2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
54 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
55 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
56 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
57 #include <net/netlabel.h>
58 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
59 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
60 #include <linux/atomic.h>
61 #include <linux/bitops.h>
62 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
63 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
64 #include <net/netlink.h>
65 #include <linux/tcp.h>
66 #include <linux/udp.h>
67 #include <linux/dccp.h>
68 #include <linux/quota.h>
69 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71 #include <linux/parser.h>
72 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
74 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
75 #include <linux/personality.h>
76 #include <linux/audit.h>
77 #include <linux/string.h>
78 #include <linux/selinux.h>
79 #include <linux/mutex.h>
80 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
81 #include <linux/syslog.h>
82 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
83 #include <linux/export.h>
84 #include <linux/msg.h>
85 #include <linux/shm.h>
97 /* SECMARK reference count */
98 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount
= ATOMIC_INIT(0);
100 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
101 int selinux_enforcing
;
103 static int __init
enforcing_setup(char *str
)
105 unsigned long enforcing
;
106 if (!kstrtoul(str
, 0, &enforcing
))
107 selinux_enforcing
= enforcing
? 1 : 0;
110 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup
);
113 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
114 int selinux_enabled
= CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
;
116 static int __init
selinux_enabled_setup(char *str
)
118 unsigned long enabled
;
119 if (!kstrtoul(str
, 0, &enabled
))
120 selinux_enabled
= enabled
? 1 : 0;
123 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup
);
125 int selinux_enabled
= 1;
128 static struct kmem_cache
*sel_inode_cache
;
129 static struct kmem_cache
*file_security_cache
;
132 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
135 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
136 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
137 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
138 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
139 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
142 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
144 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork
|| atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount
));
148 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
151 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
152 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
153 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
154 * is always considered enabled.
157 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
159 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork
|| netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
162 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event
)
164 if (event
== AVC_CALLBACK_RESET
) {
174 * initialise the security for the init task
176 static void cred_init_security(void)
178 struct cred
*cred
= (struct cred
*) current
->real_cred
;
179 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
181 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
183 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
185 tsec
->osid
= tsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
186 cred
->security
= tsec
;
190 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
192 static inline u32
cred_sid(const struct cred
*cred
)
194 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
196 tsec
= cred
->security
;
201 * get the objective security ID of a task
203 static inline u32
task_sid(const struct task_struct
*task
)
208 sid
= cred_sid(__task_cred(task
));
214 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
216 static inline u32
current_sid(void)
218 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
223 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
225 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
227 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
228 u32 sid
= current_sid();
230 isec
= kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache
, GFP_NOFS
);
234 mutex_init(&isec
->lock
);
235 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec
->list
);
237 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
238 isec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_FILE
;
239 isec
->task_sid
= sid
;
240 inode
->i_security
= isec
;
245 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
);
248 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
249 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
250 * allowed; when set to false, returns ERR_PTR(-ECHILD) when the label is
251 * invalid. The @opt_dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode;
252 * when no dentry is available, set it to NULL instead.
254 static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode
*inode
,
255 struct dentry
*opt_dentry
,
258 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
260 might_sleep_if(may_sleep
);
262 if (isec
->initialized
!= LABEL_INITIALIZED
) {
267 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
268 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
269 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
271 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, opt_dentry
);
276 static struct inode_security_struct
*inode_security_novalidate(struct inode
*inode
)
278 return inode
->i_security
;
281 static struct inode_security_struct
*inode_security_rcu(struct inode
*inode
, bool rcu
)
285 error
= __inode_security_revalidate(inode
, NULL
, !rcu
);
287 return ERR_PTR(error
);
288 return inode
->i_security
;
292 * Get the security label of an inode.
294 static struct inode_security_struct
*inode_security(struct inode
*inode
)
296 __inode_security_revalidate(inode
, NULL
, true);
297 return inode
->i_security
;
300 static struct inode_security_struct
*backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry
*dentry
)
302 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
304 return inode
->i_security
;
308 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
310 static struct inode_security_struct
*backing_inode_security(struct dentry
*dentry
)
312 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
314 __inode_security_revalidate(inode
, dentry
, true);
315 return inode
->i_security
;
318 static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head
*head
)
320 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
322 isec
= container_of(head
, struct inode_security_struct
, rcu
);
323 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache
, isec
);
326 static void inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
328 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
329 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
332 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
333 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
334 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
336 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
337 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
338 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
339 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
341 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec
->list
)) {
342 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
343 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
344 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
348 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
349 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
350 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
351 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
352 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
353 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
354 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
356 call_rcu(&isec
->rcu
, inode_free_rcu
);
359 static int file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
361 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
362 u32 sid
= current_sid();
364 fsec
= kmem_cache_zalloc(file_security_cache
, GFP_KERNEL
);
369 fsec
->fown_sid
= sid
;
370 file
->f_security
= fsec
;
375 static void file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
377 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
378 file
->f_security
= NULL
;
379 kmem_cache_free(file_security_cache
, fsec
);
382 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
384 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
386 sbsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
390 mutex_init(&sbsec
->lock
);
391 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec
->isec_head
);
392 spin_lock_init(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
394 sbsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
395 sbsec
->def_sid
= SECINITSID_FILE
;
396 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
397 sb
->s_security
= sbsec
;
402 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
404 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
405 sb
->s_security
= NULL
;
409 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
411 static const char *labeling_behaviors
[7] = {
413 "uses transition SIDs",
415 "uses genfs_contexts",
416 "not configured for labeling",
417 "uses mountpoint labeling",
418 "uses native labeling",
421 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode
*inode
)
423 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, NULL
);
432 Opt_labelsupport
= 5,
436 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
438 static const match_table_t tokens
= {
439 {Opt_context
, CONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
440 {Opt_fscontext
, FSCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
441 {Opt_defcontext
, DEFCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
442 {Opt_rootcontext
, ROOTCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
443 {Opt_labelsupport
, LABELSUPP_STR
},
447 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
449 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid
,
450 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
451 const struct cred
*cred
)
453 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
456 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
457 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
461 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
462 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
466 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid
,
467 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
468 const struct cred
*cred
)
470 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
472 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
473 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
477 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
478 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, NULL
);
482 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block
*sb
)
484 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
486 return sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
||
487 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS
||
488 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK
||
489 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
||
490 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
491 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "sysfs") ||
492 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "pstore") ||
493 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "debugfs") ||
494 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "rootfs");
497 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block
*sb
)
499 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
500 struct dentry
*root
= sb
->s_root
;
501 struct inode
*root_inode
= d_backing_inode(root
);
504 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
) {
505 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
506 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
507 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
508 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
509 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
510 if (!root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
511 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
512 "xattr support\n", sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
516 rc
= root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr(root
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, NULL
, 0);
517 if (rc
< 0 && rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
518 if (rc
== -EOPNOTSUPP
)
519 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
520 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
521 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
523 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
524 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb
->s_id
,
525 sb
->s_type
->name
, -rc
);
530 if (sbsec
->behavior
> ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors
))
531 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
532 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
534 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBINITIALIZED
;
535 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb
))
536 sbsec
->flags
|= SBLABEL_MNT
;
538 /* Initialize the root inode. */
539 rc
= inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode
, root
);
541 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
542 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
543 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
545 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
547 if (!list_empty(&sbsec
->isec_head
)) {
548 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
=
549 list_entry(sbsec
->isec_head
.next
,
550 struct inode_security_struct
, list
);
551 struct inode
*inode
= isec
->inode
;
552 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
553 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
554 inode
= igrab(inode
);
556 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode
))
560 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
563 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
569 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
570 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
571 * mount options, or whatever.
573 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*sb
,
574 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
577 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
578 char *context
= NULL
;
582 security_init_mnt_opts(opts
);
584 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
590 /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
591 BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK
>= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
));
593 tmp
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
594 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
595 for (i
= 0; i
< NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
; i
++) {
597 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
600 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
601 if (sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
)
602 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
604 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
605 if (!opts
->mnt_opts
) {
610 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
611 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
617 if (sbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) {
618 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
621 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
622 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
624 if (sbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) {
625 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, &context
, &len
);
628 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
629 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
631 if (sbsec
->flags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) {
632 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->def_sid
, &context
, &len
);
635 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
636 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
638 if (sbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
639 struct dentry
*root
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
;
640 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= backing_inode_security(root
);
642 rc
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
645 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
646 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
648 if (sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
) {
649 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = NULL
;
650 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = SBLABEL_MNT
;
653 BUG_ON(i
!= opts
->num_mnt_opts
);
658 security_free_mnt_opts(opts
);
662 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
, char flag
,
663 u32 old_sid
, u32 new_sid
)
665 char mnt_flags
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
667 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
668 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
669 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& flag
) ||
670 (old_sid
!= new_sid
))
673 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
674 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
676 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
677 if (mnt_flags
& flag
)
683 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
684 * labeling information.
686 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block
*sb
,
687 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
,
688 unsigned long kern_flags
,
689 unsigned long *set_kern_flags
)
691 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
693 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
694 const char *name
= sb
->s_type
->name
;
695 struct dentry
*root
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
;
696 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
;
697 u32 fscontext_sid
= 0, context_sid
= 0, rootcontext_sid
= 0;
698 u32 defcontext_sid
= 0;
699 char **mount_options
= opts
->mnt_opts
;
700 int *flags
= opts
->mnt_opts_flags
;
701 int num_opts
= opts
->num_mnt_opts
;
703 mutex_lock(&sbsec
->lock
);
705 if (!ss_initialized
) {
707 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
708 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
709 server is ready to handle calls. */
713 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
714 "before the security server is initialized\n");
717 if (kern_flags
&& !set_kern_flags
) {
718 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
719 * place the results is not allowed */
725 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
726 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
727 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
728 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
730 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
731 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
732 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
733 * will be used for both mounts)
735 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) && (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
739 root_isec
= backing_inode_security_novalidate(root
);
742 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
743 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
744 * than once with different security options.
746 for (i
= 0; i
< num_opts
; i
++) {
749 if (flags
[i
] == SBLABEL_MNT
)
751 rc
= security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options
[i
], &sid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
753 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
754 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
755 mount_options
[i
], sb
->s_id
, name
, rc
);
762 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
,
764 goto out_double_mount
;
766 sbsec
->flags
|= FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
771 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
,
773 goto out_double_mount
;
775 sbsec
->flags
|= CONTEXT_MNT
;
777 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
778 rootcontext_sid
= sid
;
780 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
,
782 goto out_double_mount
;
784 sbsec
->flags
|= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
788 defcontext_sid
= sid
;
790 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
,
792 goto out_double_mount
;
794 sbsec
->flags
|= DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
803 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
804 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
805 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
) && !num_opts
)
806 goto out_double_mount
;
811 if (strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "proc") == 0)
812 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBPROC
| SE_SBGENFS
;
814 if (!strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "debugfs") ||
815 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "sysfs") ||
816 !strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "pstore"))
817 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBGENFS
;
819 if (!sbsec
->behavior
) {
821 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
824 rc
= security_fs_use(sb
);
827 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
828 __func__
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
832 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
834 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid
, sbsec
, cred
);
838 sbsec
->sid
= fscontext_sid
;
842 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
843 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
844 * the superblock context if not already set.
846 if (kern_flags
& SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
&& !context_sid
) {
847 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
;
848 *set_kern_flags
|= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
;
852 if (!fscontext_sid
) {
853 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
857 sbsec
->sid
= context_sid
;
859 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
864 if (!rootcontext_sid
)
865 rootcontext_sid
= context_sid
;
867 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= context_sid
;
868 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
;
871 if (rootcontext_sid
) {
872 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid
, sbsec
,
877 root_isec
->sid
= rootcontext_sid
;
878 root_isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
881 if (defcontext_sid
) {
882 if (sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
&&
883 sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
) {
885 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: defcontext option is "
886 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
890 if (defcontext_sid
!= sbsec
->def_sid
) {
891 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid
,
897 sbsec
->def_sid
= defcontext_sid
;
900 rc
= sb_finish_set_opts(sb
);
902 mutex_unlock(&sbsec
->lock
);
906 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
907 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb
->s_id
, name
);
911 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
912 const struct super_block
*newsb
)
914 struct superblock_security_struct
*old
= oldsb
->s_security
;
915 struct superblock_security_struct
*new = newsb
->s_security
;
916 char oldflags
= old
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
917 char newflags
= new->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
919 if (oldflags
!= newflags
)
921 if ((oldflags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->sid
!= new->sid
)
923 if ((oldflags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->mntpoint_sid
!= new->mntpoint_sid
)
925 if ((oldflags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) && old
->def_sid
!= new->def_sid
)
927 if (oldflags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
928 struct inode_security_struct
*oldroot
= backing_inode_security(oldsb
->s_root
);
929 struct inode_security_struct
*newroot
= backing_inode_security(newsb
->s_root
);
930 if (oldroot
->sid
!= newroot
->sid
)
935 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
936 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
937 "type %s)\n", newsb
->s_id
, newsb
->s_type
->name
);
941 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
942 struct super_block
*newsb
)
944 const struct superblock_security_struct
*oldsbsec
= oldsb
->s_security
;
945 struct superblock_security_struct
*newsbsec
= newsb
->s_security
;
947 int set_fscontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
);
948 int set_context
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
);
949 int set_rootcontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
);
952 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
953 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
958 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
959 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
));
961 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
962 if (newsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
963 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb
, newsb
);
965 mutex_lock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
967 newsbsec
->flags
= oldsbsec
->flags
;
969 newsbsec
->sid
= oldsbsec
->sid
;
970 newsbsec
->def_sid
= oldsbsec
->def_sid
;
971 newsbsec
->behavior
= oldsbsec
->behavior
;
974 u32 sid
= oldsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
978 if (!set_rootcontext
) {
979 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= backing_inode_security(newsb
->s_root
);
982 newsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= sid
;
984 if (set_rootcontext
) {
985 const struct inode_security_struct
*oldisec
= backing_inode_security(oldsb
->s_root
);
986 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= backing_inode_security(newsb
->s_root
);
988 newisec
->sid
= oldisec
->sid
;
991 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb
);
992 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
996 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options
,
997 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
1000 char *context
= NULL
, *defcontext
= NULL
;
1001 char *fscontext
= NULL
, *rootcontext
= NULL
;
1002 int rc
, num_mnt_opts
= 0;
1004 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= 0;
1006 /* Standard string-based options. */
1007 while ((p
= strsep(&options
, "|")) != NULL
) {
1009 substring_t args
[MAX_OPT_ARGS
];
1014 token
= match_token(p
, tokens
, args
);
1018 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
1020 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
1023 context
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
1033 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
1036 fscontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
1043 case Opt_rootcontext
:
1046 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
1049 rootcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
1056 case Opt_defcontext
:
1057 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
1059 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
1062 defcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
1068 case Opt_labelsupport
:
1072 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
1079 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
1080 if (!opts
->mnt_opts
)
1083 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
1084 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
1085 kfree(opts
->mnt_opts
);
1090 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = fscontext
;
1091 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
1094 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = context
;
1095 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
1098 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = rootcontext
;
1099 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
1102 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = defcontext
;
1103 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
1106 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= num_mnt_opts
;
1117 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1119 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
1122 char *options
= data
;
1123 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
1125 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1130 BUG_ON(sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
);
1132 rc
= selinux_parse_opts_str(options
, &opts
);
1137 rc
= selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
, 0, NULL
);
1140 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1144 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file
*m
,
1145 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
1150 for (i
= 0; i
< opts
->num_mnt_opts
; i
++) {
1153 if (opts
->mnt_opts
[i
])
1154 has_comma
= strchr(opts
->mnt_opts
[i
], ',');
1158 switch (opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
]) {
1160 prefix
= CONTEXT_STR
;
1163 prefix
= FSCONTEXT_STR
;
1165 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
1166 prefix
= ROOTCONTEXT_STR
;
1168 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT
:
1169 prefix
= DEFCONTEXT_STR
;
1173 seq_puts(m
, LABELSUPP_STR
);
1179 /* we need a comma before each option */
1181 seq_puts(m
, prefix
);
1184 seq_escape(m
, opts
->mnt_opts
[i
], "\"\n\\");
1190 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file
*m
, struct super_block
*sb
)
1192 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
1195 rc
= selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
);
1197 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1203 selinux_write_opts(m
, &opts
);
1205 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1210 static inline u16
inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode
)
1212 switch (mode
& S_IFMT
) {
1214 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE
;
1216 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
;
1218 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1220 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE
;
1222 return SECCLASS_DIR
;
1224 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE
;
1226 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE
;
1230 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1233 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol
)
1235 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_TCP
);
1238 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol
)
1240 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_UDP
);
1243 static inline u16
socket_type_to_security_class(int family
, int type
, int protocol
)
1249 case SOCK_SEQPACKET
:
1250 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
;
1252 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET
;
1259 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol
))
1260 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
;
1262 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1264 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol
))
1265 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
;
1267 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1269 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
;
1271 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1277 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET
;
1278 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG
:
1279 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET
;
1281 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET
;
1283 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET
;
1284 case NETLINK_SELINUX
:
1285 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET
;
1287 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET
;
1289 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET
;
1290 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP
:
1291 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET
;
1292 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR
:
1293 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET
;
1294 case NETLINK_NETFILTER
:
1295 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET
;
1296 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG
:
1297 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET
;
1298 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT
:
1299 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET
;
1300 case NETLINK_GENERIC
:
1301 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET
;
1302 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT
:
1303 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET
;
1305 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET
;
1306 case NETLINK_CRYPTO
:
1307 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET
;
1309 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET
;
1312 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET
;
1314 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET
;
1316 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET
;
1319 return SECCLASS_SOCKET
;
1322 static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry
*dentry
,
1328 struct super_block
*sb
= dentry
->d_inode
->i_sb
;
1329 char *buffer
, *path
;
1331 buffer
= (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
1335 path
= dentry_path_raw(dentry
, buffer
, PAGE_SIZE
);
1339 if (flags
& SE_SBPROC
) {
1340 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1341 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1342 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1343 while (path
[1] >= '0' && path
[1] <= '9') {
1348 rc
= security_genfs_sid(sb
->s_type
->name
, path
, tclass
, sid
);
1350 free_page((unsigned long)buffer
);
1354 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1355 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
)
1357 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= NULL
;
1358 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1360 struct dentry
*dentry
;
1361 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1362 char *context
= NULL
;
1366 if (isec
->initialized
== LABEL_INITIALIZED
)
1369 mutex_lock(&isec
->lock
);
1370 if (isec
->initialized
== LABEL_INITIALIZED
)
1373 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1374 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)) {
1375 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1376 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1377 server is ready to handle calls. */
1378 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1379 if (list_empty(&isec
->list
))
1380 list_add(&isec
->list
, &sbsec
->isec_head
);
1381 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1385 switch (sbsec
->behavior
) {
1386 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
:
1388 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
:
1389 if (!inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
1390 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1394 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1395 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1397 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1398 dentry
= dget(opt_dentry
);
1400 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1401 dentry
= d_find_alias(inode
);
1405 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1406 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1407 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1408 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1409 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1410 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1411 * be used again by userspace.
1416 len
= INITCONTEXTLEN
;
1417 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1423 context
[len
] = '\0';
1424 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1426 if (rc
== -ERANGE
) {
1429 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1430 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1437 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1443 context
[len
] = '\0';
1444 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
,
1450 if (rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
1451 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1452 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__
,
1453 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
1457 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1458 sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1461 rc
= security_context_to_sid_default(context
, rc
, &sid
,
1465 char *dev
= inode
->i_sb
->s_id
;
1466 unsigned long ino
= inode
->i_ino
;
1468 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
1469 if (printk_ratelimit())
1470 printk(KERN_NOTICE
"SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1471 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1472 "filesystem in question.\n", ino
, dev
, context
);
1474 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1475 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1476 __func__
, context
, -rc
, dev
, ino
);
1479 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1487 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK
:
1488 isec
->sid
= isec
->task_sid
;
1490 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS
:
1491 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1492 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1494 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1495 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1496 rc
= security_transition_sid(isec
->task_sid
, sbsec
->sid
,
1497 isec
->sclass
, NULL
, &sid
);
1502 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
:
1503 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
1506 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1507 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1509 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBGENFS
) && !S_ISLNK(inode
->i_mode
)) {
1510 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1513 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1514 * d_splice_alias. */
1515 dentry
= dget(opt_dentry
);
1517 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1519 dentry
= d_find_alias(inode
);
1521 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1522 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1523 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1524 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1525 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1526 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1527 * could be used again by userspace.
1531 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1532 rc
= selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry
, isec
->sclass
,
1533 sbsec
->flags
, &sid
);
1542 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
1545 mutex_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
1547 if (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_FILE
)
1548 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1552 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1553 static inline u32
signal_to_av(int sig
)
1559 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1560 perm
= PROCESS__SIGCHLD
;
1563 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1564 perm
= PROCESS__SIGKILL
;
1567 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1568 perm
= PROCESS__SIGSTOP
;
1571 /* All other signals. */
1572 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNAL
;
1580 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1581 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1583 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred
*actor
,
1584 const struct cred
*target
,
1587 u32 asid
= cred_sid(actor
), tsid
= cred_sid(target
);
1589 return avc_has_perm(asid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1593 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1594 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1595 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1596 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1598 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk1
,
1599 const struct task_struct
*tsk2
,
1602 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec1
, *__tsec2
;
1606 __tsec1
= __task_cred(tsk1
)->security
; sid1
= __tsec1
->sid
;
1607 __tsec2
= __task_cred(tsk2
)->security
; sid2
= __tsec2
->sid
;
1609 return avc_has_perm(sid1
, sid2
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1613 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1614 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1615 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1616 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1618 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1623 sid
= current_sid();
1624 tsid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1625 return avc_has_perm(sid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1628 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1629 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1632 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1633 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred
*cred
,
1636 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1637 struct av_decision avd
;
1639 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1640 u32 av
= CAP_TO_MASK(cap
);
1643 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP
;
1646 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap
)) {
1648 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY
;
1651 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2
;
1655 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap
);
1660 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, 0, &avd
);
1661 if (audit
== SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
) {
1662 int rc2
= avc_audit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, &avd
, rc
, &ad
, 0);
1669 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1670 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1673 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1675 return avc_has_perm(sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
1676 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, perms
, NULL
);
1679 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1680 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1681 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1682 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1683 struct inode
*inode
,
1685 struct common_audit_data
*adp
)
1687 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
1690 validate_creds(cred
);
1692 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
1695 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1696 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1698 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, adp
);
1701 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1702 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1703 pathname if needed. */
1704 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1705 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1708 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
1709 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1711 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1712 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1713 __inode_security_revalidate(inode
, dentry
, true);
1714 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1717 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1718 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1719 pathname if needed. */
1720 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1721 const struct path
*path
,
1724 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(path
->dentry
);
1725 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1727 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1729 __inode_security_revalidate(inode
, path
->dentry
, true);
1730 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1733 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1734 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1738 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1740 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1741 ad
.u
.path
= file
->f_path
;
1742 return inode_has_perm(cred
, file_inode(file
), av
, &ad
);
1745 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1746 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1747 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1748 check a particular permission to the file.
1749 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1750 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1751 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1752 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1753 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1757 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
1758 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
1759 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1760 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1763 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1764 ad
.u
.path
= file
->f_path
;
1766 if (sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
1767 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, fsec
->sid
,
1775 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1778 rc
= inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1785 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1787 static int selinux_determine_inode_label(struct inode
*dir
,
1788 const struct qstr
*name
,
1792 const struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1793 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
1795 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) &&
1796 (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
)) {
1797 *_new_isid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
1798 } else if ((sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
) &&
1800 *_new_isid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
1802 const struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
= inode_security(dir
);
1803 return security_transition_sid(tsec
->sid
, dsec
->sid
, tclass
,
1810 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1811 static int may_create(struct inode
*dir
,
1812 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1815 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
1816 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
1817 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1819 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1822 dsec
= inode_security(dir
);
1823 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1827 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1828 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1830 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1831 DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
,
1836 rc
= selinux_determine_inode_label(dir
, &dentry
->d_name
, tclass
,
1841 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, tclass
, FILE__CREATE
, &ad
);
1845 return avc_has_perm(newsid
, sbsec
->sid
,
1846 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
1847 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
1850 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1851 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid
,
1852 struct task_struct
*ctx
)
1854 u32 sid
= task_sid(ctx
);
1856 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, KEY__CREATE
, NULL
);
1860 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1863 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1864 static int may_link(struct inode
*dir
,
1865 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1869 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
, *isec
;
1870 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1871 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1875 dsec
= inode_security(dir
);
1876 isec
= backing_inode_security(dentry
);
1878 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1879 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1882 av
|= (kind
? DIR__REMOVE_NAME
: DIR__ADD_NAME
);
1883 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1898 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1903 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, av
, &ad
);
1907 static inline int may_rename(struct inode
*old_dir
,
1908 struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
1909 struct inode
*new_dir
,
1910 struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
1912 struct inode_security_struct
*old_dsec
, *new_dsec
, *old_isec
, *new_isec
;
1913 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1914 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1916 int old_is_dir
, new_is_dir
;
1919 old_dsec
= inode_security(old_dir
);
1920 old_isec
= backing_inode_security(old_dentry
);
1921 old_is_dir
= d_is_dir(old_dentry
);
1922 new_dsec
= inode_security(new_dir
);
1924 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1926 ad
.u
.dentry
= old_dentry
;
1927 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1928 DIR__REMOVE_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
, &ad
);
1931 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1932 old_isec
->sclass
, FILE__RENAME
, &ad
);
1935 if (old_is_dir
&& new_dir
!= old_dir
) {
1936 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1937 old_isec
->sclass
, DIR__REPARENT
, &ad
);
1942 ad
.u
.dentry
= new_dentry
;
1943 av
= DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
;
1944 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry
))
1945 av
|= DIR__REMOVE_NAME
;
1946 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1949 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry
)) {
1950 new_isec
= backing_inode_security(new_dentry
);
1951 new_is_dir
= d_is_dir(new_dentry
);
1952 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_isec
->sid
,
1954 (new_is_dir
? DIR__RMDIR
: FILE__UNLINK
), &ad
);
1962 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1963 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1964 struct super_block
*sb
,
1966 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
1968 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1969 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1971 sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
1972 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
, perms
, ad
);
1975 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1976 static inline u32
file_mask_to_av(int mode
, int mask
)
1980 if (!S_ISDIR(mode
)) {
1981 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1982 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
1983 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1986 if (mask
& MAY_APPEND
)
1988 else if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1992 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1994 if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1996 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
2003 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
2004 static inline u32
file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
2008 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_READ
)
2010 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_WRITE
) {
2011 if (file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
)
2018 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
2027 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
2030 static inline u32
open_file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
2032 u32 av
= file_to_av(file
);
2034 if (selinux_policycap_openperm
)
2040 /* Hook functions begin here. */
2042 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct
*mgr
)
2044 u32 mysid
= current_sid();
2045 u32 mgrsid
= task_sid(mgr
);
2047 return avc_has_perm(mysid
, mgrsid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
,
2048 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR
, NULL
);
2051 static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct
*from
,
2052 struct task_struct
*to
)
2054 u32 mysid
= current_sid();
2055 u32 fromsid
= task_sid(from
);
2056 u32 tosid
= task_sid(to
);
2059 if (mysid
!= fromsid
) {
2060 rc
= avc_has_perm(mysid
, fromsid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
,
2061 BINDER__IMPERSONATE
, NULL
);
2066 return avc_has_perm(fromsid
, tosid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
, BINDER__CALL
,
2070 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct
*from
,
2071 struct task_struct
*to
)
2073 u32 fromsid
= task_sid(from
);
2074 u32 tosid
= task_sid(to
);
2076 return avc_has_perm(fromsid
, tosid
, SECCLASS_BINDER
, BINDER__TRANSFER
,
2080 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct
*from
,
2081 struct task_struct
*to
,
2084 u32 sid
= task_sid(to
);
2085 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
2086 struct dentry
*dentry
= file
->f_path
.dentry
;
2087 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2088 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2091 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
2092 ad
.u
.path
= file
->f_path
;
2094 if (sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
2095 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, fsec
->sid
,
2103 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry
))))
2106 isec
= backing_inode_security(dentry
);
2107 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, file_to_av(file
),
2111 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct
*child
,
2114 if (mode
& PTRACE_MODE_READ
) {
2115 u32 sid
= current_sid();
2116 u32 csid
= task_sid(child
);
2117 return avc_has_perm(sid
, csid
, SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__READ
, NULL
);
2120 return current_has_perm(child
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
2123 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct
*parent
)
2125 return task_has_perm(parent
, current
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
2128 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct
*target
, kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
2129 kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
, kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
2131 return current_has_perm(target
, PROCESS__GETCAP
);
2134 static int selinux_capset(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
2135 const kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
2136 const kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
,
2137 const kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
2139 return cred_has_perm(old
, new, PROCESS__SETCAP
);
2143 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2144 * which was removed).
2146 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2147 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2148 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2149 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2152 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred
*cred
, struct user_namespace
*ns
,
2155 return cred_has_capability(cred
, cap
, audit
);
2158 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds
, int type
, int id
, struct super_block
*sb
)
2160 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2172 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD
, NULL
);
2177 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET
, NULL
);
2180 rc
= 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2186 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2188 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2190 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__QUOTAON
);
2193 static int selinux_syslog(int type
)
2198 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL
: /* Read last kernel messages */
2199 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER
: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2200 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ
);
2202 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF
: /* Disable logging to console */
2203 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON
: /* Enable logging to console */
2204 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2205 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL
:
2206 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE
);
2208 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE
: /* Close log */
2209 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN
: /* Open log */
2210 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ
: /* Read from log */
2211 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR
: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2212 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR
: /* Clear ring buffer */
2214 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD
);
2221 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2222 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2223 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2225 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2226 * processes that allocate mappings.
2228 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct
*mm
, long pages
)
2230 int rc
, cap_sys_admin
= 0;
2232 rc
= cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN
,
2233 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
2237 return cap_sys_admin
;
2240 /* binprm security operations */
2242 static u32
ptrace_parent_sid(struct task_struct
*task
)
2245 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
2248 tracer
= ptrace_parent(task
);
2250 sid
= task_sid(tracer
);
2256 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm
*bprm
,
2257 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
,
2258 const struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
)
2260 int nnp
= (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS
);
2261 int nosuid
= (bprm
->file
->f_path
.mnt
->mnt_flags
& MNT_NOSUID
);
2264 if (!nnp
&& !nosuid
)
2265 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2267 if (new_tsec
->sid
== old_tsec
->sid
)
2268 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2271 * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid
2272 * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are
2273 * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions
2274 * of the current SID.
2276 rc
= security_bounded_transition(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
);
2279 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2280 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2281 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2291 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2293 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
2294 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2295 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2296 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2297 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(bprm
->file
);
2300 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2301 * the script interpreter */
2302 if (bprm
->cred_prepared
)
2305 old_tsec
= current_security();
2306 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2307 isec
= inode_security(inode
);
2309 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2310 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2311 new_tsec
->osid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2313 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2314 new_tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
2315 new_tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
2316 new_tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
2318 if (old_tsec
->exec_sid
) {
2319 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->exec_sid
;
2320 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2321 new_tsec
->exec_sid
= 0;
2323 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2324 rc
= check_nnp_nosuid(bprm
, old_tsec
, new_tsec
);
2328 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2329 rc
= security_transition_sid(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2330 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, NULL
,
2336 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2339 rc
= check_nnp_nosuid(bprm
, old_tsec
, new_tsec
);
2341 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2344 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
2345 ad
.u
.path
= bprm
->file
->f_path
;
2347 if (new_tsec
->sid
== old_tsec
->sid
) {
2348 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2349 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS
, &ad
);
2353 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2354 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2355 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__TRANSITION
, &ad
);
2359 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2360 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__ENTRYPOINT
, &ad
);
2364 /* Check for shared state */
2365 if (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE
) {
2366 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2367 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SHARE
,
2373 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2374 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2376 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE
| LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
)) {
2377 u32 ptsid
= ptrace_parent_sid(current
);
2379 rc
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2381 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
2387 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2388 bprm
->per_clear
|= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID
;
2394 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2396 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2404 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2405 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2406 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2407 atsecure
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
,
2409 PROCESS__NOATSECURE
, NULL
);
2415 static int match_file(const void *p
, struct file
*file
, unsigned fd
)
2417 return file_has_perm(p
, file
, file_to_av(file
)) ? fd
+ 1 : 0;
2420 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2421 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred
*cred
,
2422 struct files_struct
*files
)
2424 struct file
*file
, *devnull
= NULL
;
2425 struct tty_struct
*tty
;
2429 tty
= get_current_tty();
2431 spin_lock(&tty
->files_lock
);
2432 if (!list_empty(&tty
->tty_files
)) {
2433 struct tty_file_private
*file_priv
;
2435 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2436 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2437 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2438 open file may belong to another process and we are
2439 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2440 file_priv
= list_first_entry(&tty
->tty_files
,
2441 struct tty_file_private
, list
);
2442 file
= file_priv
->file
;
2443 if (file_path_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__READ
| FILE__WRITE
))
2446 spin_unlock(&tty
->files_lock
);
2449 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2453 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2454 n
= iterate_fd(files
, 0, match_file
, cred
);
2455 if (!n
) /* none found? */
2458 devnull
= dentry_open(&selinux_null
, O_RDWR
, cred
);
2459 if (IS_ERR(devnull
))
2461 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2463 replace_fd(n
- 1, devnull
, 0);
2464 } while ((n
= iterate_fd(files
, n
, match_file
, cred
)) != 0);
2470 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2472 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2474 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2475 struct rlimit
*rlim
, *initrlim
;
2478 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2479 if (new_tsec
->sid
== new_tsec
->osid
)
2482 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2483 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm
->cred
, current
->files
);
2485 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2486 current
->pdeath_signal
= 0;
2488 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2489 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2490 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2492 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2493 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2494 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2495 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2496 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2498 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->osid
, new_tsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2499 PROCESS__RLIMITINH
, NULL
);
2501 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2503 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++) {
2504 rlim
= current
->signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2505 initrlim
= init_task
.signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2506 rlim
->rlim_cur
= min(rlim
->rlim_max
, initrlim
->rlim_cur
);
2508 task_unlock(current
);
2509 update_rlimit_cpu(current
, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU
));
2514 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2517 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2519 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2520 struct itimerval itimer
;
2530 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2531 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2532 * flush and unblock signals.
2534 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2535 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2537 rc
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SIGINH
, NULL
);
2539 memset(&itimer
, 0, sizeof itimer
);
2540 for (i
= 0; i
< 3; i
++)
2541 do_setitimer(i
, &itimer
, NULL
);
2542 spin_lock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2543 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current
)) {
2544 flush_sigqueue(¤t
->pending
);
2545 flush_sigqueue(¤t
->signal
->shared_pending
);
2546 flush_signal_handlers(current
, 1);
2547 sigemptyset(¤t
->blocked
);
2548 recalc_sigpending();
2550 spin_unlock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2553 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2554 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2555 read_lock(&tasklist_lock
);
2556 __wake_up_parent(current
, current
->real_parent
);
2557 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock
);
2560 /* superblock security operations */
2562 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2564 return superblock_alloc_security(sb
);
2567 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2569 superblock_free_security(sb
);
2572 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix
, int plen
, char *option
, int olen
)
2577 return !memcmp(prefix
, option
, plen
);
2580 static inline int selinux_option(char *option
, int len
)
2582 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2583 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2584 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2585 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2586 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR
, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR
)-1, option
, len
));
2589 static inline void take_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
, int len
)
2596 memcpy(*to
, from
, len
);
2600 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
,
2603 int current_size
= 0;
2611 while (current_size
< len
) {
2621 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig
, char *copy
)
2623 int fnosec
, fsec
, rc
= 0;
2624 char *in_save
, *in_curr
, *in_end
;
2625 char *sec_curr
, *nosec_save
, *nosec
;
2631 nosec
= (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
2639 in_save
= in_end
= orig
;
2643 open_quote
= !open_quote
;
2644 if ((*in_end
== ',' && open_quote
== 0) ||
2646 int len
= in_end
- in_curr
;
2648 if (selinux_option(in_curr
, len
))
2649 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr
, in_curr
, &fsec
, len
);
2651 take_option(&nosec
, in_curr
, &fnosec
, len
);
2653 in_curr
= in_end
+ 1;
2655 } while (*in_end
++);
2657 strcpy(in_save
, nosec_save
);
2658 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save
);
2663 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
2666 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
2667 char *secdata
, **mount_options
;
2668 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
2670 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
2676 if (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
2679 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts
);
2680 secdata
= alloc_secdata();
2683 rc
= selinux_sb_copy_data(data
, secdata
);
2685 goto out_free_secdata
;
2687 rc
= selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata
, &opts
);
2689 goto out_free_secdata
;
2691 mount_options
= opts
.mnt_opts
;
2692 flags
= opts
.mnt_opts_flags
;
2694 for (i
= 0; i
< opts
.num_mnt_opts
; i
++) {
2697 if (flags
[i
] == SBLABEL_MNT
)
2699 rc
= security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options
[i
], &sid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
2701 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
2702 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2703 mount_options
[i
], sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
2709 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
, sid
))
2710 goto out_bad_option
;
2713 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, sid
))
2714 goto out_bad_option
;
2716 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
: {
2717 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
;
2718 root_isec
= backing_inode_security(sb
->s_root
);
2720 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
, sid
))
2721 goto out_bad_option
;
2724 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT
:
2725 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
, sid
))
2726 goto out_bad_option
;
2735 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
2737 free_secdata(secdata
);
2740 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unable to change security options "
2741 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb
->s_id
,
2746 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block
*sb
, int flags
, void *data
)
2748 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2749 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2752 rc
= superblock_doinit(sb
, data
);
2756 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2757 if (flags
& MS_KERNMOUNT
)
2760 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2761 ad
.u
.dentry
= sb
->s_root
;
2762 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT
, &ad
);
2765 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2767 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2768 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2770 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2771 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
->d_sb
->s_root
;
2772 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, dentry
->d_sb
, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR
, &ad
);
2775 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name
,
2778 unsigned long flags
,
2781 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2783 if (flags
& MS_REMOUNT
)
2784 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, path
->dentry
->d_sb
,
2785 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT
, NULL
);
2787 return path_has_perm(cred
, path
, FILE__MOUNTON
);
2790 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, int flags
)
2792 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2794 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, mnt
->mnt_sb
,
2795 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT
, NULL
);
2798 /* inode security operations */
2800 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2802 return inode_alloc_security(inode
);
2805 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2807 inode_free_security(inode
);
2810 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry
*dentry
, int mode
,
2811 struct qstr
*name
, void **ctx
,
2817 rc
= selinux_determine_inode_label(d_inode(dentry
->d_parent
), name
,
2818 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
),
2823 return security_sid_to_context(newsid
, (char **)ctx
, ctxlen
);
2826 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode
*inode
, struct inode
*dir
,
2827 const struct qstr
*qstr
,
2829 void **value
, size_t *len
)
2831 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2832 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2833 u32 sid
, newsid
, clen
;
2837 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2840 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
2842 rc
= selinux_determine_inode_label(
2844 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
),
2849 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2850 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
2851 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2852 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
2854 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
2857 if (!ss_initialized
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
))
2861 *name
= XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
;
2864 rc
= security_sid_to_context_force(newsid
, &context
, &clen
);
2874 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mode
)
2876 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_FILE
);
2879 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry
*old_dentry
, struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2881 return may_link(dir
, old_dentry
, MAY_LINK
);
2884 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2886 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_UNLINK
);
2889 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2891 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
);
2894 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mask
)
2896 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_DIR
);
2899 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2901 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_RMDIR
);
2904 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mode
, dev_t dev
)
2906 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
));
2909 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode
*old_inode
, struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
2910 struct inode
*new_inode
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2912 return may_rename(old_inode
, old_dentry
, new_inode
, new_dentry
);
2915 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2917 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2919 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2922 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct inode
*inode
,
2925 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2926 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2927 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2930 validate_creds(cred
);
2932 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2933 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
2934 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
2935 isec
= inode_security_rcu(inode
, rcu
);
2937 return PTR_ERR(isec
);
2939 return avc_has_perm_flags(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, FILE__READ
, &ad
,
2940 rcu
? MAY_NOT_BLOCK
: 0);
2943 static noinline
int audit_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
,
2944 u32 perms
, u32 audited
, u32 denied
,
2948 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2949 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2952 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE
;
2955 rc
= slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
,
2956 audited
, denied
, result
, &ad
, flags
);
2962 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
, int mask
)
2964 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2967 unsigned flags
= mask
& MAY_NOT_BLOCK
;
2968 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2970 struct av_decision avd
;
2972 u32 audited
, denied
;
2974 from_access
= mask
& MAY_ACCESS
;
2975 mask
&= (MAY_READ
|MAY_WRITE
|MAY_EXEC
|MAY_APPEND
);
2977 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2981 validate_creds(cred
);
2983 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
2986 perms
= file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
);
2988 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
2989 isec
= inode_security_rcu(inode
, flags
& MAY_NOT_BLOCK
);
2991 return PTR_ERR(isec
);
2993 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, 0, &avd
);
2994 audited
= avc_audit_required(perms
, &avd
, rc
,
2995 from_access
? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS
: 0,
2997 if (likely(!audited
))
3000 rc2
= audit_inode_permission(inode
, perms
, audited
, denied
, rc
, flags
);
3006 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct iattr
*iattr
)
3008 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3009 unsigned int ia_valid
= iattr
->ia_valid
;
3010 __u32 av
= FILE__WRITE
;
3012 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3013 if (ia_valid
& ATTR_FORCE
) {
3014 ia_valid
&= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID
| ATTR_KILL_SGID
| ATTR_MODE
|
3020 if (ia_valid
& (ATTR_MODE
| ATTR_UID
| ATTR_GID
|
3021 ATTR_ATIME_SET
| ATTR_MTIME_SET
| ATTR_TIMES_SET
))
3022 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
3024 if (selinux_policycap_openperm
&& (ia_valid
& ATTR_SIZE
)
3025 && !(ia_valid
& ATTR_FILE
))
3028 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, av
);
3031 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path
*path
)
3033 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3036 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
3038 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3040 if (!strncmp(name
, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
,
3041 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
- 1)) {
3042 if (!strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_CAPS
)) {
3043 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP
))
3045 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
3046 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
3047 Restrict to administrator. */
3052 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3053 ordinary setattr permission. */
3054 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
3057 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
3058 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
3060 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
3061 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3062 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
3063 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3064 u32 newsid
, sid
= current_sid();
3067 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
3068 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
3070 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
3071 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SBLABEL_MNT
))
3074 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode
))
3077 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
3078 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
3080 isec
= backing_inode_security(dentry
);
3081 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
,
3082 FILE__RELABELFROM
, &ad
);
3086 rc
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &newsid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
3087 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
3088 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
)) {
3089 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
3093 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3094 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3097 if (str
[size
- 1] == '\0')
3098 audit_size
= size
- 1;
3105 ab
= audit_log_start(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
);
3106 audit_log_format(ab
, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3107 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, value
, audit_size
);
3112 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
3117 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, isec
->sclass
,
3118 FILE__RELABELTO
, &ad
);
3122 rc
= security_validate_transition(isec
->sid
, newsid
, sid
,
3127 return avc_has_perm(newsid
,
3129 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
3130 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
,
3134 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
3135 const void *value
, size_t size
,
3138 struct inode
*inode
= d_backing_inode(dentry
);
3139 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3143 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
)) {
3144 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3148 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
3150 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3151 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3152 inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
, -rc
);
3156 isec
= backing_inode_security(dentry
);
3157 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
3159 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
3164 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
3166 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3168 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3171 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
)
3173 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3175 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3178 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
3180 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
3181 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
3183 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3184 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3189 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3191 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3193 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
, void **buffer
, bool alloc
)
3197 char *context
= NULL
;
3198 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3200 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
3204 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3205 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3206 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3207 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3208 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3209 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3210 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3212 error
= cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns
, CAP_MAC_ADMIN
,
3213 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
3215 error
= cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN
,
3216 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
3217 isec
= inode_security(inode
);
3219 error
= security_sid_to_context_force(isec
->sid
, &context
,
3222 error
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &size
);
3235 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
,
3236 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
3238 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode_security_novalidate(inode
);
3242 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
3245 if (!value
|| !size
)
3248 rc
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &newsid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
3252 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
3254 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
3258 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, char *buffer
, size_t buffer_size
)
3260 const int len
= sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
);
3261 if (buffer
&& len
<= buffer_size
)
3262 memcpy(buffer
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, len
);
3266 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode
*inode
, u32
*secid
)
3268 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode_security_novalidate(inode
);
3272 /* file security operations */
3274 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
3276 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3277 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
3279 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3280 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && (mask
& MAY_WRITE
))
3283 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
,
3284 file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
));
3287 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
3289 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
3290 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3291 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3292 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3295 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3298 isec
= inode_security(inode
);
3299 if (sid
== fsec
->sid
&& fsec
->isid
== isec
->sid
&&
3300 fsec
->pseqno
== avc_policy_seqno())
3301 /* No change since file_open check. */
3304 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file
, mask
);
3307 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
3309 return file_alloc_security(file
);
3312 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
3314 file_free_security(file
);
3318 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3319 * operation to an inode.
3321 static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
, struct file
*file
,
3322 u32 requested
, u16 cmd
)
3324 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3325 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3326 struct inode
*inode
= file_inode(file
);
3327 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3328 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl
;
3329 u32 ssid
= cred_sid(cred
);
3331 u8 driver
= cmd
>> 8;
3332 u8 xperm
= cmd
& 0xff;
3334 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP
;
3337 ad
.u
.op
->path
= file
->f_path
;
3339 if (ssid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
3340 rc
= avc_has_perm(ssid
, fsec
->sid
,
3348 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
3351 isec
= inode_security(inode
);
3352 rc
= avc_has_extended_perms(ssid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
,
3353 requested
, driver
, xperm
, &ad
);
3358 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3361 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3371 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
:
3373 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION
:
3374 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3377 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
:
3379 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION
:
3380 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__SETATTR
);
3383 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3387 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3392 error
= cred_has_capability(cred
, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG
,
3393 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
);
3396 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3397 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3400 error
= ioctl_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__IOCTL
, (u16
) cmd
);
3405 static int default_noexec
;
3407 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file
*file
, unsigned long prot
, int shared
)
3409 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3412 if (default_noexec
&&
3413 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && (!file
|| IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file
)) ||
3414 (!shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
)))) {
3416 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3417 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3418 * This has an additional check.
3420 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECMEM
);
3426 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3427 u32 av
= FILE__READ
;
3429 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3430 if (shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
))
3433 if (prot
& PROT_EXEC
)
3434 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
3436 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, av
);
3443 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr
)
3447 if (addr
< CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
) {
3448 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3449 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT
,
3450 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO
, NULL
);
3456 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file
*file
, unsigned long reqprot
,
3457 unsigned long prot
, unsigned long flags
)
3459 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3462 return file_map_prot_check(file
, prot
,
3463 (flags
& MAP_TYPE
) == MAP_SHARED
);
3466 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct
*vma
,
3467 unsigned long reqprot
,
3470 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3472 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3475 if (default_noexec
&&
3476 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && !(vma
->vm_flags
& VM_EXEC
)) {
3478 if (vma
->vm_start
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_brk
&&
3479 vma
->vm_end
<= vma
->vm_mm
->brk
) {
3480 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECHEAP
);
3481 } else if (!vma
->vm_file
&&
3482 vma
->vm_start
<= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
&&
3483 vma
->vm_end
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
) {
3484 rc
= current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__EXECSTACK
);
3485 } else if (vma
->vm_file
&& vma
->anon_vma
) {
3487 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3488 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3489 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3490 * modified content. This typically should only
3491 * occur for text relocations.
3493 rc
= file_has_perm(cred
, vma
->vm_file
, FILE__EXECMOD
);
3499 return file_map_prot_check(vma
->vm_file
, prot
, vma
->vm_flags
&VM_SHARED
);
3502 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
)
3504 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3506 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3509 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3512 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3517 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && !(arg
& O_APPEND
)) {
3518 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__WRITE
);
3527 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS
:
3528 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3529 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3537 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3542 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3549 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file
*file
)
3551 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3553 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3554 fsec
->fown_sid
= current_sid();
3557 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
3558 struct fown_struct
*fown
, int signum
)
3561 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
3563 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3565 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3566 file
= container_of(fown
, struct file
, f_owner
);
3568 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3571 perm
= signal_to_av(SIGIO
); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3573 perm
= signal_to_av(signum
);
3575 return avc_has_perm(fsec
->fown_sid
, sid
,
3576 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3579 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file
*file
)
3581 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3583 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, file_to_av(file
));
3586 static int selinux_file_open(struct file
*file
, const struct cred
*cred
)
3588 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3589 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3591 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3592 isec
= inode_security(file_inode(file
));
3594 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3595 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3596 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3597 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3598 * struct as its SID.
3600 fsec
->isid
= isec
->sid
;
3601 fsec
->pseqno
= avc_policy_seqno();
3603 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3604 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3605 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3606 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3607 * new inode label or new policy.
3608 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3610 return file_path_has_perm(cred
, file
, open_file_to_av(file
));
3613 /* task security operations */
3615 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags
)
3617 return current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__FORK
);
3621 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3623 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred
*cred
, gfp_t gfp
)
3625 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3627 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3631 cred
->security
= tsec
;
3636 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3638 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred
*cred
)
3640 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
3643 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3644 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3646 BUG_ON(cred
->security
&& (unsigned long) cred
->security
< PAGE_SIZE
);
3647 cred
->security
= (void *) 0x7UL
;
3652 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3654 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
3657 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
3658 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3660 old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3662 tsec
= kmemdup(old_tsec
, sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3666 new->security
= tsec
;
3671 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3673 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
3675 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3676 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3682 * set the security data for a kernel service
3683 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3685 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred
*new, u32 secid
)
3687 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3688 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3691 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, secid
,
3692 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3693 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE
,
3697 tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
3698 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
3699 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
3705 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3706 * objective context of the specified inode
3708 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred
*new, struct inode
*inode
)
3710 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode_security(inode
);
3711 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3712 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3715 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
3716 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3717 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS
,
3721 tsec
->create_sid
= isec
->sid
;
3725 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name
)
3728 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3730 sid
= task_sid(current
);
3732 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD
;
3733 ad
.u
.kmod_name
= kmod_name
;
3735 return avc_has_perm(sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
, SECCLASS_SYSTEM
,
3736 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST
, &ad
);
3739 static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file
*file
)
3741 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3742 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3743 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3744 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3749 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_SYSTEM
,
3750 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD
, NULL
);
3754 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
3755 ad
.u
.path
= file
->f_path
;
3757 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3758 if (sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
3759 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, fsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FD
, FD__USE
, &ad
);
3764 isec
= inode_security(file_inode(file
));
3765 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SYSTEM
,
3766 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD
, &ad
);
3769 static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file
*file
,
3770 enum kernel_read_file_id id
)
3775 case READING_MODULE
:
3776 rc
= selinux_kernel_module_from_file(file
);
3785 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct
*p
, pid_t pgid
)
3787 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETPGID
);
3790 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3792 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETPGID
);
3795 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3797 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSESSION
);
3800 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct
*p
, u32
*secid
)
3802 *secid
= task_sid(p
);
3805 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct
*p
, int nice
)
3807 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3810 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct
*p
, int ioprio
)
3812 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3815 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct
*p
)
3817 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3820 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct
*p
, unsigned int resource
,
3821 struct rlimit
*new_rlim
)
3823 struct rlimit
*old_rlim
= p
->signal
->rlim
+ resource
;
3825 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3826 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3827 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3828 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3829 if (old_rlim
->rlim_max
!= new_rlim
->rlim_max
)
3830 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT
);
3835 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
3837 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3840 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
3842 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3845 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct
*p
)
3847 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3850 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct
*p
, struct siginfo
*info
,
3857 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNULL
; /* null signal; existence test */
3859 perm
= signal_to_av(sig
);
3861 rc
= avc_has_perm(secid
, task_sid(p
),
3862 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3864 rc
= current_has_perm(p
, perm
);
3868 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct
*p
)
3870 return task_has_perm(p
, current
, PROCESS__SIGCHLD
);
3873 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct
*p
,
3874 struct inode
*inode
)
3876 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3877 u32 sid
= task_sid(p
);
3880 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
3883 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3884 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3885 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3887 int offset
, ihlen
, ret
= -EINVAL
;
3888 struct iphdr _iph
, *ih
;
3890 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3891 ih
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_iph
), &_iph
);
3895 ihlen
= ih
->ihl
* 4;
3896 if (ihlen
< sizeof(_iph
))
3899 ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
= ih
->saddr
;
3900 ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.daddr
= ih
->daddr
;
3904 *proto
= ih
->protocol
;
3906 switch (ih
->protocol
) {
3908 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3910 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3914 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3918 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= th
->source
;
3919 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= th
->dest
;
3924 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3926 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3930 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3934 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= uh
->source
;
3935 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= uh
->dest
;
3939 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3940 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3942 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3946 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3950 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3951 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3962 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3964 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3965 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3966 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3969 int ret
= -EINVAL
, offset
;
3970 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h
, *ip6
;
3973 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3974 ip6
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_ipv6h
), &_ipv6h
);
3978 ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
= ip6
->saddr
;
3979 ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.daddr
= ip6
->daddr
;
3982 nexthdr
= ip6
->nexthdr
;
3983 offset
+= sizeof(_ipv6h
);
3984 offset
= ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb
, offset
, &nexthdr
, &frag_off
);
3993 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3995 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3999 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= th
->source
;
4000 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= th
->dest
;
4005 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
4007 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
4011 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= uh
->source
;
4012 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= uh
->dest
;
4016 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
4017 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
4019 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
4023 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
4024 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
4028 /* includes fragments */
4038 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff
*skb
, struct common_audit_data
*ad
,
4039 char **_addrp
, int src
, u8
*proto
)
4044 switch (ad
->u
.net
->family
) {
4046 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb
, ad
, proto
);
4049 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
:
4050 &ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.daddr
);
4053 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4055 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb
, ad
, proto
);
4058 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
:
4059 &ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.daddr
);
4069 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4070 " unable to parse packet\n");
4080 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4082 * @family: protocol family
4083 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4086 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4087 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4088 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4089 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4090 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4094 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff
*skb
, u16 family
, u32
*sid
)
4101 err
= selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb
, &xfrm_sid
);
4104 err
= selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb
, family
, &nlbl_type
, &nlbl_sid
);
4108 err
= security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid
, nlbl_type
, xfrm_sid
, sid
);
4109 if (unlikely(err
)) {
4111 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4112 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4120 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4121 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4122 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4123 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4125 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4126 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4127 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4128 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4131 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid
, u32 skb_sid
, u32
*conn_sid
)
4135 if (skb_sid
!= SECSID_NULL
)
4136 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid
, skb_sid
, conn_sid
);
4143 /* socket security operations */
4145 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
,
4146 u16 secclass
, u32
*socksid
)
4148 if (tsec
->sockcreate_sid
> SECSID_NULL
) {
4149 *socksid
= tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
4153 return security_transition_sid(tsec
->sid
, tsec
->sid
, secclass
, NULL
,
4157 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct
*task
, struct sock
*sk
, u32 perms
)
4159 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4160 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4161 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4162 u32 tsid
= task_sid(task
);
4164 if (sksec
->sid
== SECINITSID_KERNEL
)
4167 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4171 return avc_has_perm(tsid
, sksec
->sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
4174 static int selinux_socket_create(int family
, int type
,
4175 int protocol
, int kern
)
4177 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
4185 secclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
4186 rc
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
, secclass
, &newsid
);
4190 return avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, newsid
, secclass
, SOCKET__CREATE
, NULL
);
4193 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket
*sock
, int family
,
4194 int type
, int protocol
, int kern
)
4196 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
4197 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock
));
4198 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4201 isec
->sclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
4204 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4206 err
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
, isec
->sclass
, &(isec
->sid
));
4211 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
4214 sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4215 sksec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
4216 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4217 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock
->sk
, family
);
4223 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4224 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4225 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4227 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
4229 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
4233 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, SOCKET__BIND
);
4238 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
4239 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
4240 * check the first address now.
4242 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4243 if (family
== PF_INET
|| family
== PF_INET6
) {
4245 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4246 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4247 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4248 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
4249 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
4250 unsigned short snum
;
4253 if (family
== PF_INET
) {
4254 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
4255 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
4256 addrp
= (char *)&addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
4258 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
4259 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
4260 addrp
= (char *)&addr6
->sin6_addr
.s6_addr
;
4266 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk
), &low
, &high
);
4268 if (snum
< max(PROT_SOCK
, low
) || snum
> high
) {
4269 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
,
4273 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4275 ad
.u
.net
->sport
= htons(snum
);
4276 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4277 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
,
4279 SOCKET__NAME_BIND
, &ad
);
4285 switch (sksec
->sclass
) {
4286 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
:
4287 node_perm
= TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4290 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
:
4291 node_perm
= UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4294 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
:
4295 node_perm
= DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4299 node_perm
= RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
4303 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &sid
);
4307 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4309 ad
.u
.net
->sport
= htons(snum
);
4310 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4312 if (family
== PF_INET
)
4313 ad
.u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
= addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
4315 ad
.u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
= addr6
->sin6_addr
;
4317 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
,
4318 sksec
->sclass
, node_perm
, &ad
);
4326 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
4328 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
4329 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4332 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, SOCKET__CONNECT
);
4337 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
4339 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
||
4340 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
) {
4341 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4342 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4343 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
4344 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
4345 unsigned short snum
;
4348 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
) {
4349 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
4350 if (addrlen
< sizeof(struct sockaddr_in
))
4352 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
4354 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
4355 if (addrlen
< SIN6_LEN_RFC2133
)
4357 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
4360 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
, snum
, &sid
);
4364 perm
= (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
) ?
4365 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
: DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
;
4367 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4369 ad
.u
.net
->dport
= htons(snum
);
4370 ad
.u
.net
->family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4371 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perm
, &ad
);
4376 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk
, address
);
4382 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket
*sock
, int backlog
)
4384 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__LISTEN
);
4387 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket
*sock
, struct socket
*newsock
)
4390 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
4391 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
;
4393 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__ACCEPT
);
4397 newisec
= inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock
));
4399 isec
= inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock
));
4400 newisec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4401 newisec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
4402 newisec
->initialized
= LABEL_INITIALIZED
;
4407 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
4410 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__WRITE
);
4413 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
4414 int size
, int flags
)
4416 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__READ
);
4419 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket
*sock
)
4421 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
4424 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket
*sock
)
4426 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
4429 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
, int optname
)
4433 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SETOPT
);
4437 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock
, level
, optname
);
4440 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
,
4443 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETOPT
);
4446 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket
*sock
, int how
)
4448 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN
);
4451 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock
*sock
,
4455 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_sock
= sock
->sk_security
;
4456 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_other
= other
->sk_security
;
4457 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_new
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4458 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4459 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4462 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4464 ad
.u
.net
->sk
= other
;
4466 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec_sock
->sid
, sksec_other
->sid
,
4467 sksec_other
->sclass
,
4468 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO
, &ad
);
4472 /* server child socket */
4473 sksec_new
->peer_sid
= sksec_sock
->sid
;
4474 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other
->sid
, sksec_sock
->sid
,
4479 /* connecting socket */
4480 sksec_sock
->peer_sid
= sksec_new
->sid
;
4485 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket
*sock
,
4486 struct socket
*other
)
4488 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4489 struct sk_security_struct
*osec
= other
->sk
->sk_security
;
4490 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4491 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4493 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4495 ad
.u
.net
->sk
= other
->sk
;
4497 return avc_has_perm(ssec
->sid
, osec
->sid
, osec
->sclass
, SOCKET__SENDTO
,
4501 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net
*ns
, int ifindex
,
4502 char *addrp
, u16 family
, u32 peer_sid
,
4503 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
4509 err
= sel_netif_sid(ns
, ifindex
, &if_sid
);
4512 err
= avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
4513 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__INGRESS
, ad
);
4517 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
);
4520 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
4521 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__RECVFROM
, ad
);
4524 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4528 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4529 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4530 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4531 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4534 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4536 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4537 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4538 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4542 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4543 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4549 err
= selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
, skb
, family
, &ad
);
4552 err
= selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
);
4557 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4560 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4561 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4562 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4563 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4564 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4569 if (family
!= PF_INET
&& family
!= PF_INET6
)
4572 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4573 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4576 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4577 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4578 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4579 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4580 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4581 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk
, skb
, family
);
4583 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4584 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4585 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4588 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4590 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4591 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4592 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4596 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4599 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
);
4602 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk
), skb
->skb_iif
,
4603 addrp
, family
, peer_sid
, &ad
);
4605 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4608 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, peer_sid
, SECCLASS_PEER
,
4611 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4616 if (secmark_active
) {
4617 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4626 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket
*sock
, char __user
*optval
,
4627 int __user
*optlen
, unsigned len
)
4632 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4633 u32 peer_sid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4635 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
||
4636 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
)
4637 peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
4638 if (peer_sid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4639 return -ENOPROTOOPT
;
4641 err
= security_sid_to_context(peer_sid
, &scontext
, &scontext_len
);
4645 if (scontext_len
> len
) {
4650 if (copy_to_user(optval
, scontext
, scontext_len
))
4654 if (put_user(scontext_len
, optlen
))
4660 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket
*sock
, struct sk_buff
*skb
, u32
*secid
)
4662 u32 peer_secid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4664 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
4666 if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4668 else if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IPV6
))
4671 family
= sock
->sk
->sk_family
;
4675 if (sock
&& family
== PF_UNIX
) {
4676 isec
= inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock
));
4677 peer_secid
= isec
->sid
;
4679 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_secid
);
4682 *secid
= peer_secid
;
4683 if (peer_secid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4688 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock
*sk
, int family
, gfp_t priority
)
4690 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4692 sksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec
), priority
);
4696 sksec
->peer_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4697 sksec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4698 sksec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_SOCKET
;
4699 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec
);
4700 sk
->sk_security
= sksec
;
4705 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock
*sk
)
4707 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4709 sk
->sk_security
= NULL
;
4710 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec
);
4714 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock
*sk
, struct sock
*newsk
)
4716 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4717 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4719 newsksec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4720 newsksec
->peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
4721 newsksec
->sclass
= sksec
->sclass
;
4723 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec
);
4726 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock
*sk
, u32
*secid
)
4729 *secid
= SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET
;
4731 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4733 *secid
= sksec
->sid
;
4737 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock
*sk
, struct socket
*parent
)
4739 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
=
4740 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent
));
4741 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4743 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
|| sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET6
||
4744 sk
->sk_family
== PF_UNIX
)
4745 isec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4746 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4749 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4750 struct request_sock
*req
)
4752 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4754 u16 family
= req
->rsk_ops
->family
;
4758 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peersid
);
4761 err
= selinux_conn_sid(sksec
->sid
, peersid
, &connsid
);
4764 req
->secid
= connsid
;
4765 req
->peer_secid
= peersid
;
4767 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req
, family
);
4770 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock
*newsk
,
4771 const struct request_sock
*req
)
4773 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4775 newsksec
->sid
= req
->secid
;
4776 newsksec
->peer_sid
= req
->peer_secid
;
4777 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4778 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4779 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4780 time it will have been created and available. */
4782 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4783 * thread with access to newsksec */
4784 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk
, req
->rsk_ops
->family
);
4787 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4789 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4790 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4792 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4793 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4796 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &sksec
->peer_sid
);
4799 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid
)
4801 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
4804 __tsec
= current_security();
4807 return avc_has_perm(tsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
4810 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4812 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount
);
4815 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4817 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount
);
4820 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock
*req
,
4823 fl
->flowi_secid
= req
->secid
;
4826 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security
)
4828 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
;
4830 tunsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec
), GFP_KERNEL
);
4833 tunsec
->sid
= current_sid();
4839 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security
)
4844 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4846 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4848 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4849 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4850 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4851 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4852 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4853 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4855 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE
,
4859 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security
)
4861 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
4863 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4864 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE
, NULL
);
4867 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock
*sk
, void *security
)
4869 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
4870 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4872 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4873 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4874 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4875 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4876 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4877 * protocols were being used */
4879 sksec
->sid
= tunsec
->sid
;
4880 sksec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
;
4885 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security
)
4887 struct tun_security_struct
*tunsec
= security
;
4888 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4891 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, tunsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4892 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
4895 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4896 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
4904 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4908 struct nlmsghdr
*nlh
;
4909 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4911 if (skb
->len
< NLMSG_HDRLEN
) {
4915 nlh
= nlmsg_hdr(skb
);
4917 err
= selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec
->sclass
, nlh
->nlmsg_type
, &perm
);
4919 if (err
== -EINVAL
) {
4920 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
4921 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
4922 " pig=%d comm=%s\n",
4923 sk
->sk_protocol
, nlh
->nlmsg_type
,
4924 secclass_map
[sksec
->sclass
- 1].name
,
4925 task_pid_nr(current
), current
->comm
);
4926 if (!selinux_enforcing
|| security_get_allow_unknown())
4936 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, perm
);
4941 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4943 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4944 const struct net_device
*indev
,
4950 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4951 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4956 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4959 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4960 netlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled();
4961 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4962 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4965 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
) != 0)
4968 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4970 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= indev
->ifindex
;
4971 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4972 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
) != 0)
4975 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4976 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev
), indev
->ifindex
,
4977 addrp
, family
, peer_sid
, &ad
);
4979 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 1);
4985 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4986 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__FORWARD_IN
, &ad
))
4990 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4991 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4992 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4994 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, peer_sid
) != 0)
5000 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv
,
5001 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5002 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
5004 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, state
->in
, PF_INET
);
5007 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5008 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv
,
5009 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5010 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
5012 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, state
->in
, PF_INET6
);
5016 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5022 if (!netlbl_enabled())
5025 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5026 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5027 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5030 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
5032 if (sk_listener(sk
))
5033 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5034 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5035 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5036 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
5037 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5038 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5039 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5040 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5041 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5042 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5043 * security label in the packet itself this is the
5044 * best we can do. */
5047 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5048 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5051 sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
5052 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, sid
) != 0)
5058 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv
,
5059 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5060 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
5062 return selinux_ip_output(skb
, PF_INET
);
5065 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5069 struct sock
*sk
= skb_to_full_sk(skb
);
5070 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
5071 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5072 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
5078 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5080 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
5082 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
5083 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
5084 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, &proto
))
5087 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5088 if (avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, skb
->secmark
,
5089 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__SEND
, &ad
))
5090 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5092 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
, proto
))
5093 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5098 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5099 const struct net_device
*outdev
,
5104 int ifindex
= outdev
->ifindex
;
5106 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5107 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
5112 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5113 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5114 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5115 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5116 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
5117 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb
, ifindex
, family
);
5119 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
5120 peerlbl_active
= selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5121 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
5124 sk
= skb_to_full_sk(skb
);
5127 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5128 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5129 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5130 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5131 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5132 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5133 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5134 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5135 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5136 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5138 if (skb_dst(skb
) != NULL
&& skb_dst(skb
)->xfrm
!= NULL
&&
5139 !(sk
&& sk_listener(sk
)))
5144 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5145 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5146 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5147 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5149 secmark_perm
= PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
;
5150 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
))
5153 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
5154 peer_sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
5156 } else if (sk_listener(sk
)) {
5157 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5158 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5159 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5160 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5161 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5162 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5163 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5164 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5165 * for similar problems. */
5167 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
5169 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5170 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &skb_sid
))
5172 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5173 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5174 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5175 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5176 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5177 * pass the packet. */
5178 if (skb_sid
== SECSID_NULL
) {
5181 if (IPCB(skb
)->flags
& IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED
)
5185 if (IP6CB(skb
)->flags
& IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED
)
5189 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5192 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec
->sid
, skb_sid
, &peer_sid
))
5194 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
5196 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5197 * associated socket. */
5198 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
5199 peer_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
5200 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
5203 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
5205 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
5206 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
5207 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, NULL
))
5211 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
5212 SECCLASS_PACKET
, secmark_perm
, &ad
))
5213 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5215 if (peerlbl_active
) {
5219 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev
), ifindex
, &if_sid
))
5221 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
5222 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__EGRESS
, &ad
))
5223 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5225 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
))
5227 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
5228 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__SENDTO
, &ad
))
5229 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
5235 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv
,
5236 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5237 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
5239 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, state
->out
, PF_INET
);
5242 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5243 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv
,
5244 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
5245 const struct nf_hook_state
*state
)
5247 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, state
->out
, PF_INET6
);
5251 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5253 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
5255 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk
, skb
);
5258 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct
*task
,
5259 struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
,
5262 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5265 isec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5269 sid
= task_sid(task
);
5270 isec
->sclass
= sclass
;
5272 perm
->security
= isec
;
5277 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
)
5279 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= perm
->security
;
5280 perm
->security
= NULL
;
5284 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5286 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
5288 msec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5292 msec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
5293 msg
->security
= msec
;
5298 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5300 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
= msg
->security
;
5302 msg
->security
= NULL
;
5306 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipc_perms
,
5309 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5310 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5311 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5313 isec
= ipc_perms
->security
;
5315 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5316 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= ipc_perms
->key
;
5318 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
5321 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5323 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg
);
5326 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
5328 msg_msg_free_security(msg
);
5331 /* message queue security operations */
5332 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
5334 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5335 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5336 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5339 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &msq
->q_perm
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
);
5343 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5345 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5346 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5348 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5351 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
5357 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
5359 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
5362 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int msqflg
)
5364 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5365 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5366 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5368 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5370 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5371 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5373 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5374 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5377 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int cmd
)
5385 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5386 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5389 perms
= MSGQ__GETATTR
| MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
;
5392 perms
= MSGQ__SETATTR
;
5395 perms
= MSGQ__DESTROY
;
5401 err
= ipc_has_perm(&msq
->q_perm
, perms
);
5405 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
, int msqflg
)
5407 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5408 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
5409 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5410 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5413 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5414 msec
= msg
->security
;
5417 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5419 if (msec
->sid
== SECINITSID_UNLABELED
) {
5421 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5422 * message queue this message will be stored in
5424 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
5430 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5431 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5433 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5434 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5437 /* Can this process send the message */
5438 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
5441 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5442 rc
= avc_has_perm(msec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
5443 MSGQ__ENQUEUE
, &ad
);
5448 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
,
5449 struct task_struct
*target
,
5450 long type
, int mode
)
5452 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5453 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
5454 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5455 u32 sid
= task_sid(target
);
5458 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
5459 msec
= msg
->security
;
5461 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5462 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
5464 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
5465 SECCLASS_MSGQ
, MSGQ__READ
, &ad
);
5467 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
,
5468 SECCLASS_MSG
, MSG__RECEIVE
, &ad
);
5472 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5473 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
5475 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5476 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5477 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5480 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &shp
->shm_perm
, SECCLASS_SHM
);
5484 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
5486 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5487 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
5489 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
5492 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
5498 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
5500 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
5503 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int shmflg
)
5505 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5506 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5507 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5509 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
5511 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5512 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
5514 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
5515 SHM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5518 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5519 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int cmd
)
5527 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5528 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5531 perms
= SHM__GETATTR
| SHM__ASSOCIATE
;
5534 perms
= SHM__SETATTR
;
5541 perms
= SHM__DESTROY
;
5547 err
= ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5551 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
,
5552 char __user
*shmaddr
, int shmflg
)
5556 if (shmflg
& SHM_RDONLY
)
5559 perms
= SHM__READ
| SHM__WRITE
;
5561 return ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5564 /* Semaphore security operations */
5565 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5567 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5568 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5569 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5572 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &sma
->sem_perm
, SECCLASS_SEM
);
5576 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5578 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5579 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5581 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5584 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5590 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5592 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5595 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array
*sma
, int semflg
)
5597 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5598 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5599 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5601 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5603 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5604 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5606 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5607 SEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5610 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5611 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array
*sma
, int cmd
)
5619 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5620 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5624 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
;
5635 perms
= SEM__DESTROY
;
5638 perms
= SEM__SETATTR
;
5642 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
| SEM__ASSOCIATE
;
5648 err
= ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5652 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array
*sma
,
5653 struct sembuf
*sops
, unsigned nsops
, int alter
)
5658 perms
= SEM__READ
| SEM__WRITE
;
5662 return ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5665 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, short flag
)
5671 av
|= IPC__UNIX_READ
;
5673 av
|= IPC__UNIX_WRITE
;
5678 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp
, av
);
5681 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, u32
*secid
)
5683 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= ipcp
->security
;
5687 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct inode
*inode
)
5690 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, dentry
);
5693 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5694 char *name
, char **value
)
5696 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
5702 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETATTR
);
5708 __tsec
= __task_cred(p
)->security
;
5710 if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5712 else if (!strcmp(name
, "prev"))
5714 else if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5715 sid
= __tsec
->exec_sid
;
5716 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5717 sid
= __tsec
->create_sid
;
5718 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5719 sid
= __tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5720 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5721 sid
= __tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
5729 error
= security_sid_to_context(sid
, value
, &len
);
5739 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5740 char *name
, void *value
, size_t size
)
5742 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5749 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5750 security attributes. */
5755 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5756 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5757 * above restriction is ever removed.
5759 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5760 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETEXEC
);
5761 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5762 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE
);
5763 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5764 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE
);
5765 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5766 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE
);
5767 else if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5768 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETCURRENT
);
5774 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5775 if (size
&& str
[1] && str
[1] != '\n') {
5776 if (str
[size
-1] == '\n') {
5780 error
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &sid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
5781 if (error
== -EINVAL
&& !strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5782 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
)) {
5783 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
5786 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5787 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5788 if (str
[size
- 1] == '\0')
5789 audit_size
= size
- 1;
5792 ab
= audit_log_start(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
);
5793 audit_log_format(ab
, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5794 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, value
, audit_size
);
5799 error
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
,
5806 new = prepare_creds();
5810 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5811 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5812 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5813 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5814 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5815 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5816 tsec
= new->security
;
5817 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec")) {
5818 tsec
->exec_sid
= sid
;
5819 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5820 tsec
->create_sid
= sid
;
5821 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate")) {
5822 error
= may_create_key(sid
, p
);
5825 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= sid
;
5826 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate")) {
5827 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= sid
;
5828 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "current")) {
5833 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5835 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5836 error
= security_bounded_transition(tsec
->sid
, sid
);
5841 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5842 error
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5843 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION
, NULL
);
5847 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5848 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5849 ptsid
= ptrace_parent_sid(p
);
5851 error
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5852 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
5871 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name
)
5873 return (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
) == 0);
5876 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid
, char **secdata
, u32
*seclen
)
5878 return security_sid_to_context(secid
, secdata
, seclen
);
5881 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata
, u32 seclen
, u32
*secid
)
5883 return security_context_to_sid(secdata
, seclen
, secid
, GFP_KERNEL
);
5886 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata
, u32 seclen
)
5891 static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode
*inode
)
5893 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
5895 mutex_lock(&isec
->lock
);
5896 isec
->initialized
= LABEL_INVALID
;
5897 mutex_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
5901 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5903 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5905 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5909 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5911 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry
*dentry
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5913 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5916 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void **ctx
, u32
*ctxlen
)
5919 len
= selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
,
5928 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key
*k
, const struct cred
*cred
,
5929 unsigned long flags
)
5931 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5932 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5934 ksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5938 tsec
= cred
->security
;
5939 if (tsec
->keycreate_sid
)
5940 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5942 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->sid
;
5948 static void selinux_key_free(struct key
*k
)
5950 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= k
->security
;
5956 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref
,
5957 const struct cred
*cred
,
5961 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5964 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5965 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5966 appear to be created. */
5970 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
5972 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
5973 ksec
= key
->security
;
5975 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksec
->sid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, perm
, NULL
);
5978 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key
*key
, char **_buffer
)
5980 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= key
->security
;
5981 char *context
= NULL
;
5985 rc
= security_sid_to_context(ksec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
5994 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks
[] = {
5995 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr
, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr
),
5996 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction
, selinux_binder_transaction
),
5997 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder
, selinux_binder_transfer_binder
),
5998 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file
, selinux_binder_transfer_file
),
6000 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check
, selinux_ptrace_access_check
),
6001 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme
, selinux_ptrace_traceme
),
6002 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget
, selinux_capget
),
6003 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset
, selinux_capset
),
6004 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable
, selinux_capable
),
6005 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl
, selinux_quotactl
),
6006 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on
, selinux_quota_on
),
6007 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog
, selinux_syslog
),
6008 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory
, selinux_vm_enough_memory
),
6010 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send
, selinux_netlink_send
),
6012 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds
, selinux_bprm_set_creds
),
6013 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds
, selinux_bprm_committing_creds
),
6014 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds
, selinux_bprm_committed_creds
),
6015 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec
, selinux_bprm_secureexec
),
6017 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security
, selinux_sb_alloc_security
),
6018 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security
, selinux_sb_free_security
),
6019 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data
, selinux_sb_copy_data
),
6020 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount
, selinux_sb_remount
),
6021 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount
, selinux_sb_kern_mount
),
6022 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options
, selinux_sb_show_options
),
6023 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs
, selinux_sb_statfs
),
6024 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount
, selinux_mount
),
6025 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount
, selinux_umount
),
6026 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts
, selinux_set_mnt_opts
),
6027 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts
, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts
),
6028 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str
, selinux_parse_opts_str
),
6030 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security
, selinux_dentry_init_security
),
6032 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security
, selinux_inode_alloc_security
),
6033 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security
, selinux_inode_free_security
),
6034 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security
, selinux_inode_init_security
),
6035 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create
, selinux_inode_create
),
6036 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link
, selinux_inode_link
),
6037 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink
, selinux_inode_unlink
),
6038 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink
, selinux_inode_symlink
),
6039 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir
, selinux_inode_mkdir
),
6040 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir
, selinux_inode_rmdir
),
6041 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod
, selinux_inode_mknod
),
6042 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename
, selinux_inode_rename
),
6043 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink
, selinux_inode_readlink
),
6044 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link
, selinux_inode_follow_link
),
6045 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission
, selinux_inode_permission
),
6046 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr
, selinux_inode_setattr
),
6047 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr
, selinux_inode_getattr
),
6048 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr
, selinux_inode_setxattr
),
6049 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr
, selinux_inode_post_setxattr
),
6050 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr
, selinux_inode_getxattr
),
6051 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr
, selinux_inode_listxattr
),
6052 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr
, selinux_inode_removexattr
),
6053 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity
, selinux_inode_getsecurity
),
6054 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity
, selinux_inode_setsecurity
),
6055 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity
, selinux_inode_listsecurity
),
6056 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid
, selinux_inode_getsecid
),
6058 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission
, selinux_file_permission
),
6059 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security
, selinux_file_alloc_security
),
6060 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security
, selinux_file_free_security
),
6061 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl
, selinux_file_ioctl
),
6062 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file
, selinux_mmap_file
),
6063 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr
, selinux_mmap_addr
),
6064 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect
, selinux_file_mprotect
),
6065 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock
, selinux_file_lock
),
6066 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl
, selinux_file_fcntl
),
6067 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner
, selinux_file_set_fowner
),
6068 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask
, selinux_file_send_sigiotask
),
6069 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive
, selinux_file_receive
),
6071 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open
, selinux_file_open
),
6073 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_create
, selinux_task_create
),
6074 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank
, selinux_cred_alloc_blank
),
6075 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free
, selinux_cred_free
),
6076 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare
, selinux_cred_prepare
),
6077 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer
, selinux_cred_transfer
),
6078 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as
, selinux_kernel_act_as
),
6079 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as
, selinux_kernel_create_files_as
),
6080 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request
, selinux_kernel_module_request
),
6081 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file
, selinux_kernel_read_file
),
6082 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid
, selinux_task_setpgid
),
6083 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid
, selinux_task_getpgid
),
6084 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid
, selinux_task_getsid
),
6085 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid
, selinux_task_getsecid
),
6086 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice
, selinux_task_setnice
),
6087 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio
, selinux_task_setioprio
),
6088 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio
, selinux_task_getioprio
),
6089 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit
, selinux_task_setrlimit
),
6090 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler
, selinux_task_setscheduler
),
6091 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler
, selinux_task_getscheduler
),
6092 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory
, selinux_task_movememory
),
6093 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill
, selinux_task_kill
),
6094 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait
, selinux_task_wait
),
6095 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode
, selinux_task_to_inode
),
6097 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission
, selinux_ipc_permission
),
6098 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid
, selinux_ipc_getsecid
),
6100 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security
, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security
),
6101 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security
, selinux_msg_msg_free_security
),
6103 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security
,
6104 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security
),
6105 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security
, selinux_msg_queue_free_security
),
6106 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate
, selinux_msg_queue_associate
),
6107 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl
, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl
),
6108 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd
, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd
),
6109 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv
, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv
),
6111 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security
, selinux_shm_alloc_security
),
6112 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security
, selinux_shm_free_security
),
6113 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate
, selinux_shm_associate
),
6114 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl
, selinux_shm_shmctl
),
6115 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat
, selinux_shm_shmat
),
6117 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security
, selinux_sem_alloc_security
),
6118 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security
, selinux_sem_free_security
),
6119 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate
, selinux_sem_associate
),
6120 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl
, selinux_sem_semctl
),
6121 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop
, selinux_sem_semop
),
6123 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate
, selinux_d_instantiate
),
6125 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr
, selinux_getprocattr
),
6126 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr
, selinux_setprocattr
),
6128 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel
, selinux_ismaclabel
),
6129 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx
, selinux_secid_to_secctx
),
6130 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid
, selinux_secctx_to_secid
),
6131 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx
, selinux_release_secctx
),
6132 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx
, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx
),
6133 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx
, selinux_inode_notifysecctx
),
6134 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx
, selinux_inode_setsecctx
),
6135 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx
, selinux_inode_getsecctx
),
6137 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect
, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect
),
6138 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send
, selinux_socket_unix_may_send
),
6140 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create
, selinux_socket_create
),
6141 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create
, selinux_socket_post_create
),
6142 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind
, selinux_socket_bind
),
6143 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect
, selinux_socket_connect
),
6144 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen
, selinux_socket_listen
),
6145 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept
, selinux_socket_accept
),
6146 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg
, selinux_socket_sendmsg
),
6147 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg
, selinux_socket_recvmsg
),
6148 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname
, selinux_socket_getsockname
),
6149 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername
, selinux_socket_getpeername
),
6150 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt
, selinux_socket_getsockopt
),
6151 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt
, selinux_socket_setsockopt
),
6152 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown
, selinux_socket_shutdown
),
6153 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb
, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb
),
6154 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream
,
6155 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream
),
6156 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram
, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram
),
6157 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security
, selinux_sk_alloc_security
),
6158 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security
, selinux_sk_free_security
),
6159 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security
, selinux_sk_clone_security
),
6160 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid
, selinux_sk_getsecid
),
6161 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft
, selinux_sock_graft
),
6162 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request
, selinux_inet_conn_request
),
6163 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone
, selinux_inet_csk_clone
),
6164 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established
, selinux_inet_conn_established
),
6165 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet
, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet
),
6166 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc
, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc
),
6167 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec
, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec
),
6168 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow
, selinux_req_classify_flow
),
6169 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security
, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security
),
6170 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security
, selinux_tun_dev_free_security
),
6171 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create
, selinux_tun_dev_create
),
6172 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue
, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue
),
6173 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach
, selinux_tun_dev_attach
),
6174 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open
, selinux_tun_dev_open
),
6176 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
6177 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc
),
6178 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone
),
6179 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_free
),
6180 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security
, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete
),
6181 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc
, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc
),
6182 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire
,
6183 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire
),
6184 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security
, selinux_xfrm_state_free
),
6185 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security
, selinux_xfrm_state_delete
),
6186 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup
, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup
),
6187 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
,
6188 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
),
6189 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session
, selinux_xfrm_decode_session
),
6193 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc
, selinux_key_alloc
),
6194 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free
, selinux_key_free
),
6195 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission
, selinux_key_permission
),
6196 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity
, selinux_key_getsecurity
),
6200 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init
, selinux_audit_rule_init
),
6201 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known
, selinux_audit_rule_known
),
6202 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match
, selinux_audit_rule_match
),
6203 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free
, selinux_audit_rule_free
),
6207 static __init
int selinux_init(void)
6209 if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) {
6210 selinux_enabled
= 0;
6214 if (!selinux_enabled
) {
6215 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
6219 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Initializing.\n");
6221 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
6222 cred_init_security();
6224 default_noexec
= !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS
& VM_EXEC
);
6226 sel_inode_cache
= kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
6227 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct
),
6228 0, SLAB_PANIC
, NULL
);
6229 file_security_cache
= kmem_cache_create("selinux_file_security",
6230 sizeof(struct file_security_struct
),
6231 0, SLAB_PANIC
, NULL
);
6234 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks
));
6236 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback
, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET
))
6237 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
6239 if (selinux_enforcing
)
6240 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
6242 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
6247 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block
*sb
, void *unused
)
6249 superblock_doinit(sb
, NULL
);
6252 void selinux_complete_init(void)
6254 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
6256 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
6257 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
6258 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init
, NULL
);
6261 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
6262 all processes and objects when they are created. */
6263 security_initcall(selinux_init
);
6265 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
6267 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops
[] = {
6269 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_postroute
,
6271 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
6272 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
6275 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_forward
,
6277 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
6278 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
6281 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_output
,
6283 .hooknum
= NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT
,
6284 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
6286 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
6288 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_postroute
,
6290 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
6291 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
6294 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_forward
,
6296 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
6297 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
6302 static int __init
selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
6306 if (!selinux_enabled
)
6309 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
6311 err
= nf_register_hooks(selinux_nf_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops
));
6313 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err
);
6318 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init
);
6320 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6321 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
6323 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
6325 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_nf_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops
));
6329 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6331 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6332 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
6335 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6337 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6338 static int selinux_disabled
;
6340 int selinux_disable(void)
6342 if (ss_initialized
) {
6343 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
6347 if (selinux_disabled
) {
6348 /* Only do this once. */
6352 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
6354 selinux_disabled
= 1;
6355 selinux_enabled
= 0;
6357 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks
));
6359 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
6362 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
6363 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
6365 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */