2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
79 #include <linux/syslog.h>
90 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
91 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
93 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass
, u16 nlmsg_type
, u32
*perm
);
96 extern struct security_operations
*security_ops
;
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount
= ATOMIC_INIT(0);
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing
;
104 static int __init
enforcing_setup(char *str
)
106 unsigned long enforcing
;
107 if (!strict_strtoul(str
, 0, &enforcing
))
108 selinux_enforcing
= enforcing
? 1 : 0;
111 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup
);
114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115 int selinux_enabled
= CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
;
117 static int __init
selinux_enabled_setup(char *str
)
119 unsigned long enabled
;
120 if (!strict_strtoul(str
, 0, &enabled
))
121 selinux_enabled
= enabled
? 1 : 0;
124 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup
);
126 int selinux_enabled
= 1;
129 static struct kmem_cache
*sel_inode_cache
;
132 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
135 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
136 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
137 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
138 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
141 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
143 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount
) > 0);
147 * initialise the security for the init task
149 static void cred_init_security(void)
151 struct cred
*cred
= (struct cred
*) current
->real_cred
;
152 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
154 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
156 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
158 tsec
->osid
= tsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
159 cred
->security
= tsec
;
163 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
165 static inline u32
cred_sid(const struct cred
*cred
)
167 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
169 tsec
= cred
->security
;
174 * get the objective security ID of a task
176 static inline u32
task_sid(const struct task_struct
*task
)
181 sid
= cred_sid(__task_cred(task
));
187 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
189 static inline u32
current_sid(void)
191 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_cred()->security
;
196 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
198 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
200 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
201 u32 sid
= current_sid();
203 isec
= kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache
, GFP_NOFS
);
207 mutex_init(&isec
->lock
);
208 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec
->list
);
210 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
211 isec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_FILE
;
212 isec
->task_sid
= sid
;
213 inode
->i_security
= isec
;
218 static void inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
220 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
221 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
223 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
224 if (!list_empty(&isec
->list
))
225 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
226 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
228 inode
->i_security
= NULL
;
229 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache
, isec
);
232 static int file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
234 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
235 u32 sid
= current_sid();
237 fsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
242 fsec
->fown_sid
= sid
;
243 file
->f_security
= fsec
;
248 static void file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
250 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
251 file
->f_security
= NULL
;
255 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
257 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
259 sbsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
263 mutex_init(&sbsec
->lock
);
264 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec
->isec_head
);
265 spin_lock_init(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
267 sbsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
268 sbsec
->def_sid
= SECINITSID_FILE
;
269 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
270 sb
->s_security
= sbsec
;
275 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
277 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
278 sb
->s_security
= NULL
;
282 /* The security server must be initialized before
283 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
284 extern int ss_initialized
;
286 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
288 static const char *labeling_behaviors
[6] = {
290 "uses transition SIDs",
292 "uses genfs_contexts",
293 "not configured for labeling",
294 "uses mountpoint labeling",
297 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
);
299 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode
*inode
)
301 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, NULL
);
310 Opt_labelsupport
= 5,
313 static const match_table_t tokens
= {
314 {Opt_context
, CONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
315 {Opt_fscontext
, FSCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
316 {Opt_defcontext
, DEFCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
317 {Opt_rootcontext
, ROOTCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
318 {Opt_labelsupport
, LABELSUPP_STR
},
322 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
324 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid
,
325 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
326 const struct cred
*cred
)
328 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
331 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
332 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
336 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
337 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
341 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid
,
342 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
343 const struct cred
*cred
)
345 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
347 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
348 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
352 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
353 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, NULL
);
357 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block
*sb
)
359 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
360 struct dentry
*root
= sb
->s_root
;
361 struct inode
*root_inode
= root
->d_inode
;
364 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
) {
365 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
366 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
367 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
368 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
369 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
370 if (!root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
371 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
372 "xattr support\n", sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
376 rc
= root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr(root
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, NULL
, 0);
377 if (rc
< 0 && rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
378 if (rc
== -EOPNOTSUPP
)
379 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
380 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
381 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
383 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
384 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb
->s_id
,
385 sb
->s_type
->name
, -rc
);
390 sbsec
->flags
|= (SE_SBINITIALIZED
| SE_SBLABELSUPP
);
392 if (sbsec
->behavior
> ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors
))
393 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
394 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
396 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
397 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
,
398 labeling_behaviors
[sbsec
->behavior
-1]);
400 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS
||
401 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
||
402 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE
||
403 sbsec
->behavior
> ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors
))
404 sbsec
->flags
&= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP
;
406 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
407 if (strncmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
408 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBLABELSUPP
;
410 /* Initialize the root inode. */
411 rc
= inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode
, root
);
413 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
414 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
415 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
417 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
419 if (!list_empty(&sbsec
->isec_head
)) {
420 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
=
421 list_entry(sbsec
->isec_head
.next
,
422 struct inode_security_struct
, list
);
423 struct inode
*inode
= isec
->inode
;
424 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
425 inode
= igrab(inode
);
427 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode
))
431 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
432 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
435 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
441 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
442 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
443 * mount options, or whatever.
445 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*sb
,
446 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
449 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
450 char *context
= NULL
;
454 security_init_mnt_opts(opts
);
456 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
462 tmp
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
463 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
464 for (i
= 0; i
< 8; i
++) {
466 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
469 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
470 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
)
471 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
473 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
474 if (!opts
->mnt_opts
) {
479 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
480 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
486 if (sbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) {
487 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
490 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
491 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
493 if (sbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) {
494 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, &context
, &len
);
497 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
498 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
500 if (sbsec
->flags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) {
501 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->def_sid
, &context
, &len
);
504 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
505 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
507 if (sbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
508 struct inode
*root
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
509 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= root
->i_security
;
511 rc
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
514 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
515 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
517 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
) {
518 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = NULL
;
519 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP
;
522 BUG_ON(i
!= opts
->num_mnt_opts
);
527 security_free_mnt_opts(opts
);
531 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
, char flag
,
532 u32 old_sid
, u32 new_sid
)
534 char mnt_flags
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
536 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
537 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
538 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& flag
) ||
539 (old_sid
!= new_sid
))
542 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
543 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
545 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
546 if (mnt_flags
& flag
)
552 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
553 * labeling information.
555 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block
*sb
,
556 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
558 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
560 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
561 const char *name
= sb
->s_type
->name
;
562 struct inode
*inode
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
563 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
= inode
->i_security
;
564 u32 fscontext_sid
= 0, context_sid
= 0, rootcontext_sid
= 0;
565 u32 defcontext_sid
= 0;
566 char **mount_options
= opts
->mnt_opts
;
567 int *flags
= opts
->mnt_opts_flags
;
568 int num_opts
= opts
->num_mnt_opts
;
570 mutex_lock(&sbsec
->lock
);
572 if (!ss_initialized
) {
574 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
575 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
576 server is ready to handle calls. */
580 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
581 "before the security server is initialized\n");
586 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
587 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
588 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
589 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
591 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
592 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
593 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
594 * will be used for both mounts)
596 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) && (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
601 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
602 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
603 * than once with different security options.
605 for (i
= 0; i
< num_opts
; i
++) {
608 if (flags
[i
] == SE_SBLABELSUPP
)
610 rc
= security_context_to_sid(mount_options
[i
],
611 strlen(mount_options
[i
]), &sid
);
613 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
614 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
615 mount_options
[i
], sb
->s_id
, name
, rc
);
622 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
,
624 goto out_double_mount
;
626 sbsec
->flags
|= FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
631 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
,
633 goto out_double_mount
;
635 sbsec
->flags
|= CONTEXT_MNT
;
637 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
638 rootcontext_sid
= sid
;
640 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
,
642 goto out_double_mount
;
644 sbsec
->flags
|= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
648 defcontext_sid
= sid
;
650 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
,
652 goto out_double_mount
;
654 sbsec
->flags
|= DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
663 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
664 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
665 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
) && !num_opts
)
666 goto out_double_mount
;
671 if (strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "proc") == 0)
672 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBPROC
;
674 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
675 rc
= security_fs_use((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBPROC
) ? "proc" : sb
->s_type
->name
, &sbsec
->behavior
, &sbsec
->sid
);
677 printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
678 __func__
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
682 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
684 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid
, sbsec
, cred
);
688 sbsec
->sid
= fscontext_sid
;
692 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
693 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
694 * the superblock context if not already set.
697 if (!fscontext_sid
) {
698 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
702 sbsec
->sid
= context_sid
;
704 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
709 if (!rootcontext_sid
)
710 rootcontext_sid
= context_sid
;
712 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= context_sid
;
713 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
;
716 if (rootcontext_sid
) {
717 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid
, sbsec
,
722 root_isec
->sid
= rootcontext_sid
;
723 root_isec
->initialized
= 1;
726 if (defcontext_sid
) {
727 if (sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
) {
729 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: defcontext option is "
730 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
734 if (defcontext_sid
!= sbsec
->def_sid
) {
735 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid
,
741 sbsec
->def_sid
= defcontext_sid
;
744 rc
= sb_finish_set_opts(sb
);
746 mutex_unlock(&sbsec
->lock
);
750 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
751 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb
->s_id
, name
);
755 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
756 struct super_block
*newsb
)
758 const struct superblock_security_struct
*oldsbsec
= oldsb
->s_security
;
759 struct superblock_security_struct
*newsbsec
= newsb
->s_security
;
761 int set_fscontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
);
762 int set_context
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
);
763 int set_rootcontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
);
766 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
767 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
772 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
773 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
));
775 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
776 if (newsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
779 mutex_lock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
781 newsbsec
->flags
= oldsbsec
->flags
;
783 newsbsec
->sid
= oldsbsec
->sid
;
784 newsbsec
->def_sid
= oldsbsec
->def_sid
;
785 newsbsec
->behavior
= oldsbsec
->behavior
;
788 u32 sid
= oldsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
792 if (!set_rootcontext
) {
793 struct inode
*newinode
= newsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
794 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= newinode
->i_security
;
797 newsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= sid
;
799 if (set_rootcontext
) {
800 const struct inode
*oldinode
= oldsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
801 const struct inode_security_struct
*oldisec
= oldinode
->i_security
;
802 struct inode
*newinode
= newsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
803 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= newinode
->i_security
;
805 newisec
->sid
= oldisec
->sid
;
808 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb
);
809 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
812 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options
,
813 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
816 char *context
= NULL
, *defcontext
= NULL
;
817 char *fscontext
= NULL
, *rootcontext
= NULL
;
818 int rc
, num_mnt_opts
= 0;
820 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= 0;
822 /* Standard string-based options. */
823 while ((p
= strsep(&options
, "|")) != NULL
) {
825 substring_t args
[MAX_OPT_ARGS
];
830 token
= match_token(p
, tokens
, args
);
834 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
836 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
839 context
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
849 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
852 fscontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
859 case Opt_rootcontext
:
862 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
865 rootcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
873 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
875 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
878 defcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
884 case Opt_labelsupport
:
888 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
895 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
899 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
900 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
901 kfree(opts
->mnt_opts
);
906 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = fscontext
;
907 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
910 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = context
;
911 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
914 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = rootcontext
;
915 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
918 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = defcontext
;
919 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
922 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= num_mnt_opts
;
933 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
935 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
938 char *options
= data
;
939 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
941 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts
);
946 BUG_ON(sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
);
948 rc
= selinux_parse_opts_str(options
, &opts
);
953 rc
= selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
);
956 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
960 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file
*m
,
961 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
966 for (i
= 0; i
< opts
->num_mnt_opts
; i
++) {
969 if (opts
->mnt_opts
[i
])
970 has_comma
= strchr(opts
->mnt_opts
[i
], ',');
974 switch (opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
]) {
976 prefix
= CONTEXT_STR
;
979 prefix
= FSCONTEXT_STR
;
981 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
982 prefix
= ROOTCONTEXT_STR
;
985 prefix
= DEFCONTEXT_STR
;
989 seq_puts(m
, LABELSUPP_STR
);
994 /* we need a comma before each option */
999 seq_puts(m
, opts
->mnt_opts
[i
]);
1005 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file
*m
, struct super_block
*sb
)
1007 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
1010 rc
= selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
);
1012 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1018 selinux_write_opts(m
, &opts
);
1020 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1025 static inline u16
inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode
)
1027 switch (mode
& S_IFMT
) {
1029 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE
;
1031 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
;
1033 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1035 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE
;
1037 return SECCLASS_DIR
;
1039 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE
;
1041 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE
;
1045 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1048 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol
)
1050 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_TCP
);
1053 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol
)
1055 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_UDP
);
1058 static inline u16
socket_type_to_security_class(int family
, int type
, int protocol
)
1064 case SOCK_SEQPACKET
:
1065 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
;
1067 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET
;
1074 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol
))
1075 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
;
1077 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1079 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol
))
1080 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
;
1082 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1084 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
;
1086 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1092 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET
;
1093 case NETLINK_FIREWALL
:
1094 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET
;
1095 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG
:
1096 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET
;
1098 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET
;
1100 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET
;
1101 case NETLINK_SELINUX
:
1102 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET
;
1104 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET
;
1105 case NETLINK_IP6_FW
:
1106 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET
;
1107 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG
:
1108 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET
;
1109 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT
:
1110 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET
;
1112 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET
;
1115 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET
;
1117 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET
;
1119 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET
;
1122 return SECCLASS_SOCKET
;
1125 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1126 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry
*de
,
1131 char *buffer
, *path
, *end
;
1133 buffer
= (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
1138 end
= buffer
+buflen
;
1143 while (de
&& de
!= de
->parent
) {
1144 buflen
-= de
->namelen
+ 1;
1148 memcpy(end
, de
->name
, de
->namelen
);
1153 rc
= security_genfs_sid("proc", path
, tclass
, sid
);
1154 free_page((unsigned long)buffer
);
1158 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry
*de
,
1166 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1167 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
)
1169 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= NULL
;
1170 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1172 struct dentry
*dentry
;
1173 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1174 char *context
= NULL
;
1178 if (isec
->initialized
)
1181 mutex_lock(&isec
->lock
);
1182 if (isec
->initialized
)
1185 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1186 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)) {
1187 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1188 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1189 server is ready to handle calls. */
1190 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1191 if (list_empty(&isec
->list
))
1192 list_add(&isec
->list
, &sbsec
->isec_head
);
1193 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1197 switch (sbsec
->behavior
) {
1198 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
:
1199 if (!inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
1200 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1204 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1205 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1207 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1208 dentry
= dget(opt_dentry
);
1210 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1211 dentry
= d_find_alias(inode
);
1215 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1216 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1217 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1218 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1219 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1220 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1221 * be used again by userspace.
1226 len
= INITCONTEXTLEN
;
1227 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1233 context
[len
] = '\0';
1234 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1236 if (rc
== -ERANGE
) {
1239 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1240 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1247 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1253 context
[len
] = '\0';
1254 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
,
1260 if (rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
1261 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1262 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__
,
1263 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
1267 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1268 sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1271 rc
= security_context_to_sid_default(context
, rc
, &sid
,
1275 char *dev
= inode
->i_sb
->s_id
;
1276 unsigned long ino
= inode
->i_ino
;
1278 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
1279 if (printk_ratelimit())
1280 printk(KERN_NOTICE
"SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1281 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1282 "filesystem in question.\n", ino
, dev
, context
);
1284 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1285 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1286 __func__
, context
, -rc
, dev
, ino
);
1289 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1297 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK
:
1298 isec
->sid
= isec
->task_sid
;
1300 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS
:
1301 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1302 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1304 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1305 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1306 rc
= security_transition_sid(isec
->task_sid
,
1314 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
:
1315 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
1318 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1319 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1321 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBPROC
) && !S_ISLNK(inode
->i_mode
)) {
1322 struct proc_inode
*proci
= PROC_I(inode
);
1324 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1325 rc
= selinux_proc_get_sid(proci
->pde
,
1336 isec
->initialized
= 1;
1339 mutex_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
1341 if (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_FILE
)
1342 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1346 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1347 static inline u32
signal_to_av(int sig
)
1353 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1354 perm
= PROCESS__SIGCHLD
;
1357 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1358 perm
= PROCESS__SIGKILL
;
1361 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1362 perm
= PROCESS__SIGSTOP
;
1365 /* All other signals. */
1366 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNAL
;
1374 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1375 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1377 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred
*actor
,
1378 const struct cred
*target
,
1381 u32 asid
= cred_sid(actor
), tsid
= cred_sid(target
);
1383 return avc_has_perm(asid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1387 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1388 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1389 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1390 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1392 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk1
,
1393 const struct task_struct
*tsk2
,
1396 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec1
, *__tsec2
;
1400 __tsec1
= __task_cred(tsk1
)->security
; sid1
= __tsec1
->sid
;
1401 __tsec2
= __task_cred(tsk2
)->security
; sid2
= __tsec2
->sid
;
1403 return avc_has_perm(sid1
, sid2
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1407 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1408 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1409 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1410 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1412 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1417 sid
= current_sid();
1418 tsid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1419 return avc_has_perm(sid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1422 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1423 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1426 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1427 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1428 const struct cred
*cred
,
1431 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1432 struct av_decision avd
;
1434 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1435 u32 av
= CAP_TO_MASK(cap
);
1438 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, CAP
);
1442 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap
)) {
1444 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY
;
1447 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2
;
1451 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap
);
1455 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, 0, &avd
);
1456 if (audit
== SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
)
1457 avc_audit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, &avd
, rc
, &ad
);
1461 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1462 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1465 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1467 return avc_has_perm(sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
1468 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, perms
, NULL
);
1471 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1472 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1473 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1474 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1475 struct inode
*inode
,
1477 struct common_audit_data
*adp
)
1479 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
1480 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1483 validate_creds(cred
);
1485 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
1488 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1489 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1493 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1494 ad
.u
.fs
.inode
= inode
;
1497 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, adp
);
1500 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1501 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1502 pathname if needed. */
1503 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1504 struct vfsmount
*mnt
,
1505 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1508 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
1509 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1511 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1512 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.mnt
= mnt
;
1513 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
;
1514 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1517 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1518 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1519 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1520 check a particular permission to the file.
1521 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1522 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1523 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1524 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1525 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1529 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
1530 struct inode
*inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
1531 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1532 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1535 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1536 ad
.u
.fs
.path
= file
->f_path
;
1538 if (sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
1539 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, fsec
->sid
,
1547 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1550 rc
= inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1556 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1557 static int may_create(struct inode
*dir
,
1558 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1561 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
1562 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
1563 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
1564 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1566 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1569 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
1570 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1573 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
1575 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1576 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
;
1578 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1579 DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
,
1584 if (!newsid
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
)) {
1585 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, dsec
->sid
, tclass
, &newsid
);
1590 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, tclass
, FILE__CREATE
, &ad
);
1594 return avc_has_perm(newsid
, sbsec
->sid
,
1595 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
1596 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
1599 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1600 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid
,
1601 struct task_struct
*ctx
)
1603 u32 sid
= task_sid(ctx
);
1605 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, KEY__CREATE
, NULL
);
1609 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1612 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1613 static int may_link(struct inode
*dir
,
1614 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1618 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
, *isec
;
1619 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1620 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1624 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
1625 isec
= dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1627 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1628 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
;
1631 av
|= (kind
? DIR__REMOVE_NAME
: DIR__ADD_NAME
);
1632 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1647 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1652 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, av
, &ad
);
1656 static inline int may_rename(struct inode
*old_dir
,
1657 struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
1658 struct inode
*new_dir
,
1659 struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
1661 struct inode_security_struct
*old_dsec
, *new_dsec
, *old_isec
, *new_isec
;
1662 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1663 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1665 int old_is_dir
, new_is_dir
;
1668 old_dsec
= old_dir
->i_security
;
1669 old_isec
= old_dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1670 old_is_dir
= S_ISDIR(old_dentry
->d_inode
->i_mode
);
1671 new_dsec
= new_dir
->i_security
;
1673 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1675 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= old_dentry
;
1676 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1677 DIR__REMOVE_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
, &ad
);
1680 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1681 old_isec
->sclass
, FILE__RENAME
, &ad
);
1684 if (old_is_dir
&& new_dir
!= old_dir
) {
1685 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1686 old_isec
->sclass
, DIR__REPARENT
, &ad
);
1691 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= new_dentry
;
1692 av
= DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
;
1693 if (new_dentry
->d_inode
)
1694 av
|= DIR__REMOVE_NAME
;
1695 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1698 if (new_dentry
->d_inode
) {
1699 new_isec
= new_dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1700 new_is_dir
= S_ISDIR(new_dentry
->d_inode
->i_mode
);
1701 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_isec
->sid
,
1703 (new_is_dir
? DIR__RMDIR
: FILE__UNLINK
), &ad
);
1711 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1712 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1713 struct super_block
*sb
,
1715 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
1717 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1718 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1720 sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
1721 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
, perms
, ad
);
1724 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1725 static inline u32
file_mask_to_av(int mode
, int mask
)
1729 if ((mode
& S_IFMT
) != S_IFDIR
) {
1730 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1731 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
1732 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1735 if (mask
& MAY_APPEND
)
1737 else if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1741 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1743 if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1745 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1752 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1753 static inline u32
file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1757 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_READ
)
1759 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_WRITE
) {
1760 if (file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
)
1767 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1776 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1779 static inline u32
open_file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1781 u32 av
= file_to_av(file
);
1783 if (selinux_policycap_openperm
) {
1784 mode_t mode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
->i_mode
;
1786 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1790 else if (S_ISCHR(mode
))
1791 av
|= CHR_FILE__OPEN
;
1792 else if (S_ISBLK(mode
))
1793 av
|= BLK_FILE__OPEN
;
1794 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode
))
1795 av
|= FIFO_FILE__OPEN
;
1796 else if (S_ISDIR(mode
))
1798 else if (S_ISSOCK(mode
))
1799 av
|= SOCK_FILE__OPEN
;
1801 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1802 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__
, mode
);
1807 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1809 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct
*child
,
1814 rc
= cap_ptrace_access_check(child
, mode
);
1818 if (mode
== PTRACE_MODE_READ
) {
1819 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1820 u32 csid
= task_sid(child
);
1821 return avc_has_perm(sid
, csid
, SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__READ
, NULL
);
1824 return current_has_perm(child
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
1827 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct
*parent
)
1831 rc
= cap_ptrace_traceme(parent
);
1835 return task_has_perm(parent
, current
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
1838 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct
*target
, kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
1839 kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
, kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
1843 error
= current_has_perm(target
, PROCESS__GETCAP
);
1847 return cap_capget(target
, effective
, inheritable
, permitted
);
1850 static int selinux_capset(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
1851 const kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
1852 const kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
,
1853 const kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
1857 error
= cap_capset(new, old
,
1858 effective
, inheritable
, permitted
);
1862 return cred_has_perm(old
, new, PROCESS__SETCAP
);
1866 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1867 * which was removed).
1869 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1870 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1871 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1872 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1875 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct
*tsk
, const struct cred
*cred
,
1880 rc
= cap_capable(tsk
, cred
, cap
, audit
);
1884 return task_has_capability(tsk
, cred
, cap
, audit
);
1887 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table
*table
, u16 tclass
, u32
*sid
)
1890 char *buffer
, *path
, *end
;
1893 buffer
= (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
1898 end
= buffer
+buflen
;
1904 const char *name
= table
->procname
;
1905 size_t namelen
= strlen(name
);
1906 buflen
-= namelen
+ 1;
1910 memcpy(end
, name
, namelen
);
1913 table
= table
->parent
;
1919 memcpy(end
, "/sys", 4);
1921 rc
= security_genfs_sid("proc", path
, tclass
, sid
);
1923 free_page((unsigned long)buffer
);
1928 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table
*table
, int op
)
1935 sid
= current_sid();
1937 rc
= selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table
, (op
== 0001) ?
1938 SECCLASS_DIR
: SECCLASS_FILE
, &tsid
);
1940 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1941 tsid
= SECINITSID_SYSCTL
;
1944 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1945 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1947 error
= avc_has_perm(sid
, tsid
,
1948 SECCLASS_DIR
, DIR__SEARCH
, NULL
);
1956 error
= avc_has_perm(sid
, tsid
,
1957 SECCLASS_FILE
, av
, NULL
);
1963 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds
, int type
, int id
, struct super_block
*sb
)
1965 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
1977 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD
, NULL
);
1982 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET
, NULL
);
1985 rc
= 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1991 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry
*dentry
)
1993 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
1995 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__QUOTAON
);
1998 static int selinux_syslog(int type
, bool from_file
)
2002 rc
= cap_syslog(type
, from_file
);
2007 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL
: /* Read last kernel messages */
2008 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER
: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2009 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ
);
2011 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF
: /* Disable logging to console */
2012 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON
: /* Enable logging to console */
2013 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2014 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL
:
2015 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE
);
2017 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE
: /* Close log */
2018 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN
: /* Open log */
2019 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ
: /* Read from log */
2020 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR
: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2021 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR
: /* Clear ring buffer */
2023 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD
);
2030 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2031 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2032 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2034 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2035 * processes that allocate mappings.
2037 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct
*mm
, long pages
)
2039 int rc
, cap_sys_admin
= 0;
2041 rc
= selinux_capable(current
, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN
,
2042 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
2046 return __vm_enough_memory(mm
, pages
, cap_sys_admin
);
2049 /* binprm security operations */
2051 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2053 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
2054 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2055 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2056 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2057 struct inode
*inode
= bprm
->file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
2060 rc
= cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm
);
2064 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2065 * the script interpreter */
2066 if (bprm
->cred_prepared
)
2069 old_tsec
= current_security();
2070 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2071 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2073 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2074 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2075 new_tsec
->osid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2077 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2078 new_tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
2079 new_tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
2080 new_tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
2082 if (old_tsec
->exec_sid
) {
2083 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->exec_sid
;
2084 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2085 new_tsec
->exec_sid
= 0;
2087 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2088 rc
= security_transition_sid(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2089 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, &new_tsec
->sid
);
2094 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2095 ad
.u
.fs
.path
= bprm
->file
->f_path
;
2097 if (bprm
->file
->f_path
.mnt
->mnt_flags
& MNT_NOSUID
)
2098 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2100 if (new_tsec
->sid
== old_tsec
->sid
) {
2101 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2102 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS
, &ad
);
2106 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2107 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2108 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__TRANSITION
, &ad
);
2112 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2113 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__ENTRYPOINT
, &ad
);
2117 /* Check for shared state */
2118 if (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE
) {
2119 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2120 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SHARE
,
2126 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2127 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2129 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE
| LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
)) {
2130 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
2131 struct task_security_struct
*sec
;
2135 tracer
= tracehook_tracer_task(current
);
2136 if (likely(tracer
!= NULL
)) {
2137 sec
= __task_cred(tracer
)->security
;
2143 rc
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2145 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
2151 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2152 bprm
->per_clear
|= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID
;
2158 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2160 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2161 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
2169 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2170 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2171 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2172 atsecure
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
,
2174 PROCESS__NOATSECURE
, NULL
);
2177 return (atsecure
|| cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm
));
2180 extern struct vfsmount
*selinuxfs_mount
;
2181 extern struct dentry
*selinux_null
;
2183 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2184 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred
*cred
,
2185 struct files_struct
*files
)
2187 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2188 struct file
*file
, *devnull
= NULL
;
2189 struct tty_struct
*tty
;
2190 struct fdtable
*fdt
;
2194 tty
= get_current_tty();
2197 if (!list_empty(&tty
->tty_files
)) {
2198 struct inode
*inode
;
2200 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2201 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2202 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2203 file may belong to another process and we are only
2204 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2205 file
= list_first_entry(&tty
->tty_files
, struct file
, f_u
.fu_list
);
2206 inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
2207 if (inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
,
2208 FILE__READ
| FILE__WRITE
, NULL
)) {
2215 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2219 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2221 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2223 spin_lock(&files
->file_lock
);
2225 unsigned long set
, i
;
2230 fdt
= files_fdtable(files
);
2231 if (i
>= fdt
->max_fds
)
2233 set
= fdt
->open_fds
->fds_bits
[j
];
2236 spin_unlock(&files
->file_lock
);
2237 for ( ; set
; i
++, set
>>= 1) {
2242 if (file_has_perm(cred
,
2244 file_to_av(file
))) {
2246 fd
= get_unused_fd();
2256 devnull
= dentry_open(
2258 mntget(selinuxfs_mount
),
2260 if (IS_ERR(devnull
)) {
2267 fd_install(fd
, devnull
);
2272 spin_lock(&files
->file_lock
);
2275 spin_unlock(&files
->file_lock
);
2279 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2281 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2283 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2284 struct rlimit
*rlim
, *initrlim
;
2287 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2288 if (new_tsec
->sid
== new_tsec
->osid
)
2291 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2292 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm
->cred
, current
->files
);
2294 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2295 current
->pdeath_signal
= 0;
2297 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2298 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2299 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2301 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2302 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2303 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2304 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2305 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2307 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->osid
, new_tsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2308 PROCESS__RLIMITINH
, NULL
);
2310 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++) {
2311 rlim
= current
->signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2312 initrlim
= init_task
.signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2313 rlim
->rlim_cur
= min(rlim
->rlim_max
, initrlim
->rlim_cur
);
2315 update_rlimit_cpu(current
->signal
->rlim
[RLIMIT_CPU
].rlim_cur
);
2320 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2323 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2325 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2326 struct itimerval itimer
;
2336 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2337 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2338 * flush and unblock signals.
2340 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2341 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2343 rc
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SIGINH
, NULL
);
2345 memset(&itimer
, 0, sizeof itimer
);
2346 for (i
= 0; i
< 3; i
++)
2347 do_setitimer(i
, &itimer
, NULL
);
2348 spin_lock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2349 if (!(current
->signal
->flags
& SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT
)) {
2350 __flush_signals(current
);
2351 flush_signal_handlers(current
, 1);
2352 sigemptyset(¤t
->blocked
);
2354 spin_unlock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2357 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2358 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2359 read_lock(&tasklist_lock
);
2360 __wake_up_parent(current
, current
->real_parent
);
2361 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock
);
2364 /* superblock security operations */
2366 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2368 return superblock_alloc_security(sb
);
2371 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2373 superblock_free_security(sb
);
2376 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix
, int plen
, char *option
, int olen
)
2381 return !memcmp(prefix
, option
, plen
);
2384 static inline int selinux_option(char *option
, int len
)
2386 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2387 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2388 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2389 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2390 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR
, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR
)-1, option
, len
));
2393 static inline void take_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
, int len
)
2400 memcpy(*to
, from
, len
);
2404 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
,
2407 int current_size
= 0;
2415 while (current_size
< len
) {
2425 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig
, char *copy
)
2427 int fnosec
, fsec
, rc
= 0;
2428 char *in_save
, *in_curr
, *in_end
;
2429 char *sec_curr
, *nosec_save
, *nosec
;
2435 nosec
= (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
2443 in_save
= in_end
= orig
;
2447 open_quote
= !open_quote
;
2448 if ((*in_end
== ',' && open_quote
== 0) ||
2450 int len
= in_end
- in_curr
;
2452 if (selinux_option(in_curr
, len
))
2453 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr
, in_curr
, &fsec
, len
);
2455 take_option(&nosec
, in_curr
, &fnosec
, len
);
2457 in_curr
= in_end
+ 1;
2459 } while (*in_end
++);
2461 strcpy(in_save
, nosec_save
);
2462 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save
);
2467 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block
*sb
, int flags
, void *data
)
2469 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2470 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2473 rc
= superblock_doinit(sb
, data
);
2477 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2478 if (flags
& MS_KERNMOUNT
)
2481 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2482 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= sb
->s_root
;
2483 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT
, &ad
);
2486 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2488 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2489 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2491 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2492 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
->d_sb
->s_root
;
2493 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, dentry
->d_sb
, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR
, &ad
);
2496 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name
,
2499 unsigned long flags
,
2502 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2504 if (flags
& MS_REMOUNT
)
2505 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, path
->mnt
->mnt_sb
,
2506 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT
, NULL
);
2508 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, path
->mnt
, path
->dentry
,
2512 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, int flags
)
2514 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2516 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, mnt
->mnt_sb
,
2517 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT
, NULL
);
2520 /* inode security operations */
2522 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2524 return inode_alloc_security(inode
);
2527 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2529 inode_free_security(inode
);
2532 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode
*inode
, struct inode
*dir
,
2533 char **name
, void **value
,
2536 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2537 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
2538 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
2539 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2540 u32 sid
, newsid
, clen
;
2542 char *namep
= NULL
, *context
;
2544 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
2545 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2548 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
2550 if (!newsid
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
)) {
2551 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, dsec
->sid
,
2552 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
),
2555 printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: "
2556 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2559 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
2564 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2565 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
2566 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2567 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
2569 isec
->initialized
= 1;
2572 if (!ss_initialized
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
))
2576 namep
= kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
, GFP_NOFS
);
2583 rc
= security_sid_to_context_force(newsid
, &context
, &clen
);
2595 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, int mask
)
2597 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_FILE
);
2600 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry
*old_dentry
, struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2602 return may_link(dir
, old_dentry
, MAY_LINK
);
2605 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2607 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_UNLINK
);
2610 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2612 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
);
2615 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, int mask
)
2617 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_DIR
);
2620 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2622 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_RMDIR
);
2625 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, int mode
, dev_t dev
)
2627 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
));
2630 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode
*old_inode
, struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
2631 struct inode
*new_inode
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2633 return may_rename(old_inode
, old_dentry
, new_inode
, new_dentry
);
2636 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2638 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2640 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2643 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct nameidata
*nameidata
)
2645 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2647 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2650 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
, int mask
)
2652 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2655 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2659 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
,
2660 file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
), NULL
);
2663 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct iattr
*iattr
)
2665 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2666 unsigned int ia_valid
= iattr
->ia_valid
;
2668 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2669 if (ia_valid
& ATTR_FORCE
) {
2670 ia_valid
&= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID
| ATTR_KILL_SGID
| ATTR_MODE
|
2676 if (ia_valid
& (ATTR_MODE
| ATTR_UID
| ATTR_GID
|
2677 ATTR_ATIME_SET
| ATTR_MTIME_SET
| ATTR_TIMES_SET
))
2678 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2680 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__WRITE
);
2683 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2685 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2687 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, mnt
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2690 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2692 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2694 if (!strncmp(name
, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
,
2695 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
- 1)) {
2696 if (!strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_CAPS
)) {
2697 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP
))
2699 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
2700 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2701 Restrict to administrator. */
2706 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2707 ordinary setattr permission. */
2708 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2711 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
2712 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
2714 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2715 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2716 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2717 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2718 u32 newsid
, sid
= current_sid();
2721 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
2722 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
2724 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2725 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
))
2728 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode
))
2731 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2732 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
;
2734 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
,
2735 FILE__RELABELFROM
, &ad
);
2739 rc
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2740 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
2741 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
))
2743 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2748 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, isec
->sclass
,
2749 FILE__RELABELTO
, &ad
);
2753 rc
= security_validate_transition(isec
->sid
, newsid
, sid
,
2758 return avc_has_perm(newsid
,
2760 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
2761 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
,
2765 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
2766 const void *value
, size_t size
,
2769 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2770 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2774 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
)) {
2775 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2779 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2781 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2782 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2783 inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
, -rc
);
2791 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2793 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2795 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2798 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2800 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2802 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2805 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2807 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
2808 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
2810 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2811 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2816 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2818 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2820 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
, void **buffer
, bool alloc
)
2824 char *context
= NULL
;
2825 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2827 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
2831 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2832 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2833 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2834 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2835 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2836 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2837 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2839 error
= selinux_capable(current
, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN
,
2840 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
2842 error
= security_sid_to_context_force(isec
->sid
, &context
,
2845 error
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &size
);
2858 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
,
2859 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
2861 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2865 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
2868 if (!value
|| !size
)
2871 rc
= security_context_to_sid((void *)value
, size
, &newsid
);
2876 isec
->initialized
= 1;
2880 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, char *buffer
, size_t buffer_size
)
2882 const int len
= sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
);
2883 if (buffer
&& len
<= buffer_size
)
2884 memcpy(buffer
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, len
);
2888 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode
*inode
, u32
*secid
)
2890 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2894 /* file security operations */
2896 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
2898 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2899 struct inode
*inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
2901 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2902 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && (mask
& MAY_WRITE
))
2905 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
,
2906 file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
));
2909 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
2911 struct inode
*inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
2912 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
2913 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2914 u32 sid
= current_sid();
2917 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2920 if (sid
== fsec
->sid
&& fsec
->isid
== isec
->sid
&&
2921 fsec
->pseqno
== avc_policy_seqno())
2922 /* No change since dentry_open check. */
2925 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file
, mask
);
2928 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
2930 return file_alloc_security(file
);
2933 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
2935 file_free_security(file
);
2938 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
2941 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2944 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd
) & _IOC_WRITE
)
2946 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd
) & _IOC_READ
)
2951 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, av
);
2954 static int default_noexec
;
2956 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file
*file
, unsigned long prot
, int shared
)
2958 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2961 if (default_noexec
&&
2962 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && (!file
|| (!shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
)))) {
2964 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2965 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2966 * This has an additional check.
2968 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECMEM
);
2974 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2975 u32 av
= FILE__READ
;
2977 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2978 if (shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
))
2981 if (prot
& PROT_EXEC
)
2982 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
2984 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, av
);
2991 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file
*file
, unsigned long reqprot
,
2992 unsigned long prot
, unsigned long flags
,
2993 unsigned long addr
, unsigned long addr_only
)
2996 u32 sid
= current_sid();
2999 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3000 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3001 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3002 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3004 if (addr
< CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
) {
3005 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT
,
3006 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO
, NULL
);
3011 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3012 rc
= cap_file_mmap(file
, reqprot
, prot
, flags
, addr
, addr_only
);
3013 if (rc
|| addr_only
)
3016 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3019 return file_map_prot_check(file
, prot
,
3020 (flags
& MAP_TYPE
) == MAP_SHARED
);
3023 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct
*vma
,
3024 unsigned long reqprot
,
3027 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3029 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3032 if (default_noexec
&&
3033 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && !(vma
->vm_flags
& VM_EXEC
)) {
3035 if (vma
->vm_start
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_brk
&&
3036 vma
->vm_end
<= vma
->vm_mm
->brk
) {
3037 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECHEAP
);
3038 } else if (!vma
->vm_file
&&
3039 vma
->vm_start
<= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
&&
3040 vma
->vm_end
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
) {
3041 rc
= current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__EXECSTACK
);
3042 } else if (vma
->vm_file
&& vma
->anon_vma
) {
3044 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3045 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3046 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3047 * modified content. This typically should only
3048 * occur for text relocations.
3050 rc
= file_has_perm(cred
, vma
->vm_file
, FILE__EXECMOD
);
3056 return file_map_prot_check(vma
->vm_file
, prot
, vma
->vm_flags
&VM_SHARED
);
3059 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
)
3061 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3063 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3066 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3069 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3074 if (!file
->f_path
.dentry
|| !file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
) {
3079 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && !(arg
& O_APPEND
)) {
3080 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__WRITE
);
3089 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3090 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3095 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3100 if (!file
->f_path
.dentry
|| !file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
) {
3104 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3111 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file
*file
)
3113 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3115 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3116 fsec
->fown_sid
= current_sid();
3121 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
3122 struct fown_struct
*fown
, int signum
)
3125 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
3127 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3129 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3130 file
= container_of(fown
, struct file
, f_owner
);
3132 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3135 perm
= signal_to_av(SIGIO
); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3137 perm
= signal_to_av(signum
);
3139 return avc_has_perm(fsec
->fown_sid
, sid
,
3140 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3143 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file
*file
)
3145 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3147 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, file_to_av(file
));
3150 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file
*file
, const struct cred
*cred
)
3152 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3153 struct inode
*inode
;
3154 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3156 inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
3157 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3158 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3160 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3161 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3162 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3163 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3164 * struct as its SID.
3166 fsec
->isid
= isec
->sid
;
3167 fsec
->pseqno
= avc_policy_seqno();
3169 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3170 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3171 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3172 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3173 * new inode label or new policy.
3174 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3176 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, open_file_to_av(file
), NULL
);
3179 /* task security operations */
3181 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags
)
3183 return current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__FORK
);
3187 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3189 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred
*cred
, gfp_t gfp
)
3191 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3193 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3197 cred
->security
= tsec
;
3202 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3204 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred
*cred
)
3206 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
3208 BUG_ON((unsigned long) cred
->security
< PAGE_SIZE
);
3209 cred
->security
= (void *) 0x7UL
;
3214 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3216 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
3219 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
3220 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3222 old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3224 tsec
= kmemdup(old_tsec
, sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3228 new->security
= tsec
;
3233 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3235 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
3237 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3238 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3244 * set the security data for a kernel service
3245 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3247 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred
*new, u32 secid
)
3249 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3250 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3253 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, secid
,
3254 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3255 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE
,
3259 tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
3260 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
3261 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
3267 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3268 * objective context of the specified inode
3270 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred
*new, struct inode
*inode
)
3272 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3273 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3274 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3277 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
3278 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3279 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS
,
3283 tsec
->create_sid
= isec
->sid
;
3287 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name
)
3290 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3292 sid
= task_sid(current
);
3294 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, KMOD
);
3295 ad
.u
.kmod_name
= kmod_name
;
3297 return avc_has_perm(sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
, SECCLASS_SYSTEM
,
3298 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST
, &ad
);
3301 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct
*p
, pid_t pgid
)
3303 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETPGID
);
3306 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3308 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETPGID
);
3311 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3313 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSESSION
);
3316 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct
*p
, u32
*secid
)
3318 *secid
= task_sid(p
);
3321 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct
*p
, int nice
)
3325 rc
= cap_task_setnice(p
, nice
);
3329 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3332 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct
*p
, int ioprio
)
3336 rc
= cap_task_setioprio(p
, ioprio
);
3340 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3343 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct
*p
)
3345 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3348 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource
, struct rlimit
*new_rlim
)
3350 struct rlimit
*old_rlim
= current
->signal
->rlim
+ resource
;
3352 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3353 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3354 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3355 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3356 if (old_rlim
->rlim_max
!= new_rlim
->rlim_max
)
3357 return current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT
);
3362 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
, int policy
, struct sched_param
*lp
)
3366 rc
= cap_task_setscheduler(p
, policy
, lp
);
3370 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3373 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
3375 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3378 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct
*p
)
3380 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3383 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct
*p
, struct siginfo
*info
,
3390 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNULL
; /* null signal; existence test */
3392 perm
= signal_to_av(sig
);
3394 rc
= avc_has_perm(secid
, task_sid(p
),
3395 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3397 rc
= current_has_perm(p
, perm
);
3401 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct
*p
)
3403 return task_has_perm(p
, current
, PROCESS__SIGCHLD
);
3406 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct
*p
,
3407 struct inode
*inode
)
3409 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3410 u32 sid
= task_sid(p
);
3413 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3416 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3417 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3418 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3420 int offset
, ihlen
, ret
= -EINVAL
;
3421 struct iphdr _iph
, *ih
;
3423 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3424 ih
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_iph
), &_iph
);
3428 ihlen
= ih
->ihl
* 4;
3429 if (ihlen
< sizeof(_iph
))
3432 ad
->u
.net
.v4info
.saddr
= ih
->saddr
;
3433 ad
->u
.net
.v4info
.daddr
= ih
->daddr
;
3437 *proto
= ih
->protocol
;
3439 switch (ih
->protocol
) {
3441 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3443 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3447 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3451 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= th
->source
;
3452 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= th
->dest
;
3457 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3459 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3463 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3467 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= uh
->source
;
3468 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= uh
->dest
;
3472 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3473 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3475 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3479 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3483 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3484 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3495 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3497 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3498 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3499 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3502 int ret
= -EINVAL
, offset
;
3503 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h
, *ip6
;
3505 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3506 ip6
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_ipv6h
), &_ipv6h
);
3510 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad
->u
.net
.v6info
.saddr
, &ip6
->saddr
);
3511 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad
->u
.net
.v6info
.daddr
, &ip6
->daddr
);
3514 nexthdr
= ip6
->nexthdr
;
3515 offset
+= sizeof(_ipv6h
);
3516 offset
= ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb
, offset
, &nexthdr
);
3525 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3527 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3531 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= th
->source
;
3532 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= th
->dest
;
3537 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3539 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3543 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= uh
->source
;
3544 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= uh
->dest
;
3548 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3549 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3551 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3555 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3556 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3560 /* includes fragments */
3570 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff
*skb
, struct common_audit_data
*ad
,
3571 char **_addrp
, int src
, u8
*proto
)
3576 switch (ad
->u
.net
.family
) {
3578 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3581 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
.v4info
.saddr
:
3582 &ad
->u
.net
.v4info
.daddr
);
3585 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3587 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3590 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
.v6info
.saddr
:
3591 &ad
->u
.net
.v6info
.daddr
);
3601 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3602 " unable to parse packet\n");
3612 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3614 * @family: protocol family
3615 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3618 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3619 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3620 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3621 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3622 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3626 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff
*skb
, u16 family
, u32
*sid
)
3633 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb
, &xfrm_sid
);
3634 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb
, family
, &nlbl_type
, &nlbl_sid
);
3636 err
= security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid
, nlbl_type
, xfrm_sid
, sid
);
3637 if (unlikely(err
)) {
3639 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3640 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3647 /* socket security operations */
3649 static u32
socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
)
3651 return tsec
->sockcreate_sid
? : tsec
->sid
;
3654 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct
*task
, struct sock
*sk
, u32 perms
)
3656 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
3657 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3658 u32 tsid
= task_sid(task
);
3660 if (sksec
->sid
== SECINITSID_KERNEL
)
3663 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3666 return avc_has_perm(tsid
, sksec
->sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
3669 static int selinux_socket_create(int family
, int type
,
3670 int protocol
, int kern
)
3672 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3673 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
3680 newsid
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
);
3681 secclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
3682 return avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, newsid
, secclass
, SOCKET__CREATE
, NULL
);
3685 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket
*sock
, int family
,
3686 int type
, int protocol
, int kern
)
3688 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3689 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
3690 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3691 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
3695 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
3697 isec
->sid
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
);
3699 isec
->sclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
3700 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3703 sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
3704 sksec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
3705 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
3706 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock
->sk
, family
);
3712 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3713 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3714 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3716 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
3718 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
3722 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, SOCKET__BIND
);
3727 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3728 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3729 * check the first address now.
3731 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
3732 if (family
== PF_INET
|| family
== PF_INET6
) {
3734 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
3735 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3736 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
3737 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
3738 unsigned short snum
;
3741 if (family
== PF_INET
) {
3742 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
3743 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
3744 addrp
= (char *)&addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
3746 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
3747 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
3748 addrp
= (char *)&addr6
->sin6_addr
.s6_addr
;
3754 inet_get_local_port_range(&low
, &high
);
3756 if (snum
< max(PROT_SOCK
, low
) || snum
> high
) {
3757 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
,
3761 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3762 ad
.u
.net
.sport
= htons(snum
);
3763 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
3764 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
,
3766 SOCKET__NAME_BIND
, &ad
);
3772 switch (sksec
->sclass
) {
3773 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
:
3774 node_perm
= TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3777 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
:
3778 node_perm
= UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3781 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
:
3782 node_perm
= DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3786 node_perm
= RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3790 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &sid
);
3794 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3795 ad
.u
.net
.sport
= htons(snum
);
3796 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
3798 if (family
== PF_INET
)
3799 ad
.u
.net
.v4info
.saddr
= addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
3801 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad
.u
.net
.v6info
.saddr
, &addr6
->sin6_addr
);
3803 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
,
3804 sksec
->sclass
, node_perm
, &ad
);
3812 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
3814 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
3815 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
3818 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, SOCKET__CONNECT
);
3823 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3825 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
||
3826 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
) {
3827 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3828 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
3829 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
3830 unsigned short snum
;
3833 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
) {
3834 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
3835 if (addrlen
< sizeof(struct sockaddr_in
))
3837 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
3839 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
3840 if (addrlen
< SIN6_LEN_RFC2133
)
3842 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
3845 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
, snum
, &sid
);
3849 perm
= (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
) ?
3850 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
: DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
;
3852 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3853 ad
.u
.net
.dport
= htons(snum
);
3854 ad
.u
.net
.family
= sk
->sk_family
;
3855 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perm
, &ad
);
3860 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk
, address
);
3866 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket
*sock
, int backlog
)
3868 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__LISTEN
);
3871 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket
*sock
, struct socket
*newsock
)
3874 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3875 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
;
3877 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__ACCEPT
);
3881 newisec
= SOCK_INODE(newsock
)->i_security
;
3883 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3884 newisec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
3885 newisec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
3886 newisec
->initialized
= 1;
3891 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
3894 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__WRITE
);
3897 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
3898 int size
, int flags
)
3900 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__READ
);
3903 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket
*sock
)
3905 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
3908 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket
*sock
)
3910 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
3913 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
, int optname
)
3917 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SETOPT
);
3921 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock
, level
, optname
);
3924 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
,
3927 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETOPT
);
3930 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket
*sock
, int how
)
3932 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN
);
3935 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket
*sock
,
3936 struct socket
*other
,
3939 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_sock
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
3940 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_other
= other
->sk
->sk_security
;
3941 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_new
= newsk
->sk_security
;
3942 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3945 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3946 ad
.u
.net
.sk
= other
->sk
;
3948 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec_sock
->sid
, sksec_other
->sid
,
3949 sksec_other
->sclass
,
3950 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO
, &ad
);
3954 /* server child socket */
3955 sksec_new
->peer_sid
= sksec_sock
->sid
;
3956 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other
->sid
, sksec_sock
->sid
,
3961 /* connecting socket */
3962 sksec_sock
->peer_sid
= sksec_new
->sid
;
3967 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket
*sock
,
3968 struct socket
*other
)
3970 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
3971 struct sk_security_struct
*osec
= other
->sk
->sk_security
;
3972 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3974 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3975 ad
.u
.net
.sk
= other
->sk
;
3977 return avc_has_perm(ssec
->sid
, osec
->sid
, osec
->sclass
, SOCKET__SENDTO
,
3981 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex
, char *addrp
, u16 family
,
3983 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
3989 err
= sel_netif_sid(ifindex
, &if_sid
);
3992 err
= avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
3993 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__INGRESS
, ad
);
3997 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
);
4000 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
4001 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__RECVFROM
, ad
);
4004 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4008 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4010 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4011 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4014 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4015 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4016 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4017 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4021 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4022 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4028 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer
) {
4029 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
);
4032 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, peer_sid
,
4033 SECCLASS_PEER
, PEER__RECV
, &ad
);
4035 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4037 err
= selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
, skb
, family
, &ad
);
4040 err
= selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
);
4046 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4049 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4050 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4051 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4052 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4057 if (family
!= PF_INET
&& family
!= PF_INET6
)
4060 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4061 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4064 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4065 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4066 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4067 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4068 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4069 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk
, skb
, family
);
4071 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4072 peerlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4073 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4076 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4077 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4078 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4079 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4083 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4086 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
);
4089 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb
->skb_iif
, addrp
, family
,
4092 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4095 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, peer_sid
, SECCLASS_PEER
,
4098 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4101 if (secmark_active
) {
4102 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4111 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket
*sock
, char __user
*optval
,
4112 int __user
*optlen
, unsigned len
)
4117 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4118 u32 peer_sid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4120 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
||
4121 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
)
4122 peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
4123 if (peer_sid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4124 return -ENOPROTOOPT
;
4126 err
= security_sid_to_context(peer_sid
, &scontext
, &scontext_len
);
4130 if (scontext_len
> len
) {
4135 if (copy_to_user(optval
, scontext
, scontext_len
))
4139 if (put_user(scontext_len
, optlen
))
4145 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket
*sock
, struct sk_buff
*skb
, u32
*secid
)
4147 u32 peer_secid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4150 if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4152 else if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IPV6
))
4155 family
= sock
->sk
->sk_family
;
4159 if (sock
&& family
== PF_UNIX
)
4160 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock
), &peer_secid
);
4162 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_secid
);
4165 *secid
= peer_secid
;
4166 if (peer_secid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4171 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock
*sk
, int family
, gfp_t priority
)
4173 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4175 sksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec
), priority
);
4179 sksec
->peer_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4180 sksec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4181 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec
);
4182 sk
->sk_security
= sksec
;
4187 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock
*sk
)
4189 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4191 sk
->sk_security
= NULL
;
4192 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec
);
4196 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock
*sk
, struct sock
*newsk
)
4198 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4199 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4201 newsksec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4202 newsksec
->peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
4203 newsksec
->sclass
= sksec
->sclass
;
4205 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec
);
4208 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock
*sk
, u32
*secid
)
4211 *secid
= SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET
;
4213 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4215 *secid
= sksec
->sid
;
4219 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock
*sk
, struct socket
*parent
)
4221 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= SOCK_INODE(parent
)->i_security
;
4222 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4224 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
|| sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET6
||
4225 sk
->sk_family
== PF_UNIX
)
4226 isec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4227 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4230 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4231 struct request_sock
*req
)
4233 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4235 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4239 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4240 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4243 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peersid
);
4246 if (peersid
== SECSID_NULL
) {
4247 req
->secid
= sksec
->sid
;
4248 req
->peer_secid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4250 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sksec
->sid
, peersid
, &newsid
);
4253 req
->secid
= newsid
;
4254 req
->peer_secid
= peersid
;
4257 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req
, family
);
4260 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock
*newsk
,
4261 const struct request_sock
*req
)
4263 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4265 newsksec
->sid
= req
->secid
;
4266 newsksec
->peer_sid
= req
->peer_secid
;
4267 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4268 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4269 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4270 time it will have been created and available. */
4272 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4273 * thread with access to newsksec */
4274 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk
, req
->rsk_ops
->family
);
4277 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4279 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4280 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4282 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4283 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4286 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &sksec
->peer_sid
);
4289 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock
*req
,
4292 fl
->secid
= req
->secid
;
4295 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4297 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4299 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4300 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4301 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4302 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4303 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4304 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4306 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE
,
4310 static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock
*sk
)
4312 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4314 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4315 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4316 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4317 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4318 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4319 * protocols were being used */
4321 /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
4322 * the sockcreate SID here */
4324 sksec
->sid
= current_sid();
4325 sksec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
;
4328 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock
*sk
)
4330 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4331 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4334 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sksec
->sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4335 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
4338 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4339 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
4348 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4352 struct nlmsghdr
*nlh
;
4353 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4355 if (skb
->len
< NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4359 nlh
= nlmsg_hdr(skb
);
4361 err
= selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec
->sclass
, nlh
->nlmsg_type
, &perm
);
4363 if (err
== -EINVAL
) {
4364 audit_log(current
->audit_context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
,
4365 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4366 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4367 nlh
->nlmsg_type
, sksec
->sclass
);
4368 if (!selinux_enforcing
|| security_get_allow_unknown())
4378 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, perm
);
4383 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4385 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int ifindex
,
4391 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4396 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4399 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4400 netlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled();
4401 peerlbl_active
= netlbl_active
|| selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4402 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4405 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
) != 0)
4408 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4409 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= ifindex
;
4410 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4411 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
) != 0)
4414 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4415 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex
, addrp
, family
,
4418 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 1);
4424 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4425 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__FORWARD_IN
, &ad
))
4429 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4430 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4431 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4433 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, peer_sid
) != 0)
4439 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum
,
4440 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4441 const struct net_device
*in
,
4442 const struct net_device
*out
,
4443 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4445 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, in
->ifindex
, PF_INET
);
4448 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4449 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum
,
4450 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4451 const struct net_device
*in
,
4452 const struct net_device
*out
,
4453 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4455 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, in
->ifindex
, PF_INET6
);
4459 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4464 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4467 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4468 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4469 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4471 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= skb
->sk
->sk_security
;
4474 sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4475 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, sid
) != 0)
4481 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum
,
4482 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4483 const struct net_device
*in
,
4484 const struct net_device
*out
,
4485 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4487 return selinux_ip_output(skb
, PF_INET
);
4490 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4494 struct sock
*sk
= skb
->sk
;
4495 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4496 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4502 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4504 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4505 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= ifindex
;
4506 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4507 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, &proto
))
4510 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4511 if (avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4512 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__SEND
, &ad
))
4515 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4516 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
, proto
))
4522 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int ifindex
,
4528 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4533 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4534 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4535 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4536 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4537 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4538 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb
, ifindex
, family
);
4540 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4541 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4542 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4543 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4544 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4545 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4546 if (skb_dst(skb
) != NULL
&& skb_dst(skb
)->xfrm
!= NULL
)
4549 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4550 peerlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4551 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4554 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4555 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4556 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4557 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4562 if (IPCB(skb
)->flags
& IPSKB_FORWARDED
)
4563 secmark_perm
= PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
;
4565 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4568 if (IP6CB(skb
)->flags
& IP6SKB_FORWARDED
)
4569 secmark_perm
= PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
;
4571 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4576 if (secmark_perm
== PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
) {
4577 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
))
4580 peer_sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4582 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4583 peer_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4584 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4587 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4588 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= ifindex
;
4589 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4590 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, NULL
))
4594 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4595 SECCLASS_PACKET
, secmark_perm
, &ad
))
4598 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4602 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex
, &if_sid
))
4604 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
4605 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__EGRESS
, &ad
))
4608 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
))
4610 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
4611 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__SENDTO
, &ad
))
4618 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum
,
4619 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4620 const struct net_device
*in
,
4621 const struct net_device
*out
,
4622 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4624 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, out
->ifindex
, PF_INET
);
4627 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4628 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum
,
4629 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4630 const struct net_device
*in
,
4631 const struct net_device
*out
,
4632 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4634 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, out
->ifindex
, PF_INET6
);
4638 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4640 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4644 err
= cap_netlink_send(sk
, skb
);
4648 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk
, skb
);
4651 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int capability
)
4654 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4656 err
= cap_netlink_recv(skb
, capability
);
4660 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, CAP
);
4661 ad
.u
.cap
= capability
;
4663 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb
).sid
, NETLINK_CB(skb
).sid
,
4664 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY
, CAP_TO_MASK(capability
), &ad
);
4667 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct
*task
,
4668 struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
,
4671 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4674 isec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
4678 sid
= task_sid(task
);
4679 isec
->sclass
= sclass
;
4681 perm
->security
= isec
;
4686 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
)
4688 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= perm
->security
;
4689 perm
->security
= NULL
;
4693 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4695 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
4697 msec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
4701 msec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4702 msg
->security
= msec
;
4707 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4709 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
= msg
->security
;
4711 msg
->security
= NULL
;
4715 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipc_perms
,
4718 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4719 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4720 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4722 isec
= ipc_perms
->security
;
4724 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4725 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= ipc_perms
->key
;
4727 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
4730 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4732 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg
);
4735 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4737 msg_msg_free_security(msg
);
4740 /* message queue security operations */
4741 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
4743 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4744 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4745 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4748 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &msq
->q_perm
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
);
4752 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4754 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4755 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4757 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4760 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
4766 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
4768 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
4771 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int msqflg
)
4773 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4774 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4775 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4777 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4779 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4780 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4782 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4783 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
4786 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int cmd
)
4794 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4795 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
4798 perms
= MSGQ__GETATTR
| MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
;
4801 perms
= MSGQ__SETATTR
;
4804 perms
= MSGQ__DESTROY
;
4810 err
= ipc_has_perm(&msq
->q_perm
, perms
);
4814 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
, int msqflg
)
4816 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4817 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
4818 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4819 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4822 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4823 msec
= msg
->security
;
4826 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4828 if (msec
->sid
== SECINITSID_UNLABELED
) {
4830 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4831 * message queue this message will be stored in
4833 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
4839 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4840 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4842 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4843 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4846 /* Can this process send the message */
4847 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
4850 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4851 rc
= avc_has_perm(msec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4852 MSGQ__ENQUEUE
, &ad
);
4857 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
,
4858 struct task_struct
*target
,
4859 long type
, int mode
)
4861 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4862 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
4863 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4864 u32 sid
= task_sid(target
);
4867 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4868 msec
= msg
->security
;
4870 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4871 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4873 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
4874 SECCLASS_MSGQ
, MSGQ__READ
, &ad
);
4876 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
,
4877 SECCLASS_MSG
, MSG__RECEIVE
, &ad
);
4881 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4882 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
4884 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4885 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4886 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4889 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &shp
->shm_perm
, SECCLASS_SHM
);
4893 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
4895 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4896 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
4898 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
4901 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
4907 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
4909 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
4912 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int shmflg
)
4914 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4915 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4916 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4918 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
4920 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4921 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
4923 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
4924 SHM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
4927 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4928 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int cmd
)
4936 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4937 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
4940 perms
= SHM__GETATTR
| SHM__ASSOCIATE
;
4943 perms
= SHM__SETATTR
;
4950 perms
= SHM__DESTROY
;
4956 err
= ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
4960 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
,
4961 char __user
*shmaddr
, int shmflg
)
4965 if (shmflg
& SHM_RDONLY
)
4968 perms
= SHM__READ
| SHM__WRITE
;
4970 return ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
4973 /* Semaphore security operations */
4974 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
4976 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4977 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4978 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4981 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &sma
->sem_perm
, SECCLASS_SEM
);
4985 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
4987 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4988 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
4990 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
4993 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
4999 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5001 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5004 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array
*sma
, int semflg
)
5006 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5007 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5008 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5010 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5012 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
5013 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5015 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5016 SEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5019 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5020 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array
*sma
, int cmd
)
5028 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5029 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5033 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
;
5044 perms
= SEM__DESTROY
;
5047 perms
= SEM__SETATTR
;
5051 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
| SEM__ASSOCIATE
;
5057 err
= ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5061 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array
*sma
,
5062 struct sembuf
*sops
, unsigned nsops
, int alter
)
5067 perms
= SEM__READ
| SEM__WRITE
;
5071 return ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5074 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, short flag
)
5080 av
|= IPC__UNIX_READ
;
5082 av
|= IPC__UNIX_WRITE
;
5087 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp
, av
);
5090 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, u32
*secid
)
5092 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= ipcp
->security
;
5096 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct inode
*inode
)
5099 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, dentry
);
5102 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5103 char *name
, char **value
)
5105 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
5111 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETATTR
);
5117 __tsec
= __task_cred(p
)->security
;
5119 if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5121 else if (!strcmp(name
, "prev"))
5123 else if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5124 sid
= __tsec
->exec_sid
;
5125 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5126 sid
= __tsec
->create_sid
;
5127 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5128 sid
= __tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5129 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5130 sid
= __tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
5138 error
= security_sid_to_context(sid
, value
, &len
);
5148 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5149 char *name
, void *value
, size_t size
)
5151 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5152 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
5159 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5160 security attributes. */
5165 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5166 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5167 * above restriction is ever removed.
5169 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5170 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETEXEC
);
5171 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5172 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE
);
5173 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5174 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE
);
5175 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5176 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE
);
5177 else if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5178 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETCURRENT
);
5184 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5185 if (size
&& str
[1] && str
[1] != '\n') {
5186 if (str
[size
-1] == '\n') {
5190 error
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &sid
);
5191 if (error
== -EINVAL
&& !strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5192 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
))
5194 error
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
,
5201 new = prepare_creds();
5205 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5206 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5207 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5208 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5209 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5210 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5211 tsec
= new->security
;
5212 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec")) {
5213 tsec
->exec_sid
= sid
;
5214 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5215 tsec
->create_sid
= sid
;
5216 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate")) {
5217 error
= may_create_key(sid
, p
);
5220 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= sid
;
5221 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate")) {
5222 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= sid
;
5223 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "current")) {
5228 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5230 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5231 error
= security_bounded_transition(tsec
->sid
, sid
);
5236 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5237 error
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5238 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION
, NULL
);
5242 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5243 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5246 tracer
= tracehook_tracer_task(p
);
5248 ptsid
= task_sid(tracer
);
5252 error
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5253 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
5272 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid
, char **secdata
, u32
*seclen
)
5274 return security_sid_to_context(secid
, secdata
, seclen
);
5277 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata
, u32 seclen
, u32
*secid
)
5279 return security_context_to_sid(secdata
, seclen
, secid
);
5282 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata
, u32 seclen
)
5288 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5290 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5292 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5296 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5298 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry
*dentry
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5300 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5303 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void **ctx
, u32
*ctxlen
)
5306 len
= selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
,
5315 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key
*k
, const struct cred
*cred
,
5316 unsigned long flags
)
5318 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5319 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5321 ksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5325 tsec
= cred
->security
;
5326 if (tsec
->keycreate_sid
)
5327 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5329 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->sid
;
5335 static void selinux_key_free(struct key
*k
)
5337 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= k
->security
;
5343 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref
,
5344 const struct cred
*cred
,
5348 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5351 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5352 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5353 appear to be created. */
5357 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
5359 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
5360 ksec
= key
->security
;
5362 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksec
->sid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, perm
, NULL
);
5365 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key
*key
, char **_buffer
)
5367 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= key
->security
;
5368 char *context
= NULL
;
5372 rc
= security_sid_to_context(ksec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
5381 static struct security_operations selinux_ops
= {
5384 .ptrace_access_check
= selinux_ptrace_access_check
,
5385 .ptrace_traceme
= selinux_ptrace_traceme
,
5386 .capget
= selinux_capget
,
5387 .capset
= selinux_capset
,
5388 .sysctl
= selinux_sysctl
,
5389 .capable
= selinux_capable
,
5390 .quotactl
= selinux_quotactl
,
5391 .quota_on
= selinux_quota_on
,
5392 .syslog
= selinux_syslog
,
5393 .vm_enough_memory
= selinux_vm_enough_memory
,
5395 .netlink_send
= selinux_netlink_send
,
5396 .netlink_recv
= selinux_netlink_recv
,
5398 .bprm_set_creds
= selinux_bprm_set_creds
,
5399 .bprm_committing_creds
= selinux_bprm_committing_creds
,
5400 .bprm_committed_creds
= selinux_bprm_committed_creds
,
5401 .bprm_secureexec
= selinux_bprm_secureexec
,
5403 .sb_alloc_security
= selinux_sb_alloc_security
,
5404 .sb_free_security
= selinux_sb_free_security
,
5405 .sb_copy_data
= selinux_sb_copy_data
,
5406 .sb_kern_mount
= selinux_sb_kern_mount
,
5407 .sb_show_options
= selinux_sb_show_options
,
5408 .sb_statfs
= selinux_sb_statfs
,
5409 .sb_mount
= selinux_mount
,
5410 .sb_umount
= selinux_umount
,
5411 .sb_set_mnt_opts
= selinux_set_mnt_opts
,
5412 .sb_clone_mnt_opts
= selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts
,
5413 .sb_parse_opts_str
= selinux_parse_opts_str
,
5416 .inode_alloc_security
= selinux_inode_alloc_security
,
5417 .inode_free_security
= selinux_inode_free_security
,
5418 .inode_init_security
= selinux_inode_init_security
,
5419 .inode_create
= selinux_inode_create
,
5420 .inode_link
= selinux_inode_link
,
5421 .inode_unlink
= selinux_inode_unlink
,
5422 .inode_symlink
= selinux_inode_symlink
,
5423 .inode_mkdir
= selinux_inode_mkdir
,
5424 .inode_rmdir
= selinux_inode_rmdir
,
5425 .inode_mknod
= selinux_inode_mknod
,
5426 .inode_rename
= selinux_inode_rename
,
5427 .inode_readlink
= selinux_inode_readlink
,
5428 .inode_follow_link
= selinux_inode_follow_link
,
5429 .inode_permission
= selinux_inode_permission
,
5430 .inode_setattr
= selinux_inode_setattr
,
5431 .inode_getattr
= selinux_inode_getattr
,
5432 .inode_setxattr
= selinux_inode_setxattr
,
5433 .inode_post_setxattr
= selinux_inode_post_setxattr
,
5434 .inode_getxattr
= selinux_inode_getxattr
,
5435 .inode_listxattr
= selinux_inode_listxattr
,
5436 .inode_removexattr
= selinux_inode_removexattr
,
5437 .inode_getsecurity
= selinux_inode_getsecurity
,
5438 .inode_setsecurity
= selinux_inode_setsecurity
,
5439 .inode_listsecurity
= selinux_inode_listsecurity
,
5440 .inode_getsecid
= selinux_inode_getsecid
,
5442 .file_permission
= selinux_file_permission
,
5443 .file_alloc_security
= selinux_file_alloc_security
,
5444 .file_free_security
= selinux_file_free_security
,
5445 .file_ioctl
= selinux_file_ioctl
,
5446 .file_mmap
= selinux_file_mmap
,
5447 .file_mprotect
= selinux_file_mprotect
,
5448 .file_lock
= selinux_file_lock
,
5449 .file_fcntl
= selinux_file_fcntl
,
5450 .file_set_fowner
= selinux_file_set_fowner
,
5451 .file_send_sigiotask
= selinux_file_send_sigiotask
,
5452 .file_receive
= selinux_file_receive
,
5454 .dentry_open
= selinux_dentry_open
,
5456 .task_create
= selinux_task_create
,
5457 .cred_alloc_blank
= selinux_cred_alloc_blank
,
5458 .cred_free
= selinux_cred_free
,
5459 .cred_prepare
= selinux_cred_prepare
,
5460 .cred_transfer
= selinux_cred_transfer
,
5461 .kernel_act_as
= selinux_kernel_act_as
,
5462 .kernel_create_files_as
= selinux_kernel_create_files_as
,
5463 .kernel_module_request
= selinux_kernel_module_request
,
5464 .task_setpgid
= selinux_task_setpgid
,
5465 .task_getpgid
= selinux_task_getpgid
,
5466 .task_getsid
= selinux_task_getsid
,
5467 .task_getsecid
= selinux_task_getsecid
,
5468 .task_setnice
= selinux_task_setnice
,
5469 .task_setioprio
= selinux_task_setioprio
,
5470 .task_getioprio
= selinux_task_getioprio
,
5471 .task_setrlimit
= selinux_task_setrlimit
,
5472 .task_setscheduler
= selinux_task_setscheduler
,
5473 .task_getscheduler
= selinux_task_getscheduler
,
5474 .task_movememory
= selinux_task_movememory
,
5475 .task_kill
= selinux_task_kill
,
5476 .task_wait
= selinux_task_wait
,
5477 .task_to_inode
= selinux_task_to_inode
,
5479 .ipc_permission
= selinux_ipc_permission
,
5480 .ipc_getsecid
= selinux_ipc_getsecid
,
5482 .msg_msg_alloc_security
= selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security
,
5483 .msg_msg_free_security
= selinux_msg_msg_free_security
,
5485 .msg_queue_alloc_security
= selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security
,
5486 .msg_queue_free_security
= selinux_msg_queue_free_security
,
5487 .msg_queue_associate
= selinux_msg_queue_associate
,
5488 .msg_queue_msgctl
= selinux_msg_queue_msgctl
,
5489 .msg_queue_msgsnd
= selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd
,
5490 .msg_queue_msgrcv
= selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv
,
5492 .shm_alloc_security
= selinux_shm_alloc_security
,
5493 .shm_free_security
= selinux_shm_free_security
,
5494 .shm_associate
= selinux_shm_associate
,
5495 .shm_shmctl
= selinux_shm_shmctl
,
5496 .shm_shmat
= selinux_shm_shmat
,
5498 .sem_alloc_security
= selinux_sem_alloc_security
,
5499 .sem_free_security
= selinux_sem_free_security
,
5500 .sem_associate
= selinux_sem_associate
,
5501 .sem_semctl
= selinux_sem_semctl
,
5502 .sem_semop
= selinux_sem_semop
,
5504 .d_instantiate
= selinux_d_instantiate
,
5506 .getprocattr
= selinux_getprocattr
,
5507 .setprocattr
= selinux_setprocattr
,
5509 .secid_to_secctx
= selinux_secid_to_secctx
,
5510 .secctx_to_secid
= selinux_secctx_to_secid
,
5511 .release_secctx
= selinux_release_secctx
,
5512 .inode_notifysecctx
= selinux_inode_notifysecctx
,
5513 .inode_setsecctx
= selinux_inode_setsecctx
,
5514 .inode_getsecctx
= selinux_inode_getsecctx
,
5516 .unix_stream_connect
= selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect
,
5517 .unix_may_send
= selinux_socket_unix_may_send
,
5519 .socket_create
= selinux_socket_create
,
5520 .socket_post_create
= selinux_socket_post_create
,
5521 .socket_bind
= selinux_socket_bind
,
5522 .socket_connect
= selinux_socket_connect
,
5523 .socket_listen
= selinux_socket_listen
,
5524 .socket_accept
= selinux_socket_accept
,
5525 .socket_sendmsg
= selinux_socket_sendmsg
,
5526 .socket_recvmsg
= selinux_socket_recvmsg
,
5527 .socket_getsockname
= selinux_socket_getsockname
,
5528 .socket_getpeername
= selinux_socket_getpeername
,
5529 .socket_getsockopt
= selinux_socket_getsockopt
,
5530 .socket_setsockopt
= selinux_socket_setsockopt
,
5531 .socket_shutdown
= selinux_socket_shutdown
,
5532 .socket_sock_rcv_skb
= selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb
,
5533 .socket_getpeersec_stream
= selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream
,
5534 .socket_getpeersec_dgram
= selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram
,
5535 .sk_alloc_security
= selinux_sk_alloc_security
,
5536 .sk_free_security
= selinux_sk_free_security
,
5537 .sk_clone_security
= selinux_sk_clone_security
,
5538 .sk_getsecid
= selinux_sk_getsecid
,
5539 .sock_graft
= selinux_sock_graft
,
5540 .inet_conn_request
= selinux_inet_conn_request
,
5541 .inet_csk_clone
= selinux_inet_csk_clone
,
5542 .inet_conn_established
= selinux_inet_conn_established
,
5543 .req_classify_flow
= selinux_req_classify_flow
,
5544 .tun_dev_create
= selinux_tun_dev_create
,
5545 .tun_dev_post_create
= selinux_tun_dev_post_create
,
5546 .tun_dev_attach
= selinux_tun_dev_attach
,
5548 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5549 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc
,
5550 .xfrm_policy_clone_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_clone
,
5551 .xfrm_policy_free_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_free
,
5552 .xfrm_policy_delete_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_delete
,
5553 .xfrm_state_alloc_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_alloc
,
5554 .xfrm_state_free_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_free
,
5555 .xfrm_state_delete_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_delete
,
5556 .xfrm_policy_lookup
= selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup
,
5557 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
= selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
,
5558 .xfrm_decode_session
= selinux_xfrm_decode_session
,
5562 .key_alloc
= selinux_key_alloc
,
5563 .key_free
= selinux_key_free
,
5564 .key_permission
= selinux_key_permission
,
5565 .key_getsecurity
= selinux_key_getsecurity
,
5569 .audit_rule_init
= selinux_audit_rule_init
,
5570 .audit_rule_known
= selinux_audit_rule_known
,
5571 .audit_rule_match
= selinux_audit_rule_match
,
5572 .audit_rule_free
= selinux_audit_rule_free
,
5576 static __init
int selinux_init(void)
5578 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops
)) {
5579 selinux_enabled
= 0;
5583 if (!selinux_enabled
) {
5584 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5588 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5590 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5591 cred_init_security();
5593 default_noexec
= !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS
& VM_EXEC
);
5595 sel_inode_cache
= kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5596 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct
),
5597 0, SLAB_PANIC
, NULL
);
5600 if (register_security(&selinux_ops
))
5601 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5603 if (selinux_enforcing
)
5604 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5606 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5611 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block
*sb
, void *unused
)
5613 superblock_doinit(sb
, NULL
);
5616 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5618 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5620 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5621 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5622 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init
, NULL
);
5625 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5626 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5627 security_initcall(selinux_init
);
5629 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5631 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops
[] = {
5633 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_postroute
,
5634 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5636 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
5637 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
5640 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_forward
,
5641 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5643 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
5644 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
5647 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_output
,
5648 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5650 .hooknum
= NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT
,
5651 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
5655 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5657 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops
[] = {
5659 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_postroute
,
5660 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5662 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
5663 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
5666 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_forward
,
5667 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5669 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
5670 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
5676 static int __init
selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5680 if (!selinux_enabled
)
5683 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5685 err
= nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops
));
5687 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err
);
5689 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5690 err
= nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops
));
5692 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err
);
5699 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init
);
5701 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5702 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5704 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5706 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops
));
5707 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5708 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops
));
5713 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5715 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5716 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5719 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5721 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5722 static int selinux_disabled
;
5724 int selinux_disable(void)
5726 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5728 if (ss_initialized
) {
5729 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5733 if (selinux_disabled
) {
5734 /* Only do this once. */
5738 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5740 selinux_disabled
= 1;
5741 selinux_enabled
= 0;
5743 reset_security_ops();
5745 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5748 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5749 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5751 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */