2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
54 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
55 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
56 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
57 #include <net/netlabel.h>
58 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
59 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
60 #include <linux/atomic.h>
61 #include <linux/bitops.h>
62 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
63 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
64 #include <net/netlink.h>
65 #include <linux/tcp.h>
66 #include <linux/udp.h>
67 #include <linux/dccp.h>
68 #include <linux/quota.h>
69 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71 #include <linux/parser.h>
72 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
74 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
75 #include <linux/personality.h>
76 #include <linux/audit.h>
77 #include <linux/string.h>
78 #include <linux/selinux.h>
79 #include <linux/mutex.h>
80 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
81 #include <linux/syslog.h>
82 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
83 #include <linux/export.h>
84 #include <linux/msg.h>
85 #include <linux/shm.h>
97 /* SECMARK reference count */
98 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount
= ATOMIC_INIT(0);
100 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
101 int selinux_enforcing
;
103 static int __init
enforcing_setup(char *str
)
105 unsigned long enforcing
;
106 if (!kstrtoul(str
, 0, &enforcing
))
107 selinux_enforcing
= enforcing
? 1 : 0;
110 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup
);
113 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
114 int selinux_enabled
= CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
;
116 static int __init
selinux_enabled_setup(char *str
)
118 unsigned long enabled
;
119 if (!kstrtoul(str
, 0, &enabled
))
120 selinux_enabled
= enabled
? 1 : 0;
123 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup
);
125 int selinux_enabled
= 1;
128 static struct kmem_cache
*sel_inode_cache
;
129 static struct kmem_cache
*file_security_cache
;
132 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
135 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
136 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
137 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
138 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
139 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
142 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
144 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork
|| atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount
));
148 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
151 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
152 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
153 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
154 * is always considered enabled.
157 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
159 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork
|| netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
162 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event
)
164 if (event
== AVC_CALLBACK_RESET
) {
174 * initialise the security for the init task
176 static void cred_init_security(void)
178 struct cred
*cred
= (struct cred
*) current
->real_cred
;
179 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
181 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
183 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
185 tsec
->osid
= tsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
186 cred
->security
= tsec
;
190 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
192 static inline u32
cred_sid(const struct cred
*cred
)
194 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
196 tsec
= cred
->security
;
201 * get the objective security ID of a task
203 static inline u32
task_sid(const struct task_struct
*task
)
208 sid
= cred_sid(__task_cred(task
));
214 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
216 static inline u32
current_sid(void)
218 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
223 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
225 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
227 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
228 u32 sid
= current_sid();
230 isec
= kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache
, GFP_NOFS
);
234 mutex_init(&isec
->lock
);
235 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec
->list
);
237 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
238 isec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_FILE
;
239 isec
->task_sid
= sid
;
240 inode
->i_security
= isec
;
246 * Get the security label of an inode.
248 static struct inode_security_struct
*inode_security(struct inode
*inode
)
250 return inode
->i_security
;
254 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
256 static struct inode_security_struct
*backing_inode_security(struct dentry
*dentry
)
258 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
260 return inode
->i_security
;
263 static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head
*head
)
265 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
267 isec
= container_of(head
, struct inode_security_struct
, rcu
);
268 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache
, isec
);
271 static void inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
273 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
274 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
277 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
278 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
279 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
281 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
282 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
283 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
284 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
286 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec
->list
)) {
287 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
288 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
289 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
293 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
294 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
295 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
296 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
297 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
298 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
299 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
301 call_rcu(&isec
->rcu
, inode_free_rcu
);
304 static int file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
306 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
307 u32 sid
= current_sid();
309 fsec
= kmem_cache_zalloc(file_security_cache
, GFP_KERNEL
);
314 fsec
->fown_sid
= sid
;
315 file
->f_security
= fsec
;
320 static void file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
322 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
323 file
->f_security
= NULL
;
324 kmem_cache_free(file_security_cache
, fsec
);
327 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
329 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
331 sbsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
335 mutex_init(&sbsec
->lock
);
336 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec
->isec_head
);
337 spin_lock_init(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
339 sbsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
340 sbsec
->def_sid
= SECINITSID_FILE
;
341 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
342 sb
->s_security
= sbsec
;
347 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
349 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
350 sb
->s_security
= NULL
;
354 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
356 static const char *labeling_behaviors
[7] = {
358 "uses transition SIDs",
360 "uses genfs_contexts",
361 "not configured for labeling",
362 "uses mountpoint labeling",
363 "uses native labeling",
366 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
);
368 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode
*inode
)
370 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, NULL
);
379 Opt_labelsupport
= 5,
383 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
385 static const match_table_t tokens
= {
386 {Opt_context
, CONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
387 {Opt_fscontext
, FSCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
388 {Opt_defcontext
, DEFCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
389 {Opt_rootcontext
, ROOTCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
390 {Opt_labelsupport
, LABELSUPP_STR
},
394 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
396 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid
,
397 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
398 const struct cred
*cred
)
400 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
403 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
404 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
408 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
409 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
413 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid
,
414 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
415 const struct cred
*cred
)
417 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
419 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
420 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
424 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
425 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, NULL
);
429 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block
*sb
)
431 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
433 return sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
||
434 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS
||
435 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK
||
436 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
||
437 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
438 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "sysfs") ||
439 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "pstore") ||
440 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "debugfs") ||
441 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "rootfs");
444 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block
*sb
)
446 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
447 struct dentry
*root
= sb
->s_root
;
448 struct inode
*root_inode
= d_backing_inode(root
);
451 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
) {
452 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
453 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
454 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
455 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
456 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
457 if (!root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
458 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
459 "xattr support\n", sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
463 rc
= root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr(root
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, NULL
, 0);
464 if (rc
< 0 && rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
465 if (rc
== -EOPNOTSUPP
)
466 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
467 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
468 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
470 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
471 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb
->s_id
,
472 sb
->s_type
->name
, -rc
);
477 if (sbsec
->behavior
> ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors
))
478 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
479 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
481 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBINITIALIZED
;
482 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb
))
483 sbsec
->flags
|= SBLABEL_MNT
;
485 /* Initialize the root inode. */
486 rc
= inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode
, root
);
488 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
489 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
490 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
492 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
494 if (!list_empty(&sbsec
->isec_head
)) {
495 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
=
496 list_entry(sbsec
->isec_head
.next
,
497 struct inode_security_struct
, list
);
498 struct inode
*inode
= isec
->inode
;
499 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
500 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
501 inode
= igrab(inode
);
503 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode
))
507 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
510 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
516 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
517 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
518 * mount options, or whatever.
520 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*sb
,
521 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
524 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
525 char *context
= NULL
;
529 security_init_mnt_opts(opts
);
531 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
537 /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
538 BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK
>= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
));
540 tmp
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
541 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
542 for (i
= 0; i
< NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
; i
++) {
544 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
547 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
548 if (sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
)
549 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
551 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
552 if (!opts
->mnt_opts
) {
557 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
558 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
564 if (sbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) {
565 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
568 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
569 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
571 if (sbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) {
572 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, &context
, &len
);
575 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
576 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
578 if (sbsec
->flags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) {
579 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->def_sid
, &context
, &len
);
582 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
583 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
585 if (sbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
586 struct dentry
*root
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
;
587 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= backing_inode_security(root
);
589 rc
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
592 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
593 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
595 if (sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
) {
596 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = NULL
;
597 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = SBLABEL_MNT
;
600 BUG_ON(i
!= opts
->num_mnt_opts
);
605 security_free_mnt_opts(opts
);
609 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
, char flag
,
610 u32 old_sid
, u32 new_sid
)
612 char mnt_flags
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
614 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
615 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
616 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& flag
) ||
617 (old_sid
!= new_sid
))
620 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
621 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
623 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
624 if (mnt_flags
& flag
)
630 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
631 * labeling information.
633 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block
*sb
,
634 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
,
635 unsigned long kern_flags
,
636 unsigned long *set_kern_flags
)
638 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
640 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
641 const char *name
= sb
->s_type
->name
;
642 struct dentry
*root
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
;
643 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
= backing_inode_security(root
);
644 u32 fscontext_sid
= 0, context_sid
= 0, rootcontext_sid
= 0;
645 u32 defcontext_sid
= 0;
646 char **mount_options
= opts
->mnt_opts
;
647 int *flags
= opts
->mnt_opts_flags
;
648 int num_opts
= opts
->num_mnt_opts
;
650 mutex_lock(&sbsec
->lock
);
652 if (!ss_initialized
) {
654 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
655 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
656 server is ready to handle calls. */
660 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
661 "before the security server is initialized\n");
664 if (kern_flags
&& !set_kern_flags
) {
665 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
666 * place the results is not allowed */
672 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
673 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
674 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
675 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
677 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
678 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
679 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
680 * will be used for both mounts)
682 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) && (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
687 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
688 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
689 * than once with different security options.
691 for (i
= 0; i
< num_opts
; i
++) {
694 if (flags
[i
] == SBLABEL_MNT
)
696 rc
= security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options
[i
], &sid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
698 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
699 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
700 mount_options
[i
], sb
->s_id
, name
, rc
);
707 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
,
709 goto out_double_mount
;
711 sbsec
->flags
|= FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
716 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
,
718 goto out_double_mount
;
720 sbsec
->flags
|= CONTEXT_MNT
;
722 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
723 rootcontext_sid
= sid
;
725 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
,
727 goto out_double_mount
;
729 sbsec
->flags
|= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
733 defcontext_sid
= sid
;
735 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
,
737 goto out_double_mount
;
739 sbsec
->flags
|= DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
748 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
749 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
750 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
) && !num_opts
)
751 goto out_double_mount
;
756 if (strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "proc") == 0)
757 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBPROC
| SE_SBGENFS
;
759 if (!strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "debugfs") ||
760 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "sysfs") ||
761 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "pstore"))
762 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBGENFS
;
764 if (!sbsec
->behavior
) {
766 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
769 rc
= security_fs_use(sb
);
772 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
773 __func__
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
777 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
779 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid
, sbsec
, cred
);
783 sbsec
->sid
= fscontext_sid
;
787 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
788 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
789 * the superblock context if not already set.
791 if (kern_flags
& SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
&& !context_sid
) {
792 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
;
793 *set_kern_flags
|= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
;
797 if (!fscontext_sid
) {
798 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
802 sbsec
->sid
= context_sid
;
804 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
809 if (!rootcontext_sid
)
810 rootcontext_sid
= context_sid
;
812 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= context_sid
;
813 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
;
816 if (rootcontext_sid
) {
817 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid
, sbsec
,
822 root_isec
->sid
= rootcontext_sid
;
823 root_isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
826 if (defcontext_sid
) {
827 if (sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
&&
828 sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
) {
830 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: defcontext option is "
831 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
835 if (defcontext_sid
!= sbsec
->def_sid
) {
836 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid
,
842 sbsec
->def_sid
= defcontext_sid
;
845 rc
= sb_finish_set_opts(sb
);
847 mutex_unlock(&sbsec
->lock
);
851 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
852 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb
->s_id
, name
);
856 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
857 const struct super_block
*newsb
)
859 struct superblock_security_struct
*old
= oldsb
->s_security
;
860 struct superblock_security_struct
*new = newsb
->s_security
;
861 char oldflags
= old
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
862 char newflags
= new->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
864 if (oldflags
!= newflags
)
866 if ((oldflags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->sid
!= new->sid
)
868 if ((oldflags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->mntpoint_sid
!= new->mntpoint_sid
)
870 if ((oldflags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->def_sid
!= new->def_sid
)
872 if (oldflags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
873 struct inode_security_struct
*oldroot
= backing_inode_security(oldsb
->s_root
);
874 struct inode_security_struct
*newroot
= backing_inode_security(newsb
->s_root
);
875 if (oldroot
->sid
!= newroot
->sid
)
880 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
881 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
882 "type %s)\n", newsb
->s_id
, newsb
->s_type
->name
);
886 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
887 struct super_block
*newsb
)
889 const struct superblock_security_struct
*oldsbsec
= oldsb
->s_security
;
890 struct superblock_security_struct
*newsbsec
= newsb
->s_security
;
892 int set_fscontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
);
893 int set_context
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
);
894 int set_rootcontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
);
897 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
898 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
903 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
904 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
));
906 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
907 if (newsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
908 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb
, newsb
);
910 mutex_lock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
912 newsbsec
->flags
= oldsbsec
->flags
;
914 newsbsec
->sid
= oldsbsec
->sid
;
915 newsbsec
->def_sid
= oldsbsec
->def_sid
;
916 newsbsec
->behavior
= oldsbsec
->behavior
;
919 u32 sid
= oldsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
923 if (!set_rootcontext
) {
924 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= backing_inode_security(newsb
->s_root
);
927 newsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= sid
;
929 if (set_rootcontext
) {
930 const struct inode_security_struct
*oldisec
= backing_inode_security(oldsb
->s_root
);
931 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= backing_inode_security(newsb
->s_root
);
933 newisec
->sid
= oldisec
->sid
;
936 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb
);
937 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
941 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options
,
942 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
945 char *context
= NULL
, *defcontext
= NULL
;
946 char *fscontext
= NULL
, *rootcontext
= NULL
;
947 int rc
, num_mnt_opts
= 0;
949 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= 0;
951 /* Standard string-based options. */
952 while ((p
= strsep(&options
, "|")) != NULL
) {
954 substring_t args
[MAX_OPT_ARGS
];
959 token
= match_token(p
, tokens
, args
);
963 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
965 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
968 context
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
978 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
981 fscontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
988 case Opt_rootcontext
:
991 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
994 rootcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
1001 case Opt_defcontext
:
1002 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
1004 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
1007 defcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
1013 case Opt_labelsupport
:
1017 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
1024 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
1025 if (!opts
->mnt_opts
)
1028 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
1029 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
1030 kfree(opts
->mnt_opts
);
1035 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = fscontext
;
1036 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
1039 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = context
;
1040 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
1043 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = rootcontext
;
1044 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
1047 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = defcontext
;
1048 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
1051 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= num_mnt_opts
;
1062 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1064 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
1067 char *options
= data
;
1068 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
1070 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1075 BUG_ON(sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
);
1077 rc
= selinux_parse_opts_str(options
, &opts
);
1082 rc
= selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
, 0, NULL
);
1085 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1089 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file
*m
,
1090 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
1095 for (i
= 0; i
< opts
->num_mnt_opts
; i
++) {
1098 if (opts
->mnt_opts
[i
])
1099 has_comma
= strchr(opts
->mnt_opts
[i
], ',');
1103 switch (opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
]) {
1105 prefix
= CONTEXT_STR
;
1108 prefix
= FSCONTEXT_STR
;
1110 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
1111 prefix
= ROOTCONTEXT_STR
;
1113 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT
:
1114 prefix
= DEFCONTEXT_STR
;
1118 seq_puts(m
, LABELSUPP_STR
);
1124 /* we need a comma before each option */
1126 seq_puts(m
, prefix
);
1129 seq_escape(m
, opts
->mnt_opts
[i
], "\"\n\\");
1135 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file
*m
, struct super_block
*sb
)
1137 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
1140 rc
= selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
);
1142 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1148 selinux_write_opts(m
, &opts
);
1150 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1155 static inline u16
inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode
)
1157 switch (mode
& S_IFMT
) {
1159 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE
;
1161 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
;
1163 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1165 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE
;
1167 return SECCLASS_DIR
;
1169 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE
;
1171 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE
;
1175 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1178 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol
)
1180 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_TCP
);
1183 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol
)
1185 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_UDP
);
1188 static inline u16
socket_type_to_security_class(int family
, int type
, int protocol
)
1194 case SOCK_SEQPACKET
:
1195 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
;
1197 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET
;
1204 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol
))
1205 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
;
1207 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1209 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol
))
1210 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
;
1212 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1214 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
;
1216 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1222 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET
;
1223 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG
:
1224 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET
;
1226 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET
;
1228 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET
;
1229 case NETLINK_SELINUX
:
1230 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET
;
1232 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET
;
1234 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET
;
1235 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP
:
1236 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET
;
1237 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR
:
1238 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET
;
1239 case NETLINK_NETFILTER
:
1240 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET
;
1241 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG
:
1242 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET
;
1243 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT
:
1244 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET
;
1245 case NETLINK_GENERIC
:
1246 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET
;
1247 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT
:
1248 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET
;
1250 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET
;
1251 case NETLINK_CRYPTO
:
1252 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET
;
1254 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET
;
1257 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET
;
1259 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET
;
1261 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET
;
1264 return SECCLASS_SOCKET
;
1267 static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry
*dentry
,
1273 struct super_block
*sb
= dentry
->d_inode
->i_sb
;
1274 char *buffer
, *path
;
1276 buffer
= (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
1280 path
= dentry_path_raw(dentry
, buffer
, PAGE_SIZE
);
1284 if (flags
& SE_SBPROC
) {
1285 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1286 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1287 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1288 while (path
[1] >= '0' && path
[1] <= '9') {
1293 rc
= security_genfs_sid(sb
->s_type
->name
, path
, tclass
, sid
);
1295 free_page((unsigned long)buffer
);
1299 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1300 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
)
1302 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= NULL
;
1303 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1305 struct dentry
*dentry
;
1306 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1307 char *context
= NULL
;
1311 if (isec
->initialized
== LABEL_INITIALIZED
)
1314 mutex_lock(&isec
->lock
);
1315 if (isec
->initialized
== LABEL_INITIALIZED
)
1318 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1319 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)) {
1320 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1321 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1322 server is ready to handle calls. */
1323 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1324 if (list_empty(&isec
->list
))
1325 list_add(&isec
->list
, &sbsec
->isec_head
);
1326 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1330 switch (sbsec
->behavior
) {
1331 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
:
1333 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
:
1334 if (!inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
1335 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1339 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1340 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1342 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1343 dentry
= dget(opt_dentry
);
1345 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1346 dentry
= d_find_alias(inode
);
1350 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1351 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1352 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1353 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1354 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1355 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1356 * be used again by userspace.
1361 len
= INITCONTEXTLEN
;
1362 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1368 context
[len
] = '\0';
1369 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1371 if (rc
== -ERANGE
) {
1374 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1375 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1382 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1388 context
[len
] = '\0';
1389 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
,
1395 if (rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
1396 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1397 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__
,
1398 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
1402 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1403 sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1406 rc
= security_context_to_sid_default(context
, rc
, &sid
,
1410 char *dev
= inode
->i_sb
->s_id
;
1411 unsigned long ino
= inode
->i_ino
;
1413 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
1414 if (printk_ratelimit())
1415 printk(KERN_NOTICE
"SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1416 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1417 "filesystem in question.\n", ino
, dev
, context
);
1419 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1420 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1421 __func__
, context
, -rc
, dev
, ino
);
1424 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1432 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK
:
1433 isec
->sid
= isec
->task_sid
;
1435 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS
:
1436 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1437 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1439 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1440 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1441 rc
= security_transition_sid(isec
->task_sid
, sbsec
->sid
,
1442 isec
->sclass
, NULL
, &sid
);
1447 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
:
1448 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
1451 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1452 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1454 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBGENFS
) && !S_ISLNK(inode
->i_mode
)) {
1455 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1458 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1459 * d_splice_alias. */
1460 dentry
= dget(opt_dentry
);
1462 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1464 dentry
= d_find_alias(inode
);
1466 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1467 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1468 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1469 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1470 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1471 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1472 * could be used again by userspace.
1476 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1477 rc
= selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry
, isec
->sclass
,
1478 sbsec
->flags
, &sid
);
1487 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
1490 mutex_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
1492 if (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_FILE
)
1493 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1497 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1498 static inline u32
signal_to_av(int sig
)
1504 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1505 perm
= PROCESS__SIGCHLD
;
1508 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1509 perm
= PROCESS__SIGKILL
;
1512 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1513 perm
= PROCESS__SIGSTOP
;
1516 /* All other signals. */
1517 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNAL
;
1525 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1526 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1528 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred
*actor
,
1529 const struct cred
*target
,
1532 u32 asid
= cred_sid(actor
), tsid
= cred_sid(target
);
1534 return avc_has_perm(asid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1538 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1539 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1540 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1541 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1543 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk1
,
1544 const struct task_struct
*tsk2
,
1547 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec1
, *__tsec2
;
1551 __tsec1
= __task_cred(tsk1
)->security
; sid1
= __tsec1
->sid
;
1552 __tsec2
= __task_cred(tsk2
)->security
; sid2
= __tsec2
->sid
;
1554 return avc_has_perm(sid1
, sid2
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1558 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1559 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1560 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1561 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1563 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1568 sid
= current_sid();
1569 tsid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1570 return avc_has_perm(sid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1573 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1574 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1577 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1578 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred
*cred
,
1581 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1582 struct av_decision avd
;
1584 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1585 u32 av
= CAP_TO_MASK(cap
);
1588 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP
;
1591 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap
)) {
1593 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY
;
1596 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2
;
1600 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap
);
1605 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, 0, &avd
);
1606 if (audit
== SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
) {
1607 int rc2
= avc_audit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, &avd
, rc
, &ad
, 0);
1614 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1615 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1618 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1620 return avc_has_perm(sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
1621 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, perms
, NULL
);
1624 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1625 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1626 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1627 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1628 struct inode
*inode
,
1630 struct common_audit_data
*adp
)
1632 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
1635 validate_creds(cred
);
1637 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
1640 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1641 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1643 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, adp
);
1646 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1647 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1648 pathname if needed. */
1649 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1650 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1653 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
1654 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1656 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1657 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1658 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1661 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1662 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1663 pathname if needed. */
1664 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1665 const struct path
*path
,
1668 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(path
->dentry
);
1669 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1671 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1673 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1676 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1677 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1681 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1683 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1684 ad
.u
.path
= file
->f_path
;
1685 return inode_has_perm(cred
, file_inode(file
), av
, &ad
);
1688 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1689 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1690 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1691 check a particular permission to the file.
1692 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1693 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1694 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1695 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1696 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1700 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
1701 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
1702 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1703 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1706 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1707 ad
.u
.path
= file
->f_path
;
1709 if (sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
1710 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, fsec
->sid
,
1718 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1721 rc
= inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1728 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1730 static int selinux_determine_inode_label(struct inode
*dir
,
1731 const struct qstr
*name
,
1735 const struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1736 const struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
= inode_security(dir
);
1737 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
1739 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) &&
1740 (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
)) {
1741 *_new_isid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
1742 } else if ((sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
) &&
1744 *_new_isid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
1746 return security_transition_sid(tsec
->sid
, dsec
->sid
, tclass
,
1753 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1754 static int may_create(struct inode
*dir
,
1755 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1758 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
1759 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
1760 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1762 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1765 dsec
= inode_security(dir
);
1766 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1770 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1771 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1773 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1774 DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
,
1779 rc
= selinux_determine_inode_label(dir
, &dentry
->d_name
, tclass
,
1784 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, tclass
, FILE__CREATE
, &ad
);
1788 return avc_has_perm(newsid
, sbsec
->sid
,
1789 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
1790 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
1793 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1794 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid
,
1795 struct task_struct
*ctx
)
1797 u32 sid
= task_sid(ctx
);
1799 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, KEY__CREATE
, NULL
);
1803 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1806 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1807 static int may_link(struct inode
*dir
,
1808 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1812 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
, *isec
;
1813 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1814 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1818 dsec
= inode_security(dir
);
1819 isec
= backing_inode_security(dentry
);
1821 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1822 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1825 av
|= (kind
? DIR__REMOVE_NAME
: DIR__ADD_NAME
);
1826 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1841 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1846 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, av
, &ad
);
1850 static inline int may_rename(struct inode
*old_dir
,
1851 struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
1852 struct inode
*new_dir
,
1853 struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
1855 struct inode_security_struct
*old_dsec
, *new_dsec
, *old_isec
, *new_isec
;
1856 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1857 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1859 int old_is_dir
, new_is_dir
;
1862 old_dsec
= inode_security(old_dir
);
1863 old_isec
= backing_inode_security(old_dentry
);
1864 old_is_dir
= d_is_dir(old_dentry
);
1865 new_dsec
= inode_security(new_dir
);
1867 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1869 ad
.u
.dentry
= old_dentry
;
1870 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1871 DIR__REMOVE_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
, &ad
);
1874 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1875 old_isec
->sclass
, FILE__RENAME
, &ad
);
1878 if (old_is_dir
&& new_dir
!= old_dir
) {
1879 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1880 old_isec
->sclass
, DIR__REPARENT
, &ad
);
1885 ad
.u
.dentry
= new_dentry
;
1886 av
= DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
;
1887 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry
))
1888 av
|= DIR__REMOVE_NAME
;
1889 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1892 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry
)) {
1893 new_isec
= backing_inode_security(new_dentry
);
1894 new_is_dir
= d_is_dir(new_dentry
);
1895 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_isec
->sid
,
1897 (new_is_dir
? DIR__RMDIR
: FILE__UNLINK
), &ad
);
1905 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1906 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1907 struct super_block
*sb
,
1909 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
1911 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1912 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1914 sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
1915 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
, perms
, ad
);
1918 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1919 static inline u32
file_mask_to_av(int mode
, int mask
)
1923 if (!S_ISDIR(mode
)) {
1924 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1925 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
1926 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1929 if (mask
& MAY_APPEND
)
1931 else if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1935 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1937 if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1939 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1946 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1947 static inline u32
file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1951 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_READ
)
1953 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_WRITE
) {
1954 if (file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
)
1961 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1970 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1973 static inline u32
open_file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1975 u32 av
= file_to_av(file
);
1977 if (selinux_policycap_openperm
)
1983 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1985 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct
*mgr
)
1987 u32 mysid
= current_sid();
1988 u32 mgrsid
= task_sid(mgr
);
1990 return avc_has_perm(mysid
, mgrsid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
,
1991 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR
, NULL
);
1994 static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct
*from
,
1995 struct task_struct
*to
)
1997 u32 mysid
= current_sid();
1998 u32 fromsid
= task_sid(from
);
1999 u32 tosid
= task_sid(to
);
2002 if (mysid
!= fromsid
) {
2003 rc
= avc_has_perm(mysid
, fromsid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
,
2004 BINDER__IMPERSONATE
, NULL
);
2009 return avc_has_perm(fromsid
, tosid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
, BINDER__CALL
,
2013 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct
*from
,
2014 struct task_struct
*to
)
2016 u32 fromsid
= task_sid(from
);
2017 u32 tosid
= task_sid(to
);
2019 return avc_has_perm(fromsid
, tosid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
, BINDER__TRANSFER
,
2023 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct
*from
,
2024 struct task_struct
*to
,
2027 u32 sid
= task_sid(to
);
2028 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
2029 struct dentry
*dentry
= file
->f_path
.dentry
;
2030 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= backing_inode_security(dentry
);
2031 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2034 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
2035 ad
.u
.path
= file
->f_path
;
2037 if (sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
2038 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, fsec
->sid
,
2046 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry
))))
2049 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, file_to_av(file
),
2053 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct
*child
,
2056 if (mode
& PTRACE_MODE_READ
) {
2057 u32 sid
= current_sid();
2058 u32 csid
= task_sid(child
);
2059 return avc_has_perm(sid
, csid
, SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__READ
, NULL
);
2062 return current_has_perm(child
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
2065 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct
*parent
)
2067 return task_has_perm(parent
, current
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
2070 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct
*target
, kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
2071 kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
, kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
2073 return current_has_perm(target
, PROCESS__GETCAP
);
2076 static int selinux_capset(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
2077 const kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
2078 const kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
,
2079 const kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
2081 return cred_has_perm(old
, new, PROCESS__SETCAP
);
2085 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2086 * which was removed).
2088 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2089 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2090 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2091 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2094 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred
*cred
, struct user_namespace
*ns
,
2097 return cred_has_capability(cred
, cap
, audit
);
2100 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds
, int type
, int id
, struct super_block
*sb
)
2102 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2114 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD
, NULL
);
2119 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET
, NULL
);
2122 rc
= 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2128 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2130 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2132 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__QUOTAON
);
2135 static int selinux_syslog(int type
)
2140 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL
: /* Read last kernel messages */
2141 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER
: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2142 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ
);
2144 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF
: /* Disable logging to console */
2145 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON
: /* Enable logging to console */
2146 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2147 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL
:
2148 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE
);
2150 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE
: /* Close log */
2151 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN
: /* Open log */
2152 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ
: /* Read from log */
2153 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR
: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2154 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR
: /* Clear ring buffer */
2156 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD
);
2163 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2164 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2165 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2167 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2168 * processes that allocate mappings.
2170 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct
*mm
, long pages
)
2172 int rc
, cap_sys_admin
= 0;
2174 rc
= cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN
,
2175 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
2179 return cap_sys_admin
;
2182 /* binprm security operations */
2184 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm
*bprm
,
2185 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
,
2186 const struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
)
2188 int nnp
= (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS
);
2189 int nosuid
= (bprm
->file
->f_path
.mnt
->mnt_flags
& MNT_NOSUID
);
2192 if (!nnp
&& !nosuid
)
2193 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2195 if (new_tsec
->sid
== old_tsec
->sid
)
2196 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2199 * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid
2200 * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are
2201 * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions
2202 * of the current SID.
2204 rc
= security_bounded_transition(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
);
2207 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2208 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2209 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2219 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2221 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
2222 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2223 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2224 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2225 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(bprm
->file
);
2228 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2229 * the script interpreter */
2230 if (bprm
->cred_prepared
)
2233 old_tsec
= current_security();
2234 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2235 isec
= inode_security(inode
);
2237 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2238 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2239 new_tsec
->osid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2241 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2242 new_tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
2243 new_tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
2244 new_tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
2246 if (old_tsec
->exec_sid
) {
2247 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->exec_sid
;
2248 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2249 new_tsec
->exec_sid
= 0;
2251 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2252 rc
= check_nnp_nosuid(bprm
, old_tsec
, new_tsec
);
2256 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2257 rc
= security_transition_sid(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2258 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, NULL
,
2264 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2267 rc
= check_nnp_nosuid(bprm
, old_tsec
, new_tsec
);
2269 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2272 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
2273 ad
.u
.path
= bprm
->file
->f_path
;
2275 if (new_tsec
->sid
== old_tsec
->sid
) {
2276 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2277 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS
, &ad
);
2281 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2282 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2283 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__TRANSITION
, &ad
);
2287 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2288 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__ENTRYPOINT
, &ad
);
2292 /* Check for shared state */
2293 if (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE
) {
2294 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2295 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SHARE
,
2301 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2302 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2304 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE
| LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
)) {
2305 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
2306 struct task_security_struct
*sec
;
2310 tracer
= ptrace_parent(current
);
2311 if (likely(tracer
!= NULL
)) {
2312 sec
= __task_cred(tracer
)->security
;
2318 rc
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2320 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
2326 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2327 bprm
->per_clear
|= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID
;
2333 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2335 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2343 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2344 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2345 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2346 atsecure
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
,
2348 PROCESS__NOATSECURE
, NULL
);
2354 static int match_file(const void *p
, struct file
*file
, unsigned fd
)
2356 return file_has_perm(p
, file
, file_to_av(file
)) ? fd
+ 1 : 0;
2359 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2360 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred
*cred
,
2361 struct files_struct
*files
)
2363 struct file
*file
, *devnull
= NULL
;
2364 struct tty_struct
*tty
;
2368 tty
= get_current_tty();
2370 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock
);
2371 if (!list_empty(&tty
->tty_files
)) {
2372 struct tty_file_private
*file_priv
;
2374 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2375 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2376 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2377 open file may belong to another process and we are
2378 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2379 file_priv
= list_first_entry(&tty
->tty_files
,
2380 struct tty_file_private
, list
);
2381 file
= file_priv
->file
;
2382 if (file_path_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__READ
| FILE__WRITE
))
2385 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock
);
2388 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2392 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2393 n
= iterate_fd(files
, 0, match_file
, cred
);
2394 if (!n
) /* none found? */
2397 devnull
= dentry_open(&selinux_null
, O_RDWR
, cred
);
2398 if (IS_ERR(devnull
))
2400 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2402 replace_fd(n
- 1, devnull
, 0);
2403 } while ((n
= iterate_fd(files
, n
, match_file
, cred
)) != 0);
2409 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2411 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2413 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2414 struct rlimit
*rlim
, *initrlim
;
2417 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2418 if (new_tsec
->sid
== new_tsec
->osid
)
2421 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2422 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm
->cred
, current
->files
);
2424 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2425 current
->pdeath_signal
= 0;
2427 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2428 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2429 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2431 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2432 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2433 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2434 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2435 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2437 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->osid
, new_tsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2438 PROCESS__RLIMITINH
, NULL
);
2440 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2442 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++) {
2443 rlim
= current
->signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2444 initrlim
= init_task
.signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2445 rlim
->rlim_cur
= min(rlim
->rlim_max
, initrlim
->rlim_cur
);
2447 task_unlock(current
);
2448 update_rlimit_cpu(current
, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU
));
2453 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2456 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2458 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2459 struct itimerval itimer
;
2469 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2470 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2471 * flush and unblock signals.
2473 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2474 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2476 rc
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SIGINH
, NULL
);
2478 memset(&itimer
, 0, sizeof itimer
);
2479 for (i
= 0; i
< 3; i
++)
2480 do_setitimer(i
, &itimer
, NULL
);
2481 spin_lock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2482 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current
)) {
2483 flush_sigqueue(¤t
->pending
);
2484 flush_sigqueue(¤t
->signal
->shared_pending
);
2485 flush_signal_handlers(current
, 1);
2486 sigemptyset(¤t
->blocked
);
2487 recalc_sigpending();
2489 spin_unlock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2492 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2493 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2494 read_lock(&tasklist_lock
);
2495 __wake_up_parent(current
, current
->real_parent
);
2496 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock
);
2499 /* superblock security operations */
2501 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2503 return superblock_alloc_security(sb
);
2506 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2508 superblock_free_security(sb
);
2511 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix
, int plen
, char *option
, int olen
)
2516 return !memcmp(prefix
, option
, plen
);
2519 static inline int selinux_option(char *option
, int len
)
2521 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2522 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2523 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2524 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2525 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR
, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR
)-1, option
, len
));
2528 static inline void take_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
, int len
)
2535 memcpy(*to
, from
, len
);
2539 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
,
2542 int current_size
= 0;
2550 while (current_size
< len
) {
2560 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig
, char *copy
)
2562 int fnosec
, fsec
, rc
= 0;
2563 char *in_save
, *in_curr
, *in_end
;
2564 char *sec_curr
, *nosec_save
, *nosec
;
2570 nosec
= (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
2578 in_save
= in_end
= orig
;
2582 open_quote
= !open_quote
;
2583 if ((*in_end
== ',' && open_quote
== 0) ||
2585 int len
= in_end
- in_curr
;
2587 if (selinux_option(in_curr
, len
))
2588 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr
, in_curr
, &fsec
, len
);
2590 take_option(&nosec
, in_curr
, &fnosec
, len
);
2592 in_curr
= in_end
+ 1;
2594 } while (*in_end
++);
2596 strcpy(in_save
, nosec_save
);
2597 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save
);
2602 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
2605 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
2606 char *secdata
, **mount_options
;
2607 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
2609 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
2615 if (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
2618 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts
);
2619 secdata
= alloc_secdata();
2622 rc
= selinux_sb_copy_data(data
, secdata
);
2624 goto out_free_secdata
;
2626 rc
= selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata
, &opts
);
2628 goto out_free_secdata
;
2630 mount_options
= opts
.mnt_opts
;
2631 flags
= opts
.mnt_opts_flags
;
2633 for (i
= 0; i
< opts
.num_mnt_opts
; i
++) {
2636 if (flags
[i
] == SBLABEL_MNT
)
2638 rc
= security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options
[i
], &sid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
2640 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
2641 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2642 mount_options
[i
], sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
2648 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
, sid
))
2649 goto out_bad_option
;
2652 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, sid
))
2653 goto out_bad_option
;
2655 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
: {
2656 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
;
2657 root_isec
= backing_inode_security(sb
->s_root
);
2659 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
, sid
))
2660 goto out_bad_option
;
2663 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT
:
2664 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
, sid
))
2665 goto out_bad_option
;
2674 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
2676 free_secdata(secdata
);
2679 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unable to change security options "
2680 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb
->s_id
,
2685 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block
*sb
, int flags
, void *data
)
2687 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2688 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2691 rc
= superblock_doinit(sb
, data
);
2695 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2696 if (flags
& MS_KERNMOUNT
)
2699 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2700 ad
.u
.dentry
= sb
->s_root
;
2701 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT
, &ad
);
2704 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2706 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2707 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2709 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2710 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
->d_sb
->s_root
;
2711 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, dentry
->d_sb
, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR
, &ad
);
2714 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name
,
2717 unsigned long flags
,
2720 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2722 if (flags
& MS_REMOUNT
)
2723 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, path
->dentry
->d_sb
,
2724 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT
, NULL
);
2726 return path_has_perm(cred
, path
, FILE__MOUNTON
);
2729 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, int flags
)
2731 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2733 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, mnt
->mnt_sb
,
2734 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT
, NULL
);
2737 /* inode security operations */
2739 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2741 return inode_alloc_security(inode
);
2744 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2746 inode_free_security(inode
);
2749 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry
*dentry
, int mode
,
2750 struct qstr
*name
, void **ctx
,
2756 rc
= selinux_determine_inode_label(d_inode(dentry
->d_parent
), name
,
2757 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
),
2762 return security_sid_to_context(newsid
, (char **)ctx
, ctxlen
);
2765 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode
*inode
, struct inode
*dir
,
2766 const struct qstr
*qstr
,
2768 void **value
, size_t *len
)
2770 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2771 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2772 u32 sid
, newsid
, clen
;
2776 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2779 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
2781 rc
= selinux_determine_inode_label(
2783 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
),
2788 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2789 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
2790 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2791 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
2793 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
2796 if (!ss_initialized
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
))
2800 *name
= XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
;
2803 rc
= security_sid_to_context_force(newsid
, &context
, &clen
);
2813 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mode
)
2815 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_FILE
);
2818 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry
*old_dentry
, struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2820 return may_link(dir
, old_dentry
, MAY_LINK
);
2823 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2825 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_UNLINK
);
2828 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2830 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
);
2833 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mask
)
2835 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_DIR
);
2838 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2840 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_RMDIR
);
2843 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mode
, dev_t dev
)
2845 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
));
2848 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode
*old_inode
, struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
2849 struct inode
*new_inode
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2851 return may_rename(old_inode
, old_dentry
, new_inode
, new_dentry
);
2854 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2856 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2858 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2861 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct inode
*inode
,
2864 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2865 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2866 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2869 validate_creds(cred
);
2871 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2872 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
2873 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
2874 isec
= inode_security(inode
);
2876 return avc_has_perm_flags(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, FILE__READ
, &ad
,
2877 rcu
? MAY_NOT_BLOCK
: 0);
2880 static noinline
int audit_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
,
2881 u32 perms
, u32 audited
, u32 denied
,
2885 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2886 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2889 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE
;
2892 rc
= slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
,
2893 audited
, denied
, result
, &ad
, flags
);
2899 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
, int mask
)
2901 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2904 unsigned flags
= mask
& MAY_NOT_BLOCK
;
2905 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2907 struct av_decision avd
;
2909 u32 audited
, denied
;
2911 from_access
= mask
& MAY_ACCESS
;
2912 mask
&= (MAY_READ
|MAY_WRITE
|MAY_EXEC
|MAY_APPEND
);
2914 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2918 validate_creds(cred
);
2920 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
2923 perms
= file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
);
2925 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
2926 isec
= inode_security(inode
);
2928 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, 0, &avd
);
2929 audited
= avc_audit_required(perms
, &avd
, rc
,
2930 from_access
? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS
: 0,
2932 if (likely(!audited
))
2935 rc2
= audit_inode_permission(inode
, perms
, audited
, denied
, rc
, flags
);
2941 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct iattr
*iattr
)
2943 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2944 unsigned int ia_valid
= iattr
->ia_valid
;
2945 __u32 av
= FILE__WRITE
;
2947 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2948 if (ia_valid
& ATTR_FORCE
) {
2949 ia_valid
&= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID
| ATTR_KILL_SGID
| ATTR_MODE
|
2955 if (ia_valid
& (ATTR_MODE
| ATTR_UID
| ATTR_GID
|
2956 ATTR_ATIME_SET
| ATTR_MTIME_SET
| ATTR_TIMES_SET
))
2957 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2959 if (selinux_policycap_openperm
&& (ia_valid
& ATTR_SIZE
)
2960 && !(ia_valid
& ATTR_FILE
))
2963 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, av
);
2966 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path
*path
)
2968 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2971 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2973 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2975 if (!strncmp(name
, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
,
2976 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
- 1)) {
2977 if (!strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_CAPS
)) {
2978 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP
))
2980 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
2981 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2982 Restrict to administrator. */
2987 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2988 ordinary setattr permission. */
2989 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2992 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
2993 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
2995 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
2996 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= backing_inode_security(dentry
);
2997 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2998 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2999 u32 newsid
, sid
= current_sid();
3002 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
3003 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
3005 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
3006 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
))
3009 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode
))
3012 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
3013 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
3015 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
,
3016 FILE__RELABELFROM
, &ad
);
3020 rc
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &newsid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
3021 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
3022 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
)) {
3023 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
3027 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3028 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3031 if (str
[size
- 1] == '\0')
3032 audit_size
= size
- 1;
3039 ab
= audit_log_start(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
);
3040 audit_log_format(ab
, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3041 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, value
, audit_size
);
3046 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
3051 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, isec
->sclass
,
3052 FILE__RELABELTO
, &ad
);
3056 rc
= security_validate_transition(isec
->sid
, newsid
, sid
,
3061 return avc_has_perm(newsid
,
3063 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
3064 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
,
3068 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
3069 const void *value
, size_t size
,
3072 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
3073 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= backing_inode_security(dentry
);
3077 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
)) {
3078 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3082 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
3084 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3085 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3086 inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
, -rc
);
3090 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
3092 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
3097 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
3099 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3101 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3104 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
)
3106 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3108 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3111 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
3113 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
3114 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
3116 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3117 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3122 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3124 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3126 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
, void **buffer
, bool alloc
)
3130 char *context
= NULL
;
3131 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode_security(inode
);
3133 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
3137 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3138 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3139 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3140 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3141 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3142 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3143 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3145 error
= cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns
, CAP_MAC_ADMIN
,
3146 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
3148 error
= cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN
,
3149 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
3151 error
= security_sid_to_context_force(isec
->sid
, &context
,
3154 error
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &size
);
3167 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
,
3168 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
3170 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode_security(inode
);
3174 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
3177 if (!value
|| !size
)
3180 rc
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &newsid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
3184 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
3186 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
3190 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, char *buffer
, size_t buffer_size
)
3192 const int len
= sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
);
3193 if (buffer
&& len
<= buffer_size
)
3194 memcpy(buffer
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, len
);
3198 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode
*inode
, u32
*secid
)
3200 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode_security(inode
);
3204 /* file security operations */
3206 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
3208 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3209 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
3211 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3212 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && (mask
& MAY_WRITE
))
3215 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
,
3216 file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
));
3219 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
3221 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
3222 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3223 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode_security(inode
);
3224 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3227 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3230 if (sid
== fsec
->sid
&& fsec
->isid
== isec
->sid
&&
3231 fsec
->pseqno
== avc_policy_seqno())
3232 /* No change since file_open check. */
3235 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file
, mask
);
3238 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
3240 return file_alloc_security(file
);
3243 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
3245 file_free_security(file
);
3249 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3250 * operation to an inode.
3252 static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
, struct file
*file
,
3253 u32 requested
, u16 cmd
)
3255 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3256 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3257 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
3258 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode_security(inode
);
3259 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl
;
3260 u32 ssid
= cred_sid(cred
);
3262 u8 driver
= cmd
>> 8;
3263 u8 xperm
= cmd
& 0xff;
3265 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP
;
3268 ad
.u
.op
->path
= file
->f_path
;
3270 if (ssid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
3271 rc
= avc_has_perm(ssid
, fsec
->sid
,
3279 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
3282 rc
= avc_has_extended_perms(ssid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
,
3283 requested
, driver
, xperm
, &ad
);
3288 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3291 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3301 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
:
3303 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION
:
3304 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3307 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
:
3309 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION
:
3310 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__SETATTR
);
3313 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3317 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3322 error
= cred_has_capability(cred
, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG
,
3323 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
);
3326 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3327 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3330 error
= ioctl_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__IOCTL
, (u16
) cmd
);
3335 static int default_noexec
;
3337 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file
*file
, unsigned long prot
, int shared
)
3339 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3342 if (default_noexec
&&
3343 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && (!file
|| IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file
)) ||
3344 (!shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
)))) {
3346 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3347 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3348 * This has an additional check.
3350 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECMEM
);
3356 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3357 u32 av
= FILE__READ
;
3359 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3360 if (shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
))
3363 if (prot
& PROT_EXEC
)
3364 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
3366 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, av
);
3373 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr
)
3377 if (addr
< CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
) {
3378 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3379 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT
,
3380 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO
, NULL
);
3386 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file
*file
, unsigned long reqprot
,
3387 unsigned long prot
, unsigned long flags
)
3389 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3392 return file_map_prot_check(file
, prot
,
3393 (flags
& MAP_TYPE
) == MAP_SHARED
);
3396 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct
*vma
,
3397 unsigned long reqprot
,
3400 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3402 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3405 if (default_noexec
&&
3406 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && !(vma
->vm_flags
& VM_EXEC
)) {
3408 if (vma
->vm_start
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_brk
&&
3409 vma
->vm_end
<= vma
->vm_mm
->brk
) {
3410 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECHEAP
);
3411 } else if (!vma
->vm_file
&&
3412 vma
->vm_start
<= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
&&
3413 vma
->vm_end
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
) {
3414 rc
= current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__EXECSTACK
);
3415 } else if (vma
->vm_file
&& vma
->anon_vma
) {
3417 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3418 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3419 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3420 * modified content. This typically should only
3421 * occur for text relocations.
3423 rc
= file_has_perm(cred
, vma
->vm_file
, FILE__EXECMOD
);
3429 return file_map_prot_check(vma
->vm_file
, prot
, vma
->vm_flags
&VM_SHARED
);
3432 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
)
3434 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3436 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3439 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3442 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3447 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && !(arg
& O_APPEND
)) {
3448 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__WRITE
);
3457 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS
:
3458 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3459 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3467 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3472 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3479 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file
*file
)
3481 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3483 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3484 fsec
->fown_sid
= current_sid();
3487 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
3488 struct fown_struct
*fown
, int signum
)
3491 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
3493 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3495 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3496 file
= container_of(fown
, struct file
, f_owner
);
3498 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3501 perm
= signal_to_av(SIGIO
); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3503 perm
= signal_to_av(signum
);
3505 return avc_has_perm(fsec
->fown_sid
, sid
,
3506 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3509 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file
*file
)
3511 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3513 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, file_to_av(file
));
3516 static int selinux_file_open(struct file
*file
, const struct cred
*cred
)
3518 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3519 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3521 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3522 isec
= inode_security(file_inode(file
));
3524 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3525 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3526 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3527 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3528 * struct as its SID.
3530 fsec
->isid
= isec
->sid
;
3531 fsec
->pseqno
= avc_policy_seqno();
3533 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3534 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3535 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3536 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3537 * new inode label or new policy.
3538 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3540 return file_path_has_perm(cred
, file
, open_file_to_av(file
));
3543 /* task security operations */
3545 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags
)
3547 return current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__FORK
);
3551 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3553 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred
*cred
, gfp_t gfp
)
3555 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3557 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3561 cred
->security
= tsec
;
3566 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3568 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred
*cred
)
3570 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
3573 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3574 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3576 BUG_ON(cred
->security
&& (unsigned long) cred
->security
< PAGE_SIZE
);
3577 cred
->security
= (void *) 0x7UL
;
3582 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3584 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
3587 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
3588 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3590 old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3592 tsec
= kmemdup(old_tsec
, sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3596 new->security
= tsec
;
3601 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3603 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
3605 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3606 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3612 * set the security data for a kernel service
3613 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3615 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred
*new, u32 secid
)
3617 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3618 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3621 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, secid
,
3622 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3623 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE
,
3627 tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
3628 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
3629 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
3635 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3636 * objective context of the specified inode
3638 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred
*new, struct inode
*inode
)
3640 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode_security(inode
);
3641 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3642 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3645 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
3646 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3647 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS
,
3651 tsec
->create_sid
= isec
->sid
;
3655 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name
)
3658 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3660 sid
= task_sid(current
);
3662 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD
;
3663 ad
.u
.kmod_name
= kmod_name
;
3665 return avc_has_perm(sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
, SECCLASS_SYSTEM
,
3666 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST
, &ad
);
3669 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct
*p
, pid_t pgid
)
3671 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETPGID
);
3674 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3676 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETPGID
);
3679 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3681 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSESSION
);
3684 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct
*p
, u32
*secid
)
3686 *secid
= task_sid(p
);
3689 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct
*p
, int nice
)
3691 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3694 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct
*p
, int ioprio
)
3696 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3699 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct
*p
)
3701 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3704 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct
*p
, unsigned int resource
,
3705 struct rlimit
*new_rlim
)
3707 struct rlimit
*old_rlim
= p
->signal
->rlim
+ resource
;
3709 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3710 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3711 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3712 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3713 if (old_rlim
->rlim_max
!= new_rlim
->rlim_max
)
3714 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT
);
3719 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
3721 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3724 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
3726 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3729 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct
*p
)
3731 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3734 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct
*p
, struct siginfo
*info
,
3741 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNULL
; /* null signal; existence test */
3743 perm
= signal_to_av(sig
);
3745 rc
= avc_has_perm(secid
, task_sid(p
),
3746 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3748 rc
= current_has_perm(p
, perm
);
3752 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct
*p
)
3754 return task_has_perm(p
, current
, PROCESS__SIGCHLD
);
3757 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct
*p
,
3758 struct inode
*inode
)
3760 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3761 u32 sid
= task_sid(p
);
3764 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
3767 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3768 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3769 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3771 int offset
, ihlen
, ret
= -EINVAL
;
3772 struct iphdr _iph
, *ih
;
3774 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3775 ih
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_iph
), &_iph
);
3779 ihlen
= ih
->ihl
* 4;
3780 if (ihlen
< sizeof(_iph
))
3783 ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
= ih
->saddr
;
3784 ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.daddr
= ih
->daddr
;
3788 *proto
= ih
->protocol
;
3790 switch (ih
->protocol
) {
3792 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3794 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3798 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3802 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= th
->source
;
3803 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= th
->dest
;
3808 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3810 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3814 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3818 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= uh
->source
;
3819 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= uh
->dest
;
3823 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3824 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3826 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3830 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3834 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3835 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3846 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3848 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3849 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3850 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3853 int ret
= -EINVAL
, offset
;
3854 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h
, *ip6
;
3857 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3858 ip6
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_ipv6h
), &_ipv6h
);
3862 ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
= ip6
->saddr
;
3863 ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.daddr
= ip6
->daddr
;
3866 nexthdr
= ip6
->nexthdr
;
3867 offset
+= sizeof(_ipv6h
);
3868 offset
= ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb
, offset
, &nexthdr
, &frag_off
);
3877 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3879 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3883 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= th
->source
;
3884 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= th
->dest
;
3889 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3891 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3895 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= uh
->source
;
3896 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= uh
->dest
;
3900 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3901 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3903 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3907 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3908 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3912 /* includes fragments */
3922 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff
*skb
, struct common_audit_data
*ad
,
3923 char **_addrp
, int src
, u8
*proto
)
3928 switch (ad
->u
.net
->family
) {
3930 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3933 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
:
3934 &ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.daddr
);
3937 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3939 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3942 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
:
3943 &ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.daddr
);
3953 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3954 " unable to parse packet\n");
3964 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3966 * @family: protocol family
3967 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3970 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3971 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3972 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3973 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3974 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3978 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff
*skb
, u16 family
, u32
*sid
)
3985 err
= selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb
, &xfrm_sid
);
3988 err
= selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb
, family
, &nlbl_type
, &nlbl_sid
);
3992 err
= security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid
, nlbl_type
, xfrm_sid
, sid
);
3993 if (unlikely(err
)) {
3995 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3996 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4004 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4005 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4006 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4007 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4009 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4010 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4011 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4012 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4015 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid
, u32 skb_sid
, u32
*conn_sid
)
4019 if (skb_sid
!= SECSID_NULL
)
4020 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid
, skb_sid
, conn_sid
);
4027 /* socket security operations */
4029 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
,
4030 u16 secclass
, u32
*socksid
)
4032 if (tsec
->sockcreate_sid
> SECSID_NULL
) {
4033 *socksid
= tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
4037 return security_transition_sid(tsec
->sid
, tsec
->sid
, secclass
, NULL
,
4041 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct
*task
, struct sock
*sk
, u32 perms
)
4043 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4044 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4045 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4046 u32 tsid
= task_sid(task
);
4048 if (sksec
->sid
== SECINITSID_KERNEL
)
4051 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4055 return avc_has_perm(tsid
, sksec
->sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
4058 static int selinux_socket_create(int family
, int type
,
4059 int protocol
, int kern
)
4061 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
4069 secclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
4070 rc
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
, secclass
, &newsid
);
4074 return avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, newsid
, secclass
, SOCKET__CREATE
, NULL
);
4077 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket
*sock
, int family
,
4078 int type
, int protocol
, int kern
)
4080 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
4081 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode_security(SOCK_INODE(sock
));
4082 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4085 isec
->sclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
4088 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4090 err
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
, isec
->sclass
, &(isec
->sid
));
4095 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
4098 sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4099 sksec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
4100 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4101 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock
->sk
, family
);
4107 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4108 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4109 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4111 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
4113 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
4117 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, SOCKET__BIND
);
4122 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
4123 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
4124 * check the first address now.
4126 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4127 if (family
== PF_INET
|| family
== PF_INET6
) {
4129 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4130 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4131 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4132 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
4133 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
4134 unsigned short snum
;
4137 if (family
== PF_INET
) {
4138 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
4139 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
4140 addrp
= (char *)&addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
4142 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
4143 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
4144 addrp
= (char *)&addr6
->sin6_addr
.s6_addr
;
4150 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk
), &low
, &high
);
4152 if (snum
< max(PROT_SOCK
, low
) || snum
> high
) {
4153 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
,
4157 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4159 ad
.u
.net
->sport
= htons(snum
);
4160 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4161 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
,
4163 SOCKET__NAME_BIND
, &ad
);
4169 switch (sksec
->sclass
) {
4170 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
:
4171 node_perm
= TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4174 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
:
4175 node_perm
= UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4178 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
:
4179 node_perm
= DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4183 node_perm
= RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4187 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &sid
);
4191 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4193 ad
.u
.net
->sport
= htons(snum
);
4194 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4196 if (family
== PF_INET
)
4197 ad
.u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
= addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
4199 ad
.u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
= addr6
->sin6_addr
;
4201 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
,
4202 sksec
->sclass
, node_perm
, &ad
);
4210 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
4212 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
4213 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4216 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, SOCKET__CONNECT
);
4221 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
4223 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
||
4224 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
) {
4225 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4226 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4227 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
4228 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
4229 unsigned short snum
;
4232 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
) {
4233 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
4234 if (addrlen
< sizeof(struct sockaddr_in
))
4236 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
4238 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
4239 if (addrlen
< SIN6_LEN_RFC2133
)
4241 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
4244 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
, snum
, &sid
);
4248 perm
= (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
) ?
4249 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
: DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
;
4251 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4253 ad
.u
.net
->dport
= htons(snum
);
4254 ad
.u
.net
->family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4255 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perm
, &ad
);
4260 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk
, address
);
4266 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket
*sock
, int backlog
)
4268 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__LISTEN
);
4271 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket
*sock
, struct socket
*newsock
)
4274 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
4275 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
;
4277 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__ACCEPT
);
4281 newisec
= inode_security(SOCK_INODE(newsock
));
4283 isec
= inode_security(SOCK_INODE(sock
));
4284 newisec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4285 newisec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
4286 newisec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
4291 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
4294 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__WRITE
);
4297 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
4298 int size
, int flags
)
4300 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__READ
);
4303 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket
*sock
)
4305 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
4308 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket
*sock
)
4310 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
4313 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
, int optname
)
4317 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SETOPT
);
4321 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock
, level
, optname
);
4324 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
,
4327 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETOPT
);
4330 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket
*sock
, int how
)
4332 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN
);
4335 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock
*sock
,
4339 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_sock
= sock
->sk_security
;
4340 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_other
= other
->sk_security
;
4341 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_new
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4342 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4343 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4346 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4348 ad
.u
.net
->sk
= other
;
4350 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec_sock
->sid
, sksec_other
->sid
,
4351 sksec_other
->sclass
,
4352 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO
, &ad
);
4356 /* server child socket */
4357 sksec_new
->peer_sid
= sksec_sock
->sid
;
4358 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other
->sid
, sksec_sock
->sid
,
4363 /* connecting socket */
4364 sksec_sock
->peer_sid
= sksec_new
->sid
;
4369 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket
*sock
,
4370 struct socket
*other
)
4372 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4373 struct sk_security_struct
*osec
= other
->sk
->sk_security
;
4374 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4375 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4377 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4379 ad
.u
.net
->sk
= other
->sk
;
4381 return avc_has_perm(ssec
->sid
, osec
->sid
, osec
->sclass
, SOCKET__SENDTO
,
4385 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net
*ns
, int ifindex
,
4386 char *addrp
, u16 family
, u32 peer_sid
,
4387 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
4393 err
= sel_netif_sid(ns
, ifindex
, &if_sid
);
4396 err
= avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
4397 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__INGRESS
, ad
);
4401 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
);
4404 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
4405 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__RECVFROM
, ad
);
4408 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4412 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4413 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4414 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4415 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4418 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4420 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4421 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4422 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4426 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4427 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4433 err
= selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
, skb
, family
, &ad
);
4436 err
= selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
);
4441 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4444 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4445 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4446 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4447 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4448 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4453 if (family
!= PF_INET
&& family
!= PF_INET6
)
4456 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4457 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4460 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4461 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4462 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4463 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4464 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4465 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk
, skb
, family
);
4467 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4468 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4469 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4472 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4474 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4475 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4476 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4480 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4483 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
);
4486 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk
), skb
->skb_iif
,
4487 addrp
, family
, peer_sid
, &ad
);
4489 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4492 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, peer_sid
, SECCLASS_PEER
,
4495 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4500 if (secmark_active
) {
4501 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4510 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket
*sock
, char __user
*optval
,
4511 int __user
*optlen
, unsigned len
)
4516 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4517 u32 peer_sid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4519 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
||
4520 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
)
4521 peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
4522 if (peer_sid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4523 return -ENOPROTOOPT
;
4525 err
= security_sid_to_context(peer_sid
, &scontext
, &scontext_len
);
4529 if (scontext_len
> len
) {
4534 if (copy_to_user(optval
, scontext
, scontext_len
))
4538 if (put_user(scontext_len
, optlen
))
4544 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket
*sock
, struct sk_buff
*skb
, u32
*secid
)
4546 u32 peer_secid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4549 if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4551 else if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IPV6
))
4554 family
= sock
->sk
->sk_family
;
4558 if (sock
&& family
== PF_UNIX
)
4559 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock
), &peer_secid
);
4561 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_secid
);
4564 *secid
= peer_secid
;
4565 if (peer_secid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4570 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock
*sk
, int family
, gfp_t priority
)
4572 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4574 sksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec
), priority
);
4578 sksec
->peer_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4579 sksec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4580 sksec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_SOCKET
;
4581 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec
);
4582 sk
->sk_security
= sksec
;
4587 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock
*sk
)
4589 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4591 sk
->sk_security
= NULL
;
4592 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec
);
4596 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock
*sk
, struct sock
*newsk
)
4598 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4599 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4601 newsksec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4602 newsksec
->peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
4603 newsksec
->sclass
= sksec
->sclass
;
4605 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec
);
4608 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock
*sk
, u32
*secid
)
4611 *secid
= SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET
;
4613 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4615 *secid
= sksec
->sid
;
4619 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock
*sk
, struct socket
*parent
)
4621 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode_security(SOCK_INODE(parent
));
4622 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4624 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
|| sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET6
||
4625 sk
->sk_family
== PF_UNIX
)
4626 isec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4627 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4630 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4631 struct request_sock
*req
)
4633 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4635 u16 family
= req
->rsk_ops
->family
;
4639 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peersid
);
4642 err
= selinux_conn_sid(sksec
->sid
, peersid
, &connsid
);
4645 req
->secid
= connsid
;
4646 req
->peer_secid
= peersid
;
4648 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req
, family
);
4651 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock
*newsk
,
4652 const struct request_sock
*req
)
4654 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4656 newsksec
->sid
= req
->secid
;
4657 newsksec
->peer_sid
= req
->peer_secid
;
4658 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4659 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4660 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4661 time it will have been created and available. */
4663 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4664 * thread with access to newsksec */
4665 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk
, req
->rsk_ops
->family
);
4668 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4670 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4671 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4673 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4674 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4677 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &sksec
->peer_sid
);
4680 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid
)
4682 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
4685 __tsec
= current_security();
4688 return avc_has_perm(tsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
4691 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4693 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount
);
4696 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4698 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount
);
4701 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock
*req
,
4704 fl
->flowi_secid
= req
->secid
;
4707 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security
)
4709 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
;
4711 tunsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec
), GFP_KERNEL
);
4714 tunsec
->sid
= current_sid();
4720 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security
)
4725 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4727 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4729 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4730 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4731 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4732 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4733 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4734 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4736 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE
,
4740 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security
)
4742 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
4744 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4745 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE
, NULL
);
4748 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock
*sk
, void *security
)
4750 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
4751 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4753 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4754 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4755 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4756 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4757 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4758 * protocols were being used */
4760 sksec
->sid
= tunsec
->sid
;
4761 sksec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
;
4766 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security
)
4768 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
4769 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4772 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, tunsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4773 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
4776 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4777 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
4785 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4789 struct nlmsghdr
*nlh
;
4790 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4792 if (skb
->len
< NLMSG_HDRLEN
) {
4796 nlh
= nlmsg_hdr(skb
);
4798 err
= selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec
->sclass
, nlh
->nlmsg_type
, &perm
);
4800 if (err
== -EINVAL
) {
4802 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:"
4803 " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s\n",
4804 sk
->sk_protocol
, nlh
->nlmsg_type
,
4805 secclass_map
[sksec
->sclass
- 1].name
);
4806 if (!selinux_enforcing
|| security_get_allow_unknown())
4816 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, perm
);
4821 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4823 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4824 const struct net_device
*indev
,
4830 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4831 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4836 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4839 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4840 netlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled();
4841 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4842 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4845 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
) != 0)
4848 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4850 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= indev
->ifindex
;
4851 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4852 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
) != 0)
4855 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4856 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev
), indev
->ifindex
,
4857 addrp
, family
, peer_sid
, &ad
);
4859 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 1);
4865 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4866 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__FORWARD_IN
, &ad
))
4870 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4871 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4872 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4874 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, peer_sid
) != 0)
4880 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv
,
4881 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4882 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
4884 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, state
->in
, PF_INET
);
4887 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4888 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv
,
4889 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4890 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
4892 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, state
->in
, PF_INET6
);
4896 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4902 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4905 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4906 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4907 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4910 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4912 if (sk_listener(sk
))
4913 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
4914 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
4915 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
4916 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
4917 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
4918 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
4919 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
4920 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
4921 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
4922 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
4923 * security label in the packet itself this is the
4924 * best we can do. */
4927 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
4928 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4931 sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4932 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, sid
) != 0)
4938 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv
,
4939 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4940 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
4942 return selinux_ip_output(skb
, PF_INET
);
4945 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4949 struct sock
*sk
= skb_to_full_sk(skb
);
4950 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4951 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4952 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4958 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4960 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4962 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
4963 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4964 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, &proto
))
4967 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4968 if (avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4969 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__SEND
, &ad
))
4970 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4972 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
, proto
))
4973 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4978 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4979 const struct net_device
*outdev
,
4984 int ifindex
= outdev
->ifindex
;
4986 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4987 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4992 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4993 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4994 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4995 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4996 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4997 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb
, ifindex
, family
);
4999 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
5000 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5001 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
5004 sk
= skb_to_full_sk(skb
);
5007 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5008 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5009 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5010 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5011 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5012 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5013 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5014 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5015 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5016 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5018 if (skb_dst(skb
) != NULL
&& skb_dst(skb
)->xfrm
!= NULL
&&
5019 !(sk
&& sk_listener(sk
)))
5024 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5025 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5026 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5027 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5029 secmark_perm
= PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
;
5030 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
))
5033 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
5034 peer_sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
5036 } else if (sk_listener(sk
)) {
5037 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5038 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5039 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5040 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5041 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5042 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5043 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5044 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5045 * for similar problems. */
5047 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
5049 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5050 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &skb_sid
))
5052 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5053 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5054 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5055 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5056 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5057 * pass the packet. */
5058 if (skb_sid
== SECSID_NULL
) {
5061 if (IPCB(skb
)->flags
& IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED
)
5065 if (IP6CB(skb
)->flags
& IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED
)
5069 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5072 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec
->sid
, skb_sid
, &peer_sid
))
5074 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
5076 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5077 * associated socket. */
5078 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5079 peer_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
5080 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
5083 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
5085 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
5086 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
5087 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, NULL
))
5091 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
5092 SECCLASS_PACKET
, secmark_perm
, &ad
))
5093 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5095 if (peerlbl_active
) {
5099 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev
), ifindex
, &if_sid
))
5101 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
5102 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__EGRESS
, &ad
))
5103 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5105 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
))
5107 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
5108 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__SENDTO
, &ad
))
5109 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5115 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv
,
5116 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5117 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
5119 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, state
->out
, PF_INET
);
5122 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5123 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv
,
5124 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5125 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
5127 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, state
->out
, PF_INET6
);
5131 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5133 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
5135 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk
, skb
);
5138 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct
*task
,
5139 struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
,
5142 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5145 isec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5149 sid
= task_sid(task
);
5150 isec
->sclass
= sclass
;
5152 perm
->security
= isec
;
5157 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
)
5159 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= perm
->security
;
5160 perm
->security
= NULL
;
5164 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5166 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
5168 msec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5172 msec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
5173 msg
->security
= msec
;
5178 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5180 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
= msg
->security
;
5182 msg
->security
= NULL
;
5186 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipc_perms
,
5189 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5190 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5191 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5193 isec
= ipc_perms
->security
;
5195 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5196 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= ipc_perms
->key
;
5198 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
5201 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5203 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg
);
5206 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5208 msg_msg_free_security(msg
);
5211 /* message queue security operations */
5212 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
5214 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5215 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5216 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5219 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &msq
->q_perm
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
);
5223 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5225 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5226 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5228 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5231 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
5237 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
5239 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
5242 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int msqflg
)
5244 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5245 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5246 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5248 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5250 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5251 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5253 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5254 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5257 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int cmd
)
5265 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5266 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5269 perms
= MSGQ__GETATTR
| MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
;
5272 perms
= MSGQ__SETATTR
;
5275 perms
= MSGQ__DESTROY
;
5281 err
= ipc_has_perm(&msq
->q_perm
, perms
);
5285 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
, int msqflg
)
5287 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5288 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
5289 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5290 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5293 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5294 msec
= msg
->security
;
5297 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5299 if (msec
->sid
== SECINITSID_UNLABELED
) {
5301 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5302 * message queue this message will be stored in
5304 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
5310 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5311 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5313 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5314 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5317 /* Can this process send the message */
5318 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
5321 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5322 rc
= avc_has_perm(msec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5323 MSGQ__ENQUEUE
, &ad
);
5328 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
,
5329 struct task_struct
*target
,
5330 long type
, int mode
)
5332 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5333 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
5334 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5335 u32 sid
= task_sid(target
);
5338 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5339 msec
= msg
->security
;
5341 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5342 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5344 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
5345 SECCLASS_MSGQ
, MSGQ__READ
, &ad
);
5347 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
,
5348 SECCLASS_MSG
, MSG__RECEIVE
, &ad
);
5352 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5353 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
5355 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5356 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5357 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5360 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &shp
->shm_perm
, SECCLASS_SHM
);
5364 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
5366 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5367 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
5369 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
5372 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
5378 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
5380 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
5383 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int shmflg
)
5385 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5386 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5387 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5389 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
5391 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5392 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
5394 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
5395 SHM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5398 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5399 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int cmd
)
5407 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5408 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5411 perms
= SHM__GETATTR
| SHM__ASSOCIATE
;
5414 perms
= SHM__SETATTR
;
5421 perms
= SHM__DESTROY
;
5427 err
= ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5431 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
,
5432 char __user
*shmaddr
, int shmflg
)
5436 if (shmflg
& SHM_RDONLY
)
5439 perms
= SHM__READ
| SHM__WRITE
;
5441 return ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5444 /* Semaphore security operations */
5445 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5447 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5448 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5449 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5452 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &sma
->sem_perm
, SECCLASS_SEM
);
5456 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5458 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5459 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5461 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5464 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5470 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5472 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5475 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array
*sma
, int semflg
)
5477 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5478 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5479 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5481 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5483 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5484 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5486 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5487 SEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5490 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5491 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array
*sma
, int cmd
)
5499 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5500 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5504 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
;
5515 perms
= SEM__DESTROY
;
5518 perms
= SEM__SETATTR
;
5522 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
| SEM__ASSOCIATE
;
5528 err
= ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5532 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array
*sma
,
5533 struct sembuf
*sops
, unsigned nsops
, int alter
)
5538 perms
= SEM__READ
| SEM__WRITE
;
5542 return ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5545 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, short flag
)
5551 av
|= IPC__UNIX_READ
;
5553 av
|= IPC__UNIX_WRITE
;
5558 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp
, av
);
5561 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, u32
*secid
)
5563 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= ipcp
->security
;
5567 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct inode
*inode
)
5570 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, dentry
);
5573 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5574 char *name
, char **value
)
5576 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
5582 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETATTR
);
5588 __tsec
= __task_cred(p
)->security
;
5590 if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5592 else if (!strcmp(name
, "prev"))
5594 else if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5595 sid
= __tsec
->exec_sid
;
5596 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5597 sid
= __tsec
->create_sid
;
5598 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5599 sid
= __tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5600 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5601 sid
= __tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
5609 error
= security_sid_to_context(sid
, value
, &len
);
5619 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5620 char *name
, void *value
, size_t size
)
5622 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5623 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
5630 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5631 security attributes. */
5636 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5637 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5638 * above restriction is ever removed.
5640 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5641 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETEXEC
);
5642 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5643 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE
);
5644 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5645 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE
);
5646 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5647 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE
);
5648 else if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5649 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETCURRENT
);
5655 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5656 if (size
&& str
[1] && str
[1] != '\n') {
5657 if (str
[size
-1] == '\n') {
5661 error
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &sid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
5662 if (error
== -EINVAL
&& !strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5663 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
)) {
5664 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
5667 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5668 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5669 if (str
[size
- 1] == '\0')
5670 audit_size
= size
- 1;
5673 ab
= audit_log_start(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
);
5674 audit_log_format(ab
, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5675 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, value
, audit_size
);
5680 error
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
,
5687 new = prepare_creds();
5691 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5692 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5693 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5694 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5695 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5696 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5697 tsec
= new->security
;
5698 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec")) {
5699 tsec
->exec_sid
= sid
;
5700 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5701 tsec
->create_sid
= sid
;
5702 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate")) {
5703 error
= may_create_key(sid
, p
);
5706 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= sid
;
5707 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate")) {
5708 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= sid
;
5709 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "current")) {
5714 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5716 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5717 error
= security_bounded_transition(tsec
->sid
, sid
);
5722 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5723 error
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5724 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION
, NULL
);
5728 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5729 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5732 tracer
= ptrace_parent(p
);
5734 ptsid
= task_sid(tracer
);
5738 error
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5739 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
5758 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name
)
5760 return (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
) == 0);
5763 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid
, char **secdata
, u32
*seclen
)
5765 return security_sid_to_context(secid
, secdata
, seclen
);
5768 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata
, u32 seclen
, u32
*secid
)
5770 return security_context_to_sid(secdata
, seclen
, secid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
5773 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata
, u32 seclen
)
5778 static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode
*inode
)
5780 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
5782 mutex_lock(&isec
->lock
);
5783 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INVALID
;
5784 mutex_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
5788 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5790 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5792 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5796 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5798 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry
*dentry
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5800 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5803 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void **ctx
, u32
*ctxlen
)
5806 len
= selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
,
5815 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key
*k
, const struct cred
*cred
,
5816 unsigned long flags
)
5818 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5819 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5821 ksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5825 tsec
= cred
->security
;
5826 if (tsec
->keycreate_sid
)
5827 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5829 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->sid
;
5835 static void selinux_key_free(struct key
*k
)
5837 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= k
->security
;
5843 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref
,
5844 const struct cred
*cred
,
5848 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5851 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5852 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5853 appear to be created. */
5857 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
5859 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
5860 ksec
= key
->security
;
5862 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksec
->sid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, perm
, NULL
);
5865 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key
*key
, char **_buffer
)
5867 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= key
->security
;
5868 char *context
= NULL
;
5872 rc
= security_sid_to_context(ksec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
5881 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks
[] = {
5882 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr
, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr
),
5883 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction
, selinux_binder_transaction
),
5884 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder
, selinux_binder_transfer_binder
),
5885 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file
, selinux_binder_transfer_file
),
5887 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check
, selinux_ptrace_access_check
),
5888 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme
, selinux_ptrace_traceme
),
5889 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget
, selinux_capget
),
5890 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset
, selinux_capset
),
5891 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable
, selinux_capable
),
5892 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl
, selinux_quotactl
),
5893 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on
, selinux_quota_on
),
5894 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog
, selinux_syslog
),
5895 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory
, selinux_vm_enough_memory
),
5897 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send
, selinux_netlink_send
),
5899 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds
, selinux_bprm_set_creds
),
5900 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds
, selinux_bprm_committing_creds
),
5901 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds
, selinux_bprm_committed_creds
),
5902 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec
, selinux_bprm_secureexec
),
5904 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security
, selinux_sb_alloc_security
),
5905 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security
, selinux_sb_free_security
),
5906 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data
, selinux_sb_copy_data
),
5907 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount
, selinux_sb_remount
),
5908 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount
, selinux_sb_kern_mount
),
5909 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options
, selinux_sb_show_options
),
5910 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs
, selinux_sb_statfs
),
5911 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount
, selinux_mount
),
5912 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount
, selinux_umount
),
5913 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts
, selinux_set_mnt_opts
),
5914 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts
, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts
),
5915 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str
, selinux_parse_opts_str
),
5917 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security
, selinux_dentry_init_security
),
5919 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security
, selinux_inode_alloc_security
),
5920 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security
, selinux_inode_free_security
),
5921 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security
, selinux_inode_init_security
),
5922 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create
, selinux_inode_create
),
5923 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link
, selinux_inode_link
),
5924 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink
, selinux_inode_unlink
),
5925 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink
, selinux_inode_symlink
),
5926 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir
, selinux_inode_mkdir
),
5927 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir
, selinux_inode_rmdir
),
5928 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod
, selinux_inode_mknod
),
5929 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename
, selinux_inode_rename
),
5930 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink
, selinux_inode_readlink
),
5931 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link
, selinux_inode_follow_link
),
5932 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission
, selinux_inode_permission
),
5933 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr
, selinux_inode_setattr
),
5934 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr
, selinux_inode_getattr
),
5935 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr
, selinux_inode_setxattr
),
5936 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr
, selinux_inode_post_setxattr
),
5937 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr
, selinux_inode_getxattr
),
5938 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr
, selinux_inode_listxattr
),
5939 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr
, selinux_inode_removexattr
),
5940 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity
, selinux_inode_getsecurity
),
5941 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity
, selinux_inode_setsecurity
),
5942 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity
, selinux_inode_listsecurity
),
5943 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid
, selinux_inode_getsecid
),
5945 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission
, selinux_file_permission
),
5946 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security
, selinux_file_alloc_security
),
5947 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security
, selinux_file_free_security
),
5948 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl
, selinux_file_ioctl
),
5949 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file
, selinux_mmap_file
),
5950 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr
, selinux_mmap_addr
),
5951 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect
, selinux_file_mprotect
),
5952 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock
, selinux_file_lock
),
5953 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl
, selinux_file_fcntl
),
5954 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner
, selinux_file_set_fowner
),
5955 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask
, selinux_file_send_sigiotask
),
5956 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive
, selinux_file_receive
),
5958 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open
, selinux_file_open
),
5960 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_create
, selinux_task_create
),
5961 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank
, selinux_cred_alloc_blank
),
5962 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free
, selinux_cred_free
),
5963 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare
, selinux_cred_prepare
),
5964 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer
, selinux_cred_transfer
),
5965 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as
, selinux_kernel_act_as
),
5966 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as
, selinux_kernel_create_files_as
),
5967 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request
, selinux_kernel_module_request
),
5968 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid
, selinux_task_setpgid
),
5969 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid
, selinux_task_getpgid
),
5970 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid
, selinux_task_getsid
),
5971 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid
, selinux_task_getsecid
),
5972 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice
, selinux_task_setnice
),
5973 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio
, selinux_task_setioprio
),
5974 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio
, selinux_task_getioprio
),
5975 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit
, selinux_task_setrlimit
),
5976 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler
, selinux_task_setscheduler
),
5977 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler
, selinux_task_getscheduler
),
5978 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory
, selinux_task_movememory
),
5979 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill
, selinux_task_kill
),
5980 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait
, selinux_task_wait
),
5981 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode
, selinux_task_to_inode
),
5983 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission
, selinux_ipc_permission
),
5984 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid
, selinux_ipc_getsecid
),
5986 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security
, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security
),
5987 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security
, selinux_msg_msg_free_security
),
5989 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security
,
5990 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security
),
5991 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security
, selinux_msg_queue_free_security
),
5992 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate
, selinux_msg_queue_associate
),
5993 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl
, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl
),
5994 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd
, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd
),
5995 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv
, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv
),
5997 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security
, selinux_shm_alloc_security
),
5998 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security
, selinux_shm_free_security
),
5999 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate
, selinux_shm_associate
),
6000 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl
, selinux_shm_shmctl
),
6001 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat
, selinux_shm_shmat
),
6003 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security
, selinux_sem_alloc_security
),
6004 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security
, selinux_sem_free_security
),
6005 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate
, selinux_sem_associate
),
6006 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl
, selinux_sem_semctl
),
6007 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop
, selinux_sem_semop
),
6009 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate
, selinux_d_instantiate
),
6011 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr
, selinux_getprocattr
),
6012 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr
, selinux_setprocattr
),
6014 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel
, selinux_ismaclabel
),
6015 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx
, selinux_secid_to_secctx
),
6016 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid
, selinux_secctx_to_secid
),
6017 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx
, selinux_release_secctx
),
6018 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx
, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx
),
6019 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx
, selinux_inode_notifysecctx
),
6020 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx
, selinux_inode_setsecctx
),
6021 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx
, selinux_inode_getsecctx
),
6023 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect
, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect
),
6024 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send
, selinux_socket_unix_may_send
),
6026 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create
, selinux_socket_create
),
6027 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create
, selinux_socket_post_create
),
6028 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind
, selinux_socket_bind
),
6029 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect
, selinux_socket_connect
),
6030 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen
, selinux_socket_listen
),
6031 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept
, selinux_socket_accept
),
6032 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg
, selinux_socket_sendmsg
),
6033 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg
, selinux_socket_recvmsg
),
6034 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname
, selinux_socket_getsockname
),
6035 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername
, selinux_socket_getpeername
),
6036 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt
, selinux_socket_getsockopt
),
6037 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt
, selinux_socket_setsockopt
),
6038 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown
, selinux_socket_shutdown
),
6039 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb
, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb
),
6040 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream
,
6041 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream
),
6042 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram
, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram
),
6043 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security
, selinux_sk_alloc_security
),
6044 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security
, selinux_sk_free_security
),
6045 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security
, selinux_sk_clone_security
),
6046 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid
, selinux_sk_getsecid
),
6047 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft
, selinux_sock_graft
),
6048 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request
, selinux_inet_conn_request
),
6049 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone
, selinux_inet_csk_clone
),
6050 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established
, selinux_inet_conn_established
),
6051 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet
, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet
),
6052 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc
, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc
),
6053 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec
, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec
),
6054 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow
, selinux_req_classify_flow
),
6055 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security
, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security
),
6056 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security
, selinux_tun_dev_free_security
),
6057 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create
, selinux_tun_dev_create
),
6058 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue
, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue
),
6059 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach
, selinux_tun_dev_attach
),
6060 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open
, selinux_tun_dev_open
),
6062 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
6063 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc
),
6064 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone
),
6065 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_free
),
6066 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete
),
6067 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc
, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc
),
6068 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire
,
6069 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire
),
6070 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security
, selinux_xfrm_state_free
),
6071 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security
, selinux_xfrm_state_delete
),
6072 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup
, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup
),
6073 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
,
6074 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
),
6075 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session
, selinux_xfrm_decode_session
),
6079 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc
, selinux_key_alloc
),
6080 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free
, selinux_key_free
),
6081 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission
, selinux_key_permission
),
6082 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity
, selinux_key_getsecurity
),
6086 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init
, selinux_audit_rule_init
),
6087 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known
, selinux_audit_rule_known
),
6088 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match
, selinux_audit_rule_match
),
6089 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free
, selinux_audit_rule_free
),
6093 static __init
int selinux_init(void)
6095 if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) {
6096 selinux_enabled
= 0;
6100 if (!selinux_enabled
) {
6101 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
6105 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Initializing.\n");
6107 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
6108 cred_init_security();
6110 default_noexec
= !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS
& VM_EXEC
);
6112 sel_inode_cache
= kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
6113 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct
),
6114 0, SLAB_PANIC
, NULL
);
6115 file_security_cache
= kmem_cache_create("selinux_file_security",
6116 sizeof(struct file_security_struct
),
6117 0, SLAB_PANIC
, NULL
);
6120 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks
));
6122 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback
, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET
))
6123 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
6125 if (selinux_enforcing
)
6126 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
6128 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
6133 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block
*sb
, void *unused
)
6135 superblock_doinit(sb
, NULL
);
6138 void selinux_complete_init(void)
6140 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
6142 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
6143 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
6144 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init
, NULL
);
6147 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
6148 all processes and objects when they are created. */
6149 security_initcall(selinux_init
);
6151 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
6153 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops
[] = {
6155 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_postroute
,
6157 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
6158 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
6161 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_forward
,
6163 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
6164 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
6167 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_output
,
6169 .hooknum
= NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT
,
6170 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
6172 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
6174 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_postroute
,
6176 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
6177 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
6180 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_forward
,
6182 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
6183 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
6188 static int __init
selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
6192 if (!selinux_enabled
)
6195 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
6197 err
= nf_register_hooks(selinux_nf_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops
));
6199 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err
);
6204 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init
);
6206 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6207 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
6209 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
6211 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_nf_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops
));
6215 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6217 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6218 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
6221 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6223 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6224 static int selinux_disabled
;
6226 int selinux_disable(void)
6228 if (ss_initialized
) {
6229 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
6233 if (selinux_disabled
) {
6234 /* Only do this once. */
6238 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
6240 selinux_disabled
= 1;
6241 selinux_enabled
= 0;
6243 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks
));
6245 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
6248 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
6249 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
6251 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */