2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/dcache.h>
43 #include <linux/file.h>
44 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
45 #include <linux/namei.h>
46 #include <linux/mount.h>
47 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
50 #include <linux/tty.h>
52 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
53 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
54 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
55 #include <net/netlabel.h>
56 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
57 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
58 #include <asm/atomic.h>
59 #include <linux/bitops.h>
60 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
61 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
62 #include <linux/netlink.h>
63 #include <linux/tcp.h>
64 #include <linux/udp.h>
65 #include <linux/dccp.h>
66 #include <linux/quota.h>
67 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
69 #include <linux/parser.h>
70 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
72 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
73 #include <linux/personality.h>
74 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
75 #include <linux/audit.h>
76 #include <linux/string.h>
77 #include <linux/selinux.h>
78 #include <linux/mutex.h>
79 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
80 #include <linux/syslog.h>
91 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
93 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass
, u16 nlmsg_type
, u32
*perm
);
94 extern struct security_operations
*security_ops
;
96 /* SECMARK reference count */
97 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount
= ATOMIC_INIT(0);
99 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
100 int selinux_enforcing
;
102 static int __init
enforcing_setup(char *str
)
104 unsigned long enforcing
;
105 if (!strict_strtoul(str
, 0, &enforcing
))
106 selinux_enforcing
= enforcing
? 1 : 0;
109 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup
);
112 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
113 int selinux_enabled
= CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
;
115 static int __init
selinux_enabled_setup(char *str
)
117 unsigned long enabled
;
118 if (!strict_strtoul(str
, 0, &enabled
))
119 selinux_enabled
= enabled
? 1 : 0;
122 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup
);
124 int selinux_enabled
= 1;
127 static struct kmem_cache
*sel_inode_cache
;
130 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
133 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
134 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
135 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
136 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
139 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
141 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount
) > 0);
145 * initialise the security for the init task
147 static void cred_init_security(void)
149 struct cred
*cred
= (struct cred
*) current
->real_cred
;
150 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
152 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
154 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
156 tsec
->osid
= tsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
157 cred
->security
= tsec
;
161 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
163 static inline u32
cred_sid(const struct cred
*cred
)
165 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
167 tsec
= cred
->security
;
172 * get the objective security ID of a task
174 static inline u32
task_sid(const struct task_struct
*task
)
179 sid
= cred_sid(__task_cred(task
));
185 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
187 static inline u32
current_sid(void)
189 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
194 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
196 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
198 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
199 u32 sid
= current_sid();
201 isec
= kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache
, GFP_NOFS
);
205 mutex_init(&isec
->lock
);
206 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec
->list
);
208 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
209 isec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_FILE
;
210 isec
->task_sid
= sid
;
211 inode
->i_security
= isec
;
216 static void inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
218 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
219 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
221 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
222 if (!list_empty(&isec
->list
))
223 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
224 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
226 inode
->i_security
= NULL
;
227 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache
, isec
);
230 static int file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
232 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
233 u32 sid
= current_sid();
235 fsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
240 fsec
->fown_sid
= sid
;
241 file
->f_security
= fsec
;
246 static void file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
248 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
249 file
->f_security
= NULL
;
253 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
255 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
257 sbsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
261 mutex_init(&sbsec
->lock
);
262 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec
->isec_head
);
263 spin_lock_init(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
265 sbsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
266 sbsec
->def_sid
= SECINITSID_FILE
;
267 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
268 sb
->s_security
= sbsec
;
273 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
275 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
276 sb
->s_security
= NULL
;
280 /* The security server must be initialized before
281 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
282 extern int ss_initialized
;
284 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
286 static const char *labeling_behaviors
[6] = {
288 "uses transition SIDs",
290 "uses genfs_contexts",
291 "not configured for labeling",
292 "uses mountpoint labeling",
295 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
);
297 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode
*inode
)
299 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, NULL
);
308 Opt_labelsupport
= 5,
311 static const match_table_t tokens
= {
312 {Opt_context
, CONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
313 {Opt_fscontext
, FSCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
314 {Opt_defcontext
, DEFCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
315 {Opt_rootcontext
, ROOTCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
316 {Opt_labelsupport
, LABELSUPP_STR
},
320 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
322 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid
,
323 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
324 const struct cred
*cred
)
326 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
329 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
330 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
334 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
335 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
339 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid
,
340 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
341 const struct cred
*cred
)
343 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
345 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
346 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
350 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
351 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, NULL
);
355 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block
*sb
)
357 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
358 struct dentry
*root
= sb
->s_root
;
359 struct inode
*root_inode
= root
->d_inode
;
362 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
) {
363 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
364 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
365 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
366 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
367 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
368 if (!root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
369 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
370 "xattr support\n", sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
374 rc
= root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr(root
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, NULL
, 0);
375 if (rc
< 0 && rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
376 if (rc
== -EOPNOTSUPP
)
377 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
378 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
379 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
381 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
382 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb
->s_id
,
383 sb
->s_type
->name
, -rc
);
388 sbsec
->flags
|= (SE_SBINITIALIZED
| SE_SBLABELSUPP
);
390 if (sbsec
->behavior
> ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors
))
391 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
392 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
394 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
395 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
,
396 labeling_behaviors
[sbsec
->behavior
-1]);
398 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS
||
399 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
||
400 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE
||
401 sbsec
->behavior
> ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors
))
402 sbsec
->flags
&= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP
;
404 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
405 if (strncmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
406 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBLABELSUPP
;
408 /* Initialize the root inode. */
409 rc
= inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode
, root
);
411 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
412 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
413 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
415 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
417 if (!list_empty(&sbsec
->isec_head
)) {
418 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
=
419 list_entry(sbsec
->isec_head
.next
,
420 struct inode_security_struct
, list
);
421 struct inode
*inode
= isec
->inode
;
422 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
423 inode
= igrab(inode
);
425 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode
))
429 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
430 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
433 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
439 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
440 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
441 * mount options, or whatever.
443 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*sb
,
444 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
447 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
448 char *context
= NULL
;
452 security_init_mnt_opts(opts
);
454 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
460 tmp
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
461 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
462 for (i
= 0; i
< 8; i
++) {
464 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
467 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
468 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
)
469 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
471 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
472 if (!opts
->mnt_opts
) {
477 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
478 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
484 if (sbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) {
485 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
488 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
489 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
491 if (sbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) {
492 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, &context
, &len
);
495 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
496 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
498 if (sbsec
->flags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) {
499 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->def_sid
, &context
, &len
);
502 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
503 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
505 if (sbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
506 struct inode
*root
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
507 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= root
->i_security
;
509 rc
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
512 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
513 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
515 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
) {
516 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = NULL
;
517 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP
;
520 BUG_ON(i
!= opts
->num_mnt_opts
);
525 security_free_mnt_opts(opts
);
529 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
, char flag
,
530 u32 old_sid
, u32 new_sid
)
532 char mnt_flags
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
534 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
535 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
536 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& flag
) ||
537 (old_sid
!= new_sid
))
540 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
541 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
543 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
544 if (mnt_flags
& flag
)
550 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
551 * labeling information.
553 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block
*sb
,
554 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
556 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
558 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
559 const char *name
= sb
->s_type
->name
;
560 struct inode
*inode
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
561 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
= inode
->i_security
;
562 u32 fscontext_sid
= 0, context_sid
= 0, rootcontext_sid
= 0;
563 u32 defcontext_sid
= 0;
564 char **mount_options
= opts
->mnt_opts
;
565 int *flags
= opts
->mnt_opts_flags
;
566 int num_opts
= opts
->num_mnt_opts
;
568 mutex_lock(&sbsec
->lock
);
570 if (!ss_initialized
) {
572 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
573 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
574 server is ready to handle calls. */
578 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
579 "before the security server is initialized\n");
584 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
585 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
586 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
587 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
589 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
590 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
591 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
592 * will be used for both mounts)
594 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) && (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
599 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
600 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
601 * than once with different security options.
603 for (i
= 0; i
< num_opts
; i
++) {
606 if (flags
[i
] == SE_SBLABELSUPP
)
608 rc
= security_context_to_sid(mount_options
[i
],
609 strlen(mount_options
[i
]), &sid
);
611 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
612 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
613 mount_options
[i
], sb
->s_id
, name
, rc
);
620 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
,
622 goto out_double_mount
;
624 sbsec
->flags
|= FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
629 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
,
631 goto out_double_mount
;
633 sbsec
->flags
|= CONTEXT_MNT
;
635 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
636 rootcontext_sid
= sid
;
638 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
,
640 goto out_double_mount
;
642 sbsec
->flags
|= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
646 defcontext_sid
= sid
;
648 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
,
650 goto out_double_mount
;
652 sbsec
->flags
|= DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
661 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
662 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
663 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
) && !num_opts
)
664 goto out_double_mount
;
669 if (strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "proc") == 0)
670 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBPROC
;
672 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
673 rc
= security_fs_use((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBPROC
) ? "proc" : sb
->s_type
->name
, &sbsec
->behavior
, &sbsec
->sid
);
675 printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
676 __func__
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
680 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
682 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid
, sbsec
, cred
);
686 sbsec
->sid
= fscontext_sid
;
690 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
691 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
692 * the superblock context if not already set.
695 if (!fscontext_sid
) {
696 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
700 sbsec
->sid
= context_sid
;
702 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
707 if (!rootcontext_sid
)
708 rootcontext_sid
= context_sid
;
710 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= context_sid
;
711 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
;
714 if (rootcontext_sid
) {
715 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid
, sbsec
,
720 root_isec
->sid
= rootcontext_sid
;
721 root_isec
->initialized
= 1;
724 if (defcontext_sid
) {
725 if (sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
) {
727 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: defcontext option is "
728 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
732 if (defcontext_sid
!= sbsec
->def_sid
) {
733 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid
,
739 sbsec
->def_sid
= defcontext_sid
;
742 rc
= sb_finish_set_opts(sb
);
744 mutex_unlock(&sbsec
->lock
);
748 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
749 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb
->s_id
, name
);
753 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
754 struct super_block
*newsb
)
756 const struct superblock_security_struct
*oldsbsec
= oldsb
->s_security
;
757 struct superblock_security_struct
*newsbsec
= newsb
->s_security
;
759 int set_fscontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
);
760 int set_context
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
);
761 int set_rootcontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
);
764 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
765 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
770 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
771 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
));
773 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
774 if (newsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
777 mutex_lock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
779 newsbsec
->flags
= oldsbsec
->flags
;
781 newsbsec
->sid
= oldsbsec
->sid
;
782 newsbsec
->def_sid
= oldsbsec
->def_sid
;
783 newsbsec
->behavior
= oldsbsec
->behavior
;
786 u32 sid
= oldsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
790 if (!set_rootcontext
) {
791 struct inode
*newinode
= newsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
792 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= newinode
->i_security
;
795 newsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= sid
;
797 if (set_rootcontext
) {
798 const struct inode
*oldinode
= oldsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
799 const struct inode_security_struct
*oldisec
= oldinode
->i_security
;
800 struct inode
*newinode
= newsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
801 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= newinode
->i_security
;
803 newisec
->sid
= oldisec
->sid
;
806 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb
);
807 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
810 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options
,
811 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
814 char *context
= NULL
, *defcontext
= NULL
;
815 char *fscontext
= NULL
, *rootcontext
= NULL
;
816 int rc
, num_mnt_opts
= 0;
818 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= 0;
820 /* Standard string-based options. */
821 while ((p
= strsep(&options
, "|")) != NULL
) {
823 substring_t args
[MAX_OPT_ARGS
];
828 token
= match_token(p
, tokens
, args
);
832 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
834 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
837 context
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
847 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
850 fscontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
857 case Opt_rootcontext
:
860 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
863 rootcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
871 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
873 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
876 defcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
882 case Opt_labelsupport
:
886 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
893 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
897 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
898 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
899 kfree(opts
->mnt_opts
);
904 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = fscontext
;
905 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
908 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = context
;
909 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
912 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = rootcontext
;
913 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
916 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = defcontext
;
917 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
920 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= num_mnt_opts
;
931 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
933 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
936 char *options
= data
;
937 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
939 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts
);
944 BUG_ON(sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
);
946 rc
= selinux_parse_opts_str(options
, &opts
);
951 rc
= selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
);
954 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
958 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file
*m
,
959 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
964 for (i
= 0; i
< opts
->num_mnt_opts
; i
++) {
967 if (opts
->mnt_opts
[i
])
968 has_comma
= strchr(opts
->mnt_opts
[i
], ',');
972 switch (opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
]) {
974 prefix
= CONTEXT_STR
;
977 prefix
= FSCONTEXT_STR
;
979 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
980 prefix
= ROOTCONTEXT_STR
;
983 prefix
= DEFCONTEXT_STR
;
987 seq_puts(m
, LABELSUPP_STR
);
992 /* we need a comma before each option */
997 seq_puts(m
, opts
->mnt_opts
[i
]);
1003 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file
*m
, struct super_block
*sb
)
1005 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
1008 rc
= selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
);
1010 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1016 selinux_write_opts(m
, &opts
);
1018 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1023 static inline u16
inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode
)
1025 switch (mode
& S_IFMT
) {
1027 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE
;
1029 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
;
1031 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1033 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE
;
1035 return SECCLASS_DIR
;
1037 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE
;
1039 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE
;
1043 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1046 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol
)
1048 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_TCP
);
1051 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol
)
1053 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_UDP
);
1056 static inline u16
socket_type_to_security_class(int family
, int type
, int protocol
)
1062 case SOCK_SEQPACKET
:
1063 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
;
1065 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET
;
1072 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol
))
1073 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
;
1075 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1077 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol
))
1078 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
;
1080 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1082 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
;
1084 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1090 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET
;
1091 case NETLINK_FIREWALL
:
1092 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET
;
1093 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG
:
1094 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET
;
1096 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET
;
1098 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET
;
1099 case NETLINK_SELINUX
:
1100 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET
;
1102 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET
;
1103 case NETLINK_IP6_FW
:
1104 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET
;
1105 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG
:
1106 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET
;
1107 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT
:
1108 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET
;
1110 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET
;
1113 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET
;
1115 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET
;
1117 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET
;
1120 return SECCLASS_SOCKET
;
1123 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1124 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry
*de
,
1129 char *buffer
, *path
, *end
;
1131 buffer
= (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
1136 end
= buffer
+buflen
;
1141 while (de
&& de
!= de
->parent
) {
1142 buflen
-= de
->namelen
+ 1;
1146 memcpy(end
, de
->name
, de
->namelen
);
1151 rc
= security_genfs_sid("proc", path
, tclass
, sid
);
1152 free_page((unsigned long)buffer
);
1156 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry
*de
,
1164 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1165 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
)
1167 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= NULL
;
1168 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1170 struct dentry
*dentry
;
1171 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1172 char *context
= NULL
;
1176 if (isec
->initialized
)
1179 mutex_lock(&isec
->lock
);
1180 if (isec
->initialized
)
1183 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1184 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)) {
1185 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1186 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1187 server is ready to handle calls. */
1188 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1189 if (list_empty(&isec
->list
))
1190 list_add(&isec
->list
, &sbsec
->isec_head
);
1191 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1195 switch (sbsec
->behavior
) {
1196 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
:
1197 if (!inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
1198 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1202 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1203 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1205 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1206 dentry
= dget(opt_dentry
);
1208 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1209 dentry
= d_find_alias(inode
);
1213 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1214 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1215 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1216 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1217 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1218 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1219 * be used again by userspace.
1224 len
= INITCONTEXTLEN
;
1225 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1231 context
[len
] = '\0';
1232 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1234 if (rc
== -ERANGE
) {
1237 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1238 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1245 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1251 context
[len
] = '\0';
1252 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
,
1258 if (rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
1259 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1260 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__
,
1261 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
1265 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1266 sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1269 rc
= security_context_to_sid_default(context
, rc
, &sid
,
1273 char *dev
= inode
->i_sb
->s_id
;
1274 unsigned long ino
= inode
->i_ino
;
1276 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
1277 if (printk_ratelimit())
1278 printk(KERN_NOTICE
"SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1279 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1280 "filesystem in question.\n", ino
, dev
, context
);
1282 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1283 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1284 __func__
, context
, -rc
, dev
, ino
);
1287 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1295 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK
:
1296 isec
->sid
= isec
->task_sid
;
1298 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS
:
1299 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1300 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1302 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1303 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1304 rc
= security_transition_sid(isec
->task_sid
,
1312 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
:
1313 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
1316 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1317 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1319 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBPROC
) && !S_ISLNK(inode
->i_mode
)) {
1320 struct proc_inode
*proci
= PROC_I(inode
);
1322 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1323 rc
= selinux_proc_get_sid(proci
->pde
,
1334 isec
->initialized
= 1;
1337 mutex_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
1339 if (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_FILE
)
1340 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1344 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1345 static inline u32
signal_to_av(int sig
)
1351 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1352 perm
= PROCESS__SIGCHLD
;
1355 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1356 perm
= PROCESS__SIGKILL
;
1359 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1360 perm
= PROCESS__SIGSTOP
;
1363 /* All other signals. */
1364 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNAL
;
1372 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1373 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1375 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred
*actor
,
1376 const struct cred
*target
,
1379 u32 asid
= cred_sid(actor
), tsid
= cred_sid(target
);
1381 return avc_has_perm(asid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1385 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1386 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1387 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1388 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1390 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk1
,
1391 const struct task_struct
*tsk2
,
1394 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec1
, *__tsec2
;
1398 __tsec1
= __task_cred(tsk1
)->security
; sid1
= __tsec1
->sid
;
1399 __tsec2
= __task_cred(tsk2
)->security
; sid2
= __tsec2
->sid
;
1401 return avc_has_perm(sid1
, sid2
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1405 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1406 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1407 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1408 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1410 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1415 sid
= current_sid();
1416 tsid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1417 return avc_has_perm(sid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1420 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1421 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1424 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1425 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1426 const struct cred
*cred
,
1429 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1430 struct av_decision avd
;
1432 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1433 u32 av
= CAP_TO_MASK(cap
);
1436 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, CAP
);
1440 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap
)) {
1442 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY
;
1445 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2
;
1449 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap
);
1453 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, 0, &avd
);
1454 if (audit
== SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
)
1455 avc_audit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, &avd
, rc
, &ad
);
1459 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1460 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1463 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1465 return avc_has_perm(sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
1466 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, perms
, NULL
);
1469 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1470 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1471 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1472 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1473 struct inode
*inode
,
1475 struct common_audit_data
*adp
)
1477 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
1478 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1481 validate_creds(cred
);
1483 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
1486 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1487 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1491 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1492 ad
.u
.fs
.inode
= inode
;
1495 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, adp
);
1498 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1499 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1500 pathname if needed. */
1501 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1502 struct vfsmount
*mnt
,
1503 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1506 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
1507 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1509 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1510 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.mnt
= mnt
;
1511 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
;
1512 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1515 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1516 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1517 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1518 check a particular permission to the file.
1519 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1520 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1521 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1522 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1523 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1527 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
1528 struct inode
*inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
1529 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1530 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1533 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1534 ad
.u
.fs
.path
= file
->f_path
;
1536 if (sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
1537 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, fsec
->sid
,
1545 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1548 rc
= inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
);
1554 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1555 static int may_create(struct inode
*dir
,
1556 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1559 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
1560 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
1561 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1563 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1566 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
1567 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1570 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
1572 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1573 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
;
1575 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1576 DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
,
1581 if (!newsid
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
)) {
1582 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, dsec
->sid
, tclass
, &newsid
);
1587 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, tclass
, FILE__CREATE
, &ad
);
1591 return avc_has_perm(newsid
, sbsec
->sid
,
1592 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
1593 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
1596 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1597 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid
,
1598 struct task_struct
*ctx
)
1600 u32 sid
= task_sid(ctx
);
1602 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, KEY__CREATE
, NULL
);
1606 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1609 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1610 static int may_link(struct inode
*dir
,
1611 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1615 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
, *isec
;
1616 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1617 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1621 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
1622 isec
= dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1624 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1625 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
;
1628 av
|= (kind
? DIR__REMOVE_NAME
: DIR__ADD_NAME
);
1629 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1644 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1649 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, av
, &ad
);
1653 static inline int may_rename(struct inode
*old_dir
,
1654 struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
1655 struct inode
*new_dir
,
1656 struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
1658 struct inode_security_struct
*old_dsec
, *new_dsec
, *old_isec
, *new_isec
;
1659 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1660 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1662 int old_is_dir
, new_is_dir
;
1665 old_dsec
= old_dir
->i_security
;
1666 old_isec
= old_dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1667 old_is_dir
= S_ISDIR(old_dentry
->d_inode
->i_mode
);
1668 new_dsec
= new_dir
->i_security
;
1670 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
1672 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= old_dentry
;
1673 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1674 DIR__REMOVE_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
, &ad
);
1677 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1678 old_isec
->sclass
, FILE__RENAME
, &ad
);
1681 if (old_is_dir
&& new_dir
!= old_dir
) {
1682 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1683 old_isec
->sclass
, DIR__REPARENT
, &ad
);
1688 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= new_dentry
;
1689 av
= DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
;
1690 if (new_dentry
->d_inode
)
1691 av
|= DIR__REMOVE_NAME
;
1692 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1695 if (new_dentry
->d_inode
) {
1696 new_isec
= new_dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1697 new_is_dir
= S_ISDIR(new_dentry
->d_inode
->i_mode
);
1698 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_isec
->sid
,
1700 (new_is_dir
? DIR__RMDIR
: FILE__UNLINK
), &ad
);
1708 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1709 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1710 struct super_block
*sb
,
1712 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
1714 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1715 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1717 sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
1718 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
, perms
, ad
);
1721 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1722 static inline u32
file_mask_to_av(int mode
, int mask
)
1726 if ((mode
& S_IFMT
) != S_IFDIR
) {
1727 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1728 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
1729 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1732 if (mask
& MAY_APPEND
)
1734 else if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1738 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1740 if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1742 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1749 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1750 static inline u32
file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1754 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_READ
)
1756 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_WRITE
) {
1757 if (file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
)
1764 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1773 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1776 static inline u32
open_file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1778 u32 av
= file_to_av(file
);
1780 if (selinux_policycap_openperm
)
1786 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1788 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct
*child
,
1793 rc
= cap_ptrace_access_check(child
, mode
);
1797 if (mode
== PTRACE_MODE_READ
) {
1798 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1799 u32 csid
= task_sid(child
);
1800 return avc_has_perm(sid
, csid
, SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__READ
, NULL
);
1803 return current_has_perm(child
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
1806 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct
*parent
)
1810 rc
= cap_ptrace_traceme(parent
);
1814 return task_has_perm(parent
, current
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
1817 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct
*target
, kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
1818 kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
, kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
1822 error
= current_has_perm(target
, PROCESS__GETCAP
);
1826 return cap_capget(target
, effective
, inheritable
, permitted
);
1829 static int selinux_capset(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
1830 const kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
1831 const kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
,
1832 const kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
1836 error
= cap_capset(new, old
,
1837 effective
, inheritable
, permitted
);
1841 return cred_has_perm(old
, new, PROCESS__SETCAP
);
1845 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1846 * which was removed).
1848 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1849 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1850 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1851 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1854 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct
*tsk
, const struct cred
*cred
,
1859 rc
= cap_capable(tsk
, cred
, cap
, audit
);
1863 return task_has_capability(tsk
, cred
, cap
, audit
);
1866 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table
*table
, u16 tclass
, u32
*sid
)
1869 char *buffer
, *path
, *end
;
1872 buffer
= (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
1877 end
= buffer
+buflen
;
1883 const char *name
= table
->procname
;
1884 size_t namelen
= strlen(name
);
1885 buflen
-= namelen
+ 1;
1889 memcpy(end
, name
, namelen
);
1892 table
= table
->parent
;
1898 memcpy(end
, "/sys", 4);
1900 rc
= security_genfs_sid("proc", path
, tclass
, sid
);
1902 free_page((unsigned long)buffer
);
1907 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table
*table
, int op
)
1914 sid
= current_sid();
1916 rc
= selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table
, (op
== 0001) ?
1917 SECCLASS_DIR
: SECCLASS_FILE
, &tsid
);
1919 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1920 tsid
= SECINITSID_SYSCTL
;
1923 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1924 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1926 error
= avc_has_perm(sid
, tsid
,
1927 SECCLASS_DIR
, DIR__SEARCH
, NULL
);
1935 error
= avc_has_perm(sid
, tsid
,
1936 SECCLASS_FILE
, av
, NULL
);
1942 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds
, int type
, int id
, struct super_block
*sb
)
1944 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
1956 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD
, NULL
);
1961 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET
, NULL
);
1964 rc
= 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1970 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry
*dentry
)
1972 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
1974 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__QUOTAON
);
1977 static int selinux_syslog(int type
)
1982 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL
: /* Read last kernel messages */
1983 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER
: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1984 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ
);
1986 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF
: /* Disable logging to console */
1987 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON
: /* Enable logging to console */
1988 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1989 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL
:
1990 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE
);
1992 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE
: /* Close log */
1993 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN
: /* Open log */
1994 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ
: /* Read from log */
1995 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR
: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1996 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR
: /* Clear ring buffer */
1998 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD
);
2005 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2006 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2007 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2009 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2010 * processes that allocate mappings.
2012 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct
*mm
, long pages
)
2014 int rc
, cap_sys_admin
= 0;
2016 rc
= selinux_capable(current
, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN
,
2017 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
2021 return __vm_enough_memory(mm
, pages
, cap_sys_admin
);
2024 /* binprm security operations */
2026 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2028 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
2029 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2030 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2031 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2032 struct inode
*inode
= bprm
->file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
2035 rc
= cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm
);
2039 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2040 * the script interpreter */
2041 if (bprm
->cred_prepared
)
2044 old_tsec
= current_security();
2045 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2046 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2048 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2049 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2050 new_tsec
->osid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2052 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2053 new_tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
2054 new_tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
2055 new_tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
2057 if (old_tsec
->exec_sid
) {
2058 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->exec_sid
;
2059 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2060 new_tsec
->exec_sid
= 0;
2062 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2063 rc
= security_transition_sid(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2064 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, &new_tsec
->sid
);
2069 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2070 ad
.u
.fs
.path
= bprm
->file
->f_path
;
2072 if (bprm
->file
->f_path
.mnt
->mnt_flags
& MNT_NOSUID
)
2073 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2075 if (new_tsec
->sid
== old_tsec
->sid
) {
2076 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2077 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS
, &ad
);
2081 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2082 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2083 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__TRANSITION
, &ad
);
2087 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2088 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__ENTRYPOINT
, &ad
);
2092 /* Check for shared state */
2093 if (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE
) {
2094 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2095 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SHARE
,
2101 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2102 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2104 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE
| LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
)) {
2105 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
2106 struct task_security_struct
*sec
;
2110 tracer
= tracehook_tracer_task(current
);
2111 if (likely(tracer
!= NULL
)) {
2112 sec
= __task_cred(tracer
)->security
;
2118 rc
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2120 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
2126 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2127 bprm
->per_clear
|= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID
;
2133 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2135 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2143 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2144 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2145 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2146 atsecure
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
,
2148 PROCESS__NOATSECURE
, NULL
);
2151 return (atsecure
|| cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm
));
2154 extern struct vfsmount
*selinuxfs_mount
;
2155 extern struct dentry
*selinux_null
;
2157 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2158 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred
*cred
,
2159 struct files_struct
*files
)
2161 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2162 struct file
*file
, *devnull
= NULL
;
2163 struct tty_struct
*tty
;
2164 struct fdtable
*fdt
;
2168 tty
= get_current_tty();
2170 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock
);
2171 if (!list_empty(&tty
->tty_files
)) {
2172 struct tty_file_private
*file_priv
;
2173 struct inode
*inode
;
2175 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2176 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2177 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2178 file may belong to another process and we are only
2179 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2180 file_priv
= list_first_entry(&tty
->tty_files
,
2181 struct tty_file_private
, list
);
2182 file
= file_priv
->file
;
2183 inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
2184 if (inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
,
2185 FILE__READ
| FILE__WRITE
, NULL
)) {
2189 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock
);
2192 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2196 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2198 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2200 spin_lock(&files
->file_lock
);
2202 unsigned long set
, i
;
2207 fdt
= files_fdtable(files
);
2208 if (i
>= fdt
->max_fds
)
2210 set
= fdt
->open_fds
->fds_bits
[j
];
2213 spin_unlock(&files
->file_lock
);
2214 for ( ; set
; i
++, set
>>= 1) {
2219 if (file_has_perm(cred
,
2221 file_to_av(file
))) {
2223 fd
= get_unused_fd();
2233 devnull
= dentry_open(
2235 mntget(selinuxfs_mount
),
2237 if (IS_ERR(devnull
)) {
2244 fd_install(fd
, devnull
);
2249 spin_lock(&files
->file_lock
);
2252 spin_unlock(&files
->file_lock
);
2256 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2258 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2260 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2261 struct rlimit
*rlim
, *initrlim
;
2264 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2265 if (new_tsec
->sid
== new_tsec
->osid
)
2268 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2269 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm
->cred
, current
->files
);
2271 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2272 current
->pdeath_signal
= 0;
2274 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2275 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2276 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2278 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2279 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2280 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2281 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2282 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2284 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->osid
, new_tsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2285 PROCESS__RLIMITINH
, NULL
);
2287 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2289 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++) {
2290 rlim
= current
->signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2291 initrlim
= init_task
.signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2292 rlim
->rlim_cur
= min(rlim
->rlim_max
, initrlim
->rlim_cur
);
2294 task_unlock(current
);
2295 update_rlimit_cpu(current
, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU
));
2300 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2303 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2305 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2306 struct itimerval itimer
;
2316 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2317 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2318 * flush and unblock signals.
2320 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2321 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2323 rc
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SIGINH
, NULL
);
2325 memset(&itimer
, 0, sizeof itimer
);
2326 for (i
= 0; i
< 3; i
++)
2327 do_setitimer(i
, &itimer
, NULL
);
2328 spin_lock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2329 if (!(current
->signal
->flags
& SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT
)) {
2330 __flush_signals(current
);
2331 flush_signal_handlers(current
, 1);
2332 sigemptyset(¤t
->blocked
);
2334 spin_unlock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2337 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2338 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2339 read_lock(&tasklist_lock
);
2340 __wake_up_parent(current
, current
->real_parent
);
2341 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock
);
2344 /* superblock security operations */
2346 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2348 return superblock_alloc_security(sb
);
2351 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2353 superblock_free_security(sb
);
2356 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix
, int plen
, char *option
, int olen
)
2361 return !memcmp(prefix
, option
, plen
);
2364 static inline int selinux_option(char *option
, int len
)
2366 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2367 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2368 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2369 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2370 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR
, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR
)-1, option
, len
));
2373 static inline void take_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
, int len
)
2380 memcpy(*to
, from
, len
);
2384 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
,
2387 int current_size
= 0;
2395 while (current_size
< len
) {
2405 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig
, char *copy
)
2407 int fnosec
, fsec
, rc
= 0;
2408 char *in_save
, *in_curr
, *in_end
;
2409 char *sec_curr
, *nosec_save
, *nosec
;
2415 nosec
= (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
2423 in_save
= in_end
= orig
;
2427 open_quote
= !open_quote
;
2428 if ((*in_end
== ',' && open_quote
== 0) ||
2430 int len
= in_end
- in_curr
;
2432 if (selinux_option(in_curr
, len
))
2433 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr
, in_curr
, &fsec
, len
);
2435 take_option(&nosec
, in_curr
, &fnosec
, len
);
2437 in_curr
= in_end
+ 1;
2439 } while (*in_end
++);
2441 strcpy(in_save
, nosec_save
);
2442 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save
);
2447 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block
*sb
, int flags
, void *data
)
2449 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2450 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2453 rc
= superblock_doinit(sb
, data
);
2457 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2458 if (flags
& MS_KERNMOUNT
)
2461 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2462 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= sb
->s_root
;
2463 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT
, &ad
);
2466 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2468 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2469 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2471 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2472 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
->d_sb
->s_root
;
2473 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, dentry
->d_sb
, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR
, &ad
);
2476 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name
,
2479 unsigned long flags
,
2482 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2484 if (flags
& MS_REMOUNT
)
2485 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, path
->mnt
->mnt_sb
,
2486 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT
, NULL
);
2488 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, path
->mnt
, path
->dentry
,
2492 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, int flags
)
2494 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2496 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, mnt
->mnt_sb
,
2497 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT
, NULL
);
2500 /* inode security operations */
2502 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2504 return inode_alloc_security(inode
);
2507 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2509 inode_free_security(inode
);
2512 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode
*inode
, struct inode
*dir
,
2513 const struct qstr
*qstr
, char **name
,
2514 void **value
, size_t *len
)
2516 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2517 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
2518 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2519 u32 sid
, newsid
, clen
;
2521 char *namep
= NULL
, *context
;
2523 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
2524 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2527 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
2529 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) &&
2530 (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
))
2531 newsid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
2532 else if (!newsid
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
)) {
2533 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, dsec
->sid
,
2534 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
),
2537 printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: "
2538 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2541 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
2546 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2547 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
2548 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2549 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
2551 isec
->initialized
= 1;
2554 if (!ss_initialized
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
))
2558 namep
= kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
, GFP_NOFS
);
2565 rc
= security_sid_to_context_force(newsid
, &context
, &clen
);
2577 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, int mask
)
2579 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_FILE
);
2582 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry
*old_dentry
, struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2584 return may_link(dir
, old_dentry
, MAY_LINK
);
2587 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2589 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_UNLINK
);
2592 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2594 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
);
2597 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, int mask
)
2599 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_DIR
);
2602 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2604 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_RMDIR
);
2607 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, int mode
, dev_t dev
)
2609 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
));
2612 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode
*old_inode
, struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
2613 struct inode
*new_inode
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2615 return may_rename(old_inode
, old_dentry
, new_inode
, new_dentry
);
2618 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2620 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2622 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2625 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct nameidata
*nameidata
)
2627 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2629 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2632 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
, int mask
)
2634 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2635 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2639 from_access
= mask
& MAY_ACCESS
;
2640 mask
&= (MAY_READ
|MAY_WRITE
|MAY_EXEC
|MAY_APPEND
);
2642 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2646 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2647 ad
.u
.fs
.inode
= inode
;
2650 ad
.selinux_audit_data
.auditdeny
|= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS
;
2652 perms
= file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
);
2654 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, perms
, &ad
);
2657 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct iattr
*iattr
)
2659 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2660 unsigned int ia_valid
= iattr
->ia_valid
;
2662 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2663 if (ia_valid
& ATTR_FORCE
) {
2664 ia_valid
&= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID
| ATTR_KILL_SGID
| ATTR_MODE
|
2670 if (ia_valid
& (ATTR_MODE
| ATTR_UID
| ATTR_GID
|
2671 ATTR_ATIME_SET
| ATTR_MTIME_SET
| ATTR_TIMES_SET
))
2672 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2674 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__WRITE
);
2677 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2679 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2681 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, mnt
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2684 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2686 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2688 if (!strncmp(name
, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
,
2689 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
- 1)) {
2690 if (!strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_CAPS
)) {
2691 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP
))
2693 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
2694 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2695 Restrict to administrator. */
2700 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2701 ordinary setattr permission. */
2702 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2705 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
2706 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
2708 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2709 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2710 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2711 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2712 u32 newsid
, sid
= current_sid();
2715 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
2716 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
2718 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2719 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
))
2722 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode
))
2725 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, FS
);
2726 ad
.u
.fs
.path
.dentry
= dentry
;
2728 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
,
2729 FILE__RELABELFROM
, &ad
);
2733 rc
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2734 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
2735 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
))
2737 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2742 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, isec
->sclass
,
2743 FILE__RELABELTO
, &ad
);
2747 rc
= security_validate_transition(isec
->sid
, newsid
, sid
,
2752 return avc_has_perm(newsid
,
2754 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
2755 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
,
2759 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
2760 const void *value
, size_t size
,
2763 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2764 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2768 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
)) {
2769 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2773 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2775 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2776 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2777 inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
, -rc
);
2785 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2787 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2789 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2792 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2794 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2796 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, NULL
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2799 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2801 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
2802 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
2804 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2805 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2810 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2812 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2814 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
, void **buffer
, bool alloc
)
2818 char *context
= NULL
;
2819 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2821 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
2825 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2826 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2827 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2828 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2829 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2830 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2831 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2833 error
= selinux_capable(current
, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN
,
2834 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
2836 error
= security_sid_to_context_force(isec
->sid
, &context
,
2839 error
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &size
);
2852 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
,
2853 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
2855 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2859 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
2862 if (!value
|| !size
)
2865 rc
= security_context_to_sid((void *)value
, size
, &newsid
);
2870 isec
->initialized
= 1;
2874 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, char *buffer
, size_t buffer_size
)
2876 const int len
= sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
);
2877 if (buffer
&& len
<= buffer_size
)
2878 memcpy(buffer
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, len
);
2882 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode
*inode
, u32
*secid
)
2884 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2888 /* file security operations */
2890 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
2892 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2893 struct inode
*inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
2895 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2896 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && (mask
& MAY_WRITE
))
2899 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
,
2900 file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
));
2903 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
2905 struct inode
*inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
2906 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
2907 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2908 u32 sid
= current_sid();
2911 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2914 if (sid
== fsec
->sid
&& fsec
->isid
== isec
->sid
&&
2915 fsec
->pseqno
== avc_policy_seqno())
2916 /* No change since dentry_open check. */
2919 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file
, mask
);
2922 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
2924 return file_alloc_security(file
);
2927 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
2929 file_free_security(file
);
2932 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
2935 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2938 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd
) & _IOC_WRITE
)
2940 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd
) & _IOC_READ
)
2945 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, av
);
2948 static int default_noexec
;
2950 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file
*file
, unsigned long prot
, int shared
)
2952 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2955 if (default_noexec
&&
2956 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && (!file
|| (!shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
)))) {
2958 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2959 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2960 * This has an additional check.
2962 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECMEM
);
2968 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2969 u32 av
= FILE__READ
;
2971 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2972 if (shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
))
2975 if (prot
& PROT_EXEC
)
2976 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
2978 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, av
);
2985 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file
*file
, unsigned long reqprot
,
2986 unsigned long prot
, unsigned long flags
,
2987 unsigned long addr
, unsigned long addr_only
)
2990 u32 sid
= current_sid();
2993 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
2994 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
2995 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
2996 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
2998 if (addr
< CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
) {
2999 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT
,
3000 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO
, NULL
);
3005 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3006 rc
= cap_file_mmap(file
, reqprot
, prot
, flags
, addr
, addr_only
);
3007 if (rc
|| addr_only
)
3010 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3013 return file_map_prot_check(file
, prot
,
3014 (flags
& MAP_TYPE
) == MAP_SHARED
);
3017 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct
*vma
,
3018 unsigned long reqprot
,
3021 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3023 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3026 if (default_noexec
&&
3027 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && !(vma
->vm_flags
& VM_EXEC
)) {
3029 if (vma
->vm_start
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_brk
&&
3030 vma
->vm_end
<= vma
->vm_mm
->brk
) {
3031 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECHEAP
);
3032 } else if (!vma
->vm_file
&&
3033 vma
->vm_start
<= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
&&
3034 vma
->vm_end
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
) {
3035 rc
= current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__EXECSTACK
);
3036 } else if (vma
->vm_file
&& vma
->anon_vma
) {
3038 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3039 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3040 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3041 * modified content. This typically should only
3042 * occur for text relocations.
3044 rc
= file_has_perm(cred
, vma
->vm_file
, FILE__EXECMOD
);
3050 return file_map_prot_check(vma
->vm_file
, prot
, vma
->vm_flags
&VM_SHARED
);
3053 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
)
3055 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3057 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3060 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3063 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3068 if (!file
->f_path
.dentry
|| !file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
) {
3073 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && !(arg
& O_APPEND
)) {
3074 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__WRITE
);
3083 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3084 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3089 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3094 if (!file
->f_path
.dentry
|| !file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
) {
3098 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3105 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file
*file
)
3107 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3109 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3110 fsec
->fown_sid
= current_sid();
3115 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
3116 struct fown_struct
*fown
, int signum
)
3119 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
3121 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3123 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3124 file
= container_of(fown
, struct file
, f_owner
);
3126 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3129 perm
= signal_to_av(SIGIO
); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3131 perm
= signal_to_av(signum
);
3133 return avc_has_perm(fsec
->fown_sid
, sid
,
3134 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3137 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file
*file
)
3139 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3141 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, file_to_av(file
));
3144 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file
*file
, const struct cred
*cred
)
3146 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3147 struct inode
*inode
;
3148 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3150 inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
3151 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3152 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3154 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3155 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3156 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3157 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3158 * struct as its SID.
3160 fsec
->isid
= isec
->sid
;
3161 fsec
->pseqno
= avc_policy_seqno();
3163 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3164 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3165 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3166 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3167 * new inode label or new policy.
3168 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3170 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, open_file_to_av(file
), NULL
);
3173 /* task security operations */
3175 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags
)
3177 return current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__FORK
);
3181 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3183 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred
*cred
, gfp_t gfp
)
3185 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3187 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3191 cred
->security
= tsec
;
3196 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3198 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred
*cred
)
3200 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
3202 BUG_ON((unsigned long) cred
->security
< PAGE_SIZE
);
3203 cred
->security
= (void *) 0x7UL
;
3208 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3210 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
3213 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
3214 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3216 old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3218 tsec
= kmemdup(old_tsec
, sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3222 new->security
= tsec
;
3227 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3229 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
3231 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3232 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3238 * set the security data for a kernel service
3239 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3241 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred
*new, u32 secid
)
3243 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3244 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3247 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, secid
,
3248 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3249 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE
,
3253 tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
3254 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
3255 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
3261 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3262 * objective context of the specified inode
3264 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred
*new, struct inode
*inode
)
3266 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3267 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3268 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3271 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
3272 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3273 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS
,
3277 tsec
->create_sid
= isec
->sid
;
3281 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name
)
3284 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3286 sid
= task_sid(current
);
3288 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, KMOD
);
3289 ad
.u
.kmod_name
= kmod_name
;
3291 return avc_has_perm(sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
, SECCLASS_SYSTEM
,
3292 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST
, &ad
);
3295 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct
*p
, pid_t pgid
)
3297 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETPGID
);
3300 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3302 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETPGID
);
3305 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3307 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSESSION
);
3310 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct
*p
, u32
*secid
)
3312 *secid
= task_sid(p
);
3315 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct
*p
, int nice
)
3319 rc
= cap_task_setnice(p
, nice
);
3323 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3326 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct
*p
, int ioprio
)
3330 rc
= cap_task_setioprio(p
, ioprio
);
3334 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3337 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct
*p
)
3339 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3342 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct
*p
, unsigned int resource
,
3343 struct rlimit
*new_rlim
)
3345 struct rlimit
*old_rlim
= p
->signal
->rlim
+ resource
;
3347 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3348 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3349 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3350 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3351 if (old_rlim
->rlim_max
!= new_rlim
->rlim_max
)
3352 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT
);
3357 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
3361 rc
= cap_task_setscheduler(p
);
3365 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3368 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
3370 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3373 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct
*p
)
3375 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3378 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct
*p
, struct siginfo
*info
,
3385 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNULL
; /* null signal; existence test */
3387 perm
= signal_to_av(sig
);
3389 rc
= avc_has_perm(secid
, task_sid(p
),
3390 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3392 rc
= current_has_perm(p
, perm
);
3396 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct
*p
)
3398 return task_has_perm(p
, current
, PROCESS__SIGCHLD
);
3401 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct
*p
,
3402 struct inode
*inode
)
3404 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3405 u32 sid
= task_sid(p
);
3408 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3411 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3412 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3413 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3415 int offset
, ihlen
, ret
= -EINVAL
;
3416 struct iphdr _iph
, *ih
;
3418 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3419 ih
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_iph
), &_iph
);
3423 ihlen
= ih
->ihl
* 4;
3424 if (ihlen
< sizeof(_iph
))
3427 ad
->u
.net
.v4info
.saddr
= ih
->saddr
;
3428 ad
->u
.net
.v4info
.daddr
= ih
->daddr
;
3432 *proto
= ih
->protocol
;
3434 switch (ih
->protocol
) {
3436 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3438 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3442 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3446 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= th
->source
;
3447 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= th
->dest
;
3452 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3454 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3458 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3462 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= uh
->source
;
3463 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= uh
->dest
;
3467 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3468 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3470 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3474 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3478 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3479 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3490 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3492 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3493 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3494 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3497 int ret
= -EINVAL
, offset
;
3498 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h
, *ip6
;
3500 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3501 ip6
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_ipv6h
), &_ipv6h
);
3505 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad
->u
.net
.v6info
.saddr
, &ip6
->saddr
);
3506 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad
->u
.net
.v6info
.daddr
, &ip6
->daddr
);
3509 nexthdr
= ip6
->nexthdr
;
3510 offset
+= sizeof(_ipv6h
);
3511 offset
= ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb
, offset
, &nexthdr
);
3520 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3522 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3526 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= th
->source
;
3527 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= th
->dest
;
3532 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3534 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3538 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= uh
->source
;
3539 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= uh
->dest
;
3543 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3544 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3546 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3550 ad
->u
.net
.sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3551 ad
->u
.net
.dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3555 /* includes fragments */
3565 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff
*skb
, struct common_audit_data
*ad
,
3566 char **_addrp
, int src
, u8
*proto
)
3571 switch (ad
->u
.net
.family
) {
3573 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3576 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
.v4info
.saddr
:
3577 &ad
->u
.net
.v4info
.daddr
);
3580 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3582 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3585 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
.v6info
.saddr
:
3586 &ad
->u
.net
.v6info
.daddr
);
3596 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3597 " unable to parse packet\n");
3607 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3609 * @family: protocol family
3610 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3613 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3614 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3615 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3616 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3617 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3621 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff
*skb
, u16 family
, u32
*sid
)
3628 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb
, &xfrm_sid
);
3629 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb
, family
, &nlbl_type
, &nlbl_sid
);
3631 err
= security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid
, nlbl_type
, xfrm_sid
, sid
);
3632 if (unlikely(err
)) {
3634 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3635 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3642 /* socket security operations */
3644 static u32
socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
)
3646 return tsec
->sockcreate_sid
? : tsec
->sid
;
3649 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct
*task
, struct sock
*sk
, u32 perms
)
3651 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
3652 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3653 u32 tsid
= task_sid(task
);
3655 if (sksec
->sid
== SECINITSID_KERNEL
)
3658 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3661 return avc_has_perm(tsid
, sksec
->sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
3664 static int selinux_socket_create(int family
, int type
,
3665 int protocol
, int kern
)
3667 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
3674 newsid
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
);
3675 secclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
3676 return avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, newsid
, secclass
, SOCKET__CREATE
, NULL
);
3679 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket
*sock
, int family
,
3680 int type
, int protocol
, int kern
)
3682 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
3683 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3684 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
3688 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
3690 isec
->sid
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
);
3692 isec
->sclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
3693 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3696 sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
3697 sksec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
3698 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
3699 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock
->sk
, family
);
3705 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3706 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3707 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3709 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
3711 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
3715 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, SOCKET__BIND
);
3720 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3721 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3722 * check the first address now.
3724 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
3725 if (family
== PF_INET
|| family
== PF_INET6
) {
3727 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
3728 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3729 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
3730 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
3731 unsigned short snum
;
3734 if (family
== PF_INET
) {
3735 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
3736 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
3737 addrp
= (char *)&addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
3739 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
3740 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
3741 addrp
= (char *)&addr6
->sin6_addr
.s6_addr
;
3747 inet_get_local_port_range(&low
, &high
);
3749 if (snum
< max(PROT_SOCK
, low
) || snum
> high
) {
3750 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
,
3754 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3755 ad
.u
.net
.sport
= htons(snum
);
3756 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
3757 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
,
3759 SOCKET__NAME_BIND
, &ad
);
3765 switch (sksec
->sclass
) {
3766 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
:
3767 node_perm
= TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3770 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
:
3771 node_perm
= UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3774 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
:
3775 node_perm
= DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3779 node_perm
= RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3783 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &sid
);
3787 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3788 ad
.u
.net
.sport
= htons(snum
);
3789 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
3791 if (family
== PF_INET
)
3792 ad
.u
.net
.v4info
.saddr
= addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
3794 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad
.u
.net
.v6info
.saddr
, &addr6
->sin6_addr
);
3796 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
,
3797 sksec
->sclass
, node_perm
, &ad
);
3805 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
3807 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
3808 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
3811 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, SOCKET__CONNECT
);
3816 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3818 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
||
3819 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
) {
3820 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3821 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
3822 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
3823 unsigned short snum
;
3826 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
) {
3827 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
3828 if (addrlen
< sizeof(struct sockaddr_in
))
3830 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
3832 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
3833 if (addrlen
< SIN6_LEN_RFC2133
)
3835 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
3838 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
, snum
, &sid
);
3842 perm
= (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
) ?
3843 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
: DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
;
3845 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3846 ad
.u
.net
.dport
= htons(snum
);
3847 ad
.u
.net
.family
= sk
->sk_family
;
3848 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perm
, &ad
);
3853 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk
, address
);
3859 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket
*sock
, int backlog
)
3861 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__LISTEN
);
3864 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket
*sock
, struct socket
*newsock
)
3867 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3868 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
;
3870 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__ACCEPT
);
3874 newisec
= SOCK_INODE(newsock
)->i_security
;
3876 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3877 newisec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
3878 newisec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
3879 newisec
->initialized
= 1;
3884 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
3887 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__WRITE
);
3890 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
3891 int size
, int flags
)
3893 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__READ
);
3896 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket
*sock
)
3898 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
3901 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket
*sock
)
3903 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
3906 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
, int optname
)
3910 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SETOPT
);
3914 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock
, level
, optname
);
3917 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
,
3920 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETOPT
);
3923 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket
*sock
, int how
)
3925 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN
);
3928 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock
*sock
,
3932 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_sock
= sock
->sk_security
;
3933 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_other
= other
->sk_security
;
3934 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_new
= newsk
->sk_security
;
3935 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3938 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3939 ad
.u
.net
.sk
= other
;
3941 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec_sock
->sid
, sksec_other
->sid
,
3942 sksec_other
->sclass
,
3943 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO
, &ad
);
3947 /* server child socket */
3948 sksec_new
->peer_sid
= sksec_sock
->sid
;
3949 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other
->sid
, sksec_sock
->sid
,
3954 /* connecting socket */
3955 sksec_sock
->peer_sid
= sksec_new
->sid
;
3960 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket
*sock
,
3961 struct socket
*other
)
3963 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
3964 struct sk_security_struct
*osec
= other
->sk
->sk_security
;
3965 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3967 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
3968 ad
.u
.net
.sk
= other
->sk
;
3970 return avc_has_perm(ssec
->sid
, osec
->sid
, osec
->sclass
, SOCKET__SENDTO
,
3974 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex
, char *addrp
, u16 family
,
3976 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
3982 err
= sel_netif_sid(ifindex
, &if_sid
);
3985 err
= avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
3986 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__INGRESS
, ad
);
3990 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
);
3993 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
3994 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__RECVFROM
, ad
);
3997 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4001 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4003 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4004 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4007 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4008 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4009 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4010 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4014 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4015 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4021 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer
) {
4022 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
);
4025 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, peer_sid
,
4026 SECCLASS_PEER
, PEER__RECV
, &ad
);
4028 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4030 err
= selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
, skb
, family
, &ad
);
4033 err
= selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
);
4039 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4042 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4043 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4044 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4045 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4050 if (family
!= PF_INET
&& family
!= PF_INET6
)
4053 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4054 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4057 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4058 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4059 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4060 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4061 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4062 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk
, skb
, family
);
4064 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4065 peerlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4066 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4069 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4070 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4071 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4072 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4076 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4079 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
);
4082 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb
->skb_iif
, addrp
, family
,
4085 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4088 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, peer_sid
, SECCLASS_PEER
,
4091 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4094 if (secmark_active
) {
4095 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4104 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket
*sock
, char __user
*optval
,
4105 int __user
*optlen
, unsigned len
)
4110 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4111 u32 peer_sid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4113 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
||
4114 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
)
4115 peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
4116 if (peer_sid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4117 return -ENOPROTOOPT
;
4119 err
= security_sid_to_context(peer_sid
, &scontext
, &scontext_len
);
4123 if (scontext_len
> len
) {
4128 if (copy_to_user(optval
, scontext
, scontext_len
))
4132 if (put_user(scontext_len
, optlen
))
4138 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket
*sock
, struct sk_buff
*skb
, u32
*secid
)
4140 u32 peer_secid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4143 if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4145 else if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IPV6
))
4148 family
= sock
->sk
->sk_family
;
4152 if (sock
&& family
== PF_UNIX
)
4153 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock
), &peer_secid
);
4155 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_secid
);
4158 *secid
= peer_secid
;
4159 if (peer_secid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4164 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock
*sk
, int family
, gfp_t priority
)
4166 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4168 sksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec
), priority
);
4172 sksec
->peer_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4173 sksec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4174 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec
);
4175 sk
->sk_security
= sksec
;
4180 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock
*sk
)
4182 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4184 sk
->sk_security
= NULL
;
4185 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec
);
4189 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock
*sk
, struct sock
*newsk
)
4191 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4192 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4194 newsksec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4195 newsksec
->peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
4196 newsksec
->sclass
= sksec
->sclass
;
4198 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec
);
4201 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock
*sk
, u32
*secid
)
4204 *secid
= SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET
;
4206 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4208 *secid
= sksec
->sid
;
4212 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock
*sk
, struct socket
*parent
)
4214 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= SOCK_INODE(parent
)->i_security
;
4215 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4217 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
|| sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET6
||
4218 sk
->sk_family
== PF_UNIX
)
4219 isec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4220 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4223 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4224 struct request_sock
*req
)
4226 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4228 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4232 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4233 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4236 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peersid
);
4239 if (peersid
== SECSID_NULL
) {
4240 req
->secid
= sksec
->sid
;
4241 req
->peer_secid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4243 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sksec
->sid
, peersid
, &newsid
);
4246 req
->secid
= newsid
;
4247 req
->peer_secid
= peersid
;
4250 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req
, family
);
4253 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock
*newsk
,
4254 const struct request_sock
*req
)
4256 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4258 newsksec
->sid
= req
->secid
;
4259 newsksec
->peer_sid
= req
->peer_secid
;
4260 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4261 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4262 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4263 time it will have been created and available. */
4265 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4266 * thread with access to newsksec */
4267 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk
, req
->rsk_ops
->family
);
4270 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4272 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4273 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4275 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4276 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4279 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &sksec
->peer_sid
);
4282 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid
)
4284 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
4287 __tsec
= current_security();
4290 return avc_has_perm(tsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
4293 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4295 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount
);
4298 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4300 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount
);
4303 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock
*req
,
4306 fl
->secid
= req
->secid
;
4309 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4311 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4313 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4314 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4315 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4316 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4317 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4318 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4320 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE
,
4324 static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock
*sk
)
4326 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4328 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4329 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4330 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4331 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4332 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4333 * protocols were being used */
4335 /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
4336 * the sockcreate SID here */
4338 sksec
->sid
= current_sid();
4339 sksec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
;
4342 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock
*sk
)
4344 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4345 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4348 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sksec
->sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4349 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
4352 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4353 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
4362 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4366 struct nlmsghdr
*nlh
;
4367 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4369 if (skb
->len
< NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4373 nlh
= nlmsg_hdr(skb
);
4375 err
= selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec
->sclass
, nlh
->nlmsg_type
, &perm
);
4377 if (err
== -EINVAL
) {
4378 audit_log(current
->audit_context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
,
4379 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4380 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4381 nlh
->nlmsg_type
, sksec
->sclass
);
4382 if (!selinux_enforcing
|| security_get_allow_unknown())
4392 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, perm
);
4397 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4399 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int ifindex
,
4405 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4410 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4413 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4414 netlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled();
4415 peerlbl_active
= netlbl_active
|| selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4416 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4419 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
) != 0)
4422 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4423 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= ifindex
;
4424 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4425 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
) != 0)
4428 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4429 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex
, addrp
, family
,
4432 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 1);
4438 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4439 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__FORWARD_IN
, &ad
))
4443 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4444 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4445 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4447 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, peer_sid
) != 0)
4453 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum
,
4454 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4455 const struct net_device
*in
,
4456 const struct net_device
*out
,
4457 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4459 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, in
->ifindex
, PF_INET
);
4462 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4463 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum
,
4464 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4465 const struct net_device
*in
,
4466 const struct net_device
*out
,
4467 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4469 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, in
->ifindex
, PF_INET6
);
4473 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4478 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4481 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4482 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4483 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4485 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= skb
->sk
->sk_security
;
4488 sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4489 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, sid
) != 0)
4495 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum
,
4496 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4497 const struct net_device
*in
,
4498 const struct net_device
*out
,
4499 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4501 return selinux_ip_output(skb
, PF_INET
);
4504 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4508 struct sock
*sk
= skb
->sk
;
4509 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4510 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4516 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4518 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4519 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= ifindex
;
4520 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4521 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, &proto
))
4524 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4525 if (avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4526 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__SEND
, &ad
))
4527 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4529 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4530 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
, proto
))
4531 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4536 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int ifindex
,
4542 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4547 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4548 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4549 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4550 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4551 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4552 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb
, ifindex
, family
);
4554 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4555 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4556 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4557 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4558 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4559 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4560 if (skb_dst(skb
) != NULL
&& skb_dst(skb
)->xfrm
!= NULL
)
4563 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4564 peerlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4565 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4568 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4569 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4570 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4571 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4576 if (IPCB(skb
)->flags
& IPSKB_FORWARDED
)
4577 secmark_perm
= PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
;
4579 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4582 if (IP6CB(skb
)->flags
& IP6SKB_FORWARDED
)
4583 secmark_perm
= PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
;
4585 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4588 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4590 if (secmark_perm
== PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
) {
4591 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
))
4594 peer_sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4596 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4597 peer_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4598 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4601 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, NET
);
4602 ad
.u
.net
.netif
= ifindex
;
4603 ad
.u
.net
.family
= family
;
4604 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, NULL
))
4608 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4609 SECCLASS_PACKET
, secmark_perm
, &ad
))
4610 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4612 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4616 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex
, &if_sid
))
4618 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
4619 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__EGRESS
, &ad
))
4620 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4622 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
))
4624 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
4625 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__SENDTO
, &ad
))
4626 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4632 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum
,
4633 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4634 const struct net_device
*in
,
4635 const struct net_device
*out
,
4636 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4638 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, out
->ifindex
, PF_INET
);
4641 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4642 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum
,
4643 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4644 const struct net_device
*in
,
4645 const struct net_device
*out
,
4646 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4648 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, out
->ifindex
, PF_INET6
);
4652 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4654 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4658 err
= cap_netlink_send(sk
, skb
);
4662 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk
, skb
);
4665 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int capability
)
4668 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4670 err
= cap_netlink_recv(skb
, capability
);
4674 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, CAP
);
4675 ad
.u
.cap
= capability
;
4677 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb
).sid
, NETLINK_CB(skb
).sid
,
4678 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY
, CAP_TO_MASK(capability
), &ad
);
4681 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct
*task
,
4682 struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
,
4685 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4688 isec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
4692 sid
= task_sid(task
);
4693 isec
->sclass
= sclass
;
4695 perm
->security
= isec
;
4700 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
)
4702 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= perm
->security
;
4703 perm
->security
= NULL
;
4707 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4709 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
4711 msec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
4715 msec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4716 msg
->security
= msec
;
4721 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4723 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
= msg
->security
;
4725 msg
->security
= NULL
;
4729 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipc_perms
,
4732 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4733 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4734 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4736 isec
= ipc_perms
->security
;
4738 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4739 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= ipc_perms
->key
;
4741 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
4744 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4746 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg
);
4749 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4751 msg_msg_free_security(msg
);
4754 /* message queue security operations */
4755 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
4757 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4758 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4759 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4762 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &msq
->q_perm
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
);
4766 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4768 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4769 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4771 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4774 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
4780 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
4782 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
4785 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int msqflg
)
4787 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4788 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4789 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4791 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4793 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4794 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4796 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4797 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
4800 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int cmd
)
4808 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4809 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
4812 perms
= MSGQ__GETATTR
| MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
;
4815 perms
= MSGQ__SETATTR
;
4818 perms
= MSGQ__DESTROY
;
4824 err
= ipc_has_perm(&msq
->q_perm
, perms
);
4828 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
, int msqflg
)
4830 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4831 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
4832 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4833 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4836 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4837 msec
= msg
->security
;
4840 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4842 if (msec
->sid
== SECINITSID_UNLABELED
) {
4844 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4845 * message queue this message will be stored in
4847 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
4853 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4854 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4856 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4857 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4860 /* Can this process send the message */
4861 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
4864 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4865 rc
= avc_has_perm(msec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4866 MSGQ__ENQUEUE
, &ad
);
4871 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
,
4872 struct task_struct
*target
,
4873 long type
, int mode
)
4875 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4876 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
4877 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4878 u32 sid
= task_sid(target
);
4881 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4882 msec
= msg
->security
;
4884 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4885 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4887 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
4888 SECCLASS_MSGQ
, MSGQ__READ
, &ad
);
4890 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
,
4891 SECCLASS_MSG
, MSG__RECEIVE
, &ad
);
4895 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4896 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
4898 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4899 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4900 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4903 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &shp
->shm_perm
, SECCLASS_SHM
);
4907 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
4909 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4910 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
4912 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
4915 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
4921 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
4923 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
4926 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int shmflg
)
4928 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4929 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4930 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4932 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
4934 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
4935 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
4937 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
4938 SHM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
4941 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4942 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int cmd
)
4950 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4951 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
4954 perms
= SHM__GETATTR
| SHM__ASSOCIATE
;
4957 perms
= SHM__SETATTR
;
4964 perms
= SHM__DESTROY
;
4970 err
= ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
4974 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
,
4975 char __user
*shmaddr
, int shmflg
)
4979 if (shmflg
& SHM_RDONLY
)
4982 perms
= SHM__READ
| SHM__WRITE
;
4984 return ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
4987 /* Semaphore security operations */
4988 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
4990 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4991 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4992 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4995 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &sma
->sem_perm
, SECCLASS_SEM
);
4999 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5001 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
5002 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5004 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5007 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5013 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5015 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5018 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array
*sma
, int semflg
)
5020 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5021 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5022 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5024 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5026 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad
, IPC
);
5027 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5029 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5030 SEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5033 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5034 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array
*sma
, int cmd
)
5042 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5043 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5047 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
;
5058 perms
= SEM__DESTROY
;
5061 perms
= SEM__SETATTR
;
5065 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
| SEM__ASSOCIATE
;
5071 err
= ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5075 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array
*sma
,
5076 struct sembuf
*sops
, unsigned nsops
, int alter
)
5081 perms
= SEM__READ
| SEM__WRITE
;
5085 return ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5088 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, short flag
)
5094 av
|= IPC__UNIX_READ
;
5096 av
|= IPC__UNIX_WRITE
;
5101 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp
, av
);
5104 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, u32
*secid
)
5106 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= ipcp
->security
;
5110 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct inode
*inode
)
5113 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, dentry
);
5116 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5117 char *name
, char **value
)
5119 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
5125 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETATTR
);
5131 __tsec
= __task_cred(p
)->security
;
5133 if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5135 else if (!strcmp(name
, "prev"))
5137 else if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5138 sid
= __tsec
->exec_sid
;
5139 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5140 sid
= __tsec
->create_sid
;
5141 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5142 sid
= __tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5143 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5144 sid
= __tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
5152 error
= security_sid_to_context(sid
, value
, &len
);
5162 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5163 char *name
, void *value
, size_t size
)
5165 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5166 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
5173 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5174 security attributes. */
5179 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5180 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5181 * above restriction is ever removed.
5183 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5184 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETEXEC
);
5185 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5186 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE
);
5187 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5188 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE
);
5189 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5190 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE
);
5191 else if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5192 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETCURRENT
);
5198 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5199 if (size
&& str
[1] && str
[1] != '\n') {
5200 if (str
[size
-1] == '\n') {
5204 error
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &sid
);
5205 if (error
== -EINVAL
&& !strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5206 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
))
5208 error
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
,
5215 new = prepare_creds();
5219 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5220 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5221 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5222 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5223 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5224 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5225 tsec
= new->security
;
5226 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec")) {
5227 tsec
->exec_sid
= sid
;
5228 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5229 tsec
->create_sid
= sid
;
5230 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate")) {
5231 error
= may_create_key(sid
, p
);
5234 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= sid
;
5235 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate")) {
5236 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= sid
;
5237 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "current")) {
5242 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5244 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5245 error
= security_bounded_transition(tsec
->sid
, sid
);
5250 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5251 error
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5252 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION
, NULL
);
5256 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5257 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5260 tracer
= tracehook_tracer_task(p
);
5262 ptsid
= task_sid(tracer
);
5266 error
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5267 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
5286 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid
, char **secdata
, u32
*seclen
)
5288 return security_sid_to_context(secid
, secdata
, seclen
);
5291 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata
, u32 seclen
, u32
*secid
)
5293 return security_context_to_sid(secdata
, seclen
, secid
);
5296 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata
, u32 seclen
)
5302 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5304 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5306 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5310 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5312 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry
*dentry
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5314 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5317 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void **ctx
, u32
*ctxlen
)
5320 len
= selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
,
5329 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key
*k
, const struct cred
*cred
,
5330 unsigned long flags
)
5332 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5333 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5335 ksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5339 tsec
= cred
->security
;
5340 if (tsec
->keycreate_sid
)
5341 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5343 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->sid
;
5349 static void selinux_key_free(struct key
*k
)
5351 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= k
->security
;
5357 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref
,
5358 const struct cred
*cred
,
5362 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5365 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5366 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5367 appear to be created. */
5371 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
5373 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
5374 ksec
= key
->security
;
5376 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksec
->sid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, perm
, NULL
);
5379 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key
*key
, char **_buffer
)
5381 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= key
->security
;
5382 char *context
= NULL
;
5386 rc
= security_sid_to_context(ksec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
5395 static struct security_operations selinux_ops
= {
5398 .ptrace_access_check
= selinux_ptrace_access_check
,
5399 .ptrace_traceme
= selinux_ptrace_traceme
,
5400 .capget
= selinux_capget
,
5401 .capset
= selinux_capset
,
5402 .sysctl
= selinux_sysctl
,
5403 .capable
= selinux_capable
,
5404 .quotactl
= selinux_quotactl
,
5405 .quota_on
= selinux_quota_on
,
5406 .syslog
= selinux_syslog
,
5407 .vm_enough_memory
= selinux_vm_enough_memory
,
5409 .netlink_send
= selinux_netlink_send
,
5410 .netlink_recv
= selinux_netlink_recv
,
5412 .bprm_set_creds
= selinux_bprm_set_creds
,
5413 .bprm_committing_creds
= selinux_bprm_committing_creds
,
5414 .bprm_committed_creds
= selinux_bprm_committed_creds
,
5415 .bprm_secureexec
= selinux_bprm_secureexec
,
5417 .sb_alloc_security
= selinux_sb_alloc_security
,
5418 .sb_free_security
= selinux_sb_free_security
,
5419 .sb_copy_data
= selinux_sb_copy_data
,
5420 .sb_kern_mount
= selinux_sb_kern_mount
,
5421 .sb_show_options
= selinux_sb_show_options
,
5422 .sb_statfs
= selinux_sb_statfs
,
5423 .sb_mount
= selinux_mount
,
5424 .sb_umount
= selinux_umount
,
5425 .sb_set_mnt_opts
= selinux_set_mnt_opts
,
5426 .sb_clone_mnt_opts
= selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts
,
5427 .sb_parse_opts_str
= selinux_parse_opts_str
,
5430 .inode_alloc_security
= selinux_inode_alloc_security
,
5431 .inode_free_security
= selinux_inode_free_security
,
5432 .inode_init_security
= selinux_inode_init_security
,
5433 .inode_create
= selinux_inode_create
,
5434 .inode_link
= selinux_inode_link
,
5435 .inode_unlink
= selinux_inode_unlink
,
5436 .inode_symlink
= selinux_inode_symlink
,
5437 .inode_mkdir
= selinux_inode_mkdir
,
5438 .inode_rmdir
= selinux_inode_rmdir
,
5439 .inode_mknod
= selinux_inode_mknod
,
5440 .inode_rename
= selinux_inode_rename
,
5441 .inode_readlink
= selinux_inode_readlink
,
5442 .inode_follow_link
= selinux_inode_follow_link
,
5443 .inode_permission
= selinux_inode_permission
,
5444 .inode_setattr
= selinux_inode_setattr
,
5445 .inode_getattr
= selinux_inode_getattr
,
5446 .inode_setxattr
= selinux_inode_setxattr
,
5447 .inode_post_setxattr
= selinux_inode_post_setxattr
,
5448 .inode_getxattr
= selinux_inode_getxattr
,
5449 .inode_listxattr
= selinux_inode_listxattr
,
5450 .inode_removexattr
= selinux_inode_removexattr
,
5451 .inode_getsecurity
= selinux_inode_getsecurity
,
5452 .inode_setsecurity
= selinux_inode_setsecurity
,
5453 .inode_listsecurity
= selinux_inode_listsecurity
,
5454 .inode_getsecid
= selinux_inode_getsecid
,
5456 .file_permission
= selinux_file_permission
,
5457 .file_alloc_security
= selinux_file_alloc_security
,
5458 .file_free_security
= selinux_file_free_security
,
5459 .file_ioctl
= selinux_file_ioctl
,
5460 .file_mmap
= selinux_file_mmap
,
5461 .file_mprotect
= selinux_file_mprotect
,
5462 .file_lock
= selinux_file_lock
,
5463 .file_fcntl
= selinux_file_fcntl
,
5464 .file_set_fowner
= selinux_file_set_fowner
,
5465 .file_send_sigiotask
= selinux_file_send_sigiotask
,
5466 .file_receive
= selinux_file_receive
,
5468 .dentry_open
= selinux_dentry_open
,
5470 .task_create
= selinux_task_create
,
5471 .cred_alloc_blank
= selinux_cred_alloc_blank
,
5472 .cred_free
= selinux_cred_free
,
5473 .cred_prepare
= selinux_cred_prepare
,
5474 .cred_transfer
= selinux_cred_transfer
,
5475 .kernel_act_as
= selinux_kernel_act_as
,
5476 .kernel_create_files_as
= selinux_kernel_create_files_as
,
5477 .kernel_module_request
= selinux_kernel_module_request
,
5478 .task_setpgid
= selinux_task_setpgid
,
5479 .task_getpgid
= selinux_task_getpgid
,
5480 .task_getsid
= selinux_task_getsid
,
5481 .task_getsecid
= selinux_task_getsecid
,
5482 .task_setnice
= selinux_task_setnice
,
5483 .task_setioprio
= selinux_task_setioprio
,
5484 .task_getioprio
= selinux_task_getioprio
,
5485 .task_setrlimit
= selinux_task_setrlimit
,
5486 .task_setscheduler
= selinux_task_setscheduler
,
5487 .task_getscheduler
= selinux_task_getscheduler
,
5488 .task_movememory
= selinux_task_movememory
,
5489 .task_kill
= selinux_task_kill
,
5490 .task_wait
= selinux_task_wait
,
5491 .task_to_inode
= selinux_task_to_inode
,
5493 .ipc_permission
= selinux_ipc_permission
,
5494 .ipc_getsecid
= selinux_ipc_getsecid
,
5496 .msg_msg_alloc_security
= selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security
,
5497 .msg_msg_free_security
= selinux_msg_msg_free_security
,
5499 .msg_queue_alloc_security
= selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security
,
5500 .msg_queue_free_security
= selinux_msg_queue_free_security
,
5501 .msg_queue_associate
= selinux_msg_queue_associate
,
5502 .msg_queue_msgctl
= selinux_msg_queue_msgctl
,
5503 .msg_queue_msgsnd
= selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd
,
5504 .msg_queue_msgrcv
= selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv
,
5506 .shm_alloc_security
= selinux_shm_alloc_security
,
5507 .shm_free_security
= selinux_shm_free_security
,
5508 .shm_associate
= selinux_shm_associate
,
5509 .shm_shmctl
= selinux_shm_shmctl
,
5510 .shm_shmat
= selinux_shm_shmat
,
5512 .sem_alloc_security
= selinux_sem_alloc_security
,
5513 .sem_free_security
= selinux_sem_free_security
,
5514 .sem_associate
= selinux_sem_associate
,
5515 .sem_semctl
= selinux_sem_semctl
,
5516 .sem_semop
= selinux_sem_semop
,
5518 .d_instantiate
= selinux_d_instantiate
,
5520 .getprocattr
= selinux_getprocattr
,
5521 .setprocattr
= selinux_setprocattr
,
5523 .secid_to_secctx
= selinux_secid_to_secctx
,
5524 .secctx_to_secid
= selinux_secctx_to_secid
,
5525 .release_secctx
= selinux_release_secctx
,
5526 .inode_notifysecctx
= selinux_inode_notifysecctx
,
5527 .inode_setsecctx
= selinux_inode_setsecctx
,
5528 .inode_getsecctx
= selinux_inode_getsecctx
,
5530 .unix_stream_connect
= selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect
,
5531 .unix_may_send
= selinux_socket_unix_may_send
,
5533 .socket_create
= selinux_socket_create
,
5534 .socket_post_create
= selinux_socket_post_create
,
5535 .socket_bind
= selinux_socket_bind
,
5536 .socket_connect
= selinux_socket_connect
,
5537 .socket_listen
= selinux_socket_listen
,
5538 .socket_accept
= selinux_socket_accept
,
5539 .socket_sendmsg
= selinux_socket_sendmsg
,
5540 .socket_recvmsg
= selinux_socket_recvmsg
,
5541 .socket_getsockname
= selinux_socket_getsockname
,
5542 .socket_getpeername
= selinux_socket_getpeername
,
5543 .socket_getsockopt
= selinux_socket_getsockopt
,
5544 .socket_setsockopt
= selinux_socket_setsockopt
,
5545 .socket_shutdown
= selinux_socket_shutdown
,
5546 .socket_sock_rcv_skb
= selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb
,
5547 .socket_getpeersec_stream
= selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream
,
5548 .socket_getpeersec_dgram
= selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram
,
5549 .sk_alloc_security
= selinux_sk_alloc_security
,
5550 .sk_free_security
= selinux_sk_free_security
,
5551 .sk_clone_security
= selinux_sk_clone_security
,
5552 .sk_getsecid
= selinux_sk_getsecid
,
5553 .sock_graft
= selinux_sock_graft
,
5554 .inet_conn_request
= selinux_inet_conn_request
,
5555 .inet_csk_clone
= selinux_inet_csk_clone
,
5556 .inet_conn_established
= selinux_inet_conn_established
,
5557 .secmark_relabel_packet
= selinux_secmark_relabel_packet
,
5558 .secmark_refcount_inc
= selinux_secmark_refcount_inc
,
5559 .secmark_refcount_dec
= selinux_secmark_refcount_dec
,
5560 .req_classify_flow
= selinux_req_classify_flow
,
5561 .tun_dev_create
= selinux_tun_dev_create
,
5562 .tun_dev_post_create
= selinux_tun_dev_post_create
,
5563 .tun_dev_attach
= selinux_tun_dev_attach
,
5565 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5566 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc
,
5567 .xfrm_policy_clone_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_clone
,
5568 .xfrm_policy_free_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_free
,
5569 .xfrm_policy_delete_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_delete
,
5570 .xfrm_state_alloc_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_alloc
,
5571 .xfrm_state_free_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_free
,
5572 .xfrm_state_delete_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_delete
,
5573 .xfrm_policy_lookup
= selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup
,
5574 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
= selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
,
5575 .xfrm_decode_session
= selinux_xfrm_decode_session
,
5579 .key_alloc
= selinux_key_alloc
,
5580 .key_free
= selinux_key_free
,
5581 .key_permission
= selinux_key_permission
,
5582 .key_getsecurity
= selinux_key_getsecurity
,
5586 .audit_rule_init
= selinux_audit_rule_init
,
5587 .audit_rule_known
= selinux_audit_rule_known
,
5588 .audit_rule_match
= selinux_audit_rule_match
,
5589 .audit_rule_free
= selinux_audit_rule_free
,
5593 static __init
int selinux_init(void)
5595 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops
)) {
5596 selinux_enabled
= 0;
5600 if (!selinux_enabled
) {
5601 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5605 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5607 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5608 cred_init_security();
5610 default_noexec
= !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS
& VM_EXEC
);
5612 sel_inode_cache
= kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5613 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct
),
5614 0, SLAB_PANIC
, NULL
);
5617 if (register_security(&selinux_ops
))
5618 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5620 if (selinux_enforcing
)
5621 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5623 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5628 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block
*sb
, void *unused
)
5630 superblock_doinit(sb
, NULL
);
5633 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5635 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5637 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5638 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5639 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init
, NULL
);
5642 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5643 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5644 security_initcall(selinux_init
);
5646 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5648 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops
[] = {
5650 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_postroute
,
5651 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5653 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
5654 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
5657 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_forward
,
5658 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5660 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
5661 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
5664 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_output
,
5665 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5667 .hooknum
= NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT
,
5668 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
5672 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5674 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops
[] = {
5676 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_postroute
,
5677 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5679 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
5680 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
5683 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_forward
,
5684 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5686 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
5687 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
5693 static int __init
selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5697 if (!selinux_enabled
)
5700 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5702 err
= nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops
));
5704 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err
);
5706 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5707 err
= nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops
));
5709 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err
);
5716 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init
);
5718 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5719 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5721 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5723 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops
));
5724 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5725 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops
));
5730 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5732 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5733 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5736 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5738 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5739 static int selinux_disabled
;
5741 int selinux_disable(void)
5743 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5745 if (ss_initialized
) {
5746 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5750 if (selinux_disabled
) {
5751 /* Only do this once. */
5755 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5757 selinux_disabled
= 1;
5758 selinux_enabled
= 0;
5760 reset_security_ops();
5762 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5765 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5766 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5768 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */