2 * Implementation of the security services.
4 * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
5 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
7 * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
9 * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
10 * Support for context based audit filters.
12 * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
14 * Added conditional policy language extensions
16 * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Added support for NetLabel
19 * Added support for the policy capability bitmap
21 * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
23 * Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
25 * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
27 * Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
29 * Updated: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
31 * Added support for runtime switching of the policy type
33 * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
34 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
35 * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
36 * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
37 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
38 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
39 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
40 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
42 #include <linux/kernel.h>
43 #include <linux/slab.h>
44 #include <linux/string.h>
45 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
46 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
47 #include <linux/errno.h>
49 #include <linux/sched.h>
50 #include <linux/audit.h>
51 #include <linux/mutex.h>
52 #include <linux/selinux.h>
53 #include <linux/flex_array.h>
54 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
55 #include <net/netlabel.h>
65 #include "conditional.h"
73 int selinux_policycap_netpeer
;
74 int selinux_policycap_openperm
;
75 int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork
;
77 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock
);
79 static struct sidtab sidtab
;
80 struct policydb policydb
;
84 * The largest sequence number that has been used when
85 * providing an access decision to the access vector cache.
86 * The sequence number only changes when a policy change
89 static u32 latest_granting
;
91 /* Forward declaration. */
92 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context
*context
, char **scontext
,
95 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context
*scontext
,
96 struct context
*tcontext
,
98 struct av_decision
*avd
,
99 struct extended_perms
*xperms
);
101 struct selinux_mapping
{
102 u16 value
; /* policy value */
104 u32 perms
[sizeof(u32
) * 8];
107 static struct selinux_mapping
*current_mapping
;
108 static u16 current_mapping_size
;
110 static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb
*pol
,
111 struct security_class_mapping
*map
,
112 struct selinux_mapping
**out_map_p
,
115 struct selinux_mapping
*out_map
= NULL
;
116 size_t size
= sizeof(struct selinux_mapping
);
119 bool print_unknown_handle
= false;
121 /* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
128 /* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
129 out_map
= kcalloc(++i
, size
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
133 /* Store the raw class and permission values */
135 while (map
[j
].name
) {
136 struct security_class_mapping
*p_in
= map
+ (j
++);
137 struct selinux_mapping
*p_out
= out_map
+ j
;
139 /* An empty class string skips ahead */
140 if (!strcmp(p_in
->name
, "")) {
141 p_out
->num_perms
= 0;
145 p_out
->value
= string_to_security_class(pol
, p_in
->name
);
148 "SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
150 if (pol
->reject_unknown
)
152 p_out
->num_perms
= 0;
153 print_unknown_handle
= true;
158 while (p_in
->perms
&& p_in
->perms
[k
]) {
159 /* An empty permission string skips ahead */
160 if (!*p_in
->perms
[k
]) {
164 p_out
->perms
[k
] = string_to_av_perm(pol
, p_out
->value
,
166 if (!p_out
->perms
[k
]) {
168 "SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
169 p_in
->perms
[k
], p_in
->name
);
170 if (pol
->reject_unknown
)
172 print_unknown_handle
= true;
177 p_out
->num_perms
= k
;
180 if (print_unknown_handle
)
181 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
182 pol
->allow_unknown
? "allowed" : "denied");
184 *out_map_p
= out_map
;
193 * Get real, policy values from mapped values
196 static u16
unmap_class(u16 tclass
)
198 if (tclass
< current_mapping_size
)
199 return current_mapping
[tclass
].value
;
205 * Get kernel value for class from its policy value
207 static u16
map_class(u16 pol_value
)
211 for (i
= 1; i
< current_mapping_size
; i
++) {
212 if (current_mapping
[i
].value
== pol_value
)
216 return SECCLASS_NULL
;
219 static void map_decision(u16 tclass
, struct av_decision
*avd
,
222 if (tclass
< current_mapping_size
) {
223 unsigned i
, n
= current_mapping
[tclass
].num_perms
;
226 for (i
= 0, result
= 0; i
< n
; i
++) {
227 if (avd
->allowed
& current_mapping
[tclass
].perms
[i
])
229 if (allow_unknown
&& !current_mapping
[tclass
].perms
[i
])
232 avd
->allowed
= result
;
234 for (i
= 0, result
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
235 if (avd
->auditallow
& current_mapping
[tclass
].perms
[i
])
237 avd
->auditallow
= result
;
239 for (i
= 0, result
= 0; i
< n
; i
++) {
240 if (avd
->auditdeny
& current_mapping
[tclass
].perms
[i
])
242 if (!allow_unknown
&& !current_mapping
[tclass
].perms
[i
])
246 * In case the kernel has a bug and requests a permission
247 * between num_perms and the maximum permission number, we
248 * should audit that denial
250 for (; i
< (sizeof(u32
)*8); i
++)
252 avd
->auditdeny
= result
;
256 int security_mls_enabled(void)
258 return policydb
.mls_enabled
;
262 * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
263 * when it is applied to the specified source and target
266 * xcontext is a special beast... It is used by the validatetrans rules
267 * only. For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
268 * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
269 * of the process performing the transition. All other callers of
270 * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
272 static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context
*scontext
,
273 struct context
*tcontext
,
274 struct context
*xcontext
,
275 struct constraint_expr
*cexpr
)
279 struct role_datum
*r1
, *r2
;
280 struct mls_level
*l1
, *l2
;
281 struct constraint_expr
*e
;
282 int s
[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH
];
285 for (e
= cexpr
; e
; e
= e
->next
) {
286 switch (e
->expr_type
) {
302 if (sp
== (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH
- 1))
306 val1
= scontext
->user
;
307 val2
= tcontext
->user
;
310 val1
= scontext
->type
;
311 val2
= tcontext
->type
;
314 val1
= scontext
->role
;
315 val2
= tcontext
->role
;
316 r1
= policydb
.role_val_to_struct
[val1
- 1];
317 r2
= policydb
.role_val_to_struct
[val2
- 1];
320 s
[++sp
] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1
->dominates
,
324 s
[++sp
] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2
->dominates
,
328 s
[++sp
] = (!ebitmap_get_bit(&r1
->dominates
,
330 !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2
->dominates
,
338 l1
= &(scontext
->range
.level
[0]);
339 l2
= &(tcontext
->range
.level
[0]);
342 l1
= &(scontext
->range
.level
[0]);
343 l2
= &(tcontext
->range
.level
[1]);
346 l1
= &(scontext
->range
.level
[1]);
347 l2
= &(tcontext
->range
.level
[0]);
350 l1
= &(scontext
->range
.level
[1]);
351 l2
= &(tcontext
->range
.level
[1]);
354 l1
= &(scontext
->range
.level
[0]);
355 l2
= &(scontext
->range
.level
[1]);
358 l1
= &(tcontext
->range
.level
[0]);
359 l2
= &(tcontext
->range
.level
[1]);
364 s
[++sp
] = mls_level_eq(l1
, l2
);
367 s
[++sp
] = !mls_level_eq(l1
, l2
);
370 s
[++sp
] = mls_level_dom(l1
, l2
);
373 s
[++sp
] = mls_level_dom(l2
, l1
);
376 s
[++sp
] = mls_level_incomp(l2
, l1
);
390 s
[++sp
] = (val1
== val2
);
393 s
[++sp
] = (val1
!= val2
);
401 if (sp
== (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH
-1))
404 if (e
->attr
& CEXPR_TARGET
)
406 else if (e
->attr
& CEXPR_XTARGET
) {
413 if (e
->attr
& CEXPR_USER
)
415 else if (e
->attr
& CEXPR_ROLE
)
417 else if (e
->attr
& CEXPR_TYPE
)
426 s
[++sp
] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e
->names
, val1
- 1);
429 s
[++sp
] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e
->names
, val1
- 1);
447 * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
448 * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
450 static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k
, void *d
, void *args
)
452 struct perm_datum
*pdatum
= d
;
453 char **permission_names
= args
;
455 BUG_ON(pdatum
->value
< 1 || pdatum
->value
> 32);
457 permission_names
[pdatum
->value
- 1] = (char *)k
;
462 static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context
*scontext
,
463 struct context
*tcontext
,
468 struct common_datum
*common_dat
;
469 struct class_datum
*tclass_dat
;
470 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
472 char *scontext_name
= NULL
;
473 char *tcontext_name
= NULL
;
474 char *permission_names
[32];
477 bool need_comma
= false;
482 tclass_name
= sym_name(&policydb
, SYM_CLASSES
, tclass
- 1);
483 tclass_dat
= policydb
.class_val_to_struct
[tclass
- 1];
484 common_dat
= tclass_dat
->comdatum
;
486 /* init permission_names */
488 hashtab_map(common_dat
->permissions
.table
,
489 dump_masked_av_helper
, permission_names
) < 0)
492 if (hashtab_map(tclass_dat
->permissions
.table
,
493 dump_masked_av_helper
, permission_names
) < 0)
496 /* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
497 if (context_struct_to_string(scontext
,
498 &scontext_name
, &length
) < 0)
501 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext
,
502 &tcontext_name
, &length
) < 0)
505 /* audit a message */
506 ab
= audit_log_start(current
->audit_context
,
507 GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
);
511 audit_log_format(ab
, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
512 "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
513 reason
, scontext_name
, tcontext_name
, tclass_name
);
515 for (index
= 0; index
< 32; index
++) {
516 u32 mask
= (1 << index
);
518 if ((mask
& permissions
) == 0)
521 audit_log_format(ab
, "%s%s",
522 need_comma
? "," : "",
523 permission_names
[index
]
524 ? permission_names
[index
] : "????");
529 /* release scontext/tcontext */
530 kfree(tcontext_name
);
531 kfree(scontext_name
);
537 * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
538 * on boundary constraint.
540 static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context
*scontext
,
541 struct context
*tcontext
,
543 struct av_decision
*avd
)
545 struct context lo_scontext
;
546 struct context lo_tcontext
, *tcontextp
= tcontext
;
547 struct av_decision lo_avd
;
548 struct type_datum
*source
;
549 struct type_datum
*target
;
552 source
= flex_array_get_ptr(policydb
.type_val_to_struct_array
,
559 target
= flex_array_get_ptr(policydb
.type_val_to_struct_array
,
563 memset(&lo_avd
, 0, sizeof(lo_avd
));
565 memcpy(&lo_scontext
, scontext
, sizeof(lo_scontext
));
566 lo_scontext
.type
= source
->bounds
;
568 if (target
->bounds
) {
569 memcpy(&lo_tcontext
, tcontext
, sizeof(lo_tcontext
));
570 lo_tcontext
.type
= target
->bounds
;
571 tcontextp
= &lo_tcontext
;
574 context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext
,
580 masked
= ~lo_avd
.allowed
& avd
->allowed
;
583 return; /* no masked permission */
585 /* mask violated permissions */
586 avd
->allowed
&= ~masked
;
588 /* audit masked permissions */
589 security_dump_masked_av(scontext
, tcontext
,
590 tclass
, masked
, "bounds");
594 * flag which drivers have permissions
595 * only looking for ioctl based extended permssions
597 void services_compute_xperms_drivers(
598 struct extended_perms
*xperms
,
599 struct avtab_node
*node
)
603 if (node
->datum
.u
.xperms
->specified
== AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER
) {
604 /* if one or more driver has all permissions allowed */
605 for (i
= 0; i
< ARRAY_SIZE(xperms
->drivers
.p
); i
++)
606 xperms
->drivers
.p
[i
] |= node
->datum
.u
.xperms
->perms
.p
[i
];
607 } else if (node
->datum
.u
.xperms
->specified
== AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION
) {
608 /* if allowing permissions within a driver */
609 security_xperm_set(xperms
->drivers
.p
,
610 node
->datum
.u
.xperms
->driver
);
613 /* If no ioctl commands are allowed, ignore auditallow and auditdeny */
614 if (node
->key
.specified
& AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED
)
619 * Compute access vectors and extended permissions based on a context
620 * structure pair for the permissions in a particular class.
622 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context
*scontext
,
623 struct context
*tcontext
,
625 struct av_decision
*avd
,
626 struct extended_perms
*xperms
)
628 struct constraint_node
*constraint
;
629 struct role_allow
*ra
;
630 struct avtab_key avkey
;
631 struct avtab_node
*node
;
632 struct class_datum
*tclass_datum
;
633 struct ebitmap
*sattr
, *tattr
;
634 struct ebitmap_node
*snode
, *tnode
;
639 avd
->auditdeny
= 0xffffffff;
641 memset(&xperms
->drivers
, 0, sizeof(xperms
->drivers
));
645 if (unlikely(!tclass
|| tclass
> policydb
.p_classes
.nprim
)) {
646 if (printk_ratelimit())
647 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass
);
651 tclass_datum
= policydb
.class_val_to_struct
[tclass
- 1];
654 * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
655 * this permission check, then use it.
657 avkey
.target_class
= tclass
;
658 avkey
.specified
= AVTAB_AV
| AVTAB_XPERMS
;
659 sattr
= flex_array_get(policydb
.type_attr_map_array
, scontext
->type
- 1);
661 tattr
= flex_array_get(policydb
.type_attr_map_array
, tcontext
->type
- 1);
663 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr
, snode
, i
) {
664 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr
, tnode
, j
) {
665 avkey
.source_type
= i
+ 1;
666 avkey
.target_type
= j
+ 1;
667 for (node
= avtab_search_node(&policydb
.te_avtab
, &avkey
);
669 node
= avtab_search_node_next(node
, avkey
.specified
)) {
670 if (node
->key
.specified
== AVTAB_ALLOWED
)
671 avd
->allowed
|= node
->datum
.u
.data
;
672 else if (node
->key
.specified
== AVTAB_AUDITALLOW
)
673 avd
->auditallow
|= node
->datum
.u
.data
;
674 else if (node
->key
.specified
== AVTAB_AUDITDENY
)
675 avd
->auditdeny
&= node
->datum
.u
.data
;
676 else if (xperms
&& (node
->key
.specified
& AVTAB_XPERMS
))
677 services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms
, node
);
680 /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
681 cond_compute_av(&policydb
.te_cond_avtab
, &avkey
,
688 * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
691 constraint
= tclass_datum
->constraints
;
693 if ((constraint
->permissions
& (avd
->allowed
)) &&
694 !constraint_expr_eval(scontext
, tcontext
, NULL
,
696 avd
->allowed
&= ~(constraint
->permissions
);
698 constraint
= constraint
->next
;
702 * If checking process transition permission and the
703 * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
706 if (tclass
== policydb
.process_class
&&
707 (avd
->allowed
& policydb
.process_trans_perms
) &&
708 scontext
->role
!= tcontext
->role
) {
709 for (ra
= policydb
.role_allow
; ra
; ra
= ra
->next
) {
710 if (scontext
->role
== ra
->role
&&
711 tcontext
->role
== ra
->new_role
)
715 avd
->allowed
&= ~policydb
.process_trans_perms
;
719 * If the given source and target types have boundary
720 * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
721 * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
723 type_attribute_bounds_av(scontext
, tcontext
,
727 static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context
*ocontext
,
728 struct context
*ncontext
,
729 struct context
*tcontext
,
732 char *o
= NULL
, *n
= NULL
, *t
= NULL
;
733 u32 olen
, nlen
, tlen
;
735 if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext
, &o
, &olen
))
737 if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext
, &n
, &nlen
))
739 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext
, &t
, &tlen
))
741 audit_log(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
,
742 "op=security_validate_transition seresult=denied"
743 " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
744 o
, n
, t
, sym_name(&policydb
, SYM_CLASSES
, tclass
-1));
750 if (!selinux_enforcing
)
755 static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid
, u32 newsid
, u32 tasksid
,
756 u16 orig_tclass
, bool user
)
758 struct context
*ocontext
;
759 struct context
*ncontext
;
760 struct context
*tcontext
;
761 struct class_datum
*tclass_datum
;
762 struct constraint_node
*constraint
;
769 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
772 tclass
= unmap_class(orig_tclass
);
774 tclass
= orig_tclass
;
776 if (!tclass
|| tclass
> policydb
.p_classes
.nprim
) {
780 tclass_datum
= policydb
.class_val_to_struct
[tclass
- 1];
782 ocontext
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, oldsid
);
784 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
790 ncontext
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, newsid
);
792 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
798 tcontext
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, tasksid
);
800 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
806 constraint
= tclass_datum
->validatetrans
;
808 if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext
, ncontext
, tcontext
,
813 rc
= security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext
,
819 constraint
= constraint
->next
;
823 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
827 int security_validate_transition_user(u32 oldsid
, u32 newsid
, u32 tasksid
,
830 return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid
, newsid
, tasksid
,
834 int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid
, u32 newsid
, u32 tasksid
,
837 return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid
, newsid
, tasksid
,
842 * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given
843 * transition is directed to bounded, or not.
844 * It returns 0, if @newsid is bounded by @oldsid.
845 * Otherwise, it returns error code.
847 * @oldsid : current security identifier
848 * @newsid : destinated security identifier
850 int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid
, u32 new_sid
)
852 struct context
*old_context
, *new_context
;
853 struct type_datum
*type
;
857 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
860 old_context
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, old_sid
);
862 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
868 new_context
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, new_sid
);
870 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
876 /* type/domain unchanged */
877 if (old_context
->type
== new_context
->type
)
880 index
= new_context
->type
;
882 type
= flex_array_get_ptr(policydb
.type_val_to_struct_array
,
886 /* not bounded anymore */
891 /* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
893 if (type
->bounds
== old_context
->type
)
896 index
= type
->bounds
;
900 char *old_name
= NULL
;
901 char *new_name
= NULL
;
904 if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context
,
905 &old_name
, &length
) &&
906 !context_struct_to_string(new_context
,
907 &new_name
, &length
)) {
908 audit_log(current
->audit_context
,
909 GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
,
910 "op=security_bounded_transition "
912 "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
919 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
924 static void avd_init(struct av_decision
*avd
)
928 avd
->auditdeny
= 0xffffffff;
929 avd
->seqno
= latest_granting
;
933 void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision
*xpermd
,
934 struct avtab_node
*node
)
938 if (node
->datum
.u
.xperms
->specified
== AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION
) {
939 if (xpermd
->driver
!= node
->datum
.u
.xperms
->driver
)
941 } else if (node
->datum
.u
.xperms
->specified
== AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER
) {
942 if (!security_xperm_test(node
->datum
.u
.xperms
->perms
.p
,
949 if (node
->key
.specified
== AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED
) {
950 xpermd
->used
|= XPERMS_ALLOWED
;
951 if (node
->datum
.u
.xperms
->specified
== AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER
) {
952 memset(xpermd
->allowed
->p
, 0xff,
953 sizeof(xpermd
->allowed
->p
));
955 if (node
->datum
.u
.xperms
->specified
== AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION
) {
956 for (i
= 0; i
< ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd
->allowed
->p
); i
++)
957 xpermd
->allowed
->p
[i
] |=
958 node
->datum
.u
.xperms
->perms
.p
[i
];
960 } else if (node
->key
.specified
== AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW
) {
961 xpermd
->used
|= XPERMS_AUDITALLOW
;
962 if (node
->datum
.u
.xperms
->specified
== AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER
) {
963 memset(xpermd
->auditallow
->p
, 0xff,
964 sizeof(xpermd
->auditallow
->p
));
966 if (node
->datum
.u
.xperms
->specified
== AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION
) {
967 for (i
= 0; i
< ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd
->auditallow
->p
); i
++)
968 xpermd
->auditallow
->p
[i
] |=
969 node
->datum
.u
.xperms
->perms
.p
[i
];
971 } else if (node
->key
.specified
== AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT
) {
972 xpermd
->used
|= XPERMS_DONTAUDIT
;
973 if (node
->datum
.u
.xperms
->specified
== AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER
) {
974 memset(xpermd
->dontaudit
->p
, 0xff,
975 sizeof(xpermd
->dontaudit
->p
));
977 if (node
->datum
.u
.xperms
->specified
== AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION
) {
978 for (i
= 0; i
< ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd
->dontaudit
->p
); i
++)
979 xpermd
->dontaudit
->p
[i
] |=
980 node
->datum
.u
.xperms
->perms
.p
[i
];
987 void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid
,
991 struct extended_perms_decision
*xpermd
)
994 struct context
*scontext
, *tcontext
;
995 struct avtab_key avkey
;
996 struct avtab_node
*node
;
997 struct ebitmap
*sattr
, *tattr
;
998 struct ebitmap_node
*snode
, *tnode
;
1001 xpermd
->driver
= driver
;
1003 memset(xpermd
->allowed
->p
, 0, sizeof(xpermd
->allowed
->p
));
1004 memset(xpermd
->auditallow
->p
, 0, sizeof(xpermd
->auditallow
->p
));
1005 memset(xpermd
->dontaudit
->p
, 0, sizeof(xpermd
->dontaudit
->p
));
1007 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
1008 if (!ss_initialized
)
1011 scontext
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, ssid
);
1013 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1018 tcontext
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, tsid
);
1020 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1025 tclass
= unmap_class(orig_tclass
);
1026 if (unlikely(orig_tclass
&& !tclass
)) {
1027 if (policydb
.allow_unknown
)
1033 if (unlikely(!tclass
|| tclass
> policydb
.p_classes
.nprim
)) {
1034 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass
);
1038 avkey
.target_class
= tclass
;
1039 avkey
.specified
= AVTAB_XPERMS
;
1040 sattr
= flex_array_get(policydb
.type_attr_map_array
,
1041 scontext
->type
- 1);
1043 tattr
= flex_array_get(policydb
.type_attr_map_array
,
1044 tcontext
->type
- 1);
1046 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr
, snode
, i
) {
1047 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr
, tnode
, j
) {
1048 avkey
.source_type
= i
+ 1;
1049 avkey
.target_type
= j
+ 1;
1050 for (node
= avtab_search_node(&policydb
.te_avtab
, &avkey
);
1052 node
= avtab_search_node_next(node
, avkey
.specified
))
1053 services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd
, node
);
1055 cond_compute_xperms(&policydb
.te_cond_avtab
,
1060 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
1063 memset(xpermd
->allowed
->p
, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd
->allowed
->p
));
1068 * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
1069 * @ssid: source security identifier
1070 * @tsid: target security identifier
1071 * @tclass: target security class
1072 * @avd: access vector decisions
1073 * @xperms: extended permissions
1075 * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
1076 * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
1078 void security_compute_av(u32 ssid
,
1081 struct av_decision
*avd
,
1082 struct extended_perms
*xperms
)
1085 struct context
*scontext
= NULL
, *tcontext
= NULL
;
1087 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
1090 if (!ss_initialized
)
1093 scontext
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, ssid
);
1095 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1100 /* permissive domain? */
1101 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb
.permissive_map
, scontext
->type
))
1102 avd
->flags
|= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE
;
1104 tcontext
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, tsid
);
1106 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1111 tclass
= unmap_class(orig_tclass
);
1112 if (unlikely(orig_tclass
&& !tclass
)) {
1113 if (policydb
.allow_unknown
)
1117 context_struct_compute_av(scontext
, tcontext
, tclass
, avd
, xperms
);
1118 map_decision(orig_tclass
, avd
, policydb
.allow_unknown
);
1120 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
1123 avd
->allowed
= 0xffffffff;
1127 void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid
,
1130 struct av_decision
*avd
)
1132 struct context
*scontext
= NULL
, *tcontext
= NULL
;
1134 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
1136 if (!ss_initialized
)
1139 scontext
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, ssid
);
1141 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1146 /* permissive domain? */
1147 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb
.permissive_map
, scontext
->type
))
1148 avd
->flags
|= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE
;
1150 tcontext
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, tsid
);
1152 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1157 if (unlikely(!tclass
)) {
1158 if (policydb
.allow_unknown
)
1163 context_struct_compute_av(scontext
, tcontext
, tclass
, avd
, NULL
);
1165 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
1168 avd
->allowed
= 0xffffffff;
1173 * Write the security context string representation of
1174 * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
1175 * allocated string of the correct size. Set `*scontext'
1176 * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
1177 * the length of the string.
1179 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context
*context
, char **scontext
, u32
*scontext_len
)
1188 *scontext_len
= context
->len
;
1190 *scontext
= kstrdup(context
->str
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
1197 /* Compute the size of the context. */
1198 *scontext_len
+= strlen(sym_name(&policydb
, SYM_USERS
, context
->user
- 1)) + 1;
1199 *scontext_len
+= strlen(sym_name(&policydb
, SYM_ROLES
, context
->role
- 1)) + 1;
1200 *scontext_len
+= strlen(sym_name(&policydb
, SYM_TYPES
, context
->type
- 1)) + 1;
1201 *scontext_len
+= mls_compute_context_len(context
);
1206 /* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
1207 scontextp
= kmalloc(*scontext_len
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
1210 *scontext
= scontextp
;
1213 * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
1215 scontextp
+= sprintf(scontextp
, "%s:%s:%s",
1216 sym_name(&policydb
, SYM_USERS
, context
->user
- 1),
1217 sym_name(&policydb
, SYM_ROLES
, context
->role
- 1),
1218 sym_name(&policydb
, SYM_TYPES
, context
->type
- 1));
1220 mls_sid_to_context(context
, &scontextp
);
1227 #include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
1229 const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid
)
1231 if (unlikely(sid
> SECINITSID_NUM
))
1233 return initial_sid_to_string
[sid
];
1236 static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid
, char **scontext
,
1237 u32
*scontext_len
, int force
)
1239 struct context
*context
;
1246 if (!ss_initialized
) {
1247 if (sid
<= SECINITSID_NUM
) {
1250 *scontext_len
= strlen(initial_sid_to_string
[sid
]) + 1;
1253 scontextp
= kmemdup(initial_sid_to_string
[sid
],
1254 *scontext_len
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
1259 *scontext
= scontextp
;
1262 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: called before initial "
1263 "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__
, sid
);
1267 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
1269 context
= sidtab_search_force(&sidtab
, sid
);
1271 context
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, sid
);
1273 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1278 rc
= context_struct_to_string(context
, scontext
, scontext_len
);
1280 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
1287 * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
1288 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1289 * @scontext: security context
1290 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1292 * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
1293 * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext
1294 * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
1296 int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid
, char **scontext
, u32
*scontext_len
)
1298 return security_sid_to_context_core(sid
, scontext
, scontext_len
, 0);
1301 int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid
, char **scontext
, u32
*scontext_len
)
1303 return security_sid_to_context_core(sid
, scontext
, scontext_len
, 1);
1307 * Caveat: Mutates scontext.
1309 static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb
*pol
,
1310 struct sidtab
*sidtabp
,
1313 struct context
*ctx
,
1316 struct role_datum
*role
;
1317 struct type_datum
*typdatum
;
1318 struct user_datum
*usrdatum
;
1319 char *scontextp
, *p
, oldc
;
1324 /* Parse the security context. */
1327 scontextp
= (char *) scontext
;
1329 /* Extract the user. */
1331 while (*p
&& *p
!= ':')
1339 usrdatum
= hashtab_search(pol
->p_users
.table
, scontextp
);
1343 ctx
->user
= usrdatum
->value
;
1347 while (*p
&& *p
!= ':')
1355 role
= hashtab_search(pol
->p_roles
.table
, scontextp
);
1358 ctx
->role
= role
->value
;
1362 while (*p
&& *p
!= ':')
1367 typdatum
= hashtab_search(pol
->p_types
.table
, scontextp
);
1368 if (!typdatum
|| typdatum
->attribute
)
1371 ctx
->type
= typdatum
->value
;
1373 rc
= mls_context_to_sid(pol
, oldc
, &p
, ctx
, sidtabp
, def_sid
);
1378 if ((p
- scontext
) < scontext_len
)
1381 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1382 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol
, ctx
))
1387 context_destroy(ctx
);
1391 static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext
, u32 scontext_len
,
1392 u32
*sid
, u32 def_sid
, gfp_t gfp_flags
,
1395 char *scontext2
, *str
= NULL
;
1396 struct context context
;
1399 /* An empty security context is never valid. */
1403 if (!ss_initialized
) {
1406 for (i
= 1; i
< SECINITSID_NUM
; i
++) {
1407 if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string
[i
], scontext
)) {
1412 *sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
1417 /* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */
1418 scontext2
= kmalloc(scontext_len
+ 1, gfp_flags
);
1421 memcpy(scontext2
, scontext
, scontext_len
);
1422 scontext2
[scontext_len
] = 0;
1425 /* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
1427 str
= kstrdup(scontext2
, gfp_flags
);
1432 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
1433 rc
= string_to_context_struct(&policydb
, &sidtab
, scontext2
,
1434 scontext_len
, &context
, def_sid
);
1435 if (rc
== -EINVAL
&& force
) {
1437 context
.len
= scontext_len
;
1441 rc
= sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab
, &context
, sid
);
1442 context_destroy(&context
);
1444 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
1452 * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
1453 * @scontext: security context
1454 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1455 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1456 * @gfp: context for the allocation
1458 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1459 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1460 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1461 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1463 int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext
, u32 scontext_len
, u32
*sid
,
1466 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext
, scontext_len
,
1467 sid
, SECSID_NULL
, gfp
, 0);
1470 int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext
, u32
*sid
, gfp_t gfp
)
1472 return security_context_to_sid(scontext
, strlen(scontext
), sid
, gfp
);
1476 * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context,
1477 * falling back to specified default if needed.
1479 * @scontext: security context
1480 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1481 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1482 * @def_sid: default SID to assign on error
1484 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1485 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1486 * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow
1487 * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present
1488 * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel).
1489 * Implicitly forces adding of the context even if it cannot be mapped yet.
1490 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1491 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1493 int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext
, u32 scontext_len
,
1494 u32
*sid
, u32 def_sid
, gfp_t gfp_flags
)
1496 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext
, scontext_len
,
1497 sid
, def_sid
, gfp_flags
, 1);
1500 int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext
, u32 scontext_len
,
1503 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext
, scontext_len
,
1504 sid
, SECSID_NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, 1);
1507 static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
1508 struct context
*scontext
,
1509 struct context
*tcontext
,
1511 struct context
*newcontext
)
1513 char *s
= NULL
, *t
= NULL
, *n
= NULL
;
1514 u32 slen
, tlen
, nlen
;
1516 if (context_struct_to_string(scontext
, &s
, &slen
))
1518 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext
, &t
, &tlen
))
1520 if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext
, &n
, &nlen
))
1522 audit_log(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
,
1523 "op=security_compute_sid invalid_context=%s"
1527 n
, s
, t
, sym_name(&policydb
, SYM_CLASSES
, tclass
-1));
1532 if (!selinux_enforcing
)
1537 static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb
*p
, struct context
*newcontext
,
1538 u32 stype
, u32 ttype
, u16 tclass
,
1539 const char *objname
)
1541 struct filename_trans ft
;
1542 struct filename_trans_datum
*otype
;
1545 * Most filename trans rules are going to live in specific directories
1546 * like /dev or /var/run. This bitmap will quickly skip rule searches
1547 * if the ttype does not contain any rules.
1549 if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&p
->filename_trans_ttypes
, ttype
))
1557 otype
= hashtab_search(p
->filename_trans
, &ft
);
1559 newcontext
->type
= otype
->otype
;
1562 static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid
,
1566 const char *objname
,
1570 struct class_datum
*cladatum
= NULL
;
1571 struct context
*scontext
= NULL
, *tcontext
= NULL
, newcontext
;
1572 struct role_trans
*roletr
= NULL
;
1573 struct avtab_key avkey
;
1574 struct avtab_datum
*avdatum
;
1575 struct avtab_node
*node
;
1580 if (!ss_initialized
) {
1581 switch (orig_tclass
) {
1582 case SECCLASS_PROCESS
: /* kernel value */
1592 context_init(&newcontext
);
1594 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
1597 tclass
= unmap_class(orig_tclass
);
1598 sock
= security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass
);
1600 tclass
= orig_tclass
;
1601 sock
= security_is_socket_class(map_class(tclass
));
1604 scontext
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, ssid
);
1606 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1611 tcontext
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, tsid
);
1613 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1619 if (tclass
&& tclass
<= policydb
.p_classes
.nprim
)
1620 cladatum
= policydb
.class_val_to_struct
[tclass
- 1];
1622 /* Set the user identity. */
1623 switch (specified
) {
1624 case AVTAB_TRANSITION
:
1626 if (cladatum
&& cladatum
->default_user
== DEFAULT_TARGET
) {
1627 newcontext
.user
= tcontext
->user
;
1629 /* notice this gets both DEFAULT_SOURCE and unset */
1630 /* Use the process user identity. */
1631 newcontext
.user
= scontext
->user
;
1635 /* Use the related object owner. */
1636 newcontext
.user
= tcontext
->user
;
1640 /* Set the role to default values. */
1641 if (cladatum
&& cladatum
->default_role
== DEFAULT_SOURCE
) {
1642 newcontext
.role
= scontext
->role
;
1643 } else if (cladatum
&& cladatum
->default_role
== DEFAULT_TARGET
) {
1644 newcontext
.role
= tcontext
->role
;
1646 if ((tclass
== policydb
.process_class
) || (sock
== true))
1647 newcontext
.role
= scontext
->role
;
1649 newcontext
.role
= OBJECT_R_VAL
;
1652 /* Set the type to default values. */
1653 if (cladatum
&& cladatum
->default_type
== DEFAULT_SOURCE
) {
1654 newcontext
.type
= scontext
->type
;
1655 } else if (cladatum
&& cladatum
->default_type
== DEFAULT_TARGET
) {
1656 newcontext
.type
= tcontext
->type
;
1658 if ((tclass
== policydb
.process_class
) || (sock
== true)) {
1659 /* Use the type of process. */
1660 newcontext
.type
= scontext
->type
;
1662 /* Use the type of the related object. */
1663 newcontext
.type
= tcontext
->type
;
1667 /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
1668 avkey
.source_type
= scontext
->type
;
1669 avkey
.target_type
= tcontext
->type
;
1670 avkey
.target_class
= tclass
;
1671 avkey
.specified
= specified
;
1672 avdatum
= avtab_search(&policydb
.te_avtab
, &avkey
);
1674 /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
1676 node
= avtab_search_node(&policydb
.te_cond_avtab
, &avkey
);
1677 for (; node
; node
= avtab_search_node_next(node
, specified
)) {
1678 if (node
->key
.specified
& AVTAB_ENABLED
) {
1679 avdatum
= &node
->datum
;
1686 /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
1687 newcontext
.type
= avdatum
->u
.data
;
1690 /* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
1692 filename_compute_type(&policydb
, &newcontext
, scontext
->type
,
1693 tcontext
->type
, tclass
, objname
);
1695 /* Check for class-specific changes. */
1696 if (specified
& AVTAB_TRANSITION
) {
1697 /* Look for a role transition rule. */
1698 for (roletr
= policydb
.role_tr
; roletr
; roletr
= roletr
->next
) {
1699 if ((roletr
->role
== scontext
->role
) &&
1700 (roletr
->type
== tcontext
->type
) &&
1701 (roletr
->tclass
== tclass
)) {
1702 /* Use the role transition rule. */
1703 newcontext
.role
= roletr
->new_role
;
1709 /* Set the MLS attributes.
1710 This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
1711 rc
= mls_compute_sid(scontext
, tcontext
, tclass
, specified
,
1716 /* Check the validity of the context. */
1717 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb
, &newcontext
)) {
1718 rc
= compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext
,
1725 /* Obtain the sid for the context. */
1726 rc
= sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab
, &newcontext
, out_sid
);
1728 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
1729 context_destroy(&newcontext
);
1735 * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
1736 * @ssid: source security identifier
1737 * @tsid: target security identifier
1738 * @tclass: target security class
1739 * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
1741 * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
1742 * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1743 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1744 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
1745 * computed successfully.
1747 int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid
, u32 tsid
, u16 tclass
,
1748 const struct qstr
*qstr
, u32
*out_sid
)
1750 return security_compute_sid(ssid
, tsid
, tclass
, AVTAB_TRANSITION
,
1751 qstr
? qstr
->name
: NULL
, out_sid
, true);
1754 int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid
, u32 tsid
, u16 tclass
,
1755 const char *objname
, u32
*out_sid
)
1757 return security_compute_sid(ssid
, tsid
, tclass
, AVTAB_TRANSITION
,
1758 objname
, out_sid
, false);
1762 * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
1763 * @ssid: source security identifier
1764 * @tsid: target security identifier
1765 * @tclass: target security class
1766 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1768 * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
1769 * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1770 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1771 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1772 * computed successfully.
1774 int security_member_sid(u32 ssid
,
1779 return security_compute_sid(ssid
, tsid
, tclass
, AVTAB_MEMBER
, NULL
,
1784 * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
1785 * @ssid: source security identifier
1786 * @tsid: target security identifier
1787 * @tclass: target security class
1788 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1790 * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
1791 * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1792 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1793 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1794 * computed successfully.
1796 int security_change_sid(u32 ssid
,
1801 return security_compute_sid(ssid
, tsid
, tclass
, AVTAB_CHANGE
, NULL
,
1805 /* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
1806 static int clone_sid(u32 sid
,
1807 struct context
*context
,
1810 struct sidtab
*s
= arg
;
1812 if (sid
> SECINITSID_NUM
)
1813 return sidtab_insert(s
, sid
, context
);
1818 static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context
*context
)
1823 if (selinux_enforcing
)
1826 if (!context_struct_to_string(context
, &s
, &len
)) {
1827 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n", s
);
1833 struct convert_context_args
{
1834 struct policydb
*oldp
;
1835 struct policydb
*newp
;
1839 * Convert the values in the security context
1840 * structure `c' from the values specified
1841 * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
1842 * in the policy `p->newp'. Verify that the
1843 * context is valid under the new policy.
1845 static int convert_context(u32 key
,
1849 struct convert_context_args
*args
;
1850 struct context oldc
;
1851 struct ocontext
*oc
;
1852 struct mls_range
*range
;
1853 struct role_datum
*role
;
1854 struct type_datum
*typdatum
;
1855 struct user_datum
*usrdatum
;
1860 if (key
<= SECINITSID_NUM
)
1869 s
= kstrdup(c
->str
, GFP_KERNEL
);
1873 rc
= string_to_context_struct(args
->newp
, NULL
, s
,
1874 c
->len
, &ctx
, SECSID_NULL
);
1877 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
1879 /* Replace string with mapped representation. */
1881 memcpy(c
, &ctx
, sizeof(*c
));
1883 } else if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
1884 /* Retain string representation for later mapping. */
1888 /* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
1889 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
1895 rc
= context_cpy(&oldc
, c
);
1899 /* Convert the user. */
1901 usrdatum
= hashtab_search(args
->newp
->p_users
.table
,
1902 sym_name(args
->oldp
, SYM_USERS
, c
->user
- 1));
1905 c
->user
= usrdatum
->value
;
1907 /* Convert the role. */
1909 role
= hashtab_search(args
->newp
->p_roles
.table
,
1910 sym_name(args
->oldp
, SYM_ROLES
, c
->role
- 1));
1913 c
->role
= role
->value
;
1915 /* Convert the type. */
1917 typdatum
= hashtab_search(args
->newp
->p_types
.table
,
1918 sym_name(args
->oldp
, SYM_TYPES
, c
->type
- 1));
1921 c
->type
= typdatum
->value
;
1923 /* Convert the MLS fields if dealing with MLS policies */
1924 if (args
->oldp
->mls_enabled
&& args
->newp
->mls_enabled
) {
1925 rc
= mls_convert_context(args
->oldp
, args
->newp
, c
);
1928 } else if (args
->oldp
->mls_enabled
&& !args
->newp
->mls_enabled
) {
1930 * Switching between MLS and non-MLS policy:
1931 * free any storage used by the MLS fields in the
1932 * context for all existing entries in the sidtab.
1934 mls_context_destroy(c
);
1935 } else if (!args
->oldp
->mls_enabled
&& args
->newp
->mls_enabled
) {
1937 * Switching between non-MLS and MLS policy:
1938 * ensure that the MLS fields of the context for all
1939 * existing entries in the sidtab are filled in with a
1940 * suitable default value, likely taken from one of the
1943 oc
= args
->newp
->ocontexts
[OCON_ISID
];
1944 while (oc
&& oc
->sid
[0] != SECINITSID_UNLABELED
)
1948 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: unable to look up"
1949 " the initial SIDs list\n");
1952 range
= &oc
->context
[0].range
;
1953 rc
= mls_range_set(c
, range
);
1958 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1959 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args
->newp
, c
)) {
1960 rc
= convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc
);
1965 context_destroy(&oldc
);
1971 /* Map old representation to string and save it. */
1972 rc
= context_struct_to_string(&oldc
, &s
, &len
);
1975 context_destroy(&oldc
);
1979 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
1985 static void security_load_policycaps(void)
1987 selinux_policycap_netpeer
= ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb
.policycaps
,
1988 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER
);
1989 selinux_policycap_openperm
= ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb
.policycaps
,
1990 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM
);
1991 selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork
= ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb
.policycaps
,
1992 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK
);
1995 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb
*p
);
1998 * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
1999 * @data: binary policy data
2000 * @len: length of data in bytes
2002 * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
2003 * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
2004 * This function will flush the access vector cache after
2005 * loading the new policy.
2007 int security_load_policy(void *data
, size_t len
)
2009 struct policydb
*oldpolicydb
, *newpolicydb
;
2010 struct sidtab oldsidtab
, newsidtab
;
2011 struct selinux_mapping
*oldmap
, *map
= NULL
;
2012 struct convert_context_args args
;
2016 struct policy_file file
= { data
, len
}, *fp
= &file
;
2018 oldpolicydb
= kzalloc(2 * sizeof(*oldpolicydb
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2023 newpolicydb
= oldpolicydb
+ 1;
2025 if (!ss_initialized
) {
2027 rc
= policydb_read(&policydb
, fp
);
2029 avtab_cache_destroy();
2034 rc
= selinux_set_mapping(&policydb
, secclass_map
,
2036 ¤t_mapping_size
);
2038 policydb_destroy(&policydb
);
2039 avtab_cache_destroy();
2043 rc
= policydb_load_isids(&policydb
, &sidtab
);
2045 policydb_destroy(&policydb
);
2046 avtab_cache_destroy();
2050 security_load_policycaps();
2052 seqno
= ++latest_granting
;
2053 selinux_complete_init();
2054 avc_ss_reset(seqno
);
2055 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno
);
2056 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno
);
2057 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
2058 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2063 sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab
, "sids");
2066 rc
= policydb_read(newpolicydb
, fp
);
2070 newpolicydb
->len
= len
;
2071 /* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
2072 if (policydb
.mls_enabled
&& !newpolicydb
->mls_enabled
)
2073 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
2074 else if (!policydb
.mls_enabled
&& newpolicydb
->mls_enabled
)
2075 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
2077 rc
= policydb_load_isids(newpolicydb
, &newsidtab
);
2079 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n");
2080 policydb_destroy(newpolicydb
);
2084 rc
= selinux_set_mapping(newpolicydb
, secclass_map
, &map
, &map_size
);
2088 rc
= security_preserve_bools(newpolicydb
);
2090 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n");
2094 /* Clone the SID table. */
2095 sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab
);
2097 rc
= sidtab_map(&sidtab
, clone_sid
, &newsidtab
);
2102 * Convert the internal representations of contexts
2103 * in the new SID table.
2105 args
.oldp
= &policydb
;
2106 args
.newp
= newpolicydb
;
2107 rc
= sidtab_map(&newsidtab
, convert_context
, &args
);
2109 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: unable to convert the internal"
2110 " representation of contexts in the new SID"
2115 /* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
2116 memcpy(oldpolicydb
, &policydb
, sizeof(policydb
));
2117 sidtab_set(&oldsidtab
, &sidtab
);
2119 /* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
2120 write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock
);
2121 memcpy(&policydb
, newpolicydb
, sizeof(policydb
));
2122 sidtab_set(&sidtab
, &newsidtab
);
2123 security_load_policycaps();
2124 oldmap
= current_mapping
;
2125 current_mapping
= map
;
2126 current_mapping_size
= map_size
;
2127 seqno
= ++latest_granting
;
2128 write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock
);
2130 /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
2131 policydb_destroy(oldpolicydb
);
2132 sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab
);
2135 avc_ss_reset(seqno
);
2136 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno
);
2137 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno
);
2138 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
2139 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2146 sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab
);
2147 policydb_destroy(newpolicydb
);
2154 size_t security_policydb_len(void)
2158 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2160 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2166 * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
2167 * @protocol: protocol number
2168 * @port: port number
2169 * @out_sid: security identifier
2171 int security_port_sid(u8 protocol
, u16 port
, u32
*out_sid
)
2176 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2178 c
= policydb
.ocontexts
[OCON_PORT
];
2180 if (c
->u
.port
.protocol
== protocol
&&
2181 c
->u
.port
.low_port
<= port
&&
2182 c
->u
.port
.high_port
>= port
)
2189 rc
= sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab
,
2195 *out_sid
= c
->sid
[0];
2197 *out_sid
= SECINITSID_PORT
;
2201 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2206 * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
2207 * @name: interface name
2208 * @if_sid: interface SID
2210 int security_netif_sid(char *name
, u32
*if_sid
)
2215 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2217 c
= policydb
.ocontexts
[OCON_NETIF
];
2219 if (strcmp(name
, c
->u
.name
) == 0)
2225 if (!c
->sid
[0] || !c
->sid
[1]) {
2226 rc
= sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab
,
2231 rc
= sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab
,
2237 *if_sid
= c
->sid
[0];
2239 *if_sid
= SECINITSID_NETIF
;
2242 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2246 static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32
*input
, u32
*addr
, u32
*mask
)
2250 for (i
= 0; i
< 4; i
++)
2251 if (addr
[i
] != (input
[i
] & mask
[i
])) {
2260 * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
2261 * @domain: communication domain aka address family
2263 * @addrlen: address length in bytes
2264 * @out_sid: security identifier
2266 int security_node_sid(u16 domain
,
2274 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2281 if (addrlen
!= sizeof(u32
))
2284 addr
= *((u32
*)addrp
);
2286 c
= policydb
.ocontexts
[OCON_NODE
];
2288 if (c
->u
.node
.addr
== (addr
& c
->u
.node
.mask
))
2297 if (addrlen
!= sizeof(u64
) * 2)
2299 c
= policydb
.ocontexts
[OCON_NODE6
];
2301 if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp
, c
->u
.node6
.addr
,
2310 *out_sid
= SECINITSID_NODE
;
2316 rc
= sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab
,
2322 *out_sid
= c
->sid
[0];
2324 *out_sid
= SECINITSID_NODE
;
2329 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2336 * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user.
2337 * @fromsid: starting SID
2338 * @username: username
2339 * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user
2340 * @nel: number of elements in @sids
2342 * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
2343 * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid.
2344 * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated
2345 * array containing the set of SIDs. Set *@nel to the
2346 * number of elements in the array.
2349 int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid
,
2354 struct context
*fromcon
, usercon
;
2355 u32
*mysids
= NULL
, *mysids2
, sid
;
2356 u32 mynel
= 0, maxnel
= SIDS_NEL
;
2357 struct user_datum
*user
;
2358 struct role_datum
*role
;
2359 struct ebitmap_node
*rnode
, *tnode
;
2365 if (!ss_initialized
)
2368 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2370 context_init(&usercon
);
2373 fromcon
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, fromsid
);
2378 user
= hashtab_search(policydb
.p_users
.table
, username
);
2382 usercon
.user
= user
->value
;
2385 mysids
= kcalloc(maxnel
, sizeof(*mysids
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2389 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user
->roles
, rnode
, i
) {
2390 role
= policydb
.role_val_to_struct
[i
];
2391 usercon
.role
= i
+ 1;
2392 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role
->types
, tnode
, j
) {
2393 usercon
.type
= j
+ 1;
2395 if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon
, user
, &usercon
))
2398 rc
= sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab
, &usercon
, &sid
);
2401 if (mynel
< maxnel
) {
2402 mysids
[mynel
++] = sid
;
2406 mysids2
= kcalloc(maxnel
, sizeof(*mysids2
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2409 memcpy(mysids2
, mysids
, mynel
* sizeof(*mysids2
));
2412 mysids
[mynel
++] = sid
;
2418 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2425 mysids2
= kcalloc(mynel
, sizeof(*mysids2
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2430 for (i
= 0, j
= 0; i
< mynel
; i
++) {
2431 struct av_decision dummy_avd
;
2432 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid
, mysids
[i
],
2433 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, /* kernel value */
2434 PROCESS__TRANSITION
, AVC_STRICT
,
2437 mysids2
[j
++] = mysids
[i
];
2449 * __security_genfs_sid - Helper to obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
2450 * @fstype: filesystem type
2451 * @path: path from root of mount
2452 * @sclass: file security class
2453 * @sid: SID for path
2455 * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
2456 * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
2457 * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
2459 * The caller must acquire the policy_rwlock before calling this function.
2461 static inline int __security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype
,
2468 struct genfs
*genfs
;
2472 while (path
[0] == '/' && path
[1] == '/')
2475 sclass
= unmap_class(orig_sclass
);
2476 *sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
2478 for (genfs
= policydb
.genfs
; genfs
; genfs
= genfs
->next
) {
2479 cmp
= strcmp(fstype
, genfs
->fstype
);
2488 for (c
= genfs
->head
; c
; c
= c
->next
) {
2489 len
= strlen(c
->u
.name
);
2490 if ((!c
->v
.sclass
|| sclass
== c
->v
.sclass
) &&
2491 (strncmp(c
->u
.name
, path
, len
) == 0))
2500 rc
= sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab
, &c
->context
[0], &c
->sid
[0]);
2512 * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
2513 * @fstype: filesystem type
2514 * @path: path from root of mount
2515 * @sclass: file security class
2516 * @sid: SID for path
2518 * Acquire policy_rwlock before calling __security_genfs_sid() and release
2521 int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype
,
2528 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2529 retval
= __security_genfs_sid(fstype
, path
, orig_sclass
, sid
);
2530 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2535 * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
2536 * @sb: superblock in question
2538 int security_fs_use(struct super_block
*sb
)
2542 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
2543 const char *fstype
= sb
->s_type
->name
;
2545 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2547 c
= policydb
.ocontexts
[OCON_FSUSE
];
2549 if (strcmp(fstype
, c
->u
.name
) == 0)
2555 sbsec
->behavior
= c
->v
.behavior
;
2557 rc
= sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab
, &c
->context
[0],
2562 sbsec
->sid
= c
->sid
[0];
2564 rc
= __security_genfs_sid(fstype
, "/", SECCLASS_DIR
,
2567 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE
;
2570 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS
;
2575 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2579 int security_get_bools(int *len
, char ***names
, int **values
)
2583 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2588 *len
= policydb
.p_bools
.nprim
;
2593 *names
= kcalloc(*len
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2598 *values
= kcalloc(*len
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2602 for (i
= 0; i
< *len
; i
++) {
2603 (*values
)[i
] = policydb
.bool_val_to_struct
[i
]->state
;
2606 (*names
)[i
] = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb
, SYM_BOOLS
, i
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2612 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2616 for (i
= 0; i
< *len
; i
++)
2624 int security_set_bools(int len
, int *values
)
2627 int lenp
, seqno
= 0;
2628 struct cond_node
*cur
;
2630 write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock
);
2633 lenp
= policydb
.p_bools
.nprim
;
2637 for (i
= 0; i
< len
; i
++) {
2638 if (!!values
[i
] != policydb
.bool_val_to_struct
[i
]->state
) {
2639 audit_log(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
,
2640 AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE
,
2641 "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
2642 sym_name(&policydb
, SYM_BOOLS
, i
),
2644 policydb
.bool_val_to_struct
[i
]->state
,
2645 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, audit_get_loginuid(current
)),
2646 audit_get_sessionid(current
));
2649 policydb
.bool_val_to_struct
[i
]->state
= 1;
2651 policydb
.bool_val_to_struct
[i
]->state
= 0;
2654 for (cur
= policydb
.cond_list
; cur
; cur
= cur
->next
) {
2655 rc
= evaluate_cond_node(&policydb
, cur
);
2660 seqno
= ++latest_granting
;
2663 write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock
);
2665 avc_ss_reset(seqno
);
2666 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno
);
2667 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno
);
2668 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2673 int security_get_bool_value(int index
)
2678 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2681 len
= policydb
.p_bools
.nprim
;
2685 rc
= policydb
.bool_val_to_struct
[index
]->state
;
2687 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2691 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb
*p
)
2693 int rc
, nbools
= 0, *bvalues
= NULL
, i
;
2694 char **bnames
= NULL
;
2695 struct cond_bool_datum
*booldatum
;
2696 struct cond_node
*cur
;
2698 rc
= security_get_bools(&nbools
, &bnames
, &bvalues
);
2701 for (i
= 0; i
< nbools
; i
++) {
2702 booldatum
= hashtab_search(p
->p_bools
.table
, bnames
[i
]);
2704 booldatum
->state
= bvalues
[i
];
2706 for (cur
= p
->cond_list
; cur
; cur
= cur
->next
) {
2707 rc
= evaluate_cond_node(p
, cur
);
2714 for (i
= 0; i
< nbools
; i
++)
2723 * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
2724 * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
2726 int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid
, u32 mls_sid
, u32
*new_sid
)
2728 struct context
*context1
;
2729 struct context
*context2
;
2730 struct context newcon
;
2736 if (!ss_initialized
|| !policydb
.mls_enabled
) {
2741 context_init(&newcon
);
2743 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2746 context1
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, sid
);
2748 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2754 context2
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, mls_sid
);
2756 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2761 newcon
.user
= context1
->user
;
2762 newcon
.role
= context1
->role
;
2763 newcon
.type
= context1
->type
;
2764 rc
= mls_context_cpy(&newcon
, context2
);
2768 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
2769 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb
, &newcon
)) {
2770 rc
= convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&newcon
);
2772 if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon
, &s
, &len
)) {
2773 audit_log(current
->audit_context
,
2774 GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
,
2775 "op=security_sid_mls_copy "
2776 "invalid_context=%s", s
);
2783 rc
= sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab
, &newcon
, new_sid
);
2785 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2786 context_destroy(&newcon
);
2792 * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs
2793 * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
2794 * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
2795 * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
2798 * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
2799 * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function
2800 * returns zero. Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function
2801 * returns a negative value. A table summarizing the behavior is below:
2803 * | function return | @sid
2804 * ------------------------------+-----------------+-----------------
2805 * no peer labels | 0 | SECSID_NULL
2806 * single peer label | 0 | <peer_label>
2807 * multiple, consistent labels | 0 | <peer_label>
2808 * multiple, inconsistent labels | -<errno> | SECSID_NULL
2811 int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid
, u32 nlbl_type
,
2816 struct context
*nlbl_ctx
;
2817 struct context
*xfrm_ctx
;
2819 *peer_sid
= SECSID_NULL
;
2821 /* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
2822 * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
2823 * single or absent peer SID/label */
2824 if (xfrm_sid
== SECSID_NULL
) {
2825 *peer_sid
= nlbl_sid
;
2828 /* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label
2829 * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label
2831 if (nlbl_sid
== SECSID_NULL
|| nlbl_type
== NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED
) {
2832 *peer_sid
= xfrm_sid
;
2836 /* we don't need to check ss_initialized here since the only way both
2837 * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
2838 * security server was initialized and ss_initialized was true */
2839 if (!policydb
.mls_enabled
)
2842 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2845 nlbl_ctx
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, nlbl_sid
);
2847 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2848 __func__
, nlbl_sid
);
2852 xfrm_ctx
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, xfrm_sid
);
2854 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2855 __func__
, xfrm_sid
);
2858 rc
= (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx
, xfrm_ctx
) ? 0 : -EACCES
);
2862 /* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
2863 * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
2864 * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
2865 * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
2867 *peer_sid
= xfrm_sid
;
2869 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2873 static int get_classes_callback(void *k
, void *d
, void *args
)
2875 struct class_datum
*datum
= d
;
2876 char *name
= k
, **classes
= args
;
2877 int value
= datum
->value
- 1;
2879 classes
[value
] = kstrdup(name
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
2880 if (!classes
[value
])
2886 int security_get_classes(char ***classes
, int *nclasses
)
2890 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2893 *nclasses
= policydb
.p_classes
.nprim
;
2894 *classes
= kcalloc(*nclasses
, sizeof(**classes
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2898 rc
= hashtab_map(policydb
.p_classes
.table
, get_classes_callback
,
2902 for (i
= 0; i
< *nclasses
; i
++)
2903 kfree((*classes
)[i
]);
2908 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2912 static int get_permissions_callback(void *k
, void *d
, void *args
)
2914 struct perm_datum
*datum
= d
;
2915 char *name
= k
, **perms
= args
;
2916 int value
= datum
->value
- 1;
2918 perms
[value
] = kstrdup(name
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
2925 int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms
, int *nperms
)
2928 struct class_datum
*match
;
2930 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2933 match
= hashtab_search(policydb
.p_classes
.table
, class);
2935 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n",
2941 *nperms
= match
->permissions
.nprim
;
2942 *perms
= kcalloc(*nperms
, sizeof(**perms
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2946 if (match
->comdatum
) {
2947 rc
= hashtab_map(match
->comdatum
->permissions
.table
,
2948 get_permissions_callback
, *perms
);
2953 rc
= hashtab_map(match
->permissions
.table
, get_permissions_callback
,
2959 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2963 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
2964 for (i
= 0; i
< *nperms
; i
++)
2970 int security_get_reject_unknown(void)
2972 return policydb
.reject_unknown
;
2975 int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
2977 return policydb
.allow_unknown
;
2981 * security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability
2982 * @req_cap: capability
2985 * This function queries the currently loaded policy to see if it supports the
2986 * capability specified by @req_cap. Returns true (1) if the capability is
2987 * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
2990 int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap
)
2994 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
2995 rc
= ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb
.policycaps
, req_cap
);
2996 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
3001 struct selinux_audit_rule
{
3003 struct context au_ctxt
;
3006 void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule
)
3008 struct selinux_audit_rule
*rule
= vrule
;
3011 context_destroy(&rule
->au_ctxt
);
3016 int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field
, u32 op
, char *rulestr
, void **vrule
)
3018 struct selinux_audit_rule
*tmprule
;
3019 struct role_datum
*roledatum
;
3020 struct type_datum
*typedatum
;
3021 struct user_datum
*userdatum
;
3022 struct selinux_audit_rule
**rule
= (struct selinux_audit_rule
**)vrule
;
3027 if (!ss_initialized
)
3031 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER
:
3032 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE
:
3033 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE
:
3034 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER
:
3035 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE
:
3036 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE
:
3037 /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
3038 if (op
!= Audit_equal
&& op
!= Audit_not_equal
)
3041 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN
:
3042 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
:
3043 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW
:
3044 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH
:
3045 /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presence of '-' */
3046 if (strchr(rulestr
, '-'))
3050 /* only the above fields are valid */
3054 tmprule
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule
), GFP_KERNEL
);
3058 context_init(&tmprule
->au_ctxt
);
3060 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
3062 tmprule
->au_seqno
= latest_granting
;
3065 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER
:
3066 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER
:
3068 userdatum
= hashtab_search(policydb
.p_users
.table
, rulestr
);
3071 tmprule
->au_ctxt
.user
= userdatum
->value
;
3073 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE
:
3074 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE
:
3076 roledatum
= hashtab_search(policydb
.p_roles
.table
, rulestr
);
3079 tmprule
->au_ctxt
.role
= roledatum
->value
;
3081 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE
:
3082 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE
:
3084 typedatum
= hashtab_search(policydb
.p_types
.table
, rulestr
);
3087 tmprule
->au_ctxt
.type
= typedatum
->value
;
3089 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN
:
3090 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
:
3091 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW
:
3092 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH
:
3093 rc
= mls_from_string(rulestr
, &tmprule
->au_ctxt
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
3100 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
3103 selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule
);
3112 /* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
3113 int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule
*rule
)
3117 for (i
= 0; i
< rule
->field_count
; i
++) {
3118 struct audit_field
*f
= &rule
->fields
[i
];
3120 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER
:
3121 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE
:
3122 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE
:
3123 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN
:
3124 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
:
3125 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER
:
3126 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE
:
3127 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE
:
3128 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW
:
3129 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH
:
3137 int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid
, u32 field
, u32 op
, void *vrule
,
3138 struct audit_context
*actx
)
3140 struct context
*ctxt
;
3141 struct mls_level
*level
;
3142 struct selinux_audit_rule
*rule
= vrule
;
3145 if (unlikely(!rule
)) {
3146 WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
3150 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
3152 if (rule
->au_seqno
< latest_granting
) {
3157 ctxt
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, sid
);
3158 if (unlikely(!ctxt
)) {
3159 WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
3165 /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
3168 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER
:
3169 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER
:
3172 match
= (ctxt
->user
== rule
->au_ctxt
.user
);
3174 case Audit_not_equal
:
3175 match
= (ctxt
->user
!= rule
->au_ctxt
.user
);
3179 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE
:
3180 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE
:
3183 match
= (ctxt
->role
== rule
->au_ctxt
.role
);
3185 case Audit_not_equal
:
3186 match
= (ctxt
->role
!= rule
->au_ctxt
.role
);
3190 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE
:
3191 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE
:
3194 match
= (ctxt
->type
== rule
->au_ctxt
.type
);
3196 case Audit_not_equal
:
3197 match
= (ctxt
->type
!= rule
->au_ctxt
.type
);
3201 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN
:
3202 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
:
3203 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW
:
3204 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH
:
3205 level
= ((field
== AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN
||
3206 field
== AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW
) ?
3207 &ctxt
->range
.level
[0] : &ctxt
->range
.level
[1]);
3210 match
= mls_level_eq(&rule
->au_ctxt
.range
.level
[0],
3213 case Audit_not_equal
:
3214 match
= !mls_level_eq(&rule
->au_ctxt
.range
.level
[0],
3218 match
= (mls_level_dom(&rule
->au_ctxt
.range
.level
[0],
3220 !mls_level_eq(&rule
->au_ctxt
.range
.level
[0],
3224 match
= mls_level_dom(&rule
->au_ctxt
.range
.level
[0],
3228 match
= (mls_level_dom(level
,
3229 &rule
->au_ctxt
.range
.level
[0]) &&
3230 !mls_level_eq(level
,
3231 &rule
->au_ctxt
.range
.level
[0]));
3234 match
= mls_level_dom(level
,
3235 &rule
->au_ctxt
.range
.level
[0]);
3241 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
3245 static int (*aurule_callback
)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules
;
3247 static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event
)
3251 if (event
== AVC_CALLBACK_RESET
&& aurule_callback
)
3252 err
= aurule_callback();
3256 static int __init
aurule_init(void)
3260 err
= avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback
, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET
);
3262 panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err
);
3266 __initcall(aurule_init
);
3268 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
3270 * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
3271 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3272 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3275 * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in
3276 * @skb, in the NetLabel subsystem cache. This function assumes @secattr has
3277 * already been initialized.
3280 static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr
*secattr
,
3285 sid_cache
= kmalloc(sizeof(*sid_cache
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
3286 if (sid_cache
== NULL
)
3288 secattr
->cache
= netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC
);
3289 if (secattr
->cache
== NULL
) {
3295 secattr
->cache
->free
= kfree
;
3296 secattr
->cache
->data
= sid_cache
;
3297 secattr
->flags
|= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE
;
3301 * security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID
3302 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3303 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3306 * Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
3307 * SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
3308 * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possible the
3309 * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
3310 * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
3311 * conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on
3315 int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr
*secattr
,
3319 struct context
*ctx
;
3320 struct context ctx_new
;
3322 if (!ss_initialized
) {
3327 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
3329 if (secattr
->flags
& NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE
)
3330 *sid
= *(u32
*)secattr
->cache
->data
;
3331 else if (secattr
->flags
& NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID
)
3332 *sid
= secattr
->attr
.secid
;
3333 else if (secattr
->flags
& NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL
) {
3335 ctx
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, SECINITSID_NETMSG
);
3339 context_init(&ctx_new
);
3340 ctx_new
.user
= ctx
->user
;
3341 ctx_new
.role
= ctx
->role
;
3342 ctx_new
.type
= ctx
->type
;
3343 mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new
, secattr
);
3344 if (secattr
->flags
& NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT
) {
3345 rc
= mls_import_netlbl_cat(&ctx_new
, secattr
);
3350 if (!mls_context_isvalid(&policydb
, &ctx_new
))
3353 rc
= sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab
, &ctx_new
, sid
);
3357 security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr
, *sid
);
3359 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new
.range
.level
[0].cat
);
3363 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
3366 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new
.range
.level
[0].cat
);
3368 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
3373 * security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr - Convert a SELinux SID to a NetLabel secattr
3374 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3375 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3378 * Convert the given SELinux SID in @sid into a NetLabel security attribute.
3379 * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3382 int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid
, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr
*secattr
)
3385 struct context
*ctx
;
3387 if (!ss_initialized
)
3390 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
3393 ctx
= sidtab_search(&sidtab
, sid
);
3398 secattr
->domain
= kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb
, SYM_TYPES
, ctx
->type
- 1),
3400 if (secattr
->domain
== NULL
)
3403 secattr
->attr
.secid
= sid
;
3404 secattr
->flags
|= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY
| NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID
;
3405 mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx
, secattr
);
3406 rc
= mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx
, secattr
);
3408 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
3411 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
3414 * security_read_policy - read the policy.
3415 * @data: binary policy data
3416 * @len: length of data in bytes
3419 int security_read_policy(void **data
, size_t *len
)
3422 struct policy_file fp
;
3424 if (!ss_initialized
)
3427 *len
= security_policydb_len();
3429 *data
= vmalloc_user(*len
);
3436 read_lock(&policy_rwlock
);
3437 rc
= policydb_write(&policydb
, &fp
);
3438 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock
);
3443 *len
= (unsigned long)fp
.data
- (unsigned long)*data
;