2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/security.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
55 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
57 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
58 #include <net/netlabel.h>
59 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
60 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
61 #include <linux/atomic.h>
62 #include <linux/bitops.h>
63 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
64 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
65 #include <net/netlink.h>
66 #include <linux/tcp.h>
67 #include <linux/udp.h>
68 #include <linux/dccp.h>
69 #include <linux/quota.h>
70 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
72 #include <linux/parser.h>
73 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
75 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
76 #include <linux/personality.h>
77 #include <linux/audit.h>
78 #include <linux/string.h>
79 #include <linux/selinux.h>
80 #include <linux/mutex.h>
81 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
82 #include <linux/syslog.h>
83 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
84 #include <linux/export.h>
85 #include <linux/msg.h>
86 #include <linux/shm.h>
98 extern struct security_operations
*security_ops
;
100 /* SECMARK reference count */
101 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount
= ATOMIC_INIT(0);
103 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
104 int selinux_enforcing
;
106 static int __init
enforcing_setup(char *str
)
108 unsigned long enforcing
;
109 if (!kstrtoul(str
, 0, &enforcing
))
110 selinux_enforcing
= enforcing
? 1 : 0;
113 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup
);
116 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
117 int selinux_enabled
= CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
;
119 static int __init
selinux_enabled_setup(char *str
)
121 unsigned long enabled
;
122 if (!kstrtoul(str
, 0, &enabled
))
123 selinux_enabled
= enabled
? 1 : 0;
126 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup
);
128 int selinux_enabled
= 1;
131 static struct kmem_cache
*sel_inode_cache
;
134 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
137 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
138 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
139 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
140 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
141 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
144 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
146 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork
|| atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount
));
150 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
153 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
154 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
155 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
156 * is always considered enabled.
159 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
161 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork
|| netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
165 * initialise the security for the init task
167 static void cred_init_security(void)
169 struct cred
*cred
= (struct cred
*) current
->real_cred
;
170 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
172 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
174 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
176 tsec
->osid
= tsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
177 cred
->security
= tsec
;
181 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
183 static inline u32
cred_sid(const struct cred
*cred
)
185 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
187 tsec
= cred
->security
;
192 * get the objective security ID of a task
194 static inline u32
task_sid(const struct task_struct
*task
)
199 sid
= cred_sid(__task_cred(task
));
205 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
207 static inline u32
current_sid(void)
209 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
214 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
216 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
218 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
219 u32 sid
= current_sid();
221 isec
= kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache
, GFP_NOFS
);
225 mutex_init(&isec
->lock
);
226 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec
->list
);
228 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
229 isec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_FILE
;
230 isec
->task_sid
= sid
;
231 inode
->i_security
= isec
;
236 static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head
*head
)
238 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
240 isec
= container_of(head
, struct inode_security_struct
, rcu
);
241 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache
, isec
);
244 static void inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
246 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
247 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
249 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
250 if (!list_empty(&isec
->list
))
251 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
252 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
255 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
256 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
257 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
258 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
259 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
260 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
261 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
263 call_rcu(&isec
->rcu
, inode_free_rcu
);
266 static int file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
268 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
269 u32 sid
= current_sid();
271 fsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
276 fsec
->fown_sid
= sid
;
277 file
->f_security
= fsec
;
282 static void file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
284 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
285 file
->f_security
= NULL
;
289 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
291 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
293 sbsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
297 mutex_init(&sbsec
->lock
);
298 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec
->isec_head
);
299 spin_lock_init(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
301 sbsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
302 sbsec
->def_sid
= SECINITSID_FILE
;
303 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
304 sb
->s_security
= sbsec
;
309 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
311 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
312 sb
->s_security
= NULL
;
316 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
318 static const char *labeling_behaviors
[7] = {
320 "uses transition SIDs",
322 "uses genfs_contexts",
323 "not configured for labeling",
324 "uses mountpoint labeling",
325 "uses native labeling",
328 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
);
330 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode
*inode
)
332 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, NULL
);
341 Opt_labelsupport
= 5,
345 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
347 static const match_table_t tokens
= {
348 {Opt_context
, CONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
349 {Opt_fscontext
, FSCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
350 {Opt_defcontext
, DEFCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
351 {Opt_rootcontext
, ROOTCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
352 {Opt_labelsupport
, LABELSUPP_STR
},
356 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
358 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid
,
359 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
360 const struct cred
*cred
)
362 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
365 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
366 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
370 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
371 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
375 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid
,
376 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
377 const struct cred
*cred
)
379 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
381 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
382 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
386 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
387 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, NULL
);
391 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block
*sb
)
393 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
395 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
||
396 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS
||
397 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK
)
400 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
401 if (strncmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
405 * Special handling for rootfs. Is genfs but supports
406 * setting SELinux context on in-core inodes.
408 if (strncmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "rootfs", sizeof("rootfs")) == 0)
414 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block
*sb
)
416 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
417 struct dentry
*root
= sb
->s_root
;
418 struct inode
*root_inode
= root
->d_inode
;
421 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
) {
422 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
423 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
424 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
425 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
426 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
427 if (!root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
428 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
429 "xattr support\n", sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
433 rc
= root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr(root
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, NULL
, 0);
434 if (rc
< 0 && rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
435 if (rc
== -EOPNOTSUPP
)
436 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
437 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
438 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
440 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
441 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb
->s_id
,
442 sb
->s_type
->name
, -rc
);
447 if (sbsec
->behavior
> ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors
))
448 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
449 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
451 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
452 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
,
453 labeling_behaviors
[sbsec
->behavior
-1]);
455 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBINITIALIZED
;
456 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb
))
457 sbsec
->flags
|= SBLABEL_MNT
;
459 /* Initialize the root inode. */
460 rc
= inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode
, root
);
462 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
463 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
464 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
466 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
468 if (!list_empty(&sbsec
->isec_head
)) {
469 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
=
470 list_entry(sbsec
->isec_head
.next
,
471 struct inode_security_struct
, list
);
472 struct inode
*inode
= isec
->inode
;
473 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
474 inode
= igrab(inode
);
476 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode
))
480 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
481 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
484 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
490 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
491 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
492 * mount options, or whatever.
494 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*sb
,
495 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
498 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
499 char *context
= NULL
;
503 security_init_mnt_opts(opts
);
505 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
511 /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
512 BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK
>= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
));
514 tmp
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
515 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
516 for (i
= 0; i
< NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
; i
++) {
518 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
521 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
522 if (sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
)
523 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
525 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
526 if (!opts
->mnt_opts
) {
531 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
532 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
538 if (sbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) {
539 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
542 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
543 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
545 if (sbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) {
546 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, &context
, &len
);
549 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
550 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
552 if (sbsec
->flags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) {
553 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->def_sid
, &context
, &len
);
556 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
557 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
559 if (sbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
560 struct inode
*root
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
561 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= root
->i_security
;
563 rc
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
566 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
567 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
569 if (sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
) {
570 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = NULL
;
571 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = SBLABEL_MNT
;
574 BUG_ON(i
!= opts
->num_mnt_opts
);
579 security_free_mnt_opts(opts
);
583 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
, char flag
,
584 u32 old_sid
, u32 new_sid
)
586 char mnt_flags
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
588 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
589 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
590 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& flag
) ||
591 (old_sid
!= new_sid
))
594 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
595 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
597 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
598 if (mnt_flags
& flag
)
604 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
605 * labeling information.
607 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block
*sb
,
608 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
,
609 unsigned long kern_flags
,
610 unsigned long *set_kern_flags
)
612 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
614 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
615 const char *name
= sb
->s_type
->name
;
616 struct inode
*inode
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
617 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
= inode
->i_security
;
618 u32 fscontext_sid
= 0, context_sid
= 0, rootcontext_sid
= 0;
619 u32 defcontext_sid
= 0;
620 char **mount_options
= opts
->mnt_opts
;
621 int *flags
= opts
->mnt_opts_flags
;
622 int num_opts
= opts
->num_mnt_opts
;
624 mutex_lock(&sbsec
->lock
);
626 if (!ss_initialized
) {
628 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
629 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
630 server is ready to handle calls. */
634 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
635 "before the security server is initialized\n");
638 if (kern_flags
&& !set_kern_flags
) {
639 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
640 * place the results is not allowed */
646 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
647 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
648 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
649 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
651 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
652 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
653 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
654 * will be used for both mounts)
656 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) && (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
661 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
662 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
663 * than once with different security options.
665 for (i
= 0; i
< num_opts
; i
++) {
668 if (flags
[i
] == SBLABEL_MNT
)
670 rc
= security_context_to_sid(mount_options
[i
],
671 strlen(mount_options
[i
]), &sid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
673 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
674 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
675 mount_options
[i
], sb
->s_id
, name
, rc
);
682 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
,
684 goto out_double_mount
;
686 sbsec
->flags
|= FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
691 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
,
693 goto out_double_mount
;
695 sbsec
->flags
|= CONTEXT_MNT
;
697 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
698 rootcontext_sid
= sid
;
700 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
,
702 goto out_double_mount
;
704 sbsec
->flags
|= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
708 defcontext_sid
= sid
;
710 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
,
712 goto out_double_mount
;
714 sbsec
->flags
|= DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
723 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
724 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
725 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
) && !num_opts
)
726 goto out_double_mount
;
731 if (strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "proc") == 0)
732 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBPROC
;
734 if (!sbsec
->behavior
) {
736 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
739 rc
= security_fs_use(sb
);
742 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
743 __func__
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
747 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
749 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid
, sbsec
, cred
);
753 sbsec
->sid
= fscontext_sid
;
757 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
758 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
759 * the superblock context if not already set.
761 if (kern_flags
& SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
&& !context_sid
) {
762 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
;
763 *set_kern_flags
|= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
;
767 if (!fscontext_sid
) {
768 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
772 sbsec
->sid
= context_sid
;
774 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
779 if (!rootcontext_sid
)
780 rootcontext_sid
= context_sid
;
782 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= context_sid
;
783 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
;
786 if (rootcontext_sid
) {
787 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid
, sbsec
,
792 root_isec
->sid
= rootcontext_sid
;
793 root_isec
->initialized
= 1;
796 if (defcontext_sid
) {
797 if (sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
&&
798 sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
) {
800 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: defcontext option is "
801 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
805 if (defcontext_sid
!= sbsec
->def_sid
) {
806 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid
,
812 sbsec
->def_sid
= defcontext_sid
;
815 rc
= sb_finish_set_opts(sb
);
817 mutex_unlock(&sbsec
->lock
);
821 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
822 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb
->s_id
, name
);
826 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
827 const struct super_block
*newsb
)
829 struct superblock_security_struct
*old
= oldsb
->s_security
;
830 struct superblock_security_struct
*new = newsb
->s_security
;
831 char oldflags
= old
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
832 char newflags
= new->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
834 if (oldflags
!= newflags
)
836 if ((oldflags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->sid
!= new->sid
)
838 if ((oldflags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->mntpoint_sid
!= new->mntpoint_sid
)
840 if ((oldflags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->def_sid
!= new->def_sid
)
842 if (oldflags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
843 struct inode_security_struct
*oldroot
= oldsb
->s_root
->d_inode
->i_security
;
844 struct inode_security_struct
*newroot
= newsb
->s_root
->d_inode
->i_security
;
845 if (oldroot
->sid
!= newroot
->sid
)
850 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
851 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
852 "type %s)\n", newsb
->s_id
, newsb
->s_type
->name
);
856 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
857 struct super_block
*newsb
)
859 const struct superblock_security_struct
*oldsbsec
= oldsb
->s_security
;
860 struct superblock_security_struct
*newsbsec
= newsb
->s_security
;
862 int set_fscontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
);
863 int set_context
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
);
864 int set_rootcontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
);
867 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
868 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
873 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
874 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
));
876 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
877 if (newsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
878 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb
, newsb
);
880 mutex_lock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
882 newsbsec
->flags
= oldsbsec
->flags
;
884 newsbsec
->sid
= oldsbsec
->sid
;
885 newsbsec
->def_sid
= oldsbsec
->def_sid
;
886 newsbsec
->behavior
= oldsbsec
->behavior
;
889 u32 sid
= oldsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
893 if (!set_rootcontext
) {
894 struct inode
*newinode
= newsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
895 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= newinode
->i_security
;
898 newsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= sid
;
900 if (set_rootcontext
) {
901 const struct inode
*oldinode
= oldsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
902 const struct inode_security_struct
*oldisec
= oldinode
->i_security
;
903 struct inode
*newinode
= newsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
904 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= newinode
->i_security
;
906 newisec
->sid
= oldisec
->sid
;
909 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb
);
910 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
914 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options
,
915 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
918 char *context
= NULL
, *defcontext
= NULL
;
919 char *fscontext
= NULL
, *rootcontext
= NULL
;
920 int rc
, num_mnt_opts
= 0;
922 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= 0;
924 /* Standard string-based options. */
925 while ((p
= strsep(&options
, "|")) != NULL
) {
927 substring_t args
[MAX_OPT_ARGS
];
932 token
= match_token(p
, tokens
, args
);
936 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
938 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
941 context
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
951 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
954 fscontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
961 case Opt_rootcontext
:
964 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
967 rootcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
975 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
977 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
980 defcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
986 case Opt_labelsupport
:
990 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
997 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
1001 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
1002 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
1003 kfree(opts
->mnt_opts
);
1008 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = fscontext
;
1009 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
1012 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = context
;
1013 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
1016 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = rootcontext
;
1017 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
1020 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = defcontext
;
1021 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
1024 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= num_mnt_opts
;
1035 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1037 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
1040 char *options
= data
;
1041 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
1043 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1048 BUG_ON(sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
);
1050 rc
= selinux_parse_opts_str(options
, &opts
);
1055 rc
= selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
, 0, NULL
);
1058 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1062 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file
*m
,
1063 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
1068 for (i
= 0; i
< opts
->num_mnt_opts
; i
++) {
1071 if (opts
->mnt_opts
[i
])
1072 has_comma
= strchr(opts
->mnt_opts
[i
], ',');
1076 switch (opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
]) {
1078 prefix
= CONTEXT_STR
;
1081 prefix
= FSCONTEXT_STR
;
1083 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
1084 prefix
= ROOTCONTEXT_STR
;
1086 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT
:
1087 prefix
= DEFCONTEXT_STR
;
1091 seq_puts(m
, LABELSUPP_STR
);
1097 /* we need a comma before each option */
1099 seq_puts(m
, prefix
);
1102 seq_puts(m
, opts
->mnt_opts
[i
]);
1108 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file
*m
, struct super_block
*sb
)
1110 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
1113 rc
= selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
);
1115 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1121 selinux_write_opts(m
, &opts
);
1123 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1128 static inline u16
inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode
)
1130 switch (mode
& S_IFMT
) {
1132 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE
;
1134 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
;
1136 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1138 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE
;
1140 return SECCLASS_DIR
;
1142 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE
;
1144 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE
;
1148 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1151 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol
)
1153 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_TCP
);
1156 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol
)
1158 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_UDP
);
1161 static inline u16
socket_type_to_security_class(int family
, int type
, int protocol
)
1167 case SOCK_SEQPACKET
:
1168 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
;
1170 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET
;
1177 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol
))
1178 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
;
1180 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1182 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol
))
1183 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
;
1185 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1187 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
;
1189 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1195 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET
;
1196 case NETLINK_FIREWALL
:
1197 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET
;
1198 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG
:
1199 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET
;
1201 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET
;
1203 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET
;
1204 case NETLINK_SELINUX
:
1205 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET
;
1207 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET
;
1208 case NETLINK_IP6_FW
:
1209 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET
;
1210 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG
:
1211 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET
;
1212 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT
:
1213 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET
;
1215 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET
;
1218 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET
;
1220 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET
;
1222 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET
;
1225 return SECCLASS_SOCKET
;
1228 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1229 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry
*dentry
,
1234 char *buffer
, *path
;
1236 buffer
= (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
1240 path
= dentry_path_raw(dentry
, buffer
, PAGE_SIZE
);
1244 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1245 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1246 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1247 while (path
[1] >= '0' && path
[1] <= '9') {
1251 rc
= security_genfs_sid("proc", path
, tclass
, sid
);
1253 free_page((unsigned long)buffer
);
1257 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry
*dentry
,
1265 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1266 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
)
1268 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= NULL
;
1269 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1271 struct dentry
*dentry
;
1272 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1273 char *context
= NULL
;
1277 if (isec
->initialized
)
1280 mutex_lock(&isec
->lock
);
1281 if (isec
->initialized
)
1284 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1285 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)) {
1286 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1287 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1288 server is ready to handle calls. */
1289 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1290 if (list_empty(&isec
->list
))
1291 list_add(&isec
->list
, &sbsec
->isec_head
);
1292 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1296 switch (sbsec
->behavior
) {
1297 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
:
1299 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
:
1300 if (!inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
1301 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1305 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1306 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1308 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1309 dentry
= dget(opt_dentry
);
1311 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1312 dentry
= d_find_alias(inode
);
1316 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1317 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1318 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1319 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1320 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1321 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1322 * be used again by userspace.
1327 len
= INITCONTEXTLEN
;
1328 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1334 context
[len
] = '\0';
1335 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1337 if (rc
== -ERANGE
) {
1340 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1341 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1348 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1354 context
[len
] = '\0';
1355 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
,
1361 if (rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
1362 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1363 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__
,
1364 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
1368 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1369 sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1372 rc
= security_context_to_sid_default(context
, rc
, &sid
,
1376 char *dev
= inode
->i_sb
->s_id
;
1377 unsigned long ino
= inode
->i_ino
;
1379 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
1380 if (printk_ratelimit())
1381 printk(KERN_NOTICE
"SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1382 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1383 "filesystem in question.\n", ino
, dev
, context
);
1385 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1386 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1387 __func__
, context
, -rc
, dev
, ino
);
1390 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1398 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK
:
1399 isec
->sid
= isec
->task_sid
;
1401 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS
:
1402 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1403 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1405 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1406 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1407 rc
= security_transition_sid(isec
->task_sid
, sbsec
->sid
,
1408 isec
->sclass
, NULL
, &sid
);
1413 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
:
1414 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
1417 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1418 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1420 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBPROC
) && !S_ISLNK(inode
->i_mode
)) {
1421 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1424 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1425 * d_splice_alias. */
1426 dentry
= dget(opt_dentry
);
1428 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1430 dentry
= d_find_alias(inode
);
1432 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1433 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1434 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1435 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1436 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1437 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1438 * could be used again by userspace.
1442 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1443 rc
= selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry
, isec
->sclass
, &sid
);
1452 isec
->initialized
= 1;
1455 mutex_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
1457 if (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_FILE
)
1458 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1462 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1463 static inline u32
signal_to_av(int sig
)
1469 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1470 perm
= PROCESS__SIGCHLD
;
1473 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1474 perm
= PROCESS__SIGKILL
;
1477 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1478 perm
= PROCESS__SIGSTOP
;
1481 /* All other signals. */
1482 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNAL
;
1490 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1491 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1493 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred
*actor
,
1494 const struct cred
*target
,
1497 u32 asid
= cred_sid(actor
), tsid
= cred_sid(target
);
1499 return avc_has_perm(asid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1503 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1504 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1505 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1506 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1508 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk1
,
1509 const struct task_struct
*tsk2
,
1512 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec1
, *__tsec2
;
1516 __tsec1
= __task_cred(tsk1
)->security
; sid1
= __tsec1
->sid
;
1517 __tsec2
= __task_cred(tsk2
)->security
; sid2
= __tsec2
->sid
;
1519 return avc_has_perm(sid1
, sid2
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1523 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1524 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1525 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1526 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1528 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1533 sid
= current_sid();
1534 tsid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1535 return avc_has_perm(sid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1538 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1539 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1542 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1543 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred
*cred
,
1546 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1547 struct av_decision avd
;
1549 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1550 u32 av
= CAP_TO_MASK(cap
);
1553 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP
;
1556 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap
)) {
1558 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY
;
1561 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2
;
1565 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap
);
1570 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, 0, &avd
);
1571 if (audit
== SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
) {
1572 int rc2
= avc_audit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, &avd
, rc
, &ad
);
1579 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1580 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1583 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1585 return avc_has_perm(sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
1586 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, perms
, NULL
);
1589 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1590 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1591 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1592 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1593 struct inode
*inode
,
1595 struct common_audit_data
*adp
)
1597 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
1600 validate_creds(cred
);
1602 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
1605 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1606 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1608 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, adp
);
1611 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1612 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1613 pathname if needed. */
1614 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1615 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1618 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
1619 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1621 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1622 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1623 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1626 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1627 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1628 pathname if needed. */
1629 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1633 struct inode
*inode
= path
->dentry
->d_inode
;
1634 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1636 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1638 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1641 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1642 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1646 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1648 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1649 ad
.u
.path
= file
->f_path
;
1650 return inode_has_perm(cred
, file_inode(file
), av
, &ad
);
1653 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1654 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1655 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1656 check a particular permission to the file.
1657 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1658 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1659 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1660 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1661 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1665 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
1666 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
1667 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1668 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1671 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1672 ad
.u
.path
= file
->f_path
;
1674 if (sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
1675 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, fsec
->sid
,
1683 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1686 rc
= inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1692 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1693 static int may_create(struct inode
*dir
,
1694 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1697 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
1698 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
1699 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1701 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1704 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
1705 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1708 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
1710 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1711 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1713 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1714 DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
,
1719 if (!newsid
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
)) {
1720 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, dsec
->sid
, tclass
,
1721 &dentry
->d_name
, &newsid
);
1726 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, tclass
, FILE__CREATE
, &ad
);
1730 return avc_has_perm(newsid
, sbsec
->sid
,
1731 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
1732 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
1735 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1736 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid
,
1737 struct task_struct
*ctx
)
1739 u32 sid
= task_sid(ctx
);
1741 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, KEY__CREATE
, NULL
);
1745 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1748 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1749 static int may_link(struct inode
*dir
,
1750 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1754 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
, *isec
;
1755 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1756 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1760 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
1761 isec
= dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1763 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1764 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1767 av
|= (kind
? DIR__REMOVE_NAME
: DIR__ADD_NAME
);
1768 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1783 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1788 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, av
, &ad
);
1792 static inline int may_rename(struct inode
*old_dir
,
1793 struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
1794 struct inode
*new_dir
,
1795 struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
1797 struct inode_security_struct
*old_dsec
, *new_dsec
, *old_isec
, *new_isec
;
1798 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1799 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1801 int old_is_dir
, new_is_dir
;
1804 old_dsec
= old_dir
->i_security
;
1805 old_isec
= old_dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1806 old_is_dir
= S_ISDIR(old_dentry
->d_inode
->i_mode
);
1807 new_dsec
= new_dir
->i_security
;
1809 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1811 ad
.u
.dentry
= old_dentry
;
1812 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1813 DIR__REMOVE_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
, &ad
);
1816 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1817 old_isec
->sclass
, FILE__RENAME
, &ad
);
1820 if (old_is_dir
&& new_dir
!= old_dir
) {
1821 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1822 old_isec
->sclass
, DIR__REPARENT
, &ad
);
1827 ad
.u
.dentry
= new_dentry
;
1828 av
= DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
;
1829 if (new_dentry
->d_inode
)
1830 av
|= DIR__REMOVE_NAME
;
1831 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1834 if (new_dentry
->d_inode
) {
1835 new_isec
= new_dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1836 new_is_dir
= S_ISDIR(new_dentry
->d_inode
->i_mode
);
1837 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_isec
->sid
,
1839 (new_is_dir
? DIR__RMDIR
: FILE__UNLINK
), &ad
);
1847 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1848 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1849 struct super_block
*sb
,
1851 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
1853 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1854 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1856 sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
1857 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
, perms
, ad
);
1860 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1861 static inline u32
file_mask_to_av(int mode
, int mask
)
1865 if (!S_ISDIR(mode
)) {
1866 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1867 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
1868 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1871 if (mask
& MAY_APPEND
)
1873 else if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1877 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1879 if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1881 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1888 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1889 static inline u32
file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1893 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_READ
)
1895 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_WRITE
) {
1896 if (file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
)
1903 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1912 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1915 static inline u32
open_file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1917 u32 av
= file_to_av(file
);
1919 if (selinux_policycap_openperm
)
1925 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1927 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct
*child
,
1932 rc
= cap_ptrace_access_check(child
, mode
);
1936 if (mode
& PTRACE_MODE_READ
) {
1937 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1938 u32 csid
= task_sid(child
);
1939 return avc_has_perm(sid
, csid
, SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__READ
, NULL
);
1942 return current_has_perm(child
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
1945 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct
*parent
)
1949 rc
= cap_ptrace_traceme(parent
);
1953 return task_has_perm(parent
, current
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
1956 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct
*target
, kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
1957 kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
, kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
1961 error
= current_has_perm(target
, PROCESS__GETCAP
);
1965 return cap_capget(target
, effective
, inheritable
, permitted
);
1968 static int selinux_capset(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
1969 const kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
1970 const kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
,
1971 const kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
1975 error
= cap_capset(new, old
,
1976 effective
, inheritable
, permitted
);
1980 return cred_has_perm(old
, new, PROCESS__SETCAP
);
1984 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1985 * which was removed).
1987 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1988 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1989 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1990 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1993 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred
*cred
, struct user_namespace
*ns
,
1998 rc
= cap_capable(cred
, ns
, cap
, audit
);
2002 return cred_has_capability(cred
, cap
, audit
);
2005 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds
, int type
, int id
, struct super_block
*sb
)
2007 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2019 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD
, NULL
);
2024 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET
, NULL
);
2027 rc
= 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2033 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2035 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2037 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__QUOTAON
);
2040 static int selinux_syslog(int type
)
2045 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL
: /* Read last kernel messages */
2046 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER
: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2047 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ
);
2049 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF
: /* Disable logging to console */
2050 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON
: /* Enable logging to console */
2051 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2052 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL
:
2053 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE
);
2055 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE
: /* Close log */
2056 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN
: /* Open log */
2057 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ
: /* Read from log */
2058 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR
: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2059 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR
: /* Clear ring buffer */
2061 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD
);
2068 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2069 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2070 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2072 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2073 * processes that allocate mappings.
2075 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct
*mm
, long pages
)
2077 int rc
, cap_sys_admin
= 0;
2079 rc
= selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns
, CAP_SYS_ADMIN
,
2080 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
2084 return __vm_enough_memory(mm
, pages
, cap_sys_admin
);
2087 /* binprm security operations */
2089 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2091 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
2092 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2093 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2094 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2095 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(bprm
->file
);
2098 rc
= cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm
);
2102 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2103 * the script interpreter */
2104 if (bprm
->cred_prepared
)
2107 old_tsec
= current_security();
2108 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2109 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2111 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2112 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2113 new_tsec
->osid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2115 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2116 new_tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
2117 new_tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
2118 new_tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
2120 if (old_tsec
->exec_sid
) {
2121 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->exec_sid
;
2122 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2123 new_tsec
->exec_sid
= 0;
2126 * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs or nosuid and a
2127 * transition is explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
2129 if (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS
)
2131 if (bprm
->file
->f_path
.mnt
->mnt_flags
& MNT_NOSUID
)
2134 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2135 rc
= security_transition_sid(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2136 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, NULL
,
2142 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
2143 ad
.u
.path
= bprm
->file
->f_path
;
2145 if ((bprm
->file
->f_path
.mnt
->mnt_flags
& MNT_NOSUID
) ||
2146 (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS
))
2147 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2149 if (new_tsec
->sid
== old_tsec
->sid
) {
2150 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2151 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS
, &ad
);
2155 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2156 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2157 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__TRANSITION
, &ad
);
2161 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2162 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__ENTRYPOINT
, &ad
);
2166 /* Check for shared state */
2167 if (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE
) {
2168 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2169 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SHARE
,
2175 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2176 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2178 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE
| LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
)) {
2179 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
2180 struct task_security_struct
*sec
;
2184 tracer
= ptrace_parent(current
);
2185 if (likely(tracer
!= NULL
)) {
2186 sec
= __task_cred(tracer
)->security
;
2192 rc
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2194 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
2200 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2201 bprm
->per_clear
|= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID
;
2207 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2209 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2217 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2218 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2219 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2220 atsecure
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
,
2222 PROCESS__NOATSECURE
, NULL
);
2225 return (atsecure
|| cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm
));
2228 static int match_file(const void *p
, struct file
*file
, unsigned fd
)
2230 return file_has_perm(p
, file
, file_to_av(file
)) ? fd
+ 1 : 0;
2233 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2234 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred
*cred
,
2235 struct files_struct
*files
)
2237 struct file
*file
, *devnull
= NULL
;
2238 struct tty_struct
*tty
;
2242 tty
= get_current_tty();
2244 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock
);
2245 if (!list_empty(&tty
->tty_files
)) {
2246 struct tty_file_private
*file_priv
;
2248 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2249 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2250 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2251 open file may belong to another process and we are
2252 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2253 file_priv
= list_first_entry(&tty
->tty_files
,
2254 struct tty_file_private
, list
);
2255 file
= file_priv
->file
;
2256 if (file_path_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__READ
| FILE__WRITE
))
2259 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock
);
2262 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2266 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2267 n
= iterate_fd(files
, 0, match_file
, cred
);
2268 if (!n
) /* none found? */
2271 devnull
= dentry_open(&selinux_null
, O_RDWR
, cred
);
2272 if (IS_ERR(devnull
))
2274 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2276 replace_fd(n
- 1, devnull
, 0);
2277 } while ((n
= iterate_fd(files
, n
, match_file
, cred
)) != 0);
2283 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2285 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2287 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2288 struct rlimit
*rlim
, *initrlim
;
2291 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2292 if (new_tsec
->sid
== new_tsec
->osid
)
2295 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2296 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm
->cred
, current
->files
);
2298 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2299 current
->pdeath_signal
= 0;
2301 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2302 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2303 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2305 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2306 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2307 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2308 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2309 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2311 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->osid
, new_tsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2312 PROCESS__RLIMITINH
, NULL
);
2314 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2316 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++) {
2317 rlim
= current
->signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2318 initrlim
= init_task
.signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2319 rlim
->rlim_cur
= min(rlim
->rlim_max
, initrlim
->rlim_cur
);
2321 task_unlock(current
);
2322 update_rlimit_cpu(current
, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU
));
2327 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2330 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2332 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2333 struct itimerval itimer
;
2343 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2344 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2345 * flush and unblock signals.
2347 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2348 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2350 rc
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SIGINH
, NULL
);
2352 memset(&itimer
, 0, sizeof itimer
);
2353 for (i
= 0; i
< 3; i
++)
2354 do_setitimer(i
, &itimer
, NULL
);
2355 spin_lock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2356 if (!(current
->signal
->flags
& SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT
)) {
2357 __flush_signals(current
);
2358 flush_signal_handlers(current
, 1);
2359 sigemptyset(¤t
->blocked
);
2361 spin_unlock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2364 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2365 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2366 read_lock(&tasklist_lock
);
2367 __wake_up_parent(current
, current
->real_parent
);
2368 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock
);
2371 /* superblock security operations */
2373 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2375 return superblock_alloc_security(sb
);
2378 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2380 superblock_free_security(sb
);
2383 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix
, int plen
, char *option
, int olen
)
2388 return !memcmp(prefix
, option
, plen
);
2391 static inline int selinux_option(char *option
, int len
)
2393 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2394 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2395 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2396 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2397 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR
, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR
)-1, option
, len
));
2400 static inline void take_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
, int len
)
2407 memcpy(*to
, from
, len
);
2411 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
,
2414 int current_size
= 0;
2422 while (current_size
< len
) {
2432 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig
, char *copy
)
2434 int fnosec
, fsec
, rc
= 0;
2435 char *in_save
, *in_curr
, *in_end
;
2436 char *sec_curr
, *nosec_save
, *nosec
;
2442 nosec
= (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
2450 in_save
= in_end
= orig
;
2454 open_quote
= !open_quote
;
2455 if ((*in_end
== ',' && open_quote
== 0) ||
2457 int len
= in_end
- in_curr
;
2459 if (selinux_option(in_curr
, len
))
2460 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr
, in_curr
, &fsec
, len
);
2462 take_option(&nosec
, in_curr
, &fnosec
, len
);
2464 in_curr
= in_end
+ 1;
2466 } while (*in_end
++);
2468 strcpy(in_save
, nosec_save
);
2469 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save
);
2474 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
2477 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
2478 char *secdata
, **mount_options
;
2479 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
2481 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
2487 if (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
2490 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts
);
2491 secdata
= alloc_secdata();
2494 rc
= selinux_sb_copy_data(data
, secdata
);
2496 goto out_free_secdata
;
2498 rc
= selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata
, &opts
);
2500 goto out_free_secdata
;
2502 mount_options
= opts
.mnt_opts
;
2503 flags
= opts
.mnt_opts_flags
;
2505 for (i
= 0; i
< opts
.num_mnt_opts
; i
++) {
2509 if (flags
[i
] == SBLABEL_MNT
)
2511 len
= strlen(mount_options
[i
]);
2512 rc
= security_context_to_sid(mount_options
[i
], len
, &sid
,
2515 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2516 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2517 mount_options
[i
], sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
2523 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
, sid
))
2524 goto out_bad_option
;
2527 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, sid
))
2528 goto out_bad_option
;
2530 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
: {
2531 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
;
2532 root_isec
= sb
->s_root
->d_inode
->i_security
;
2534 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
, sid
))
2535 goto out_bad_option
;
2538 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT
:
2539 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
, sid
))
2540 goto out_bad_option
;
2549 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
2551 free_secdata(secdata
);
2554 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unable to change security options "
2555 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb
->s_id
,
2560 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block
*sb
, int flags
, void *data
)
2562 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2563 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2566 rc
= superblock_doinit(sb
, data
);
2570 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2571 if (flags
& MS_KERNMOUNT
)
2574 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2575 ad
.u
.dentry
= sb
->s_root
;
2576 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT
, &ad
);
2579 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2581 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2582 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2584 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2585 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
->d_sb
->s_root
;
2586 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, dentry
->d_sb
, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR
, &ad
);
2589 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name
,
2592 unsigned long flags
,
2595 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2597 if (flags
& MS_REMOUNT
)
2598 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, path
->dentry
->d_sb
,
2599 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT
, NULL
);
2601 return path_has_perm(cred
, path
, FILE__MOUNTON
);
2604 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, int flags
)
2606 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2608 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, mnt
->mnt_sb
,
2609 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT
, NULL
);
2612 /* inode security operations */
2614 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2616 return inode_alloc_security(inode
);
2619 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2621 inode_free_security(inode
);
2624 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry
*dentry
, int mode
,
2625 struct qstr
*name
, void **ctx
,
2628 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2629 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
2630 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
2631 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2632 struct inode
*dir
= dentry
->d_parent
->d_inode
;
2636 tsec
= cred
->security
;
2637 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
2638 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2640 if (tsec
->create_sid
&& sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
) {
2641 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
2643 rc
= security_transition_sid(tsec
->sid
, dsec
->sid
,
2644 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
),
2649 "%s: security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d\n",
2655 return security_sid_to_context(newsid
, (char **)ctx
, ctxlen
);
2658 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode
*inode
, struct inode
*dir
,
2659 const struct qstr
*qstr
,
2661 void **value
, size_t *len
)
2663 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2664 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
2665 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2666 u32 sid
, newsid
, clen
;
2670 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
2671 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2674 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
2676 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) &&
2677 (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
))
2678 newsid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
2679 else if (!newsid
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
)) {
2680 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, dsec
->sid
,
2681 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
),
2684 printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: "
2685 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2688 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
2693 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2694 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
2695 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2696 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
2698 isec
->initialized
= 1;
2701 if (!ss_initialized
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
))
2705 *name
= XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
;
2708 rc
= security_sid_to_context_force(newsid
, &context
, &clen
);
2718 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mode
)
2720 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_FILE
);
2723 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry
*old_dentry
, struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2725 return may_link(dir
, old_dentry
, MAY_LINK
);
2728 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2730 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_UNLINK
);
2733 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2735 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
);
2738 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mask
)
2740 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_DIR
);
2743 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2745 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_RMDIR
);
2748 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mode
, dev_t dev
)
2750 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
));
2753 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode
*old_inode
, struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
2754 struct inode
*new_inode
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2756 return may_rename(old_inode
, old_dentry
, new_inode
, new_dentry
);
2759 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2761 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2763 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2766 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct nameidata
*nameidata
)
2768 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2770 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2773 static noinline
int audit_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
,
2774 u32 perms
, u32 audited
, u32 denied
,
2778 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2779 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2782 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE
;
2785 rc
= slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
,
2786 audited
, denied
, result
, &ad
, flags
);
2792 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
, int mask
)
2794 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2797 unsigned flags
= mask
& MAY_NOT_BLOCK
;
2798 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2800 struct av_decision avd
;
2802 u32 audited
, denied
;
2804 from_access
= mask
& MAY_ACCESS
;
2805 mask
&= (MAY_READ
|MAY_WRITE
|MAY_EXEC
|MAY_APPEND
);
2807 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2811 validate_creds(cred
);
2813 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
2816 perms
= file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
);
2818 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
2819 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2821 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, 0, &avd
);
2822 audited
= avc_audit_required(perms
, &avd
, rc
,
2823 from_access
? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS
: 0,
2825 if (likely(!audited
))
2828 rc2
= audit_inode_permission(inode
, perms
, audited
, denied
, rc
, flags
);
2834 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct iattr
*iattr
)
2836 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2837 unsigned int ia_valid
= iattr
->ia_valid
;
2838 __u32 av
= FILE__WRITE
;
2840 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2841 if (ia_valid
& ATTR_FORCE
) {
2842 ia_valid
&= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID
| ATTR_KILL_SGID
| ATTR_MODE
|
2848 if (ia_valid
& (ATTR_MODE
| ATTR_UID
| ATTR_GID
|
2849 ATTR_ATIME_SET
| ATTR_MTIME_SET
| ATTR_TIMES_SET
))
2850 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2852 if (selinux_policycap_openperm
&& (ia_valid
& ATTR_SIZE
))
2855 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, av
);
2858 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2860 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2863 path
.dentry
= dentry
;
2866 return path_has_perm(cred
, &path
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2869 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2871 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2873 if (!strncmp(name
, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
,
2874 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
- 1)) {
2875 if (!strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_CAPS
)) {
2876 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP
))
2878 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
2879 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2880 Restrict to administrator. */
2885 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2886 ordinary setattr permission. */
2887 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2890 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
2891 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
2893 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2894 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2895 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2896 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2897 u32 newsid
, sid
= current_sid();
2900 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
2901 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
2903 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2904 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
))
2907 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode
))
2910 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2911 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
2913 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
,
2914 FILE__RELABELFROM
, &ad
);
2918 rc
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &newsid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
2919 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
2920 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
)) {
2921 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2925 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
2926 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
2929 if (str
[size
- 1] == '\0')
2930 audit_size
= size
- 1;
2937 ab
= audit_log_start(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
);
2938 audit_log_format(ab
, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
2939 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, value
, audit_size
);
2944 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2949 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, isec
->sclass
,
2950 FILE__RELABELTO
, &ad
);
2954 rc
= security_validate_transition(isec
->sid
, newsid
, sid
,
2959 return avc_has_perm(newsid
,
2961 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
2962 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
,
2966 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
2967 const void *value
, size_t size
,
2970 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2971 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2975 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
)) {
2976 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2980 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2982 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2983 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2984 inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
, -rc
);
2988 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
2990 isec
->initialized
= 1;
2995 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2997 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2999 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3002 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
)
3004 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3006 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3009 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
3011 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
3012 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
3014 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3015 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3020 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3022 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3024 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
, void **buffer
, bool alloc
)
3028 char *context
= NULL
;
3029 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3031 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
3035 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3036 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3037 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3038 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3039 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3040 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3041 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3043 error
= selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns
, CAP_MAC_ADMIN
,
3044 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
3046 error
= security_sid_to_context_force(isec
->sid
, &context
,
3049 error
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &size
);
3062 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
,
3063 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
3065 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3069 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
3072 if (!value
|| !size
)
3075 rc
= security_context_to_sid((void *)value
, size
, &newsid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
3079 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
3081 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3085 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, char *buffer
, size_t buffer_size
)
3087 const int len
= sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
);
3088 if (buffer
&& len
<= buffer_size
)
3089 memcpy(buffer
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, len
);
3093 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode
*inode
, u32
*secid
)
3095 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3099 /* file security operations */
3101 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
3103 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3104 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
3106 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3107 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && (mask
& MAY_WRITE
))
3110 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
,
3111 file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
));
3114 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
3116 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
3117 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3118 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3119 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3122 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3125 if (sid
== fsec
->sid
&& fsec
->isid
== isec
->sid
&&
3126 fsec
->pseqno
== avc_policy_seqno())
3127 /* No change since file_open check. */
3130 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file
, mask
);
3133 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
3135 return file_alloc_security(file
);
3138 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
3140 file_free_security(file
);
3143 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3146 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3156 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
:
3158 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION
:
3159 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3162 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
:
3164 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION
:
3165 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__SETATTR
);
3168 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3172 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3177 error
= cred_has_capability(cred
, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG
,
3178 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
);
3181 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3182 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3185 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__IOCTL
);
3190 static int default_noexec
;
3192 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file
*file
, unsigned long prot
, int shared
)
3194 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3197 if (default_noexec
&&
3198 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && (!file
|| (!shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
)))) {
3200 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3201 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3202 * This has an additional check.
3204 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECMEM
);
3210 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3211 u32 av
= FILE__READ
;
3213 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3214 if (shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
))
3217 if (prot
& PROT_EXEC
)
3218 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
3220 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, av
);
3227 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr
)
3231 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3232 rc
= cap_mmap_addr(addr
);
3236 if (addr
< CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
) {
3237 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3238 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT
,
3239 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO
, NULL
);
3245 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file
*file
, unsigned long reqprot
,
3246 unsigned long prot
, unsigned long flags
)
3248 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3251 return file_map_prot_check(file
, prot
,
3252 (flags
& MAP_TYPE
) == MAP_SHARED
);
3255 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct
*vma
,
3256 unsigned long reqprot
,
3259 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3261 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3264 if (default_noexec
&&
3265 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && !(vma
->vm_flags
& VM_EXEC
)) {
3267 if (vma
->vm_start
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_brk
&&
3268 vma
->vm_end
<= vma
->vm_mm
->brk
) {
3269 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECHEAP
);
3270 } else if (!vma
->vm_file
&&
3271 vma
->vm_start
<= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
&&
3272 vma
->vm_end
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
) {
3273 rc
= current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__EXECSTACK
);
3274 } else if (vma
->vm_file
&& vma
->anon_vma
) {
3276 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3277 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3278 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3279 * modified content. This typically should only
3280 * occur for text relocations.
3282 rc
= file_has_perm(cred
, vma
->vm_file
, FILE__EXECMOD
);
3288 return file_map_prot_check(vma
->vm_file
, prot
, vma
->vm_flags
&VM_SHARED
);
3291 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
)
3293 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3295 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3298 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3301 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3306 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && !(arg
& O_APPEND
)) {
3307 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__WRITE
);
3316 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS
:
3317 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3318 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3326 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3331 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3338 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file
*file
)
3340 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3342 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3343 fsec
->fown_sid
= current_sid();
3348 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
3349 struct fown_struct
*fown
, int signum
)
3352 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
3354 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3356 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3357 file
= container_of(fown
, struct file
, f_owner
);
3359 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3362 perm
= signal_to_av(SIGIO
); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3364 perm
= signal_to_av(signum
);
3366 return avc_has_perm(fsec
->fown_sid
, sid
,
3367 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3370 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file
*file
)
3372 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3374 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, file_to_av(file
));
3377 static int selinux_file_open(struct file
*file
, const struct cred
*cred
)
3379 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3380 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3382 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3383 isec
= file_inode(file
)->i_security
;
3385 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3386 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3387 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3388 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3389 * struct as its SID.
3391 fsec
->isid
= isec
->sid
;
3392 fsec
->pseqno
= avc_policy_seqno();
3394 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3395 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3396 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3397 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3398 * new inode label or new policy.
3399 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3401 return file_path_has_perm(cred
, file
, open_file_to_av(file
));
3404 /* task security operations */
3406 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags
)
3408 return current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__FORK
);
3412 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3414 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred
*cred
, gfp_t gfp
)
3416 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3418 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3422 cred
->security
= tsec
;
3427 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3429 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred
*cred
)
3431 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
3434 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3435 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3437 BUG_ON(cred
->security
&& (unsigned long) cred
->security
< PAGE_SIZE
);
3438 cred
->security
= (void *) 0x7UL
;
3443 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3445 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
3448 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
3449 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3451 old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3453 tsec
= kmemdup(old_tsec
, sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3457 new->security
= tsec
;
3462 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3464 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
3466 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3467 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3473 * set the security data for a kernel service
3474 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3476 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred
*new, u32 secid
)
3478 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3479 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3482 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, secid
,
3483 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3484 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE
,
3488 tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
3489 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
3490 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
3496 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3497 * objective context of the specified inode
3499 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred
*new, struct inode
*inode
)
3501 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3502 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3503 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3506 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
3507 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3508 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS
,
3512 tsec
->create_sid
= isec
->sid
;
3516 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name
)
3519 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3521 sid
= task_sid(current
);
3523 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD
;
3524 ad
.u
.kmod_name
= kmod_name
;
3526 return avc_has_perm(sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
, SECCLASS_SYSTEM
,
3527 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST
, &ad
);
3530 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct
*p
, pid_t pgid
)
3532 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETPGID
);
3535 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3537 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETPGID
);
3540 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3542 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSESSION
);
3545 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct
*p
, u32
*secid
)
3547 *secid
= task_sid(p
);
3550 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct
*p
, int nice
)
3554 rc
= cap_task_setnice(p
, nice
);
3558 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3561 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct
*p
, int ioprio
)
3565 rc
= cap_task_setioprio(p
, ioprio
);
3569 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3572 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct
*p
)
3574 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3577 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct
*p
, unsigned int resource
,
3578 struct rlimit
*new_rlim
)
3580 struct rlimit
*old_rlim
= p
->signal
->rlim
+ resource
;
3582 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3583 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3584 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3585 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3586 if (old_rlim
->rlim_max
!= new_rlim
->rlim_max
)
3587 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT
);
3592 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
3596 rc
= cap_task_setscheduler(p
);
3600 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3603 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
3605 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3608 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct
*p
)
3610 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3613 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct
*p
, struct siginfo
*info
,
3620 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNULL
; /* null signal; existence test */
3622 perm
= signal_to_av(sig
);
3624 rc
= avc_has_perm(secid
, task_sid(p
),
3625 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3627 rc
= current_has_perm(p
, perm
);
3631 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct
*p
)
3633 return task_has_perm(p
, current
, PROCESS__SIGCHLD
);
3636 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct
*p
,
3637 struct inode
*inode
)
3639 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3640 u32 sid
= task_sid(p
);
3643 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3646 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3647 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3648 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3650 int offset
, ihlen
, ret
= -EINVAL
;
3651 struct iphdr _iph
, *ih
;
3653 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3654 ih
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_iph
), &_iph
);
3658 ihlen
= ih
->ihl
* 4;
3659 if (ihlen
< sizeof(_iph
))
3662 ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
= ih
->saddr
;
3663 ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.daddr
= ih
->daddr
;
3667 *proto
= ih
->protocol
;
3669 switch (ih
->protocol
) {
3671 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3673 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3677 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3681 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= th
->source
;
3682 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= th
->dest
;
3687 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3689 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3693 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3697 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= uh
->source
;
3698 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= uh
->dest
;
3702 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3703 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3705 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3709 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3713 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3714 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3725 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3727 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3728 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3729 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3732 int ret
= -EINVAL
, offset
;
3733 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h
, *ip6
;
3736 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3737 ip6
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_ipv6h
), &_ipv6h
);
3741 ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
= ip6
->saddr
;
3742 ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.daddr
= ip6
->daddr
;
3745 nexthdr
= ip6
->nexthdr
;
3746 offset
+= sizeof(_ipv6h
);
3747 offset
= ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb
, offset
, &nexthdr
, &frag_off
);
3756 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3758 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3762 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= th
->source
;
3763 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= th
->dest
;
3768 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3770 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3774 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= uh
->source
;
3775 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= uh
->dest
;
3779 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3780 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3782 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3786 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3787 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3791 /* includes fragments */
3801 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff
*skb
, struct common_audit_data
*ad
,
3802 char **_addrp
, int src
, u8
*proto
)
3807 switch (ad
->u
.net
->family
) {
3809 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3812 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
:
3813 &ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.daddr
);
3816 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3818 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3821 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
:
3822 &ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.daddr
);
3832 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3833 " unable to parse packet\n");
3843 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3845 * @family: protocol family
3846 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3849 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3850 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3851 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3852 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3853 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3857 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff
*skb
, u16 family
, u32
*sid
)
3864 err
= selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb
, &xfrm_sid
);
3867 err
= selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb
, family
, &nlbl_type
, &nlbl_sid
);
3871 err
= security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid
, nlbl_type
, xfrm_sid
, sid
);
3872 if (unlikely(err
)) {
3874 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3875 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3883 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
3884 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
3885 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
3886 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
3888 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
3889 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
3890 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
3891 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3894 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid
, u32 skb_sid
, u32
*conn_sid
)
3898 if (skb_sid
!= SECSID_NULL
)
3899 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid
, skb_sid
, conn_sid
);
3906 /* socket security operations */
3908 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
,
3909 u16 secclass
, u32
*socksid
)
3911 if (tsec
->sockcreate_sid
> SECSID_NULL
) {
3912 *socksid
= tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
3916 return security_transition_sid(tsec
->sid
, tsec
->sid
, secclass
, NULL
,
3920 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct
*task
, struct sock
*sk
, u32 perms
)
3922 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
3923 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3924 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
3925 u32 tsid
= task_sid(task
);
3927 if (sksec
->sid
== SECINITSID_KERNEL
)
3930 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
3934 return avc_has_perm(tsid
, sksec
->sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
3937 static int selinux_socket_create(int family
, int type
,
3938 int protocol
, int kern
)
3940 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
3948 secclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
3949 rc
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
, secclass
, &newsid
);
3953 return avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, newsid
, secclass
, SOCKET__CREATE
, NULL
);
3956 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket
*sock
, int family
,
3957 int type
, int protocol
, int kern
)
3959 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
3960 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3961 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
3964 isec
->sclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
3967 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
3969 err
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
, isec
->sclass
, &(isec
->sid
));
3974 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3977 sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
3978 sksec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
3979 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
3980 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock
->sk
, family
);
3986 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3987 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3988 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3990 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
3992 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
3996 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, SOCKET__BIND
);
4001 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
4002 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
4003 * check the first address now.
4005 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4006 if (family
== PF_INET
|| family
== PF_INET6
) {
4008 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4009 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4010 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4011 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
4012 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
4013 unsigned short snum
;
4016 if (family
== PF_INET
) {
4017 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
4018 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
4019 addrp
= (char *)&addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
4021 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
4022 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
4023 addrp
= (char *)&addr6
->sin6_addr
.s6_addr
;
4029 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk
), &low
, &high
);
4031 if (snum
< max(PROT_SOCK
, low
) || snum
> high
) {
4032 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
,
4036 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4038 ad
.u
.net
->sport
= htons(snum
);
4039 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4040 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
,
4042 SOCKET__NAME_BIND
, &ad
);
4048 switch (sksec
->sclass
) {
4049 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
:
4050 node_perm
= TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4053 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
:
4054 node_perm
= UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4057 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
:
4058 node_perm
= DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4062 node_perm
= RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4066 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &sid
);
4070 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4072 ad
.u
.net
->sport
= htons(snum
);
4073 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4075 if (family
== PF_INET
)
4076 ad
.u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
= addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
4078 ad
.u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
= addr6
->sin6_addr
;
4080 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
,
4081 sksec
->sclass
, node_perm
, &ad
);
4089 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
4091 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
4092 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4095 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, SOCKET__CONNECT
);
4100 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
4102 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
||
4103 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
) {
4104 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4105 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4106 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
4107 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
4108 unsigned short snum
;
4111 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
) {
4112 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
4113 if (addrlen
< sizeof(struct sockaddr_in
))
4115 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
4117 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
4118 if (addrlen
< SIN6_LEN_RFC2133
)
4120 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
4123 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
, snum
, &sid
);
4127 perm
= (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
) ?
4128 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
: DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
;
4130 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4132 ad
.u
.net
->dport
= htons(snum
);
4133 ad
.u
.net
->family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4134 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perm
, &ad
);
4139 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk
, address
);
4145 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket
*sock
, int backlog
)
4147 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__LISTEN
);
4150 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket
*sock
, struct socket
*newsock
)
4153 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
4154 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
;
4156 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__ACCEPT
);
4160 newisec
= SOCK_INODE(newsock
)->i_security
;
4162 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
4163 newisec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4164 newisec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
4165 newisec
->initialized
= 1;
4170 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
4173 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__WRITE
);
4176 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
4177 int size
, int flags
)
4179 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__READ
);
4182 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket
*sock
)
4184 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
4187 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket
*sock
)
4189 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
4192 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
, int optname
)
4196 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SETOPT
);
4200 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock
, level
, optname
);
4203 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
,
4206 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETOPT
);
4209 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket
*sock
, int how
)
4211 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN
);
4214 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock
*sock
,
4218 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_sock
= sock
->sk_security
;
4219 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_other
= other
->sk_security
;
4220 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_new
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4221 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4222 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4225 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4227 ad
.u
.net
->sk
= other
;
4229 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec_sock
->sid
, sksec_other
->sid
,
4230 sksec_other
->sclass
,
4231 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO
, &ad
);
4235 /* server child socket */
4236 sksec_new
->peer_sid
= sksec_sock
->sid
;
4237 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other
->sid
, sksec_sock
->sid
,
4242 /* connecting socket */
4243 sksec_sock
->peer_sid
= sksec_new
->sid
;
4248 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket
*sock
,
4249 struct socket
*other
)
4251 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4252 struct sk_security_struct
*osec
= other
->sk
->sk_security
;
4253 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4254 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4256 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4258 ad
.u
.net
->sk
= other
->sk
;
4260 return avc_has_perm(ssec
->sid
, osec
->sid
, osec
->sclass
, SOCKET__SENDTO
,
4264 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex
, char *addrp
, u16 family
,
4266 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
4272 err
= sel_netif_sid(ifindex
, &if_sid
);
4275 err
= avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
4276 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__INGRESS
, ad
);
4280 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
);
4283 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
4284 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__RECVFROM
, ad
);
4287 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4291 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4292 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4293 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4294 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4297 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4299 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4300 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4301 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4305 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4306 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4312 err
= selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
, skb
, family
, &ad
);
4315 err
= selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
);
4320 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4323 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4324 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4325 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4326 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4327 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4332 if (family
!= PF_INET
&& family
!= PF_INET6
)
4335 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4336 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4339 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4340 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4341 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4342 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4343 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4344 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk
, skb
, family
);
4346 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4347 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4348 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4351 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4353 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4354 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4355 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4359 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4362 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
);
4365 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb
->skb_iif
, addrp
, family
,
4368 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4371 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, peer_sid
, SECCLASS_PEER
,
4374 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4379 if (secmark_active
) {
4380 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4389 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket
*sock
, char __user
*optval
,
4390 int __user
*optlen
, unsigned len
)
4395 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4396 u32 peer_sid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4398 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
||
4399 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
)
4400 peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
4401 if (peer_sid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4402 return -ENOPROTOOPT
;
4404 err
= security_sid_to_context(peer_sid
, &scontext
, &scontext_len
);
4408 if (scontext_len
> len
) {
4413 if (copy_to_user(optval
, scontext
, scontext_len
))
4417 if (put_user(scontext_len
, optlen
))
4423 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket
*sock
, struct sk_buff
*skb
, u32
*secid
)
4425 u32 peer_secid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4428 if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4430 else if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IPV6
))
4433 family
= sock
->sk
->sk_family
;
4437 if (sock
&& family
== PF_UNIX
)
4438 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock
), &peer_secid
);
4440 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_secid
);
4443 *secid
= peer_secid
;
4444 if (peer_secid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4449 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock
*sk
, int family
, gfp_t priority
)
4451 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4453 sksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec
), priority
);
4457 sksec
->peer_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4458 sksec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4459 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec
);
4460 sk
->sk_security
= sksec
;
4465 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock
*sk
)
4467 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4469 sk
->sk_security
= NULL
;
4470 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec
);
4474 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock
*sk
, struct sock
*newsk
)
4476 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4477 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4479 newsksec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4480 newsksec
->peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
4481 newsksec
->sclass
= sksec
->sclass
;
4483 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec
);
4486 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock
*sk
, u32
*secid
)
4489 *secid
= SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET
;
4491 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4493 *secid
= sksec
->sid
;
4497 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock
*sk
, struct socket
*parent
)
4499 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= SOCK_INODE(parent
)->i_security
;
4500 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4502 switch (sk
->sk_family
) {
4506 isec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4509 /* by default there is no special labeling mechanism for the
4510 * sksec label so inherit the label from the parent socket */
4511 BUG_ON(sksec
->sid
!= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
);
4512 sksec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
4514 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4517 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4518 struct request_sock
*req
)
4520 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4522 u16 family
= req
->rsk_ops
->family
;
4526 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peersid
);
4529 err
= selinux_conn_sid(sksec
->sid
, peersid
, &connsid
);
4532 req
->secid
= connsid
;
4533 req
->peer_secid
= peersid
;
4535 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req
, family
);
4538 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock
*newsk
,
4539 const struct request_sock
*req
)
4541 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4543 newsksec
->sid
= req
->secid
;
4544 newsksec
->peer_sid
= req
->peer_secid
;
4545 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4546 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4547 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4548 time it will have been created and available. */
4550 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4551 * thread with access to newsksec */
4552 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk
, req
->rsk_ops
->family
);
4555 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4557 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4558 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4560 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4561 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4564 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &sksec
->peer_sid
);
4567 static void selinux_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff
*skb
, struct sock
*sk
)
4569 skb_set_owner_w(skb
, sk
);
4572 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid
)
4574 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
4577 __tsec
= current_security();
4580 return avc_has_perm(tsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
4583 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4585 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount
);
4588 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4590 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount
);
4593 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock
*req
,
4596 fl
->flowi_secid
= req
->secid
;
4599 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security
)
4601 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
;
4603 tunsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec
), GFP_KERNEL
);
4606 tunsec
->sid
= current_sid();
4612 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security
)
4617 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4619 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4621 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4622 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4623 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4624 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4625 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4626 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4628 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE
,
4632 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security
)
4634 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
4636 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4637 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE
, NULL
);
4640 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock
*sk
, void *security
)
4642 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
4643 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4645 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4646 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4647 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4648 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4649 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4650 * protocols were being used */
4652 sksec
->sid
= tunsec
->sid
;
4653 sksec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
;
4658 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security
)
4660 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
4661 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4664 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, tunsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4665 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
4668 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4669 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
4677 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4681 struct nlmsghdr
*nlh
;
4682 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4684 if (skb
->len
< NLMSG_HDRLEN
) {
4688 nlh
= nlmsg_hdr(skb
);
4690 err
= selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec
->sclass
, nlh
->nlmsg_type
, &perm
);
4692 if (err
== -EINVAL
) {
4693 audit_log(current
->audit_context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
,
4694 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4695 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4696 nlh
->nlmsg_type
, sksec
->sclass
);
4697 if (!selinux_enforcing
|| security_get_allow_unknown())
4707 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, perm
);
4712 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4714 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int ifindex
,
4720 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4721 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4726 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4729 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4730 netlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled();
4731 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4732 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4735 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
) != 0)
4738 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4740 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
4741 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4742 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
) != 0)
4745 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4746 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex
, addrp
, family
,
4749 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 1);
4755 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4756 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__FORWARD_IN
, &ad
))
4760 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4761 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4762 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4764 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, peer_sid
) != 0)
4770 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops
*ops
,
4771 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4772 const struct net_device
*in
,
4773 const struct net_device
*out
,
4774 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4776 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, in
->ifindex
, PF_INET
);
4779 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4780 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops
*ops
,
4781 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4782 const struct net_device
*in
,
4783 const struct net_device
*out
,
4784 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4786 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, in
->ifindex
, PF_INET6
);
4790 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4796 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4799 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4800 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4801 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4804 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4806 if (sk
->sk_state
== TCP_LISTEN
)
4807 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
4808 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
4809 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
4810 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
4811 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
4812 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
4813 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
4814 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
4815 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
4816 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
4817 * security label in the packet itself this is the
4818 * best we can do. */
4821 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
4822 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4825 sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4826 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, sid
) != 0)
4832 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(const struct nf_hook_ops
*ops
,
4833 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4834 const struct net_device
*in
,
4835 const struct net_device
*out
,
4836 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4838 return selinux_ip_output(skb
, PF_INET
);
4841 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4845 struct sock
*sk
= skb
->sk
;
4846 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4847 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4848 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4854 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4856 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4858 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
4859 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4860 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, &proto
))
4863 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4864 if (avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4865 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__SEND
, &ad
))
4866 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4868 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
, proto
))
4869 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4874 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int ifindex
,
4880 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4881 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4886 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4887 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4888 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4889 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4890 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4891 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb
, ifindex
, family
);
4893 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4894 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4895 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4901 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4902 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4903 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4904 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4905 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4906 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
4907 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
4908 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
4909 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
4910 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
4912 if (skb_dst(skb
) != NULL
&& skb_dst(skb
)->xfrm
!= NULL
&&
4913 !(sk
!= NULL
&& sk
->sk_state
== TCP_LISTEN
))
4918 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
4919 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
4920 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
4921 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
4923 secmark_perm
= PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
;
4924 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
))
4927 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4928 peer_sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4930 } else if (sk
->sk_state
== TCP_LISTEN
) {
4931 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
4932 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
4933 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
4934 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
4935 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
4936 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
4937 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
4938 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
4939 * for similar problems. */
4941 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4942 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &skb_sid
))
4944 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
4945 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
4946 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
4947 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
4948 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
4949 * pass the packet. */
4950 if (skb_sid
== SECSID_NULL
) {
4953 if (IPCB(skb
)->flags
& IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED
)
4957 if (IP6CB(skb
)->flags
& IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED
)
4960 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4963 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec
->sid
, skb_sid
, &peer_sid
))
4965 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4967 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
4968 * associated socket. */
4969 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4970 peer_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4971 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4974 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4976 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
4977 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4978 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, NULL
))
4982 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4983 SECCLASS_PACKET
, secmark_perm
, &ad
))
4984 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4986 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4990 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex
, &if_sid
))
4992 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
4993 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__EGRESS
, &ad
))
4994 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4996 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
))
4998 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
4999 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__SENDTO
, &ad
))
5000 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5006 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops
*ops
,
5007 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5008 const struct net_device
*in
,
5009 const struct net_device
*out
,
5010 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
5012 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, out
->ifindex
, PF_INET
);
5015 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5016 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops
*ops
,
5017 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5018 const struct net_device
*in
,
5019 const struct net_device
*out
,
5020 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
5022 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, out
->ifindex
, PF_INET6
);
5026 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5028 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
5032 err
= cap_netlink_send(sk
, skb
);
5036 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk
, skb
);
5039 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct
*task
,
5040 struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
,
5043 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5046 isec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5050 sid
= task_sid(task
);
5051 isec
->sclass
= sclass
;
5053 perm
->security
= isec
;
5058 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
)
5060 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= perm
->security
;
5061 perm
->security
= NULL
;
5065 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5067 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
5069 msec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5073 msec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
5074 msg
->security
= msec
;
5079 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5081 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
= msg
->security
;
5083 msg
->security
= NULL
;
5087 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipc_perms
,
5090 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5091 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5092 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5094 isec
= ipc_perms
->security
;
5096 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5097 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= ipc_perms
->key
;
5099 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
5102 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5104 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg
);
5107 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5109 msg_msg_free_security(msg
);
5112 /* message queue security operations */
5113 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
5115 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5116 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5117 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5120 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &msq
->q_perm
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
);
5124 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5126 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5127 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5129 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5132 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
5138 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
5140 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
5143 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int msqflg
)
5145 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5146 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5147 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5149 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5151 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5152 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5154 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5155 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5158 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int cmd
)
5166 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5167 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5170 perms
= MSGQ__GETATTR
| MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
;
5173 perms
= MSGQ__SETATTR
;
5176 perms
= MSGQ__DESTROY
;
5182 err
= ipc_has_perm(&msq
->q_perm
, perms
);
5186 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
, int msqflg
)
5188 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5189 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
5190 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5191 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5194 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5195 msec
= msg
->security
;
5198 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5200 if (msec
->sid
== SECINITSID_UNLABELED
) {
5202 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5203 * message queue this message will be stored in
5205 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
5211 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5212 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5214 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5215 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5218 /* Can this process send the message */
5219 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
5222 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5223 rc
= avc_has_perm(msec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5224 MSGQ__ENQUEUE
, &ad
);
5229 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
,
5230 struct task_struct
*target
,
5231 long type
, int mode
)
5233 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5234 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
5235 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5236 u32 sid
= task_sid(target
);
5239 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5240 msec
= msg
->security
;
5242 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5243 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5245 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
5246 SECCLASS_MSGQ
, MSGQ__READ
, &ad
);
5248 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
,
5249 SECCLASS_MSG
, MSG__RECEIVE
, &ad
);
5253 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5254 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
5256 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5257 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5258 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5261 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &shp
->shm_perm
, SECCLASS_SHM
);
5265 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
5267 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5268 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
5270 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
5273 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
5279 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
5281 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
5284 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int shmflg
)
5286 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5287 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5288 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5290 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
5292 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5293 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
5295 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
5296 SHM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5299 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5300 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int cmd
)
5308 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5309 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5312 perms
= SHM__GETATTR
| SHM__ASSOCIATE
;
5315 perms
= SHM__SETATTR
;
5322 perms
= SHM__DESTROY
;
5328 err
= ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5332 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
,
5333 char __user
*shmaddr
, int shmflg
)
5337 if (shmflg
& SHM_RDONLY
)
5340 perms
= SHM__READ
| SHM__WRITE
;
5342 return ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5345 /* Semaphore security operations */
5346 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5348 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5349 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5350 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5353 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &sma
->sem_perm
, SECCLASS_SEM
);
5357 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5359 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5360 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5362 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5365 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5371 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5373 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5376 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array
*sma
, int semflg
)
5378 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5379 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5380 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5382 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5384 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5385 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5387 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5388 SEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5391 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5392 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array
*sma
, int cmd
)
5400 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5401 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5405 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
;
5416 perms
= SEM__DESTROY
;
5419 perms
= SEM__SETATTR
;
5423 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
| SEM__ASSOCIATE
;
5429 err
= ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5433 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array
*sma
,
5434 struct sembuf
*sops
, unsigned nsops
, int alter
)
5439 perms
= SEM__READ
| SEM__WRITE
;
5443 return ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5446 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, short flag
)
5452 av
|= IPC__UNIX_READ
;
5454 av
|= IPC__UNIX_WRITE
;
5459 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp
, av
);
5462 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, u32
*secid
)
5464 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= ipcp
->security
;
5468 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct inode
*inode
)
5471 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, dentry
);
5474 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5475 char *name
, char **value
)
5477 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
5483 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETATTR
);
5489 __tsec
= __task_cred(p
)->security
;
5491 if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5493 else if (!strcmp(name
, "prev"))
5495 else if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5496 sid
= __tsec
->exec_sid
;
5497 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5498 sid
= __tsec
->create_sid
;
5499 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5500 sid
= __tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5501 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5502 sid
= __tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
5510 error
= security_sid_to_context(sid
, value
, &len
);
5520 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5521 char *name
, void *value
, size_t size
)
5523 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5524 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
5531 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5532 security attributes. */
5537 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5538 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5539 * above restriction is ever removed.
5541 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5542 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETEXEC
);
5543 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5544 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE
);
5545 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5546 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE
);
5547 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5548 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE
);
5549 else if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5550 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETCURRENT
);
5556 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5557 if (size
&& str
[1] && str
[1] != '\n') {
5558 if (str
[size
-1] == '\n') {
5562 error
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &sid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
5563 if (error
== -EINVAL
&& !strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5564 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
)) {
5565 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
5568 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5569 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5570 if (str
[size
- 1] == '\0')
5571 audit_size
= size
- 1;
5574 ab
= audit_log_start(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
);
5575 audit_log_format(ab
, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5576 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, value
, audit_size
);
5581 error
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
,
5588 new = prepare_creds();
5592 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5593 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5594 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5595 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5596 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5597 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5598 tsec
= new->security
;
5599 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec")) {
5600 tsec
->exec_sid
= sid
;
5601 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5602 tsec
->create_sid
= sid
;
5603 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate")) {
5604 error
= may_create_key(sid
, p
);
5607 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= sid
;
5608 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate")) {
5609 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= sid
;
5610 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "current")) {
5615 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5617 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5618 error
= security_bounded_transition(tsec
->sid
, sid
);
5623 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5624 error
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5625 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION
, NULL
);
5629 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5630 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5633 tracer
= ptrace_parent(p
);
5635 ptsid
= task_sid(tracer
);
5639 error
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5640 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
5659 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name
)
5661 return (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
) == 0);
5664 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid
, char **secdata
, u32
*seclen
)
5666 return security_sid_to_context(secid
, secdata
, seclen
);
5669 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata
, u32 seclen
, u32
*secid
)
5671 return security_context_to_sid(secdata
, seclen
, secid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
5674 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata
, u32 seclen
)
5680 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5682 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5684 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5688 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5690 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry
*dentry
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5692 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5695 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void **ctx
, u32
*ctxlen
)
5698 len
= selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
,
5707 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key
*k
, const struct cred
*cred
,
5708 unsigned long flags
)
5710 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5711 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5713 ksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5717 tsec
= cred
->security
;
5718 if (tsec
->keycreate_sid
)
5719 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5721 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->sid
;
5727 static void selinux_key_free(struct key
*k
)
5729 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= k
->security
;
5735 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref
,
5736 const struct cred
*cred
,
5740 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5743 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5744 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5745 appear to be created. */
5749 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
5751 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
5752 ksec
= key
->security
;
5754 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksec
->sid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, perm
, NULL
);
5757 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key
*key
, char **_buffer
)
5759 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= key
->security
;
5760 char *context
= NULL
;
5764 rc
= security_sid_to_context(ksec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
5773 static struct security_operations selinux_ops
= {
5776 .ptrace_access_check
= selinux_ptrace_access_check
,
5777 .ptrace_traceme
= selinux_ptrace_traceme
,
5778 .capget
= selinux_capget
,
5779 .capset
= selinux_capset
,
5780 .capable
= selinux_capable
,
5781 .quotactl
= selinux_quotactl
,
5782 .quota_on
= selinux_quota_on
,
5783 .syslog
= selinux_syslog
,
5784 .vm_enough_memory
= selinux_vm_enough_memory
,
5786 .netlink_send
= selinux_netlink_send
,
5788 .bprm_set_creds
= selinux_bprm_set_creds
,
5789 .bprm_committing_creds
= selinux_bprm_committing_creds
,
5790 .bprm_committed_creds
= selinux_bprm_committed_creds
,
5791 .bprm_secureexec
= selinux_bprm_secureexec
,
5793 .sb_alloc_security
= selinux_sb_alloc_security
,
5794 .sb_free_security
= selinux_sb_free_security
,
5795 .sb_copy_data
= selinux_sb_copy_data
,
5796 .sb_remount
= selinux_sb_remount
,
5797 .sb_kern_mount
= selinux_sb_kern_mount
,
5798 .sb_show_options
= selinux_sb_show_options
,
5799 .sb_statfs
= selinux_sb_statfs
,
5800 .sb_mount
= selinux_mount
,
5801 .sb_umount
= selinux_umount
,
5802 .sb_set_mnt_opts
= selinux_set_mnt_opts
,
5803 .sb_clone_mnt_opts
= selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts
,
5804 .sb_parse_opts_str
= selinux_parse_opts_str
,
5806 .dentry_init_security
= selinux_dentry_init_security
,
5808 .inode_alloc_security
= selinux_inode_alloc_security
,
5809 .inode_free_security
= selinux_inode_free_security
,
5810 .inode_init_security
= selinux_inode_init_security
,
5811 .inode_create
= selinux_inode_create
,
5812 .inode_link
= selinux_inode_link
,
5813 .inode_unlink
= selinux_inode_unlink
,
5814 .inode_symlink
= selinux_inode_symlink
,
5815 .inode_mkdir
= selinux_inode_mkdir
,
5816 .inode_rmdir
= selinux_inode_rmdir
,
5817 .inode_mknod
= selinux_inode_mknod
,
5818 .inode_rename
= selinux_inode_rename
,
5819 .inode_readlink
= selinux_inode_readlink
,
5820 .inode_follow_link
= selinux_inode_follow_link
,
5821 .inode_permission
= selinux_inode_permission
,
5822 .inode_setattr
= selinux_inode_setattr
,
5823 .inode_getattr
= selinux_inode_getattr
,
5824 .inode_setxattr
= selinux_inode_setxattr
,
5825 .inode_post_setxattr
= selinux_inode_post_setxattr
,
5826 .inode_getxattr
= selinux_inode_getxattr
,
5827 .inode_listxattr
= selinux_inode_listxattr
,
5828 .inode_removexattr
= selinux_inode_removexattr
,
5829 .inode_getsecurity
= selinux_inode_getsecurity
,
5830 .inode_setsecurity
= selinux_inode_setsecurity
,
5831 .inode_listsecurity
= selinux_inode_listsecurity
,
5832 .inode_getsecid
= selinux_inode_getsecid
,
5834 .file_permission
= selinux_file_permission
,
5835 .file_alloc_security
= selinux_file_alloc_security
,
5836 .file_free_security
= selinux_file_free_security
,
5837 .file_ioctl
= selinux_file_ioctl
,
5838 .mmap_file
= selinux_mmap_file
,
5839 .mmap_addr
= selinux_mmap_addr
,
5840 .file_mprotect
= selinux_file_mprotect
,
5841 .file_lock
= selinux_file_lock
,
5842 .file_fcntl
= selinux_file_fcntl
,
5843 .file_set_fowner
= selinux_file_set_fowner
,
5844 .file_send_sigiotask
= selinux_file_send_sigiotask
,
5845 .file_receive
= selinux_file_receive
,
5847 .file_open
= selinux_file_open
,
5849 .task_create
= selinux_task_create
,
5850 .cred_alloc_blank
= selinux_cred_alloc_blank
,
5851 .cred_free
= selinux_cred_free
,
5852 .cred_prepare
= selinux_cred_prepare
,
5853 .cred_transfer
= selinux_cred_transfer
,
5854 .kernel_act_as
= selinux_kernel_act_as
,
5855 .kernel_create_files_as
= selinux_kernel_create_files_as
,
5856 .kernel_module_request
= selinux_kernel_module_request
,
5857 .task_setpgid
= selinux_task_setpgid
,
5858 .task_getpgid
= selinux_task_getpgid
,
5859 .task_getsid
= selinux_task_getsid
,
5860 .task_getsecid
= selinux_task_getsecid
,
5861 .task_setnice
= selinux_task_setnice
,
5862 .task_setioprio
= selinux_task_setioprio
,
5863 .task_getioprio
= selinux_task_getioprio
,
5864 .task_setrlimit
= selinux_task_setrlimit
,
5865 .task_setscheduler
= selinux_task_setscheduler
,
5866 .task_getscheduler
= selinux_task_getscheduler
,
5867 .task_movememory
= selinux_task_movememory
,
5868 .task_kill
= selinux_task_kill
,
5869 .task_wait
= selinux_task_wait
,
5870 .task_to_inode
= selinux_task_to_inode
,
5872 .ipc_permission
= selinux_ipc_permission
,
5873 .ipc_getsecid
= selinux_ipc_getsecid
,
5875 .msg_msg_alloc_security
= selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security
,
5876 .msg_msg_free_security
= selinux_msg_msg_free_security
,
5878 .msg_queue_alloc_security
= selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security
,
5879 .msg_queue_free_security
= selinux_msg_queue_free_security
,
5880 .msg_queue_associate
= selinux_msg_queue_associate
,
5881 .msg_queue_msgctl
= selinux_msg_queue_msgctl
,
5882 .msg_queue_msgsnd
= selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd
,
5883 .msg_queue_msgrcv
= selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv
,
5885 .shm_alloc_security
= selinux_shm_alloc_security
,
5886 .shm_free_security
= selinux_shm_free_security
,
5887 .shm_associate
= selinux_shm_associate
,
5888 .shm_shmctl
= selinux_shm_shmctl
,
5889 .shm_shmat
= selinux_shm_shmat
,
5891 .sem_alloc_security
= selinux_sem_alloc_security
,
5892 .sem_free_security
= selinux_sem_free_security
,
5893 .sem_associate
= selinux_sem_associate
,
5894 .sem_semctl
= selinux_sem_semctl
,
5895 .sem_semop
= selinux_sem_semop
,
5897 .d_instantiate
= selinux_d_instantiate
,
5899 .getprocattr
= selinux_getprocattr
,
5900 .setprocattr
= selinux_setprocattr
,
5902 .ismaclabel
= selinux_ismaclabel
,
5903 .secid_to_secctx
= selinux_secid_to_secctx
,
5904 .secctx_to_secid
= selinux_secctx_to_secid
,
5905 .release_secctx
= selinux_release_secctx
,
5906 .inode_notifysecctx
= selinux_inode_notifysecctx
,
5907 .inode_setsecctx
= selinux_inode_setsecctx
,
5908 .inode_getsecctx
= selinux_inode_getsecctx
,
5910 .unix_stream_connect
= selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect
,
5911 .unix_may_send
= selinux_socket_unix_may_send
,
5913 .socket_create
= selinux_socket_create
,
5914 .socket_post_create
= selinux_socket_post_create
,
5915 .socket_bind
= selinux_socket_bind
,
5916 .socket_connect
= selinux_socket_connect
,
5917 .socket_listen
= selinux_socket_listen
,
5918 .socket_accept
= selinux_socket_accept
,
5919 .socket_sendmsg
= selinux_socket_sendmsg
,
5920 .socket_recvmsg
= selinux_socket_recvmsg
,
5921 .socket_getsockname
= selinux_socket_getsockname
,
5922 .socket_getpeername
= selinux_socket_getpeername
,
5923 .socket_getsockopt
= selinux_socket_getsockopt
,
5924 .socket_setsockopt
= selinux_socket_setsockopt
,
5925 .socket_shutdown
= selinux_socket_shutdown
,
5926 .socket_sock_rcv_skb
= selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb
,
5927 .socket_getpeersec_stream
= selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream
,
5928 .socket_getpeersec_dgram
= selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram
,
5929 .sk_alloc_security
= selinux_sk_alloc_security
,
5930 .sk_free_security
= selinux_sk_free_security
,
5931 .sk_clone_security
= selinux_sk_clone_security
,
5932 .sk_getsecid
= selinux_sk_getsecid
,
5933 .sock_graft
= selinux_sock_graft
,
5934 .inet_conn_request
= selinux_inet_conn_request
,
5935 .inet_csk_clone
= selinux_inet_csk_clone
,
5936 .inet_conn_established
= selinux_inet_conn_established
,
5937 .secmark_relabel_packet
= selinux_secmark_relabel_packet
,
5938 .secmark_refcount_inc
= selinux_secmark_refcount_inc
,
5939 .secmark_refcount_dec
= selinux_secmark_refcount_dec
,
5940 .req_classify_flow
= selinux_req_classify_flow
,
5941 .tun_dev_alloc_security
= selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security
,
5942 .tun_dev_free_security
= selinux_tun_dev_free_security
,
5943 .tun_dev_create
= selinux_tun_dev_create
,
5944 .tun_dev_attach_queue
= selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue
,
5945 .tun_dev_attach
= selinux_tun_dev_attach
,
5946 .tun_dev_open
= selinux_tun_dev_open
,
5947 .skb_owned_by
= selinux_skb_owned_by
,
5949 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5950 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc
,
5951 .xfrm_policy_clone_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_clone
,
5952 .xfrm_policy_free_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_free
,
5953 .xfrm_policy_delete_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_delete
,
5954 .xfrm_state_alloc
= selinux_xfrm_state_alloc
,
5955 .xfrm_state_alloc_acquire
= selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire
,
5956 .xfrm_state_free_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_free
,
5957 .xfrm_state_delete_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_delete
,
5958 .xfrm_policy_lookup
= selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup
,
5959 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
= selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
,
5960 .xfrm_decode_session
= selinux_xfrm_decode_session
,
5964 .key_alloc
= selinux_key_alloc
,
5965 .key_free
= selinux_key_free
,
5966 .key_permission
= selinux_key_permission
,
5967 .key_getsecurity
= selinux_key_getsecurity
,
5971 .audit_rule_init
= selinux_audit_rule_init
,
5972 .audit_rule_known
= selinux_audit_rule_known
,
5973 .audit_rule_match
= selinux_audit_rule_match
,
5974 .audit_rule_free
= selinux_audit_rule_free
,
5978 static __init
int selinux_init(void)
5980 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops
)) {
5981 selinux_enabled
= 0;
5985 if (!selinux_enabled
) {
5986 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5990 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5992 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5993 cred_init_security();
5995 default_noexec
= !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS
& VM_EXEC
);
5997 sel_inode_cache
= kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5998 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct
),
5999 0, SLAB_PANIC
, NULL
);
6002 if (register_security(&selinux_ops
))
6003 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
6005 if (selinux_enforcing
)
6006 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
6008 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
6013 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block
*sb
, void *unused
)
6015 superblock_doinit(sb
, NULL
);
6018 void selinux_complete_init(void)
6020 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
6022 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
6023 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
6024 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init
, NULL
);
6027 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
6028 all processes and objects when they are created. */
6029 security_initcall(selinux_init
);
6031 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
6033 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops
[] = {
6035 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_postroute
,
6036 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
6038 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
6039 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
6042 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_forward
,
6043 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
6045 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
6046 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
6049 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_output
,
6050 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
6052 .hooknum
= NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT
,
6053 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
6057 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
6059 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops
[] = {
6061 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_postroute
,
6062 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
6064 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
6065 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
6068 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_forward
,
6069 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
6071 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
6072 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
6078 static int __init
selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
6082 if (!selinux_enabled
)
6085 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
6087 err
= nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops
));
6089 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err
);
6091 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
6092 err
= nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops
));
6094 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err
);
6101 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init
);
6103 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6104 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
6106 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
6108 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops
));
6109 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
6110 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops
));
6115 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6117 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6118 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
6121 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6123 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6124 static int selinux_disabled
;
6126 int selinux_disable(void)
6128 if (ss_initialized
) {
6129 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
6133 if (selinux_disabled
) {
6134 /* Only do this once. */
6138 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
6140 selinux_disabled
= 1;
6141 selinux_enabled
= 0;
6143 reset_security_ops();
6145 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
6148 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
6149 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
6151 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */