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1 /*
2 * Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors:
7 * Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
8 * Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
9 *
10 * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
12 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation
14 * Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation.
15 *
16 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
17 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
18 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
19 */
20
21 #include <linux/xattr.h>
22 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
23 #include <linux/mount.h>
24 #include <linux/stat.h>
25 #include <linux/kd.h>
26 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
27 #include <linux/ip.h>
28 #include <linux/tcp.h>
29 #include <linux/udp.h>
30 #include <linux/dccp.h>
31 #include <linux/icmpv6.h>
32 #include <linux/slab.h>
33 #include <linux/mutex.h>
34 #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
35 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
36 #include <net/ip.h>
37 #include <net/ipv6.h>
38 #include <linux/audit.h>
39 #include <linux/magic.h>
40 #include <linux/dcache.h>
41 #include <linux/personality.h>
42 #include <linux/msg.h>
43 #include <linux/shm.h>
44 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
45 #include <linux/parser.h>
46 #include <linux/fs_context.h>
47 #include <linux/fs_parser.h>
48 #include "smack.h"
49
50 #define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
51 #define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4
52
53 #define SMK_CONNECTING 0
54 #define SMK_RECEIVING 1
55 #define SMK_SENDING 2
56
57 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
58 DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ipv6_lock);
59 static LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
60 #endif
61 static struct kmem_cache *smack_inode_cache;
62 int smack_enabled;
63
64 #define A(s) {"smack"#s, sizeof("smack"#s) - 1, Opt_##s}
65 static struct {
66 const char *name;
67 int len;
68 int opt;
69 } smk_mount_opts[] = {
70 A(fsdefault), A(fsfloor), A(fshat), A(fsroot), A(fstransmute)
71 };
72 #undef A
73
74 static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
75 {
76 int i;
77
78 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(smk_mount_opts); i++) {
79 size_t len = smk_mount_opts[i].len;
80 if (len > l || memcmp(s, smk_mount_opts[i].name, len))
81 continue;
82 if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
83 continue;
84 *arg = s + len + 1;
85 return smk_mount_opts[i].opt;
86 }
87 return Opt_error;
88 }
89
90 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
91 static char *smk_bu_mess[] = {
92 "Bringup Error", /* Unused */
93 "Bringup", /* SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW */
94 "Unconfined Subject", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT */
95 "Unconfined Object", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT */
96 };
97
98 static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s)
99 {
100 int i = 0;
101
102 if (mode & MAY_READ)
103 s[i++] = 'r';
104 if (mode & MAY_WRITE)
105 s[i++] = 'w';
106 if (mode & MAY_EXEC)
107 s[i++] = 'x';
108 if (mode & MAY_APPEND)
109 s[i++] = 'a';
110 if (mode & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
111 s[i++] = 't';
112 if (mode & MAY_LOCK)
113 s[i++] = 'l';
114 if (i == 0)
115 s[i++] = '-';
116 s[i] = '\0';
117 }
118 #endif
119
120 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
121 static int smk_bu_note(char *note, struct smack_known *sskp,
122 struct smack_known *oskp, int mode, int rc)
123 {
124 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
125
126 if (rc <= 0)
127 return rc;
128 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
129 rc = 0;
130
131 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
132 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
133 sskp->smk_known, oskp->smk_known, acc, note);
134 return 0;
135 }
136 #else
137 #define smk_bu_note(note, sskp, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
138 #endif
139
140 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
141 static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
142 int mode, int rc)
143 {
144 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
145 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
146
147 if (rc <= 0)
148 return rc;
149 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
150 rc = 0;
151
152 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
153 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
154 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, oskp->smk_known,
155 acc, current->comm, note);
156 return 0;
157 }
158 #else
159 #define smk_bu_current(note, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
160 #endif
161
162 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
163 static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
164 {
165 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
166 struct smack_known *smk_task = smk_of_task_struct(otp);
167 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
168
169 if (rc <= 0)
170 return rc;
171 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
172 rc = 0;
173
174 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
175 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
176 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_task->smk_known, acc,
177 current->comm, otp->comm);
178 return 0;
179 }
180 #else
181 #define smk_bu_task(otp, mode, RC) (RC)
182 #endif
183
184 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
185 static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
186 {
187 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
188 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
189 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
190
191 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
192 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
193 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
194
195 if (rc <= 0)
196 return rc;
197 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
198 rc = 0;
199 if (rc == SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT &&
200 (mode & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)))
201 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_IMPURE;
202
203 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
204
205 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
206 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, isp->smk_inode->smk_known, acc,
207 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
208 return 0;
209 }
210 #else
211 #define smk_bu_inode(inode, mode, RC) (RC)
212 #endif
213
214 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
215 static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
216 {
217 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
218 struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
219 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
220 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
221 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
222
223 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
224 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
225 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
226
227 if (rc <= 0)
228 return rc;
229 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
230 rc = 0;
231
232 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
233 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
234 sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
235 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
236 current->comm);
237 return 0;
238 }
239 #else
240 #define smk_bu_file(file, mode, RC) (RC)
241 #endif
242
243 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
244 static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
245 int mode, int rc)
246 {
247 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
248 struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
249 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
250 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
251 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
252
253 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
254 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
255 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
256
257 if (rc <= 0)
258 return rc;
259 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
260 rc = 0;
261
262 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
263 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
264 sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
265 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
266 current->comm);
267 return 0;
268 }
269 #else
270 #define smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, mode, RC) (RC)
271 #endif
272
273 /**
274 * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
275 * @name: type of the label (attribute)
276 * @ip: a pointer to the inode
277 * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
278 *
279 * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label,
280 * NULL if there was no label to fetch, or an error code.
281 */
282 static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
283 struct dentry *dp)
284 {
285 int rc;
286 char *buffer;
287 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
288
289 if (!(ip->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
290 return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
291
292 buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_KERNEL);
293 if (buffer == NULL)
294 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
295
296 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, ip, name, buffer, SMK_LONGLABEL);
297 if (rc < 0)
298 skp = ERR_PTR(rc);
299 else if (rc == 0)
300 skp = NULL;
301 else
302 skp = smk_import_entry(buffer, rc);
303
304 kfree(buffer);
305
306 return skp;
307 }
308
309 /**
310 * init_inode_smack - initialize an inode security blob
311 * @isp: the blob to initialize
312 * @skp: a pointer to the Smack label entry to use in the blob
313 *
314 */
315 static void init_inode_smack(struct inode *inode, struct smack_known *skp)
316 {
317 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
318
319 isp->smk_inode = skp;
320 isp->smk_flags = 0;
321 mutex_init(&isp->smk_lock);
322 }
323
324 /**
325 * init_task_smack - initialize a task security blob
326 * @tsp: blob to initialize
327 * @task: a pointer to the Smack label for the running task
328 * @forked: a pointer to the Smack label for the forked task
329 *
330 */
331 static void init_task_smack(struct task_smack *tsp, struct smack_known *task,
332 struct smack_known *forked)
333 {
334 tsp->smk_task = task;
335 tsp->smk_forked = forked;
336 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
337 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_relabel);
338 mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
339 }
340
341 /**
342 * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
343 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
344 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
345 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
346 *
347 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
348 */
349 static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
350 gfp_t gfp)
351 {
352 struct smack_rule *nrp;
353 struct smack_rule *orp;
354 int rc = 0;
355
356 list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) {
357 nrp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_rule), gfp);
358 if (nrp == NULL) {
359 rc = -ENOMEM;
360 break;
361 }
362 *nrp = *orp;
363 list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead);
364 }
365 return rc;
366 }
367
368 /**
369 * smk_copy_relabel - copy smk_relabel labels list
370 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
371 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
372 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
373 *
374 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
375 */
376 static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
377 gfp_t gfp)
378 {
379 struct smack_known_list_elem *nklep;
380 struct smack_known_list_elem *oklep;
381
382 list_for_each_entry(oklep, ohead, list) {
383 nklep = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_known_list_elem), gfp);
384 if (nklep == NULL) {
385 smk_destroy_label_list(nhead);
386 return -ENOMEM;
387 }
388 nklep->smk_label = oklep->smk_label;
389 list_add(&nklep->list, nhead);
390 }
391
392 return 0;
393 }
394
395 /**
396 * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_*
397 * @mode - input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
398 *
399 * Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules
400 */
401 static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
402 {
403 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)
404 return MAY_READWRITE;
405 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
406 return MAY_READ;
407
408 return 0;
409 }
410
411 /**
412 * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
413 * @tracer: tracer process
414 * @tracee_known: label entry of the process that's about to be traced
415 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
416 * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
417 *
418 * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error
419 */
420 static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
421 struct smack_known *tracee_known,
422 unsigned int mode, const char *func)
423 {
424 int rc;
425 struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
426 struct task_smack *tsp;
427 struct smack_known *tracer_known;
428 const struct cred *tracercred;
429
430 if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
431 smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
432 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
433 saip = &ad;
434 }
435
436 rcu_read_lock();
437 tracercred = __task_cred(tracer);
438 tsp = smack_cred(tracercred);
439 tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
440
441 if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
442 (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT ||
443 smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)) {
444 if (tracer_known->smk_known == tracee_known->smk_known)
445 rc = 0;
446 else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
447 rc = -EACCES;
448 else if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_SYS_PTRACE, tracercred))
449 rc = 0;
450 else
451 rc = -EACCES;
452
453 if (saip)
454 smack_log(tracer_known->smk_known,
455 tracee_known->smk_known,
456 0, rc, saip);
457
458 rcu_read_unlock();
459 return rc;
460 }
461
462 /* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */
463 rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_known, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
464
465 rcu_read_unlock();
466 return rc;
467 }
468
469 /*
470 * LSM hooks.
471 * We he, that is fun!
472 */
473
474 /**
475 * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
476 * @ctp: child task pointer
477 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
478 *
479 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
480 *
481 * Do the capability checks.
482 */
483 static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
484 {
485 struct smack_known *skp;
486
487 skp = smk_of_task_struct(ctp);
488
489 return smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__);
490 }
491
492 /**
493 * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME
494 * @ptp: parent task pointer
495 *
496 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
497 *
498 * Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH.
499 */
500 static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
501 {
502 int rc;
503 struct smack_known *skp;
504
505 skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(current_cred()));
506
507 rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
508 return rc;
509 }
510
511 /**
512 * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
513 * @type: message type
514 *
515 * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
516 */
517 static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
518 {
519 int rc = 0;
520 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
521
522 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
523 return 0;
524
525 if (smack_syslog_label != NULL && smack_syslog_label != skp)
526 rc = -EACCES;
527
528 return rc;
529 }
530
531 /*
532 * Superblock Hooks.
533 */
534
535 /**
536 * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob
537 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
538 *
539 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
540 */
541 static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
542 {
543 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
544
545 sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
546
547 if (sbsp == NULL)
548 return -ENOMEM;
549
550 sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
551 sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
552 sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor;
553 sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat;
554 /*
555 * SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc.
556 */
557 sb->s_security = sbsp;
558
559 return 0;
560 }
561
562 /**
563 * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
564 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
565 *
566 */
567 static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
568 {
569 kfree(sb->s_security);
570 sb->s_security = NULL;
571 }
572
573 struct smack_mnt_opts {
574 const char *fsdefault, *fsfloor, *fshat, *fsroot, *fstransmute;
575 };
576
577 static void smack_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
578 {
579 struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
580 kfree(opts->fsdefault);
581 kfree(opts->fsfloor);
582 kfree(opts->fshat);
583 kfree(opts->fsroot);
584 kfree(opts->fstransmute);
585 kfree(opts);
586 }
587
588 static int smack_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
589 {
590 struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
591
592 if (!opts) {
593 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
594 if (!opts)
595 return -ENOMEM;
596 *mnt_opts = opts;
597 }
598 if (!s)
599 return -ENOMEM;
600
601 switch (token) {
602 case Opt_fsdefault:
603 if (opts->fsdefault)
604 goto out_opt_err;
605 opts->fsdefault = s;
606 break;
607 case Opt_fsfloor:
608 if (opts->fsfloor)
609 goto out_opt_err;
610 opts->fsfloor = s;
611 break;
612 case Opt_fshat:
613 if (opts->fshat)
614 goto out_opt_err;
615 opts->fshat = s;
616 break;
617 case Opt_fsroot:
618 if (opts->fsroot)
619 goto out_opt_err;
620 opts->fsroot = s;
621 break;
622 case Opt_fstransmute:
623 if (opts->fstransmute)
624 goto out_opt_err;
625 opts->fstransmute = s;
626 break;
627 }
628 return 0;
629
630 out_opt_err:
631 pr_warn("Smack: duplicate mount options\n");
632 return -EINVAL;
633 }
634
635 /**
636 * smack_fs_context_dup - Duplicate the security data on fs_context duplication
637 * @fc: The new filesystem context.
638 * @src_fc: The source filesystem context being duplicated.
639 *
640 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
641 */
642 static int smack_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
643 struct fs_context *src_fc)
644 {
645 struct smack_mnt_opts *dst, *src = src_fc->security;
646
647 if (!src)
648 return 0;
649
650 fc->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
651 if (!fc->security)
652 return -ENOMEM;
653 dst = fc->security;
654
655 if (src->fsdefault) {
656 dst->fsdefault = kstrdup(src->fsdefault, GFP_KERNEL);
657 if (!dst->fsdefault)
658 return -ENOMEM;
659 }
660 if (src->fsfloor) {
661 dst->fsfloor = kstrdup(src->fsfloor, GFP_KERNEL);
662 if (!dst->fsfloor)
663 return -ENOMEM;
664 }
665 if (src->fshat) {
666 dst->fshat = kstrdup(src->fshat, GFP_KERNEL);
667 if (!dst->fshat)
668 return -ENOMEM;
669 }
670 if (src->fsroot) {
671 dst->fsroot = kstrdup(src->fsroot, GFP_KERNEL);
672 if (!dst->fsroot)
673 return -ENOMEM;
674 }
675 if (src->fstransmute) {
676 dst->fstransmute = kstrdup(src->fstransmute, GFP_KERNEL);
677 if (!dst->fstransmute)
678 return -ENOMEM;
679 }
680 return 0;
681 }
682
683 static const struct fs_parameter_spec smack_param_specs[] = {
684 fsparam_string("fsdefault", Opt_fsdefault),
685 fsparam_string("fsfloor", Opt_fsfloor),
686 fsparam_string("fshat", Opt_fshat),
687 fsparam_string("fsroot", Opt_fsroot),
688 fsparam_string("fstransmute", Opt_fstransmute),
689 {}
690 };
691
692 static const struct fs_parameter_description smack_fs_parameters = {
693 .name = "smack",
694 .specs = smack_param_specs,
695 };
696
697 /**
698 * smack_fs_context_parse_param - Parse a single mount parameter
699 * @fc: The new filesystem context being constructed.
700 * @param: The parameter.
701 *
702 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOPARAM to pass the parameter on or anything else on
703 * error.
704 */
705 static int smack_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
706 struct fs_parameter *param)
707 {
708 struct fs_parse_result result;
709 int opt, rc;
710
711 opt = fs_parse(fc, &smack_fs_parameters, param, &result);
712 if (opt < 0)
713 return opt;
714
715 rc = smack_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
716 if (!rc)
717 param->string = NULL;
718 return rc;
719 }
720
721 static int smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
722 {
723 char *from = options, *to = options;
724 bool first = true;
725
726 while (1) {
727 char *next = strchr(from, ',');
728 int token, len, rc;
729 char *arg = NULL;
730
731 if (next)
732 len = next - from;
733 else
734 len = strlen(from);
735
736 token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
737 if (token != Opt_error) {
738 arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, from + len - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
739 rc = smack_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
740 if (unlikely(rc)) {
741 kfree(arg);
742 if (*mnt_opts)
743 smack_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
744 *mnt_opts = NULL;
745 return rc;
746 }
747 } else {
748 if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma
749 from--;
750 len++;
751 }
752 if (to != from)
753 memmove(to, from, len);
754 to += len;
755 first = false;
756 }
757 if (!from[len])
758 break;
759 from += len + 1;
760 }
761 *to = '\0';
762 return 0;
763 }
764
765 /**
766 * smack_set_mnt_opts - set Smack specific mount options
767 * @sb: the file system superblock
768 * @opts: Smack mount options
769 * @kern_flags: mount option from kernel space or user space
770 * @set_kern_flags: where to store converted mount opts
771 *
772 * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
773 *
774 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set Smack mount
775 * labels.
776 */
777 static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
778 void *mnt_opts,
779 unsigned long kern_flags,
780 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
781 {
782 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
783 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
784 struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
785 struct inode_smack *isp;
786 struct smack_known *skp;
787 struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
788 bool transmute = false;
789
790 if (sp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_INITIALIZED)
791 return 0;
792
793 if (inode->i_security == NULL) {
794 int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode);
795
796 if (rc)
797 return rc;
798 }
799
800 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
801 /*
802 * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values.
803 */
804 if (opts)
805 return -EPERM;
806 /*
807 * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller.
808 */
809 skp = smk_of_current();
810 sp->smk_root = skp;
811 sp->smk_default = skp;
812 /*
813 * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled
814 * backing store it's okay to trust security labels
815 * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted.
816 */
817 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
818 sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC &&
819 sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) {
820 transmute = true;
821 sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED;
822 }
823 }
824
825 sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_INITIALIZED;
826
827 if (opts) {
828 if (opts->fsdefault) {
829 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fsdefault, 0);
830 if (IS_ERR(skp))
831 return PTR_ERR(skp);
832 sp->smk_default = skp;
833 }
834 if (opts->fsfloor) {
835 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fsfloor, 0);
836 if (IS_ERR(skp))
837 return PTR_ERR(skp);
838 sp->smk_floor = skp;
839 }
840 if (opts->fshat) {
841 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fshat, 0);
842 if (IS_ERR(skp))
843 return PTR_ERR(skp);
844 sp->smk_hat = skp;
845 }
846 if (opts->fsroot) {
847 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fsroot, 0);
848 if (IS_ERR(skp))
849 return PTR_ERR(skp);
850 sp->smk_root = skp;
851 }
852 if (opts->fstransmute) {
853 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fstransmute, 0);
854 if (IS_ERR(skp))
855 return PTR_ERR(skp);
856 sp->smk_root = skp;
857 transmute = true;
858 }
859 }
860
861 /*
862 * Initialize the root inode.
863 */
864 init_inode_smack(inode, sp->smk_root);
865
866 if (transmute) {
867 isp = smack_inode(inode);
868 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
869 }
870
871 return 0;
872 }
873
874 /**
875 * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
876 * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
877 *
878 * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem,
879 * and error code otherwise
880 */
881 static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
882 {
883 struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
884 int rc;
885 struct smk_audit_info ad;
886
887 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
888 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
889
890 rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
891 rc = smk_bu_current("statfs", sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, rc);
892 return rc;
893 }
894
895 /*
896 * BPRM hooks
897 */
898
899 /**
900 * smack_bprm_set_creds - set creds for exec
901 * @bprm: the exec information
902 *
903 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise
904 */
905 static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
906 {
907 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
908 struct task_smack *bsp = smack_cred(bprm->cred);
909 struct inode_smack *isp;
910 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
911 int rc;
912
913 if (bprm->called_set_creds)
914 return 0;
915
916 isp = smack_inode(inode);
917 if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
918 return 0;
919
920 sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
921 if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
922 isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
923 return 0;
924
925 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
926 struct task_struct *tracer;
927 rc = 0;
928
929 rcu_read_lock();
930 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
931 if (likely(tracer != NULL))
932 rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer,
933 isp->smk_task,
934 PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH,
935 __func__);
936 rcu_read_unlock();
937
938 if (rc != 0)
939 return rc;
940 } else if (bprm->unsafe)
941 return -EPERM;
942
943 bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
944 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
945
946 /* Decide if this is a secure exec. */
947 if (bsp->smk_task != bsp->smk_forked)
948 bprm->secureexec = 1;
949
950 return 0;
951 }
952
953 /*
954 * Inode hooks
955 */
956
957 /**
958 * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
959 * @inode: the inode in need of a blob
960 *
961 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
962 */
963 static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
964 {
965 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
966
967 init_inode_smack(inode, skp);
968 return 0;
969 }
970
971 /**
972 * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
973 * @inode: the newly created inode
974 * @dir: containing directory object
975 * @qstr: unused
976 * @name: where to put the attribute name
977 * @value: where to put the attribute value
978 * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
979 *
980 * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
981 */
982 static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
983 const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
984 void **value, size_t *len)
985 {
986 struct inode_smack *issp = smack_inode(inode);
987 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
988 struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
989 struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
990 int may;
991
992 if (name)
993 *name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX;
994
995 if (value && len) {
996 rcu_read_lock();
997 may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
998 &skp->smk_rules);
999 rcu_read_unlock();
1000
1001 /*
1002 * If the access rule allows transmutation and
1003 * the directory requests transmutation then
1004 * by all means transmute.
1005 * Mark the inode as changed.
1006 */
1007 if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
1008 smk_inode_transmutable(dir)) {
1009 isp = dsp;
1010 issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
1011 }
1012
1013 *value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
1014 if (*value == NULL)
1015 return -ENOMEM;
1016
1017 *len = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1018 }
1019
1020 return 0;
1021 }
1022
1023 /**
1024 * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link
1025 * @old_dentry: the existing object
1026 * @dir: unused
1027 * @new_dentry: the new object
1028 *
1029 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1030 */
1031 static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
1032 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1033 {
1034 struct smack_known *isp;
1035 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1036 int rc;
1037
1038 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1039 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1040
1041 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1042 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1043 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1044
1045 if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1046 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1047 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1048 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1049 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1050 }
1051
1052 return rc;
1053 }
1054
1055 /**
1056 * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion
1057 * @dir: containing directory object
1058 * @dentry: file to unlink
1059 *
1060 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1061 * and the object, error code otherwise
1062 */
1063 static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1064 {
1065 struct inode *ip = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1066 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1067 int rc;
1068
1069 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1070 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1071
1072 /*
1073 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
1074 */
1075 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1076 rc = smk_bu_inode(ip, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1077 if (rc == 0) {
1078 /*
1079 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1080 */
1081 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1082 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1083 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1084 rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1085 }
1086 return rc;
1087 }
1088
1089 /**
1090 * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion
1091 * @dir: containing directory object
1092 * @dentry: directory to unlink
1093 *
1094 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1095 * and the directory, error code otherwise
1096 */
1097 static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1098 {
1099 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1100 int rc;
1101
1102 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1103 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1104
1105 /*
1106 * You need write access to the thing you're removing
1107 */
1108 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1109 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1110 if (rc == 0) {
1111 /*
1112 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1113 */
1114 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1115 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1116 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1117 rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1118 }
1119
1120 return rc;
1121 }
1122
1123 /**
1124 * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
1125 * @old_inode: unused
1126 * @old_dentry: the old object
1127 * @new_inode: unused
1128 * @new_dentry: the new object
1129 *
1130 * Read and write access is required on both the old and
1131 * new directories.
1132 *
1133 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1134 */
1135 static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
1136 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1137 struct inode *new_inode,
1138 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1139 {
1140 int rc;
1141 struct smack_known *isp;
1142 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1143
1144 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1145 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1146
1147 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1148 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1149 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1150
1151 if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1152 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1153 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1154 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1155 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1156 }
1157 return rc;
1158 }
1159
1160 /**
1161 * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
1162 * @inode: the inode in question
1163 * @mask: the access requested
1164 *
1165 * This is the important Smack hook.
1166 *
1167 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, -EACCES otherwise
1168 */
1169 static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
1170 {
1171 struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1172 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1173 int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
1174 int rc;
1175
1176 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
1177 /*
1178 * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
1179 */
1180 if (mask == 0)
1181 return 0;
1182
1183 if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) {
1184 if (smk_of_inode(inode) != sbsp->smk_root)
1185 return -EACCES;
1186 }
1187
1188 /* May be droppable after audit */
1189 if (no_block)
1190 return -ECHILD;
1191 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1192 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
1193 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
1194 rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, mask, rc);
1195 return rc;
1196 }
1197
1198 /**
1199 * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
1200 * @dentry: the object
1201 * @iattr: for the force flag
1202 *
1203 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1204 */
1205 static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
1206 {
1207 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1208 int rc;
1209
1210 /*
1211 * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
1212 */
1213 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
1214 return 0;
1215 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1216 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1217
1218 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1219 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1220 return rc;
1221 }
1222
1223 /**
1224 * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
1225 * @mnt: vfsmount of the object
1226 * @dentry: the object
1227 *
1228 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1229 */
1230 static int smack_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
1231 {
1232 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1233 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1234 int rc;
1235
1236 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1237 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
1238 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1239 rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, MAY_READ, rc);
1240 return rc;
1241 }
1242
1243 /**
1244 * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
1245 * @dentry: the object
1246 * @name: name of the attribute
1247 * @value: value of the attribute
1248 * @size: size of the value
1249 * @flags: unused
1250 *
1251 * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly.
1252 *
1253 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1254 */
1255 static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1256 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1257 {
1258 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1259 struct smack_known *skp;
1260 int check_priv = 0;
1261 int check_import = 0;
1262 int check_star = 0;
1263 int rc = 0;
1264
1265 /*
1266 * Check label validity here so import won't fail in post_setxattr
1267 */
1268 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1269 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1270 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
1271 check_priv = 1;
1272 check_import = 1;
1273 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1274 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1275 check_priv = 1;
1276 check_import = 1;
1277 check_star = 1;
1278 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1279 check_priv = 1;
1280 if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
1281 strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
1282 rc = -EINVAL;
1283 } else
1284 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
1285
1286 if (check_priv && !smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1287 rc = -EPERM;
1288
1289 if (rc == 0 && check_import) {
1290 skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL;
1291 if (IS_ERR(skp))
1292 rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
1293 else if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
1294 (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)))
1295 rc = -EINVAL;
1296 }
1297
1298 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1299 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1300
1301 if (rc == 0) {
1302 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1303 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1304 }
1305
1306 return rc;
1307 }
1308
1309 /**
1310 * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above
1311 * @dentry: object
1312 * @name: attribute name
1313 * @value: attribute value
1314 * @size: attribute size
1315 * @flags: unused
1316 *
1317 * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found
1318 * in the master label list.
1319 */
1320 static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1321 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1322 {
1323 struct smack_known *skp;
1324 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry));
1325
1326 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1327 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1328 return;
1329 }
1330
1331 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1332 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1333 if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1334 isp->smk_inode = skp;
1335 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
1336 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1337 if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1338 isp->smk_task = skp;
1339 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1340 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1341 if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1342 isp->smk_mmap = skp;
1343 }
1344
1345 return;
1346 }
1347
1348 /**
1349 * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr
1350 * @dentry: the object
1351 * @name: unused
1352 *
1353 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1354 */
1355 static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1356 {
1357 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1358 int rc;
1359
1360 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1361 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1362
1363 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_READ, &ad);
1364 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_READ, rc);
1365 return rc;
1366 }
1367
1368 /**
1369 * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
1370 * @dentry: the object
1371 * @name: name of the attribute
1372 *
1373 * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN
1374 *
1375 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1376 */
1377 static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1378 {
1379 struct inode_smack *isp;
1380 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1381 int rc = 0;
1382
1383 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1384 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1385 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
1386 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1387 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
1388 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1389 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1390 rc = -EPERM;
1391 } else
1392 rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
1393
1394 if (rc != 0)
1395 return rc;
1396
1397 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1398 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1399
1400 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1401 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1402 if (rc != 0)
1403 return rc;
1404
1405 isp = smack_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry));
1406 /*
1407 * Don't do anything special for these.
1408 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN
1409 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT
1410 */
1411 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1412 struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb;
1413 struct superblock_smack *sbsp = sbp->s_security;
1414
1415 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default;
1416 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0)
1417 isp->smk_task = NULL;
1418 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0)
1419 isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
1420 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
1421 isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1422
1423 return 0;
1424 }
1425
1426 /**
1427 * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
1428 * @inode: the object
1429 * @name: attribute name
1430 * @buffer: where to put the result
1431 * @alloc: duplicate memory
1432 *
1433 * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
1434 */
1435 static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
1436 const char *name, void **buffer,
1437 bool alloc)
1438 {
1439 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1440 struct socket *sock;
1441 struct super_block *sbp;
1442 struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode;
1443 struct smack_known *isp;
1444
1445 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0)
1446 isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1447 else {
1448 /*
1449 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
1450 */
1451 sbp = ip->i_sb;
1452 if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
1453 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1454
1455 sock = SOCKET_I(ip);
1456 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
1457 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1458
1459 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1460
1461 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
1462 isp = ssp->smk_in;
1463 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
1464 isp = ssp->smk_out;
1465 else
1466 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1467 }
1468
1469 if (alloc) {
1470 *buffer = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
1471 if (*buffer == NULL)
1472 return -ENOMEM;
1473 }
1474
1475 return strlen(isp->smk_known);
1476 }
1477
1478
1479 /**
1480 * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes
1481 * @inode: the object
1482 * @buffer: where they go
1483 * @buffer_size: size of buffer
1484 */
1485 static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
1486 size_t buffer_size)
1487 {
1488 int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
1489
1490 if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size)
1491 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len);
1492
1493 return len;
1494 }
1495
1496 /**
1497 * smack_inode_getsecid - Extract inode's security id
1498 * @inode: inode to extract the info from
1499 * @secid: where result will be saved
1500 */
1501 static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
1502 {
1503 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1504
1505 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
1506 }
1507
1508 /*
1509 * File Hooks
1510 */
1511
1512 /*
1513 * There is no smack_file_permission hook
1514 *
1515 * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
1516 * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
1517 * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no.
1518 *
1519 * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
1520 * label changing that SELinux does.
1521 */
1522
1523 /**
1524 * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
1525 * @file: the object
1526 *
1527 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1528 * label list, so no allocation is done.
1529 *
1530 * f_security is the owner security information. It
1531 * isn't used on file access checks, it's for send_sigio.
1532 *
1533 * Returns 0
1534 */
1535 static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
1536 {
1537 struct smack_known **blob = smack_file(file);
1538
1539 *blob = smk_of_current();
1540 return 0;
1541 }
1542
1543 /**
1544 * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
1545 * @file: the object
1546 * @cmd: what to do
1547 * @arg: unused
1548 *
1549 * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions.
1550 *
1551 * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise
1552 */
1553 static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1554 unsigned long arg)
1555 {
1556 int rc = 0;
1557 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1558 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1559
1560 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1561 return 0;
1562
1563 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1564 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1565
1566 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
1567 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1568 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1569 }
1570
1571 if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)) {
1572 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1573 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_READ, rc);
1574 }
1575
1576 return rc;
1577 }
1578
1579 /**
1580 * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
1581 * @file: the object
1582 * @cmd: unused
1583 *
1584 * Returns 0 if current has lock access, error code otherwise
1585 */
1586 static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
1587 {
1588 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1589 int rc;
1590 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1591
1592 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1593 return 0;
1594
1595 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1596 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1597 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1598 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1599 return rc;
1600 }
1601
1602 /**
1603 * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl
1604 * @file: the object
1605 * @cmd: what action to check
1606 * @arg: unused
1607 *
1608 * Generally these operations are harmless.
1609 * File locking operations present an obvious mechanism
1610 * for passing information, so they require write access.
1611 *
1612 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1613 */
1614 static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1615 unsigned long arg)
1616 {
1617 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1618 int rc = 0;
1619 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1620
1621 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1622 return 0;
1623
1624 switch (cmd) {
1625 case F_GETLK:
1626 break;
1627 case F_SETLK:
1628 case F_SETLKW:
1629 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1630 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1631 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1632 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1633 break;
1634 case F_SETOWN:
1635 case F_SETSIG:
1636 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1637 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1638 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1639 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1640 break;
1641 default:
1642 break;
1643 }
1644
1645 return rc;
1646 }
1647
1648 /**
1649 * smack_mmap_file :
1650 * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g.
1651 * if mapping anonymous memory.
1652 * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
1653 * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
1654 * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
1655 * @flags contains the operational flags.
1656 * Return 0 if permission is granted.
1657 */
1658 static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
1659 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
1660 unsigned long flags)
1661 {
1662 struct smack_known *skp;
1663 struct smack_known *mkp;
1664 struct smack_rule *srp;
1665 struct task_smack *tsp;
1666 struct smack_known *okp;
1667 struct inode_smack *isp;
1668 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
1669 int may;
1670 int mmay;
1671 int tmay;
1672 int rc;
1673
1674 if (file == NULL)
1675 return 0;
1676
1677 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file))))
1678 return 0;
1679
1680 isp = smack_inode(file_inode(file));
1681 if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
1682 return 0;
1683 sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security;
1684 if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
1685 isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
1686 return -EACCES;
1687 mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
1688
1689 tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
1690 skp = smk_of_current();
1691 rc = 0;
1692
1693 rcu_read_lock();
1694 /*
1695 * For each Smack rule associated with the subject
1696 * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access
1697 * to that rule's object label.
1698 */
1699 list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &skp->smk_rules, list) {
1700 okp = srp->smk_object;
1701 /*
1702 * Matching labels always allows access.
1703 */
1704 if (mkp->smk_known == okp->smk_known)
1705 continue;
1706 /*
1707 * If there is a matching local rule take
1708 * that into account as well.
1709 */
1710 may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject->smk_known,
1711 okp->smk_known,
1712 &tsp->smk_rules);
1713 if (may == -ENOENT)
1714 may = srp->smk_access;
1715 else
1716 may &= srp->smk_access;
1717 /*
1718 * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't
1719 * possibly have less access.
1720 */
1721 if (may == 0)
1722 continue;
1723
1724 /*
1725 * Fetch the global list entry.
1726 * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
1727 * can't have as much access as current.
1728 */
1729 mmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1730 &mkp->smk_rules);
1731 if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
1732 rc = -EACCES;
1733 break;
1734 }
1735 /*
1736 * If there is a local entry it modifies the
1737 * potential access, too.
1738 */
1739 tmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1740 &tsp->smk_rules);
1741 if (tmay != -ENOENT)
1742 mmay &= tmay;
1743
1744 /*
1745 * If there is any access available to current that is
1746 * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
1747 * deny access.
1748 */
1749 if ((may | mmay) != mmay) {
1750 rc = -EACCES;
1751 break;
1752 }
1753 }
1754
1755 rcu_read_unlock();
1756
1757 return rc;
1758 }
1759
1760 /**
1761 * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
1762 * @file: object in question
1763 *
1764 */
1765 static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
1766 {
1767 struct smack_known **blob = smack_file(file);
1768
1769 *blob = smk_of_current();
1770 }
1771
1772 /**
1773 * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio
1774 * @tsk: The target task
1775 * @fown: the object the signal come from
1776 * @signum: unused
1777 *
1778 * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't
1779 *
1780 * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could
1781 * write to the task, an error code otherwise.
1782 */
1783 static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
1784 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
1785 {
1786 struct smack_known **blob;
1787 struct smack_known *skp;
1788 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(tsk->cred));
1789 const struct cred *tcred;
1790 struct file *file;
1791 int rc;
1792 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1793
1794 /*
1795 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
1796 */
1797 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
1798
1799 /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
1800 blob = smack_file(file);
1801 skp = *blob;
1802 rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, NULL);
1803 rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
1804
1805 rcu_read_lock();
1806 tcred = __task_cred(tsk);
1807 if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, tcred))
1808 rc = 0;
1809 rcu_read_unlock();
1810
1811 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1812 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
1813 smack_log(skp->smk_known, tkp->smk_known, MAY_DELIVER, rc, &ad);
1814 return rc;
1815 }
1816
1817 /**
1818 * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check
1819 * @file: the object
1820 *
1821 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1822 */
1823 static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
1824 {
1825 int rc;
1826 int may = 0;
1827 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1828 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1829 struct socket *sock;
1830 struct task_smack *tsp;
1831 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1832
1833 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1834 return 0;
1835
1836 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1837 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1838
1839 if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
1840 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
1841 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1842 tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
1843 /*
1844 * If the receiving process can't write to the
1845 * passed socket or if the passed socket can't
1846 * write to the receiving process don't accept
1847 * the passed socket.
1848 */
1849 rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, ssp->smk_out, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1850 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1851 if (rc < 0)
1852 return rc;
1853 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_in, tsp->smk_task, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1854 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1855 return rc;
1856 }
1857 /*
1858 * This code relies on bitmasks.
1859 */
1860 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1861 may = MAY_READ;
1862 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
1863 may |= MAY_WRITE;
1864
1865 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), may, &ad);
1866 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1867 return rc;
1868 }
1869
1870 /**
1871 * smack_file_open - Smack dentry open processing
1872 * @file: the object
1873 * @cred: task credential
1874 *
1875 * Set the security blob in the file structure.
1876 * Allow the open only if the task has read access. There are
1877 * many read operations (e.g. fstat) that you can do with an
1878 * fd even if you have the file open write-only.
1879 *
1880 * Returns 0
1881 */
1882 static int smack_file_open(struct file *file)
1883 {
1884 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(file->f_cred);
1885 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1886 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1887 int rc;
1888
1889 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1890 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1891 rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1892 rc = smk_bu_credfile(file->f_cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
1893
1894 return rc;
1895 }
1896
1897 /*
1898 * Task hooks
1899 */
1900
1901 /**
1902 * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
1903 * @new: the new credentials
1904 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1905 *
1906 * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification. This must allocate all
1907 * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
1908 * complete without error.
1909 */
1910 static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
1911 {
1912 init_task_smack(smack_cred(cred), NULL, NULL);
1913 return 0;
1914 }
1915
1916
1917 /**
1918 * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
1919 * @cred: the credentials in question
1920 *
1921 */
1922 static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
1923 {
1924 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
1925 struct smack_rule *rp;
1926 struct list_head *l;
1927 struct list_head *n;
1928
1929 smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
1930
1931 list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
1932 rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list);
1933 list_del(&rp->list);
1934 kfree(rp);
1935 }
1936 }
1937
1938 /**
1939 * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification
1940 * @new: the new credentials
1941 * @old: the original credentials
1942 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1943 *
1944 * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
1945 */
1946 static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1947 gfp_t gfp)
1948 {
1949 struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
1950 struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
1951 int rc;
1952
1953 init_task_smack(new_tsp, old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task);
1954
1955 rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
1956 if (rc != 0)
1957 return rc;
1958
1959 rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel,
1960 gfp);
1961 return rc;
1962 }
1963
1964 /**
1965 * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
1966 * @new: the new credentials
1967 * @old: the original credentials
1968 *
1969 * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
1970 */
1971 static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
1972 {
1973 struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
1974 struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
1975
1976 new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
1977 new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
1978 mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
1979 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
1980
1981 /* cbs copy rule list */
1982 }
1983
1984 /**
1985 * smack_cred_getsecid - get the secid corresponding to a creds structure
1986 * @c: the object creds
1987 * @secid: where to put the result
1988 *
1989 * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
1990 */
1991 static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, u32 *secid)
1992 {
1993 struct smack_known *skp;
1994
1995 rcu_read_lock();
1996 skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
1997 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
1998 rcu_read_unlock();
1999 }
2000
2001 /**
2002 * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
2003 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
2004 * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
2005 *
2006 * Set the security data for a kernel service.
2007 */
2008 static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
2009 {
2010 struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
2011
2012 new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid);
2013 return 0;
2014 }
2015
2016 /**
2017 * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
2018 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified
2019 * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference
2020 *
2021 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
2022 * as the objective context of the specified inode
2023 */
2024 static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
2025 struct inode *inode)
2026 {
2027 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
2028 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(new);
2029
2030 tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
2031 tsp->smk_task = tsp->smk_forked;
2032 return 0;
2033 }
2034
2035 /**
2036 * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access
2037 * @p: the task object
2038 * @access: the access requested
2039 * @caller: name of the calling function for audit
2040 *
2041 * Return 0 if access is permitted
2042 */
2043 static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
2044 const char *caller)
2045 {
2046 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2047 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2048 int rc;
2049
2050 smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2051 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2052 rc = smk_curacc(skp, access, &ad);
2053 rc = smk_bu_task(p, access, rc);
2054 return rc;
2055 }
2056
2057 /**
2058 * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
2059 * @p: the task object
2060 * @pgid: unused
2061 *
2062 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2063 */
2064 static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2065 {
2066 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2067 }
2068
2069 /**
2070 * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid
2071 * @p: the object task
2072 *
2073 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2074 */
2075 static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2076 {
2077 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2078 }
2079
2080 /**
2081 * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid
2082 * @p: the object task
2083 *
2084 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2085 */
2086 static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2087 {
2088 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2089 }
2090
2091 /**
2092 * smack_task_getsecid - get the secid of the task
2093 * @p: the object task
2094 * @secid: where to put the result
2095 *
2096 * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
2097 */
2098 static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
2099 {
2100 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2101
2102 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
2103 }
2104
2105 /**
2106 * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice
2107 * @p: the task object
2108 * @nice: unused
2109 *
2110 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2111 */
2112 static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2113 {
2114 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2115 }
2116
2117 /**
2118 * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio
2119 * @p: the task object
2120 * @ioprio: unused
2121 *
2122 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2123 */
2124 static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2125 {
2126 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2127 }
2128
2129 /**
2130 * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio
2131 * @p: the task object
2132 *
2133 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2134 */
2135 static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
2136 {
2137 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2138 }
2139
2140 /**
2141 * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler
2142 * @p: the task object
2143 * @policy: unused
2144 * @lp: unused
2145 *
2146 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2147 */
2148 static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2149 {
2150 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2151 }
2152
2153 /**
2154 * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler
2155 * @p: the task object
2156 *
2157 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2158 */
2159 static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2160 {
2161 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2162 }
2163
2164 /**
2165 * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory
2166 * @p: the task object
2167 *
2168 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2169 */
2170 static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2171 {
2172 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2173 }
2174
2175 /**
2176 * smack_task_kill - Smack check on signal delivery
2177 * @p: the task object
2178 * @info: unused
2179 * @sig: unused
2180 * @cred: identifies the cred to use in lieu of current's
2181 *
2182 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2183 *
2184 */
2185 static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
2186 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
2187 {
2188 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2189 struct smack_known *skp;
2190 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2191 int rc;
2192
2193 if (!sig)
2194 return 0; /* null signal; existence test */
2195
2196 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2197 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2198 /*
2199 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
2200 * can write the receiver.
2201 */
2202 if (cred == NULL) {
2203 rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
2204 rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
2205 return rc;
2206 }
2207 /*
2208 * If the cred isn't NULL we're dealing with some USB IO
2209 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
2210 * we can't take privilege into account.
2211 */
2212 skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
2213 rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
2214 rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
2215 return rc;
2216 }
2217
2218 /**
2219 * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
2220 * @p: task to copy from
2221 * @inode: inode to copy to
2222 *
2223 * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
2224 */
2225 static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
2226 {
2227 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
2228 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2229
2230 isp->smk_inode = skp;
2231 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2232 }
2233
2234 /*
2235 * Socket hooks.
2236 */
2237
2238 /**
2239 * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
2240 * @sk: the socket
2241 * @family: unused
2242 * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
2243 *
2244 * Assign Smack pointers to current
2245 *
2246 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
2247 */
2248 static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
2249 {
2250 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2251 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2252
2253 ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
2254 if (ssp == NULL)
2255 return -ENOMEM;
2256
2257 /*
2258 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
2259 */
2260 if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
2261 ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
2262 ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
2263 } else {
2264 ssp->smk_in = skp;
2265 ssp->smk_out = skp;
2266 }
2267 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
2268
2269 sk->sk_security = ssp;
2270
2271 return 0;
2272 }
2273
2274 /**
2275 * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
2276 * @sk: the socket
2277 *
2278 * Clears the blob pointer
2279 */
2280 static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
2281 {
2282 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2283 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2284
2285 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
2286 rcu_read_lock();
2287 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2288 if (spp->smk_sock != sk)
2289 continue;
2290 spp->smk_can_reuse = 1;
2291 break;
2292 }
2293 rcu_read_unlock();
2294 }
2295 #endif
2296 kfree(sk->sk_security);
2297 }
2298
2299 /**
2300 * smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
2301 * @sip: the object end
2302 *
2303 * looks for host based access restrictions
2304 *
2305 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2306 * hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2307 * taken before calling this function.
2308 *
2309 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2310 */
2311 static struct smack_known *smack_ipv4host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
2312 {
2313 struct smk_net4addr *snp;
2314 struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
2315
2316 if (siap->s_addr == 0)
2317 return NULL;
2318
2319 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net4addr_list, list)
2320 /*
2321 * we break after finding the first match because
2322 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2323 * so we have found the most specific match
2324 */
2325 if (snp->smk_host.s_addr ==
2326 (siap->s_addr & snp->smk_mask.s_addr))
2327 return snp->smk_label;
2328
2329 return NULL;
2330 }
2331
2332 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2333 /*
2334 * smk_ipv6_localhost - Check for local ipv6 host address
2335 * @sip: the address
2336 *
2337 * Returns boolean true if this is the localhost address
2338 */
2339 static bool smk_ipv6_localhost(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2340 {
2341 __be16 *be16p = (__be16 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2342 __be32 *be32p = (__be32 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2343
2344 if (be32p[0] == 0 && be32p[1] == 0 && be32p[2] == 0 && be16p[6] == 0 &&
2345 ntohs(be16p[7]) == 1)
2346 return true;
2347 return false;
2348 }
2349
2350 /**
2351 * smack_ipv6host_label - check host based restrictions
2352 * @sip: the object end
2353 *
2354 * looks for host based access restrictions
2355 *
2356 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2357 * hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2358 * taken before calling this function.
2359 *
2360 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2361 */
2362 static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2363 {
2364 struct smk_net6addr *snp;
2365 struct in6_addr *sap = &sip->sin6_addr;
2366 int i;
2367 int found = 0;
2368
2369 /*
2370 * It's local. Don't look for a host label.
2371 */
2372 if (smk_ipv6_localhost(sip))
2373 return NULL;
2374
2375 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
2376 /*
2377 * If the label is NULL the entry has
2378 * been renounced. Ignore it.
2379 */
2380 if (snp->smk_label == NULL)
2381 continue;
2382 /*
2383 * we break after finding the first match because
2384 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2385 * so we have found the most specific match
2386 */
2387 for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
2388 if ((sap->s6_addr16[i] & snp->smk_mask.s6_addr16[i]) !=
2389 snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) {
2390 found = 0;
2391 break;
2392 }
2393 }
2394 if (found)
2395 return snp->smk_label;
2396 }
2397
2398 return NULL;
2399 }
2400 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
2401
2402 /**
2403 * smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket
2404 * @sk: the socket
2405 * @labeled: socket label scheme
2406 *
2407 * Convert the outbound smack value (smk_out) to a
2408 * secattr and attach it to the socket.
2409 *
2410 * Returns 0 on success or an error code
2411 */
2412 static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
2413 {
2414 struct smack_known *skp;
2415 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2416 int rc = 0;
2417
2418 /*
2419 * Usually the netlabel code will handle changing the
2420 * packet labeling based on the label.
2421 * The case of a single label host is different, because
2422 * a single label host should never get a labeled packet
2423 * even though the label is usually associated with a packet
2424 * label.
2425 */
2426 local_bh_disable();
2427 bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
2428
2429 if (ssp->smk_out == smack_net_ambient ||
2430 labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
2431 netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
2432 else {
2433 skp = ssp->smk_out;
2434 rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel);
2435 }
2436
2437 bh_unlock_sock(sk);
2438 local_bh_enable();
2439
2440 return rc;
2441 }
2442
2443 /**
2444 * smack_netlbel_send - Set the secattr on a socket and perform access checks
2445 * @sk: the socket
2446 * @sap: the destination address
2447 *
2448 * Set the correct secattr for the given socket based on the destination
2449 * address and perform any outbound access checks needed.
2450 *
2451 * Returns 0 on success or an error code.
2452 *
2453 */
2454 static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
2455 {
2456 struct smack_known *skp;
2457 int rc;
2458 int sk_lbl;
2459 struct smack_known *hkp;
2460 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2461 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2462
2463 rcu_read_lock();
2464 hkp = smack_ipv4host_label(sap);
2465 if (hkp != NULL) {
2466 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2467 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2468
2469 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2470 ad.a.u.net->family = sap->sin_family;
2471 ad.a.u.net->dport = sap->sin_port;
2472 ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
2473 #endif
2474 sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET;
2475 skp = ssp->smk_out;
2476 rc = smk_access(skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2477 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 host check", skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2478 } else {
2479 sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
2480 rc = 0;
2481 }
2482 rcu_read_unlock();
2483 if (rc != 0)
2484 return rc;
2485
2486 return smack_netlabel(sk, sk_lbl);
2487 }
2488
2489 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2490 /**
2491 * smk_ipv6_check - check Smack access
2492 * @subject: subject Smack label
2493 * @object: object Smack label
2494 * @address: address
2495 * @act: the action being taken
2496 *
2497 * Check an IPv6 access
2498 */
2499 static int smk_ipv6_check(struct smack_known *subject,
2500 struct smack_known *object,
2501 struct sockaddr_in6 *address, int act)
2502 {
2503 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2504 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2505 #endif
2506 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2507 int rc;
2508
2509 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2510 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2511 ad.a.u.net->family = PF_INET6;
2512 ad.a.u.net->dport = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
2513 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2514 ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = address->sin6_addr;
2515 else
2516 ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = address->sin6_addr;
2517 #endif
2518 rc = smk_access(subject, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2519 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 check", subject, object, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2520 return rc;
2521 }
2522 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
2523
2524 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2525 /**
2526 * smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management
2527 * @sock: socket
2528 * @address: address
2529 *
2530 * Create or update the port list entry
2531 */
2532 static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
2533 {
2534 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
2535 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
2536 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2537 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2538 unsigned short port = 0;
2539
2540 if (address == NULL) {
2541 /*
2542 * This operation is changing the Smack information
2543 * on the bound socket. Take the changes to the port
2544 * as well.
2545 */
2546 rcu_read_lock();
2547 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2548 if (sk != spp->smk_sock)
2549 continue;
2550 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2551 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2552 rcu_read_unlock();
2553 return;
2554 }
2555 /*
2556 * A NULL address is only used for updating existing
2557 * bound entries. If there isn't one, it's OK.
2558 */
2559 rcu_read_unlock();
2560 return;
2561 }
2562
2563 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
2564 port = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
2565 /*
2566 * This is a special case that is safely ignored.
2567 */
2568 if (port == 0)
2569 return;
2570
2571 /*
2572 * Look for an existing port list entry.
2573 * This is an indication that a port is getting reused.
2574 */
2575 rcu_read_lock();
2576 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2577 if (spp->smk_port != port || spp->smk_sock_type != sock->type)
2578 continue;
2579 if (spp->smk_can_reuse != 1) {
2580 rcu_read_unlock();
2581 return;
2582 }
2583 spp->smk_port = port;
2584 spp->smk_sock = sk;
2585 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2586 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2587 spp->smk_can_reuse = 0;
2588 rcu_read_unlock();
2589 return;
2590 }
2591 rcu_read_unlock();
2592 /*
2593 * A new port entry is required.
2594 */
2595 spp = kzalloc(sizeof(*spp), GFP_KERNEL);
2596 if (spp == NULL)
2597 return;
2598
2599 spp->smk_port = port;
2600 spp->smk_sock = sk;
2601 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2602 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2603 spp->smk_sock_type = sock->type;
2604 spp->smk_can_reuse = 0;
2605
2606 mutex_lock(&smack_ipv6_lock);
2607 list_add_rcu(&spp->list, &smk_ipv6_port_list);
2608 mutex_unlock(&smack_ipv6_lock);
2609 return;
2610 }
2611
2612 /**
2613 * smk_ipv6_port_check - check Smack port access
2614 * @sock: socket
2615 * @address: address
2616 *
2617 * Create or update the port list entry
2618 */
2619 static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
2620 int act)
2621 {
2622 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2623 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2624 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
2625 unsigned short port;
2626 struct smack_known *object;
2627
2628 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
2629 skp = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2630 object = ssp->smk_in;
2631 } else {
2632 skp = ssp->smk_out;
2633 object = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2634 }
2635
2636 /*
2637 * The other end is a single label host.
2638 */
2639 if (skp != NULL && object != NULL)
2640 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2641 if (skp == NULL)
2642 skp = smack_net_ambient;
2643 if (object == NULL)
2644 object = smack_net_ambient;
2645
2646 /*
2647 * It's remote, so port lookup does no good.
2648 */
2649 if (!smk_ipv6_localhost(address))
2650 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2651
2652 /*
2653 * It's local so the send check has to have passed.
2654 */
2655 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2656 return 0;
2657
2658 port = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
2659 rcu_read_lock();
2660 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2661 if (spp->smk_port != port || spp->smk_sock_type != sk->sk_type)
2662 continue;
2663 object = spp->smk_in;
2664 if (act == SMK_CONNECTING)
2665 ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out;
2666 break;
2667 }
2668 rcu_read_unlock();
2669
2670 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2671 }
2672 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
2673
2674 /**
2675 * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
2676 * @inode: the object
2677 * @name: attribute name
2678 * @value: attribute value
2679 * @size: size of the attribute
2680 * @flags: unused
2681 *
2682 * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob
2683 *
2684 * Returns 0 on success, or an error code
2685 */
2686 static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2687 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2688 {
2689 struct smack_known *skp;
2690 struct inode_smack *nsp = smack_inode(inode);
2691 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2692 struct socket *sock;
2693 int rc = 0;
2694
2695 if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0)
2696 return -EINVAL;
2697
2698 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
2699 if (IS_ERR(skp))
2700 return PTR_ERR(skp);
2701
2702 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
2703 nsp->smk_inode = skp;
2704 nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2705 return 0;
2706 }
2707 /*
2708 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
2709 */
2710 if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2711 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2712
2713 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
2714 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
2715 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2716
2717 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2718
2719 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
2720 ssp->smk_in = skp;
2721 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
2722 ssp->smk_out = skp;
2723 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
2724 rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
2725 if (rc != 0)
2726 printk(KERN_WARNING
2727 "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
2728 __func__, -rc);
2729 }
2730 } else
2731 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2732
2733 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2734 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
2735 smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL);
2736 #endif
2737
2738 return 0;
2739 }
2740
2741 /**
2742 * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup
2743 * @sock: the socket
2744 * @family: protocol family
2745 * @type: unused
2746 * @protocol: unused
2747 * @kern: unused
2748 *
2749 * Sets the netlabel information on the socket
2750 *
2751 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2752 */
2753 static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2754 int type, int protocol, int kern)
2755 {
2756 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2757
2758 if (sock->sk == NULL)
2759 return 0;
2760
2761 /*
2762 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
2763 */
2764 if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
2765 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2766 ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
2767 ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
2768 }
2769
2770 if (family != PF_INET)
2771 return 0;
2772 /*
2773 * Set the outbound netlbl.
2774 */
2775 return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
2776 }
2777
2778 /**
2779 * smack_socket_socketpair - create socket pair
2780 * @socka: one socket
2781 * @sockb: another socket
2782 *
2783 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC
2784 *
2785 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2786 */
2787 static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
2788 struct socket *sockb)
2789 {
2790 struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security;
2791 struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security;
2792
2793 asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out;
2794 bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;
2795
2796 return 0;
2797 }
2798
2799 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2800 /**
2801 * smack_socket_bind - record port binding information.
2802 * @sock: the socket
2803 * @address: the port address
2804 * @addrlen: size of the address
2805 *
2806 * Records the label bound to a port.
2807 *
2808 * Returns 0
2809 */
2810 static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
2811 int addrlen)
2812 {
2813 if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
2814 smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address);
2815 return 0;
2816 }
2817 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
2818
2819 /**
2820 * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
2821 * @sock: the socket
2822 * @sap: the other end
2823 * @addrlen: size of sap
2824 *
2825 * Verifies that a connection may be possible
2826 *
2827 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2828 */
2829 static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
2830 int addrlen)
2831 {
2832 int rc = 0;
2833 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2834 struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;
2835 #endif
2836 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
2837 struct smack_known *rsp;
2838 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2839 #endif
2840
2841 if (sock->sk == NULL)
2842 return 0;
2843
2844 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
2845 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2846 #endif
2847
2848 switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
2849 case PF_INET:
2850 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
2851 return -EINVAL;
2852 rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
2853 break;
2854 case PF_INET6:
2855 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
2856 return -EINVAL;
2857 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
2858 rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
2859 if (rsp != NULL)
2860 rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
2861 SMK_CONNECTING);
2862 #endif
2863 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2864 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING);
2865 #endif
2866 break;
2867 }
2868 return rc;
2869 }
2870
2871 /**
2872 * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values
2873 * @flags: the S_ value
2874 *
2875 * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value
2876 */
2877 static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
2878 {
2879 int may = 0;
2880
2881 if (flags & S_IRUGO)
2882 may |= MAY_READ;
2883 if (flags & S_IWUGO)
2884 may |= MAY_WRITE;
2885 if (flags & S_IXUGO)
2886 may |= MAY_EXEC;
2887
2888 return may;
2889 }
2890
2891 /**
2892 * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg
2893 * @msg: the object
2894 *
2895 * Returns 0
2896 */
2897 static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2898 {
2899 struct smack_known **blob = smack_msg_msg(msg);
2900
2901 *blob = smk_of_current();
2902 return 0;
2903 }
2904
2905 /**
2906 * smack_of_ipc - the smack pointer for the ipc
2907 * @isp: the object
2908 *
2909 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
2910 */
2911 static struct smack_known *smack_of_ipc(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp)
2912 {
2913 struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(isp);
2914
2915 return *blob;
2916 }
2917
2918 /**
2919 * smack_ipc_alloc_security - Set the security blob for ipc
2920 * @isp: the object
2921 *
2922 * Returns 0
2923 */
2924 static int smack_ipc_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp)
2925 {
2926 struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(isp);
2927
2928 *blob = smk_of_current();
2929 return 0;
2930 }
2931
2932 /**
2933 * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
2934 * @isp : the object
2935 * @access : access requested
2936 *
2937 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2938 */
2939 static int smk_curacc_shm(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access)
2940 {
2941 struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_ipc(isp);
2942 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2943 int rc;
2944
2945 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2946 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2947 ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id;
2948 #endif
2949 rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
2950 rc = smk_bu_current("shm", ssp, access, rc);
2951 return rc;
2952 }
2953
2954 /**
2955 * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
2956 * @isp: the object
2957 * @shmflg: access requested
2958 *
2959 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2960 */
2961 static int smack_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int shmflg)
2962 {
2963 int may;
2964
2965 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
2966 return smk_curacc_shm(isp, may);
2967 }
2968
2969 /**
2970 * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm
2971 * @isp: the object
2972 * @cmd: what it wants to do
2973 *
2974 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2975 */
2976 static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
2977 {
2978 int may;
2979
2980 switch (cmd) {
2981 case IPC_STAT:
2982 case SHM_STAT:
2983 case SHM_STAT_ANY:
2984 may = MAY_READ;
2985 break;
2986 case IPC_SET:
2987 case SHM_LOCK:
2988 case SHM_UNLOCK:
2989 case IPC_RMID:
2990 may = MAY_READWRITE;
2991 break;
2992 case IPC_INFO:
2993 case SHM_INFO:
2994 /*
2995 * System level information.
2996 */
2997 return 0;
2998 default:
2999 return -EINVAL;
3000 }
3001 return smk_curacc_shm(isp, may);
3002 }
3003
3004 /**
3005 * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat
3006 * @isp: the object
3007 * @shmaddr: unused
3008 * @shmflg: access requested
3009 *
3010 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3011 */
3012 static int smack_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc, char __user *shmaddr,
3013 int shmflg)
3014 {
3015 int may;
3016
3017 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
3018 return smk_curacc_shm(ipc, may);
3019 }
3020
3021 /**
3022 * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem
3023 * @isp : the object
3024 * @access : access requested
3025 *
3026 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3027 */
3028 static int smk_curacc_sem(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access)
3029 {
3030 struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_ipc(isp);
3031 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3032 int rc;
3033
3034 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3035 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3036 ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id;
3037 #endif
3038 rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
3039 rc = smk_bu_current("sem", ssp, access, rc);
3040 return rc;
3041 }
3042
3043 /**
3044 * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
3045 * @isp: the object
3046 * @semflg: access requested
3047 *
3048 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3049 */
3050 static int smack_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int semflg)
3051 {
3052 int may;
3053
3054 may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
3055 return smk_curacc_sem(isp, may);
3056 }
3057
3058 /**
3059 * smack_sem_shmctl - Smack access check for sem
3060 * @isp: the object
3061 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3062 *
3063 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3064 */
3065 static int smack_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
3066 {
3067 int may;
3068
3069 switch (cmd) {
3070 case GETPID:
3071 case GETNCNT:
3072 case GETZCNT:
3073 case GETVAL:
3074 case GETALL:
3075 case IPC_STAT:
3076 case SEM_STAT:
3077 case SEM_STAT_ANY:
3078 may = MAY_READ;
3079 break;
3080 case SETVAL:
3081 case SETALL:
3082 case IPC_RMID:
3083 case IPC_SET:
3084 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3085 break;
3086 case IPC_INFO:
3087 case SEM_INFO:
3088 /*
3089 * System level information
3090 */
3091 return 0;
3092 default:
3093 return -EINVAL;
3094 }
3095
3096 return smk_curacc_sem(isp, may);
3097 }
3098
3099 /**
3100 * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations
3101 * @isp: the object
3102 * @sops: unused
3103 * @nsops: unused
3104 * @alter: unused
3105 *
3106 * Treated as read and write in all cases.
3107 *
3108 * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise
3109 */
3110 static int smack_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct sembuf *sops,
3111 unsigned nsops, int alter)
3112 {
3113 return smk_curacc_sem(isp, MAY_READWRITE);
3114 }
3115
3116 /**
3117 * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq
3118 * @isp : the msq
3119 * @access : access requested
3120 *
3121 * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise
3122 */
3123 static int smk_curacc_msq(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access)
3124 {
3125 struct smack_known *msp = smack_of_ipc(isp);
3126 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3127 int rc;
3128
3129 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3130 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3131 ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id;
3132 #endif
3133 rc = smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
3134 rc = smk_bu_current("msq", msp, access, rc);
3135 return rc;
3136 }
3137
3138 /**
3139 * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
3140 * @isp: the object
3141 * @msqflg: access requested
3142 *
3143 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3144 */
3145 static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int msqflg)
3146 {
3147 int may;
3148
3149 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3150 return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may);
3151 }
3152
3153 /**
3154 * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue
3155 * @isp: the object
3156 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3157 *
3158 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3159 */
3160 static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
3161 {
3162 int may;
3163
3164 switch (cmd) {
3165 case IPC_STAT:
3166 case MSG_STAT:
3167 case MSG_STAT_ANY:
3168 may = MAY_READ;
3169 break;
3170 case IPC_SET:
3171 case IPC_RMID:
3172 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3173 break;
3174 case IPC_INFO:
3175 case MSG_INFO:
3176 /*
3177 * System level information
3178 */
3179 return 0;
3180 default:
3181 return -EINVAL;
3182 }
3183
3184 return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may);
3185 }
3186
3187 /**
3188 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3189 * @isp: the object
3190 * @msg: unused
3191 * @msqflg: access requested
3192 *
3193 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3194 */
3195 static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct msg_msg *msg,
3196 int msqflg)
3197 {
3198 int may;
3199
3200 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3201 return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may);
3202 }
3203
3204 /**
3205 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3206 * @isp: the object
3207 * @msg: unused
3208 * @target: unused
3209 * @type: unused
3210 * @mode: unused
3211 *
3212 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3213 */
3214 static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct msg_msg *msg,
3215 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
3216 {
3217 return smk_curacc_msq(isp, MAY_READWRITE);
3218 }
3219
3220 /**
3221 * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission()
3222 * @ipp: the object permissions
3223 * @flag: access requested
3224 *
3225 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3226 */
3227 static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
3228 {
3229 struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(ipp);
3230 struct smack_known *iskp = *blob;
3231 int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
3232 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3233 int rc;
3234
3235 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3236 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3237 ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
3238 #endif
3239 rc = smk_curacc(iskp, may, &ad);
3240 rc = smk_bu_current("svipc", iskp, may, rc);
3241 return rc;
3242 }
3243
3244 /**
3245 * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id
3246 * @ipp: the object permissions
3247 * @secid: where result will be saved
3248 */
3249 static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
3250 {
3251 struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(ipp);
3252 struct smack_known *iskp = *blob;
3253
3254 *secid = iskp->smk_secid;
3255 }
3256
3257 /**
3258 * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
3259 * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached
3260 * @inode: the object
3261 *
3262 * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
3263 */
3264 static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
3265 {
3266 struct super_block *sbp;
3267 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
3268 struct inode_smack *isp;
3269 struct smack_known *skp;
3270 struct smack_known *ckp = smk_of_current();
3271 struct smack_known *final;
3272 char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
3273 int transflag = 0;
3274 int rc;
3275 struct dentry *dp;
3276
3277 if (inode == NULL)
3278 return;
3279
3280 isp = smack_inode(inode);
3281
3282 mutex_lock(&isp->smk_lock);
3283 /*
3284 * If the inode is already instantiated
3285 * take the quick way out
3286 */
3287 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT)
3288 goto unlockandout;
3289
3290 sbp = inode->i_sb;
3291 sbsp = sbp->s_security;
3292 /*
3293 * We're going to use the superblock default label
3294 * if there's no label on the file.
3295 */
3296 final = sbsp->smk_default;
3297
3298 /*
3299 * If this is the root inode the superblock
3300 * may be in the process of initialization.
3301 * If that is the case use the root value out
3302 * of the superblock.
3303 */
3304 if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
3305 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3306 case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3307 case CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC:
3308 /*
3309 * The cgroup filesystem is never mounted,
3310 * so there's no opportunity to set the mount
3311 * options.
3312 */
3313 sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_star;
3314 sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_star;
3315 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3316 break;
3317 case TMPFS_MAGIC:
3318 /*
3319 * What about shmem/tmpfs anonymous files with dentry
3320 * obtained from d_alloc_pseudo()?
3321 */
3322 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3323 break;
3324 case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
3325 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3326 break;
3327 case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
3328 /*
3329 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
3330 * structures associated with the task involved.
3331 */
3332 isp->smk_inode = &smack_known_star;
3333 break;
3334 default:
3335 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3336 break;
3337 }
3338 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
3339 goto unlockandout;
3340 }
3341
3342 /*
3343 * This is pretty hackish.
3344 * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do
3345 * file system specific code, but it does help
3346 * with keeping it simple.
3347 */
3348 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3349 case SMACK_MAGIC:
3350 case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3351 case CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC:
3352 /*
3353 * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
3354 * that the smack file system doesn't do
3355 * extended attributes.
3356 *
3357 * Cgroupfs is special
3358 */
3359 final = &smack_known_star;
3360 break;
3361 case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
3362 /*
3363 * devpts seems content with the label of the task.
3364 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
3365 * pty with respect.
3366 */
3367 final = ckp;
3368 break;
3369 case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
3370 /*
3371 * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
3372 * The superblock default suffices.
3373 */
3374 break;
3375 case TMPFS_MAGIC:
3376 /*
3377 * Device labels should come from the filesystem,
3378 * but watch out, because they're volitile,
3379 * getting recreated on every reboot.
3380 */
3381 final = &smack_known_star;
3382 /*
3383 * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
3384 * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
3385 * to set mount options simulate setting the
3386 * superblock default.
3387 */
3388 /* Fall through */
3389 default:
3390 /*
3391 * This isn't an understood special case.
3392 * Get the value from the xattr.
3393 */
3394
3395 /*
3396 * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data.
3397 */
3398 if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
3399 final = &smack_known_star;
3400 break;
3401 }
3402 /*
3403 * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
3404 * Use the aforeapplied default.
3405 * It would be curious if the label of the task
3406 * does not match that assigned.
3407 */
3408 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
3409 break;
3410 /*
3411 * Get the dentry for xattr.
3412 */
3413 dp = dget(opt_dentry);
3414 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
3415 if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skp))
3416 final = skp;
3417
3418 /*
3419 * Transmuting directory
3420 */
3421 if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
3422 /*
3423 * If this is a new directory and the label was
3424 * transmuted when the inode was initialized
3425 * set the transmute attribute on the directory
3426 * and mark the inode.
3427 *
3428 * If there is a transmute attribute on the
3429 * directory mark the inode.
3430 */
3431 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_CHANGED) {
3432 isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
3433 rc = __vfs_setxattr(dp, inode,
3434 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
3435 TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE,
3436 0);
3437 } else {
3438 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, inode,
3439 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, trattr,
3440 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE);
3441 if (rc >= 0 && strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
3442 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
3443 rc = -EINVAL;
3444 }
3445 if (rc >= 0)
3446 transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
3447 }
3448 /*
3449 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
3450 */
3451 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
3452 if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3453 skp == &smack_known_web)
3454 skp = NULL;
3455 isp->smk_task = skp;
3456
3457 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
3458 if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3459 skp == &smack_known_web)
3460 skp = NULL;
3461 isp->smk_mmap = skp;
3462
3463 dput(dp);
3464 break;
3465 }
3466
3467 if (final == NULL)
3468 isp->smk_inode = ckp;
3469 else
3470 isp->smk_inode = final;
3471
3472 isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
3473
3474 unlockandout:
3475 mutex_unlock(&isp->smk_lock);
3476 return;
3477 }
3478
3479 /**
3480 * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access
3481 * @p: the object task
3482 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3483 * @value: where to put the result
3484 *
3485 * Places a copy of the task Smack into value
3486 *
3487 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3488 */
3489 static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
3490 {
3491 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
3492 char *cp;
3493 int slen;
3494
3495 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3496 return -EINVAL;
3497
3498 cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
3499 if (cp == NULL)
3500 return -ENOMEM;
3501
3502 slen = strlen(cp);
3503 *value = cp;
3504 return slen;
3505 }
3506
3507 /**
3508 * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
3509 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3510 * @value: the value to set
3511 * @size: the size of the value
3512 *
3513 * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
3514 * is permitted and only with privilege
3515 *
3516 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3517 */
3518 static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
3519 {
3520 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
3521 struct cred *new;
3522 struct smack_known *skp;
3523 struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
3524 int rc;
3525
3526 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
3527 return -EPERM;
3528
3529 if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
3530 return -EINVAL;
3531
3532 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3533 return -EINVAL;
3534
3535 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
3536 if (IS_ERR(skp))
3537 return PTR_ERR(skp);
3538
3539 /*
3540 * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label
3541 * and the star ("*") label.
3542 */
3543 if (skp == &smack_known_web || skp == &smack_known_star)
3544 return -EINVAL;
3545
3546 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
3547 rc = -EPERM;
3548 list_for_each_entry(sklep, &tsp->smk_relabel, list)
3549 if (sklep->smk_label == skp) {
3550 rc = 0;
3551 break;
3552 }
3553 if (rc)
3554 return rc;
3555 }
3556
3557 new = prepare_creds();
3558 if (new == NULL)
3559 return -ENOMEM;
3560
3561 tsp = smack_cred(new);
3562 tsp->smk_task = skp;
3563 /*
3564 * process can change its label only once
3565 */
3566 smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
3567
3568 commit_creds(new);
3569 return size;
3570 }
3571
3572 /**
3573 * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
3574 * @sock: one sock
3575 * @other: the other sock
3576 * @newsk: unused
3577 *
3578 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3579 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3580 */
3581 static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
3582 struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
3583 {
3584 struct smack_known *skp;
3585 struct smack_known *okp;
3586 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
3587 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
3588 struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
3589 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3590 int rc = 0;
3591 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3592 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3593 #endif
3594
3595 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
3596 skp = ssp->smk_out;
3597 okp = osp->smk_in;
3598 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3599 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3600 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
3601 #endif
3602 rc = smk_access(skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3603 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3604 if (rc == 0) {
3605 okp = osp->smk_out;
3606 skp = ssp->smk_in;
3607 rc = smk_access(okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3608 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", okp, skp,
3609 MAY_WRITE, rc);
3610 }
3611 }
3612
3613 /*
3614 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
3615 */
3616 if (rc == 0) {
3617 nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
3618 ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
3619 }
3620
3621 return rc;
3622 }
3623
3624 /**
3625 * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS
3626 * @sock: one socket
3627 * @other: the other socket
3628 *
3629 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3630 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3631 */
3632 static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
3633 {
3634 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3635 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
3636 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3637 int rc;
3638
3639 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3640 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3641
3642 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3643 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
3644 #endif
3645
3646 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
3647 return 0;
3648
3649 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3650 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS send", ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3651 return rc;
3652 }
3653
3654 /**
3655 * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
3656 * @sock: the socket
3657 * @msg: the message
3658 * @size: the size of the message
3659 *
3660 * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination host.
3661 * For IPv4 this is only a question if the destination is a single label host.
3662 * For IPv6 this is a check against the label of the port.
3663 */
3664 static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3665 int size)
3666 {
3667 struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
3668 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3669 struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
3670 #endif
3671 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3672 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3673 struct smack_known *rsp;
3674 #endif
3675 int rc = 0;
3676
3677 /*
3678 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
3679 */
3680 if (sip == NULL)
3681 return 0;
3682
3683 switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
3684 case AF_INET:
3685 rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
3686 break;
3687 case AF_INET6:
3688 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3689 rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sap);
3690 if (rsp != NULL)
3691 rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sap,
3692 SMK_CONNECTING);
3693 #endif
3694 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
3695 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING);
3696 #endif
3697 break;
3698 }
3699 return rc;
3700 }
3701
3702 /**
3703 * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack
3704 * @sap: netlabel secattr
3705 * @ssp: socket security information
3706 *
3707 * Returns a pointer to a Smack label entry found on the label list.
3708 */
3709 static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
3710 struct socket_smack *ssp)
3711 {
3712 struct smack_known *skp;
3713 int found = 0;
3714 int acat;
3715 int kcat;
3716
3717 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
3718 /*
3719 * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
3720 * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
3721 * behaving the way we expect it to.
3722 *
3723 * Look it up in the label table
3724 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
3725 * for the packet fall back on the network
3726 * ambient value.
3727 */
3728 rcu_read_lock();
3729 list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
3730 if (sap->attr.mls.lvl != skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl)
3731 continue;
3732 /*
3733 * Compare the catsets. Use the netlbl APIs.
3734 */
3735 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) {
3736 if ((skp->smk_netlabel.flags &
3737 NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0)
3738 found = 1;
3739 break;
3740 }
3741 for (acat = -1, kcat = -1; acat == kcat; ) {
3742 acat = netlbl_catmap_walk(sap->attr.mls.cat,
3743 acat + 1);
3744 kcat = netlbl_catmap_walk(
3745 skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat,
3746 kcat + 1);
3747 if (acat < 0 || kcat < 0)
3748 break;
3749 }
3750 if (acat == kcat) {
3751 found = 1;
3752 break;
3753 }
3754 }
3755 rcu_read_unlock();
3756
3757 if (found)
3758 return skp;
3759
3760 if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == &smack_known_star)
3761 return &smack_known_web;
3762 return &smack_known_star;
3763 }
3764 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0)
3765 /*
3766 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
3767 */
3768 return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
3769 /*
3770 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
3771 * for the packet fall back on the network
3772 * ambient value.
3773 */
3774 return smack_net_ambient;
3775 }
3776
3777 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3778 static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
3779 {
3780 u8 nexthdr;
3781 int offset;
3782 int proto = -EINVAL;
3783 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h;
3784 struct ipv6hdr *ip6;
3785 __be16 frag_off;
3786 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3787 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3788 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3789
3790 sip->sin6_port = 0;
3791
3792 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3793 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3794 if (ip6 == NULL)
3795 return -EINVAL;
3796 sip->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
3797
3798 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3799 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3800 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3801 if (offset < 0)
3802 return -EINVAL;
3803
3804 proto = nexthdr;
3805 switch (proto) {
3806 case IPPROTO_TCP:
3807 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3808 if (th != NULL)
3809 sip->sin6_port = th->source;
3810 break;
3811 case IPPROTO_UDP:
3812 case IPPROTO_UDPLITE:
3813 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3814 if (uh != NULL)
3815 sip->sin6_port = uh->source;
3816 break;
3817 case IPPROTO_DCCP:
3818 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3819 if (dh != NULL)
3820 sip->sin6_port = dh->dccph_sport;
3821 break;
3822 }
3823 return proto;
3824 }
3825 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3826
3827 /**
3828 * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
3829 * @sk: socket
3830 * @skb: packet
3831 *
3832 * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise
3833 */
3834 static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3835 {
3836 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
3837 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
3838 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
3839 int rc = 0;
3840 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3841 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
3842 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3843 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3844 #endif
3845 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3846 struct sockaddr_in6 sadd;
3847 int proto;
3848
3849 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
3850 family = PF_INET;
3851 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3852
3853 switch (family) {
3854 case PF_INET:
3855 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
3856 /*
3857 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
3858 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
3859 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
3860 */
3861 if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
3862 skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
3863 goto access_check;
3864 }
3865 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
3866 /*
3867 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
3868 */
3869 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
3870
3871 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
3872 if (rc == 0)
3873 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
3874 else
3875 skp = smack_net_ambient;
3876
3877 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
3878
3879 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
3880 access_check:
3881 #endif
3882 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3883 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3884 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
3885 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
3886 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
3887 #endif
3888 /*
3889 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
3890 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
3891 * This is the simplist possible security model
3892 * for networking.
3893 */
3894 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3895 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
3896 MAY_WRITE, rc);
3897 if (rc != 0)
3898 netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, rc, 0);
3899 break;
3900 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3901 case PF_INET6:
3902 proto = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd);
3903 if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_UDPLITE &&
3904 proto != IPPROTO_TCP && proto != IPPROTO_DCCP)
3905 break;
3906 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3907 if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)
3908 skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
3909 else
3910 skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd);
3911 if (skp == NULL)
3912 skp = smack_net_ambient;
3913 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3914 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3915 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
3916 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
3917 ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
3918 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
3919 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3920 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
3921 MAY_WRITE, rc);
3922 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING */
3923 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
3924 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING);
3925 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
3926 if (rc != 0)
3927 icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH,
3928 ICMPV6_ADM_PROHIBITED, 0);
3929 break;
3930 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3931 }
3932
3933 return rc;
3934 }
3935
3936 /**
3937 * smack_socket_getpeersec_stream - pull in packet label
3938 * @sock: the socket
3939 * @optval: user's destination
3940 * @optlen: size thereof
3941 * @len: max thereof
3942 *
3943 * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
3944 */
3945 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
3946 char __user *optval,
3947 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3948 {
3949 struct socket_smack *ssp;
3950 char *rcp = "";
3951 int slen = 1;
3952 int rc = 0;
3953
3954 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3955 if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
3956 rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
3957 slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
3958 }
3959
3960 if (slen > len)
3961 rc = -ERANGE;
3962 else if (copy_to_user(optval, rcp, slen) != 0)
3963 rc = -EFAULT;
3964
3965 if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0)
3966 rc = -EFAULT;
3967
3968 return rc;
3969 }
3970
3971
3972 /**
3973 * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
3974 * @sock: the peer socket
3975 * @skb: packet data
3976 * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
3977 *
3978 * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
3979 */
3980 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
3981 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
3982
3983 {
3984 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
3985 struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
3986 struct smack_known *skp;
3987 int family = PF_UNSPEC;
3988 u32 s = 0; /* 0 is the invalid secid */
3989 int rc;
3990
3991 if (skb != NULL) {
3992 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
3993 family = PF_INET;
3994 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3995 else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
3996 family = PF_INET6;
3997 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3998 }
3999 if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
4000 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4001
4002 switch (family) {
4003 case PF_UNIX:
4004 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4005 s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
4006 break;
4007 case PF_INET:
4008 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4009 s = skb->secmark;
4010 if (s != 0)
4011 break;
4012 #endif
4013 /*
4014 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
4015 */
4016 if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL)
4017 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4018 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
4019 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
4020 if (rc == 0) {
4021 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4022 s = skp->smk_secid;
4023 }
4024 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4025 break;
4026 case PF_INET6:
4027 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4028 s = skb->secmark;
4029 #endif
4030 break;
4031 }
4032 *secid = s;
4033 if (s == 0)
4034 return -EINVAL;
4035 return 0;
4036 }
4037
4038 /**
4039 * smack_sock_graft - Initialize a newly created socket with an existing sock
4040 * @sk: child sock
4041 * @parent: parent socket
4042 *
4043 * Set the smk_{in,out} state of an existing sock based on the process that
4044 * is creating the new socket.
4045 */
4046 static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4047 {
4048 struct socket_smack *ssp;
4049 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
4050
4051 if (sk == NULL ||
4052 (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
4053 return;
4054
4055 ssp = sk->sk_security;
4056 ssp->smk_in = skp;
4057 ssp->smk_out = skp;
4058 /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
4059 }
4060
4061 /**
4062 * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
4063 * @sk: socket involved
4064 * @skb: packet
4065 * @req: unused
4066 *
4067 * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to
4068 * the socket, otherwise an error code
4069 */
4070 static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4071 struct request_sock *req)
4072 {
4073 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4074 struct smack_known *skp;
4075 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4076 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
4077 struct sockaddr_in addr;
4078 struct iphdr *hdr;
4079 struct smack_known *hskp;
4080 int rc;
4081 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4082 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4083 struct lsm_network_audit net;
4084 #endif
4085
4086 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4087 if (family == PF_INET6) {
4088 /*
4089 * Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving
4090 * via IPv6 sockets. Don't set up netlabel
4091 * processing on IPv6.
4092 */
4093 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4094 family = PF_INET;
4095 else
4096 return 0;
4097 }
4098 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4099
4100 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4101 /*
4102 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
4103 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
4104 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
4105 */
4106 if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
4107 skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
4108 goto access_check;
4109 }
4110 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
4111
4112 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
4113 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
4114 if (rc == 0)
4115 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4116 else
4117 skp = &smack_known_huh;
4118 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4119
4120 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4121 access_check:
4122 #endif
4123
4124 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4125 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4126 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
4127 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4128 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4129 #endif
4130 /*
4131 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
4132 * here. Read access is not required.
4133 */
4134 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4135 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 connect", skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
4136 if (rc != 0)
4137 return rc;
4138
4139 /*
4140 * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
4141 * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
4142 */
4143 req->peer_secid = skp->smk_secid;
4144
4145 /*
4146 * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
4147 * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
4148 * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
4149 */
4150 hdr = ip_hdr(skb);
4151 addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
4152 rcu_read_lock();
4153 hskp = smack_ipv4host_label(&addr);
4154 rcu_read_unlock();
4155
4156 if (hskp == NULL)
4157 rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &skp->smk_netlabel);
4158 else
4159 netlbl_req_delattr(req);
4160
4161 return rc;
4162 }
4163
4164 /**
4165 * smack_inet_csk_clone - Copy the connection information to the new socket
4166 * @sk: the new socket
4167 * @req: the connection's request_sock
4168 *
4169 * Transfer the connection's peer label to the newly created socket.
4170 */
4171 static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
4172 const struct request_sock *req)
4173 {
4174 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4175 struct smack_known *skp;
4176
4177 if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
4178 skp = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
4179 ssp->smk_packet = skp;
4180 } else
4181 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
4182 }
4183
4184 /*
4185 * Key management security hooks
4186 *
4187 * Casey has not tested key support very heavily.
4188 * The permission check is most likely too restrictive.
4189 * If you care about keys please have a look.
4190 */
4191 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4192
4193 /**
4194 * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
4195 * @key: object
4196 * @cred: the credentials to use
4197 * @flags: unused
4198 *
4199 * No allocation required
4200 *
4201 * Returns 0
4202 */
4203 static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
4204 unsigned long flags)
4205 {
4206 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
4207
4208 key->security = skp;
4209 return 0;
4210 }
4211
4212 /**
4213 * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
4214 * @key: the object
4215 *
4216 * Clear the blob pointer
4217 */
4218 static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
4219 {
4220 key->security = NULL;
4221 }
4222
4223 /**
4224 * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
4225 * @key_ref: gets to the object
4226 * @cred: the credentials to use
4227 * @perm: requested key permissions
4228 *
4229 * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
4230 * an error code otherwise
4231 */
4232 static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4233 const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
4234 {
4235 struct key *keyp;
4236 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4237 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
4238 int request = 0;
4239 int rc;
4240
4241 /*
4242 * Validate requested permissions
4243 */
4244 if (perm & ~KEY_NEED_ALL)
4245 return -EINVAL;
4246
4247 keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4248 if (keyp == NULL)
4249 return -EINVAL;
4250 /*
4251 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
4252 * it may do so.
4253 */
4254 if (keyp->security == NULL)
4255 return 0;
4256 /*
4257 * This should not occur
4258 */
4259 if (tkp == NULL)
4260 return -EACCES;
4261
4262 if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, cred))
4263 return 0;
4264
4265 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4266 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
4267 ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
4268 ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
4269 #endif
4270 if (perm & (KEY_NEED_READ | KEY_NEED_SEARCH | KEY_NEED_VIEW))
4271 request |= MAY_READ;
4272 if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
4273 request |= MAY_WRITE;
4274 rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
4275 rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
4276 return rc;
4277 }
4278
4279 /*
4280 * smack_key_getsecurity - Smack label tagging the key
4281 * @key points to the key to be queried
4282 * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
4283 * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
4284 * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
4285 * an error.
4286 * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
4287 */
4288 static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
4289 {
4290 struct smack_known *skp = key->security;
4291 size_t length;
4292 char *copy;
4293
4294 if (key->security == NULL) {
4295 *_buffer = NULL;
4296 return 0;
4297 }
4298
4299 copy = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
4300 if (copy == NULL)
4301 return -ENOMEM;
4302 length = strlen(copy) + 1;
4303
4304 *_buffer = copy;
4305 return length;
4306 }
4307
4308 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4309
4310 /*
4311 * Smack Audit hooks
4312 *
4313 * Audit requires a unique representation of each Smack specific
4314 * rule. This unique representation is used to distinguish the
4315 * object to be audited from remaining kernel objects and also
4316 * works as a glue between the audit hooks.
4317 *
4318 * Since repository entries are added but never deleted, we'll use
4319 * the smack_known label address related to the given audit rule as
4320 * the needed unique representation. This also better fits the smack
4321 * model where nearly everything is a label.
4322 */
4323 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4324
4325 /**
4326 * smack_audit_rule_init - Initialize a smack audit rule
4327 * @field: audit rule fields given from user-space (audit.h)
4328 * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
4329 * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
4330 * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
4331 *
4332 * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
4333 * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
4334 */
4335 static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
4336 {
4337 struct smack_known *skp;
4338 char **rule = (char **)vrule;
4339 *rule = NULL;
4340
4341 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4342 return -EINVAL;
4343
4344 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
4345 return -EINVAL;
4346
4347 skp = smk_import_entry(rulestr, 0);
4348 if (IS_ERR(skp))
4349 return PTR_ERR(skp);
4350
4351 *rule = skp->smk_known;
4352
4353 return 0;
4354 }
4355
4356 /**
4357 * smack_audit_rule_known - Distinguish Smack audit rules
4358 * @krule: rule of interest, in Audit kernel representation format
4359 *
4360 * This is used to filter Smack rules from remaining Audit ones.
4361 * If it's proved that this rule belongs to us, the
4362 * audit_rule_match hook will be called to do the final judgement.
4363 */
4364 static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
4365 {
4366 struct audit_field *f;
4367 int i;
4368
4369 for (i = 0; i < krule->field_count; i++) {
4370 f = &krule->fields[i];
4371
4372 if (f->type == AUDIT_SUBJ_USER || f->type == AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4373 return 1;
4374 }
4375
4376 return 0;
4377 }
4378
4379 /**
4380 * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
4381 * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test
4382 * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
4383 * @op: required testing operator
4384 * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
4385 *
4386 * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
4387 * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
4388 */
4389 static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
4390 {
4391 struct smack_known *skp;
4392 char *rule = vrule;
4393
4394 if (unlikely(!rule)) {
4395 WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n");
4396 return -ENOENT;
4397 }
4398
4399 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4400 return 0;
4401
4402 skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4403
4404 /*
4405 * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
4406 * both pointers will point to the same smack_known
4407 * label.
4408 */
4409 if (op == Audit_equal)
4410 return (rule == skp->smk_known);
4411 if (op == Audit_not_equal)
4412 return (rule != skp->smk_known);
4413
4414 return 0;
4415 }
4416
4417 /*
4418 * There is no need for a smack_audit_rule_free hook.
4419 * No memory was allocated.
4420 */
4421
4422 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4423
4424 /**
4425 * smack_ismaclabel - check if xattr @name references a smack MAC label
4426 * @name: Full xattr name to check.
4427 */
4428 static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
4429 {
4430 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0);
4431 }
4432
4433
4434 /**
4435 * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
4436 * @secid: incoming integer
4437 * @secdata: destination
4438 * @seclen: how long it is
4439 *
4440 * Exists for networking code.
4441 */
4442 static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
4443 {
4444 struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4445
4446 if (secdata)
4447 *secdata = skp->smk_known;
4448 *seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
4449 return 0;
4450 }
4451
4452 /**
4453 * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
4454 * @secdata: smack label
4455 * @seclen: how long result is
4456 * @secid: outgoing integer
4457 *
4458 * Exists for audit and networking code.
4459 */
4460 static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
4461 {
4462 struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
4463
4464 if (skp)
4465 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
4466 else
4467 *secid = 0;
4468 return 0;
4469 }
4470
4471 /*
4472 * There used to be a smack_release_secctx hook
4473 * that did nothing back when hooks were in a vector.
4474 * Now that there's a list such a hook adds cost.
4475 */
4476
4477 static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4478 {
4479 return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
4480 }
4481
4482 static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4483 {
4484 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
4485 }
4486
4487 static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
4488 {
4489 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode);
4490
4491 *ctx = skp->smk_known;
4492 *ctxlen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
4493 return 0;
4494 }
4495
4496 static int smack_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, struct cred **new)
4497 {
4498
4499 struct task_smack *tsp;
4500 struct smack_known *skp;
4501 struct inode_smack *isp;
4502 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
4503
4504 if (new_creds == NULL) {
4505 new_creds = prepare_creds();
4506 if (new_creds == NULL)
4507 return -ENOMEM;
4508 }
4509
4510 tsp = smack_cred(new_creds);
4511
4512 /*
4513 * Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid
4514 */
4515 isp = smack_inode(d_inode(dentry->d_parent));
4516 skp = isp->smk_inode;
4517 tsp->smk_task = skp;
4518 *new = new_creds;
4519 return 0;
4520 }
4521
4522 static int smack_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
4523 {
4524 /*
4525 * Return 1 if this is the smack access Smack attribute.
4526 */
4527 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0)
4528 return 1;
4529
4530 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
4531 }
4532
4533 static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
4534 struct qstr *name,
4535 const struct cred *old,
4536 struct cred *new)
4537 {
4538 struct task_smack *otsp = smack_cred(old);
4539 struct task_smack *ntsp = smack_cred(new);
4540 struct inode_smack *isp;
4541 int may;
4542
4543 /*
4544 * Use the process credential unless all of
4545 * the transmuting criteria are met
4546 */
4547 ntsp->smk_task = otsp->smk_task;
4548
4549 /*
4550 * the attribute of the containing directory
4551 */
4552 isp = smack_inode(d_inode(dentry->d_parent));
4553
4554 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) {
4555 rcu_read_lock();
4556 may = smk_access_entry(otsp->smk_task->smk_known,
4557 isp->smk_inode->smk_known,
4558 &otsp->smk_task->smk_rules);
4559 rcu_read_unlock();
4560
4561 /*
4562 * If the directory is transmuting and the rule
4563 * providing access is transmuting use the containing
4564 * directory label instead of the process label.
4565 */
4566 if (may > 0 && (may & MAY_TRANSMUTE))
4567 ntsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode;
4568 }
4569 return 0;
4570 }
4571
4572 struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
4573 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
4574 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
4575 .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
4576 .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
4577 .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
4578 };
4579
4580 static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
4581 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
4582 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
4583 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
4584
4585 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, smack_fs_context_dup),
4586 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, smack_fs_context_parse_param),
4587
4588 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
4589 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
4590 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, smack_free_mnt_opts),
4591 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
4592 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
4593 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, smack_set_mnt_opts),
4594
4595 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds),
4596
4597 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
4598 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security),
4599 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link),
4600 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink),
4601 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, smack_inode_rmdir),
4602 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, smack_inode_rename),
4603 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, smack_inode_permission),
4604 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, smack_inode_setattr),
4605 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, smack_inode_getattr),
4606 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, smack_inode_setxattr),
4607 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr),
4608 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, smack_inode_getxattr),
4609 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, smack_inode_removexattr),
4610 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity),
4611 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity),
4612 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity),
4613 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, smack_inode_getsecid),
4614
4615 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security),
4616 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl),
4617 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, smack_file_lock),
4618 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, smack_file_fcntl),
4619 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, smack_mmap_file),
4620 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
4621 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, smack_file_set_fowner),
4622 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, smack_file_send_sigiotask),
4623 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, smack_file_receive),
4624
4625 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, smack_file_open),
4626
4627 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, smack_cred_alloc_blank),
4628 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free),
4629 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare),
4630 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer),
4631 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, smack_cred_getsecid),
4632 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as),
4633 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as),
4634 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
4635 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
4636 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
4637 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, smack_task_getsecid),
4638 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
4639 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
4640 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),
4641 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, smack_task_setscheduler),
4642 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler),
4643 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory),
4644 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill),
4645 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode),
4646
4647 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission),
4648 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, smack_ipc_getsecid),
4649
4650 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security),
4651
4652 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
4653 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, smack_msg_queue_associate),
4654 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, smack_msg_queue_msgctl),
4655 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, smack_msg_queue_msgsnd),
4656 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv),
4657
4658 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
4659 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, smack_shm_associate),
4660 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, smack_shm_shmctl),
4661 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, smack_shm_shmat),
4662
4663 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
4664 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, smack_sem_associate),
4665 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, smack_sem_semctl),
4666 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, smack_sem_semop),
4667
4668 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, smack_d_instantiate),
4669
4670 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, smack_getprocattr),
4671 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, smack_setprocattr),
4672
4673 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, smack_unix_stream_connect),
4674 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send),
4675
4676 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create),
4677 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, smack_socket_socketpair),
4678 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4679 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind),
4680 #endif
4681 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, smack_socket_connect),
4682 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, smack_socket_sendmsg),
4683 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
4684 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
4685 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
4686 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
4687 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
4688 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
4689 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
4690 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
4691
4692 /* key management security hooks */
4693 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4694 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
4695 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free),
4696 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
4697 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
4698 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4699
4700 /* Audit hooks */
4701 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4702 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, smack_audit_rule_init),
4703 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, smack_audit_rule_known),
4704 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, smack_audit_rule_match),
4705 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4706
4707 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
4708 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
4709 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
4710 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
4711 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
4712 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
4713 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, smack_inode_copy_up),
4714 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, smack_inode_copy_up_xattr),
4715 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, smack_dentry_create_files_as),
4716 };
4717
4718
4719 static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
4720 {
4721 /*
4722 * Initialize rule list locks
4723 */
4724 mutex_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules_lock);
4725 mutex_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules_lock);
4726 mutex_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules_lock);
4727 mutex_init(&smack_known_star.smk_rules_lock);
4728 mutex_init(&smack_known_web.smk_rules_lock);
4729 /*
4730 * Initialize rule lists
4731 */
4732 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules);
4733 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules);
4734 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_star.smk_rules);
4735 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules);
4736 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_web.smk_rules);
4737 /*
4738 * Create the known labels list
4739 */
4740 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_huh);
4741 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_hat);
4742 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_star);
4743 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_floor);
4744 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_web);
4745 }
4746
4747 /**
4748 * smack_init - initialize the smack system
4749 *
4750 * Returns 0
4751 */
4752 static __init int smack_init(void)
4753 {
4754 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
4755 struct task_smack *tsp;
4756
4757 smack_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(inode_smack, 0);
4758 if (!smack_inode_cache)
4759 return -ENOMEM;
4760
4761 /*
4762 * Set the security state for the initial task.
4763 */
4764 tsp = smack_cred(cred);
4765 init_task_smack(tsp, &smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor);
4766
4767 /*
4768 * Register with LSM
4769 */
4770 security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
4771 smack_enabled = 1;
4772
4773 pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
4774 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4775 pr_info("Smack: Netfilter enabled.\n");
4776 #endif
4777 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4778 pr_info("Smack: IPv6 port labeling enabled.\n");
4779 #endif
4780 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4781 pr_info("Smack: IPv6 Netfilter enabled.\n");
4782 #endif
4783
4784 /* initialize the smack_known_list */
4785 init_smack_known_list();
4786
4787 return 0;
4788 }
4789
4790 /*
4791 * Smack requires early initialization in order to label
4792 * all processes and objects when they are created.
4793 */
4794 DEFINE_LSM(smack) = {
4795 .name = "smack",
4796 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
4797 .blobs = &smack_blob_sizes,
4798 .init = smack_init,
4799 };