext
) {
885 const struct inode
*oldinode
= oldsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
886 const struct inode_security_struct
*oldisec
= oldinode
->i_security
;
887 struct inode
*newinode
= newsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
888 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= newinode
->i_security
;
890 newisec
->sid
= oldisec
->sid
;
893 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb
);
894 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
898 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options
,
899 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
902 char *context
= NULL
, *defcontext
= NULL
;
903 char *fscontext
= NULL
, *rootcontext
= NULL
;
904 int rc
, num_mnt_opts
= 0;
906 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= 0;
908 /* Standard string-based options. */
909 while ((p
= strsep(&options
, "|")) != NULL
) {
911 substring_t args
[MAX_OPT_ARGS
];
916 token
= match_token(p
, tokens
, args
);
920 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
922 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
925 context
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
935 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
938 fscontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
945 case Opt_rootcontext
:
948 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
951 rootcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
959 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
961 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
964 defcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
970 case Opt_labelsupport
:
974 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
981 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
985 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
986 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
987 kfree(opts
->mnt_opts
);
992 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = fscontext
;
993 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
996 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = context
;
997 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
1000 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = rootcontext
;
1001 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
1004 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = defcontext
;
1005 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
1008 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= num_mnt_opts
;
1019 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1021 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
1024 char *options
= data
;
1025 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
1027 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1032 BUG_ON(sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
);
1034 rc
= selinux_parse_opts_str(options
, &opts
);
1039 rc
= selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
, 0, NULL
);
1042 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1046 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file
*m
,
1047 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
1052 for (i
= 0; i
< opts
->num_mnt_opts
; i
++) {
1055 if (opts
->mnt_opts
[i
])
1056 has_comma
= strchr(opts
->mnt_opts
[i
], ',');
1060 switch (opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
]) {
1062 prefix
= CONTEXT_STR
;
1065 prefix
= FSCONTEXT_STR
;
1067 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
1068 prefix
= ROOTCONTEXT_STR
;
1070 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT
:
1071 prefix
= DEFCONTEXT_STR
;
1075 seq_puts(m
, LABELSUPP_STR
);
1081 /* we need a comma before each option */
1083 seq_puts(m
, prefix
);
1086 seq_puts(m
, opts
->mnt_opts
[i
]);
1092 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file
*m
, struct super_block
*sb
)
1094 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
1097 rc
= selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
);
1099 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1105 selinux_write_opts(m
, &opts
);
1107 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1112 static inline u16
inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode
)
1114 switch (mode
& S_IFMT
) {
1116 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE
;
1118 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
;
1120 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1122 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE
;
1124 return SECCLASS_DIR
;
1126 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE
;
1128 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE
;
1132 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1135 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol
)
1137 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_TCP
);
1140 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol
)
1142 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_UDP
);
1145 static inline u16
socket_type_to_security_class(int family
, int type
, int protocol
)
1151 case SOCK_SEQPACKET
:
1152 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
;
1154 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET
;
1161 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol
))
1162 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
;
1164 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1166 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol
))
1167 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
;
1169 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1171 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
;
1173 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1179 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET
;
1180 case NETLINK_FIREWALL
:
1181 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET
;
1182 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG
:
1183 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET
;
1185 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET
;
1187 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET
;
1188 case NETLINK_SELINUX
:
1189 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET
;
1191 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET
;
1192 case NETLINK_IP6_FW
:
1193 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET
;
1194 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG
:
1195 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET
;
1196 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT
:
1197 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET
;
1199 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET
;
1202 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET
;
1204 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET
;
1206 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET
;
1209 return SECCLASS_SOCKET
;
1212 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1213 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry
*dentry
,
1218 char *buffer
, *path
;
1220 buffer
= (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
1224 path
= dentry_path_raw(dentry
, buffer
, PAGE_SIZE
);
1228 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1229 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1230 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1231 while (path
[1] >= '0' && path
[1] <= '9') {
1235 rc
= security_genfs_sid("proc", path
, tclass
, sid
);
1237 free_page((unsigned long)buffer
);
1241 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry
*dentry
,
1249 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1250 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
)
1252 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= NULL
;
1253 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1255 struct dentry
*dentry
;
1256 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1257 char *context
= NULL
;
1261 if (isec
->initialized
)
1264 mutex_lock(&isec
->lock
);
1265 if (isec
->initialized
)
1268 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1269 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)) {
1270 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1271 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1272 server is ready to handle calls. */
1273 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1274 if (list_empty(&isec
->list
))
1275 list_add(&isec
->list
, &sbsec
->isec_head
);
1276 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1280 switch (sbsec
->behavior
) {
1281 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
:
1283 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
:
1284 if (!inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
1285 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1289 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1290 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1292 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1293 dentry
= dget(opt_dentry
);
1295 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1296 dentry
= d_find_alias(inode
);
1300 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1301 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1302 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1303 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1304 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1305 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1306 * be used again by userspace.
1311 len
= INITCONTEXTLEN
;
1312 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1318 context
[len
] = '\0';
1319 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1321 if (rc
== -ERANGE
) {
1324 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1325 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1332 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1338 context
[len
] = '\0';
1339 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
,
1345 if (rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
1346 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1347 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__
,
1348 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
1352 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1353 sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1356 rc
= security_context_to_sid_default(context
, rc
, &sid
,
1360 char *dev
= inode
->i_sb
->s_id
;
1361 unsigned long ino
= inode
->i_ino
;
1363 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
1364 if (printk_ratelimit())
1365 printk(KERN_NOTICE
"SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1366 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1367 "filesystem in question.\n", ino
, dev
, context
);
1369 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1370 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1371 __func__
, context
, -rc
, dev
, ino
);
1374 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1382 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK
:
1383 isec
->sid
= isec
->task_sid
;
1385 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS
:
1386 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1387 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1389 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1390 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1391 rc
= security_transition_sid(isec
->task_sid
, sbsec
->sid
,
1392 isec
->sclass
, NULL
, &sid
);
1397 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
:
1398 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
1401 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1402 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1404 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBPROC
) && !S_ISLNK(inode
->i_mode
)) {
1406 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1407 rc
= selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry
,
1418 isec
->initialized
= 1;
1421 mutex_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
1423 if (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_FILE
)
1424 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1428 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1429 static inline u32
signal_to_av(int sig
)
1435 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1436 perm
= PROCESS__SIGCHLD
;
1439 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1440 perm
= PROCESS__SIGKILL
;
1443 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1444 perm
= PROCESS__SIGSTOP
;
1447 /* All other signals. */
1448 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNAL
;
1456 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1457 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1459 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred
*actor
,
1460 const struct cred
*target
,
1463 u32 asid
= cred_sid(actor
), tsid
= cred_sid(target
);
1465 return avc_has_perm(asid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1469 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1470 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1471 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1472 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1474 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk1
,
1475 const struct task_struct
*tsk2
,
1478 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec1
, *__tsec2
;
1482 __tsec1
= __task_cred(tsk1
)->security
; sid1
= __tsec1
->sid
;
1483 __tsec2
= __task_cred(tsk2
)->security
; sid2
= __tsec2
->sid
;
1485 return avc_has_perm(sid1
, sid2
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1489 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1490 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1491 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1492 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1494 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1499 sid
= current_sid();
1500 tsid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1501 return avc_has_perm(sid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1504 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1505 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1508 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1509 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred
*cred
,
1512 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1513 struct av_decision avd
;
1515 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1516 u32 av
= CAP_TO_MASK(cap
);
1519 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP
;
1522 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap
)) {
1524 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY
;
1527 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2
;
1531 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap
);
1536 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, 0, &avd
);
1537 if (audit
== SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
) {
1538 int rc2
= avc_audit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, &avd
, rc
, &ad
);
1545 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1546 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1549 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1551 return avc_has_perm(sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
1552 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, perms
, NULL
);
1555 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1556 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1557 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1558 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1559 struct inode
*inode
,
1561 struct common_audit_data
*adp
)
1563 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
1566 validate_creds(cred
);
1568 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
1571 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1572 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1574 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, adp
);
1577 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1578 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1579 pathname if needed. */
1580 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1581 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1584 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
1585 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1587 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1588 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1589 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1592 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1593 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1594 pathname if needed. */
1595 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1599 struct inode
*inode
= path
->dentry
->d_inode
;
1600 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1602 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1604 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1607 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1608 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1612 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1614 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1615 ad
.u
.path
= file
->f_path
;
1616 return inode_has_perm(cred
, file_inode(file
), av
, &ad
);
1619 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1620 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1621 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1622 check a particular permission to the file.
1623 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1624 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1625 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1626 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1627 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1631 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
1632 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
1633 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1634 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1637 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1638 ad
.u
.path
= file
->f_path
;
1640 if (sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
1641 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, fsec
->sid
,
1649 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1652 rc
= inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1658 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1659 static int may_create(struct inode
*dir
,
1660 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1663 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
1664 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
1665 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1667 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1670 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
1671 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1674 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
1676 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1677 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1679 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1680 DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
,
1685 if (!newsid
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
)) {
1686 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, dsec
->sid
, tclass
,
1687 &dentry
->d_name
, &newsid
);
1692 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, tclass
, FILE__CREATE
, &ad
);
1696 return avc_has_perm(newsid
, sbsec
->sid
,
1697 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
1698 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
1701 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1702 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid
,
1703 struct task_struct
*ctx
)
1705 u32 sid
= task_sid(ctx
);
1707 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, KEY__CREATE
, NULL
);
1711 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1714 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1715 static int may_link(struct inode
*dir
,
1716 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1720 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
, *isec
;
1721 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1722 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1726 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
1727 isec
= dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1729 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1730 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1733 av
|= (kind
? DIR__REMOVE_NAME
: DIR__ADD_NAME
);
1734 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1749 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1754 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, av
, &ad
);
1758 static inline int may_rename(struct inode
*old_dir
,
1759 struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
1760 struct inode
*new_dir
,
1761 struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
1763 struct inode_security_struct
*old_dsec
, *new_dsec
, *old_isec
, *new_isec
;
1764 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1765 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1767 int old_is_dir
, new_is_dir
;
1770 old_dsec
= old_dir
->i_security
;
1771 old_isec
= old_dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1772 old_is_dir
= S_ISDIR(old_dentry
->d_inode
->i_mode
);
1773 new_dsec
= new_dir
->i_security
;
1775 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1777 ad
.u
.dentry
= old_dentry
;
1778 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1779 DIR__REMOVE_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
, &ad
);
1782 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1783 old_isec
->sclass
, FILE__RENAME
, &ad
);
1786 if (old_is_dir
&& new_dir
!= old_dir
) {
1787 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1788 old_isec
->sclass
, DIR__REPARENT
, &ad
);
1793 ad
.u
.dentry
= new_dentry
;
1794 av
= DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
;
1795 if (new_dentry
->d_inode
)
1796 av
|= DIR__REMOVE_NAME
;
1797 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1800 if (new_dentry
->d_inode
) {
1801 new_isec
= new_dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1802 new_is_dir
= S_ISDIR(new_dentry
->d_inode
->i_mode
);
1803 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_isec
->sid
,
1805 (new_is_dir
? DIR__RMDIR
: FILE__UNLINK
), &ad
);
1813 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1814 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1815 struct super_block
*sb
,
1817 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
1819 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1820 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1822 sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
1823 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
, perms
, ad
);
1826 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1827 static inline u32
file_mask_to_av(int mode
, int mask
)
1831 if (!S_ISDIR(mode
)) {
1832 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1833 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
1834 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1837 if (mask
& MAY_APPEND
)
1839 else if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1843 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1845 if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1847 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1854 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1855 static inline u32
file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1859 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_READ
)
1861 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_WRITE
) {
1862 if (file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
)
1869 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1878 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1881 static inline u32
open_file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1883 u32 av
= file_to_av(file
);
1885 if (selinux_policycap_openperm
)
1891 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1893 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct
*child
,
1898 rc
= cap_ptrace_access_check(child
, mode
);
1902 if (mode
& PTRACE_MODE_READ
) {
1903 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1904 u32 csid
= task_sid(child
);
1905 return avc_has_perm(sid
, csid
, SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__READ
, NULL
);
1908 return current_has_perm(child
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
1911 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct
*parent
)
1915 rc
= cap_ptrace_traceme(parent
);
1919 return task_has_perm(parent
, current
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
1922 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct
*target
, kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
1923 kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
, kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
1927 error
= current_has_perm(target
, PROCESS__GETCAP
);
1931 return cap_capget(target
, effective
, inheritable
, permitted
);
1934 static int selinux_capset(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
1935 const kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
1936 const kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
,
1937 const kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
1941 error
= cap_capset(new, old
,
1942 effective
, inheritable
, permitted
);
1946 return cred_has_perm(old
, new, PROCESS__SETCAP
);
1950 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1951 * which was removed).
1953 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1954 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1955 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1956 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1959 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred
*cred
, struct user_namespace
*ns
,
1964 rc
= cap_capable(cred
, ns
, cap
, audit
);
1968 return cred_has_capability(cred
, cap
, audit
);
1971 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds
, int type
, int id
, struct super_block
*sb
)
1973 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
1985 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD
, NULL
);
1990 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET
, NULL
);
1993 rc
= 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1999 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2001 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2003 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__QUOTAON
);
2006 static int selinux_syslog(int type
)
2011 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL
: /* Read last kernel messages */
2012 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER
: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2013 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ
);
2015 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF
: /* Disable logging to console */
2016 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON
: /* Enable logging to console */
2017 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2018 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL
:
2019 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE
);
2021 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE
: /* Close log */
2022 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN
: /* Open log */
2023 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ
: /* Read from log */
2024 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR
: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2025 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR
: /* Clear ring buffer */
2027 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD
);
2034 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2035 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2036 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2038 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2039 * processes that allocate mappings.
2041 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct
*mm
, long pages
)
2043 int rc
, cap_sys_admin
= 0;
2045 rc
= selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns
, CAP_SYS_ADMIN
,
2046 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
2050 return __vm_enough_memory(mm
, pages
, cap_sys_admin
);
2053 /* binprm security operations */
2055 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2057 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
2058 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2059 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2060 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2061 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(bprm
->file
);
2064 rc
= cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm
);
2068 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2069 * the script interpreter */
2070 if (bprm
->cred_prepared
)
2073 old_tsec
= current_security();
2074 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2075 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2077 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2078 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2079 new_tsec
->osid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2081 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2082 new_tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
2083 new_tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
2084 new_tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
2086 if (old_tsec
->exec_sid
) {
2087 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->exec_sid
;
2088 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2089 new_tsec
->exec_sid
= 0;
2092 * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs and a transition is
2093 * explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
2095 if (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS
)
2098 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2099 rc
= security_transition_sid(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2100 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, NULL
,
2106 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
2107 ad
.u
.path
= bprm
->file
->f_path
;
2109 if ((bprm
->file
->f_path
.mnt
->mnt_flags
& MNT_NOSUID
) ||
2110 (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS
))
2111 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2113 if (new_tsec
->sid
== old_tsec
->sid
) {
2114 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2115 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS
, &ad
);
2119 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2120 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2121 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__TRANSITION
, &ad
);
2125 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2126 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__ENTRYPOINT
, &ad
);
2130 /* Check for shared state */
2131 if (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE
) {
2132 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2133 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SHARE
,
2139 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2140 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2142 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE
| LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
)) {
2143 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
2144 struct task_security_struct
*sec
;
2148 tracer
= ptrace_parent(current
);
2149 if (likely(tracer
!= NULL
)) {
2150 sec
= __task_cred(tracer
)->security
;
2156 rc
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2158 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
2164 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2165 bprm
->per_clear
|= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID
;
2171 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2173 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2181 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2182 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2183 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2184 atsecure
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
,
2186 PROCESS__NOATSECURE
, NULL
);
2189 return (atsecure
|| cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm
));
2192 static int match_file(const void *p
, struct file
*file
, unsigned fd
)
2194 return file_has_perm(p
, file
, file_to_av(file
)) ? fd
+ 1 : 0;
2197 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2198 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred
*cred
,
2199 struct files_struct
*files
)
2201 struct file
*file
, *devnull
= NULL
;
2202 struct tty_struct
*tty
;
2206 tty
= get_current_tty();
2208 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock
);
2209 if (!list_empty(&tty
->tty_files
)) {
2210 struct tty_file_private
*file_priv
;
2212 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2213 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2214 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2215 open file may belong to another process and we are
2216 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2217 file_priv
= list_first_entry(&tty
->tty_files
,
2218 struct tty_file_private
, list
);
2219 file
= file_priv
->file
;
2220 if (file_path_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__READ
| FILE__WRITE
))
2223 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock
);
2226 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2230 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2231 n
= iterate_fd(files
, 0, match_file
, cred
);
2232 if (!n
) /* none found? */
2235 devnull
= dentry_open(&selinux_null
, O_RDWR
, cred
);
2236 if (IS_ERR(devnull
))
2238 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2240 replace_fd(n
- 1, devnull
, 0);
2241 } while ((n
= iterate_fd(files
, n
, match_file
, cred
)) != 0);
2247 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2249 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2251 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2252 struct rlimit
*rlim
, *initrlim
;
2255 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2256 if (new_tsec
->sid
== new_tsec
->osid
)
2259 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2260 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm
->cred
, current
->files
);
2262 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2263 current
->pdeath_signal
= 0;
2265 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2266 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2267 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2269 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2270 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2271 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2272 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2273 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2275 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->osid
, new_tsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2276 PROCESS__RLIMITINH
, NULL
);
2278 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2280 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++) {
2281 rlim
= current
->signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2282 initrlim
= init_task
.signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2283 rlim
->rlim_cur
= min(rlim
->rlim_max
, initrlim
->rlim_cur
);
2285 task_unlock(current
);
2286 update_rlimit_cpu(current
, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU
));
2291 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2294 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2296 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2297 struct itimerval itimer
;
2307 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2308 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2309 * flush and unblock signals.
2311 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2312 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2314 rc
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SIGINH
, NULL
);
2316 memset(&itimer
, 0, sizeof itimer
);
2317 for (i
= 0; i
< 3; i
++)
2318 do_setitimer(i
, &itimer
, NULL
);
2319 spin_lock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2320 if (!(current
->signal
->flags
& SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT
)) {
2321 __flush_signals(current
);
2322 flush_signal_handlers(current
, 1);
2323 sigemptyset(¤t
->blocked
);
2325 spin_unlock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2328 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2329 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2330 read_lock(&tasklist_lock
);
2331 __wake_up_parent(current
, current
->real_parent
);
2332 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock
);
2335 /* superblock security operations */
2337 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2339 return superblock_alloc_security(sb
);
2342 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2344 superblock_free_security(sb
);
2347 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix
, int plen
, char *option
, int olen
)
2352 return !memcmp(prefix
, option
, plen
);
2355 static inline int selinux_option(char *option
, int len
)
2357 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2358 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2359 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2360 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2361 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR
, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR
)-1, option
, len
));
2364 static inline void take_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
, int len
)
2371 memcpy(*to
, from
, len
);
2375 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
,
2378 int current_size
= 0;
2386 while (current_size
< len
) {
2396 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig
, char *copy
)
2398 int fnosec
, fsec
, rc
= 0;
2399 char *in_save
, *in_curr
, *in_end
;
2400 char *sec_curr
, *nosec_save
, *nosec
;
2406 nosec
= (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
2414 in_save
= in_end
= orig
;
2418 open_quote
= !open_quote
;
2419 if ((*in_end
== ',' && open_quote
== 0) ||
2421 int len
= in_end
- in_curr
;
2423 if (selinux_option(in_curr
, len
))
2424 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr
, in_curr
, &fsec
, len
);
2426 take_option(&nosec
, in_curr
, &fnosec
, len
);
2428 in_curr
= in_end
+ 1;
2430 } while (*in_end
++);
2432 strcpy(in_save
, nosec_save
);
2433 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save
);
2438 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
2441 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
2442 char *secdata
, **mount_options
;
2443 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
2445 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
2451 if (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
2454 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts
);
2455 secdata
= alloc_secdata();
2458 rc
= selinux_sb_copy_data(data
, secdata
);
2460 goto out_free_secdata
;
2462 rc
= selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata
, &opts
);
2464 goto out_free_secdata
;
2466 mount_options
= opts
.mnt_opts
;
2467 flags
= opts
.mnt_opts_flags
;
2469 for (i
= 0; i
< opts
.num_mnt_opts
; i
++) {
2473 if (flags
[i
] == SBLABEL_MNT
)
2475 len
= strlen(mount_options
[i
]);
2476 rc
= security_context_to_sid(mount_options
[i
], len
, &sid
);
2478 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2479 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2480 mount_options
[i
], sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
2486 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
, sid
))
2487 goto out_bad_option
;
2490 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, sid
))
2491 goto out_bad_option
;
2493 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
: {
2494 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
;
2495 root_isec
= sb
->s_root
->d_inode
->i_security
;
2497 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
, sid
))
2498 goto out_bad_option
;
2501 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT
:
2502 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
, sid
))
2503 goto out_bad_option
;
2512 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
2514 free_secdata(secdata
);
2517 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unable to change security options "
2518 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb
->s_id
,
2523 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block
*sb
, int flags
, void *data
)
2525 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2526 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2529 rc
= superblock_doinit(sb
, data
);
2533 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2534 if (flags
& MS_KERNMOUNT
)
2537 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2538 ad
.u
.dentry
= sb
->s_root
;
2539 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT
, &ad
);
2542 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2544 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2545 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2547 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2548 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
->d_sb
->s_root
;
2549 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, dentry
->d_sb
, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR
, &ad
);
2552 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name
,
2555 unsigned long flags
,
2558 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2560 if (flags
& MS_REMOUNT
)
2561 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, path
->dentry
->d_sb
,
2562 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT
, NULL
);
2564 return path_has_perm(cred
, path
, FILE__MOUNTON
);
2567 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, int flags
)
2569 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2571 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, mnt
->mnt_sb
,
2572 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT
, NULL
);
2575 /* inode security operations */
2577 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2579 return inode_alloc_security(inode
);
2582 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2584 inode_free_security(inode
);
2587 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry
*dentry
, int mode
,
2588 struct qstr
*name
, void **ctx
,
2591 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2592 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
2593 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
2594 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2595 struct inode
*dir
= dentry
->d_parent
->d_inode
;
2599 tsec
= cred
->security
;
2600 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
2601 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2603 if (tsec
->create_sid
&& sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
) {
2604 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
2606 rc
= security_transition_sid(tsec
->sid
, dsec
->sid
,
2607 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
),
2612 "%s: security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d\n",
2618 return security_sid_to_context(newsid
, (char **)ctx
, ctxlen
);
2621 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode
*inode
, struct inode
*dir
,
2622 const struct qstr
*qstr
,
2624 void **value
, size_t *len
)
2626 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2627 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
2628 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2629 u32 sid
, newsid
, clen
;
2633 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
2634 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2637 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
2639 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) &&
2640 (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
))
2641 newsid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
2642 else if (!newsid
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
)) {
2643 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, dsec
->sid
,
2644 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
),
2647 printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: "
2648 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2651 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
2656 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2657 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
2658 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2659 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
2661 isec
->initialized
= 1;
2664 if (!ss_initialized
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
))
2668 *name
= XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
;
2671 rc
= security_sid_to_context_force(newsid
, &context
, &clen
);
2681 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mode
)
2683 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_FILE
);
2686 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry
*old_dentry
, struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2688 return may_link(dir
, old_dentry
, MAY_LINK
);
2691 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2693 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_UNLINK
);
2696 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2698 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
);
2701 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mask
)
2703 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_DIR
);
2706 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2708 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_RMDIR
);
2711 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mode
, dev_t dev
)
2713 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
));
2716 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode
*old_inode
, struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
2717 struct inode
*new_inode
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2719 return may_rename(old_inode
, old_dentry
, new_inode
, new_dentry
);
2722 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2724 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2726 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2729 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct nameidata
*nameidata
)
2731 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2733 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2736 static noinline
int audit_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
,
2737 u32 perms
, u32 audited
, u32 denied
,
2740 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2741 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2744 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE
;
2747 rc
= slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
,
2748 audited
, denied
, &ad
, flags
);
2754 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
, int mask
)
2756 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2759 unsigned flags
= mask
& MAY_NOT_BLOCK
;
2760 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2762 struct av_decision avd
;
2764 u32 audited
, denied
;
2766 from_access
= mask
& MAY_ACCESS
;
2767 mask
&= (MAY_READ
|MAY_WRITE
|MAY_EXEC
|MAY_APPEND
);
2769 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2773 validate_creds(cred
);
2775 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
2778 perms
= file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
);
2780 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
2781 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2783 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, 0, &avd
);
2784 audited
= avc_audit_required(perms
, &avd
, rc
,
2785 from_access
? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS
: 0,
2787 if (likely(!audited
))
2790 rc2
= audit_inode_permission(inode
, perms
, audited
, denied
, flags
);
2796 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct iattr
*iattr
)
2798 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2799 unsigned int ia_valid
= iattr
->ia_valid
;
2800 __u32 av
= FILE__WRITE
;
2802 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2803 if (ia_valid
& ATTR_FORCE
) {
2804 ia_valid
&= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID
| ATTR_KILL_SGID
| ATTR_MODE
|
2810 if (ia_valid
& (ATTR_MODE
| ATTR_UID
| ATTR_GID
|
2811 ATTR_ATIME_SET
| ATTR_MTIME_SET
| ATTR_TIMES_SET
))
2812 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2814 if (selinux_policycap_openperm
&& (ia_valid
& ATTR_SIZE
))
2817 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, av
);
2820 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2822 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2825 path
.dentry
= dentry
;
2828 return path_has_perm(cred
, &path
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2831 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2833 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2835 if (!strncmp(name
, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
,
2836 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
- 1)) {
2837 if (!strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_CAPS
)) {
2838 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP
))
2840 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
2841 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2842 Restrict to administrator. */
2847 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2848 ordinary setattr permission. */
2849 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2852 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
2853 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
2855 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2856 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2857 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2858 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2859 u32 newsid
, sid
= current_sid();
2862 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
2863 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
2865 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2866 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
))
2869 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode
))
2872 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2873 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
2875 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
,
2876 FILE__RELABELFROM
, &ad
);
2880 rc
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2881 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
2882 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
)) {
2883 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2887 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
2888 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
2891 if (str
[size
- 1] == '\0')
2892 audit_size
= size
- 1;
2899 ab
= audit_log_start(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
);
2900 audit_log_format(ab
, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
2901 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, value
, audit_size
);
2906 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2911 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, isec
->sclass
,
2912 FILE__RELABELTO
, &ad
);
2916 rc
= security_validate_transition(isec
->sid
, newsid
, sid
,
2921 return avc_has_perm(newsid
,
2923 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
2924 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
,
2928 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
2929 const void *value
, size_t size
,
2932 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2933 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2937 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
)) {
2938 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2942 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2944 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2945 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2946 inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
, -rc
);
2950 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
2952 isec
->initialized
= 1;
2957 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2959 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2961 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2964 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2966 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2968 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2971 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2973 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
2974 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
2976 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2977 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2982 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2984 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2986 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
, void **buffer
, bool alloc
)
2990 char *context
= NULL
;
2991 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2993 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
2997 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2998 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2999 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3000 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3001 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3002 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3003 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3005 error
= selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns
, CAP_MAC_ADMIN
,
3006 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
3008 error
= security_sid_to_context_force(isec
->sid
, &context
,
3011 error
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &size
);
3024 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
,
3025 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
3027 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3031 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
3034 if (!value
|| !size
)
3037 rc
= security_context_to_sid((void *)value
, size
, &newsid
);
3041 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
3043 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3047 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, char *buffer
, size_t buffer_size
)
3049 const int len
= sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
);
3050 if (buffer
&& len
<= buffer_size
)
3051 memcpy(buffer
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, len
);
3055 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode
*inode
, u32
*secid
)
3057 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3061 /* file security operations */
3063 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
3065 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3066 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
3068 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3069 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && (mask
& MAY_WRITE
))
3072 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
,
3073 file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
));
3076 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
3078 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
3079 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3080 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3081 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3084 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3087 if (sid
== fsec
->sid
&& fsec
->isid
== isec
->sid
&&
3088 fsec
->pseqno
== avc_policy_seqno())
3089 /* No change since file_open check. */
3092 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file
, mask
);
3095 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
3097 return file_alloc_security(file
);
3100 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
3102 file_free_security(file
);
3105 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3108 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3118 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
:
3120 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION
:
3121 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3124 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
:
3126 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION
:
3127 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__SETATTR
);
3130 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3134 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3139 error
= cred_has_capability(cred
, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG
,
3140 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
);
3143 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3144 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3147 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__IOCTL
);
3152 static int default_noexec
;
3154 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file
*file
, unsigned long prot
, int shared
)
3156 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3159 if (default_noexec
&&
3160 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && (!file
|| (!shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
)))) {
3162 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3163 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3164 * This has an additional check.
3166 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECMEM
);
3172 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3173 u32 av
= FILE__READ
;
3175 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3176 if (shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
))
3179 if (prot
& PROT_EXEC
)
3180 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
3182 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, av
);
3189 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr
)
3192 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3195 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3196 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3197 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3198 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3200 if (addr
< CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
) {
3201 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT
,
3202 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO
, NULL
);
3207 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3208 return cap_mmap_addr(addr
);
3211 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file
*file
, unsigned long reqprot
,
3212 unsigned long prot
, unsigned long flags
)
3214 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3217 return file_map_prot_check(file
, prot
,
3218 (flags
& MAP_TYPE
) == MAP_SHARED
);
3221 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct
*vma
,
3222 unsigned long reqprot
,
3225 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3227 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3230 if (default_noexec
&&
3231 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && !(vma
->vm_flags
& VM_EXEC
)) {
3233 if (vma
->vm_start
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_brk
&&
3234 vma
->vm_end
<= vma
->vm_mm
->brk
) {
3235 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECHEAP
);
3236 } else if (!vma
->vm_file
&&
3237 vma
->vm_start
<= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
&&
3238 vma
->vm_end
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
) {
3239 rc
= current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__EXECSTACK
);
3240 } else if (vma
->vm_file
&& vma
->anon_vma
) {
3242 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3243 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3244 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3245 * modified content. This typically should only
3246 * occur for text relocations.
3248 rc
= file_has_perm(cred
, vma
->vm_file
, FILE__EXECMOD
);
3254 return file_map_prot_check(vma
->vm_file
, prot
, vma
->vm_flags
&VM_SHARED
);
3257 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
)
3259 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3261 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3264 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3267 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3272 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && !(arg
& O_APPEND
)) {
3273 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__WRITE
);
3282 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS
:
3283 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3284 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3289 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3294 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3301 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file
*file
)
3303 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3305 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3306 fsec
->fown_sid
= current_sid();
3311 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
3312 struct fown_struct
*fown
, int signum
)
3315 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
3317 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3319 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3320 file
= container_of(fown
, struct file
, f_owner
);
3322 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3325 perm
= signal_to_av(SIGIO
); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3327 perm
= signal_to_av(signum
);
3329 return avc_has_perm(fsec
->fown_sid
, sid
,
3330 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3333 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file
*file
)
3335 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3337 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, file_to_av(file
));
3340 static int selinux_file_open(struct file
*file
, const struct cred
*cred
)
3342 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3343 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3345 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3346 isec
= file_inode(file
)->i_security
;
3348 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3349 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3350 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3351 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3352 * struct as its SID.
3354 fsec
->isid
= isec
->sid
;
3355 fsec
->pseqno
= avc_policy_seqno();
3357 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3358 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3359 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3360 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3361 * new inode label or new policy.
3362 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3364 return file_path_has_perm(cred
, file
, open_file_to_av(file
));
3367 /* task security operations */
3369 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags
)
3371 return current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__FORK
);
3375 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3377 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred
*cred
, gfp_t gfp
)
3379 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3381 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3385 cred
->security
= tsec
;
3390 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3392 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred
*cred
)
3394 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
3397 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3398 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3400 BUG_ON(cred
->security
&& (unsigned long) cred
->security
< PAGE_SIZE
);
3401 cred
->security
= (void *) 0x7UL
;
3406 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3408 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
3411 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
3412 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3414 old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3416 tsec
= kmemdup(old_tsec
, sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3420 new->security
= tsec
;
3425 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3427 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
3429 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3430 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3436 * set the security data for a kernel service
3437 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3439 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred
*new, u32 secid
)
3441 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3442 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3445 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, secid
,
3446 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3447 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE
,
3451 tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
3452 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
3453 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
3459 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3460 * objective context of the specified inode
3462 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred
*new, struct inode
*inode
)
3464 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3465 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3466 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3469 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
3470 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3471 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS
,
3475 tsec
->create_sid
= isec
->sid
;
3479 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name
)
3482 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3484 sid
= task_sid(current
);
3486 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD
;
3487 ad
.u
.kmod_name
= kmod_name
;
3489 return avc_has_perm(sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
, SECCLASS_SYSTEM
,
3490 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST
, &ad
);
3493 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct
*p
, pid_t pgid
)
3495 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETPGID
);
3498 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3500 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETPGID
);
3503 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3505 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSESSION
);
3508 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct
*p
, u32
*secid
)
3510 *secid
= task_sid(p
);
3513 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct
*p
, int nice
)
3517 rc
= cap_task_setnice(p
, nice
);
3521 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3524 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct
*p
, int ioprio
)
3528 rc
= cap_task_setioprio(p
, ioprio
);
3532 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3535 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct
*p
)
3537 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3540 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct
*p
, unsigned int resource
,
3541 struct rlimit
*new_rlim
)
3543 struct rlimit
*old_rlim
= p
->signal
->rlim
+ resource
;
3545 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3546 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3547 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3548 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3549 if (old_rlim
->rlim_max
!= new_rlim
->rlim_max
)
3550 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT
);
3555 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
3559 rc
= cap_task_setscheduler(p
);
3563 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3566 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
3568 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3571 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct
*p
)
3573 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3576 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct
*p
, struct siginfo
*info
,
3583 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNULL
; /* null signal; existence test */
3585 perm
= signal_to_av(sig
);
3587 rc
= avc_has_perm(secid
, task_sid(p
),
3588 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3590 rc
= current_has_perm(p
, perm
);
3594 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct
*p
)
3596 return task_has_perm(p
, current
, PROCESS__SIGCHLD
);
3599 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct
*p
,
3600 struct inode
*inode
)
3602 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3603 u32 sid
= task_sid(p
);
3606 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3609 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3610 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3611 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3613 int offset
, ihlen
, ret
= -EINVAL
;
3614 struct iphdr _iph
, *ih
;
3616 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3617 ih
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_iph
), &_iph
);
3621 ihlen
= ih
->ihl
* 4;
3622 if (ihlen
< sizeof(_iph
))
3625 ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
= ih
->saddr
;
3626 ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.daddr
= ih
->daddr
;
3630 *proto
= ih
->protocol
;
3632 switch (ih
->protocol
) {
3634 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3636 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3640 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3644 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= th
->source
;
3645 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= th
->dest
;
3650 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3652 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3656 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3660 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= uh
->source
;
3661 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= uh
->dest
;
3665 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3666 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3668 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3672 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3676 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3677 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3688 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3690 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3691 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3692 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3695 int ret
= -EINVAL
, offset
;
3696 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h
, *ip6
;
3699 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3700 ip6
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_ipv6h
), &_ipv6h
);
3704 ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
= ip6
->saddr
;
3705 ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.daddr
= ip6
->daddr
;
3708 nexthdr
= ip6
->nexthdr
;
3709 offset
+= sizeof(_ipv6h
);
3710 offset
= ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb
, offset
, &nexthdr
, &frag_off
);
3719 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3721 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3725 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= th
->source
;
3726 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= th
->dest
;
3731 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3733 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3737 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= uh
->source
;
3738 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= uh
->dest
;
3742 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3743 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3745 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3749 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3750 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3754 /* includes fragments */
3764 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff
*skb
, struct common_audit_data
*ad
,
3765 char **_addrp
, int src
, u8
*proto
)
3770 switch (ad
->u
.net
->family
) {
3772 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3775 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
:
3776 &ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.daddr
);
3779 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3781 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3784 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
:
3785 &ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.daddr
);
3795 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3796 " unable to parse packet\n");
3806 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3808 * @family: protocol family
3809 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3812 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3813 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3814 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3815 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3816 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3820 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff
*skb
, u16 family
, u32
*sid
)
3827 err
= selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb
, &xfrm_sid
);
3830 err
= selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb
, family
, &nlbl_type
, &nlbl_sid
);
3834 err
= security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid
, nlbl_type
, xfrm_sid
, sid
);
3835 if (unlikely(err
)) {
3837 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3838 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3845 /* socket security operations */
3847 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
,
3848 u16 secclass
, u32
*socksid
)
3850 if (tsec
->sockcreate_sid
> SECSID_NULL
) {
3851 *socksid
= tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
3855 return security_transition_sid(tsec
->sid
, tsec
->sid
, secclass
, NULL
,
3859 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct
*task
, struct sock
*sk
, u32 perms
)
3861 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
3862 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3863 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
3864 u32 tsid
= task_sid(task
);
3866 if (sksec
->sid
== SECINITSID_KERNEL
)
3869 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
3873 return avc_has_perm(tsid
, sksec
->sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
3876 static int selinux_socket_create(int family
, int type
,
3877 int protocol
, int kern
)
3879 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
3887 secclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
3888 rc
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
, secclass
, &newsid
);
3892 return avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, newsid
, secclass
, SOCKET__CREATE
, NULL
);
3895 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket
*sock
, int family
,
3896 int type
, int protocol
, int kern
)
3898 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
3899 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3900 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
3903 isec
->sclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
3906 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
3908 err
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
, isec
->sclass
, &(isec
->sid
));
3913 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3916 sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
3917 sksec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
3918 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
3919 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock
->sk
, family
);
3925 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3926 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3927 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3929 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
3931 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
3935 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, SOCKET__BIND
);
3940 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3941 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3942 * check the first address now.
3944 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
3945 if (family
== PF_INET
|| family
== PF_INET6
) {
3947 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
3948 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3949 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
3950 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
3951 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
3952 unsigned short snum
;
3955 if (family
== PF_INET
) {
3956 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
3957 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
3958 addrp
= (char *)&addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
3960 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
3961 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
3962 addrp
= (char *)&addr6
->sin6_addr
.s6_addr
;
3968 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk
), &low
, &high
);
3970 if (snum
< max(PROT_SOCK
, low
) || snum
> high
) {
3971 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
,
3975 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
3977 ad
.u
.net
->sport
= htons(snum
);
3978 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
3979 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
,
3981 SOCKET__NAME_BIND
, &ad
);
3987 switch (sksec
->sclass
) {
3988 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
:
3989 node_perm
= TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3992 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
:
3993 node_perm
= UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3996 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
:
3997 node_perm
= DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4001 node_perm
= RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4005 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &sid
);
4009 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4011 ad
.u
.net
->sport
= htons(snum
);
4012 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4014 if (family
== PF_INET
)
4015 ad
.u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
= addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
4017 ad
.u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
= addr6
->sin6_addr
;
4019 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
,
4020 sksec
->sclass
, node_perm
, &ad
);
4028 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
4030 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
4031 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4034 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, SOCKET__CONNECT
);
4039 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
4041 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
||
4042 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
) {
4043 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4044 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4045 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
4046 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
4047 unsigned short snum
;
4050 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
) {
4051 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
4052 if (addrlen
< sizeof(struct sockaddr_in
))
4054 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
4056 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
4057 if (addrlen
< SIN6_LEN_RFC2133
)
4059 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
4062 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
, snum
, &sid
);
4066 perm
= (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
) ?
4067 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
: DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
;
4069 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4071 ad
.u
.net
->dport
= htons(snum
);
4072 ad
.u
.net
->family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4073 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perm
, &ad
);
4078 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk
, address
);
4084 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket
*sock
, int backlog
)
4086 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__LISTEN
);
4089 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket
*sock
, struct socket
*newsock
)
4092 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
4093 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
;
4095 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__ACCEPT
);
4099 newisec
= SOCK_INODE(newsock
)->i_security
;
4101 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
4102 newisec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4103 newisec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
4104 newisec
->initialized
= 1;
4109 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
4112 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__WRITE
);
4115 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
4116 int size
, int flags
)
4118 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__READ
);
4121 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket
*sock
)
4123 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
4126 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket
*sock
)
4128 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
4131 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
, int optname
)
4135 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SETOPT
);
4139 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock
, level
, optname
);
4142 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
,
4145 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETOPT
);
4148 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket
*sock
, int how
)
4150 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN
);
4153 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock
*sock
,
4157 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_sock
= sock
->sk_security
;
4158 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_other
= other
->sk_security
;
4159 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_new
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4160 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4161 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4164 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4166 ad
.u
.net
->sk
= other
;
4168 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec_sock
->sid
, sksec_other
->sid
,
4169 sksec_other
->sclass
,
4170 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO
, &ad
);
4174 /* server child socket */
4175 sksec_new
->peer_sid
= sksec_sock
->sid
;
4176 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other
->sid
, sksec_sock
->sid
,
4181 /* connecting socket */
4182 sksec_sock
->peer_sid
= sksec_new
->sid
;
4187 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket
*sock
,
4188 struct socket
*other
)
4190 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4191 struct sk_security_struct
*osec
= other
->sk
->sk_security
;
4192 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4193 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4195 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4197 ad
.u
.net
->sk
= other
->sk
;
4199 return avc_has_perm(ssec
->sid
, osec
->sid
, osec
->sclass
, SOCKET__SENDTO
,
4203 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex
, char *addrp
, u16 family
,
4205 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
4211 err
= sel_netif_sid(ifindex
, &if_sid
);
4214 err
= avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
4215 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__INGRESS
, ad
);
4219 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
);
4222 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
4223 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__RECVFROM
, ad
);
4226 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4230 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4231 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4232 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4233 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4236 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4238 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4239 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4240 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4244 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4245 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4251 err
= selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
, skb
, family
, &ad
);
4254 err
= selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
);
4259 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4262 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4263 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4264 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4265 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4266 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4271 if (family
!= PF_INET
&& family
!= PF_INET6
)
4274 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4275 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4278 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4279 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4280 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4281 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4282 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4283 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk
, skb
, family
);
4285 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4286 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4287 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4290 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4292 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4293 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4294 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4298 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4301 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
);
4304 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb
->skb_iif
, addrp
, family
,
4307 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4310 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, peer_sid
, SECCLASS_PEER
,
4313 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4316 if (secmark_active
) {
4317 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4326 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket
*sock
, char __user
*optval
,
4327 int __user
*optlen
, unsigned len
)
4332 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4333 u32 peer_sid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4335 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
||
4336 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
)
4337 peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
4338 if (peer_sid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4339 return -ENOPROTOOPT
;
4341 err
= security_sid_to_context(peer_sid
, &scontext
, &scontext_len
);
4345 if (scontext_len
> len
) {
4350 if (copy_to_user(optval
, scontext
, scontext_len
))
4354 if (put_user(scontext_len
, optlen
))
4360 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket
*sock
, struct sk_buff
*skb
, u32
*secid
)
4362 u32 peer_secid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4365 if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4367 else if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IPV6
))
4370 family
= sock
->sk
->sk_family
;
4374 if (sock
&& family
== PF_UNIX
)
4375 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock
), &peer_secid
);
4377 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_secid
);
4380 *secid
= peer_secid
;
4381 if (peer_secid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4386 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock
*sk
, int family
, gfp_t priority
)
4388 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4390 sksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec
), priority
);
4394 sksec
->peer_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4395 sksec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4396 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec
);
4397 sk
->sk_security
= sksec
;
4402 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock
*sk
)
4404 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4406 sk
->sk_security
= NULL
;
4407 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec
);
4411 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock
*sk
, struct sock
*newsk
)
4413 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4414 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4416 newsksec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4417 newsksec
->peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
4418 newsksec
->sclass
= sksec
->sclass
;
4420 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec
);
4423 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock
*sk
, u32
*secid
)
4426 *secid
= SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET
;
4428 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4430 *secid
= sksec
->sid
;
4434 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock
*sk
, struct socket
*parent
)
4436 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= SOCK_INODE(parent
)->i_security
;
4437 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4439 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
|| sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET6
||
4440 sk
->sk_family
== PF_UNIX
)
4441 isec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4442 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4445 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4446 struct request_sock
*req
)
4448 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4450 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4454 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4455 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4458 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peersid
);
4461 if (peersid
== SECSID_NULL
) {
4462 req
->secid
= sksec
->sid
;
4463 req
->peer_secid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4465 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sksec
->sid
, peersid
, &newsid
);
4468 req
->secid
= newsid
;
4469 req
->peer_secid
= peersid
;
4472 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req
, family
);
4475 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock
*newsk
,
4476 const struct request_sock
*req
)
4478 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4480 newsksec
->sid
= req
->secid
;
4481 newsksec
->peer_sid
= req
->peer_secid
;
4482 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4483 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4484 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4485 time it will have been created and available. */
4487 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4488 * thread with access to newsksec */
4489 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk
, req
->rsk_ops
->family
);
4492 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4494 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4495 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4497 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4498 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4501 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &sksec
->peer_sid
);
4504 static void selinux_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff
*skb
, struct sock
*sk
)
4506 skb_set_owner_w(skb
, sk
);
4509 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid
)
4511 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
4514 __tsec
= current_security();
4517 return avc_has_perm(tsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
4520 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4522 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount
);
4525 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4527 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount
);
4530 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock
*req
,
4533 fl
->flowi_secid
= req
->secid
;
4536 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security
)
4538 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
;
4540 tunsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec
), GFP_KERNEL
);
4543 tunsec
->sid
= current_sid();
4549 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security
)
4554 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4556 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4558 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4559 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4560 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4561 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4562 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4563 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4565 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE
,
4569 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security
)
4571 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
4573 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4574 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE
, NULL
);
4577 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock
*sk
, void *security
)
4579 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
4580 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4582 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4583 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4584 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4585 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4586 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4587 * protocols were being used */
4589 sksec
->sid
= tunsec
->sid
;
4590 sksec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
;
4595 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security
)
4597 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
4598 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4601 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, tunsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4602 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
4605 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4606 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
4614 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4618 struct nlmsghdr
*nlh
;
4619 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4621 if (skb
->len
< NLMSG_HDRLEN
) {
4625 nlh
= nlmsg_hdr(skb
);
4627 err
= selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec
->sclass
, nlh
->nlmsg_type
, &perm
);
4629 if (err
== -EINVAL
) {
4630 audit_log(current
->audit_context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
,
4631 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4632 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4633 nlh
->nlmsg_type
, sksec
->sclass
);
4634 if (!selinux_enforcing
|| security_get_allow_unknown())
4644 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, perm
);
4649 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4651 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int ifindex
,
4657 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4658 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4663 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4666 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4667 netlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled();
4668 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4669 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4672 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
) != 0)
4675 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4677 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
4678 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4679 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
) != 0)
4682 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4683 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex
, addrp
, family
,
4686 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 1);
4692 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4693 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__FORWARD_IN
, &ad
))
4697 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4698 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4699 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4701 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, peer_sid
) != 0)
4707 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops
*ops
,
4708 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4709 const struct net_device
*in
,
4710 const struct net_device
*out
,
4711 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4713 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, in
->ifindex
, PF_INET
);
4716 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4717 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops
*ops
,
4718 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4719 const struct net_device
*in
,
4720 const struct net_device
*out
,
4721 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4723 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, in
->ifindex
, PF_INET6
);
4727 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4732 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4735 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4736 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4737 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4739 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= skb
->sk
->sk_security
;
4742 sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4743 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, sid
) != 0)
4749 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(const struct nf_hook_ops
*ops
,
4750 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4751 const struct net_device
*in
,
4752 const struct net_device
*out
,
4753 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4755 return selinux_ip_output(skb
, PF_INET
);
4758 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4762 struct sock
*sk
= skb
->sk
;
4763 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4764 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4765 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4771 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4773 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4775 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
4776 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4777 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, &proto
))
4780 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4781 if (avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4782 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__SEND
, &ad
))
4783 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4785 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
, proto
))
4786 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4791 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int ifindex
,
4797 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4798 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4803 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4804 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4805 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4806 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4807 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4808 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb
, ifindex
, family
);
4810 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4811 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4812 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4813 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4814 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4815 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4816 if (skb_dst(skb
) != NULL
&& skb_dst(skb
)->xfrm
!= NULL
)
4819 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4820 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4821 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4824 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4825 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4826 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4827 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4831 secmark_perm
= PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
;
4832 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
))
4835 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4836 peer_sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4839 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4840 peer_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4841 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4844 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4846 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
4847 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4848 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, NULL
))
4852 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4853 SECCLASS_PACKET
, secmark_perm
, &ad
))
4854 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4856 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4860 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex
, &if_sid
))
4862 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
4863 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__EGRESS
, &ad
))
4864 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4866 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
))
4868 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
4869 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__SENDTO
, &ad
))
4870 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4876 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops
*ops
,
4877 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4878 const struct net_device
*in
,
4879 const struct net_device
*out
,
4880 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4882 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, out
->ifindex
, PF_INET
);
4885 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4886 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops
*ops
,
4887 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4888 const struct net_device
*in
,
4889 const struct net_device
*out
,
4890 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4892 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, out
->ifindex
, PF_INET6
);
4896 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4898 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4902 err
= cap_netlink_send(sk
, skb
);
4906 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk
, skb
);
4909 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct
*task
,
4910 struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
,
4913 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4916 isec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
4920 sid
= task_sid(task
);
4921 isec
->sclass
= sclass
;
4923 perm
->security
= isec
;
4928 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
)
4930 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= perm
->security
;
4931 perm
->security
= NULL
;
4935 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4937 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
4939 msec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
4943 msec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4944 msg
->security
= msec
;
4949 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4951 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
= msg
->security
;
4953 msg
->security
= NULL
;
4957 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipc_perms
,
4960 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4961 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4962 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4964 isec
= ipc_perms
->security
;
4966 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
4967 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= ipc_perms
->key
;
4969 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
4972 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4974 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg
);
4977 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4979 msg_msg_free_security(msg
);
4982 /* message queue security operations */
4983 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
4985 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4986 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4987 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4990 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &msq
->q_perm
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
);
4994 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4996 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
4997 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4999 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5002 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
5008 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
5010 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
5013 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int msqflg
)
5015 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5016 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5017 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5019 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5021 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5022 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5024 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5025 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5028 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int cmd
)
5036 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5037 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5040 perms
= MSGQ__GETATTR
| MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
;
5043 perms
= MSGQ__SETATTR
;
5046 perms
= MSGQ__DESTROY
;
5052 err
= ipc_has_perm(&msq
->q_perm
, perms
);
5056 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
, int msqflg
)
5058 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5059 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
5060 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5061 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5064 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5065 msec
= msg
->security
;
5068 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5070 if (msec
->sid
== SECINITSID_UNLABELED
) {
5072 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5073 * message queue this message will be stored in
5075 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
5081 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5082 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5084 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5085 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5088 /* Can this process send the message */
5089 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
5092 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5093 rc
= avc_has_perm(msec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5094 MSGQ__ENQUEUE
, &ad
);
5099 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
,
5100 struct task_struct
*target
,
5101 long type
, int mode
)
5103 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5104 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
5105 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5106 u32 sid
= task_sid(target
);
5109 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5110 msec
= msg
->security
;
5112 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5113 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5115 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
5116 SECCLASS_MSGQ
, MSGQ__READ
, &ad
);
5118 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
,
5119 SECCLASS_MSG
, MSG__RECEIVE
, &ad
);
5123 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5124 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
5126 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5127 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5128 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5131 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &shp
->shm_perm
, SECCLASS_SHM
);
5135 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
5137 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5138 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
5140 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
5143 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
5149 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
5151 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
5154 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int shmflg
)
5156 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5157 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5158 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5160 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
5162 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5163 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
5165 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
5166 SHM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5169 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5170 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int cmd
)
5178 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5179 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5182 perms
= SHM__GETATTR
| SHM__ASSOCIATE
;
5185 perms
= SHM__SETATTR
;
5192 perms
= SHM__DESTROY
;
5198 err
= ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5202 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
,
5203 char __user
*shmaddr
, int shmflg
)
5207 if (shmflg
& SHM_RDONLY
)
5210 perms
= SHM__READ
| SHM__WRITE
;
5212 return ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5215 /* Semaphore security operations */
5216 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5218 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5219 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5220 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5223 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &sma
->sem_perm
, SECCLASS_SEM
);
5227 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5229 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5230 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5232 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5235 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5241 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5243 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5246 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array
*sma
, int semflg
)
5248 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5249 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5250 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5252 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5254 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5255 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5257 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5258 SEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5261 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5262 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array
*sma
, int cmd
)
5270 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5271 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5275 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
;
5286 perms
= SEM__DESTROY
;
5289 perms
= SEM__SETATTR
;
5293 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
| SEM__ASSOCIATE
;
5299 err
= ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5303 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array
*sma
,
5304 struct sembuf
*sops
, unsigned nsops
, int alter
)
5309 perms
= SEM__READ
| SEM__WRITE
;
5313 return ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5316 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, short flag
)
5322 av
|= IPC__UNIX_READ
;
5324 av
|= IPC__UNIX_WRITE
;
5329 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp
, av
);
5332 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, u32
*secid
)
5334 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= ipcp
->security
;
5338 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct inode
*inode
)
5341 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, dentry
);
5344 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5345 char *name
, char **value
)
5347 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
5353 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETATTR
);
5359 __tsec
= __task_cred(p
)->security
;
5361 if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5363 else if (!strcmp(name
, "prev"))
5365 else if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5366 sid
= __tsec
->exec_sid
;
5367 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5368 sid
= __tsec
->create_sid
;
5369 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5370 sid
= __tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5371 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5372 sid
= __tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
5380 error
= security_sid_to_context(sid
, value
, &len
);
5390 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5391 char *name
, void *value
, size_t size
)
5393 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5394 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
5401 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5402 security attributes. */
5407 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5408 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5409 * above restriction is ever removed.
5411 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5412 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETEXEC
);
5413 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5414 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE
);
5415 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5416 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE
);
5417 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5418 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE
);
5419 else if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5420 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETCURRENT
);
5426 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5427 if (size
&& str
[1] && str
[1] != '\n') {
5428 if (str
[size
-1] == '\n') {
5432 error
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &sid
);
5433 if (error
== -EINVAL
&& !strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5434 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
)) {
5435 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
5438 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5439 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5440 if (str
[size
- 1] == '\0')
5441 audit_size
= size
- 1;
5444 ab
= audit_log_start(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
);
5445 audit_log_format(ab
, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5446 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, value
, audit_size
);
5451 error
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
,
5458 new = prepare_creds();
5462 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5463 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5464 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5465 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5466 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5467 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5468 tsec
= new->security
;
5469 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec")) {
5470 tsec
->exec_sid
= sid
;
5471 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5472 tsec
->create_sid
= sid
;
5473 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate")) {
5474 error
= may_create_key(sid
, p
);
5477 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= sid
;
5478 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate")) {
5479 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= sid
;
5480 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "current")) {
5485 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5487 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5488 error
= security_bounded_transition(tsec
->sid
, sid
);
5493 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5494 error
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5495 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION
, NULL
);
5499 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5500 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5503 tracer
= ptrace_parent(p
);
5505 ptsid
= task_sid(tracer
);
5509 error
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5510 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
5529 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name
)
5531 return (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
) == 0);
5534 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid
, char **secdata
, u32
*seclen
)
5536 return security_sid_to_context(secid
, secdata
, seclen
);
5539 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata
, u32 seclen
, u32
*secid
)
5541 return security_context_to_sid(secdata
, seclen
, secid
);
5544 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata
, u32 seclen
)
5550 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5552 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5554 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5558 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5560 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry
*dentry
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5562 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5565 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void **ctx
, u32
*ctxlen
)
5568 len
= selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
,
5577 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key
*k
, const struct cred
*cred
,
5578 unsigned long flags
)
5580 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5581 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5583 ksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5587 tsec
= cred
->security
;
5588 if (tsec
->keycreate_sid
)
5589 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5591 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->sid
;
5597 static void selinux_key_free(struct key
*k
)
5599 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= k
->security
;
5605 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref
,
5606 const struct cred
*cred
,
5610 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5613 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5614 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5615 appear to be created. */
5619 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
5621 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
5622 ksec
= key
->security
;
5624 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksec
->sid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, perm
, NULL
);
5627 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key
*key
, char **_buffer
)
5629 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= key
->security
;
5630 char *context
= NULL
;
5634 rc
= security_sid_to_context(ksec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
5643 static struct security_operations selinux_ops
= {
5646 .ptrace_access_check
= selinux_ptrace_access_check
,
5647 .ptrace_traceme
= selinux_ptrace_traceme
,
5648 .capget
= selinux_capget
,
5649 .capset
= selinux_capset
,
5650 .capable
= selinux_capable
,
5651 .quotactl
= selinux_quotactl
,
5652 .quota_on
= selinux_quota_on
,
5653 .syslog
= selinux_syslog
,
5654 .vm_enough_memory
= selinux_vm_enough_memory
,
5656 .netlink_send
= selinux_netlink_send
,
5658 .bprm_set_creds
= selinux_bprm_set_creds
,
5659 .bprm_committing_creds
= selinux_bprm_committing_creds
,
5660 .bprm_committed_creds
= selinux_bprm_committed_creds
,
5661 .bprm_secureexec
= selinux_bprm_secureexec
,
5663 .sb_alloc_security
= selinux_sb_alloc_security
,
5664 .sb_free_security
= selinux_sb_free_security
,
5665 .sb_copy_data
= selinux_sb_copy_data
,
5666 .sb_remount
= selinux_sb_remount
,
5667 .sb_kern_mount
= selinux_sb_kern_mount
,
5668 .sb_show_options
= selinux_sb_show_options
,
5669 .sb_statfs
= selinux_sb_statfs
,
5670 .sb_mount
= selinux_mount
,
5671 .sb_umount
= selinux_umount
,
5672 .sb_set_mnt_opts
= selinux_set_mnt_opts
,
5673 .sb_clone_mnt_opts
= selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts
,
5674 .sb_parse_opts_str
= selinux_parse_opts_str
,
5676 .dentry_init_security
= selinux_dentry_init_security
,
5678 .inode_alloc_security
= selinux_inode_alloc_security
,
5679 .inode_free_security
= selinux_inode_free_security
,
5680 .inode_init_security
= selinux_inode_init_security
,
5681 .inode_create
= selinux_inode_create
,
5682 .inode_link
= selinux_inode_link
,
5683 .inode_unlink
= selinux_inode_unlink
,
5684 .inode_symlink
= selinux_inode_symlink
,
5685 .inode_mkdir
= selinux_inode_mkdir
,
5686 .inode_rmdir
= selinux_inode_rmdir
,
5687 .inode_mknod
= selinux_inode_mknod
,
5688 .inode_rename
= selinux_inode_rename
,
5689 .inode_readlink
= selinux_inode_readlink
,
5690 .inode_follow_link
= selinux_inode_follow_link
,
5691 .inode_permission
= selinux_inode_permission
,
5692 .inode_setattr
= selinux_inode_setattr
,
5693 .inode_getattr
= selinux_inode_getattr
,
5694 .inode_setxattr
= selinux_inode_setxattr
,
5695 .inode_post_setxattr
= selinux_inode_post_setxattr
,
5696 .inode_getxattr
= selinux_inode_getxattr
,
5697 .inode_listxattr
= selinux_inode_listxattr
,
5698 .inode_removexattr
= selinux_inode_removexattr
,
5699 .inode_getsecurity
= selinux_inode_getsecurity
,
5700 .inode_setsecurity
= selinux_inode_setsecurity
,
5701 .inode_listsecurity
= selinux_inode_listsecurity
,
5702 .inode_getsecid
= selinux_inode_getsecid
,
5704 .file_permission
= selinux_file_permission
,
5705 .file_alloc_security
= selinux_file_alloc_security
,
5706 .file_free_security
= selinux_file_free_security
,
5707 .file_ioctl
= selinux_file_ioctl
,
5708 .mmap_file
= selinux_mmap_file
,
5709 .mmap_addr
= selinux_mmap_addr
,
5710 .file_mprotect
= selinux_file_mprotect
,
5711 .file_lock
= selinux_file_lock
,
5712 .file_fcntl
= selinux_file_fcntl
,
5713 .file_set_fowner
= selinux_file_set_fowner
,
5714 .file_send_sigiotask
= selinux_file_send_sigiotask
,
5715 .file_receive
= selinux_file_receive
,
5717 .file_open
= selinux_file_open
,
5719 .task_create
= selinux_task_create
,
5720 .cred_alloc_blank
= selinux_cred_alloc_blank
,
5721 .cred_free
= selinux_cred_free
,
5722 .cred_prepare
= selinux_cred_prepare
,
5723 .cred_transfer
= selinux_cred_transfer
,
5724 .kernel_act_as
= selinux_kernel_act_as
,
5725 .kernel_create_files_as
= selinux_kernel_create_files_as
,
5726 .kernel_module_request
= selinux_kernel_module_request
,
5727 .task_setpgid
= selinux_task_setpgid
,
5728 .task_getpgid
= selinux_task_getpgid
,
5729 .task_getsid
= selinux_task_getsid
,
5730 .task_getsecid
= selinux_task_getsecid
,
5731 .task_setnice
= selinux_task_setnice
,
5732 .task_setioprio
= selinux_task_setioprio
,
5733 .task_getioprio
= selinux_task_getioprio
,
5734 .task_setrlimit
= selinux_task_setrlimit
,
5735 .task_setscheduler
= selinux_task_setscheduler
,
5736 .task_getscheduler
= selinux_task_getscheduler
,
5737 .task_movememory
= selinux_task_movememory
,
5738 .task_kill
= selinux_task_kill
,
5739 .task_wait
= selinux_task_wait
,
5740 .task_to_inode
= selinux_task_to_inode
,
5742 .ipc_permission
= selinux_ipc_permission
,
5743 .ipc_getsecid
= selinux_ipc_getsecid
,
5745 .msg_msg_alloc_security
= selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security
,
5746 .msg_msg_free_security
= selinux_msg_msg_free_security
,
5748 .msg_queue_alloc_security
= selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security
,
5749 .msg_queue_free_security
= selinux_msg_queue_free_security
,
5750 .msg_queue_associate
= selinux_msg_queue_associate
,
5751 .msg_queue_msgctl
= selinux_msg_queue_msgctl
,
5752 .msg_queue_msgsnd
= selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd
,
5753 .msg_queue_msgrcv
= selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv
,
5755 .shm_alloc_security
= selinux_shm_alloc_security
,
5756 .shm_free_security
= selinux_shm_free_security
,
5757 .shm_associate
= selinux_shm_associate
,
5758 .shm_shmctl
= selinux_shm_shmctl
,
5759 .shm_shmat
= selinux_shm_shmat
,
5761 .sem_alloc_security
= selinux_sem_alloc_security
,
5762 .sem_free_security
= selinux_sem_free_security
,
5763 .sem_associate
= selinux_sem_associate
,
5764 .sem_semctl
= selinux_sem_semctl
,
5765 .sem_semop
= selinux_sem_semop
,
5767 .d_instantiate
= selinux_d_instantiate
,
5769 .getprocattr
= selinux_getprocattr
,
5770 .setprocattr
= selinux_setprocattr
,
5772 .ismaclabel
= selinux_ismaclabel
,
5773 .secid_to_secctx
= selinux_secid_to_secctx
,
5774 .secctx_to_secid
= selinux_secctx_to_secid
,
5775 .release_secctx
= selinux_release_secctx
,
5776 .inode_notifysecctx
= selinux_inode_notifysecctx
,
5777 .inode_setsecctx
= selinux_inode_setsecctx
,
5778 .inode_getsecctx
= selinux_inode_getsecctx
,
5780 .unix_stream_connect
= selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect
,
5781 .unix_may_send
= selinux_socket_unix_may_send
,
5783 .socket_create
= selinux_socket_create
,
5784 .socket_post_create
= selinux_socket_post_create
,
5785 .socket_bind
= selinux_socket_bind
,
5786 .socket_connect
= selinux_socket_connect
,
5787 .socket_listen
= selinux_socket_listen
,
5788 .socket_accept
= selinux_socket_accept
,
5789 .socket_sendmsg
= selinux_socket_sendmsg
,
5790 .socket_recvmsg
= selinux_socket_recvmsg
,
5791 .socket_getsockname
= selinux_socket_getsockname
,
5792 .socket_getpeername
= selinux_socket_getpeername
,
5793 .socket_getsockopt
= selinux_socket_getsockopt
,
5794 .socket_setsockopt
= selinux_socket_setsockopt
,
5795 .socket_shutdown
= selinux_socket_shutdown
,
5796 .socket_sock_rcv_skb
= selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb
,
5797 .socket_getpeersec_stream
= selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream
,
5798 .socket_getpeersec_dgram
= selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram
,
5799 .sk_alloc_security
= selinux_sk_alloc_security
,
5800 .sk_free_security
= selinux_sk_free_security
,
5801 .sk_clone_security
= selinux_sk_clone_security
,
5802 .sk_getsecid
= selinux_sk_getsecid
,
5803 .sock_graft
= selinux_sock_graft
,
5804 .inet_conn_request
= selinux_inet_conn_request
,
5805 .inet_csk_clone
= selinux_inet_csk_clone
,
5806 .inet_conn_established
= selinux_inet_conn_established
,
5807 .secmark_relabel_packet
= selinux_secmark_relabel_packet
,
5808 .secmark_refcount_inc
= selinux_secmark_refcount_inc
,
5809 .secmark_refcount_dec
= selinux_secmark_refcount_dec
,
5810 .req_classify_flow
= selinux_req_classify_flow
,
5811 .tun_dev_alloc_security
= selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security
,
5812 .tun_dev_free_security
= selinux_tun_dev_free_security
,
5813 .tun_dev_create
= selinux_tun_dev_create
,
5814 .tun_dev_attach_queue
= selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue
,
5815 .tun_dev_attach
= selinux_tun_dev_attach
,
5816 .tun_dev_open
= selinux_tun_dev_open
,
5817 .skb_owned_by
= selinux_skb_owned_by
,
5819 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5820 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc
,
5821 .xfrm_policy_clone_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_clone
,
5822 .xfrm_policy_free_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_free
,
5823 .xfrm_policy_delete_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_delete
,
5824 .xfrm_state_alloc
= selinux_xfrm_state_alloc
,
5825 .xfrm_state_alloc_acquire
= selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire
,
5826 .xfrm_state_free_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_free
,
5827 .xfrm_state_delete_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_delete
,
5828 .xfrm_policy_lookup
= selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup
,
5829 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
= selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
,
5830 .xfrm_decode_session
= selinux_xfrm_decode_session
,
5834 .key_alloc
= selinux_key_alloc
,
5835 .key_free
= selinux_key_free
,
5836 .key_permission
= selinux_key_permission
,
5837 .key_getsecurity
= selinux_key_getsecurity
,
5841 .audit_rule_init
= selinux_audit_rule_init
,
5842 .audit_rule_known
= selinux_audit_rule_known
,
5843 .audit_rule_match
= selinux_audit_rule_match
,
5844 .audit_rule_free
= selinux_audit_rule_free
,
5848 static __init
int selinux_init(void)
5850 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops
)) {
5851 selinux_enabled
= 0;
5855 if (!selinux_enabled
) {
5856 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5860 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5862 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5863 cred_init_security();
5865 default_noexec
= !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS
& VM_EXEC
);
5867 sel_inode_cache
= kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5868 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct
),
5869 0, SLAB_PANIC
, NULL
);
5872 if (register_security(&selinux_ops
))
5873 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5875 if (selinux_enforcing
)
5876 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5878 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5883 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block
*sb
, void *unused
)
5885 superblock_doinit(sb
, NULL
);
5888 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5890 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5892 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5893 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5894 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init
, NULL
);
5897 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5898 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5899 security_initcall(selinux_init
);
5901 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5903 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops
[] = {
5905 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_postroute
,
5906 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5908 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
5909 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
5912 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_forward
,
5913 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5915 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
5916 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
5919 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_output
,
5920 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5922 .hooknum
= NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT
,
5923 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
5927 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5929 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops
[] = {
5931 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_postroute
,
5932 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5934 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
5935 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
5938 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_forward
,
5939 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5941 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
5942 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
5948 static int __init
selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5952 if (!selinux_enabled
)
5955 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5957 err
= nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops
));
5959 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err
);
5961 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5962 err
= nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops
));
5964 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err
);
5971 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init
);
5973 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5974 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5976 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5978 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops
));
5979 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5980 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops
));
5985 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5987 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5988 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5991 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5993 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5994 static int selinux_disabled
;
5996 int selinux_disable(void)
5998 if (ss_initialized
) {
5999 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
6003 if (selinux_disabled
) {
6004 /* Only do this once. */
6008 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
6010 selinux_disabled
= 1;
6011 selinux_enabled
= 0;
6013 reset_security_ops();
6015 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
6018 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
6019 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
6021 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */