2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
79 #include <linux/syslog.h>
90 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
91 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
93 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass
, u16 nlmsg_type
, u32
*perm
);
96 extern struct security_operations
*security_ops
;
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount
= ATOMIC_INIT(0);
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing
;
104 static int __init
enforcing_setup(char *str
)
106 unsigned long enforcing
;
107 if (!strict_strtoul(str
, 0, &enforcing
))
108 selinux_enforcing
= enforcing
? 1 : 0;
111 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup
);
114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115 int selinux_enabled
= CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
;
117 static int __init
selinux_enabled_setup(char *str
)
119 unsigned long enabled
;
120 if (!strict_strtoul(str
, 0, &enabled
))
121 selinux_enabled
= enabled
? 1 : 0;
124 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup
);
126 int selinux_enabled
= 1;
131 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
132 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
134 static struct security_operations
*secondary_ops
;
136 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
137 before the policy was loaded. */
138 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head
);
139 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock
);
141 static struct kmem_cache
*sel_inode_cache
;
144 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
147 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
148 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
149 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
150 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
153 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
155 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount
) > 0);
159 * initialise the security for the init task
161 static void cred_init_security(void)
163 struct cred
*cred
= (struct cred
*) current
->real_cred
;
164 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
166 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
168 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
170 tsec
->osid
= tsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
171 cred
->security
= tsec
;
175 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
177 static inline u32
cred_sid(const struct cred
*cred
)
179 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
181 tsec
= cred
->security
;
186 * get the objective security ID of a task
188 static inline u32
task_sid(const struct task_struct
*task
)
193 sid
= cred_sid(__task_cred(task
));
199 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
201 static inline u32
current_sid(void)
203 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_cred()->security
;
208 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
210 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
212 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
213 u32 sid
= current_sid();
215 isec
= kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache
, GFP_NOFS
);
219 mutex_init(&isec
->lock
);
220 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec
->list
);
222 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
223 isec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_FILE
;
224 isec
->task_sid
= sid
;
225 inode
->i_security
= isec
;
230 static void inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
232 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
233 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
235 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
236 if (!list_empty(&isec
->list
))
237 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
238 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
240 inode
->i_security
= NULL
;
241 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache
, isec
);
244 static int file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
246 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
247 u32 sid
= current_sid();
249 fsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
254 fsec
->fown_sid
= sid
;
255 file
->f_security
= fsec
;
260 static void file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
262 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
263 file
->f_security
= NULL
;
267 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
269 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
271 sbsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
275 mutex_init(&sbsec
->lock
);
276 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec
->list
);
277 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec
->isec_head
);
278 spin_lock_init(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
280 sbsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
281 sbsec
->def_sid
= SECINITSID_FILE
;
282 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
283 sb
->s_security
= sbsec
;
288 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
290 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
292 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock
);
293 if (!list_empty(&sbsec
->list
))
294 list_del_init(&sbsec
->list
);
295 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock
);
297 sb
->s_security
= NULL
;
301 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock
*sk
, int family
, gfp_t priority
)
303 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
;
305 ssec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec
), priority
);
309 ssec
->peer_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
310 ssec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
311 sk
->sk_security
= ssec
;
313 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec
);
318 static void sk_free_security(struct sock
*sk
)
320 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
= sk
->sk_security
;
322 sk
->sk_security
= NULL
;
323 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec
);
327 /* The security server must be initialized before
328 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
329 extern int ss_initialized
;
331 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
333 static char *labeling_behaviors
[6] = {
335 "uses transition SIDs",
337 "uses genfs_contexts",
338 "not configured for labeling",
339 "uses mountpoint labeling",
342 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
);
344 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode
*inode
)
346 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, NULL
);
355 Opt_labelsupport
= 5,
358 static const match_table_t tokens
= {
359 {Opt_context
, CONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
360 {Opt_fscontext
, FSCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
361 {Opt_defcontext
, DEFCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
362 {Opt_rootcontext
, ROOTCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
363 {Opt_labelsupport
, LABELSUPP_STR
},
367 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
369 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid
,
370 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
371 const struct cred
*cred
)
373 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
376 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
377 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
381 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
382 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
386 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid
,
387 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
388 const struct cred
*cred
)
390 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
392 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
393 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
397 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
398 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, NULL
);
402 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block
*sb
)
404 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
405 struct dentry
*root
= sb
->s_root
;
406 struct inode
*root_inode
= root
->d_inode
;
409 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
) {
410 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
411 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
412 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
413 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
414 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
415 if (!root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
416 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
417 "xattr support\n", sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
421 rc
= root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr(root
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, NULL
, 0);
422 if (rc
< 0 && rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
423 if (rc
== -EOPNOTSUPP
)
424 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
425 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
426 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
428 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
429 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb
->s_id
,
430 sb
->s_type
->name
, -rc
);
435 sbsec
->flags
|= (SE_SBINITIALIZED
| SE_SBLABELSUPP
);
437 if (sbsec
->behavior
> ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors
))
438 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
439 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
441 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
442 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
,
443 labeling_behaviors
[sbsec
->behavior
-1]);
445 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS
||
446 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
||
447 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE
||
448 sbsec
->behavior
> ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors
))
449 sbsec
->flags
&= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP
;
451 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
452 if (strncmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
453 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBLABELSUPP
;
455 /* Initialize the root inode. */
456 rc
= inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode
, root
);
458 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
459 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
460 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
462 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
464 if (!list_empty(&sbsec
->isec_head
)) {
465 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
=
466 list_entry(sbsec
->isec_head
.next
,
467 struct inode_security_struct
, list
);
468 struct inode
*inode
= isec
->inode
;
469 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
470 inode
= igrab(inode
);
472 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode
))
476 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
477 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
480 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
486 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
487 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
488 * mount options, or whatever.
490 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*sb
,
491 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
494 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
495 char *context
= NULL
;
499 security_init_mnt_opts(opts
);
501 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
507 tmp
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
508 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
509 for (i
= 0; i
< 8; i
++) {
511 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
514 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
515 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
)
516 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
518 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
519 if (!opts
->mnt_opts
) {
524 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
525 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
531 if (sbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) {
532 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
535 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
536 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
538 if (sbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) {
539 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, &context
, &len
);
542 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
543 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
545 if (sbsec
->flags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) {
546 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->def_sid
, &context
, &len
);
549 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
550 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
552 if (sbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
553 struct inode
*root
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
554 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= root
->i_security
;
556 rc
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
559 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
560 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
562 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
) {
563 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = NULL
;
564 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP
;
567 BUG_ON(i
!= opts
->num_mnt_opts
);
572 security_free_mnt_opts(opts
);
576 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
, char flag
,
577 u32 old_sid
, u32 new_sid
)
579 char mnt_flags
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
581 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
582 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
583 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& flag
) ||
584 (old_sid
!= new_sid
))
587 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
588 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
590 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
591 if (mnt_flags
& flag
)
597 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
598 * labeling information.
600 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block
*sb
,
601 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
603 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
605 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
606 const char *name
= sb
->s_type
->name
;
607 struct inode
*inode
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
608 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
= inode
->i_security
;
609 u32 fscontext_sid
= 0, context_sid
= 0, rootcontext_sid
= 0;
610 u32 defcontext_sid
= 0;
611 char **mount_options
= opts
->mnt_opts
;
612 int *flags
= opts
->mnt_opts_flags
;
613 int num_opts
= opts
->num_mnt_opts
;
615 mutex_lock(&sbsec
->lock
);
617 if (!ss_initialized
) {
619 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
620 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
621 server is ready to handle calls. */
622 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock
);
623 if (list_empty(&sbsec
->list
))
624 list_add(&sbsec
->list
, &superblock_security_head
);
625 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock
);
629 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
630 "before the security server is initialized\n");
635 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
636 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
637 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
638 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
640 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
641 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
642 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
643 * will be used for both mounts)
645 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) && (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
650 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
651 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
652 * than once with different security options.
654 for (i
= 0; i
< num_opts
; i
++) {
657 if (flags
[i
] == SE_SBLABELSUPP
)
659 rc
= security_context_to_sid(mount_options
[i
],
660 strlen(mount_options
[i
]), &sid
);
662 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
663 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
664 mount_options
[i
], sb
->s_id
, name
, rc
);
671 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
,
673 goto out_double_mount
;
675 sbsec
->flags
|= FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
680 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
,
682 goto out_double_mount
;
684 sbsec
->flags
|= CONTEXT_MNT
;
686 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
687 rootcontext_sid
= sid
;
689 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
,
691 goto out_double_mount
;
693 sbsec
->flags
|= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
697 defcontext_sid
= sid
;
699 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
,
701 goto out_double_mount
;
703 sbsec
->flags
|= DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
712 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
713 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
714 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
) && !num_opts
)
715 goto out_double_mount
;
720 if (strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "proc") == 0)
721 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBPROC
;
723 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
724 rc
= security_fs_use((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBPROC
) ? "proc" : sb
->s_type
->name
, &sbsec
->behavior
, &sbsec
->sid
);
726 printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
727 __func__
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
731 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
733 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid
, sbsec
, cred
);
737 sbsec
->sid
= fscontext_sid
;
741 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
742 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
743 * the superblock context if not already set.
746 if (!fscontext_sid
) {
747 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
751 sbsec
->sid
= context_sid
;
753 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
758 if (!rootcontext_sid
)
759 rootcontext_sid
= context_sid
;
761 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= context_sid
;
762 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
;
765 if (rootcontext_sid
) {
766 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid
, sbsec
,
771 root_isec
->sid
= rootcontext_sid
;
772 root_isec
->initialized
= 1;
775 if (defcontext_sid
) {
776 if (sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
) {
778 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: defcontext option is "
779 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
783 if (defcontext_sid
!= sbsec
->def_sid
) {
784 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid
,
790 sbsec
->def_sid
= defcontext_sid
;
793 rc
= sb_finish_set_opts(sb
);
795 mutex_unlock(&sbsec
->lock
);
799 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
800 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb
->s_id
, name
);
804 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
805 struct super_block
*newsb
)
807 const struct superblock_security_struct
*oldsbsec
= oldsb
->s_security
;
808 struct superblock_security_struct
*newsbsec
= newsb
->s_security
;
810 int set_fscontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
);
811 int set_context
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
);
812 int set_rootcontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
);
815 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
816 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
819 if (!ss_initialized
) {
820 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock
);
821 if (list_empty(&newsbsec
->list
))
822 list_add(&newsbsec
->list
, &superblock_security_head
);
823 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock
);
827 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
828 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
));
830 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
831 if (newsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
834 mutex_lock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
836 newsbsec
->flags
= oldsbsec
->flags
;
838 newsbsec
->sid
= oldsbsec
->sid
;
839 newsbsec
->def_sid
= oldsbsec
->def_sid
;
840 newsbsec
->behavior
= oldsbsec
->behavior
;
843 u32 sid
= oldsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
847 if (!set_rootcontext
) {
848 struct inode
*newinode
= newsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
849 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= newinode
->i_security
;
852 newsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= sid
;
854 if (set_rootcontext
) {
855 const struct inode
*oldinode
= oldsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
856 const struct inode_security_struct
*oldisec
= oldinode
->i_security
;
857 struct inode
*newinode
= newsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
858 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= newinode
->i_security
;
860 newisec
->sid
= oldisec
->sid
;
863 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb
);
864 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
867 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options
,
868 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
871 char *context
= NULL
, *defcontext
= NULL
;
872 char *fscontext
= NULL
, *rootcontext
= NULL
;
873 int rc
, num_mnt_opts
= 0;
875 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= 0;
877 /* Standard string-based options. */
878 while ((p
= strsep(&options
, "|")) != NULL
) {
880 substring_t args
[MAX_OPT_ARGS
];
885 token
= match_token(p
, tokens
, args
);
889 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
891 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
894 context
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
904 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
907 fscontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
914 case Opt_rootcontext
:
917 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
920 rootcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
928 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
930 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
933 defcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
939 case Opt_labelsupport
:
943 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
950 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
954 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
955 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
956 kfree(opts
->mnt_opts
);
961 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = fscontext
;
962 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
965 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = context
;
966 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
969 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = rootcontext
;
970 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
973 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = defcontext
;
974 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
977 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= num_mnt_opts
;
988 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
990 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
993 char *options
= data
;
994 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
996 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1001 BUG_ON(sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
);
1003 rc
= selinux_parse_opts_str(options
, &opts
);
1008 rc
= selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
);
1011 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1015 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file
*m
,
1016 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
1021 for (i
= 0; i
< opts
->num_mnt_opts
; i
++) {
1024 if (opts
->mnt_opts
[i
])
1025 has_comma
= strchr(opts
->mnt_opts
[i
], ',');
1029 switch (opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
]) {
1031 prefix
= CONTEXT_STR
;
1034 prefix
= FSCONTEXT_STR
;
1036 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
1037 prefix
= ROOTCONTEXT_STR
;
1039 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT
:
1040 prefix
= DEFCONTEXT_STR
;
1042 case SE_SBLABELSUPP
:
1044 seq_puts(m
, LABELSUPP_STR
);
1049 /* we need a comma before each option */
1051 seq_puts(m
, prefix
);
1054 seq_puts(m
, opts
->mnt_opts
[i
]);
1060 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file
*m
, struct super_block
*sb
)
1062 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
1065 rc
= selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
);
1067 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1073 selinux_write_opts(m
, &opts
);
1075 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1080 static inline u16
inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode
)
1082 switch (mode
& S_IFMT
) {
1084 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE
;
1086 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
;
1088 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1090 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE
;
1092 return SECCLASS_DIR
;
1094 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE
;
1096 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE
;
1100 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1103 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol
)
1105 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_TCP
);
1108 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol
)
1110 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_UDP
);
1113 static inline u16
socket_type_to_security_class(int family
, int type
, int protocol
)
1119 case SOCK_SEQPACKET
:
1120 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
;
1122 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET
;
1129 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol
))
1130 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
;
1132 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1134 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol
))
1135 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
;
1137 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1139 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
;
1141 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1147 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET
;
1148 case NETLINK_FIREWALL
:
1149 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET
;
1150 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG
:
1151 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET
;
1153 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET
;
1155 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET
;
1156 case NETLINK_SELINUX
:
1157 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET
;
1159 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET
;
1160 case NETLINK_IP6_FW
:
1161 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET
;
1162 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG
:
1163 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET
;
1164 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT
:
1165 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET
;
1167 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET
;
1170 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET
;
1172 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET
;
1174 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET
;
1177 return SECCLASS_SOCKET
;
1180 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1181 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry
*de
,
1186 char *buffer
, *path
, *end
;
1188 buffer
= (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
1193 end
= buffer
+buflen
;
1198 while (de
&& de
!= de
->parent
) {
1199 buflen
-= de
->namelen
+ 1;
1203 memcpy(end
, de
->name
, de
->namelen
);
1208 rc
= security_genfs_sid("proc", path
, tclass
, sid
);
1209 free_page((unsigned long)buffer
);
1213 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry
*de
,
1221 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1222 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
)
1224 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= NULL
;
1225 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1227 struct dentry
*dentry
;
1228 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1229 char *context
= NULL
;
1233 if (isec
->initialized
)
1236 mutex_lock(&isec
->lock
);
1237 if (isec
->initialized
)
1240 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1241 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)) {
1242 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1243 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1244 server is ready to handle calls. */
1245 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1246 if (list_empty(&isec
->list
))
1247 list_add(&isec
->list
, &sbsec
->isec_head
);
1248 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1252 switch (sbsec
->behavior
) {
1253 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
:
1254 if (!inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
1255 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1259 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1260 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1262 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1263 dentry
= dget(opt_dentry
);
1265 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1266 dentry
= d_find_alias(inode
);
1270 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1271 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1272 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1273 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1274 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1275 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1276 * be used again by userspace.
1281 len
= INITCONTEXTLEN
;
1282 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1288 context
[len
] = '\0';
1289 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1291 if (rc
== -ERANGE
) {
1294 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1295 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1302 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1308 context
[len
] = '\0';
1309 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
,
1315 if (rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
1316 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1317 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__
,
1318 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
1322 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1323 sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1326 rc
= security_context_to_sid_default(context
, rc
, &sid
,
1330 char *dev
= inode
->i_sb
->s_id
;
1331 unsigned long ino
= inode
->i_ino
;
1333 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
1334 if (printk_ratelimit())
1335 printk(KERN_NOTICE
"SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1336 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1337 "filesystem in question.\n", ino
, dev
, context
);
1339 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1340 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1341 __func__
, context
, -rc
, dev
, ino
);
1344 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1352 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK
:
1353 isec
->sid
= isec
->task_sid
;
1355 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS
:
1356 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1357 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1359 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1360 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1361 rc
= security_transition_sid(isec
->task_sid
,
1369 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
:
1370 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
1373 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1374 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1376 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBPROC
) && !S_ISLNK(inode
->i_mode
)) {
1377 struct proc_inode
*proci
= PROC_I(inode
);
1379 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1380 rc
= selinux_proc_get_sid(proci
->pde
,
1391 isec
->initialized
= 1;
1394 mutex_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
1396 if (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_FILE
)
1397 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1401 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1402 static inline u32
signal_to_av(int sig
)
1408 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1409 perm
= PROCESS__SIGCHLD
;
1412 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1413 perm
= PROCESS__SIGKILL
;
1416 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1417 perm
= PROCESS__SIGSTOP
;
1420 /* All other signals. */
1421 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNAL
;
1429 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1430 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1432 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred
*actor
,
1433 const struct cred
*target
,
1436 u32 asid
= cred_sid(actor
), tsid
= cred_sid(target
);
1438 return avc_has_perm(asid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1442 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1443 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1444 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1445 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1447 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk1
,
1448 const struct task_struct
*tsk2
,
1451 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec1
, *__tsec2
;
1455 __tsec1
= __task_cred(tsk1
)->security
; sid1
= __tsec1
->sid
;
1456 __tsec2
= __task_cred(tsk2
)->security
; sid2
= __tsec2
->sid
;
1458 return avc_has_perm(sid1
, sid2
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1462 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1463 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1464 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1465 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1467 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1472 sid
= current_sid();
1473 tsid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1474 return avc_has_perm(sid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1477 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1478 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1481 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1482 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1483 const struct cred
*cred
,
1486 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1487 struct av_decision avd
;
1489 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1490 u32 av
= CAP_TO_MASK(cap
);
1493 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, CAP
);
1497 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap
)) {
1499 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY
;
1502 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2
;
1506 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap
);
1510 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, 0, &avd
);
1511 if (audit
== SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
)
1512 avc_audit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, &avd
, rc
, &ad
);
1516 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1517 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1520 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1522 return avc_has_perm(sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
1523 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, perms
, NULL
);
1526 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1527 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1528 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1529 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1530 struct inode
*inode
,
1532 struct common_audit_data
*adp
)
1534 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
1535 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1538 validate_creds(cred
);
1540 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
1543 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1544 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1548 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1549 ad
.u
.fs
.inode
= inode
;
1552 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, adp
);
1555 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1556 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1557 pathname if needed. */
1558 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1559 struct vfsmount
*mnt
,
1560 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1563 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
1564 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1566 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1567 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.mnt
= mnt
;
1568 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
;
1569 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1572 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1573 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1574 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1575 check a particular permission to the file.
1576 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1577 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1578 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1579 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1580 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1584 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
1585 struct inode
*inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
1586 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1587 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1590 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1591 ad
.u
.fs
.path
= file
->f_path
;
1593 if (sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
1594 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, fsec
->sid
,
1602 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1605 rc
= inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1611 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1612 static int may_create(struct inode
*dir
,
1613 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1616 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
1617 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
1618 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
1619 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1621 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1624 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
1625 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1628 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
1630 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1631 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
;
1633 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1634 DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
,
1639 if (!newsid
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
)) {
1640 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, dsec
->sid
, tclass
, &newsid
);
1645 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, tclass
, FILE__CREATE
, &ad
);
1649 return avc_has_perm(newsid
, sbsec
->sid
,
1650 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
1651 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
1654 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1655 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid
,
1656 struct task_struct
*ctx
)
1658 u32 sid
= task_sid(ctx
);
1660 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, KEY__CREATE
, NULL
);
1664 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1667 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1668 static int may_link(struct inode
*dir
,
1669 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1673 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
, *isec
;
1674 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1675 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1679 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
1680 isec
= dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1682 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1683 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
;
1686 av
|= (kind
? DIR__REMOVE_NAME
: DIR__ADD_NAME
);
1687 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1702 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1707 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, av
, &ad
);
1711 static inline int may_rename(struct inode
*old_dir
,
1712 struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
1713 struct inode
*new_dir
,
1714 struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
1716 struct inode_security_struct
*old_dsec
, *new_dsec
, *old_isec
, *new_isec
;
1717 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1718 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1720 int old_is_dir
, new_is_dir
;
1723 old_dsec
= old_dir
->i_security
;
1724 old_isec
= old_dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1725 old_is_dir
= S_ISDIR(old_dentry
->d_inode
->i_mode
);
1726 new_dsec
= new_dir
->i_security
;
1728 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1730 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= old_dentry
;
1731 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1732 DIR__REMOVE_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
, &ad
);
1735 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1736 old_isec
->sclass
, FILE__RENAME
, &ad
);
1739 if (old_is_dir
&& new_dir
!= old_dir
) {
1740 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1741 old_isec
->sclass
, DIR__REPARENT
, &ad
);
1746 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= new_dentry
;
1747 av
= DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
;
1748 if (new_dentry
->d_inode
)
1749 av
|= DIR__REMOVE_NAME
;
1750 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1753 if (new_dentry
->d_inode
) {
1754 new_isec
= new_dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1755 new_is_dir
= S_ISDIR(new_dentry
->d_inode
->i_mode
);
1756 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_isec
->sid
,
1758 (new_is_dir
? DIR__RMDIR
: FILE__UNLINK
), &ad
);
1766 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1767 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1768 struct super_block
*sb
,
1770 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
1772 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1773 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1775 sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
1776 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
, perms
, ad
);
1779 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1780 static inline u32
file_mask_to_av(int mode
, int mask
)
1784 if ((mode
& S_IFMT
) != S_IFDIR
) {
1785 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1786 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
1787 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1790 if (mask
& MAY_APPEND
)
1792 else if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1796 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1798 if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1800 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1807 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1808 static inline u32
file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1812 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_READ
)
1814 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_WRITE
) {
1815 if (file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
)
1822 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1831 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1834 static inline u32
open_file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1836 u32 av
= file_to_av(file
);
1838 if (selinux_policycap_openperm
) {
1839 mode_t mode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
->i_mode
;
1841 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1845 else if (S_ISCHR(mode
))
1846 av
|= CHR_FILE__OPEN
;
1847 else if (S_ISBLK(mode
))
1848 av
|= BLK_FILE__OPEN
;
1849 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode
))
1850 av
|= FIFO_FILE__OPEN
;
1851 else if (S_ISDIR(mode
))
1853 else if (S_ISSOCK(mode
))
1854 av
|= SOCK_FILE__OPEN
;
1856 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1857 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__
, mode
);
1862 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1864 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct
*child
,
1869 rc
= cap_ptrace_access_check(child
, mode
);
1873 if (mode
== PTRACE_MODE_READ
) {
1874 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1875 u32 csid
= task_sid(child
);
1876 return avc_has_perm(sid
, csid
, SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__READ
, NULL
);
1879 return current_has_perm(child
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
1882 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct
*parent
)
1886 rc
= cap_ptrace_traceme(parent
);
1890 return task_has_perm(parent
, current
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
1893 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct
*target
, kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
1894 kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
, kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
1898 error
= current_has_perm(target
, PROCESS__GETCAP
);
1902 return cap_capget(target
, effective
, inheritable
, permitted
);
1905 static int selinux_capset(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
1906 const kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
1907 const kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
,
1908 const kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
1912 error
= cap_capset(new, old
,
1913 effective
, inheritable
, permitted
);
1917 return cred_has_perm(old
, new, PROCESS__SETCAP
);
1921 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1922 * which was removed).
1924 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1925 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1926 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1927 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1930 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct
*tsk
, const struct cred
*cred
,
1935 rc
= cap_capable(tsk
, cred
, cap
, audit
);
1939 return task_has_capability(tsk
, cred
, cap
, audit
);
1942 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table
*table
, u16 tclass
, u32
*sid
)
1945 char *buffer
, *path
, *end
;
1948 buffer
= (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
1953 end
= buffer
+buflen
;
1959 const char *name
= table
->procname
;
1960 size_t namelen
= strlen(name
);
1961 buflen
-= namelen
+ 1;
1965 memcpy(end
, name
, namelen
);
1968 table
= table
->parent
;
1974 memcpy(end
, "/sys", 4);
1976 rc
= security_genfs_sid("proc", path
, tclass
, sid
);
1978 free_page((unsigned long)buffer
);
1983 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table
*table
, int op
)
1990 sid
= current_sid();
1992 rc
= selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table
, (op
== 0001) ?
1993 SECCLASS_DIR
: SECCLASS_FILE
, &tsid
);
1995 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1996 tsid
= SECINITSID_SYSCTL
;
1999 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
2000 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
2002 error
= avc_has_perm(sid
, tsid
,
2003 SECCLASS_DIR
, DIR__SEARCH
, NULL
);
2011 error
= avc_has_perm(sid
, tsid
,
2012 SECCLASS_FILE
, av
, NULL
);
2018 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds
, int type
, int id
, struct super_block
*sb
)
2020 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2032 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD
, NULL
);
2037 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET
, NULL
);
2040 rc
= 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2046 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2048 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2050 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__QUOTAON
);
2053 static int selinux_syslog(int type
, bool from_file
)
2057 rc
= cap_syslog(type
, from_file
);
2062 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
2063 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2064 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ
);
2066 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
2067 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
2068 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2069 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE
);
2071 case 0: /* Close log */
2072 case 1: /* Open log */
2073 case 2: /* Read from log */
2074 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2075 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
2077 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD
);
2084 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2085 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2086 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2088 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2089 * processes that allocate mappings.
2091 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct
*mm
, long pages
)
2093 int rc
, cap_sys_admin
= 0;
2095 rc
= selinux_capable(current
, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN
,
2096 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
2100 return __vm_enough_memory(mm
, pages
, cap_sys_admin
);
2103 /* binprm security operations */
2105 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2107 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
2108 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2109 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2110 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2111 struct inode
*inode
= bprm
->file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
2114 rc
= cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm
);
2118 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2119 * the script interpreter */
2120 if (bprm
->cred_prepared
)
2123 old_tsec
= current_security();
2124 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2125 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2127 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2128 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2129 new_tsec
->osid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2131 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2132 new_tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
2133 new_tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
2134 new_tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
2136 if (old_tsec
->exec_sid
) {
2137 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->exec_sid
;
2138 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2139 new_tsec
->exec_sid
= 0;
2141 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2142 rc
= security_transition_sid(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2143 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, &new_tsec
->sid
);
2148 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2149 ad
.u
.fs
.path
= bprm
->file
->f_path
;
2151 if (bprm
->file
->f_path
.mnt
->mnt_flags
& MNT_NOSUID
)
2152 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2154 if (new_tsec
->sid
== old_tsec
->sid
) {
2155 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2156 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS
, &ad
);
2160 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2161 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2162 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__TRANSITION
, &ad
);
2166 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2167 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__ENTRYPOINT
, &ad
);
2171 /* Check for shared state */
2172 if (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE
) {
2173 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2174 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SHARE
,
2180 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2181 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2183 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE
| LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
)) {
2184 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
2185 struct task_security_struct
*sec
;
2189 tracer
= tracehook_tracer_task(current
);
2190 if (likely(tracer
!= NULL
)) {
2191 sec
= __task_cred(tracer
)->security
;
2197 rc
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2199 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
2205 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2206 bprm
->per_clear
|= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID
;
2212 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2214 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2215 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
2223 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2224 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2225 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2226 atsecure
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
,
2228 PROCESS__NOATSECURE
, NULL
);
2231 return (atsecure
|| cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm
));
2234 extern struct vfsmount
*selinuxfs_mount
;
2235 extern struct dentry
*selinux_null
;
2237 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2238 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred
*cred
,
2239 struct files_struct
*files
)
2241 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2242 struct file
*file
, *devnull
= NULL
;
2243 struct tty_struct
*tty
;
2244 struct fdtable
*fdt
;
2248 tty
= get_current_tty();
2251 if (!list_empty(&tty
->tty_files
)) {
2252 struct inode
*inode
;
2254 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2255 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2256 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2257 file may belong to another process and we are only
2258 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2259 file
= list_first_entry(&tty
->tty_files
, struct file
, f_u
.fu_list
);
2260 inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
2261 if (inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
,
2262 FILE__READ
| FILE__WRITE
, NULL
)) {
2269 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2273 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2275 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2277 spin_lock(&files
->file_lock
);
2279 unsigned long set
, i
;
2284 fdt
= files_fdtable(files
);
2285 if (i
>= fdt
->max_fds
)
2287 set
= fdt
->open_fds
->fds_bits
[j
];
2290 spin_unlock(&files
->file_lock
);
2291 for ( ; set
; i
++, set
>>= 1) {
2296 if (file_has_perm(cred
,
2298 file_to_av(file
))) {
2300 fd
= get_unused_fd();
2310 devnull
= dentry_open(
2312 mntget(selinuxfs_mount
),
2314 if (IS_ERR(devnull
)) {
2321 fd_install(fd
, devnull
);
2326 spin_lock(&files
->file_lock
);
2329 spin_unlock(&files
->file_lock
);
2333 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2335 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2337 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2338 struct rlimit
*rlim
, *initrlim
;
2341 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2342 if (new_tsec
->sid
== new_tsec
->osid
)
2345 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2346 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm
->cred
, current
->files
);
2348 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2349 current
->pdeath_signal
= 0;
2351 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2352 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2353 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2355 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2356 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2357 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2358 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2359 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2361 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->osid
, new_tsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2362 PROCESS__RLIMITINH
, NULL
);
2364 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++) {
2365 rlim
= current
->signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2366 initrlim
= init_task
.signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2367 rlim
->rlim_cur
= min(rlim
->rlim_max
, initrlim
->rlim_cur
);
2369 update_rlimit_cpu(current
->signal
->rlim
[RLIMIT_CPU
].rlim_cur
);
2374 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2377 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2379 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2380 struct itimerval itimer
;
2390 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2391 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2392 * flush and unblock signals.
2394 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2395 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2397 rc
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SIGINH
, NULL
);
2399 memset(&itimer
, 0, sizeof itimer
);
2400 for (i
= 0; i
< 3; i
++)
2401 do_setitimer(i
, &itimer
, NULL
);
2402 spin_lock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2403 if (!(current
->signal
->flags
& SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT
)) {
2404 __flush_signals(current
);
2405 flush_signal_handlers(current
, 1);
2406 sigemptyset(¤t
->blocked
);
2408 spin_unlock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2411 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2412 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2413 read_lock(&tasklist_lock
);
2414 __wake_up_parent(current
, current
->real_parent
);
2415 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock
);
2418 /* superblock security operations */
2420 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2422 return superblock_alloc_security(sb
);
2425 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2427 superblock_free_security(sb
);
2430 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix
, int plen
, char *option
, int olen
)
2435 return !memcmp(prefix
, option
, plen
);
2438 static inline int selinux_option(char *option
, int len
)
2440 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2441 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2442 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2443 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2444 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR
, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR
)-1, option
, len
));
2447 static inline void take_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
, int len
)
2454 memcpy(*to
, from
, len
);
2458 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
,
2461 int current_size
= 0;
2469 while (current_size
< len
) {
2479 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig
, char *copy
)
2481 int fnosec
, fsec
, rc
= 0;
2482 char *in_save
, *in_curr
, *in_end
;
2483 char *sec_curr
, *nosec_save
, *nosec
;
2489 nosec
= (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
2497 in_save
= in_end
= orig
;
2501 open_quote
= !open_quote
;
2502 if ((*in_end
== ',' && open_quote
== 0) ||
2504 int len
= in_end
- in_curr
;
2506 if (selinux_option(in_curr
, len
))
2507 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr
, in_curr
, &fsec
, len
);
2509 take_option(&nosec
, in_curr
, &fnosec
, len
);
2511 in_curr
= in_end
+ 1;
2513 } while (*in_end
++);
2515 strcpy(in_save
, nosec_save
);
2516 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save
);
2521 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block
*sb
, int flags
, void *data
)
2523 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2524 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2527 rc
= superblock_doinit(sb
, data
);
2531 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2532 if (flags
& MS_KERNMOUNT
)
2535 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2536 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= sb
->s_root
;
2537 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT
, &ad
);
2540 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2542 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2543 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2545 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2546 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
->d_sb
->s_root
;
2547 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, dentry
->d_sb
, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR
, &ad
);
2550 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name
,
2553 unsigned long flags
,
2556 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2558 if (flags
& MS_REMOUNT
)
2559 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, path
->mnt
->mnt_sb
,
2560 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT
, NULL
);
2562 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, path
->mnt
, path
->dentry
,
2566 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, int flags
)
2568 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2570 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, mnt
->mnt_sb
,
2571 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT
, NULL
);
2574 /* inode security operations */
2576 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2578 return inode_alloc_security(inode
);
2581 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2583 inode_free_security(inode
);
2586 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode
*inode
, struct inode
*dir
,
2587 char **name
, void **value
,
2590 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2591 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
2592 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
2593 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2594 u32 sid
, newsid
, clen
;
2596 char *namep
= NULL
, *context
;
2598 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
2599 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2602 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
2604 if (!newsid
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
)) {
2605 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, dsec
->sid
,
2606 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
),
2609 printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: "
2610 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2613 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
2618 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2619 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
2620 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2621 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
2623 isec
->initialized
= 1;
2626 if (!ss_initialized
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
))
2630 namep
= kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
, GFP_NOFS
);
2637 rc
= security_sid_to_context_force(newsid
, &context
, &clen
);
2649 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, int mask
)
2651 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_FILE
);
2654 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry
*old_dentry
, struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2656 return may_link(dir
, old_dentry
, MAY_LINK
);
2659 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2661 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_UNLINK
);
2664 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2666 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
);
2669 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, int mask
)
2671 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_DIR
);
2674 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2676 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_RMDIR
);
2679 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, int mode
, dev_t dev
)
2681 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
));
2684 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode
*old_inode
, struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
2685 struct inode
*new_inode
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2687 return may_rename(old_inode
, old_dentry
, new_inode
, new_dentry
);
2690 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2692 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2694 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2697 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct nameidata
*nameidata
)
2699 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2701 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2704 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
, int mask
)
2706 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2709 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2713 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
,
2714 file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
), NULL
);
2717 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct iattr
*iattr
)
2719 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2720 unsigned int ia_valid
= iattr
->ia_valid
;
2722 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2723 if (ia_valid
& ATTR_FORCE
) {
2724 ia_valid
&= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID
| ATTR_KILL_SGID
| ATTR_MODE
|
2730 if (ia_valid
& (ATTR_MODE
| ATTR_UID
| ATTR_GID
|
2731 ATTR_ATIME_SET
| ATTR_MTIME_SET
| ATTR_TIMES_SET
))
2732 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2734 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__WRITE
);
2737 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2739 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2741 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, mnt
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2744 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2746 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2748 if (!strncmp(name
, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
,
2749 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
- 1)) {
2750 if (!strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_CAPS
)) {
2751 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP
))
2753 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
2754 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2755 Restrict to administrator. */
2760 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2761 ordinary setattr permission. */
2762 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2765 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
2766 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
2768 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2769 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2770 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2771 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2772 u32 newsid
, sid
= current_sid();
2775 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
2776 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
2778 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2779 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
))
2782 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode
))
2785 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2786 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
;
2788 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
,
2789 FILE__RELABELFROM
, &ad
);
2793 rc
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2794 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
2795 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
))
2797 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2802 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, isec
->sclass
,
2803 FILE__RELABELTO
, &ad
);
2807 rc
= security_validate_transition(isec
->sid
, newsid
, sid
,
2812 return avc_has_perm(newsid
,
2814 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
2815 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
,
2819 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
2820 const void *value
, size_t size
,
2823 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2824 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2828 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
)) {
2829 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2833 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2835 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2836 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2837 inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
, -rc
);
2845 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2847 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2849 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2852 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2854 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2856 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2859 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2861 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
2862 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
2864 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2865 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2870 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2872 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2874 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
, void **buffer
, bool alloc
)
2878 char *context
= NULL
;
2879 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2881 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
2885 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2886 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2887 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2888 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2889 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2890 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2891 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2893 error
= selinux_capable(current
, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN
,
2894 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
2896 error
= security_sid_to_context_force(isec
->sid
, &context
,
2899 error
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &size
);
2912 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
,
2913 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
2915 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2919 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
2922 if (!value
|| !size
)
2925 rc
= security_context_to_sid((void *)value
, size
, &newsid
);
2930 isec
->initialized
= 1;
2934 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, char *buffer
, size_t buffer_size
)
2936 const int len
= sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
);
2937 if (buffer
&& len
<= buffer_size
)
2938 memcpy(buffer
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, len
);
2942 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode
*inode
, u32
*secid
)
2944 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2948 /* file security operations */
2950 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
2952 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2953 struct inode
*inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
2955 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2956 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && (mask
& MAY_WRITE
))
2959 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
,
2960 file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
));
2963 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
2965 struct inode
*inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
2966 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
2967 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2968 u32 sid
= current_sid();
2971 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2974 if (sid
== fsec
->sid
&& fsec
->isid
== isec
->sid
&&
2975 fsec
->pseqno
== avc_policy_seqno())
2976 /* No change since dentry_open check. */
2979 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file
, mask
);
2982 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
2984 return file_alloc_security(file
);
2987 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
2989 file_free_security(file
);
2992 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
2995 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2998 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd
) & _IOC_WRITE
)
3000 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd
) & _IOC_READ
)
3005 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, av
);
3008 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file
*file
, unsigned long prot
, int shared
)
3010 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3013 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3014 if ((prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && (!file
|| (!shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
)))) {
3016 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3017 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3018 * This has an additional check.
3020 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECMEM
);
3027 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3028 u32 av
= FILE__READ
;
3030 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3031 if (shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
))
3034 if (prot
& PROT_EXEC
)
3035 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
3037 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, av
);
3044 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file
*file
, unsigned long reqprot
,
3045 unsigned long prot
, unsigned long flags
,
3046 unsigned long addr
, unsigned long addr_only
)
3049 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3052 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3053 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3054 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3055 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3057 if (addr
< CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
) {
3058 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT
,
3059 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO
, NULL
);
3064 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3065 rc
= cap_file_mmap(file
, reqprot
, prot
, flags
, addr
, addr_only
);
3066 if (rc
|| addr_only
)
3069 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3072 return file_map_prot_check(file
, prot
,
3073 (flags
& MAP_TYPE
) == MAP_SHARED
);
3076 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct
*vma
,
3077 unsigned long reqprot
,
3080 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3082 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3085 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3086 if ((prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && !(vma
->vm_flags
& VM_EXEC
)) {
3088 if (vma
->vm_start
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_brk
&&
3089 vma
->vm_end
<= vma
->vm_mm
->brk
) {
3090 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECHEAP
);
3091 } else if (!vma
->vm_file
&&
3092 vma
->vm_start
<= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
&&
3093 vma
->vm_end
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
) {
3094 rc
= current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__EXECSTACK
);
3095 } else if (vma
->vm_file
&& vma
->anon_vma
) {
3097 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3098 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3099 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3100 * modified content. This typically should only
3101 * occur for text relocations.
3103 rc
= file_has_perm(cred
, vma
->vm_file
, FILE__EXECMOD
);
3110 return file_map_prot_check(vma
->vm_file
, prot
, vma
->vm_flags
&VM_SHARED
);
3113 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
)
3115 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3117 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3120 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3123 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3128 if (!file
->f_path
.dentry
|| !file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
) {
3133 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && !(arg
& O_APPEND
)) {
3134 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__WRITE
);
3143 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3144 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3149 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3154 if (!file
->f_path
.dentry
|| !file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
) {
3158 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3165 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file
*file
)
3167 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3169 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3170 fsec
->fown_sid
= current_sid();
3175 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
3176 struct fown_struct
*fown
, int signum
)
3179 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
3181 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3183 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3184 file
= container_of(fown
, struct file
, f_owner
);
3186 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3189 perm
= signal_to_av(SIGIO
); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3191 perm
= signal_to_av(signum
);
3193 return avc_has_perm(fsec
->fown_sid
, sid
,
3194 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3197 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file
*file
)
3199 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3201 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, file_to_av(file
));
3204 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file
*file
, const struct cred
*cred
)
3206 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3207 struct inode
*inode
;
3208 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3210 inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
3211 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3212 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3214 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3215 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3216 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3217 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3218 * struct as its SID.
3220 fsec
->isid
= isec
->sid
;
3221 fsec
->pseqno
= avc_policy_seqno();
3223 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3224 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3225 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3226 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3227 * new inode label or new policy.
3228 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3230 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, open_file_to_av(file
), NULL
);
3233 /* task security operations */
3235 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags
)
3237 return current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__FORK
);
3241 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3243 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred
*cred
, gfp_t gfp
)
3245 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3247 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3251 cred
->security
= tsec
;
3256 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3258 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred
*cred
)
3260 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
3262 BUG_ON((unsigned long) cred
->security
< PAGE_SIZE
);
3263 cred
->security
= (void *) 0x7UL
;
3268 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3270 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
3273 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
3274 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3276 old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3278 tsec
= kmemdup(old_tsec
, sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3282 new->security
= tsec
;
3287 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3289 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
3291 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3292 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3298 * set the security data for a kernel service
3299 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3301 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred
*new, u32 secid
)
3303 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3304 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3307 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, secid
,
3308 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3309 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE
,
3313 tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
3314 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
3315 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
3321 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3322 * objective context of the specified inode
3324 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred
*new, struct inode
*inode
)
3326 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3327 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3328 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3331 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
3332 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3333 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS
,
3337 tsec
->create_sid
= isec
->sid
;
3341 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name
)
3344 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3346 sid
= task_sid(current
);
3348 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, KMOD
);
3349 ad
.u
.kmod_name
= kmod_name
;
3351 return avc_has_perm(sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
, SECCLASS_SYSTEM
,
3352 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST
, &ad
);
3355 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct
*p
, pid_t pgid
)
3357 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETPGID
);
3360 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3362 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETPGID
);
3365 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3367 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSESSION
);
3370 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct
*p
, u32
*secid
)
3372 *secid
= task_sid(p
);
3375 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct
*p
, int nice
)
3379 rc
= cap_task_setnice(p
, nice
);
3383 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3386 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct
*p
, int ioprio
)
3390 rc
= cap_task_setioprio(p
, ioprio
);
3394 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3397 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct
*p
)
3399 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3402 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource
, struct rlimit
*new_rlim
)
3404 struct rlimit
*old_rlim
= current
->signal
->rlim
+ resource
;
3406 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3407 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3408 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3409 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3410 if (old_rlim
->rlim_max
!= new_rlim
->rlim_max
)
3411 return current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT
);
3416 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
, int policy
, struct sched_param
*lp
)
3420 rc
= cap_task_setscheduler(p
, policy
, lp
);
3424 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3427 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
3429 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3432 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct
*p
)
3434 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3437 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct
*p
, struct siginfo
*info
,
3444 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNULL
; /* null signal; existence test */
3446 perm
= signal_to_av(sig
);
3448 rc
= avc_has_perm(secid
, task_sid(p
),
3449 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3451 rc
= current_has_perm(p
, perm
);
3455 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct
*p
)
3457 return task_has_perm(p
, current
, PROCESS__SIGCHLD
);
3460 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct
*p
,
3461 struct inode
*inode
)
3463 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3464 u32 sid
= task_sid(p
);
3467 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3470 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3471 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3472 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3474 int offset
, ihlen
, ret
= -EINVAL
;
3475 struct iphdr _iph
, *ih
;
3477 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3478 ih
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_iph
), &_iph
);
3482 ihlen
= ih
->ihl
* 4;
3483 if (ihlen
< sizeof(_iph
))
3486 ad
->u
.net
.v4info
.saddr
= ih
->saddr
;
3487 ad
->u
.net
.v4info
.daddr
= ih
->daddr
;
3491 *proto
= ih
->protocol
;
3493 switch (ih
->protocol
) {
3495 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3497 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3501 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3505 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= th
->source
;
3506 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= th
->dest
;
3511 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3513 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3517 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3521 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= uh
->source
;
3522 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= uh
->dest
;
3526 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3527 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3529 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3533 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3537 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3538 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3549 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3551 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3552 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3553 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3556 int ret
= -EINVAL
, offset
;
3557 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h
, *ip6
;
3559 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3560 ip6
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_ipv6h
), &_ipv6h
);
3564 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad
->u
.net
.v6info
.saddr
, &ip6
->saddr
);
3565 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad
->u
.net
.v6info
.daddr
, &ip6
->daddr
);
3568 nexthdr
= ip6
->nexthdr
;
3569 offset
+= sizeof(_ipv6h
);
3570 offset
= ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb
, offset
, &nexthdr
);
3579 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3581 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3585 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= th
->source
;
3586 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= th
->dest
;
3591 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3593 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3597 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= uh
->source
;
3598 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= uh
->dest
;
3602 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3603 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3605 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3609 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3610 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3614 /* includes fragments */
3624 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff
*skb
, struct common_audit_data
*ad
,
3625 char **_addrp
, int src
, u8
*proto
)
3630 switch (ad
->u
.net
.family
) {
3632 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3635 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
.v4info
.saddr
:
3636 &ad
->u
.net
.v4info
.daddr
);
3639 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3641 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3644 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
.v6info
.saddr
:
3645 &ad
->u
.net
.v6info
.daddr
);
3655 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3656 " unable to parse packet\n");
3666 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3668 * @family: protocol family
3669 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3672 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3673 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3674 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3675 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3676 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3680 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff
*skb
, u16 family
, u32
*sid
)
3687 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb
, &xfrm_sid
);
3688 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb
, family
, &nlbl_type
, &nlbl_sid
);
3690 err
= security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid
, nlbl_type
, xfrm_sid
, sid
);
3691 if (unlikely(err
)) {
3693 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3694 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3701 /* socket security operations */
3702 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct
*task
, struct socket
*sock
,
3705 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3706 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3710 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3712 if (isec
->sid
== SECINITSID_KERNEL
)
3714 sid
= task_sid(task
);
3716 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3717 ad
.u
.net
.sk
= sock
->sk
;
3718 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
3724 static int selinux_socket_create(int family
, int type
,
3725 int protocol
, int kern
)
3727 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3728 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
3737 newsid
= tsec
->sockcreate_sid
?: sid
;
3739 secclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
3740 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, secclass
, SOCKET__CREATE
, NULL
);
3746 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket
*sock
, int family
,
3747 int type
, int protocol
, int kern
)
3749 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3750 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
3751 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3752 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
3757 newsid
= tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
3759 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3762 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
3768 isec
->sclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
3769 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3772 sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
3773 sksec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
3774 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
3775 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock
->sk
, family
);
3781 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3782 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3783 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3785 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
3790 err
= socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__BIND
);
3795 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3796 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3797 * check the first address now.
3799 family
= sock
->sk
->sk_family
;
3800 if (family
== PF_INET
|| family
== PF_INET6
) {
3802 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3803 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3804 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
3805 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
3806 unsigned short snum
;
3807 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
3810 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3812 if (family
== PF_INET
) {
3813 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
3814 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
3815 addrp
= (char *)&addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
3817 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
3818 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
3819 addrp
= (char *)&addr6
->sin6_addr
.s6_addr
;
3825 inet_get_local_port_range(&low
, &high
);
3827 if (snum
< max(PROT_SOCK
, low
) || snum
> high
) {
3828 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
,
3832 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3833 ad
.u
.net
.sport
= htons(snum
);
3834 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
3835 err
= avc_has_perm(isec
->sid
, sid
,
3837 SOCKET__NAME_BIND
, &ad
);
3843 switch (isec
->sclass
) {
3844 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
:
3845 node_perm
= TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3848 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
:
3849 node_perm
= UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3852 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
:
3853 node_perm
= DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3857 node_perm
= RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3861 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &sid
);
3865 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3866 ad
.u
.net
.sport
= htons(snum
);
3867 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
3869 if (family
== PF_INET
)
3870 ad
.u
.net
.v4info
.saddr
= addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
3872 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad
.u
.net
.v6info
.saddr
, &addr6
->sin6_addr
);
3874 err
= avc_has_perm(isec
->sid
, sid
,
3875 isec
->sclass
, node_perm
, &ad
);
3883 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
3885 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
3886 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3889 err
= socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__CONNECT
);
3894 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3896 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3897 if (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
||
3898 isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
) {
3899 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3900 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
3901 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
3902 unsigned short snum
;
3905 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
) {
3906 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
3907 if (addrlen
< sizeof(struct sockaddr_in
))
3909 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
3911 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
3912 if (addrlen
< SIN6_LEN_RFC2133
)
3914 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
3917 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
, snum
, &sid
);
3921 perm
= (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
) ?
3922 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
: DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
;
3924 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3925 ad
.u
.net
.dport
= htons(snum
);
3926 ad
.u
.net
.family
= sk
->sk_family
;
3927 err
= avc_has_perm(isec
->sid
, sid
, isec
->sclass
, perm
, &ad
);
3932 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk
, address
);
3938 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket
*sock
, int backlog
)
3940 return socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__LISTEN
);
3943 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket
*sock
, struct socket
*newsock
)
3946 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3947 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
;
3949 err
= socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__ACCEPT
);
3953 newisec
= SOCK_INODE(newsock
)->i_security
;
3955 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3956 newisec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
3957 newisec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
3958 newisec
->initialized
= 1;
3963 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
3966 return socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__WRITE
);
3969 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
3970 int size
, int flags
)
3972 return socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__READ
);
3975 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket
*sock
)
3977 return socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
3980 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket
*sock
)
3982 return socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
3985 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
, int optname
)
3989 err
= socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__SETOPT
);
3993 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock
, level
, optname
);
3996 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
,
3999 return socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__GETOPT
);
4002 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket
*sock
, int how
)
4004 return socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN
);
4007 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket
*sock
,
4008 struct socket
*other
,
4011 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
;
4012 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
4013 struct inode_security_struct
*other_isec
;
4014 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4017 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
4018 other_isec
= SOCK_INODE(other
)->i_security
;
4020 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4021 ad
.u
.net
.sk
= other
->sk
;
4023 err
= avc_has_perm(isec
->sid
, other_isec
->sid
,
4025 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO
, &ad
);
4029 /* connecting socket */
4030 ssec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4031 ssec
->peer_sid
= other_isec
->sid
;
4033 /* server child socket */
4034 ssec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4035 ssec
->peer_sid
= isec
->sid
;
4036 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec
->sid
, ssec
->peer_sid
, &ssec
->sid
);
4041 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket
*sock
,
4042 struct socket
*other
)
4044 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
4045 struct inode_security_struct
*other_isec
;
4046 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4049 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
4050 other_isec
= SOCK_INODE(other
)->i_security
;
4052 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4053 ad
.u
.net
.sk
= other
->sk
;
4055 err
= avc_has_perm(isec
->sid
, other_isec
->sid
,
4056 isec
->sclass
, SOCKET__SENDTO
, &ad
);
4063 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex
, char *addrp
, u16 family
,
4065 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
4071 err
= sel_netif_sid(ifindex
, &if_sid
);
4074 err
= avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
4075 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__INGRESS
, ad
);
4079 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
);
4082 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
4083 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__RECVFROM
, ad
);
4086 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4090 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4092 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4093 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4096 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4097 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4098 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4099 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4103 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4104 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4110 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer
) {
4111 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
);
4114 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, peer_sid
,
4115 SECCLASS_PEER
, PEER__RECV
, &ad
);
4117 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4119 err
= selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
, skb
, family
, &ad
);
4122 err
= selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
);
4128 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4131 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4132 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4133 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4134 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4139 if (family
!= PF_INET
&& family
!= PF_INET6
)
4142 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4143 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4146 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4147 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4148 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4149 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4150 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4151 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk
, skb
, family
);
4153 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4154 peerlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4155 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4158 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4159 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4160 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4161 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4165 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4168 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
);
4171 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb
->skb_iif
, addrp
, family
,
4174 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4177 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, peer_sid
, SECCLASS_PEER
,
4180 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4183 if (secmark_active
) {
4184 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4193 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket
*sock
, char __user
*optval
,
4194 int __user
*optlen
, unsigned len
)
4199 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
;
4200 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
4201 u32 peer_sid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4203 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
4205 if (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
||
4206 isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
) {
4207 ssec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4208 peer_sid
= ssec
->peer_sid
;
4210 if (peer_sid
== SECSID_NULL
) {
4215 err
= security_sid_to_context(peer_sid
, &scontext
, &scontext_len
);
4220 if (scontext_len
> len
) {
4225 if (copy_to_user(optval
, scontext
, scontext_len
))
4229 if (put_user(scontext_len
, optlen
))
4237 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket
*sock
, struct sk_buff
*skb
, u32
*secid
)
4239 u32 peer_secid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4242 if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4244 else if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IPV6
))
4247 family
= sock
->sk
->sk_family
;
4251 if (sock
&& family
== PF_UNIX
)
4252 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock
), &peer_secid
);
4254 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_secid
);
4257 *secid
= peer_secid
;
4258 if (peer_secid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4263 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock
*sk
, int family
, gfp_t priority
)
4265 return sk_alloc_security(sk
, family
, priority
);
4268 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock
*sk
)
4270 sk_free_security(sk
);
4273 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock
*sk
, struct sock
*newsk
)
4275 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4276 struct sk_security_struct
*newssec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4278 newssec
->sid
= ssec
->sid
;
4279 newssec
->peer_sid
= ssec
->peer_sid
;
4280 newssec
->sclass
= ssec
->sclass
;
4282 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec
);
4285 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock
*sk
, u32
*secid
)
4288 *secid
= SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET
;
4290 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4292 *secid
= sksec
->sid
;
4296 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock
*sk
, struct socket
*parent
)
4298 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= SOCK_INODE(parent
)->i_security
;
4299 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4301 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
|| sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET6
||
4302 sk
->sk_family
== PF_UNIX
)
4303 isec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4304 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4307 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4308 struct request_sock
*req
)
4310 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4312 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4316 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4317 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4320 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peersid
);
4323 if (peersid
== SECSID_NULL
) {
4324 req
->secid
= sksec
->sid
;
4325 req
->peer_secid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4327 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sksec
->sid
, peersid
, &newsid
);
4330 req
->secid
= newsid
;
4331 req
->peer_secid
= peersid
;
4334 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req
, family
);
4337 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock
*newsk
,
4338 const struct request_sock
*req
)
4340 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4342 newsksec
->sid
= req
->secid
;
4343 newsksec
->peer_sid
= req
->peer_secid
;
4344 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4345 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4346 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4347 time it will have been created and available. */
4349 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4350 * thread with access to newsksec */
4351 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk
, req
->rsk_ops
->family
);
4354 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4356 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4357 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4359 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4360 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4363 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &sksec
->peer_sid
);
4366 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock
*req
,
4369 fl
->secid
= req
->secid
;
4372 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4374 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4376 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4377 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4378 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4379 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4380 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4381 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4383 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE
,
4387 static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock
*sk
)
4389 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4391 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4392 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4393 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4394 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4395 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4396 * protocols were being used */
4398 /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
4399 * the sockcreate SID here */
4401 sksec
->sid
= current_sid();
4402 sksec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
;
4405 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock
*sk
)
4407 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4408 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4411 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sksec
->sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4412 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
4415 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4416 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
4425 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4429 struct nlmsghdr
*nlh
;
4430 struct socket
*sock
= sk
->sk_socket
;
4431 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
4433 if (skb
->len
< NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4437 nlh
= nlmsg_hdr(skb
);
4439 err
= selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec
->sclass
, nlh
->nlmsg_type
, &perm
);
4441 if (err
== -EINVAL
) {
4442 audit_log(current
->audit_context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
,
4443 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4444 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4445 nlh
->nlmsg_type
, isec
->sclass
);
4446 if (!selinux_enforcing
|| security_get_allow_unknown())
4456 err
= socket_has_perm(current
, sock
, perm
);
4461 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4463 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int ifindex
,
4469 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4474 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4477 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4478 netlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled();
4479 peerlbl_active
= netlbl_active
|| selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4480 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4483 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
) != 0)
4486 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4487 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= ifindex
;
4488 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4489 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
) != 0)
4492 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4493 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex
, addrp
, family
,
4496 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 1);
4502 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4503 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__FORWARD_IN
, &ad
))
4507 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4508 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4509 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4511 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, peer_sid
) != 0)
4517 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum
,
4518 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4519 const struct net_device
*in
,
4520 const struct net_device
*out
,
4521 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4523 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, in
->ifindex
, PF_INET
);
4526 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4527 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum
,
4528 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4529 const struct net_device
*in
,
4530 const struct net_device
*out
,
4531 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4533 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, in
->ifindex
, PF_INET6
);
4537 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4542 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4545 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4546 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4547 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4549 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= skb
->sk
->sk_security
;
4552 sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4553 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, sid
) != 0)
4559 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum
,
4560 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4561 const struct net_device
*in
,
4562 const struct net_device
*out
,
4563 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4565 return selinux_ip_output(skb
, PF_INET
);
4568 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4572 struct sock
*sk
= skb
->sk
;
4573 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4574 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4580 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4582 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4583 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= ifindex
;
4584 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4585 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, &proto
))
4588 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4589 if (avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4590 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__SEND
, &ad
))
4593 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4594 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
, proto
))
4600 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int ifindex
,
4606 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4611 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4612 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4613 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4614 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4615 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4616 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb
, ifindex
, family
);
4618 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4619 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4620 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4621 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4622 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4623 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4624 if (skb_dst(skb
) != NULL
&& skb_dst(skb
)->xfrm
!= NULL
)
4627 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4628 peerlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4629 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4632 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4633 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4634 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4635 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4640 if (IPCB(skb
)->flags
& IPSKB_FORWARDED
)
4641 secmark_perm
= PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
;
4643 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4646 if (IP6CB(skb
)->flags
& IP6SKB_FORWARDED
)
4647 secmark_perm
= PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
;
4649 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4654 if (secmark_perm
== PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
) {
4655 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
))
4658 peer_sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4660 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4661 peer_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4662 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4665 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4666 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= ifindex
;
4667 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4668 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, NULL
))
4672 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4673 SECCLASS_PACKET
, secmark_perm
, &ad
))
4676 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4680 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex
, &if_sid
))
4682 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
4683 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__EGRESS
, &ad
))
4686 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
))
4688 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
4689 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__SENDTO
, &ad
))
4696 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum
,
4697 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4698 const struct net_device
*in
,
4699 const struct net_device
*out
,
4700 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4702 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, out
->ifindex
, PF_INET
);
4705 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4706 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum
,
4707 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4708 const struct net_device
*in
,
4709 const struct net_device
*out
,
4710 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4712 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, out
->ifindex
, PF_INET6
);
4716 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4718 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4722 err
= cap_netlink_send(sk
, skb
);
4726 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk
, skb
);
4729 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int capability
)
4732 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4734 err
= cap_netlink_recv(skb
, capability
);
4738 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, CAP
);
4739 ad
.u
.cap
= capability
;
4741 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb
).sid
, NETLINK_CB(skb
).sid
,
4742 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY
, CAP_TO_MASK(capability
), &ad
);
4745 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct
*task
,
4746 struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
,
4749 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4752 isec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
4756 sid
= task_sid(task
);
4757 isec
->sclass
= sclass
;
4759 perm
->security
= isec
;
4764 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
)
4766 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= perm
->security
;
4767 perm
->security
= NULL
;
4771 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4773 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
4775 msec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
4779 msec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4780 msg
->security
= msec
;
4785 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4787 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
= msg
->security
;
4789 msg
->security
= NULL
;
4793 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipc_perms
,
4796 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4797 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4798 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4800 isec
= ipc_perms
->security
;
4802 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4803 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= ipc_perms
->key
;
4805 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
4808 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4810 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg
);
4813 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4815 msg_msg_free_security(msg
);
4818 /* message queue security operations */
4819 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
4821 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4822 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4823 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4826 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &msq
->q_perm
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
);
4830 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4832 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4833 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4835 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4838 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
4844 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
4846 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
4849 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int msqflg
)
4851 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4852 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4853 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4855 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4857 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4858 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4860 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4861 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
4864 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int cmd
)
4872 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4873 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
4876 perms
= MSGQ__GETATTR
| MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
;
4879 perms
= MSGQ__SETATTR
;
4882 perms
= MSGQ__DESTROY
;
4888 err
= ipc_has_perm(&msq
->q_perm
, perms
);
4892 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
, int msqflg
)
4894 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4895 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
4896 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4897 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4900 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4901 msec
= msg
->security
;
4904 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4906 if (msec
->sid
== SECINITSID_UNLABELED
) {
4908 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4909 * message queue this message will be stored in
4911 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
4917 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4918 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4920 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4921 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4924 /* Can this process send the message */
4925 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
4928 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4929 rc
= avc_has_perm(msec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4930 MSGQ__ENQUEUE
, &ad
);
4935 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
,
4936 struct task_struct
*target
,
4937 long type
, int mode
)
4939 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4940 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
4941 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4942 u32 sid
= task_sid(target
);
4945 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4946 msec
= msg
->security
;
4948 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4949 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4951 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
4952 SECCLASS_MSGQ
, MSGQ__READ
, &ad
);
4954 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
,
4955 SECCLASS_MSG
, MSG__RECEIVE
, &ad
);
4959 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4960 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
4962 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4963 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4964 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4967 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &shp
->shm_perm
, SECCLASS_SHM
);
4971 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
4973 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4974 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
4976 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
4979 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
4985 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
4987 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
4990 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int shmflg
)
4992 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4993 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4994 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4996 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
4998 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4999 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
5001 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
5002 SHM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5005 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5006 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int cmd
)
5014 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5015 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5018 perms
= SHM__GETATTR
| SHM__ASSOCIATE
;
5021 perms
= SHM__SETATTR
;
5028 perms
= SHM__DESTROY
;
5034 err
= ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5038 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
,
5039 char __user
*shmaddr
, int shmflg
)
5043 if (shmflg
& SHM_RDONLY
)
5046 perms
= SHM__READ
| SHM__WRITE
;
5048 return ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5051 /* Semaphore security operations */
5052 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5054 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5055 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5056 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5059 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &sma
->sem_perm
, SECCLASS_SEM
);
5063 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5065 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
5066 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5068 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5071 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5077 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5079 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5082 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array
*sma
, int semflg
)
5084 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5085 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5086 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5088 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5090 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
5091 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5093 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5094 SEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5097 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5098 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array
*sma
, int cmd
)
5106 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5107 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5111 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
;
5122 perms
= SEM__DESTROY
;
5125 perms
= SEM__SETATTR
;
5129 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
| SEM__ASSOCIATE
;
5135 err
= ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5139 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array
*sma
,
5140 struct sembuf
*sops
, unsigned nsops
, int alter
)
5145 perms
= SEM__READ
| SEM__WRITE
;
5149 return ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5152 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, short flag
)
5158 av
|= IPC__UNIX_READ
;
5160 av
|= IPC__UNIX_WRITE
;
5165 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp
, av
);
5168 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, u32
*secid
)
5170 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= ipcp
->security
;
5174 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct inode
*inode
)
5177 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, dentry
);
5180 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5181 char *name
, char **value
)
5183 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
5189 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETATTR
);
5195 __tsec
= __task_cred(p
)->security
;
5197 if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5199 else if (!strcmp(name
, "prev"))
5201 else if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5202 sid
= __tsec
->exec_sid
;
5203 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5204 sid
= __tsec
->create_sid
;
5205 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5206 sid
= __tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5207 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5208 sid
= __tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
5216 error
= security_sid_to_context(sid
, value
, &len
);
5226 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5227 char *name
, void *value
, size_t size
)
5229 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5230 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
5237 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5238 security attributes. */
5243 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5244 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5245 * above restriction is ever removed.
5247 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5248 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETEXEC
);
5249 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5250 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE
);
5251 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5252 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE
);
5253 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5254 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE
);
5255 else if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5256 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETCURRENT
);
5262 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5263 if (size
&& str
[1] && str
[1] != '\n') {
5264 if (str
[size
-1] == '\n') {
5268 error
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &sid
);
5269 if (error
== -EINVAL
&& !strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5270 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
))
5272 error
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
,
5279 new = prepare_creds();
5283 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5284 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5285 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5286 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5287 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5288 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5289 tsec
= new->security
;
5290 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec")) {
5291 tsec
->exec_sid
= sid
;
5292 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5293 tsec
->create_sid
= sid
;
5294 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate")) {
5295 error
= may_create_key(sid
, p
);
5298 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= sid
;
5299 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate")) {
5300 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= sid
;
5301 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "current")) {
5306 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5308 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5309 error
= security_bounded_transition(tsec
->sid
, sid
);
5314 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5315 error
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5316 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION
, NULL
);
5320 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5321 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5324 tracer
= tracehook_tracer_task(p
);
5326 ptsid
= task_sid(tracer
);
5330 error
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5331 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
5350 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid
, char **secdata
, u32
*seclen
)
5352 return security_sid_to_context(secid
, secdata
, seclen
);
5355 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata
, u32 seclen
, u32
*secid
)
5357 return security_context_to_sid(secdata
, seclen
, secid
);
5360 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata
, u32 seclen
)
5366 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5368 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5370 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5374 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5376 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry
*dentry
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5378 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5381 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void **ctx
, u32
*ctxlen
)
5384 len
= selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
,
5393 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key
*k
, const struct cred
*cred
,
5394 unsigned long flags
)
5396 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5397 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5399 ksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5403 tsec
= cred
->security
;
5404 if (tsec
->keycreate_sid
)
5405 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5407 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->sid
;
5413 static void selinux_key_free(struct key
*k
)
5415 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= k
->security
;
5421 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref
,
5422 const struct cred
*cred
,
5426 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5429 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5430 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5431 appear to be created. */
5435 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
5437 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
5438 ksec
= key
->security
;
5440 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksec
->sid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, perm
, NULL
);
5443 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key
*key
, char **_buffer
)
5445 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= key
->security
;
5446 char *context
= NULL
;
5450 rc
= security_sid_to_context(ksec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
5459 static struct security_operations selinux_ops
= {
5462 .ptrace_access_check
= selinux_ptrace_access_check
,
5463 .ptrace_traceme
= selinux_ptrace_traceme
,
5464 .capget
= selinux_capget
,
5465 .capset
= selinux_capset
,
5466 .sysctl
= selinux_sysctl
,
5467 .capable
= selinux_capable
,
5468 .quotactl
= selinux_quotactl
,
5469 .quota_on
= selinux_quota_on
,
5470 .syslog
= selinux_syslog
,
5471 .vm_enough_memory
= selinux_vm_enough_memory
,
5473 .netlink_send
= selinux_netlink_send
,
5474 .netlink_recv
= selinux_netlink_recv
,
5476 .bprm_set_creds
= selinux_bprm_set_creds
,
5477 .bprm_committing_creds
= selinux_bprm_committing_creds
,
5478 .bprm_committed_creds
= selinux_bprm_committed_creds
,
5479 .bprm_secureexec
= selinux_bprm_secureexec
,
5481 .sb_alloc_security
= selinux_sb_alloc_security
,
5482 .sb_free_security
= selinux_sb_free_security
,
5483 .sb_copy_data
= selinux_sb_copy_data
,
5484 .sb_kern_mount
= selinux_sb_kern_mount
,
5485 .sb_show_options
= selinux_sb_show_options
,
5486 .sb_statfs
= selinux_sb_statfs
,
5487 .sb_mount
= selinux_mount
,
5488 .sb_umount
= selinux_umount
,
5489 .sb_set_mnt_opts
= selinux_set_mnt_opts
,
5490 .sb_clone_mnt_opts
= selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts
,
5491 .sb_parse_opts_str
= selinux_parse_opts_str
,
5494 .inode_alloc_security
= selinux_inode_alloc_security
,
5495 .inode_free_security
= selinux_inode_free_security
,
5496 .inode_init_security
= selinux_inode_init_security
,
5497 .inode_create
= selinux_inode_create
,
5498 .inode_link
= selinux_inode_link
,
5499 .inode_unlink
= selinux_inode_unlink
,
5500 .inode_symlink
= selinux_inode_symlink
,
5501 .inode_mkdir
= selinux_inode_mkdir
,
5502 .inode_rmdir
= selinux_inode_rmdir
,
5503 .inode_mknod
= selinux_inode_mknod
,
5504 .inode_rename
= selinux_inode_rename
,
5505 .inode_readlink
= selinux_inode_readlink
,
5506 .inode_follow_link
= selinux_inode_follow_link
,
5507 .inode_permission
= selinux_inode_permission
,
5508 .inode_setattr
= selinux_inode_setattr
,
5509 .inode_getattr
= selinux_inode_getattr
,
5510 .inode_setxattr
= selinux_inode_setxattr
,
5511 .inode_post_setxattr
= selinux_inode_post_setxattr
,
5512 .inode_getxattr
= selinux_inode_getxattr
,
5513 .inode_listxattr
= selinux_inode_listxattr
,
5514 .inode_removexattr
= selinux_inode_removexattr
,
5515 .inode_getsecurity
= selinux_inode_getsecurity
,
5516 .inode_setsecurity
= selinux_inode_setsecurity
,
5517 .inode_listsecurity
= selinux_inode_listsecurity
,
5518 .inode_getsecid
= selinux_inode_getsecid
,
5520 .file_permission
= selinux_file_permission
,
5521 .file_alloc_security
= selinux_file_alloc_security
,
5522 .file_free_security
= selinux_file_free_security
,
5523 .file_ioctl
= selinux_file_ioctl
,
5524 .file_mmap
= selinux_file_mmap
,
5525 .file_mprotect
= selinux_file_mprotect
,
5526 .file_lock
= selinux_file_lock
,
5527 .file_fcntl
= selinux_file_fcntl
,
5528 .file_set_fowner
= selinux_file_set_fowner
,
5529 .file_send_sigiotask
= selinux_file_send_sigiotask
,
5530 .file_receive
= selinux_file_receive
,
5532 .dentry_open
= selinux_dentry_open
,
5534 .task_create
= selinux_task_create
,
5535 .cred_alloc_blank
= selinux_cred_alloc_blank
,
5536 .cred_free
= selinux_cred_free
,
5537 .cred_prepare
= selinux_cred_prepare
,
5538 .cred_transfer
= selinux_cred_transfer
,
5539 .kernel_act_as
= selinux_kernel_act_as
,
5540 .kernel_create_files_as
= selinux_kernel_create_files_as
,
5541 .kernel_module_request
= selinux_kernel_module_request
,
5542 .task_setpgid
= selinux_task_setpgid
,
5543 .task_getpgid
= selinux_task_getpgid
,
5544 .task_getsid
= selinux_task_getsid
,
5545 .task_getsecid
= selinux_task_getsecid
,
5546 .task_setnice
= selinux_task_setnice
,
5547 .task_setioprio
= selinux_task_setioprio
,
5548 .task_getioprio
= selinux_task_getioprio
,
5549 .task_setrlimit
= selinux_task_setrlimit
,
5550 .task_setscheduler
= selinux_task_setscheduler
,
5551 .task_getscheduler
= selinux_task_getscheduler
,
5552 .task_movememory
= selinux_task_movememory
,
5553 .task_kill
= selinux_task_kill
,
5554 .task_wait
= selinux_task_wait
,
5555 .task_to_inode
= selinux_task_to_inode
,
5557 .ipc_permission
= selinux_ipc_permission
,
5558 .ipc_getsecid
= selinux_ipc_getsecid
,
5560 .msg_msg_alloc_security
= selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security
,
5561 .msg_msg_free_security
= selinux_msg_msg_free_security
,
5563 .msg_queue_alloc_security
= selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security
,
5564 .msg_queue_free_security
= selinux_msg_queue_free_security
,
5565 .msg_queue_associate
= selinux_msg_queue_associate
,
5566 .msg_queue_msgctl
= selinux_msg_queue_msgctl
,
5567 .msg_queue_msgsnd
= selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd
,
5568 .msg_queue_msgrcv
= selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv
,
5570 .shm_alloc_security
= selinux_shm_alloc_security
,
5571 .shm_free_security
= selinux_shm_free_security
,
5572 .shm_associate
= selinux_shm_associate
,
5573 .shm_shmctl
= selinux_shm_shmctl
,
5574 .shm_shmat
= selinux_shm_shmat
,
5576 .sem_alloc_security
= selinux_sem_alloc_security
,
5577 .sem_free_security
= selinux_sem_free_security
,
5578 .sem_associate
= selinux_sem_associate
,
5579 .sem_semctl
= selinux_sem_semctl
,
5580 .sem_semop
= selinux_sem_semop
,
5582 .d_instantiate
= selinux_d_instantiate
,
5584 .getprocattr
= selinux_getprocattr
,
5585 .setprocattr
= selinux_setprocattr
,
5587 .secid_to_secctx
= selinux_secid_to_secctx
,
5588 .secctx_to_secid
= selinux_secctx_to_secid
,
5589 .release_secctx
= selinux_release_secctx
,
5590 .inode_notifysecctx
= selinux_inode_notifysecctx
,
5591 .inode_setsecctx
= selinux_inode_setsecctx
,
5592 .inode_getsecctx
= selinux_inode_getsecctx
,
5594 .unix_stream_connect
= selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect
,
5595 .unix_may_send
= selinux_socket_unix_may_send
,
5597 .socket_create
= selinux_socket_create
,
5598 .socket_post_create
= selinux_socket_post_create
,
5599 .socket_bind
= selinux_socket_bind
,
5600 .socket_connect
= selinux_socket_connect
,
5601 .socket_listen
= selinux_socket_listen
,
5602 .socket_accept
= selinux_socket_accept
,
5603 .socket_sendmsg
= selinux_socket_sendmsg
,
5604 .socket_recvmsg
= selinux_socket_recvmsg
,
5605 .socket_getsockname
= selinux_socket_getsockname
,
5606 .socket_getpeername
= selinux_socket_getpeername
,
5607 .socket_getsockopt
= selinux_socket_getsockopt
,
5608 .socket_setsockopt
= selinux_socket_setsockopt
,
5609 .socket_shutdown
= selinux_socket_shutdown
,
5610 .socket_sock_rcv_skb
= selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb
,
5611 .socket_getpeersec_stream
= selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream
,
5612 .socket_getpeersec_dgram
= selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram
,
5613 .sk_alloc_security
= selinux_sk_alloc_security
,
5614 .sk_free_security
= selinux_sk_free_security
,
5615 .sk_clone_security
= selinux_sk_clone_security
,
5616 .sk_getsecid
= selinux_sk_getsecid
,
5617 .sock_graft
= selinux_sock_graft
,
5618 .inet_conn_request
= selinux_inet_conn_request
,
5619 .inet_csk_clone
= selinux_inet_csk_clone
,
5620 .inet_conn_established
= selinux_inet_conn_established
,
5621 .req_classify_flow
= selinux_req_classify_flow
,
5622 .tun_dev_create
= selinux_tun_dev_create
,
5623 .tun_dev_post_create
= selinux_tun_dev_post_create
,
5624 .tun_dev_attach
= selinux_tun_dev_attach
,
5626 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5627 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc
,
5628 .xfrm_policy_clone_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_clone
,
5629 .xfrm_policy_free_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_free
,
5630 .xfrm_policy_delete_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_delete
,
5631 .xfrm_state_alloc_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_alloc
,
5632 .xfrm_state_free_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_free
,
5633 .xfrm_state_delete_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_delete
,
5634 .xfrm_policy_lookup
= selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup
,
5635 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
= selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
,
5636 .xfrm_decode_session
= selinux_xfrm_decode_session
,
5640 .key_alloc
= selinux_key_alloc
,
5641 .key_free
= selinux_key_free
,
5642 .key_permission
= selinux_key_permission
,
5643 .key_getsecurity
= selinux_key_getsecurity
,
5647 .audit_rule_init
= selinux_audit_rule_init
,
5648 .audit_rule_known
= selinux_audit_rule_known
,
5649 .audit_rule_match
= selinux_audit_rule_match
,
5650 .audit_rule_free
= selinux_audit_rule_free
,
5654 static __init
int selinux_init(void)
5656 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops
)) {
5657 selinux_enabled
= 0;
5661 if (!selinux_enabled
) {
5662 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5666 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5668 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5669 cred_init_security();
5671 sel_inode_cache
= kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5672 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct
),
5673 0, SLAB_PANIC
, NULL
);
5676 secondary_ops
= security_ops
;
5678 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5679 if (register_security(&selinux_ops
))
5680 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5682 if (selinux_enforcing
)
5683 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5685 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5690 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5692 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5694 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5695 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5696 spin_lock(&sb_lock
);
5697 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock
);
5699 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head
)) {
5700 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
=
5701 list_entry(superblock_security_head
.next
,
5702 struct superblock_security_struct
,
5704 struct super_block
*sb
= sbsec
->sb
;
5706 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock
);
5707 spin_unlock(&sb_lock
);
5708 down_read(&sb
->s_umount
);
5710 superblock_doinit(sb
, NULL
);
5712 spin_lock(&sb_lock
);
5713 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock
);
5714 list_del_init(&sbsec
->list
);
5717 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock
);
5718 spin_unlock(&sb_lock
);
5721 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5722 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5723 security_initcall(selinux_init
);
5725 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5727 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops
[] = {
5729 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_postroute
,
5730 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5732 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
5733 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
5736 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_forward
,
5737 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5739 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
5740 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
5743 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_output
,
5744 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5746 .hooknum
= NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT
,
5747 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
5751 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5753 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops
[] = {
5755 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_postroute
,
5756 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5758 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
5759 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
5762 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_forward
,
5763 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5765 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
5766 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
5772 static int __init
selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5776 if (!selinux_enabled
)
5779 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5781 err
= nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops
));
5783 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err
);
5785 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5786 err
= nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops
));
5788 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err
);
5795 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init
);
5797 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5798 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5800 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5802 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops
));
5803 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5804 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops
));
5809 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5811 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5812 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5815 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5817 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5818 static int selinux_disabled
;
5820 int selinux_disable(void)
5822 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5824 if (ss_initialized
) {
5825 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5829 if (selinux_disabled
) {
5830 /* Only do this once. */
5834 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5836 selinux_disabled
= 1;
5837 selinux_enabled
= 0;
5839 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5840 security_ops
= secondary_ops
;
5842 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5845 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5846 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5848 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */