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1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2 /*
3 * Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
4 *
5 * This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
6 *
7 * Authors:
8 * Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
9 * Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
12 * Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
13 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation
15 * Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation.
16 */
17
18 #include <linux/xattr.h>
19 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
20 #include <linux/mount.h>
21 #include <linux/stat.h>
22 #include <linux/kd.h>
23 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
24 #include <linux/ip.h>
25 #include <linux/tcp.h>
26 #include <linux/udp.h>
27 #include <linux/dccp.h>
28 #include <linux/icmpv6.h>
29 #include <linux/slab.h>
30 #include <linux/mutex.h>
31 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
32 #include <net/ip.h>
33 #include <net/ipv6.h>
34 #include <linux/audit.h>
35 #include <linux/magic.h>
36 #include <linux/dcache.h>
37 #include <linux/personality.h>
38 #include <linux/msg.h>
39 #include <linux/shm.h>
40 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
41 #include <linux/parser.h>
42 #include <linux/fs_context.h>
43 #include <linux/fs_parser.h>
44 #include <linux/watch_queue.h>
45 #include "smack.h"
46
47 #define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
48 #define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4
49
50 #define SMK_CONNECTING 0
51 #define SMK_RECEIVING 1
52 #define SMK_SENDING 2
53
54 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ipv6_lock);
55 static LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
56 struct kmem_cache *smack_rule_cache;
57 int smack_enabled;
58
59 #define A(s) {"smack"#s, sizeof("smack"#s) - 1, Opt_##s}
60 static struct {
61 const char *name;
62 int len;
63 int opt;
64 } smk_mount_opts[] = {
65 {"smackfsdef", sizeof("smackfsdef") - 1, Opt_fsdefault},
66 A(fsdefault), A(fsfloor), A(fshat), A(fsroot), A(fstransmute)
67 };
68 #undef A
69
70 static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
71 {
72 int i;
73
74 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(smk_mount_opts); i++) {
75 size_t len = smk_mount_opts[i].len;
76 if (len > l || memcmp(s, smk_mount_opts[i].name, len))
77 continue;
78 if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
79 continue;
80 *arg = s + len + 1;
81 return smk_mount_opts[i].opt;
82 }
83 return Opt_error;
84 }
85
86 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
87 static char *smk_bu_mess[] = {
88 "Bringup Error", /* Unused */
89 "Bringup", /* SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW */
90 "Unconfined Subject", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT */
91 "Unconfined Object", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT */
92 };
93
94 static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s)
95 {
96 int i = 0;
97
98 if (mode & MAY_READ)
99 s[i++] = 'r';
100 if (mode & MAY_WRITE)
101 s[i++] = 'w';
102 if (mode & MAY_EXEC)
103 s[i++] = 'x';
104 if (mode & MAY_APPEND)
105 s[i++] = 'a';
106 if (mode & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
107 s[i++] = 't';
108 if (mode & MAY_LOCK)
109 s[i++] = 'l';
110 if (i == 0)
111 s[i++] = '-';
112 s[i] = '\0';
113 }
114 #endif
115
116 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
117 static int smk_bu_note(char *note, struct smack_known *sskp,
118 struct smack_known *oskp, int mode, int rc)
119 {
120 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
121
122 if (rc <= 0)
123 return rc;
124 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
125 rc = 0;
126
127 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
128 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
129 sskp->smk_known, oskp->smk_known, acc, note);
130 return 0;
131 }
132 #else
133 #define smk_bu_note(note, sskp, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
134 #endif
135
136 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
137 static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
138 int mode, int rc)
139 {
140 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
141 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
142
143 if (rc <= 0)
144 return rc;
145 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
146 rc = 0;
147
148 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
149 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
150 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, oskp->smk_known,
151 acc, current->comm, note);
152 return 0;
153 }
154 #else
155 #define smk_bu_current(note, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
156 #endif
157
158 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
159 static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
160 {
161 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
162 struct smack_known *smk_task = smk_of_task_struct(otp);
163 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
164
165 if (rc <= 0)
166 return rc;
167 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
168 rc = 0;
169
170 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
171 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
172 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_task->smk_known, acc,
173 current->comm, otp->comm);
174 return 0;
175 }
176 #else
177 #define smk_bu_task(otp, mode, RC) (RC)
178 #endif
179
180 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
181 static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
182 {
183 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
184 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
185 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
186
187 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
188 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
189 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
190
191 if (rc <= 0)
192 return rc;
193 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
194 rc = 0;
195 if (rc == SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT &&
196 (mode & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)))
197 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_IMPURE;
198
199 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
200
201 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
202 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, isp->smk_inode->smk_known, acc,
203 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
204 return 0;
205 }
206 #else
207 #define smk_bu_inode(inode, mode, RC) (RC)
208 #endif
209
210 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
211 static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
212 {
213 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
214 struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
215 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
216 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
217 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
218
219 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
220 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
221 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
222
223 if (rc <= 0)
224 return rc;
225 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
226 rc = 0;
227
228 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
229 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
230 sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
231 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
232 current->comm);
233 return 0;
234 }
235 #else
236 #define smk_bu_file(file, mode, RC) (RC)
237 #endif
238
239 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
240 static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
241 int mode, int rc)
242 {
243 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
244 struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
245 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
246 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
247 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
248
249 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
250 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
251 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
252
253 if (rc <= 0)
254 return rc;
255 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
256 rc = 0;
257
258 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
259 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
260 sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
261 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
262 current->comm);
263 return 0;
264 }
265 #else
266 #define smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, mode, RC) (RC)
267 #endif
268
269 /**
270 * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
271 * @name: type of the label (attribute)
272 * @ip: a pointer to the inode
273 * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
274 *
275 * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label,
276 * NULL if there was no label to fetch, or an error code.
277 */
278 static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
279 struct dentry *dp)
280 {
281 int rc;
282 char *buffer;
283 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
284
285 if (!(ip->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
286 return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
287
288 buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_NOFS);
289 if (buffer == NULL)
290 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
291
292 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, ip, name, buffer, SMK_LONGLABEL);
293 if (rc < 0)
294 skp = ERR_PTR(rc);
295 else if (rc == 0)
296 skp = NULL;
297 else
298 skp = smk_import_entry(buffer, rc);
299
300 kfree(buffer);
301
302 return skp;
303 }
304
305 /**
306 * init_inode_smack - initialize an inode security blob
307 * @inode: inode to extract the info from
308 * @skp: a pointer to the Smack label entry to use in the blob
309 *
310 */
311 static void init_inode_smack(struct inode *inode, struct smack_known *skp)
312 {
313 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
314
315 isp->smk_inode = skp;
316 isp->smk_flags = 0;
317 }
318
319 /**
320 * init_task_smack - initialize a task security blob
321 * @tsp: blob to initialize
322 * @task: a pointer to the Smack label for the running task
323 * @forked: a pointer to the Smack label for the forked task
324 *
325 */
326 static void init_task_smack(struct task_smack *tsp, struct smack_known *task,
327 struct smack_known *forked)
328 {
329 tsp->smk_task = task;
330 tsp->smk_forked = forked;
331 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
332 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_relabel);
333 mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
334 }
335
336 /**
337 * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
338 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
339 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
340 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
341 *
342 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
343 */
344 static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
345 gfp_t gfp)
346 {
347 struct smack_rule *nrp;
348 struct smack_rule *orp;
349 int rc = 0;
350
351 list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) {
352 nrp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_rule_cache, gfp);
353 if (nrp == NULL) {
354 rc = -ENOMEM;
355 break;
356 }
357 *nrp = *orp;
358 list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead);
359 }
360 return rc;
361 }
362
363 /**
364 * smk_copy_relabel - copy smk_relabel labels list
365 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
366 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
367 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
368 *
369 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
370 */
371 static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
372 gfp_t gfp)
373 {
374 struct smack_known_list_elem *nklep;
375 struct smack_known_list_elem *oklep;
376
377 list_for_each_entry(oklep, ohead, list) {
378 nklep = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_known_list_elem), gfp);
379 if (nklep == NULL) {
380 smk_destroy_label_list(nhead);
381 return -ENOMEM;
382 }
383 nklep->smk_label = oklep->smk_label;
384 list_add(&nklep->list, nhead);
385 }
386
387 return 0;
388 }
389
390 /**
391 * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_*
392 * @mode - input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
393 *
394 * Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules
395 */
396 static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
397 {
398 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)
399 return MAY_READWRITE;
400 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
401 return MAY_READ;
402
403 return 0;
404 }
405
406 /**
407 * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
408 * @tracer: tracer process
409 * @tracee_known: label entry of the process that's about to be traced
410 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
411 * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
412 *
413 * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error
414 */
415 static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
416 struct smack_known *tracee_known,
417 unsigned int mode, const char *func)
418 {
419 int rc;
420 struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
421 struct task_smack *tsp;
422 struct smack_known *tracer_known;
423 const struct cred *tracercred;
424
425 if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
426 smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
427 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
428 saip = &ad;
429 }
430
431 rcu_read_lock();
432 tracercred = __task_cred(tracer);
433 tsp = smack_cred(tracercred);
434 tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
435
436 if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
437 (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT ||
438 smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)) {
439 if (tracer_known->smk_known == tracee_known->smk_known)
440 rc = 0;
441 else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
442 rc = -EACCES;
443 else if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_SYS_PTRACE, tracercred))
444 rc = 0;
445 else
446 rc = -EACCES;
447
448 if (saip)
449 smack_log(tracer_known->smk_known,
450 tracee_known->smk_known,
451 0, rc, saip);
452
453 rcu_read_unlock();
454 return rc;
455 }
456
457 /* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */
458 rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_known, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
459
460 rcu_read_unlock();
461 return rc;
462 }
463
464 /*
465 * LSM hooks.
466 * We he, that is fun!
467 */
468
469 /**
470 * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
471 * @ctp: child task pointer
472 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
473 *
474 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
475 *
476 * Do the capability checks.
477 */
478 static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
479 {
480 struct smack_known *skp;
481
482 skp = smk_of_task_struct(ctp);
483
484 return smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__);
485 }
486
487 /**
488 * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME
489 * @ptp: parent task pointer
490 *
491 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
492 *
493 * Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH.
494 */
495 static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
496 {
497 int rc;
498 struct smack_known *skp;
499
500 skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(current_cred()));
501
502 rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
503 return rc;
504 }
505
506 /**
507 * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
508 * @typefrom_file: unused
509 *
510 * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
511 */
512 static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
513 {
514 int rc = 0;
515 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
516
517 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
518 return 0;
519
520 if (smack_syslog_label != NULL && smack_syslog_label != skp)
521 rc = -EACCES;
522
523 return rc;
524 }
525
526 /*
527 * Superblock Hooks.
528 */
529
530 /**
531 * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob
532 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
533 *
534 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
535 */
536 static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
537 {
538 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
539
540 sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
541
542 if (sbsp == NULL)
543 return -ENOMEM;
544
545 sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
546 sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
547 sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor;
548 sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat;
549 /*
550 * SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc.
551 */
552 sb->s_security = sbsp;
553
554 return 0;
555 }
556
557 /**
558 * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
559 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
560 *
561 */
562 static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
563 {
564 kfree(sb->s_security);
565 sb->s_security = NULL;
566 }
567
568 struct smack_mnt_opts {
569 const char *fsdefault, *fsfloor, *fshat, *fsroot, *fstransmute;
570 };
571
572 static void smack_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
573 {
574 struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
575 kfree(opts->fsdefault);
576 kfree(opts->fsfloor);
577 kfree(opts->fshat);
578 kfree(opts->fsroot);
579 kfree(opts->fstransmute);
580 kfree(opts);
581 }
582
583 static int smack_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
584 {
585 struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
586
587 if (!opts) {
588 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
589 if (!opts)
590 return -ENOMEM;
591 *mnt_opts = opts;
592 }
593 if (!s)
594 return -ENOMEM;
595
596 switch (token) {
597 case Opt_fsdefault:
598 if (opts->fsdefault)
599 goto out_opt_err;
600 opts->fsdefault = s;
601 break;
602 case Opt_fsfloor:
603 if (opts->fsfloor)
604 goto out_opt_err;
605 opts->fsfloor = s;
606 break;
607 case Opt_fshat:
608 if (opts->fshat)
609 goto out_opt_err;
610 opts->fshat = s;
611 break;
612 case Opt_fsroot:
613 if (opts->fsroot)
614 goto out_opt_err;
615 opts->fsroot = s;
616 break;
617 case Opt_fstransmute:
618 if (opts->fstransmute)
619 goto out_opt_err;
620 opts->fstransmute = s;
621 break;
622 }
623 return 0;
624
625 out_opt_err:
626 pr_warn("Smack: duplicate mount options\n");
627 return -EINVAL;
628 }
629
630 /**
631 * smack_fs_context_dup - Duplicate the security data on fs_context duplication
632 * @fc: The new filesystem context.
633 * @src_fc: The source filesystem context being duplicated.
634 *
635 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
636 */
637 static int smack_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
638 struct fs_context *src_fc)
639 {
640 struct smack_mnt_opts *dst, *src = src_fc->security;
641
642 if (!src)
643 return 0;
644
645 fc->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
646 if (!fc->security)
647 return -ENOMEM;
648 dst = fc->security;
649
650 if (src->fsdefault) {
651 dst->fsdefault = kstrdup(src->fsdefault, GFP_KERNEL);
652 if (!dst->fsdefault)
653 return -ENOMEM;
654 }
655 if (src->fsfloor) {
656 dst->fsfloor = kstrdup(src->fsfloor, GFP_KERNEL);
657 if (!dst->fsfloor)
658 return -ENOMEM;
659 }
660 if (src->fshat) {
661 dst->fshat = kstrdup(src->fshat, GFP_KERNEL);
662 if (!dst->fshat)
663 return -ENOMEM;
664 }
665 if (src->fsroot) {
666 dst->fsroot = kstrdup(src->fsroot, GFP_KERNEL);
667 if (!dst->fsroot)
668 return -ENOMEM;
669 }
670 if (src->fstransmute) {
671 dst->fstransmute = kstrdup(src->fstransmute, GFP_KERNEL);
672 if (!dst->fstransmute)
673 return -ENOMEM;
674 }
675 return 0;
676 }
677
678 static const struct fs_parameter_spec smack_fs_parameters[] = {
679 fsparam_string("smackfsdef", Opt_fsdefault),
680 fsparam_string("smackfsdefault", Opt_fsdefault),
681 fsparam_string("smackfsfloor", Opt_fsfloor),
682 fsparam_string("smackfshat", Opt_fshat),
683 fsparam_string("smackfsroot", Opt_fsroot),
684 fsparam_string("smackfstransmute", Opt_fstransmute),
685 {}
686 };
687
688 /**
689 * smack_fs_context_parse_param - Parse a single mount parameter
690 * @fc: The new filesystem context being constructed.
691 * @param: The parameter.
692 *
693 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOPARAM to pass the parameter on or anything else on
694 * error.
695 */
696 static int smack_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
697 struct fs_parameter *param)
698 {
699 struct fs_parse_result result;
700 int opt, rc;
701
702 opt = fs_parse(fc, smack_fs_parameters, param, &result);
703 if (opt < 0)
704 return opt;
705
706 rc = smack_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
707 if (!rc)
708 param->string = NULL;
709 return rc;
710 }
711
712 static int smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
713 {
714 char *from = options, *to = options;
715 bool first = true;
716
717 while (1) {
718 char *next = strchr(from, ',');
719 int token, len, rc;
720 char *arg = NULL;
721
722 if (next)
723 len = next - from;
724 else
725 len = strlen(from);
726
727 token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
728 if (token != Opt_error) {
729 arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, from + len - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
730 rc = smack_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
731 if (unlikely(rc)) {
732 kfree(arg);
733 if (*mnt_opts)
734 smack_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
735 *mnt_opts = NULL;
736 return rc;
737 }
738 } else {
739 if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma
740 from--;
741 len++;
742 }
743 if (to != from)
744 memmove(to, from, len);
745 to += len;
746 first = false;
747 }
748 if (!from[len])
749 break;
750 from += len + 1;
751 }
752 *to = '\0';
753 return 0;
754 }
755
756 /**
757 * smack_set_mnt_opts - set Smack specific mount options
758 * @sb: the file system superblock
759 * @mnt_opts: Smack mount options
760 * @kern_flags: mount option from kernel space or user space
761 * @set_kern_flags: where to store converted mount opts
762 *
763 * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
764 *
765 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set Smack mount
766 * labels.
767 */
768 static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
769 void *mnt_opts,
770 unsigned long kern_flags,
771 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
772 {
773 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
774 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
775 struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
776 struct inode_smack *isp;
777 struct smack_known *skp;
778 struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
779 bool transmute = false;
780
781 if (sp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_INITIALIZED)
782 return 0;
783
784 if (inode->i_security == NULL) {
785 int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode);
786
787 if (rc)
788 return rc;
789 }
790
791 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
792 /*
793 * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values.
794 */
795 if (opts)
796 return -EPERM;
797 /*
798 * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller.
799 */
800 skp = smk_of_current();
801 sp->smk_root = skp;
802 sp->smk_default = skp;
803 /*
804 * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled
805 * backing store it's okay to trust security labels
806 * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted.
807 */
808 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
809 sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC &&
810 sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) {
811 transmute = true;
812 sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED;
813 }
814 }
815
816 sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_INITIALIZED;
817
818 if (opts) {
819 if (opts->fsdefault) {
820 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fsdefault, 0);
821 if (IS_ERR(skp))
822 return PTR_ERR(skp);
823 sp->smk_default = skp;
824 }
825 if (opts->fsfloor) {
826 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fsfloor, 0);
827 if (IS_ERR(skp))
828 return PTR_ERR(skp);
829 sp->smk_floor = skp;
830 }
831 if (opts->fshat) {
832 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fshat, 0);
833 if (IS_ERR(skp))
834 return PTR_ERR(skp);
835 sp->smk_hat = skp;
836 }
837 if (opts->fsroot) {
838 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fsroot, 0);
839 if (IS_ERR(skp))
840 return PTR_ERR(skp);
841 sp->smk_root = skp;
842 }
843 if (opts->fstransmute) {
844 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fstransmute, 0);
845 if (IS_ERR(skp))
846 return PTR_ERR(skp);
847 sp->smk_root = skp;
848 transmute = true;
849 }
850 }
851
852 /*
853 * Initialize the root inode.
854 */
855 init_inode_smack(inode, sp->smk_root);
856
857 if (transmute) {
858 isp = smack_inode(inode);
859 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
860 }
861
862 return 0;
863 }
864
865 /**
866 * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
867 * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
868 *
869 * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem,
870 * and error code otherwise
871 */
872 static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
873 {
874 struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
875 int rc;
876 struct smk_audit_info ad;
877
878 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
879 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
880
881 rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
882 rc = smk_bu_current("statfs", sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, rc);
883 return rc;
884 }
885
886 /*
887 * BPRM hooks
888 */
889
890 /**
891 * smack_bprm_creds_for_exec - Update bprm->cred if needed for exec
892 * @bprm: the exec information
893 *
894 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise
895 */
896 static int smack_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
897 {
898 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
899 struct task_smack *bsp = smack_cred(bprm->cred);
900 struct inode_smack *isp;
901 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
902 int rc;
903
904 isp = smack_inode(inode);
905 if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
906 return 0;
907
908 sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
909 if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
910 isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
911 return 0;
912
913 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
914 struct task_struct *tracer;
915 rc = 0;
916
917 rcu_read_lock();
918 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
919 if (likely(tracer != NULL))
920 rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer,
921 isp->smk_task,
922 PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH,
923 __func__);
924 rcu_read_unlock();
925
926 if (rc != 0)
927 return rc;
928 }
929 if (bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE)
930 return -EPERM;
931
932 bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
933 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
934
935 /* Decide if this is a secure exec. */
936 if (bsp->smk_task != bsp->smk_forked)
937 bprm->secureexec = 1;
938
939 return 0;
940 }
941
942 /*
943 * Inode hooks
944 */
945
946 /**
947 * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
948 * @inode: the inode in need of a blob
949 *
950 * Returns 0
951 */
952 static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
953 {
954 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
955
956 init_inode_smack(inode, skp);
957 return 0;
958 }
959
960 /**
961 * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
962 * @inode: the newly created inode
963 * @dir: containing directory object
964 * @qstr: unused
965 * @name: where to put the attribute name
966 * @value: where to put the attribute value
967 * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
968 *
969 * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
970 */
971 static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
972 const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
973 void **value, size_t *len)
974 {
975 struct inode_smack *issp = smack_inode(inode);
976 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
977 struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
978 struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
979 int may;
980
981 if (name)
982 *name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX;
983
984 if (value && len) {
985 rcu_read_lock();
986 may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
987 &skp->smk_rules);
988 rcu_read_unlock();
989
990 /*
991 * If the access rule allows transmutation and
992 * the directory requests transmutation then
993 * by all means transmute.
994 * Mark the inode as changed.
995 */
996 if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
997 smk_inode_transmutable(dir)) {
998 isp = dsp;
999 issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
1000 }
1001
1002 *value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
1003 if (*value == NULL)
1004 return -ENOMEM;
1005
1006 *len = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1007 }
1008
1009 return 0;
1010 }
1011
1012 /**
1013 * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link
1014 * @old_dentry: the existing object
1015 * @dir: unused
1016 * @new_dentry: the new object
1017 *
1018 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1019 */
1020 static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
1021 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1022 {
1023 struct smack_known *isp;
1024 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1025 int rc;
1026
1027 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1028 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1029
1030 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1031 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1032 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1033
1034 if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1035 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1036 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1037 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1038 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1039 }
1040
1041 return rc;
1042 }
1043
1044 /**
1045 * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion
1046 * @dir: containing directory object
1047 * @dentry: file to unlink
1048 *
1049 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1050 * and the object, error code otherwise
1051 */
1052 static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1053 {
1054 struct inode *ip = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1055 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1056 int rc;
1057
1058 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1059 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1060
1061 /*
1062 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
1063 */
1064 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1065 rc = smk_bu_inode(ip, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1066 if (rc == 0) {
1067 /*
1068 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1069 */
1070 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1071 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1072 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1073 rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1074 }
1075 return rc;
1076 }
1077
1078 /**
1079 * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion
1080 * @dir: containing directory object
1081 * @dentry: directory to unlink
1082 *
1083 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1084 * and the directory, error code otherwise
1085 */
1086 static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1087 {
1088 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1089 int rc;
1090
1091 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1092 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1093
1094 /*
1095 * You need write access to the thing you're removing
1096 */
1097 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1098 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1099 if (rc == 0) {
1100 /*
1101 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1102 */
1103 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1104 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1105 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1106 rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1107 }
1108
1109 return rc;
1110 }
1111
1112 /**
1113 * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
1114 * @old_inode: unused
1115 * @old_dentry: the old object
1116 * @new_inode: unused
1117 * @new_dentry: the new object
1118 *
1119 * Read and write access is required on both the old and
1120 * new directories.
1121 *
1122 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1123 */
1124 static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
1125 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1126 struct inode *new_inode,
1127 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1128 {
1129 int rc;
1130 struct smack_known *isp;
1131 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1132
1133 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1134 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1135
1136 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1137 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1138 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1139
1140 if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1141 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1142 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1143 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1144 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1145 }
1146 return rc;
1147 }
1148
1149 /**
1150 * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
1151 * @inode: the inode in question
1152 * @mask: the access requested
1153 *
1154 * This is the important Smack hook.
1155 *
1156 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1157 */
1158 static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
1159 {
1160 struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1161 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1162 int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
1163 int rc;
1164
1165 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
1166 /*
1167 * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
1168 */
1169 if (mask == 0)
1170 return 0;
1171
1172 if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) {
1173 if (smk_of_inode(inode) != sbsp->smk_root)
1174 return -EACCES;
1175 }
1176
1177 /* May be droppable after audit */
1178 if (no_block)
1179 return -ECHILD;
1180 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1181 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
1182 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
1183 rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, mask, rc);
1184 return rc;
1185 }
1186
1187 /**
1188 * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
1189 * @dentry: the object
1190 * @iattr: for the force flag
1191 *
1192 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1193 */
1194 static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
1195 {
1196 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1197 int rc;
1198
1199 /*
1200 * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
1201 */
1202 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
1203 return 0;
1204 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1205 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1206
1207 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1208 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1209 return rc;
1210 }
1211
1212 /**
1213 * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
1214 * @path: path to extract the info from
1215 *
1216 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1217 */
1218 static int smack_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
1219 {
1220 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1221 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1222 int rc;
1223
1224 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1225 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
1226 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1227 rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, MAY_READ, rc);
1228 return rc;
1229 }
1230
1231 /**
1232 * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
1233 * @dentry: the object
1234 * @name: name of the attribute
1235 * @value: value of the attribute
1236 * @size: size of the value
1237 * @flags: unused
1238 *
1239 * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly.
1240 *
1241 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1242 */
1243 static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
1244 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1245 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1246 {
1247 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1248 struct smack_known *skp;
1249 int check_priv = 0;
1250 int check_import = 0;
1251 int check_star = 0;
1252 int rc = 0;
1253
1254 /*
1255 * Check label validity here so import won't fail in post_setxattr
1256 */
1257 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1258 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1259 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
1260 check_priv = 1;
1261 check_import = 1;
1262 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1263 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1264 check_priv = 1;
1265 check_import = 1;
1266 check_star = 1;
1267 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1268 check_priv = 1;
1269 if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
1270 strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
1271 rc = -EINVAL;
1272 } else
1273 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
1274
1275 if (check_priv && !smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1276 rc = -EPERM;
1277
1278 if (rc == 0 && check_import) {
1279 skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL;
1280 if (IS_ERR(skp))
1281 rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
1282 else if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
1283 (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)))
1284 rc = -EINVAL;
1285 }
1286
1287 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1288 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1289
1290 if (rc == 0) {
1291 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1292 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1293 }
1294
1295 return rc;
1296 }
1297
1298 /**
1299 * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above
1300 * @dentry: object
1301 * @name: attribute name
1302 * @value: attribute value
1303 * @size: attribute size
1304 * @flags: unused
1305 *
1306 * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found
1307 * in the master label list.
1308 */
1309 static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1310 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1311 {
1312 struct smack_known *skp;
1313 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry));
1314
1315 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1316 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1317 return;
1318 }
1319
1320 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1321 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1322 if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1323 isp->smk_inode = skp;
1324 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
1325 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1326 if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1327 isp->smk_task = skp;
1328 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1329 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1330 if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1331 isp->smk_mmap = skp;
1332 }
1333
1334 return;
1335 }
1336
1337 /**
1338 * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr
1339 * @dentry: the object
1340 * @name: unused
1341 *
1342 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1343 */
1344 static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1345 {
1346 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1347 int rc;
1348
1349 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1350 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1351
1352 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_READ, &ad);
1353 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_READ, rc);
1354 return rc;
1355 }
1356
1357 /**
1358 * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
1359 * @dentry: the object
1360 * @name: name of the attribute
1361 *
1362 * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN
1363 *
1364 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1365 */
1366 static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
1367 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1368 {
1369 struct inode_smack *isp;
1370 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1371 int rc = 0;
1372
1373 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1374 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1375 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
1376 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1377 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
1378 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1379 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1380 rc = -EPERM;
1381 } else
1382 rc = cap_inode_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name);
1383
1384 if (rc != 0)
1385 return rc;
1386
1387 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1388 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1389
1390 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1391 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1392 if (rc != 0)
1393 return rc;
1394
1395 isp = smack_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry));
1396 /*
1397 * Don't do anything special for these.
1398 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN
1399 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT
1400 */
1401 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1402 struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb;
1403 struct superblock_smack *sbsp = sbp->s_security;
1404
1405 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default;
1406 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0)
1407 isp->smk_task = NULL;
1408 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0)
1409 isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
1410 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
1411 isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1412
1413 return 0;
1414 }
1415
1416 /**
1417 * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
1418 * @inode: the object
1419 * @name: attribute name
1420 * @buffer: where to put the result
1421 * @alloc: duplicate memory
1422 *
1423 * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
1424 */
1425 static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
1426 struct inode *inode, const char *name,
1427 void **buffer, bool alloc)
1428 {
1429 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1430 struct socket *sock;
1431 struct super_block *sbp;
1432 struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode;
1433 struct smack_known *isp;
1434
1435 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0)
1436 isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1437 else {
1438 /*
1439 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
1440 */
1441 sbp = ip->i_sb;
1442 if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
1443 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1444
1445 sock = SOCKET_I(ip);
1446 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
1447 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1448
1449 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1450
1451 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
1452 isp = ssp->smk_in;
1453 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
1454 isp = ssp->smk_out;
1455 else
1456 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1457 }
1458
1459 if (alloc) {
1460 *buffer = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
1461 if (*buffer == NULL)
1462 return -ENOMEM;
1463 }
1464
1465 return strlen(isp->smk_known);
1466 }
1467
1468
1469 /**
1470 * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes
1471 * @inode: the object
1472 * @buffer: where they go
1473 * @buffer_size: size of buffer
1474 */
1475 static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
1476 size_t buffer_size)
1477 {
1478 int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
1479
1480 if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size)
1481 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len);
1482
1483 return len;
1484 }
1485
1486 /**
1487 * smack_inode_getsecid - Extract inode's security id
1488 * @inode: inode to extract the info from
1489 * @secid: where result will be saved
1490 */
1491 static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
1492 {
1493 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1494
1495 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
1496 }
1497
1498 /*
1499 * File Hooks
1500 */
1501
1502 /*
1503 * There is no smack_file_permission hook
1504 *
1505 * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
1506 * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
1507 * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no.
1508 *
1509 * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
1510 * label changing that SELinux does.
1511 */
1512
1513 /**
1514 * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
1515 * @file: the object
1516 *
1517 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1518 * label list, so no allocation is done.
1519 *
1520 * f_security is the owner security information. It
1521 * isn't used on file access checks, it's for send_sigio.
1522 *
1523 * Returns 0
1524 */
1525 static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
1526 {
1527 struct smack_known **blob = smack_file(file);
1528
1529 *blob = smk_of_current();
1530 return 0;
1531 }
1532
1533 /**
1534 * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
1535 * @file: the object
1536 * @cmd: what to do
1537 * @arg: unused
1538 *
1539 * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions.
1540 *
1541 * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise
1542 */
1543 static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1544 unsigned long arg)
1545 {
1546 int rc = 0;
1547 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1548 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1549
1550 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1551 return 0;
1552
1553 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1554 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1555
1556 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
1557 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1558 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1559 }
1560
1561 if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)) {
1562 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1563 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_READ, rc);
1564 }
1565
1566 return rc;
1567 }
1568
1569 /**
1570 * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
1571 * @file: the object
1572 * @cmd: unused
1573 *
1574 * Returns 0 if current has lock access, error code otherwise
1575 */
1576 static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
1577 {
1578 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1579 int rc;
1580 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1581
1582 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1583 return 0;
1584
1585 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1586 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1587 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1588 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1589 return rc;
1590 }
1591
1592 /**
1593 * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl
1594 * @file: the object
1595 * @cmd: what action to check
1596 * @arg: unused
1597 *
1598 * Generally these operations are harmless.
1599 * File locking operations present an obvious mechanism
1600 * for passing information, so they require write access.
1601 *
1602 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1603 */
1604 static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1605 unsigned long arg)
1606 {
1607 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1608 int rc = 0;
1609 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1610
1611 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1612 return 0;
1613
1614 switch (cmd) {
1615 case F_GETLK:
1616 break;
1617 case F_SETLK:
1618 case F_SETLKW:
1619 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1620 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1621 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1622 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1623 break;
1624 case F_SETOWN:
1625 case F_SETSIG:
1626 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1627 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1628 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1629 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1630 break;
1631 default:
1632 break;
1633 }
1634
1635 return rc;
1636 }
1637
1638 /**
1639 * smack_mmap_file :
1640 * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g.
1641 * if mapping anonymous memory.
1642 * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
1643 * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
1644 * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
1645 * @flags contains the operational flags.
1646 * Return 0 if permission is granted.
1647 */
1648 static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
1649 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
1650 unsigned long flags)
1651 {
1652 struct smack_known *skp;
1653 struct smack_known *mkp;
1654 struct smack_rule *srp;
1655 struct task_smack *tsp;
1656 struct smack_known *okp;
1657 struct inode_smack *isp;
1658 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
1659 int may;
1660 int mmay;
1661 int tmay;
1662 int rc;
1663
1664 if (file == NULL)
1665 return 0;
1666
1667 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file))))
1668 return 0;
1669
1670 isp = smack_inode(file_inode(file));
1671 if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
1672 return 0;
1673 sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security;
1674 if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
1675 isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
1676 return -EACCES;
1677 mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
1678
1679 tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
1680 skp = smk_of_current();
1681 rc = 0;
1682
1683 rcu_read_lock();
1684 /*
1685 * For each Smack rule associated with the subject
1686 * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access
1687 * to that rule's object label.
1688 */
1689 list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &skp->smk_rules, list) {
1690 okp = srp->smk_object;
1691 /*
1692 * Matching labels always allows access.
1693 */
1694 if (mkp->smk_known == okp->smk_known)
1695 continue;
1696 /*
1697 * If there is a matching local rule take
1698 * that into account as well.
1699 */
1700 may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject->smk_known,
1701 okp->smk_known,
1702 &tsp->smk_rules);
1703 if (may == -ENOENT)
1704 may = srp->smk_access;
1705 else
1706 may &= srp->smk_access;
1707 /*
1708 * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't
1709 * possibly have less access.
1710 */
1711 if (may == 0)
1712 continue;
1713
1714 /*
1715 * Fetch the global list entry.
1716 * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
1717 * can't have as much access as current.
1718 */
1719 mmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1720 &mkp->smk_rules);
1721 if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
1722 rc = -EACCES;
1723 break;
1724 }
1725 /*
1726 * If there is a local entry it modifies the
1727 * potential access, too.
1728 */
1729 tmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1730 &tsp->smk_rules);
1731 if (tmay != -ENOENT)
1732 mmay &= tmay;
1733
1734 /*
1735 * If there is any access available to current that is
1736 * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
1737 * deny access.
1738 */
1739 if ((may | mmay) != mmay) {
1740 rc = -EACCES;
1741 break;
1742 }
1743 }
1744
1745 rcu_read_unlock();
1746
1747 return rc;
1748 }
1749
1750 /**
1751 * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
1752 * @file: object in question
1753 *
1754 */
1755 static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
1756 {
1757 struct smack_known **blob = smack_file(file);
1758
1759 *blob = smk_of_current();
1760 }
1761
1762 /**
1763 * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio
1764 * @tsk: The target task
1765 * @fown: the object the signal come from
1766 * @signum: unused
1767 *
1768 * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't
1769 *
1770 * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could
1771 * write to the task, an error code otherwise.
1772 */
1773 static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
1774 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
1775 {
1776 struct smack_known **blob;
1777 struct smack_known *skp;
1778 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(tsk->cred));
1779 const struct cred *tcred;
1780 struct file *file;
1781 int rc;
1782 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1783
1784 /*
1785 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
1786 */
1787 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
1788
1789 /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
1790 blob = smack_file(file);
1791 skp = *blob;
1792 rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, NULL);
1793 rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
1794
1795 rcu_read_lock();
1796 tcred = __task_cred(tsk);
1797 if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, tcred))
1798 rc = 0;
1799 rcu_read_unlock();
1800
1801 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1802 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
1803 smack_log(skp->smk_known, tkp->smk_known, MAY_DELIVER, rc, &ad);
1804 return rc;
1805 }
1806
1807 /**
1808 * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check
1809 * @file: the object
1810 *
1811 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1812 */
1813 static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
1814 {
1815 int rc;
1816 int may = 0;
1817 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1818 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1819 struct socket *sock;
1820 struct task_smack *tsp;
1821 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1822
1823 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1824 return 0;
1825
1826 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1827 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1828
1829 if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
1830 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
1831 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1832 tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
1833 /*
1834 * If the receiving process can't write to the
1835 * passed socket or if the passed socket can't
1836 * write to the receiving process don't accept
1837 * the passed socket.
1838 */
1839 rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, ssp->smk_out, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1840 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1841 if (rc < 0)
1842 return rc;
1843 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_in, tsp->smk_task, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1844 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1845 return rc;
1846 }
1847 /*
1848 * This code relies on bitmasks.
1849 */
1850 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1851 may = MAY_READ;
1852 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
1853 may |= MAY_WRITE;
1854
1855 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), may, &ad);
1856 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1857 return rc;
1858 }
1859
1860 /**
1861 * smack_file_open - Smack dentry open processing
1862 * @file: the object
1863 *
1864 * Set the security blob in the file structure.
1865 * Allow the open only if the task has read access. There are
1866 * many read operations (e.g. fstat) that you can do with an
1867 * fd even if you have the file open write-only.
1868 *
1869 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1870 */
1871 static int smack_file_open(struct file *file)
1872 {
1873 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(file->f_cred);
1874 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1875 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1876 int rc;
1877
1878 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1879 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1880 rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1881 rc = smk_bu_credfile(file->f_cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
1882
1883 return rc;
1884 }
1885
1886 /*
1887 * Task hooks
1888 */
1889
1890 /**
1891 * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
1892 * @cred: the new credentials
1893 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1894 *
1895 * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification. This must allocate all
1896 * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
1897 * complete without error.
1898 */
1899 static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
1900 {
1901 init_task_smack(smack_cred(cred), NULL, NULL);
1902 return 0;
1903 }
1904
1905
1906 /**
1907 * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
1908 * @cred: the credentials in question
1909 *
1910 */
1911 static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
1912 {
1913 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
1914 struct smack_rule *rp;
1915 struct list_head *l;
1916 struct list_head *n;
1917
1918 smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
1919
1920 list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
1921 rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list);
1922 list_del(&rp->list);
1923 kmem_cache_free(smack_rule_cache, rp);
1924 }
1925 }
1926
1927 /**
1928 * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification
1929 * @new: the new credentials
1930 * @old: the original credentials
1931 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1932 *
1933 * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
1934 */
1935 static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1936 gfp_t gfp)
1937 {
1938 struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
1939 struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
1940 int rc;
1941
1942 init_task_smack(new_tsp, old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task);
1943
1944 rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
1945 if (rc != 0)
1946 return rc;
1947
1948 rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel,
1949 gfp);
1950 return rc;
1951 }
1952
1953 /**
1954 * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
1955 * @new: the new credentials
1956 * @old: the original credentials
1957 *
1958 * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
1959 */
1960 static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
1961 {
1962 struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
1963 struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
1964
1965 new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
1966 new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
1967 mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
1968 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
1969
1970 /* cbs copy rule list */
1971 }
1972
1973 /**
1974 * smack_cred_getsecid - get the secid corresponding to a creds structure
1975 * @cred: the object creds
1976 * @secid: where to put the result
1977 *
1978 * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
1979 */
1980 static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, u32 *secid)
1981 {
1982 struct smack_known *skp;
1983
1984 rcu_read_lock();
1985 skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
1986 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
1987 rcu_read_unlock();
1988 }
1989
1990 /**
1991 * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
1992 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
1993 * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
1994 *
1995 * Set the security data for a kernel service.
1996 */
1997 static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
1998 {
1999 struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
2000
2001 new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid);
2002 return 0;
2003 }
2004
2005 /**
2006 * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
2007 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified
2008 * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference
2009 *
2010 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
2011 * as the objective context of the specified inode
2012 */
2013 static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
2014 struct inode *inode)
2015 {
2016 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
2017 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(new);
2018
2019 tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
2020 tsp->smk_task = tsp->smk_forked;
2021 return 0;
2022 }
2023
2024 /**
2025 * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access
2026 * @p: the task object
2027 * @access: the access requested
2028 * @caller: name of the calling function for audit
2029 *
2030 * Return 0 if access is permitted
2031 */
2032 static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
2033 const char *caller)
2034 {
2035 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2036 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2037 int rc;
2038
2039 smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2040 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2041 rc = smk_curacc(skp, access, &ad);
2042 rc = smk_bu_task(p, access, rc);
2043 return rc;
2044 }
2045
2046 /**
2047 * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
2048 * @p: the task object
2049 * @pgid: unused
2050 *
2051 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2052 */
2053 static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2054 {
2055 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2056 }
2057
2058 /**
2059 * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid
2060 * @p: the object task
2061 *
2062 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2063 */
2064 static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2065 {
2066 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2067 }
2068
2069 /**
2070 * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid
2071 * @p: the object task
2072 *
2073 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2074 */
2075 static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2076 {
2077 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2078 }
2079
2080 /**
2081 * smack_task_getsecid - get the secid of the task
2082 * @p: the object task
2083 * @secid: where to put the result
2084 *
2085 * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
2086 */
2087 static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
2088 {
2089 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2090
2091 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
2092 }
2093
2094 /**
2095 * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice
2096 * @p: the task object
2097 * @nice: unused
2098 *
2099 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2100 */
2101 static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2102 {
2103 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2104 }
2105
2106 /**
2107 * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio
2108 * @p: the task object
2109 * @ioprio: unused
2110 *
2111 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2112 */
2113 static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2114 {
2115 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2116 }
2117
2118 /**
2119 * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio
2120 * @p: the task object
2121 *
2122 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2123 */
2124 static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
2125 {
2126 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2127 }
2128
2129 /**
2130 * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler
2131 * @p: the task object
2132 *
2133 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2134 */
2135 static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2136 {
2137 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2138 }
2139
2140 /**
2141 * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler
2142 * @p: the task object
2143 *
2144 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2145 */
2146 static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2147 {
2148 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2149 }
2150
2151 /**
2152 * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory
2153 * @p: the task object
2154 *
2155 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2156 */
2157 static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2158 {
2159 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2160 }
2161
2162 /**
2163 * smack_task_kill - Smack check on signal delivery
2164 * @p: the task object
2165 * @info: unused
2166 * @sig: unused
2167 * @cred: identifies the cred to use in lieu of current's
2168 *
2169 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2170 *
2171 */
2172 static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
2173 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
2174 {
2175 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2176 struct smack_known *skp;
2177 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2178 int rc;
2179
2180 if (!sig)
2181 return 0; /* null signal; existence test */
2182
2183 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2184 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2185 /*
2186 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
2187 * can write the receiver.
2188 */
2189 if (cred == NULL) {
2190 rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
2191 rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
2192 return rc;
2193 }
2194 /*
2195 * If the cred isn't NULL we're dealing with some USB IO
2196 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
2197 * we can't take privilege into account.
2198 */
2199 skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
2200 rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
2201 rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
2202 return rc;
2203 }
2204
2205 /**
2206 * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
2207 * @p: task to copy from
2208 * @inode: inode to copy to
2209 *
2210 * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
2211 */
2212 static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
2213 {
2214 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
2215 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2216
2217 isp->smk_inode = skp;
2218 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2219 }
2220
2221 /*
2222 * Socket hooks.
2223 */
2224
2225 /**
2226 * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
2227 * @sk: the socket
2228 * @family: unused
2229 * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
2230 *
2231 * Assign Smack pointers to current
2232 *
2233 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
2234 */
2235 static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
2236 {
2237 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2238 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2239
2240 ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
2241 if (ssp == NULL)
2242 return -ENOMEM;
2243
2244 /*
2245 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
2246 */
2247 if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
2248 ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
2249 ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
2250 } else {
2251 ssp->smk_in = skp;
2252 ssp->smk_out = skp;
2253 }
2254 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
2255
2256 sk->sk_security = ssp;
2257
2258 return 0;
2259 }
2260
2261 /**
2262 * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
2263 * @sk: the socket
2264 *
2265 * Clears the blob pointer
2266 */
2267 static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
2268 {
2269 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2270 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2271
2272 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
2273 rcu_read_lock();
2274 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2275 if (spp->smk_sock != sk)
2276 continue;
2277 spp->smk_can_reuse = 1;
2278 break;
2279 }
2280 rcu_read_unlock();
2281 }
2282 #endif
2283 kfree(sk->sk_security);
2284 }
2285
2286 /**
2287 * smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
2288 * @sip: the object end
2289 *
2290 * looks for host based access restrictions
2291 *
2292 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2293 * hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2294 * taken before calling this function.
2295 *
2296 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2297 */
2298 static struct smack_known *smack_ipv4host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
2299 {
2300 struct smk_net4addr *snp;
2301 struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
2302
2303 if (siap->s_addr == 0)
2304 return NULL;
2305
2306 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net4addr_list, list)
2307 /*
2308 * we break after finding the first match because
2309 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2310 * so we have found the most specific match
2311 */
2312 if (snp->smk_host.s_addr ==
2313 (siap->s_addr & snp->smk_mask.s_addr))
2314 return snp->smk_label;
2315
2316 return NULL;
2317 }
2318
2319 /*
2320 * smk_ipv6_localhost - Check for local ipv6 host address
2321 * @sip: the address
2322 *
2323 * Returns boolean true if this is the localhost address
2324 */
2325 static bool smk_ipv6_localhost(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2326 {
2327 __be16 *be16p = (__be16 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2328 __be32 *be32p = (__be32 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2329
2330 if (be32p[0] == 0 && be32p[1] == 0 && be32p[2] == 0 && be16p[6] == 0 &&
2331 ntohs(be16p[7]) == 1)
2332 return true;
2333 return false;
2334 }
2335
2336 /**
2337 * smack_ipv6host_label - check host based restrictions
2338 * @sip: the object end
2339 *
2340 * looks for host based access restrictions
2341 *
2342 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2343 * hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2344 * taken before calling this function.
2345 *
2346 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2347 */
2348 static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2349 {
2350 struct smk_net6addr *snp;
2351 struct in6_addr *sap = &sip->sin6_addr;
2352 int i;
2353 int found = 0;
2354
2355 /*
2356 * It's local. Don't look for a host label.
2357 */
2358 if (smk_ipv6_localhost(sip))
2359 return NULL;
2360
2361 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
2362 /*
2363 * If the label is NULL the entry has
2364 * been renounced. Ignore it.
2365 */
2366 if (snp->smk_label == NULL)
2367 continue;
2368 /*
2369 * we break after finding the first match because
2370 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2371 * so we have found the most specific match
2372 */
2373 for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
2374 if ((sap->s6_addr16[i] & snp->smk_mask.s6_addr16[i]) !=
2375 snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) {
2376 found = 0;
2377 break;
2378 }
2379 }
2380 if (found)
2381 return snp->smk_label;
2382 }
2383
2384 return NULL;
2385 }
2386
2387 /**
2388 * smack_netlbl_add - Set the secattr on a socket
2389 * @sk: the socket
2390 *
2391 * Attach the outbound smack value (smk_out) to the socket.
2392 *
2393 * Returns 0 on success or an error code
2394 */
2395 static int smack_netlbl_add(struct sock *sk)
2396 {
2397 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2398 struct smack_known *skp = ssp->smk_out;
2399 int rc;
2400
2401 local_bh_disable();
2402 bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
2403
2404 rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel);
2405 switch (rc) {
2406 case 0:
2407 ssp->smk_state = SMK_NETLBL_LABELED;
2408 break;
2409 case -EDESTADDRREQ:
2410 ssp->smk_state = SMK_NETLBL_REQSKB;
2411 rc = 0;
2412 break;
2413 }
2414
2415 bh_unlock_sock(sk);
2416 local_bh_enable();
2417
2418 return rc;
2419 }
2420
2421 /**
2422 * smack_netlbl_delete - Remove the secattr from a socket
2423 * @sk: the socket
2424 *
2425 * Remove the outbound smack value from a socket
2426 */
2427 static void smack_netlbl_delete(struct sock *sk)
2428 {
2429 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2430
2431 /*
2432 * Take the label off the socket if one is set.
2433 */
2434 if (ssp->smk_state != SMK_NETLBL_LABELED)
2435 return;
2436
2437 local_bh_disable();
2438 bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
2439 netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
2440 bh_unlock_sock(sk);
2441 local_bh_enable();
2442 ssp->smk_state = SMK_NETLBL_UNLABELED;
2443 }
2444
2445 /**
2446 * smk_ipv4_check - Perform IPv4 host access checks
2447 * @sk: the socket
2448 * @sap: the destination address
2449 *
2450 * Set the correct secattr for the given socket based on the destination
2451 * address and perform any outbound access checks needed.
2452 *
2453 * Returns 0 on success or an error code.
2454 *
2455 */
2456 static int smk_ipv4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
2457 {
2458 struct smack_known *skp;
2459 int rc = 0;
2460 struct smack_known *hkp;
2461 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2462 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2463
2464 rcu_read_lock();
2465 hkp = smack_ipv4host_label(sap);
2466 if (hkp != NULL) {
2467 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2468 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2469
2470 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2471 ad.a.u.net->family = sap->sin_family;
2472 ad.a.u.net->dport = sap->sin_port;
2473 ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
2474 #endif
2475 skp = ssp->smk_out;
2476 rc = smk_access(skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2477 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 host check", skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2478 /*
2479 * Clear the socket netlabel if it's set.
2480 */
2481 if (!rc)
2482 smack_netlbl_delete(sk);
2483 }
2484 rcu_read_unlock();
2485
2486 return rc;
2487 }
2488
2489 /**
2490 * smk_ipv6_check - check Smack access
2491 * @subject: subject Smack label
2492 * @object: object Smack label
2493 * @address: address
2494 * @act: the action being taken
2495 *
2496 * Check an IPv6 access
2497 */
2498 static int smk_ipv6_check(struct smack_known *subject,
2499 struct smack_known *object,
2500 struct sockaddr_in6 *address, int act)
2501 {
2502 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2503 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2504 #endif
2505 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2506 int rc;
2507
2508 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2509 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2510 ad.a.u.net->family = PF_INET6;
2511 ad.a.u.net->dport = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
2512 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2513 ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = address->sin6_addr;
2514 else
2515 ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = address->sin6_addr;
2516 #endif
2517 rc = smk_access(subject, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2518 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 check", subject, object, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2519 return rc;
2520 }
2521
2522 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2523 /**
2524 * smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management
2525 * @sock: socket
2526 * @address: address
2527 *
2528 * Create or update the port list entry
2529 */
2530 static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
2531 {
2532 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
2533 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
2534 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2535 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2536 unsigned short port = 0;
2537
2538 if (address == NULL) {
2539 /*
2540 * This operation is changing the Smack information
2541 * on the bound socket. Take the changes to the port
2542 * as well.
2543 */
2544 rcu_read_lock();
2545 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2546 if (sk != spp->smk_sock)
2547 continue;
2548 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2549 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2550 rcu_read_unlock();
2551 return;
2552 }
2553 /*
2554 * A NULL address is only used for updating existing
2555 * bound entries. If there isn't one, it's OK.
2556 */
2557 rcu_read_unlock();
2558 return;
2559 }
2560
2561 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
2562 port = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
2563 /*
2564 * This is a special case that is safely ignored.
2565 */
2566 if (port == 0)
2567 return;
2568
2569 /*
2570 * Look for an existing port list entry.
2571 * This is an indication that a port is getting reused.
2572 */
2573 rcu_read_lock();
2574 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2575 if (spp->smk_port != port || spp->smk_sock_type != sock->type)
2576 continue;
2577 if (spp->smk_can_reuse != 1) {
2578 rcu_read_unlock();
2579 return;
2580 }
2581 spp->smk_port = port;
2582 spp->smk_sock = sk;
2583 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2584 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2585 spp->smk_can_reuse = 0;
2586 rcu_read_unlock();
2587 return;
2588 }
2589 rcu_read_unlock();
2590 /*
2591 * A new port entry is required.
2592 */
2593 spp = kzalloc(sizeof(*spp), GFP_KERNEL);
2594 if (spp == NULL)
2595 return;
2596
2597 spp->smk_port = port;
2598 spp->smk_sock = sk;
2599 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2600 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2601 spp->smk_sock_type = sock->type;
2602 spp->smk_can_reuse = 0;
2603
2604 mutex_lock(&smack_ipv6_lock);
2605 list_add_rcu(&spp->list, &smk_ipv6_port_list);
2606 mutex_unlock(&smack_ipv6_lock);
2607 return;
2608 }
2609 #endif
2610
2611 /**
2612 * smk_ipv6_port_check - check Smack port access
2613 * @sk: socket
2614 * @address: address
2615 * @act: the action being taken
2616 *
2617 * Create or update the port list entry
2618 */
2619 static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
2620 int act)
2621 {
2622 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2623 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2624 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
2625 unsigned short port;
2626 struct smack_known *object;
2627
2628 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
2629 skp = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2630 object = ssp->smk_in;
2631 } else {
2632 skp = ssp->smk_out;
2633 object = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2634 }
2635
2636 /*
2637 * The other end is a single label host.
2638 */
2639 if (skp != NULL && object != NULL)
2640 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2641 if (skp == NULL)
2642 skp = smack_net_ambient;
2643 if (object == NULL)
2644 object = smack_net_ambient;
2645
2646 /*
2647 * It's remote, so port lookup does no good.
2648 */
2649 if (!smk_ipv6_localhost(address))
2650 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2651
2652 /*
2653 * It's local so the send check has to have passed.
2654 */
2655 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2656 return 0;
2657
2658 port = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
2659 rcu_read_lock();
2660 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2661 if (spp->smk_port != port || spp->smk_sock_type != sk->sk_type)
2662 continue;
2663 object = spp->smk_in;
2664 if (act == SMK_CONNECTING)
2665 ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out;
2666 break;
2667 }
2668 rcu_read_unlock();
2669
2670 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2671 }
2672
2673 /**
2674 * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
2675 * @inode: the object
2676 * @name: attribute name
2677 * @value: attribute value
2678 * @size: size of the attribute
2679 * @flags: unused
2680 *
2681 * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob
2682 *
2683 * Returns 0 on success, or an error code
2684 */
2685 static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2686 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2687 {
2688 struct smack_known *skp;
2689 struct inode_smack *nsp = smack_inode(inode);
2690 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2691 struct socket *sock;
2692 int rc = 0;
2693
2694 if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0)
2695 return -EINVAL;
2696
2697 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
2698 if (IS_ERR(skp))
2699 return PTR_ERR(skp);
2700
2701 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
2702 nsp->smk_inode = skp;
2703 nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2704 return 0;
2705 }
2706 /*
2707 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
2708 */
2709 if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2710 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2711
2712 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
2713 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
2714 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2715
2716 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2717
2718 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
2719 ssp->smk_in = skp;
2720 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
2721 ssp->smk_out = skp;
2722 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
2723 rc = smack_netlbl_add(sock->sk);
2724 if (rc != 0)
2725 printk(KERN_WARNING
2726 "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
2727 __func__, -rc);
2728 }
2729 } else
2730 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2731
2732 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2733 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
2734 smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL);
2735 #endif
2736
2737 return 0;
2738 }
2739
2740 /**
2741 * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup
2742 * @sock: the socket
2743 * @family: protocol family
2744 * @type: unused
2745 * @protocol: unused
2746 * @kern: unused
2747 *
2748 * Sets the netlabel information on the socket
2749 *
2750 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2751 */
2752 static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2753 int type, int protocol, int kern)
2754 {
2755 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2756
2757 if (sock->sk == NULL)
2758 return 0;
2759
2760 /*
2761 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
2762 */
2763 if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
2764 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2765 ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
2766 ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
2767 }
2768
2769 if (family != PF_INET)
2770 return 0;
2771 /*
2772 * Set the outbound netlbl.
2773 */
2774 return smack_netlbl_add(sock->sk);
2775 }
2776
2777 /**
2778 * smack_socket_socketpair - create socket pair
2779 * @socka: one socket
2780 * @sockb: another socket
2781 *
2782 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC
2783 *
2784 * Returns 0
2785 */
2786 static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
2787 struct socket *sockb)
2788 {
2789 struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security;
2790 struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security;
2791
2792 asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out;
2793 bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;
2794
2795 return 0;
2796 }
2797
2798 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2799 /**
2800 * smack_socket_bind - record port binding information.
2801 * @sock: the socket
2802 * @address: the port address
2803 * @addrlen: size of the address
2804 *
2805 * Records the label bound to a port.
2806 *
2807 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2808 */
2809 static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
2810 int addrlen)
2811 {
2812 if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
2813 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 ||
2814 address->sa_family != AF_INET6)
2815 return -EINVAL;
2816 smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address);
2817 }
2818 return 0;
2819 }
2820 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
2821
2822 /**
2823 * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
2824 * @sock: the socket
2825 * @sap: the other end
2826 * @addrlen: size of sap
2827 *
2828 * Verifies that a connection may be possible
2829 *
2830 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2831 */
2832 static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
2833 int addrlen)
2834 {
2835 int rc = 0;
2836
2837 if (sock->sk == NULL)
2838 return 0;
2839 if (sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET &&
2840 (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) || sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
2841 return 0;
2842 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
2843 return 0;
2844 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && sap->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
2845 struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;
2846 struct smack_known *rsp = NULL;
2847
2848 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
2849 return 0;
2850 if (__is_defined(SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING))
2851 rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
2852 if (rsp != NULL) {
2853 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2854
2855 rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
2856 SMK_CONNECTING);
2857 }
2858 if (__is_defined(SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING))
2859 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING);
2860
2861 return rc;
2862 }
2863 if (sap->sa_family != AF_INET || addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
2864 return 0;
2865 rc = smk_ipv4_check(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
2866 return rc;
2867 }
2868
2869 /**
2870 * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values
2871 * @flags: the S_ value
2872 *
2873 * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value
2874 */
2875 static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
2876 {
2877 int may = 0;
2878
2879 if (flags & S_IRUGO)
2880 may |= MAY_READ;
2881 if (flags & S_IWUGO)
2882 may |= MAY_WRITE;
2883 if (flags & S_IXUGO)
2884 may |= MAY_EXEC;
2885
2886 return may;
2887 }
2888
2889 /**
2890 * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg
2891 * @msg: the object
2892 *
2893 * Returns 0
2894 */
2895 static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2896 {
2897 struct smack_known **blob = smack_msg_msg(msg);
2898
2899 *blob = smk_of_current();
2900 return 0;
2901 }
2902
2903 /**
2904 * smack_of_ipc - the smack pointer for the ipc
2905 * @isp: the object
2906 *
2907 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
2908 */
2909 static struct smack_known *smack_of_ipc(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp)
2910 {
2911 struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(isp);
2912
2913 return *blob;
2914 }
2915
2916 /**
2917 * smack_ipc_alloc_security - Set the security blob for ipc
2918 * @isp: the object
2919 *
2920 * Returns 0
2921 */
2922 static int smack_ipc_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp)
2923 {
2924 struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(isp);
2925
2926 *blob = smk_of_current();
2927 return 0;
2928 }
2929
2930 /**
2931 * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
2932 * @isp : the object
2933 * @access : access requested
2934 *
2935 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2936 */
2937 static int smk_curacc_shm(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access)
2938 {
2939 struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_ipc(isp);
2940 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2941 int rc;
2942
2943 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2944 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2945 ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id;
2946 #endif
2947 rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
2948 rc = smk_bu_current("shm", ssp, access, rc);
2949 return rc;
2950 }
2951
2952 /**
2953 * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
2954 * @isp: the object
2955 * @shmflg: access requested
2956 *
2957 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2958 */
2959 static int smack_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int shmflg)
2960 {
2961 int may;
2962
2963 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
2964 return smk_curacc_shm(isp, may);
2965 }
2966
2967 /**
2968 * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm
2969 * @isp: the object
2970 * @cmd: what it wants to do
2971 *
2972 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2973 */
2974 static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
2975 {
2976 int may;
2977
2978 switch (cmd) {
2979 case IPC_STAT:
2980 case SHM_STAT:
2981 case SHM_STAT_ANY:
2982 may = MAY_READ;
2983 break;
2984 case IPC_SET:
2985 case SHM_LOCK:
2986 case SHM_UNLOCK:
2987 case IPC_RMID:
2988 may = MAY_READWRITE;
2989 break;
2990 case IPC_INFO:
2991 case SHM_INFO:
2992 /*
2993 * System level information.
2994 */
2995 return 0;
2996 default:
2997 return -EINVAL;
2998 }
2999 return smk_curacc_shm(isp, may);
3000 }
3001
3002 /**
3003 * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat
3004 * @isp: the object
3005 * @shmaddr: unused
3006 * @shmflg: access requested
3007 *
3008 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3009 */
3010 static int smack_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, char __user *shmaddr,
3011 int shmflg)
3012 {
3013 int may;
3014
3015 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
3016 return smk_curacc_shm(isp, may);
3017 }
3018
3019 /**
3020 * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem
3021 * @isp : the object
3022 * @access : access requested
3023 *
3024 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3025 */
3026 static int smk_curacc_sem(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access)
3027 {
3028 struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_ipc(isp);
3029 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3030 int rc;
3031
3032 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3033 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3034 ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id;
3035 #endif
3036 rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
3037 rc = smk_bu_current("sem", ssp, access, rc);
3038 return rc;
3039 }
3040
3041 /**
3042 * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
3043 * @isp: the object
3044 * @semflg: access requested
3045 *
3046 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3047 */
3048 static int smack_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int semflg)
3049 {
3050 int may;
3051
3052 may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
3053 return smk_curacc_sem(isp, may);
3054 }
3055
3056 /**
3057 * smack_sem_shmctl - Smack access check for sem
3058 * @isp: the object
3059 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3060 *
3061 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3062 */
3063 static int smack_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
3064 {
3065 int may;
3066
3067 switch (cmd) {
3068 case GETPID:
3069 case GETNCNT:
3070 case GETZCNT:
3071 case GETVAL:
3072 case GETALL:
3073 case IPC_STAT:
3074 case SEM_STAT:
3075 case SEM_STAT_ANY:
3076 may = MAY_READ;
3077 break;
3078 case SETVAL:
3079 case SETALL:
3080 case IPC_RMID:
3081 case IPC_SET:
3082 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3083 break;
3084 case IPC_INFO:
3085 case SEM_INFO:
3086 /*
3087 * System level information
3088 */
3089 return 0;
3090 default:
3091 return -EINVAL;
3092 }
3093
3094 return smk_curacc_sem(isp, may);
3095 }
3096
3097 /**
3098 * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations
3099 * @isp: the object
3100 * @sops: unused
3101 * @nsops: unused
3102 * @alter: unused
3103 *
3104 * Treated as read and write in all cases.
3105 *
3106 * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise
3107 */
3108 static int smack_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct sembuf *sops,
3109 unsigned nsops, int alter)
3110 {
3111 return smk_curacc_sem(isp, MAY_READWRITE);
3112 }
3113
3114 /**
3115 * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq
3116 * @isp : the msq
3117 * @access : access requested
3118 *
3119 * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise
3120 */
3121 static int smk_curacc_msq(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access)
3122 {
3123 struct smack_known *msp = smack_of_ipc(isp);
3124 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3125 int rc;
3126
3127 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3128 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3129 ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id;
3130 #endif
3131 rc = smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
3132 rc = smk_bu_current("msq", msp, access, rc);
3133 return rc;
3134 }
3135
3136 /**
3137 * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
3138 * @isp: the object
3139 * @msqflg: access requested
3140 *
3141 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3142 */
3143 static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int msqflg)
3144 {
3145 int may;
3146
3147 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3148 return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may);
3149 }
3150
3151 /**
3152 * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue
3153 * @isp: the object
3154 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3155 *
3156 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3157 */
3158 static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
3159 {
3160 int may;
3161
3162 switch (cmd) {
3163 case IPC_STAT:
3164 case MSG_STAT:
3165 case MSG_STAT_ANY:
3166 may = MAY_READ;
3167 break;
3168 case IPC_SET:
3169 case IPC_RMID:
3170 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3171 break;
3172 case IPC_INFO:
3173 case MSG_INFO:
3174 /*
3175 * System level information
3176 */
3177 return 0;
3178 default:
3179 return -EINVAL;
3180 }
3181
3182 return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may);
3183 }
3184
3185 /**
3186 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3187 * @isp: the object
3188 * @msg: unused
3189 * @msqflg: access requested
3190 *
3191 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3192 */
3193 static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct msg_msg *msg,
3194 int msqflg)
3195 {
3196 int may;
3197
3198 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3199 return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may);
3200 }
3201
3202 /**
3203 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3204 * @isp: the object
3205 * @msg: unused
3206 * @target: unused
3207 * @type: unused
3208 * @mode: unused
3209 *
3210 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3211 */
3212 static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct msg_msg *msg,
3213 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
3214 {
3215 return smk_curacc_msq(isp, MAY_READWRITE);
3216 }
3217
3218 /**
3219 * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission()
3220 * @ipp: the object permissions
3221 * @flag: access requested
3222 *
3223 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3224 */
3225 static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
3226 {
3227 struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(ipp);
3228 struct smack_known *iskp = *blob;
3229 int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
3230 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3231 int rc;
3232
3233 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3234 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3235 ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
3236 #endif
3237 rc = smk_curacc(iskp, may, &ad);
3238 rc = smk_bu_current("svipc", iskp, may, rc);
3239 return rc;
3240 }
3241
3242 /**
3243 * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id
3244 * @ipp: the object permissions
3245 * @secid: where result will be saved
3246 */
3247 static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
3248 {
3249 struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(ipp);
3250 struct smack_known *iskp = *blob;
3251
3252 *secid = iskp->smk_secid;
3253 }
3254
3255 /**
3256 * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
3257 * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached
3258 * @inode: the object
3259 *
3260 * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
3261 */
3262 static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
3263 {
3264 struct super_block *sbp;
3265 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
3266 struct inode_smack *isp;
3267 struct smack_known *skp;
3268 struct smack_known *ckp = smk_of_current();
3269 struct smack_known *final;
3270 char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
3271 int transflag = 0;
3272 int rc;
3273 struct dentry *dp;
3274
3275 if (inode == NULL)
3276 return;
3277
3278 isp = smack_inode(inode);
3279
3280 /*
3281 * If the inode is already instantiated
3282 * take the quick way out
3283 */
3284 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT)
3285 return;
3286
3287 sbp = inode->i_sb;
3288 sbsp = sbp->s_security;
3289 /*
3290 * We're going to use the superblock default label
3291 * if there's no label on the file.
3292 */
3293 final = sbsp->smk_default;
3294
3295 /*
3296 * If this is the root inode the superblock
3297 * may be in the process of initialization.
3298 * If that is the case use the root value out
3299 * of the superblock.
3300 */
3301 if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
3302 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3303 case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3304 case CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC:
3305 /*
3306 * The cgroup filesystem is never mounted,
3307 * so there's no opportunity to set the mount
3308 * options.
3309 */
3310 sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_star;
3311 sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_star;
3312 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3313 break;
3314 case TMPFS_MAGIC:
3315 /*
3316 * What about shmem/tmpfs anonymous files with dentry
3317 * obtained from d_alloc_pseudo()?
3318 */
3319 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3320 break;
3321 case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
3322 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3323 break;
3324 case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
3325 /*
3326 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
3327 * structures associated with the task involved.
3328 */
3329 isp->smk_inode = &smack_known_star;
3330 break;
3331 default:
3332 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3333 break;
3334 }
3335 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
3336 return;
3337 }
3338
3339 /*
3340 * This is pretty hackish.
3341 * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do
3342 * file system specific code, but it does help
3343 * with keeping it simple.
3344 */
3345 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3346 case SMACK_MAGIC:
3347 case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3348 case CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC:
3349 /*
3350 * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
3351 * that the smack file system doesn't do
3352 * extended attributes.
3353 *
3354 * Cgroupfs is special
3355 */
3356 final = &smack_known_star;
3357 break;
3358 case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
3359 /*
3360 * devpts seems content with the label of the task.
3361 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
3362 * pty with respect.
3363 */
3364 final = ckp;
3365 break;
3366 case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
3367 /*
3368 * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
3369 * The superblock default suffices.
3370 */
3371 break;
3372 case TMPFS_MAGIC:
3373 /*
3374 * Device labels should come from the filesystem,
3375 * but watch out, because they're volitile,
3376 * getting recreated on every reboot.
3377 */
3378 final = &smack_known_star;
3379 /*
3380 * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
3381 * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
3382 * to set mount options simulate setting the
3383 * superblock default.
3384 */
3385 fallthrough;
3386 default:
3387 /*
3388 * This isn't an understood special case.
3389 * Get the value from the xattr.
3390 */
3391
3392 /*
3393 * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data.
3394 */
3395 if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
3396 final = &smack_known_star;
3397 break;
3398 }
3399 /*
3400 * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
3401 * Use the aforeapplied default.
3402 * It would be curious if the label of the task
3403 * does not match that assigned.
3404 */
3405 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
3406 break;
3407 /*
3408 * Get the dentry for xattr.
3409 */
3410 dp = dget(opt_dentry);
3411 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
3412 if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skp))
3413 final = skp;
3414
3415 /*
3416 * Transmuting directory
3417 */
3418 if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
3419 /*
3420 * If this is a new directory and the label was
3421 * transmuted when the inode was initialized
3422 * set the transmute attribute on the directory
3423 * and mark the inode.
3424 *
3425 * If there is a transmute attribute on the
3426 * directory mark the inode.
3427 */
3428 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_CHANGED) {
3429 isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
3430 rc = __vfs_setxattr(&init_user_ns, dp, inode,
3431 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
3432 TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE,
3433 0);
3434 } else {
3435 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, inode,
3436 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, trattr,
3437 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE);
3438 if (rc >= 0 && strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
3439 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
3440 rc = -EINVAL;
3441 }
3442 if (rc >= 0)
3443 transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
3444 }
3445 /*
3446 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
3447 */
3448 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
3449 if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3450 skp == &smack_known_web)
3451 skp = NULL;
3452 isp->smk_task = skp;
3453
3454 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
3455 if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3456 skp == &smack_known_web)
3457 skp = NULL;
3458 isp->smk_mmap = skp;
3459
3460 dput(dp);
3461 break;
3462 }
3463
3464 if (final == NULL)
3465 isp->smk_inode = ckp;
3466 else
3467 isp->smk_inode = final;
3468
3469 isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
3470
3471 return;
3472 }
3473
3474 /**
3475 * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access
3476 * @p: the object task
3477 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3478 * @value: where to put the result
3479 *
3480 * Places a copy of the task Smack into value
3481 *
3482 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3483 */
3484 static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
3485 {
3486 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
3487 char *cp;
3488 int slen;
3489
3490 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3491 return -EINVAL;
3492
3493 cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
3494 if (cp == NULL)
3495 return -ENOMEM;
3496
3497 slen = strlen(cp);
3498 *value = cp;
3499 return slen;
3500 }
3501
3502 /**
3503 * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
3504 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3505 * @value: the value to set
3506 * @size: the size of the value
3507 *
3508 * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
3509 * is permitted and only with privilege
3510 *
3511 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3512 */
3513 static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
3514 {
3515 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
3516 struct cred *new;
3517 struct smack_known *skp;
3518 struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
3519 int rc;
3520
3521 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
3522 return -EPERM;
3523
3524 if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
3525 return -EINVAL;
3526
3527 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3528 return -EINVAL;
3529
3530 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
3531 if (IS_ERR(skp))
3532 return PTR_ERR(skp);
3533
3534 /*
3535 * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label
3536 * and the star ("*") label.
3537 */
3538 if (skp == &smack_known_web || skp == &smack_known_star)
3539 return -EINVAL;
3540
3541 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
3542 rc = -EPERM;
3543 list_for_each_entry(sklep, &tsp->smk_relabel, list)
3544 if (sklep->smk_label == skp) {
3545 rc = 0;
3546 break;
3547 }
3548 if (rc)
3549 return rc;
3550 }
3551
3552 new = prepare_creds();
3553 if (new == NULL)
3554 return -ENOMEM;
3555
3556 tsp = smack_cred(new);
3557 tsp->smk_task = skp;
3558 /*
3559 * process can change its label only once
3560 */
3561 smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
3562
3563 commit_creds(new);
3564 return size;
3565 }
3566
3567 /**
3568 * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
3569 * @sock: one sock
3570 * @other: the other sock
3571 * @newsk: unused
3572 *
3573 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3574 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3575 */
3576 static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
3577 struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
3578 {
3579 struct smack_known *skp;
3580 struct smack_known *okp;
3581 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
3582 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
3583 struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
3584 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3585 int rc = 0;
3586 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3587 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3588 #endif
3589
3590 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
3591 skp = ssp->smk_out;
3592 okp = osp->smk_in;
3593 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3594 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3595 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
3596 #endif
3597 rc = smk_access(skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3598 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3599 if (rc == 0) {
3600 okp = osp->smk_out;
3601 skp = ssp->smk_in;
3602 rc = smk_access(okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3603 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", okp, skp,
3604 MAY_WRITE, rc);
3605 }
3606 }
3607
3608 /*
3609 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
3610 */
3611 if (rc == 0) {
3612 nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
3613 ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
3614 }
3615
3616 return rc;
3617 }
3618
3619 /**
3620 * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS
3621 * @sock: one socket
3622 * @other: the other socket
3623 *
3624 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3625 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3626 */
3627 static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
3628 {
3629 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3630 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
3631 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3632 int rc;
3633
3634 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3635 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3636
3637 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3638 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
3639 #endif
3640
3641 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
3642 return 0;
3643
3644 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3645 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS send", ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3646 return rc;
3647 }
3648
3649 /**
3650 * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
3651 * @sock: the socket
3652 * @msg: the message
3653 * @size: the size of the message
3654 *
3655 * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination host.
3656 * For IPv4 this is only a question if the destination is a single label host.
3657 * For IPv6 this is a check against the label of the port.
3658 */
3659 static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3660 int size)
3661 {
3662 struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
3663 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3664 struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
3665 #endif
3666 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3667 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3668 struct smack_known *rsp;
3669 #endif
3670 int rc = 0;
3671
3672 /*
3673 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
3674 */
3675 if (sip == NULL)
3676 return 0;
3677
3678 switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
3679 case AF_INET:
3680 if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) ||
3681 sip->sin_family != AF_INET)
3682 return -EINVAL;
3683 rc = smk_ipv4_check(sock->sk, sip);
3684 break;
3685 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3686 case AF_INET6:
3687 if (msg->msg_namelen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 ||
3688 sap->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
3689 return -EINVAL;
3690 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3691 rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sap);
3692 if (rsp != NULL)
3693 rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sap,
3694 SMK_CONNECTING);
3695 #endif
3696 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
3697 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING);
3698 #endif
3699 #endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */
3700 break;
3701 }
3702 return rc;
3703 }
3704
3705 /**
3706 * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack
3707 * @sap: netlabel secattr
3708 * @ssp: socket security information
3709 *
3710 * Returns a pointer to a Smack label entry found on the label list.
3711 */
3712 static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
3713 struct socket_smack *ssp)
3714 {
3715 struct smack_known *skp;
3716 int found = 0;
3717 int acat;
3718 int kcat;
3719
3720 /*
3721 * Netlabel found it in the cache.
3722 */
3723 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) != 0)
3724 return (struct smack_known *)sap->cache->data;
3725
3726 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0)
3727 /*
3728 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
3729 */
3730 return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
3731
3732 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
3733 /*
3734 * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
3735 * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
3736 * behaving the way we expect it to.
3737 *
3738 * Look it up in the label table
3739 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
3740 * for the packet fall back on the network
3741 * ambient value.
3742 */
3743 rcu_read_lock();
3744 list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
3745 if (sap->attr.mls.lvl != skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl)
3746 continue;
3747 /*
3748 * Compare the catsets. Use the netlbl APIs.
3749 */
3750 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) {
3751 if ((skp->smk_netlabel.flags &
3752 NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0)
3753 found = 1;
3754 break;
3755 }
3756 for (acat = -1, kcat = -1; acat == kcat; ) {
3757 acat = netlbl_catmap_walk(sap->attr.mls.cat,
3758 acat + 1);
3759 kcat = netlbl_catmap_walk(
3760 skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat,
3761 kcat + 1);
3762 if (acat < 0 || kcat < 0)
3763 break;
3764 }
3765 if (acat == kcat) {
3766 found = 1;
3767 break;
3768 }
3769 }
3770 rcu_read_unlock();
3771
3772 if (found)
3773 return skp;
3774
3775 if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == &smack_known_star)
3776 return &smack_known_web;
3777 return &smack_known_star;
3778 }
3779 /*
3780 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
3781 * for the packet fall back on the network
3782 * ambient value.
3783 */
3784 return smack_net_ambient;
3785 }
3786
3787 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3788 static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
3789 {
3790 u8 nexthdr;
3791 int offset;
3792 int proto = -EINVAL;
3793 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h;
3794 struct ipv6hdr *ip6;
3795 __be16 frag_off;
3796 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3797 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3798 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3799
3800 sip->sin6_port = 0;
3801
3802 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3803 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3804 if (ip6 == NULL)
3805 return -EINVAL;
3806 sip->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
3807
3808 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3809 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3810 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3811 if (offset < 0)
3812 return -EINVAL;
3813
3814 proto = nexthdr;
3815 switch (proto) {
3816 case IPPROTO_TCP:
3817 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3818 if (th != NULL)
3819 sip->sin6_port = th->source;
3820 break;
3821 case IPPROTO_UDP:
3822 case IPPROTO_UDPLITE:
3823 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3824 if (uh != NULL)
3825 sip->sin6_port = uh->source;
3826 break;
3827 case IPPROTO_DCCP:
3828 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3829 if (dh != NULL)
3830 sip->sin6_port = dh->dccph_sport;
3831 break;
3832 }
3833 return proto;
3834 }
3835 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3836
3837 /**
3838 * smack_from_skb - Smack data from the secmark in an skb
3839 * @skb: packet
3840 *
3841 * Returns smack_known of the secmark or NULL if that won't work.
3842 */
3843 #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
3844 static struct smack_known *smack_from_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
3845 {
3846 if (skb == NULL || skb->secmark == 0)
3847 return NULL;
3848
3849 return smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
3850 }
3851 #else
3852 static inline struct smack_known *smack_from_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
3853 {
3854 return NULL;
3855 }
3856 #endif
3857
3858 /**
3859 * smack_from_netlbl - Smack data from the IP options in an skb
3860 * @sk: socket data came in on
3861 * @family: address family
3862 * @skb: packet
3863 *
3864 * Find the Smack label in the IP options. If it hasn't been
3865 * added to the netlabel cache, add it here.
3866 *
3867 * Returns smack_known of the IP options or NULL if that won't work.
3868 */
3869 static struct smack_known *smack_from_netlbl(const struct sock *sk, u16 family,
3870 struct sk_buff *skb)
3871 {
3872 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
3873 struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
3874 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
3875
3876 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
3877
3878 if (sk)
3879 ssp = sk->sk_security;
3880
3881 if (netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr) == 0) {
3882 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
3883 if (secattr.flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE)
3884 netlbl_cache_add(skb, family, &skp->smk_netlabel);
3885 }
3886
3887 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
3888
3889 return skp;
3890 }
3891
3892 /**
3893 * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
3894 * @sk: socket
3895 * @skb: packet
3896 *
3897 * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise
3898 */
3899 static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3900 {
3901 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
3902 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
3903 int rc = 0;
3904 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3905 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
3906 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3907 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3908 #endif
3909 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3910 struct sockaddr_in6 sadd;
3911 int proto;
3912
3913 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
3914 family = PF_INET;
3915 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3916
3917 switch (family) {
3918 case PF_INET:
3919 /*
3920 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
3921 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
3922 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
3923 */
3924 skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
3925 if (skp == NULL) {
3926 skp = smack_from_netlbl(sk, family, skb);
3927 if (skp == NULL)
3928 skp = smack_net_ambient;
3929 }
3930
3931 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3932 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3933 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
3934 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
3935 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
3936 #endif
3937 /*
3938 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
3939 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
3940 * This is the simplist possible security model
3941 * for networking.
3942 */
3943 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3944 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
3945 MAY_WRITE, rc);
3946 if (rc != 0)
3947 netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, rc, 0);
3948 break;
3949 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3950 case PF_INET6:
3951 proto = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd);
3952 if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_UDPLITE &&
3953 proto != IPPROTO_TCP && proto != IPPROTO_DCCP)
3954 break;
3955 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3956 skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
3957 if (skp == NULL) {
3958 if (smk_ipv6_localhost(&sadd))
3959 break;
3960 skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd);
3961 if (skp == NULL)
3962 skp = smack_net_ambient;
3963 }
3964 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3965 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3966 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
3967 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
3968 ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
3969 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
3970 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3971 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
3972 MAY_WRITE, rc);
3973 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING */
3974 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
3975 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING);
3976 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
3977 if (rc != 0)
3978 icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH,
3979 ICMPV6_ADM_PROHIBITED, 0);
3980 break;
3981 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3982 }
3983
3984 return rc;
3985 }
3986
3987 /**
3988 * smack_socket_getpeersec_stream - pull in packet label
3989 * @sock: the socket
3990 * @optval: user's destination
3991 * @optlen: size thereof
3992 * @len: max thereof
3993 *
3994 * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
3995 */
3996 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
3997 char __user *optval,
3998 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3999 {
4000 struct socket_smack *ssp;
4001 char *rcp = "";
4002 int slen = 1;
4003 int rc = 0;
4004
4005 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4006 if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
4007 rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
4008 slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
4009 }
4010
4011 if (slen > len)
4012 rc = -ERANGE;
4013 else if (copy_to_user(optval, rcp, slen) != 0)
4014 rc = -EFAULT;
4015
4016 if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0)
4017 rc = -EFAULT;
4018
4019 return rc;
4020 }
4021
4022
4023 /**
4024 * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
4025 * @sock: the peer socket
4026 * @skb: packet data
4027 * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
4028 *
4029 * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
4030 */
4031 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
4032 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4033
4034 {
4035 struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
4036 struct smack_known *skp;
4037 struct sock *sk = NULL;
4038 int family = PF_UNSPEC;
4039 u32 s = 0; /* 0 is the invalid secid */
4040
4041 if (skb != NULL) {
4042 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4043 family = PF_INET;
4044 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4045 else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4046 family = PF_INET6;
4047 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4048 }
4049 if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
4050 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4051
4052 switch (family) {
4053 case PF_UNIX:
4054 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4055 s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
4056 break;
4057 case PF_INET:
4058 skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
4059 if (skp) {
4060 s = skp->smk_secid;
4061 break;
4062 }
4063 /*
4064 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
4065 */
4066 if (sock != NULL)
4067 sk = sock->sk;
4068 skp = smack_from_netlbl(sk, family, skb);
4069 if (skp != NULL)
4070 s = skp->smk_secid;
4071 break;
4072 case PF_INET6:
4073 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4074 skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
4075 if (skp)
4076 s = skp->smk_secid;
4077 #endif
4078 break;
4079 }
4080 *secid = s;
4081 if (s == 0)
4082 return -EINVAL;
4083 return 0;
4084 }
4085
4086 /**
4087 * smack_sock_graft - Initialize a newly created socket with an existing sock
4088 * @sk: child sock
4089 * @parent: parent socket
4090 *
4091 * Set the smk_{in,out} state of an existing sock based on the process that
4092 * is creating the new socket.
4093 */
4094 static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4095 {
4096 struct socket_smack *ssp;
4097 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
4098
4099 if (sk == NULL ||
4100 (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
4101 return;
4102
4103 ssp = sk->sk_security;
4104 ssp->smk_in = skp;
4105 ssp->smk_out = skp;
4106 /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
4107 }
4108
4109 /**
4110 * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
4111 * @sk: socket involved
4112 * @skb: packet
4113 * @req: unused
4114 *
4115 * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to
4116 * the socket, otherwise an error code
4117 */
4118 static int smack_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4119 struct request_sock *req)
4120 {
4121 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4122 struct smack_known *skp;
4123 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4124 struct sockaddr_in addr;
4125 struct iphdr *hdr;
4126 struct smack_known *hskp;
4127 int rc;
4128 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4129 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4130 struct lsm_network_audit net;
4131 #endif
4132
4133 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4134 if (family == PF_INET6) {
4135 /*
4136 * Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving
4137 * via IPv6 sockets. Don't set up netlabel
4138 * processing on IPv6.
4139 */
4140 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4141 family = PF_INET;
4142 else
4143 return 0;
4144 }
4145 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4146
4147 /*
4148 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
4149 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
4150 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
4151 */
4152 skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
4153 if (skp == NULL) {
4154 skp = smack_from_netlbl(sk, family, skb);
4155 if (skp == NULL)
4156 skp = &smack_known_huh;
4157 }
4158
4159 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4160 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4161 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
4162 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4163 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4164 #endif
4165 /*
4166 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
4167 * here. Read access is not required.
4168 */
4169 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4170 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 connect", skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
4171 if (rc != 0)
4172 return rc;
4173
4174 /*
4175 * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
4176 * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
4177 */
4178 req->peer_secid = skp->smk_secid;
4179
4180 /*
4181 * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
4182 * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
4183 * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
4184 */
4185 hdr = ip_hdr(skb);
4186 addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
4187 rcu_read_lock();
4188 hskp = smack_ipv4host_label(&addr);
4189 rcu_read_unlock();
4190
4191 if (hskp == NULL)
4192 rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &skp->smk_netlabel);
4193 else
4194 netlbl_req_delattr(req);
4195
4196 return rc;
4197 }
4198
4199 /**
4200 * smack_inet_csk_clone - Copy the connection information to the new socket
4201 * @sk: the new socket
4202 * @req: the connection's request_sock
4203 *
4204 * Transfer the connection's peer label to the newly created socket.
4205 */
4206 static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
4207 const struct request_sock *req)
4208 {
4209 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4210 struct smack_known *skp;
4211
4212 if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
4213 skp = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
4214 ssp->smk_packet = skp;
4215 } else
4216 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
4217 }
4218
4219 /*
4220 * Key management security hooks
4221 *
4222 * Casey has not tested key support very heavily.
4223 * The permission check is most likely too restrictive.
4224 * If you care about keys please have a look.
4225 */
4226 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4227
4228 /**
4229 * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
4230 * @key: object
4231 * @cred: the credentials to use
4232 * @flags: unused
4233 *
4234 * No allocation required
4235 *
4236 * Returns 0
4237 */
4238 static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
4239 unsigned long flags)
4240 {
4241 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
4242
4243 key->security = skp;
4244 return 0;
4245 }
4246
4247 /**
4248 * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
4249 * @key: the object
4250 *
4251 * Clear the blob pointer
4252 */
4253 static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
4254 {
4255 key->security = NULL;
4256 }
4257
4258 /**
4259 * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
4260 * @key_ref: gets to the object
4261 * @cred: the credentials to use
4262 * @need_perm: requested key permission
4263 *
4264 * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
4265 * an error code otherwise
4266 */
4267 static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4268 const struct cred *cred,
4269 enum key_need_perm need_perm)
4270 {
4271 struct key *keyp;
4272 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4273 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
4274 int request = 0;
4275 int rc;
4276
4277 /*
4278 * Validate requested permissions
4279 */
4280 switch (need_perm) {
4281 case KEY_NEED_READ:
4282 case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
4283 case KEY_NEED_VIEW:
4284 request |= MAY_READ;
4285 break;
4286 case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
4287 case KEY_NEED_LINK:
4288 case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
4289 request |= MAY_WRITE;
4290 break;
4291 case KEY_NEED_UNSPECIFIED:
4292 case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
4293 case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
4294 case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
4295 case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
4296 return 0;
4297 default:
4298 return -EINVAL;
4299 }
4300
4301 keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4302 if (keyp == NULL)
4303 return -EINVAL;
4304 /*
4305 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
4306 * it may do so.
4307 */
4308 if (keyp->security == NULL)
4309 return 0;
4310 /*
4311 * This should not occur
4312 */
4313 if (tkp == NULL)
4314 return -EACCES;
4315
4316 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
4317 return 0;
4318
4319 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4320 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
4321 ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
4322 ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
4323 #endif
4324 rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
4325 rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
4326 return rc;
4327 }
4328
4329 /*
4330 * smack_key_getsecurity - Smack label tagging the key
4331 * @key points to the key to be queried
4332 * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
4333 * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
4334 * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
4335 * an error.
4336 * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
4337 */
4338 static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
4339 {
4340 struct smack_known *skp = key->security;
4341 size_t length;
4342 char *copy;
4343
4344 if (key->security == NULL) {
4345 *_buffer = NULL;
4346 return 0;
4347 }
4348
4349 copy = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
4350 if (copy == NULL)
4351 return -ENOMEM;
4352 length = strlen(copy) + 1;
4353
4354 *_buffer = copy;
4355 return length;
4356 }
4357
4358
4359 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
4360 /**
4361 * smack_watch_key - Smack access to watch a key for notifications.
4362 * @key: The key to be watched
4363 *
4364 * Return 0 if the @watch->cred has permission to read from the key object and
4365 * an error otherwise.
4366 */
4367 static int smack_watch_key(struct key *key)
4368 {
4369 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4370 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_current();
4371 int rc;
4372
4373 if (key == NULL)
4374 return -EINVAL;
4375 /*
4376 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
4377 * it may do so.
4378 */
4379 if (key->security == NULL)
4380 return 0;
4381 /*
4382 * This should not occur
4383 */
4384 if (tkp == NULL)
4385 return -EACCES;
4386
4387 if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, current_cred()))
4388 return 0;
4389
4390 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4391 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
4392 ad.a.u.key_struct.key = key->serial;
4393 ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = key->description;
4394 #endif
4395 rc = smk_access(tkp, key->security, MAY_READ, &ad);
4396 rc = smk_bu_note("key watch", tkp, key->security, MAY_READ, rc);
4397 return rc;
4398 }
4399 #endif /* CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */
4400 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4401
4402 #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE
4403 /**
4404 * smack_post_notification - Smack access to post a notification to a queue
4405 * @w_cred: The credentials of the watcher.
4406 * @cred: The credentials of the event source (may be NULL).
4407 * @n: The notification message to be posted.
4408 */
4409 static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
4410 const struct cred *cred,
4411 struct watch_notification *n)
4412 {
4413 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4414 struct smack_known *subj, *obj;
4415 int rc;
4416
4417 /* Always let maintenance notifications through. */
4418 if (n->type == WATCH_TYPE_META)
4419 return 0;
4420
4421 if (!cred)
4422 return 0;
4423 subj = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
4424 obj = smk_of_task(smack_cred(w_cred));
4425
4426 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NOTIFICATION);
4427 rc = smk_access(subj, obj, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4428 rc = smk_bu_note("notification", subj, obj, MAY_WRITE, rc);
4429 return rc;
4430 }
4431 #endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */
4432
4433 /*
4434 * Smack Audit hooks
4435 *
4436 * Audit requires a unique representation of each Smack specific
4437 * rule. This unique representation is used to distinguish the
4438 * object to be audited from remaining kernel objects and also
4439 * works as a glue between the audit hooks.
4440 *
4441 * Since repository entries are added but never deleted, we'll use
4442 * the smack_known label address related to the given audit rule as
4443 * the needed unique representation. This also better fits the smack
4444 * model where nearly everything is a label.
4445 */
4446 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4447
4448 /**
4449 * smack_audit_rule_init - Initialize a smack audit rule
4450 * @field: audit rule fields given from user-space (audit.h)
4451 * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
4452 * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
4453 * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
4454 *
4455 * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
4456 * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
4457 */
4458 static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
4459 {
4460 struct smack_known *skp;
4461 char **rule = (char **)vrule;
4462 *rule = NULL;
4463
4464 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4465 return -EINVAL;
4466
4467 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
4468 return -EINVAL;
4469
4470 skp = smk_import_entry(rulestr, 0);
4471 if (IS_ERR(skp))
4472 return PTR_ERR(skp);
4473
4474 *rule = skp->smk_known;
4475
4476 return 0;
4477 }
4478
4479 /**
4480 * smack_audit_rule_known - Distinguish Smack audit rules
4481 * @krule: rule of interest, in Audit kernel representation format
4482 *
4483 * This is used to filter Smack rules from remaining Audit ones.
4484 * If it's proved that this rule belongs to us, the
4485 * audit_rule_match hook will be called to do the final judgement.
4486 */
4487 static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
4488 {
4489 struct audit_field *f;
4490 int i;
4491
4492 for (i = 0; i < krule->field_count; i++) {
4493 f = &krule->fields[i];
4494
4495 if (f->type == AUDIT_SUBJ_USER || f->type == AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4496 return 1;
4497 }
4498
4499 return 0;
4500 }
4501
4502 /**
4503 * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
4504 * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test
4505 * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
4506 * @op: required testing operator
4507 * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
4508 *
4509 * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
4510 * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
4511 */
4512 static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
4513 {
4514 struct smack_known *skp;
4515 char *rule = vrule;
4516
4517 if (unlikely(!rule)) {
4518 WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n");
4519 return -ENOENT;
4520 }
4521
4522 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4523 return 0;
4524
4525 skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4526
4527 /*
4528 * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
4529 * both pointers will point to the same smack_known
4530 * label.
4531 */
4532 if (op == Audit_equal)
4533 return (rule == skp->smk_known);
4534 if (op == Audit_not_equal)
4535 return (rule != skp->smk_known);
4536
4537 return 0;
4538 }
4539
4540 /*
4541 * There is no need for a smack_audit_rule_free hook.
4542 * No memory was allocated.
4543 */
4544
4545 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4546
4547 /**
4548 * smack_ismaclabel - check if xattr @name references a smack MAC label
4549 * @name: Full xattr name to check.
4550 */
4551 static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
4552 {
4553 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0);
4554 }
4555
4556
4557 /**
4558 * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
4559 * @secid: incoming integer
4560 * @secdata: destination
4561 * @seclen: how long it is
4562 *
4563 * Exists for networking code.
4564 */
4565 static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
4566 {
4567 struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4568
4569 if (secdata)
4570 *secdata = skp->smk_known;
4571 *seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
4572 return 0;
4573 }
4574
4575 /**
4576 * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
4577 * @secdata: smack label
4578 * @seclen: how long result is
4579 * @secid: outgoing integer
4580 *
4581 * Exists for audit and networking code.
4582 */
4583 static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
4584 {
4585 struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
4586
4587 if (skp)
4588 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
4589 else
4590 *secid = 0;
4591 return 0;
4592 }
4593
4594 /*
4595 * There used to be a smack_release_secctx hook
4596 * that did nothing back when hooks were in a vector.
4597 * Now that there's a list such a hook adds cost.
4598 */
4599
4600 static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4601 {
4602 return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx,
4603 ctxlen, 0);
4604 }
4605
4606 static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4607 {
4608 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
4609 ctx, ctxlen, 0);
4610 }
4611
4612 static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
4613 {
4614 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode);
4615
4616 *ctx = skp->smk_known;
4617 *ctxlen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
4618 return 0;
4619 }
4620
4621 static int smack_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, struct cred **new)
4622 {
4623
4624 struct task_smack *tsp;
4625 struct smack_known *skp;
4626 struct inode_smack *isp;
4627 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
4628
4629 if (new_creds == NULL) {
4630 new_creds = prepare_creds();
4631 if (new_creds == NULL)
4632 return -ENOMEM;
4633 }
4634
4635 tsp = smack_cred(new_creds);
4636
4637 /*
4638 * Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid
4639 */
4640 isp = smack_inode(d_inode(dentry->d_parent));
4641 skp = isp->smk_inode;
4642 tsp->smk_task = skp;
4643 *new = new_creds;
4644 return 0;
4645 }
4646
4647 static int smack_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
4648 {
4649 /*
4650 * Return 1 if this is the smack access Smack attribute.
4651 */
4652 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0)
4653 return 1;
4654
4655 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
4656 }
4657
4658 static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
4659 struct qstr *name,
4660 const struct cred *old,
4661 struct cred *new)
4662 {
4663 struct task_smack *otsp = smack_cred(old);
4664 struct task_smack *ntsp = smack_cred(new);
4665 struct inode_smack *isp;
4666 int may;
4667
4668 /*
4669 * Use the process credential unless all of
4670 * the transmuting criteria are met
4671 */
4672 ntsp->smk_task = otsp->smk_task;
4673
4674 /*
4675 * the attribute of the containing directory
4676 */
4677 isp = smack_inode(d_inode(dentry->d_parent));
4678
4679 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) {
4680 rcu_read_lock();
4681 may = smk_access_entry(otsp->smk_task->smk_known,
4682 isp->smk_inode->smk_known,
4683 &otsp->smk_task->smk_rules);
4684 rcu_read_unlock();
4685
4686 /*
4687 * If the directory is transmuting and the rule
4688 * providing access is transmuting use the containing
4689 * directory label instead of the process label.
4690 */
4691 if (may > 0 && (may & MAY_TRANSMUTE))
4692 ntsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode;
4693 }
4694 return 0;
4695 }
4696
4697 struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
4698 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
4699 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
4700 .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
4701 .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
4702 .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
4703 };
4704
4705 static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
4706 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
4707 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
4708 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
4709
4710 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, smack_fs_context_dup),
4711 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, smack_fs_context_parse_param),
4712
4713 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
4714 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
4715 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, smack_free_mnt_opts),
4716 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
4717 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
4718 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, smack_set_mnt_opts),
4719
4720 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, smack_bprm_creds_for_exec),
4721
4722 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
4723 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security),
4724 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link),
4725 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink),
4726 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, smack_inode_rmdir),
4727 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, smack_inode_rename),
4728 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, smack_inode_permission),
4729 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, smack_inode_setattr),
4730 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, smack_inode_getattr),
4731 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, smack_inode_setxattr),
4732 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr),
4733 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, smack_inode_getxattr),
4734 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, smack_inode_removexattr),
4735 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity),
4736 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity),
4737 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity),
4738 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, smack_inode_getsecid),
4739
4740 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security),
4741 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl),
4742 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, smack_file_lock),
4743 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, smack_file_fcntl),
4744 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, smack_mmap_file),
4745 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
4746 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, smack_file_set_fowner),
4747 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, smack_file_send_sigiotask),
4748 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, smack_file_receive),
4749
4750 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, smack_file_open),
4751
4752 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, smack_cred_alloc_blank),
4753 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free),
4754 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare),
4755 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer),
4756 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, smack_cred_getsecid),
4757 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as),
4758 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as),
4759 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
4760 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
4761 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
4762 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, smack_task_getsecid),
4763 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
4764 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
4765 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),
4766 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, smack_task_setscheduler),
4767 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler),
4768 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory),
4769 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill),
4770 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode),
4771
4772 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission),
4773 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, smack_ipc_getsecid),
4774
4775 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security),
4776
4777 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
4778 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, smack_msg_queue_associate),
4779 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, smack_msg_queue_msgctl),
4780 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, smack_msg_queue_msgsnd),
4781 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv),
4782
4783 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
4784 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, smack_shm_associate),
4785 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, smack_shm_shmctl),
4786 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, smack_shm_shmat),
4787
4788 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
4789 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, smack_sem_associate),
4790 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, smack_sem_semctl),
4791 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, smack_sem_semop),
4792
4793 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, smack_d_instantiate),
4794
4795 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, smack_getprocattr),
4796 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, smack_setprocattr),
4797
4798 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, smack_unix_stream_connect),
4799 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send),
4800
4801 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create),
4802 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, smack_socket_socketpair),
4803 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4804 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind),
4805 #endif
4806 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, smack_socket_connect),
4807 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, smack_socket_sendmsg),
4808 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
4809 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
4810 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
4811 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
4812 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
4813 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
4814 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
4815 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
4816
4817 /* key management security hooks */
4818 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4819 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
4820 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free),
4821 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
4822 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
4823 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
4824 LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, smack_watch_key),
4825 #endif
4826 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4827
4828 #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE
4829 LSM_HOOK_INIT(post_notification, smack_post_notification),
4830 #endif
4831
4832 /* Audit hooks */
4833 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4834 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, smack_audit_rule_init),
4835 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, smack_audit_rule_known),
4836 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, smack_audit_rule_match),
4837 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4838
4839 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
4840 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
4841 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
4842 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
4843 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
4844 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
4845 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, smack_inode_copy_up),
4846 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, smack_inode_copy_up_xattr),
4847 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, smack_dentry_create_files_as),
4848 };
4849
4850
4851 static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
4852 {
4853 /*
4854 * Initialize rule list locks
4855 */
4856 mutex_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules_lock);
4857 mutex_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules_lock);
4858 mutex_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules_lock);
4859 mutex_init(&smack_known_star.smk_rules_lock);
4860 mutex_init(&smack_known_web.smk_rules_lock);
4861 /*
4862 * Initialize rule lists
4863 */
4864 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules);
4865 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules);
4866 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_star.smk_rules);
4867 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules);
4868 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_web.smk_rules);
4869 /*
4870 * Create the known labels list
4871 */
4872 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_huh);
4873 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_hat);
4874 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_star);
4875 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_floor);
4876 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_web);
4877 }
4878
4879 /**
4880 * smack_init - initialize the smack system
4881 *
4882 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
4883 */
4884 static __init int smack_init(void)
4885 {
4886 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
4887 struct task_smack *tsp;
4888
4889 smack_rule_cache = KMEM_CACHE(smack_rule, 0);
4890 if (!smack_rule_cache)
4891 return -ENOMEM;
4892
4893 /*
4894 * Set the security state for the initial task.
4895 */
4896 tsp = smack_cred(cred);
4897 init_task_smack(tsp, &smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor);
4898
4899 /*
4900 * Register with LSM
4901 */
4902 security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
4903 smack_enabled = 1;
4904
4905 pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
4906 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4907 pr_info("Smack: Netfilter enabled.\n");
4908 #endif
4909 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4910 pr_info("Smack: IPv6 port labeling enabled.\n");
4911 #endif
4912 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4913 pr_info("Smack: IPv6 Netfilter enabled.\n");
4914 #endif
4915
4916 /* initialize the smack_known_list */
4917 init_smack_known_list();
4918
4919 return 0;
4920 }
4921
4922 /*
4923 * Smack requires early initialization in order to label
4924 * all processes and objects when they are created.
4925 */
4926 DEFINE_LSM(smack) = {
4927 .name = "smack",
4928 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
4929 .blobs = &smack_blob_sizes,
4930 .init = smack_init,
4931 };