]> git.proxmox.com Git - mirror_ubuntu-artful-kernel.git/blob - security/smack/smack_lsm.c
Merge branch 'stable-4.11' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into...
[mirror_ubuntu-artful-kernel.git] / security / smack / smack_lsm.c
1 /*
2 * Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors:
7 * Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
8 * Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
9 *
10 * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
12 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation
14 * Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation.
15 *
16 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
17 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
18 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
19 */
20
21 #include <linux/xattr.h>
22 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
23 #include <linux/mount.h>
24 #include <linux/stat.h>
25 #include <linux/kd.h>
26 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
27 #include <linux/ip.h>
28 #include <linux/tcp.h>
29 #include <linux/udp.h>
30 #include <linux/dccp.h>
31 #include <linux/slab.h>
32 #include <linux/mutex.h>
33 #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
34 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
35 #include <net/ip.h>
36 #include <net/ipv6.h>
37 #include <linux/audit.h>
38 #include <linux/magic.h>
39 #include <linux/dcache.h>
40 #include <linux/personality.h>
41 #include <linux/msg.h>
42 #include <linux/shm.h>
43 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
44 #include <linux/parser.h>
45 #include "smack.h"
46
47 #define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
48 #define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4
49
50 #define SMK_CONNECTING 0
51 #define SMK_RECEIVING 1
52 #define SMK_SENDING 2
53
54 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
55 DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ipv6_lock);
56 static LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
57 #endif
58 static struct kmem_cache *smack_inode_cache;
59 int smack_enabled;
60
61 static const match_table_t smk_mount_tokens = {
62 {Opt_fsdefault, SMK_FSDEFAULT "%s"},
63 {Opt_fsfloor, SMK_FSFLOOR "%s"},
64 {Opt_fshat, SMK_FSHAT "%s"},
65 {Opt_fsroot, SMK_FSROOT "%s"},
66 {Opt_fstransmute, SMK_FSTRANS "%s"},
67 {Opt_error, NULL},
68 };
69
70 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
71 static char *smk_bu_mess[] = {
72 "Bringup Error", /* Unused */
73 "Bringup", /* SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW */
74 "Unconfined Subject", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT */
75 "Unconfined Object", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT */
76 };
77
78 static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s)
79 {
80 int i = 0;
81
82 if (mode & MAY_READ)
83 s[i++] = 'r';
84 if (mode & MAY_WRITE)
85 s[i++] = 'w';
86 if (mode & MAY_EXEC)
87 s[i++] = 'x';
88 if (mode & MAY_APPEND)
89 s[i++] = 'a';
90 if (mode & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
91 s[i++] = 't';
92 if (mode & MAY_LOCK)
93 s[i++] = 'l';
94 if (i == 0)
95 s[i++] = '-';
96 s[i] = '\0';
97 }
98 #endif
99
100 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
101 static int smk_bu_note(char *note, struct smack_known *sskp,
102 struct smack_known *oskp, int mode, int rc)
103 {
104 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
105
106 if (rc <= 0)
107 return rc;
108 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
109 rc = 0;
110
111 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
112 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
113 sskp->smk_known, oskp->smk_known, acc, note);
114 return 0;
115 }
116 #else
117 #define smk_bu_note(note, sskp, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
118 #endif
119
120 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
121 static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
122 int mode, int rc)
123 {
124 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
125 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
126
127 if (rc <= 0)
128 return rc;
129 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
130 rc = 0;
131
132 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
133 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
134 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, oskp->smk_known,
135 acc, current->comm, note);
136 return 0;
137 }
138 #else
139 #define smk_bu_current(note, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
140 #endif
141
142 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
143 static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
144 {
145 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
146 struct smack_known *smk_task = smk_of_task_struct(otp);
147 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
148
149 if (rc <= 0)
150 return rc;
151 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
152 rc = 0;
153
154 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
155 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
156 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_task->smk_known, acc,
157 current->comm, otp->comm);
158 return 0;
159 }
160 #else
161 #define smk_bu_task(otp, mode, RC) (RC)
162 #endif
163
164 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
165 static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
166 {
167 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
168 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
169 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
170
171 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
172 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
173 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
174
175 if (rc <= 0)
176 return rc;
177 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
178 rc = 0;
179 if (rc == SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT &&
180 (mode & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)))
181 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_IMPURE;
182
183 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
184
185 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
186 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, isp->smk_inode->smk_known, acc,
187 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
188 return 0;
189 }
190 #else
191 #define smk_bu_inode(inode, mode, RC) (RC)
192 #endif
193
194 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
195 static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
196 {
197 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
198 struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
199 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
200 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
201 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
202
203 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
204 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
205 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
206
207 if (rc <= 0)
208 return rc;
209 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
210 rc = 0;
211
212 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
213 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
214 sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
215 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
216 current->comm);
217 return 0;
218 }
219 #else
220 #define smk_bu_file(file, mode, RC) (RC)
221 #endif
222
223 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
224 static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
225 int mode, int rc)
226 {
227 struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
228 struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
229 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
230 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
231 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
232
233 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
234 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
235 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
236
237 if (rc <= 0)
238 return rc;
239 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
240 rc = 0;
241
242 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
243 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
244 sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
245 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
246 current->comm);
247 return 0;
248 }
249 #else
250 #define smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, mode, RC) (RC)
251 #endif
252
253 /**
254 * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
255 * @name: type of the label (attribute)
256 * @ip: a pointer to the inode
257 * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
258 *
259 * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label,
260 * NULL if there was no label to fetch, or an error code.
261 */
262 static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
263 struct dentry *dp)
264 {
265 int rc;
266 char *buffer;
267 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
268
269 if (!(ip->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
270 return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
271
272 buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_KERNEL);
273 if (buffer == NULL)
274 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
275
276 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, ip, name, buffer, SMK_LONGLABEL);
277 if (rc < 0)
278 skp = ERR_PTR(rc);
279 else if (rc == 0)
280 skp = NULL;
281 else
282 skp = smk_import_entry(buffer, rc);
283
284 kfree(buffer);
285
286 return skp;
287 }
288
289 /**
290 * new_inode_smack - allocate an inode security blob
291 * @skp: a pointer to the Smack label entry to use in the blob
292 *
293 * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
294 */
295 static struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
296 {
297 struct inode_smack *isp;
298
299 isp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
300 if (isp == NULL)
301 return NULL;
302
303 isp->smk_inode = skp;
304 isp->smk_flags = 0;
305 mutex_init(&isp->smk_lock);
306
307 return isp;
308 }
309
310 /**
311 * new_task_smack - allocate a task security blob
312 * @task: a pointer to the Smack label for the running task
313 * @forked: a pointer to the Smack label for the forked task
314 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
315 *
316 * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
317 */
318 static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(struct smack_known *task,
319 struct smack_known *forked, gfp_t gfp)
320 {
321 struct task_smack *tsp;
322
323 tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
324 if (tsp == NULL)
325 return NULL;
326
327 tsp->smk_task = task;
328 tsp->smk_forked = forked;
329 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
330 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_relabel);
331 mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
332
333 return tsp;
334 }
335
336 /**
337 * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
338 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
339 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
340 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
341 *
342 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
343 */
344 static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
345 gfp_t gfp)
346 {
347 struct smack_rule *nrp;
348 struct smack_rule *orp;
349 int rc = 0;
350
351 list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) {
352 nrp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_rule), gfp);
353 if (nrp == NULL) {
354 rc = -ENOMEM;
355 break;
356 }
357 *nrp = *orp;
358 list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead);
359 }
360 return rc;
361 }
362
363 /**
364 * smk_copy_relabel - copy smk_relabel labels list
365 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
366 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
367 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
368 *
369 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
370 */
371 static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
372 gfp_t gfp)
373 {
374 struct smack_known_list_elem *nklep;
375 struct smack_known_list_elem *oklep;
376
377 list_for_each_entry(oklep, ohead, list) {
378 nklep = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_known_list_elem), gfp);
379 if (nklep == NULL) {
380 smk_destroy_label_list(nhead);
381 return -ENOMEM;
382 }
383 nklep->smk_label = oklep->smk_label;
384 list_add(&nklep->list, nhead);
385 }
386
387 return 0;
388 }
389
390 /**
391 * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_*
392 * @mode - input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
393 *
394 * Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules
395 */
396 static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
397 {
398 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)
399 return MAY_READWRITE;
400 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
401 return MAY_READ;
402
403 return 0;
404 }
405
406 /**
407 * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
408 * @tracer: tracer process
409 * @tracee_known: label entry of the process that's about to be traced
410 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
411 * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
412 *
413 * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error
414 */
415 static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
416 struct smack_known *tracee_known,
417 unsigned int mode, const char *func)
418 {
419 int rc;
420 struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
421 struct task_smack *tsp;
422 struct smack_known *tracer_known;
423
424 if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
425 smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
426 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
427 saip = &ad;
428 }
429
430 rcu_read_lock();
431 tsp = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
432 tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
433
434 if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
435 (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT ||
436 smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)) {
437 if (tracer_known->smk_known == tracee_known->smk_known)
438 rc = 0;
439 else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
440 rc = -EACCES;
441 else if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
442 rc = 0;
443 else
444 rc = -EACCES;
445
446 if (saip)
447 smack_log(tracer_known->smk_known,
448 tracee_known->smk_known,
449 0, rc, saip);
450
451 rcu_read_unlock();
452 return rc;
453 }
454
455 /* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */
456 rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_known, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
457
458 rcu_read_unlock();
459 return rc;
460 }
461
462 /*
463 * LSM hooks.
464 * We he, that is fun!
465 */
466
467 /**
468 * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
469 * @ctp: child task pointer
470 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
471 *
472 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
473 *
474 * Do the capability checks.
475 */
476 static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
477 {
478 struct smack_known *skp;
479
480 skp = smk_of_task_struct(ctp);
481
482 return smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__);
483 }
484
485 /**
486 * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME
487 * @ptp: parent task pointer
488 *
489 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
490 *
491 * Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH.
492 */
493 static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
494 {
495 int rc;
496 struct smack_known *skp;
497
498 skp = smk_of_task(current_security());
499
500 rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
501 return rc;
502 }
503
504 /**
505 * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
506 * @type: message type
507 *
508 * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
509 */
510 static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
511 {
512 int rc = 0;
513 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
514
515 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
516 return 0;
517
518 if (smack_syslog_label != NULL && smack_syslog_label != skp)
519 rc = -EACCES;
520
521 return rc;
522 }
523
524
525 /*
526 * Superblock Hooks.
527 */
528
529 /**
530 * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob
531 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
532 *
533 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
534 */
535 static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
536 {
537 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
538
539 sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
540
541 if (sbsp == NULL)
542 return -ENOMEM;
543
544 sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
545 sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
546 sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor;
547 sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat;
548 /*
549 * SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc.
550 */
551 sb->s_security = sbsp;
552
553 return 0;
554 }
555
556 /**
557 * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
558 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
559 *
560 */
561 static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
562 {
563 kfree(sb->s_security);
564 sb->s_security = NULL;
565 }
566
567 /**
568 * smack_sb_copy_data - copy mount options data for processing
569 * @orig: where to start
570 * @smackopts: mount options string
571 *
572 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
573 *
574 * Copy the Smack specific mount options out of the mount
575 * options list.
576 */
577 static int smack_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *smackopts)
578 {
579 char *cp, *commap, *otheropts, *dp;
580
581 otheropts = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
582 if (otheropts == NULL)
583 return -ENOMEM;
584
585 for (cp = orig, commap = orig; commap != NULL; cp = commap + 1) {
586 if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSDEFAULT) == cp)
587 dp = smackopts;
588 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSFLOOR) == cp)
589 dp = smackopts;
590 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSHAT) == cp)
591 dp = smackopts;
592 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSROOT) == cp)
593 dp = smackopts;
594 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSTRANS) == cp)
595 dp = smackopts;
596 else
597 dp = otheropts;
598
599 commap = strchr(cp, ',');
600 if (commap != NULL)
601 *commap = '\0';
602
603 if (*dp != '\0')
604 strcat(dp, ",");
605 strcat(dp, cp);
606 }
607
608 strcpy(orig, otheropts);
609 free_page((unsigned long)otheropts);
610
611 return 0;
612 }
613
614 /**
615 * smack_parse_opts_str - parse Smack specific mount options
616 * @options: mount options string
617 * @opts: where to store converted mount opts
618 *
619 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
620 *
621 * converts Smack specific mount options to generic security option format
622 */
623 static int smack_parse_opts_str(char *options,
624 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
625 {
626 char *p;
627 char *fsdefault = NULL;
628 char *fsfloor = NULL;
629 char *fshat = NULL;
630 char *fsroot = NULL;
631 char *fstransmute = NULL;
632 int rc = -ENOMEM;
633 int num_mnt_opts = 0;
634 int token;
635
636 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
637
638 if (!options)
639 return 0;
640
641 while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
642 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
643
644 if (!*p)
645 continue;
646
647 token = match_token(p, smk_mount_tokens, args);
648
649 switch (token) {
650 case Opt_fsdefault:
651 if (fsdefault)
652 goto out_opt_err;
653 fsdefault = match_strdup(&args[0]);
654 if (!fsdefault)
655 goto out_err;
656 break;
657 case Opt_fsfloor:
658 if (fsfloor)
659 goto out_opt_err;
660 fsfloor = match_strdup(&args[0]);
661 if (!fsfloor)
662 goto out_err;
663 break;
664 case Opt_fshat:
665 if (fshat)
666 goto out_opt_err;
667 fshat = match_strdup(&args[0]);
668 if (!fshat)
669 goto out_err;
670 break;
671 case Opt_fsroot:
672 if (fsroot)
673 goto out_opt_err;
674 fsroot = match_strdup(&args[0]);
675 if (!fsroot)
676 goto out_err;
677 break;
678 case Opt_fstransmute:
679 if (fstransmute)
680 goto out_opt_err;
681 fstransmute = match_strdup(&args[0]);
682 if (!fstransmute)
683 goto out_err;
684 break;
685 default:
686 rc = -EINVAL;
687 pr_warn("Smack: unknown mount option\n");
688 goto out_err;
689 }
690 }
691
692 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
693 if (!opts->mnt_opts)
694 goto out_err;
695
696 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
697 GFP_KERNEL);
698 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
699 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
700 goto out_err;
701 }
702
703 if (fsdefault) {
704 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsdefault;
705 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSDEFAULT_MNT;
706 }
707 if (fsfloor) {
708 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsfloor;
709 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSFLOOR_MNT;
710 }
711 if (fshat) {
712 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fshat;
713 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSHAT_MNT;
714 }
715 if (fsroot) {
716 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsroot;
717 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSROOT_MNT;
718 }
719 if (fstransmute) {
720 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fstransmute;
721 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSTRANS_MNT;
722 }
723
724 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
725 return 0;
726
727 out_opt_err:
728 rc = -EINVAL;
729 pr_warn("Smack: duplicate mount options\n");
730
731 out_err:
732 kfree(fsdefault);
733 kfree(fsfloor);
734 kfree(fshat);
735 kfree(fsroot);
736 kfree(fstransmute);
737 return rc;
738 }
739
740 /**
741 * smack_set_mnt_opts - set Smack specific mount options
742 * @sb: the file system superblock
743 * @opts: Smack mount options
744 * @kern_flags: mount option from kernel space or user space
745 * @set_kern_flags: where to store converted mount opts
746 *
747 * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
748 *
749 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set Smack mount
750 * labels.
751 */
752 static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
753 struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
754 unsigned long kern_flags,
755 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
756 {
757 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
758 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
759 struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
760 struct inode_smack *isp;
761 struct smack_known *skp;
762 int i;
763 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
764 int transmute = 0;
765
766 if (sp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_INITIALIZED)
767 return 0;
768
769 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
770 /*
771 * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values.
772 */
773 if (num_opts)
774 return -EPERM;
775 /*
776 * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller.
777 */
778 skp = smk_of_current();
779 sp->smk_root = skp;
780 sp->smk_default = skp;
781 /*
782 * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled
783 * backing store it's okay to trust security labels
784 * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted.
785 */
786 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
787 sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC &&
788 sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) {
789 transmute = 1;
790 sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED;
791 }
792 }
793
794 sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_INITIALIZED;
795
796 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
797 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
798 case FSDEFAULT_MNT:
799 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
800 if (IS_ERR(skp))
801 return PTR_ERR(skp);
802 sp->smk_default = skp;
803 break;
804 case FSFLOOR_MNT:
805 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
806 if (IS_ERR(skp))
807 return PTR_ERR(skp);
808 sp->smk_floor = skp;
809 break;
810 case FSHAT_MNT:
811 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
812 if (IS_ERR(skp))
813 return PTR_ERR(skp);
814 sp->smk_hat = skp;
815 break;
816 case FSROOT_MNT:
817 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
818 if (IS_ERR(skp))
819 return PTR_ERR(skp);
820 sp->smk_root = skp;
821 break;
822 case FSTRANS_MNT:
823 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
824 if (IS_ERR(skp))
825 return PTR_ERR(skp);
826 sp->smk_root = skp;
827 transmute = 1;
828 break;
829 default:
830 break;
831 }
832 }
833
834 /*
835 * Initialize the root inode.
836 */
837 isp = inode->i_security;
838 if (isp == NULL) {
839 isp = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
840 if (isp == NULL)
841 return -ENOMEM;
842 inode->i_security = isp;
843 } else
844 isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
845
846 if (transmute)
847 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
848
849 return 0;
850 }
851
852 /**
853 * smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing
854 * @sb: the file system superblock
855 * @flags: the mount flags
856 * @data: the smack mount options
857 *
858 * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
859 */
860 static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
861 {
862 int rc = 0;
863 char *options = data;
864 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
865
866 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
867
868 if (!options)
869 goto out;
870
871 rc = smack_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
872 if (rc)
873 goto out_err;
874
875 out:
876 rc = smack_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
877
878 out_err:
879 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
880 return rc;
881 }
882
883 /**
884 * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
885 * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
886 *
887 * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem,
888 * and error code otherwise
889 */
890 static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
891 {
892 struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
893 int rc;
894 struct smk_audit_info ad;
895
896 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
897 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
898
899 rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
900 rc = smk_bu_current("statfs", sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, rc);
901 return rc;
902 }
903
904 /*
905 * BPRM hooks
906 */
907
908 /**
909 * smack_bprm_set_creds - set creds for exec
910 * @bprm: the exec information
911 *
912 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise
913 */
914 static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
915 {
916 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
917 struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
918 struct inode_smack *isp;
919 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
920 int rc;
921
922 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
923 return 0;
924
925 isp = inode->i_security;
926 if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
927 return 0;
928
929 sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
930 if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
931 isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
932 return 0;
933
934 if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
935 struct task_struct *tracer;
936 rc = 0;
937
938 rcu_read_lock();
939 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
940 if (likely(tracer != NULL))
941 rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer,
942 isp->smk_task,
943 PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH,
944 __func__);
945 rcu_read_unlock();
946
947 if (rc != 0)
948 return rc;
949 } else if (bprm->unsafe)
950 return -EPERM;
951
952 bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
953 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
954
955 return 0;
956 }
957
958 /**
959 * smack_bprm_committing_creds - Prepare to install the new credentials
960 * from bprm.
961 *
962 * @bprm: binprm for exec
963 */
964 static void smack_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
965 {
966 struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
967
968 if (bsp->smk_task != bsp->smk_forked)
969 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
970 }
971
972 /**
973 * smack_bprm_secureexec - Return the decision to use secureexec.
974 * @bprm: binprm for exec
975 *
976 * Returns 0 on success.
977 */
978 static int smack_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
979 {
980 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
981
982 if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_forked)
983 return 1;
984
985 return 0;
986 }
987
988 /*
989 * Inode hooks
990 */
991
992 /**
993 * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
994 * @inode: the inode in need of a blob
995 *
996 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
997 */
998 static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
999 {
1000 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
1001
1002 inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(skp);
1003 if (inode->i_security == NULL)
1004 return -ENOMEM;
1005 return 0;
1006 }
1007
1008 /**
1009 * smack_inode_free_rcu - Free inode_smack blob from cache
1010 * @head: the rcu_head for getting inode_smack pointer
1011 *
1012 * Call back function called from call_rcu() to free
1013 * the i_security blob pointer in inode
1014 */
1015 static void smack_inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
1016 {
1017 struct inode_smack *issp;
1018
1019 issp = container_of(head, struct inode_smack, smk_rcu);
1020 kmem_cache_free(smack_inode_cache, issp);
1021 }
1022
1023 /**
1024 * smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob using call_rcu()
1025 * @inode: the inode with a blob
1026 *
1027 * Clears the blob pointer in inode using RCU
1028 */
1029 static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
1030 {
1031 struct inode_smack *issp = inode->i_security;
1032
1033 /*
1034 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
1035 * a call to smack_inode_permission() can be made
1036 * after smack_inode_free_security() is called.
1037 * To avoid race condition free the i_security via RCU
1038 * and leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
1039 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
1040 */
1041 call_rcu(&issp->smk_rcu, smack_inode_free_rcu);
1042 }
1043
1044 /**
1045 * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
1046 * @inode: the newly created inode
1047 * @dir: containing directory object
1048 * @qstr: unused
1049 * @name: where to put the attribute name
1050 * @value: where to put the attribute value
1051 * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
1052 *
1053 * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
1054 */
1055 static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
1056 const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
1057 void **value, size_t *len)
1058 {
1059 struct inode_smack *issp = inode->i_security;
1060 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
1061 struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1062 struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
1063 int may;
1064
1065 if (name)
1066 *name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX;
1067
1068 if (value && len) {
1069 rcu_read_lock();
1070 may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
1071 &skp->smk_rules);
1072 rcu_read_unlock();
1073
1074 /*
1075 * If the access rule allows transmutation and
1076 * the directory requests transmutation then
1077 * by all means transmute.
1078 * Mark the inode as changed.
1079 */
1080 if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
1081 smk_inode_transmutable(dir)) {
1082 isp = dsp;
1083 issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
1084 }
1085
1086 *value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
1087 if (*value == NULL)
1088 return -ENOMEM;
1089
1090 *len = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1091 }
1092
1093 return 0;
1094 }
1095
1096 /**
1097 * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link
1098 * @old_dentry: the existing object
1099 * @dir: unused
1100 * @new_dentry: the new object
1101 *
1102 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1103 */
1104 static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
1105 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1106 {
1107 struct smack_known *isp;
1108 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1109 int rc;
1110
1111 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1112 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1113
1114 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1115 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1116 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1117
1118 if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1119 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1120 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1121 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1122 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1123 }
1124
1125 return rc;
1126 }
1127
1128 /**
1129 * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion
1130 * @dir: containing directory object
1131 * @dentry: file to unlink
1132 *
1133 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1134 * and the object, error code otherwise
1135 */
1136 static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1137 {
1138 struct inode *ip = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1139 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1140 int rc;
1141
1142 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1143 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1144
1145 /*
1146 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
1147 */
1148 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1149 rc = smk_bu_inode(ip, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1150 if (rc == 0) {
1151 /*
1152 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1153 */
1154 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1155 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1156 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1157 rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1158 }
1159 return rc;
1160 }
1161
1162 /**
1163 * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion
1164 * @dir: containing directory object
1165 * @dentry: directory to unlink
1166 *
1167 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1168 * and the directory, error code otherwise
1169 */
1170 static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1171 {
1172 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1173 int rc;
1174
1175 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1176 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1177
1178 /*
1179 * You need write access to the thing you're removing
1180 */
1181 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1182 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1183 if (rc == 0) {
1184 /*
1185 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1186 */
1187 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1188 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1189 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1190 rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1191 }
1192
1193 return rc;
1194 }
1195
1196 /**
1197 * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
1198 * @old_inode: unused
1199 * @old_dentry: the old object
1200 * @new_inode: unused
1201 * @new_dentry: the new object
1202 *
1203 * Read and write access is required on both the old and
1204 * new directories.
1205 *
1206 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1207 */
1208 static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
1209 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1210 struct inode *new_inode,
1211 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1212 {
1213 int rc;
1214 struct smack_known *isp;
1215 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1216
1217 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1218 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1219
1220 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1221 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1222 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1223
1224 if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1225 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1226 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1227 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1228 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1229 }
1230 return rc;
1231 }
1232
1233 /**
1234 * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
1235 * @inode: the inode in question
1236 * @mask: the access requested
1237 *
1238 * This is the important Smack hook.
1239 *
1240 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, -EACCES otherwise
1241 */
1242 static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
1243 {
1244 struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1245 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1246 int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
1247 int rc;
1248
1249 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
1250 /*
1251 * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
1252 */
1253 if (mask == 0)
1254 return 0;
1255
1256 if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) {
1257 if (smk_of_inode(inode) != sbsp->smk_root)
1258 return -EACCES;
1259 }
1260
1261 /* May be droppable after audit */
1262 if (no_block)
1263 return -ECHILD;
1264 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1265 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
1266 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
1267 rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, mask, rc);
1268 return rc;
1269 }
1270
1271 /**
1272 * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
1273 * @dentry: the object
1274 * @iattr: for the force flag
1275 *
1276 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1277 */
1278 static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
1279 {
1280 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1281 int rc;
1282
1283 /*
1284 * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
1285 */
1286 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
1287 return 0;
1288 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1289 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1290
1291 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1292 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1293 return rc;
1294 }
1295
1296 /**
1297 * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
1298 * @mnt: vfsmount of the object
1299 * @dentry: the object
1300 *
1301 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1302 */
1303 static int smack_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
1304 {
1305 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1306 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1307 int rc;
1308
1309 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1310 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
1311 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1312 rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, MAY_READ, rc);
1313 return rc;
1314 }
1315
1316 /**
1317 * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
1318 * @dentry: the object
1319 * @name: name of the attribute
1320 * @value: value of the attribute
1321 * @size: size of the value
1322 * @flags: unused
1323 *
1324 * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly.
1325 *
1326 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1327 */
1328 static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1329 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1330 {
1331 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1332 struct smack_known *skp;
1333 int check_priv = 0;
1334 int check_import = 0;
1335 int check_star = 0;
1336 int rc = 0;
1337
1338 /*
1339 * Check label validity here so import won't fail in post_setxattr
1340 */
1341 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1342 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1343 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
1344 check_priv = 1;
1345 check_import = 1;
1346 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1347 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1348 check_priv = 1;
1349 check_import = 1;
1350 check_star = 1;
1351 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1352 check_priv = 1;
1353 if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
1354 strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
1355 rc = -EINVAL;
1356 } else
1357 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
1358
1359 if (check_priv && !smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1360 rc = -EPERM;
1361
1362 if (rc == 0 && check_import) {
1363 skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL;
1364 if (IS_ERR(skp))
1365 rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
1366 else if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
1367 (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)))
1368 rc = -EINVAL;
1369 }
1370
1371 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1372 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1373
1374 if (rc == 0) {
1375 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1376 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1377 }
1378
1379 return rc;
1380 }
1381
1382 /**
1383 * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above
1384 * @dentry: object
1385 * @name: attribute name
1386 * @value: attribute value
1387 * @size: attribute size
1388 * @flags: unused
1389 *
1390 * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found
1391 * in the master label list.
1392 */
1393 static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1394 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1395 {
1396 struct smack_known *skp;
1397 struct inode_smack *isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
1398
1399 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1400 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1401 return;
1402 }
1403
1404 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1405 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1406 if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1407 isp->smk_inode = skp;
1408 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
1409 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1410 if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1411 isp->smk_task = skp;
1412 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1413 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1414 if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1415 isp->smk_mmap = skp;
1416 }
1417
1418 return;
1419 }
1420
1421 /**
1422 * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr
1423 * @dentry: the object
1424 * @name: unused
1425 *
1426 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1427 */
1428 static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1429 {
1430 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1431 int rc;
1432
1433 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1434 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1435
1436 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_READ, &ad);
1437 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_READ, rc);
1438 return rc;
1439 }
1440
1441 /**
1442 * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
1443 * @dentry: the object
1444 * @name: name of the attribute
1445 *
1446 * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN
1447 *
1448 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1449 */
1450 static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1451 {
1452 struct inode_smack *isp;
1453 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1454 int rc = 0;
1455
1456 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1457 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1458 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
1459 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1460 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
1461 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1462 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1463 rc = -EPERM;
1464 } else
1465 rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
1466
1467 if (rc != 0)
1468 return rc;
1469
1470 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1471 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1472
1473 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1474 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1475 if (rc != 0)
1476 return rc;
1477
1478 isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
1479 /*
1480 * Don't do anything special for these.
1481 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN
1482 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT
1483 */
1484 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1485 struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb;
1486 struct superblock_smack *sbsp = sbp->s_security;
1487
1488 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default;
1489 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0)
1490 isp->smk_task = NULL;
1491 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0)
1492 isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
1493 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
1494 isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1495
1496 return 0;
1497 }
1498
1499 /**
1500 * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
1501 * @inode: the object
1502 * @name: attribute name
1503 * @buffer: where to put the result
1504 * @alloc: unused
1505 *
1506 * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
1507 */
1508 static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
1509 const char *name, void **buffer,
1510 bool alloc)
1511 {
1512 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1513 struct socket *sock;
1514 struct super_block *sbp;
1515 struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode;
1516 struct smack_known *isp;
1517 int ilen;
1518 int rc = 0;
1519
1520 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
1521 isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1522 ilen = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1523 *buffer = isp->smk_known;
1524 return ilen;
1525 }
1526
1527 /*
1528 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
1529 */
1530 sbp = ip->i_sb;
1531 if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
1532 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1533
1534 sock = SOCKET_I(ip);
1535 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
1536 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1537
1538 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1539
1540 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
1541 isp = ssp->smk_in;
1542 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
1543 isp = ssp->smk_out;
1544 else
1545 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1546
1547 ilen = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1548 if (rc == 0) {
1549 *buffer = isp->smk_known;
1550 rc = ilen;
1551 }
1552
1553 return rc;
1554 }
1555
1556
1557 /**
1558 * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes
1559 * @inode: the object
1560 * @buffer: where they go
1561 * @buffer_size: size of buffer
1562 */
1563 static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
1564 size_t buffer_size)
1565 {
1566 int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
1567
1568 if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size)
1569 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len);
1570
1571 return len;
1572 }
1573
1574 /**
1575 * smack_inode_getsecid - Extract inode's security id
1576 * @inode: inode to extract the info from
1577 * @secid: where result will be saved
1578 */
1579 static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
1580 {
1581 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
1582
1583 *secid = isp->smk_inode->smk_secid;
1584 }
1585
1586 /*
1587 * File Hooks
1588 */
1589
1590 /*
1591 * There is no smack_file_permission hook
1592 *
1593 * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
1594 * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
1595 * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no.
1596 *
1597 * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
1598 * label changing that SELinux does.
1599 */
1600
1601 /**
1602 * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
1603 * @file: the object
1604 *
1605 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1606 * label list, so no allocation is done.
1607 *
1608 * f_security is the owner security information. It
1609 * isn't used on file access checks, it's for send_sigio.
1610 *
1611 * Returns 0
1612 */
1613 static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
1614 {
1615 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
1616
1617 file->f_security = skp;
1618 return 0;
1619 }
1620
1621 /**
1622 * smack_file_free_security - clear a file security blob
1623 * @file: the object
1624 *
1625 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1626 * label list, so no memory is freed.
1627 */
1628 static void smack_file_free_security(struct file *file)
1629 {
1630 file->f_security = NULL;
1631 }
1632
1633 /**
1634 * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
1635 * @file: the object
1636 * @cmd: what to do
1637 * @arg: unused
1638 *
1639 * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions.
1640 *
1641 * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise
1642 */
1643 static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1644 unsigned long arg)
1645 {
1646 int rc = 0;
1647 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1648 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1649
1650 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1651 return 0;
1652
1653 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1654 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1655
1656 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
1657 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1658 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1659 }
1660
1661 if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)) {
1662 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1663 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_READ, rc);
1664 }
1665
1666 return rc;
1667 }
1668
1669 /**
1670 * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
1671 * @file: the object
1672 * @cmd: unused
1673 *
1674 * Returns 0 if current has lock access, error code otherwise
1675 */
1676 static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
1677 {
1678 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1679 int rc;
1680 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1681
1682 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1683 return 0;
1684
1685 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1686 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1687 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1688 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1689 return rc;
1690 }
1691
1692 /**
1693 * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl
1694 * @file: the object
1695 * @cmd: what action to check
1696 * @arg: unused
1697 *
1698 * Generally these operations are harmless.
1699 * File locking operations present an obvious mechanism
1700 * for passing information, so they require write access.
1701 *
1702 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1703 */
1704 static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1705 unsigned long arg)
1706 {
1707 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1708 int rc = 0;
1709 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1710
1711 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1712 return 0;
1713
1714 switch (cmd) {
1715 case F_GETLK:
1716 break;
1717 case F_SETLK:
1718 case F_SETLKW:
1719 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1720 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1721 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1722 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1723 break;
1724 case F_SETOWN:
1725 case F_SETSIG:
1726 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1727 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1728 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1729 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1730 break;
1731 default:
1732 break;
1733 }
1734
1735 return rc;
1736 }
1737
1738 /**
1739 * smack_mmap_file :
1740 * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g.
1741 * if mapping anonymous memory.
1742 * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
1743 * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
1744 * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
1745 * @flags contains the operational flags.
1746 * Return 0 if permission is granted.
1747 */
1748 static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
1749 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
1750 unsigned long flags)
1751 {
1752 struct smack_known *skp;
1753 struct smack_known *mkp;
1754 struct smack_rule *srp;
1755 struct task_smack *tsp;
1756 struct smack_known *okp;
1757 struct inode_smack *isp;
1758 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
1759 int may;
1760 int mmay;
1761 int tmay;
1762 int rc;
1763
1764 if (file == NULL)
1765 return 0;
1766
1767 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file))))
1768 return 0;
1769
1770 isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
1771 if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
1772 return 0;
1773 sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security;
1774 if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
1775 isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
1776 return -EACCES;
1777 mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
1778
1779 tsp = current_security();
1780 skp = smk_of_current();
1781 rc = 0;
1782
1783 rcu_read_lock();
1784 /*
1785 * For each Smack rule associated with the subject
1786 * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access
1787 * to that rule's object label.
1788 */
1789 list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &skp->smk_rules, list) {
1790 okp = srp->smk_object;
1791 /*
1792 * Matching labels always allows access.
1793 */
1794 if (mkp->smk_known == okp->smk_known)
1795 continue;
1796 /*
1797 * If there is a matching local rule take
1798 * that into account as well.
1799 */
1800 may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject->smk_known,
1801 okp->smk_known,
1802 &tsp->smk_rules);
1803 if (may == -ENOENT)
1804 may = srp->smk_access;
1805 else
1806 may &= srp->smk_access;
1807 /*
1808 * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't
1809 * possibly have less access.
1810 */
1811 if (may == 0)
1812 continue;
1813
1814 /*
1815 * Fetch the global list entry.
1816 * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
1817 * can't have as much access as current.
1818 */
1819 mmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1820 &mkp->smk_rules);
1821 if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
1822 rc = -EACCES;
1823 break;
1824 }
1825 /*
1826 * If there is a local entry it modifies the
1827 * potential access, too.
1828 */
1829 tmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1830 &tsp->smk_rules);
1831 if (tmay != -ENOENT)
1832 mmay &= tmay;
1833
1834 /*
1835 * If there is any access available to current that is
1836 * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
1837 * deny access.
1838 */
1839 if ((may | mmay) != mmay) {
1840 rc = -EACCES;
1841 break;
1842 }
1843 }
1844
1845 rcu_read_unlock();
1846
1847 return rc;
1848 }
1849
1850 /**
1851 * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
1852 * @file: object in question
1853 *
1854 */
1855 static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
1856 {
1857 file->f_security = smk_of_current();
1858 }
1859
1860 /**
1861 * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio
1862 * @tsk: The target task
1863 * @fown: the object the signal come from
1864 * @signum: unused
1865 *
1866 * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't
1867 *
1868 * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could
1869 * write to the task, an error code otherwise.
1870 */
1871 static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
1872 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
1873 {
1874 struct smack_known *skp;
1875 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
1876 struct file *file;
1877 int rc;
1878 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1879
1880 /*
1881 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
1882 */
1883 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
1884
1885 /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
1886 skp = file->f_security;
1887 rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, NULL);
1888 rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
1889 if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
1890 rc = 0;
1891
1892 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1893 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
1894 smack_log(skp->smk_known, tkp->smk_known, MAY_DELIVER, rc, &ad);
1895 return rc;
1896 }
1897
1898 /**
1899 * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check
1900 * @file: the object
1901 *
1902 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1903 */
1904 static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
1905 {
1906 int rc;
1907 int may = 0;
1908 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1909 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1910 struct socket *sock;
1911 struct task_smack *tsp;
1912 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1913
1914 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1915 return 0;
1916
1917 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1918 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1919
1920 if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
1921 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
1922 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1923 tsp = current_security();
1924 /*
1925 * If the receiving process can't write to the
1926 * passed socket or if the passed socket can't
1927 * write to the receiving process don't accept
1928 * the passed socket.
1929 */
1930 rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, ssp->smk_out, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1931 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1932 if (rc < 0)
1933 return rc;
1934 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_in, tsp->smk_task, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1935 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1936 return rc;
1937 }
1938 /*
1939 * This code relies on bitmasks.
1940 */
1941 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1942 may = MAY_READ;
1943 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
1944 may |= MAY_WRITE;
1945
1946 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), may, &ad);
1947 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1948 return rc;
1949 }
1950
1951 /**
1952 * smack_file_open - Smack dentry open processing
1953 * @file: the object
1954 * @cred: task credential
1955 *
1956 * Set the security blob in the file structure.
1957 * Allow the open only if the task has read access. There are
1958 * many read operations (e.g. fstat) that you can do with an
1959 * fd even if you have the file open write-only.
1960 *
1961 * Returns 0
1962 */
1963 static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
1964 {
1965 struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
1966 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1967 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1968 int rc;
1969
1970 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1971 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1972 rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1973 rc = smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
1974
1975 return rc;
1976 }
1977
1978 /*
1979 * Task hooks
1980 */
1981
1982 /**
1983 * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
1984 * @new: the new credentials
1985 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1986 *
1987 * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification. This must allocate all
1988 * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
1989 * complete without error.
1990 */
1991 static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
1992 {
1993 struct task_smack *tsp;
1994
1995 tsp = new_task_smack(NULL, NULL, gfp);
1996 if (tsp == NULL)
1997 return -ENOMEM;
1998
1999 cred->security = tsp;
2000
2001 return 0;
2002 }
2003
2004
2005 /**
2006 * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
2007 * @cred: the credentials in question
2008 *
2009 */
2010 static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
2011 {
2012 struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
2013 struct smack_rule *rp;
2014 struct list_head *l;
2015 struct list_head *n;
2016
2017 if (tsp == NULL)
2018 return;
2019 cred->security = NULL;
2020
2021 smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
2022
2023 list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
2024 rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list);
2025 list_del(&rp->list);
2026 kfree(rp);
2027 }
2028 kfree(tsp);
2029 }
2030
2031 /**
2032 * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification
2033 * @new: the new credentials
2034 * @old: the original credentials
2035 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
2036 *
2037 * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
2038 */
2039 static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2040 gfp_t gfp)
2041 {
2042 struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
2043 struct task_smack *new_tsp;
2044 int rc;
2045
2046 new_tsp = new_task_smack(old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task, gfp);
2047 if (new_tsp == NULL)
2048 return -ENOMEM;
2049
2050 new->security = new_tsp;
2051
2052 rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
2053 if (rc != 0)
2054 return rc;
2055
2056 rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel,
2057 gfp);
2058 if (rc != 0)
2059 return rc;
2060
2061 return 0;
2062 }
2063
2064 /**
2065 * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
2066 * @new: the new credentials
2067 * @old: the original credentials
2068 *
2069 * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
2070 */
2071 static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2072 {
2073 struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
2074 struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
2075
2076 new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
2077 new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
2078 mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
2079 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
2080
2081
2082 /* cbs copy rule list */
2083 }
2084
2085 /**
2086 * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
2087 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
2088 * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
2089 *
2090 * Set the security data for a kernel service.
2091 */
2092 static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
2093 {
2094 struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
2095
2096 new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid);
2097 return 0;
2098 }
2099
2100 /**
2101 * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
2102 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified
2103 * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference
2104 *
2105 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
2106 * as the objective context of the specified inode
2107 */
2108 static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
2109 struct inode *inode)
2110 {
2111 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
2112 struct task_smack *tsp = new->security;
2113
2114 tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
2115 tsp->smk_task = tsp->smk_forked;
2116 return 0;
2117 }
2118
2119 /**
2120 * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access
2121 * @p: the task object
2122 * @access: the access requested
2123 * @caller: name of the calling function for audit
2124 *
2125 * Return 0 if access is permitted
2126 */
2127 static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
2128 const char *caller)
2129 {
2130 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2131 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2132 int rc;
2133
2134 smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2135 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2136 rc = smk_curacc(skp, access, &ad);
2137 rc = smk_bu_task(p, access, rc);
2138 return rc;
2139 }
2140
2141 /**
2142 * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
2143 * @p: the task object
2144 * @pgid: unused
2145 *
2146 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2147 */
2148 static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2149 {
2150 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2151 }
2152
2153 /**
2154 * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid
2155 * @p: the object task
2156 *
2157 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2158 */
2159 static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2160 {
2161 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2162 }
2163
2164 /**
2165 * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid
2166 * @p: the object task
2167 *
2168 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2169 */
2170 static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2171 {
2172 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2173 }
2174
2175 /**
2176 * smack_task_getsecid - get the secid of the task
2177 * @p: the object task
2178 * @secid: where to put the result
2179 *
2180 * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
2181 */
2182 static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
2183 {
2184 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2185
2186 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
2187 }
2188
2189 /**
2190 * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice
2191 * @p: the task object
2192 * @nice: unused
2193 *
2194 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2195 */
2196 static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2197 {
2198 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2199 }
2200
2201 /**
2202 * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio
2203 * @p: the task object
2204 * @ioprio: unused
2205 *
2206 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2207 */
2208 static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2209 {
2210 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2211 }
2212
2213 /**
2214 * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio
2215 * @p: the task object
2216 *
2217 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2218 */
2219 static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
2220 {
2221 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2222 }
2223
2224 /**
2225 * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler
2226 * @p: the task object
2227 * @policy: unused
2228 * @lp: unused
2229 *
2230 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2231 */
2232 static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2233 {
2234 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2235 }
2236
2237 /**
2238 * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler
2239 * @p: the task object
2240 *
2241 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2242 */
2243 static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2244 {
2245 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2246 }
2247
2248 /**
2249 * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory
2250 * @p: the task object
2251 *
2252 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2253 */
2254 static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2255 {
2256 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2257 }
2258
2259 /**
2260 * smack_task_kill - Smack check on signal delivery
2261 * @p: the task object
2262 * @info: unused
2263 * @sig: unused
2264 * @secid: identifies the smack to use in lieu of current's
2265 *
2266 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2267 *
2268 * The secid behavior is an artifact of an SELinux hack
2269 * in the USB code. Someday it may go away.
2270 */
2271 static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
2272 int sig, u32 secid)
2273 {
2274 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2275 struct smack_known *skp;
2276 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2277 int rc;
2278
2279 if (!sig)
2280 return 0; /* null signal; existence test */
2281
2282 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2283 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2284 /*
2285 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
2286 * can write the receiver.
2287 */
2288 if (secid == 0) {
2289 rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
2290 rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
2291 return rc;
2292 }
2293 /*
2294 * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
2295 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
2296 * we can't take privilege into account.
2297 */
2298 skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
2299 rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
2300 rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
2301 return rc;
2302 }
2303
2304 /**
2305 * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
2306 * @p: task to copy from
2307 * @inode: inode to copy to
2308 *
2309 * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
2310 */
2311 static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
2312 {
2313 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
2314 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2315
2316 isp->smk_inode = skp;
2317 }
2318
2319 /*
2320 * Socket hooks.
2321 */
2322
2323 /**
2324 * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
2325 * @sk: the socket
2326 * @family: unused
2327 * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
2328 *
2329 * Assign Smack pointers to current
2330 *
2331 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
2332 */
2333 static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
2334 {
2335 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2336 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2337
2338 ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
2339 if (ssp == NULL)
2340 return -ENOMEM;
2341
2342 /*
2343 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
2344 */
2345 if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
2346 ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
2347 ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
2348 } else {
2349 ssp->smk_in = skp;
2350 ssp->smk_out = skp;
2351 }
2352 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
2353
2354 sk->sk_security = ssp;
2355
2356 return 0;
2357 }
2358
2359 /**
2360 * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
2361 * @sk: the socket
2362 *
2363 * Clears the blob pointer
2364 */
2365 static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
2366 {
2367 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2368 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2369
2370 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
2371 rcu_read_lock();
2372 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2373 if (spp->smk_sock != sk)
2374 continue;
2375 spp->smk_can_reuse = 1;
2376 break;
2377 }
2378 rcu_read_unlock();
2379 }
2380 #endif
2381 kfree(sk->sk_security);
2382 }
2383
2384 /**
2385 * smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
2386 * @sip: the object end
2387 *
2388 * looks for host based access restrictions
2389 *
2390 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2391 * hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2392 * taken before calling this function.
2393 *
2394 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2395 */
2396 static struct smack_known *smack_ipv4host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
2397 {
2398 struct smk_net4addr *snp;
2399 struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
2400
2401 if (siap->s_addr == 0)
2402 return NULL;
2403
2404 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net4addr_list, list)
2405 /*
2406 * we break after finding the first match because
2407 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2408 * so we have found the most specific match
2409 */
2410 if (snp->smk_host.s_addr ==
2411 (siap->s_addr & snp->smk_mask.s_addr))
2412 return snp->smk_label;
2413
2414 return NULL;
2415 }
2416
2417 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2418 /*
2419 * smk_ipv6_localhost - Check for local ipv6 host address
2420 * @sip: the address
2421 *
2422 * Returns boolean true if this is the localhost address
2423 */
2424 static bool smk_ipv6_localhost(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2425 {
2426 __be16 *be16p = (__be16 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2427 __be32 *be32p = (__be32 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2428
2429 if (be32p[0] == 0 && be32p[1] == 0 && be32p[2] == 0 && be16p[6] == 0 &&
2430 ntohs(be16p[7]) == 1)
2431 return true;
2432 return false;
2433 }
2434
2435 /**
2436 * smack_ipv6host_label - check host based restrictions
2437 * @sip: the object end
2438 *
2439 * looks for host based access restrictions
2440 *
2441 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2442 * hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2443 * taken before calling this function.
2444 *
2445 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2446 */
2447 static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2448 {
2449 struct smk_net6addr *snp;
2450 struct in6_addr *sap = &sip->sin6_addr;
2451 int i;
2452 int found = 0;
2453
2454 /*
2455 * It's local. Don't look for a host label.
2456 */
2457 if (smk_ipv6_localhost(sip))
2458 return NULL;
2459
2460 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
2461 /*
2462 * If the label is NULL the entry has
2463 * been renounced. Ignore it.
2464 */
2465 if (snp->smk_label == NULL)
2466 continue;
2467 /*
2468 * we break after finding the first match because
2469 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2470 * so we have found the most specific match
2471 */
2472 for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
2473 if ((sap->s6_addr16[i] & snp->smk_mask.s6_addr16[i]) !=
2474 snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) {
2475 found = 0;
2476 break;
2477 }
2478 }
2479 if (found)
2480 return snp->smk_label;
2481 }
2482
2483 return NULL;
2484 }
2485 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
2486
2487 /**
2488 * smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket
2489 * @sk: the socket
2490 * @labeled: socket label scheme
2491 *
2492 * Convert the outbound smack value (smk_out) to a
2493 * secattr and attach it to the socket.
2494 *
2495 * Returns 0 on success or an error code
2496 */
2497 static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
2498 {
2499 struct smack_known *skp;
2500 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2501 int rc = 0;
2502
2503 /*
2504 * Usually the netlabel code will handle changing the
2505 * packet labeling based on the label.
2506 * The case of a single label host is different, because
2507 * a single label host should never get a labeled packet
2508 * even though the label is usually associated with a packet
2509 * label.
2510 */
2511 local_bh_disable();
2512 bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
2513
2514 if (ssp->smk_out == smack_net_ambient ||
2515 labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
2516 netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
2517 else {
2518 skp = ssp->smk_out;
2519 rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel);
2520 }
2521
2522 bh_unlock_sock(sk);
2523 local_bh_enable();
2524
2525 return rc;
2526 }
2527
2528 /**
2529 * smack_netlbel_send - Set the secattr on a socket and perform access checks
2530 * @sk: the socket
2531 * @sap: the destination address
2532 *
2533 * Set the correct secattr for the given socket based on the destination
2534 * address and perform any outbound access checks needed.
2535 *
2536 * Returns 0 on success or an error code.
2537 *
2538 */
2539 static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
2540 {
2541 struct smack_known *skp;
2542 int rc;
2543 int sk_lbl;
2544 struct smack_known *hkp;
2545 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2546 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2547
2548 rcu_read_lock();
2549 hkp = smack_ipv4host_label(sap);
2550 if (hkp != NULL) {
2551 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2552 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2553
2554 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2555 ad.a.u.net->family = sap->sin_family;
2556 ad.a.u.net->dport = sap->sin_port;
2557 ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
2558 #endif
2559 sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET;
2560 skp = ssp->smk_out;
2561 rc = smk_access(skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2562 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 host check", skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2563 } else {
2564 sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
2565 rc = 0;
2566 }
2567 rcu_read_unlock();
2568 if (rc != 0)
2569 return rc;
2570
2571 return smack_netlabel(sk, sk_lbl);
2572 }
2573
2574 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2575 /**
2576 * smk_ipv6_check - check Smack access
2577 * @subject: subject Smack label
2578 * @object: object Smack label
2579 * @address: address
2580 * @act: the action being taken
2581 *
2582 * Check an IPv6 access
2583 */
2584 static int smk_ipv6_check(struct smack_known *subject,
2585 struct smack_known *object,
2586 struct sockaddr_in6 *address, int act)
2587 {
2588 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2589 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2590 #endif
2591 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2592 int rc;
2593
2594 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2595 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2596 ad.a.u.net->family = PF_INET6;
2597 ad.a.u.net->dport = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
2598 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2599 ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = address->sin6_addr;
2600 else
2601 ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = address->sin6_addr;
2602 #endif
2603 rc = smk_access(subject, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2604 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 check", subject, object, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2605 return rc;
2606 }
2607 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
2608
2609 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2610 /**
2611 * smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management
2612 * @sock: socket
2613 * @address: address
2614 *
2615 * Create or update the port list entry
2616 */
2617 static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
2618 {
2619 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
2620 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
2621 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2622 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2623 unsigned short port = 0;
2624
2625 if (address == NULL) {
2626 /*
2627 * This operation is changing the Smack information
2628 * on the bound socket. Take the changes to the port
2629 * as well.
2630 */
2631 rcu_read_lock();
2632 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2633 if (sk != spp->smk_sock)
2634 continue;
2635 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2636 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2637 rcu_read_unlock();
2638 return;
2639 }
2640 /*
2641 * A NULL address is only used for updating existing
2642 * bound entries. If there isn't one, it's OK.
2643 */
2644 rcu_read_unlock();
2645 return;
2646 }
2647
2648 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
2649 port = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
2650 /*
2651 * This is a special case that is safely ignored.
2652 */
2653 if (port == 0)
2654 return;
2655
2656 /*
2657 * Look for an existing port list entry.
2658 * This is an indication that a port is getting reused.
2659 */
2660 rcu_read_lock();
2661 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2662 if (spp->smk_port != port || spp->smk_sock_type != sock->type)
2663 continue;
2664 if (spp->smk_can_reuse != 1) {
2665 rcu_read_unlock();
2666 return;
2667 }
2668 spp->smk_port = port;
2669 spp->smk_sock = sk;
2670 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2671 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2672 spp->smk_can_reuse = 0;
2673 rcu_read_unlock();
2674 return;
2675 }
2676 rcu_read_unlock();
2677 /*
2678 * A new port entry is required.
2679 */
2680 spp = kzalloc(sizeof(*spp), GFP_KERNEL);
2681 if (spp == NULL)
2682 return;
2683
2684 spp->smk_port = port;
2685 spp->smk_sock = sk;
2686 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2687 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2688 spp->smk_sock_type = sock->type;
2689 spp->smk_can_reuse = 0;
2690
2691 mutex_lock(&smack_ipv6_lock);
2692 list_add_rcu(&spp->list, &smk_ipv6_port_list);
2693 mutex_unlock(&smack_ipv6_lock);
2694 return;
2695 }
2696
2697 /**
2698 * smk_ipv6_port_check - check Smack port access
2699 * @sock: socket
2700 * @address: address
2701 *
2702 * Create or update the port list entry
2703 */
2704 static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
2705 int act)
2706 {
2707 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2708 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2709 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
2710 unsigned short port;
2711 struct smack_known *object;
2712
2713 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
2714 skp = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2715 object = ssp->smk_in;
2716 } else {
2717 skp = ssp->smk_out;
2718 object = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2719 }
2720
2721 /*
2722 * The other end is a single label host.
2723 */
2724 if (skp != NULL && object != NULL)
2725 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2726 if (skp == NULL)
2727 skp = smack_net_ambient;
2728 if (object == NULL)
2729 object = smack_net_ambient;
2730
2731 /*
2732 * It's remote, so port lookup does no good.
2733 */
2734 if (!smk_ipv6_localhost(address))
2735 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2736
2737 /*
2738 * It's local so the send check has to have passed.
2739 */
2740 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2741 return 0;
2742
2743 port = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
2744 rcu_read_lock();
2745 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2746 if (spp->smk_port != port || spp->smk_sock_type != sk->sk_type)
2747 continue;
2748 object = spp->smk_in;
2749 if (act == SMK_CONNECTING)
2750 ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out;
2751 break;
2752 }
2753 rcu_read_unlock();
2754
2755 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2756 }
2757 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
2758
2759 /**
2760 * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
2761 * @inode: the object
2762 * @name: attribute name
2763 * @value: attribute value
2764 * @size: size of the attribute
2765 * @flags: unused
2766 *
2767 * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob
2768 *
2769 * Returns 0 on success, or an error code
2770 */
2771 static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2772 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2773 {
2774 struct smack_known *skp;
2775 struct inode_smack *nsp = inode->i_security;
2776 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2777 struct socket *sock;
2778 int rc = 0;
2779
2780 if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0)
2781 return -EINVAL;
2782
2783 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
2784 if (IS_ERR(skp))
2785 return PTR_ERR(skp);
2786
2787 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
2788 nsp->smk_inode = skp;
2789 nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2790 return 0;
2791 }
2792 /*
2793 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
2794 */
2795 if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2796 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2797
2798 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
2799 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
2800 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2801
2802 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2803
2804 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
2805 ssp->smk_in = skp;
2806 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
2807 ssp->smk_out = skp;
2808 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
2809 rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
2810 if (rc != 0)
2811 printk(KERN_WARNING
2812 "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
2813 __func__, -rc);
2814 }
2815 } else
2816 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2817
2818 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2819 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
2820 smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL);
2821 #endif
2822
2823 return 0;
2824 }
2825
2826 /**
2827 * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup
2828 * @sock: the socket
2829 * @family: protocol family
2830 * @type: unused
2831 * @protocol: unused
2832 * @kern: unused
2833 *
2834 * Sets the netlabel information on the socket
2835 *
2836 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2837 */
2838 static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2839 int type, int protocol, int kern)
2840 {
2841 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2842
2843 if (sock->sk == NULL)
2844 return 0;
2845
2846 /*
2847 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
2848 */
2849 if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
2850 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2851 ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
2852 ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
2853 }
2854
2855 if (family != PF_INET)
2856 return 0;
2857 /*
2858 * Set the outbound netlbl.
2859 */
2860 return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
2861 }
2862
2863 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2864 /**
2865 * smack_socket_bind - record port binding information.
2866 * @sock: the socket
2867 * @address: the port address
2868 * @addrlen: size of the address
2869 *
2870 * Records the label bound to a port.
2871 *
2872 * Returns 0
2873 */
2874 static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
2875 int addrlen)
2876 {
2877 if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
2878 smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address);
2879 return 0;
2880 }
2881 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
2882
2883 /**
2884 * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
2885 * @sock: the socket
2886 * @sap: the other end
2887 * @addrlen: size of sap
2888 *
2889 * Verifies that a connection may be possible
2890 *
2891 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2892 */
2893 static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
2894 int addrlen)
2895 {
2896 int rc = 0;
2897 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2898 struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;
2899 #endif
2900 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
2901 struct smack_known *rsp;
2902 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2903 #endif
2904
2905 if (sock->sk == NULL)
2906 return 0;
2907
2908 switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
2909 case PF_INET:
2910 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
2911 return -EINVAL;
2912 rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
2913 break;
2914 case PF_INET6:
2915 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
2916 return -EINVAL;
2917 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
2918 rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
2919 if (rsp != NULL)
2920 rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
2921 SMK_CONNECTING);
2922 #endif
2923 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2924 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING);
2925 #endif
2926 break;
2927 }
2928 return rc;
2929 }
2930
2931 /**
2932 * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values
2933 * @flags: the S_ value
2934 *
2935 * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value
2936 */
2937 static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
2938 {
2939 int may = 0;
2940
2941 if (flags & S_IRUGO)
2942 may |= MAY_READ;
2943 if (flags & S_IWUGO)
2944 may |= MAY_WRITE;
2945 if (flags & S_IXUGO)
2946 may |= MAY_EXEC;
2947
2948 return may;
2949 }
2950
2951 /**
2952 * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg
2953 * @msg: the object
2954 *
2955 * Returns 0
2956 */
2957 static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2958 {
2959 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2960
2961 msg->security = skp;
2962 return 0;
2963 }
2964
2965 /**
2966 * smack_msg_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg_msg
2967 * @msg: the object
2968 *
2969 * Clears the blob pointer
2970 */
2971 static void smack_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2972 {
2973 msg->security = NULL;
2974 }
2975
2976 /**
2977 * smack_of_shm - the smack pointer for the shm
2978 * @shp: the object
2979 *
2980 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
2981 */
2982 static struct smack_known *smack_of_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2983 {
2984 return (struct smack_known *)shp->shm_perm.security;
2985 }
2986
2987 /**
2988 * smack_shm_alloc_security - Set the security blob for shm
2989 * @shp: the object
2990 *
2991 * Returns 0
2992 */
2993 static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2994 {
2995 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
2996 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2997
2998 isp->security = skp;
2999 return 0;
3000 }
3001
3002 /**
3003 * smack_shm_free_security - Clear the security blob for shm
3004 * @shp: the object
3005 *
3006 * Clears the blob pointer
3007 */
3008 static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
3009 {
3010 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
3011
3012 isp->security = NULL;
3013 }
3014
3015 /**
3016 * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
3017 * @shp : the object
3018 * @access : access requested
3019 *
3020 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3021 */
3022 static int smk_curacc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int access)
3023 {
3024 struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
3025 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3026 int rc;
3027
3028 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3029 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3030 ad.a.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.id;
3031 #endif
3032 rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
3033 rc = smk_bu_current("shm", ssp, access, rc);
3034 return rc;
3035 }
3036
3037 /**
3038 * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
3039 * @shp: the object
3040 * @shmflg: access requested
3041 *
3042 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3043 */
3044 static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
3045 {
3046 int may;
3047
3048 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
3049 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
3050 }
3051
3052 /**
3053 * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm
3054 * @shp: the object
3055 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3056 *
3057 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3058 */
3059 static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
3060 {
3061 int may;
3062
3063 switch (cmd) {
3064 case IPC_STAT:
3065 case SHM_STAT:
3066 may = MAY_READ;
3067 break;
3068 case IPC_SET:
3069 case SHM_LOCK:
3070 case SHM_UNLOCK:
3071 case IPC_RMID:
3072 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3073 break;
3074 case IPC_INFO:
3075 case SHM_INFO:
3076 /*
3077 * System level information.
3078 */
3079 return 0;
3080 default:
3081 return -EINVAL;
3082 }
3083 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
3084 }
3085
3086 /**
3087 * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat
3088 * @shp: the object
3089 * @shmaddr: unused
3090 * @shmflg: access requested
3091 *
3092 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3093 */
3094 static int smack_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
3095 int shmflg)
3096 {
3097 int may;
3098
3099 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
3100 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
3101 }
3102
3103 /**
3104 * smack_of_sem - the smack pointer for the sem
3105 * @sma: the object
3106 *
3107 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
3108 */
3109 static struct smack_known *smack_of_sem(struct sem_array *sma)
3110 {
3111 return (struct smack_known *)sma->sem_perm.security;
3112 }
3113
3114 /**
3115 * smack_sem_alloc_security - Set the security blob for sem
3116 * @sma: the object
3117 *
3118 * Returns 0
3119 */
3120 static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3121 {
3122 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
3123 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
3124
3125 isp->security = skp;
3126 return 0;
3127 }
3128
3129 /**
3130 * smack_sem_free_security - Clear the security blob for sem
3131 * @sma: the object
3132 *
3133 * Clears the blob pointer
3134 */
3135 static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3136 {
3137 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
3138
3139 isp->security = NULL;
3140 }
3141
3142 /**
3143 * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem
3144 * @sma : the object
3145 * @access : access requested
3146 *
3147 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3148 */
3149 static int smk_curacc_sem(struct sem_array *sma, int access)
3150 {
3151 struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
3152 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3153 int rc;
3154
3155 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3156 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3157 ad.a.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.id;
3158 #endif
3159 rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
3160 rc = smk_bu_current("sem", ssp, access, rc);
3161 return rc;
3162 }
3163
3164 /**
3165 * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
3166 * @sma: the object
3167 * @semflg: access requested
3168 *
3169 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3170 */
3171 static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
3172 {
3173 int may;
3174
3175 may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
3176 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
3177 }
3178
3179 /**
3180 * smack_sem_shmctl - Smack access check for sem
3181 * @sma: the object
3182 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3183 *
3184 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3185 */
3186 static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
3187 {
3188 int may;
3189
3190 switch (cmd) {
3191 case GETPID:
3192 case GETNCNT:
3193 case GETZCNT:
3194 case GETVAL:
3195 case GETALL:
3196 case IPC_STAT:
3197 case SEM_STAT:
3198 may = MAY_READ;
3199 break;
3200 case SETVAL:
3201 case SETALL:
3202 case IPC_RMID:
3203 case IPC_SET:
3204 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3205 break;
3206 case IPC_INFO:
3207 case SEM_INFO:
3208 /*
3209 * System level information
3210 */
3211 return 0;
3212 default:
3213 return -EINVAL;
3214 }
3215
3216 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
3217 }
3218
3219 /**
3220 * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations
3221 * @sma: the object
3222 * @sops: unused
3223 * @nsops: unused
3224 * @alter: unused
3225 *
3226 * Treated as read and write in all cases.
3227 *
3228 * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise
3229 */
3230 static int smack_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
3231 unsigned nsops, int alter)
3232 {
3233 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, MAY_READWRITE);
3234 }
3235
3236 /**
3237 * smack_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg
3238 * @msq: the object
3239 *
3240 * Returns 0
3241 */
3242 static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3243 {
3244 struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
3245 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
3246
3247 kisp->security = skp;
3248 return 0;
3249 }
3250
3251 /**
3252 * smack_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg
3253 * @msq: the object
3254 *
3255 * Clears the blob pointer
3256 */
3257 static void smack_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3258 {
3259 struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
3260
3261 kisp->security = NULL;
3262 }
3263
3264 /**
3265 * smack_of_msq - the smack pointer for the msq
3266 * @msq: the object
3267 *
3268 * Returns a pointer to the smack label entry
3269 */
3270 static struct smack_known *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq)
3271 {
3272 return (struct smack_known *)msq->q_perm.security;
3273 }
3274
3275 /**
3276 * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq
3277 * @msq : the msq
3278 * @access : access requested
3279 *
3280 * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise
3281 */
3282 static int smk_curacc_msq(struct msg_queue *msq, int access)
3283 {
3284 struct smack_known *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
3285 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3286 int rc;
3287
3288 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3289 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3290 ad.a.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.id;
3291 #endif
3292 rc = smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
3293 rc = smk_bu_current("msq", msp, access, rc);
3294 return rc;
3295 }
3296
3297 /**
3298 * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
3299 * @msq: the object
3300 * @msqflg: access requested
3301 *
3302 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3303 */
3304 static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
3305 {
3306 int may;
3307
3308 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3309 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3310 }
3311
3312 /**
3313 * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue
3314 * @msq: the object
3315 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3316 *
3317 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3318 */
3319 static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
3320 {
3321 int may;
3322
3323 switch (cmd) {
3324 case IPC_STAT:
3325 case MSG_STAT:
3326 may = MAY_READ;
3327 break;
3328 case IPC_SET:
3329 case IPC_RMID:
3330 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3331 break;
3332 case IPC_INFO:
3333 case MSG_INFO:
3334 /*
3335 * System level information
3336 */
3337 return 0;
3338 default:
3339 return -EINVAL;
3340 }
3341
3342 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3343 }
3344
3345 /**
3346 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3347 * @msq: the object
3348 * @msg: unused
3349 * @msqflg: access requested
3350 *
3351 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3352 */
3353 static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3354 int msqflg)
3355 {
3356 int may;
3357
3358 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3359 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3360 }
3361
3362 /**
3363 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3364 * @msq: the object
3365 * @msg: unused
3366 * @target: unused
3367 * @type: unused
3368 * @mode: unused
3369 *
3370 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3371 */
3372 static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3373 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
3374 {
3375 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, MAY_READWRITE);
3376 }
3377
3378 /**
3379 * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission()
3380 * @ipp: the object permissions
3381 * @flag: access requested
3382 *
3383 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3384 */
3385 static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
3386 {
3387 struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
3388 int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
3389 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3390 int rc;
3391
3392 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3393 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3394 ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
3395 #endif
3396 rc = smk_curacc(iskp, may, &ad);
3397 rc = smk_bu_current("svipc", iskp, may, rc);
3398 return rc;
3399 }
3400
3401 /**
3402 * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id
3403 * @ipp: the object permissions
3404 * @secid: where result will be saved
3405 */
3406 static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
3407 {
3408 struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
3409
3410 *secid = iskp->smk_secid;
3411 }
3412
3413 /**
3414 * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
3415 * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached
3416 * @inode: the object
3417 *
3418 * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
3419 */
3420 static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
3421 {
3422 struct super_block *sbp;
3423 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
3424 struct inode_smack *isp;
3425 struct smack_known *skp;
3426 struct smack_known *ckp = smk_of_current();
3427 struct smack_known *final;
3428 char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
3429 int transflag = 0;
3430 int rc;
3431 struct dentry *dp;
3432
3433 if (inode == NULL)
3434 return;
3435
3436 isp = inode->i_security;
3437
3438 mutex_lock(&isp->smk_lock);
3439 /*
3440 * If the inode is already instantiated
3441 * take the quick way out
3442 */
3443 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT)
3444 goto unlockandout;
3445
3446 sbp = inode->i_sb;
3447 sbsp = sbp->s_security;
3448 /*
3449 * We're going to use the superblock default label
3450 * if there's no label on the file.
3451 */
3452 final = sbsp->smk_default;
3453
3454 /*
3455 * If this is the root inode the superblock
3456 * may be in the process of initialization.
3457 * If that is the case use the root value out
3458 * of the superblock.
3459 */
3460 if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
3461 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3462 case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3463 /*
3464 * The cgroup filesystem is never mounted,
3465 * so there's no opportunity to set the mount
3466 * options.
3467 */
3468 sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_star;
3469 sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_star;
3470 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3471 break;
3472 case TMPFS_MAGIC:
3473 /*
3474 * What about shmem/tmpfs anonymous files with dentry
3475 * obtained from d_alloc_pseudo()?
3476 */
3477 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3478 break;
3479 case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
3480 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3481 break;
3482 case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
3483 /*
3484 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
3485 * structures associated with the task involved.
3486 */
3487 isp->smk_inode = &smack_known_star;
3488 break;
3489 default:
3490 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3491 break;
3492 }
3493 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
3494 goto unlockandout;
3495 }
3496
3497 /*
3498 * This is pretty hackish.
3499 * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do
3500 * file system specific code, but it does help
3501 * with keeping it simple.
3502 */
3503 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3504 case SMACK_MAGIC:
3505 case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3506 /*
3507 * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
3508 * that the smack file system doesn't do
3509 * extended attributes.
3510 *
3511 * Cgroupfs is special
3512 */
3513 final = &smack_known_star;
3514 break;
3515 case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
3516 /*
3517 * devpts seems content with the label of the task.
3518 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
3519 * pty with respect.
3520 */
3521 final = ckp;
3522 break;
3523 case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
3524 /*
3525 * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
3526 * The superblock default suffices.
3527 */
3528 break;
3529 case TMPFS_MAGIC:
3530 /*
3531 * Device labels should come from the filesystem,
3532 * but watch out, because they're volitile,
3533 * getting recreated on every reboot.
3534 */
3535 final = &smack_known_star;
3536 /*
3537 * No break.
3538 *
3539 * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
3540 * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
3541 * to set mount options simulate setting the
3542 * superblock default.
3543 */
3544 default:
3545 /*
3546 * This isn't an understood special case.
3547 * Get the value from the xattr.
3548 */
3549
3550 /*
3551 * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data.
3552 */
3553 if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
3554 final = &smack_known_star;
3555 break;
3556 }
3557 /*
3558 * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
3559 * Use the aforeapplied default.
3560 * It would be curious if the label of the task
3561 * does not match that assigned.
3562 */
3563 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
3564 break;
3565 /*
3566 * Get the dentry for xattr.
3567 */
3568 dp = dget(opt_dentry);
3569 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
3570 if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skp))
3571 final = skp;
3572
3573 /*
3574 * Transmuting directory
3575 */
3576 if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
3577 /*
3578 * If this is a new directory and the label was
3579 * transmuted when the inode was initialized
3580 * set the transmute attribute on the directory
3581 * and mark the inode.
3582 *
3583 * If there is a transmute attribute on the
3584 * directory mark the inode.
3585 */
3586 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_CHANGED) {
3587 isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
3588 rc = __vfs_setxattr(dp, inode,
3589 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
3590 TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE,
3591 0);
3592 } else {
3593 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, inode,
3594 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, trattr,
3595 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE);
3596 if (rc >= 0 && strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
3597 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
3598 rc = -EINVAL;
3599 }
3600 if (rc >= 0)
3601 transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
3602 }
3603 /*
3604 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
3605 */
3606 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
3607 if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3608 skp == &smack_known_web)
3609 skp = NULL;
3610 isp->smk_task = skp;
3611
3612 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
3613 if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3614 skp == &smack_known_web)
3615 skp = NULL;
3616 isp->smk_mmap = skp;
3617
3618 dput(dp);
3619 break;
3620 }
3621
3622 if (final == NULL)
3623 isp->smk_inode = ckp;
3624 else
3625 isp->smk_inode = final;
3626
3627 isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
3628
3629 unlockandout:
3630 mutex_unlock(&isp->smk_lock);
3631 return;
3632 }
3633
3634 /**
3635 * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access
3636 * @p: the object task
3637 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3638 * @value: where to put the result
3639 *
3640 * Places a copy of the task Smack into value
3641 *
3642 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3643 */
3644 static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
3645 {
3646 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
3647 char *cp;
3648 int slen;
3649
3650 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3651 return -EINVAL;
3652
3653 cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
3654 if (cp == NULL)
3655 return -ENOMEM;
3656
3657 slen = strlen(cp);
3658 *value = cp;
3659 return slen;
3660 }
3661
3662 /**
3663 * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
3664 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3665 * @value: the value to set
3666 * @size: the size of the value
3667 *
3668 * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
3669 * is permitted and only with privilege
3670 *
3671 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3672 */
3673 static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
3674 {
3675 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
3676 struct cred *new;
3677 struct smack_known *skp;
3678 struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
3679 int rc;
3680
3681 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
3682 return -EPERM;
3683
3684 if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
3685 return -EINVAL;
3686
3687 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3688 return -EINVAL;
3689
3690 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
3691 if (IS_ERR(skp))
3692 return PTR_ERR(skp);
3693
3694 /*
3695 * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label
3696 * and the star ("*") label.
3697 */
3698 if (skp == &smack_known_web || skp == &smack_known_star)
3699 return -EINVAL;
3700
3701 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
3702 rc = -EPERM;
3703 list_for_each_entry(sklep, &tsp->smk_relabel, list)
3704 if (sklep->smk_label == skp) {
3705 rc = 0;
3706 break;
3707 }
3708 if (rc)
3709 return rc;
3710 }
3711
3712 new = prepare_creds();
3713 if (new == NULL)
3714 return -ENOMEM;
3715
3716 tsp = new->security;
3717 tsp->smk_task = skp;
3718 /*
3719 * process can change its label only once
3720 */
3721 smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
3722
3723 commit_creds(new);
3724 return size;
3725 }
3726
3727 /**
3728 * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
3729 * @sock: one sock
3730 * @other: the other sock
3731 * @newsk: unused
3732 *
3733 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3734 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3735 */
3736 static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
3737 struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
3738 {
3739 struct smack_known *skp;
3740 struct smack_known *okp;
3741 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
3742 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
3743 struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
3744 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3745 int rc = 0;
3746 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3747 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3748 #endif
3749
3750 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
3751 skp = ssp->smk_out;
3752 okp = osp->smk_in;
3753 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3754 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3755 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
3756 #endif
3757 rc = smk_access(skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3758 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3759 if (rc == 0) {
3760 okp = osp->smk_out;
3761 skp = ssp->smk_in;
3762 rc = smk_access(okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3763 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", okp, skp,
3764 MAY_WRITE, rc);
3765 }
3766 }
3767
3768 /*
3769 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
3770 */
3771 if (rc == 0) {
3772 nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
3773 ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
3774 }
3775
3776 return rc;
3777 }
3778
3779 /**
3780 * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS
3781 * @sock: one socket
3782 * @other: the other socket
3783 *
3784 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3785 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3786 */
3787 static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
3788 {
3789 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3790 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
3791 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3792 int rc;
3793
3794 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3795 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3796
3797 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3798 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
3799 #endif
3800
3801 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
3802 return 0;
3803
3804 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3805 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS send", ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3806 return rc;
3807 }
3808
3809 /**
3810 * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
3811 * @sock: the socket
3812 * @msg: the message
3813 * @size: the size of the message
3814 *
3815 * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination host.
3816 * For IPv4 this is only a question if the destination is a single label host.
3817 * For IPv6 this is a check against the label of the port.
3818 */
3819 static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3820 int size)
3821 {
3822 struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
3823 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3824 struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
3825 #endif
3826 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3827 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3828 struct smack_known *rsp;
3829 #endif
3830 int rc = 0;
3831
3832 /*
3833 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
3834 */
3835 if (sip == NULL)
3836 return 0;
3837
3838 switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
3839 case AF_INET:
3840 rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
3841 break;
3842 case AF_INET6:
3843 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3844 rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sap);
3845 if (rsp != NULL)
3846 rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sap,
3847 SMK_CONNECTING);
3848 #endif
3849 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
3850 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING);
3851 #endif
3852 break;
3853 }
3854 return rc;
3855 }
3856
3857 /**
3858 * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack
3859 * @sap: netlabel secattr
3860 * @ssp: socket security information
3861 *
3862 * Returns a pointer to a Smack label entry found on the label list.
3863 */
3864 static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
3865 struct socket_smack *ssp)
3866 {
3867 struct smack_known *skp;
3868 int found = 0;
3869 int acat;
3870 int kcat;
3871
3872 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
3873 /*
3874 * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
3875 * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
3876 * behaving the way we expect it to.
3877 *
3878 * Look it up in the label table
3879 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
3880 * for the packet fall back on the network
3881 * ambient value.
3882 */
3883 rcu_read_lock();
3884 list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
3885 if (sap->attr.mls.lvl != skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl)
3886 continue;
3887 /*
3888 * Compare the catsets. Use the netlbl APIs.
3889 */
3890 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) {
3891 if ((skp->smk_netlabel.flags &
3892 NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0)
3893 found = 1;
3894 break;
3895 }
3896 for (acat = -1, kcat = -1; acat == kcat; ) {
3897 acat = netlbl_catmap_walk(sap->attr.mls.cat,
3898 acat + 1);
3899 kcat = netlbl_catmap_walk(
3900 skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat,
3901 kcat + 1);
3902 if (acat < 0 || kcat < 0)
3903 break;
3904 }
3905 if (acat == kcat) {
3906 found = 1;
3907 break;
3908 }
3909 }
3910 rcu_read_unlock();
3911
3912 if (found)
3913 return skp;
3914
3915 if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == &smack_known_star)
3916 return &smack_known_web;
3917 return &smack_known_star;
3918 }
3919 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0)
3920 /*
3921 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
3922 */
3923 return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
3924 /*
3925 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
3926 * for the packet fall back on the network
3927 * ambient value.
3928 */
3929 return smack_net_ambient;
3930 }
3931
3932 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3933 static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
3934 {
3935 u8 nexthdr;
3936 int offset;
3937 int proto = -EINVAL;
3938 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h;
3939 struct ipv6hdr *ip6;
3940 __be16 frag_off;
3941 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3942 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3943 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3944
3945 sip->sin6_port = 0;
3946
3947 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3948 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3949 if (ip6 == NULL)
3950 return -EINVAL;
3951 sip->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
3952
3953 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3954 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3955 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3956 if (offset < 0)
3957 return -EINVAL;
3958
3959 proto = nexthdr;
3960 switch (proto) {
3961 case IPPROTO_TCP:
3962 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3963 if (th != NULL)
3964 sip->sin6_port = th->source;
3965 break;
3966 case IPPROTO_UDP:
3967 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3968 if (uh != NULL)
3969 sip->sin6_port = uh->source;
3970 break;
3971 case IPPROTO_DCCP:
3972 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3973 if (dh != NULL)
3974 sip->sin6_port = dh->dccph_sport;
3975 break;
3976 }
3977 return proto;
3978 }
3979 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3980
3981 /**
3982 * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
3983 * @sk: socket
3984 * @skb: packet
3985 *
3986 * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise
3987 */
3988 static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3989 {
3990 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
3991 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
3992 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
3993 int rc = 0;
3994 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3995 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3996 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3997 #endif
3998 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3999 struct sockaddr_in6 sadd;
4000 int proto;
4001 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4002
4003 switch (sk->sk_family) {
4004 case PF_INET:
4005 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4006 /*
4007 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
4008 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
4009 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
4010 */
4011 if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
4012 skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
4013 goto access_check;
4014 }
4015 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
4016 /*
4017 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
4018 */
4019 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
4020
4021 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
4022 if (rc == 0)
4023 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4024 else
4025 skp = smack_net_ambient;
4026
4027 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4028
4029 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4030 access_check:
4031 #endif
4032 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4033 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4034 ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4035 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4036 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4037 #endif
4038 /*
4039 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
4040 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
4041 * This is the simplist possible security model
4042 * for networking.
4043 */
4044 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4045 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
4046 MAY_WRITE, rc);
4047 if (rc != 0)
4048 netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, sk->sk_family, rc, 0);
4049 break;
4050 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4051 case PF_INET6:
4052 proto = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd);
4053 if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_TCP)
4054 break;
4055 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4056 if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)
4057 skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
4058 else
4059 skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd);
4060 if (skp == NULL)
4061 skp = smack_net_ambient;
4062 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4063 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4064 ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4065 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4066 ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4067 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4068 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4069 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
4070 MAY_WRITE, rc);
4071 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING */
4072 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4073 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING);
4074 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
4075 break;
4076 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4077 }
4078
4079 return rc;
4080 }
4081
4082 /**
4083 * smack_socket_getpeersec_stream - pull in packet label
4084 * @sock: the socket
4085 * @optval: user's destination
4086 * @optlen: size thereof
4087 * @len: max thereof
4088 *
4089 * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
4090 */
4091 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
4092 char __user *optval,
4093 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4094 {
4095 struct socket_smack *ssp;
4096 char *rcp = "";
4097 int slen = 1;
4098 int rc = 0;
4099
4100 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4101 if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
4102 rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
4103 slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
4104 }
4105
4106 if (slen > len)
4107 rc = -ERANGE;
4108 else if (copy_to_user(optval, rcp, slen) != 0)
4109 rc = -EFAULT;
4110
4111 if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0)
4112 rc = -EFAULT;
4113
4114 return rc;
4115 }
4116
4117
4118 /**
4119 * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
4120 * @sock: the peer socket
4121 * @skb: packet data
4122 * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
4123 *
4124 * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
4125 */
4126 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
4127 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4128
4129 {
4130 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
4131 struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
4132 struct smack_known *skp;
4133 int family = PF_UNSPEC;
4134 u32 s = 0; /* 0 is the invalid secid */
4135 int rc;
4136
4137 if (skb != NULL) {
4138 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4139 family = PF_INET;
4140 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4141 else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4142 family = PF_INET6;
4143 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4144 }
4145 if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
4146 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4147
4148 switch (family) {
4149 case PF_UNIX:
4150 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4151 s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
4152 break;
4153 case PF_INET:
4154 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4155 s = skb->secmark;
4156 if (s != 0)
4157 break;
4158 #endif
4159 /*
4160 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
4161 */
4162 if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL)
4163 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4164 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
4165 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
4166 if (rc == 0) {
4167 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4168 s = skp->smk_secid;
4169 }
4170 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4171 break;
4172 case PF_INET6:
4173 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4174 s = skb->secmark;
4175 #endif
4176 break;
4177 }
4178 *secid = s;
4179 if (s == 0)
4180 return -EINVAL;
4181 return 0;
4182 }
4183
4184 /**
4185 * smack_sock_graft - Initialize a newly created socket with an existing sock
4186 * @sk: child sock
4187 * @parent: parent socket
4188 *
4189 * Set the smk_{in,out} state of an existing sock based on the process that
4190 * is creating the new socket.
4191 */
4192 static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4193 {
4194 struct socket_smack *ssp;
4195 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
4196
4197 if (sk == NULL ||
4198 (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
4199 return;
4200
4201 ssp = sk->sk_security;
4202 ssp->smk_in = skp;
4203 ssp->smk_out = skp;
4204 /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
4205 }
4206
4207 /**
4208 * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
4209 * @sk: socket involved
4210 * @skb: packet
4211 * @req: unused
4212 *
4213 * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to
4214 * the socket, otherwise an error code
4215 */
4216 static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4217 struct request_sock *req)
4218 {
4219 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4220 struct smack_known *skp;
4221 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4222 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
4223 struct sockaddr_in addr;
4224 struct iphdr *hdr;
4225 struct smack_known *hskp;
4226 int rc;
4227 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4228 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4229 struct lsm_network_audit net;
4230 #endif
4231
4232 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4233 if (family == PF_INET6) {
4234 /*
4235 * Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving
4236 * via IPv6 sockets. Don't set up netlabel
4237 * processing on IPv6.
4238 */
4239 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4240 family = PF_INET;
4241 else
4242 return 0;
4243 }
4244 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4245
4246 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4247 /*
4248 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
4249 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
4250 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
4251 */
4252 if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
4253 skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
4254 goto access_check;
4255 }
4256 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
4257
4258 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
4259 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
4260 if (rc == 0)
4261 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4262 else
4263 skp = &smack_known_huh;
4264 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4265
4266 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4267 access_check:
4268 #endif
4269
4270 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4271 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4272 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
4273 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4274 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4275 #endif
4276 /*
4277 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
4278 * here. Read access is not required.
4279 */
4280 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4281 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 connect", skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
4282 if (rc != 0)
4283 return rc;
4284
4285 /*
4286 * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
4287 * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
4288 */
4289 req->peer_secid = skp->smk_secid;
4290
4291 /*
4292 * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
4293 * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
4294 * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
4295 */
4296 hdr = ip_hdr(skb);
4297 addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
4298 rcu_read_lock();
4299 hskp = smack_ipv4host_label(&addr);
4300 rcu_read_unlock();
4301
4302 if (hskp == NULL)
4303 rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &skp->smk_netlabel);
4304 else
4305 netlbl_req_delattr(req);
4306
4307 return rc;
4308 }
4309
4310 /**
4311 * smack_inet_csk_clone - Copy the connection information to the new socket
4312 * @sk: the new socket
4313 * @req: the connection's request_sock
4314 *
4315 * Transfer the connection's peer label to the newly created socket.
4316 */
4317 static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
4318 const struct request_sock *req)
4319 {
4320 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4321 struct smack_known *skp;
4322
4323 if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
4324 skp = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
4325 ssp->smk_packet = skp;
4326 } else
4327 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
4328 }
4329
4330 /*
4331 * Key management security hooks
4332 *
4333 * Casey has not tested key support very heavily.
4334 * The permission check is most likely too restrictive.
4335 * If you care about keys please have a look.
4336 */
4337 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4338
4339 /**
4340 * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
4341 * @key: object
4342 * @cred: the credentials to use
4343 * @flags: unused
4344 *
4345 * No allocation required
4346 *
4347 * Returns 0
4348 */
4349 static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
4350 unsigned long flags)
4351 {
4352 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
4353
4354 key->security = skp;
4355 return 0;
4356 }
4357
4358 /**
4359 * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
4360 * @key: the object
4361 *
4362 * Clear the blob pointer
4363 */
4364 static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
4365 {
4366 key->security = NULL;
4367 }
4368
4369 /**
4370 * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
4371 * @key_ref: gets to the object
4372 * @cred: the credentials to use
4373 * @perm: requested key permissions
4374 *
4375 * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
4376 * an error code otherwise
4377 */
4378 static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4379 const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
4380 {
4381 struct key *keyp;
4382 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4383 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
4384 int request = 0;
4385 int rc;
4386
4387 keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4388 if (keyp == NULL)
4389 return -EINVAL;
4390 /*
4391 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
4392 * it may do so.
4393 */
4394 if (keyp->security == NULL)
4395 return 0;
4396 /*
4397 * This should not occur
4398 */
4399 if (tkp == NULL)
4400 return -EACCES;
4401 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4402 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
4403 ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
4404 ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
4405 #endif
4406 if (perm & KEY_NEED_READ)
4407 request = MAY_READ;
4408 if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
4409 request = MAY_WRITE;
4410 rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
4411 rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
4412 return rc;
4413 }
4414
4415 /*
4416 * smack_key_getsecurity - Smack label tagging the key
4417 * @key points to the key to be queried
4418 * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
4419 * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
4420 * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
4421 * an error.
4422 * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
4423 */
4424 static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
4425 {
4426 struct smack_known *skp = key->security;
4427 size_t length;
4428 char *copy;
4429
4430 if (key->security == NULL) {
4431 *_buffer = NULL;
4432 return 0;
4433 }
4434
4435 copy = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
4436 if (copy == NULL)
4437 return -ENOMEM;
4438 length = strlen(copy) + 1;
4439
4440 *_buffer = copy;
4441 return length;
4442 }
4443
4444 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4445
4446 /*
4447 * Smack Audit hooks
4448 *
4449 * Audit requires a unique representation of each Smack specific
4450 * rule. This unique representation is used to distinguish the
4451 * object to be audited from remaining kernel objects and also
4452 * works as a glue between the audit hooks.
4453 *
4454 * Since repository entries are added but never deleted, we'll use
4455 * the smack_known label address related to the given audit rule as
4456 * the needed unique representation. This also better fits the smack
4457 * model where nearly everything is a label.
4458 */
4459 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4460
4461 /**
4462 * smack_audit_rule_init - Initialize a smack audit rule
4463 * @field: audit rule fields given from user-space (audit.h)
4464 * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
4465 * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
4466 * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
4467 *
4468 * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
4469 * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
4470 */
4471 static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
4472 {
4473 struct smack_known *skp;
4474 char **rule = (char **)vrule;
4475 *rule = NULL;
4476
4477 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4478 return -EINVAL;
4479
4480 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
4481 return -EINVAL;
4482
4483 skp = smk_import_entry(rulestr, 0);
4484 if (IS_ERR(skp))
4485 return PTR_ERR(skp);
4486
4487 *rule = skp->smk_known;
4488
4489 return 0;
4490 }
4491
4492 /**
4493 * smack_audit_rule_known - Distinguish Smack audit rules
4494 * @krule: rule of interest, in Audit kernel representation format
4495 *
4496 * This is used to filter Smack rules from remaining Audit ones.
4497 * If it's proved that this rule belongs to us, the
4498 * audit_rule_match hook will be called to do the final judgement.
4499 */
4500 static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
4501 {
4502 struct audit_field *f;
4503 int i;
4504
4505 for (i = 0; i < krule->field_count; i++) {
4506 f = &krule->fields[i];
4507
4508 if (f->type == AUDIT_SUBJ_USER || f->type == AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4509 return 1;
4510 }
4511
4512 return 0;
4513 }
4514
4515 /**
4516 * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
4517 * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test
4518 * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
4519 * @op: required testing operator
4520 * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
4521 * @actx: audit context associated with the check
4522 *
4523 * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
4524 * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
4525 */
4526 static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
4527 struct audit_context *actx)
4528 {
4529 struct smack_known *skp;
4530 char *rule = vrule;
4531
4532 if (unlikely(!rule)) {
4533 WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n");
4534 return -ENOENT;
4535 }
4536
4537 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4538 return 0;
4539
4540 skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4541
4542 /*
4543 * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
4544 * both pointers will point to the same smack_known
4545 * label.
4546 */
4547 if (op == Audit_equal)
4548 return (rule == skp->smk_known);
4549 if (op == Audit_not_equal)
4550 return (rule != skp->smk_known);
4551
4552 return 0;
4553 }
4554
4555 /*
4556 * There is no need for a smack_audit_rule_free hook.
4557 * No memory was allocated.
4558 */
4559
4560 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4561
4562 /**
4563 * smack_ismaclabel - check if xattr @name references a smack MAC label
4564 * @name: Full xattr name to check.
4565 */
4566 static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
4567 {
4568 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0);
4569 }
4570
4571
4572 /**
4573 * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
4574 * @secid: incoming integer
4575 * @secdata: destination
4576 * @seclen: how long it is
4577 *
4578 * Exists for networking code.
4579 */
4580 static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
4581 {
4582 struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4583
4584 if (secdata)
4585 *secdata = skp->smk_known;
4586 *seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
4587 return 0;
4588 }
4589
4590 /**
4591 * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
4592 * @secdata: smack label
4593 * @seclen: how long result is
4594 * @secid: outgoing integer
4595 *
4596 * Exists for audit and networking code.
4597 */
4598 static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
4599 {
4600 struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
4601
4602 if (skp)
4603 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
4604 else
4605 *secid = 0;
4606 return 0;
4607 }
4608
4609 /*
4610 * There used to be a smack_release_secctx hook
4611 * that did nothing back when hooks were in a vector.
4612 * Now that there's a list such a hook adds cost.
4613 */
4614
4615 static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4616 {
4617 return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
4618 }
4619
4620 static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4621 {
4622 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
4623 }
4624
4625 static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
4626 {
4627 int len = 0;
4628 len = smack_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
4629
4630 if (len < 0)
4631 return len;
4632 *ctxlen = len;
4633 return 0;
4634 }
4635
4636 static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = {
4637 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
4638 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
4639 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
4640
4641 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
4642 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
4643 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, smack_sb_copy_data),
4644 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, smack_sb_kern_mount),
4645 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
4646 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, smack_set_mnt_opts),
4647 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, smack_parse_opts_str),
4648
4649 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds),
4650 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, smack_bprm_committing_creds),
4651 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, smack_bprm_secureexec),
4652
4653 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
4654 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, smack_inode_free_security),
4655 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security),
4656 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link),
4657 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink),
4658 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, smack_inode_rmdir),
4659 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, smack_inode_rename),
4660 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, smack_inode_permission),
4661 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, smack_inode_setattr),
4662 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, smack_inode_getattr),
4663 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, smack_inode_setxattr),
4664 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr),
4665 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, smack_inode_getxattr),
4666 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, smack_inode_removexattr),
4667 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity),
4668 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity),
4669 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity),
4670 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, smack_inode_getsecid),
4671
4672 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security),
4673 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, smack_file_free_security),
4674 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl),
4675 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, smack_file_lock),
4676 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, smack_file_fcntl),
4677 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, smack_mmap_file),
4678 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
4679 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, smack_file_set_fowner),
4680 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, smack_file_send_sigiotask),
4681 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, smack_file_receive),
4682
4683 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, smack_file_open),
4684
4685 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, smack_cred_alloc_blank),
4686 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free),
4687 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare),
4688 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer),
4689 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as),
4690 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as),
4691 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
4692 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
4693 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
4694 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, smack_task_getsecid),
4695 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
4696 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
4697 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),
4698 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, smack_task_setscheduler),
4699 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler),
4700 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory),
4701 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill),
4702 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode),
4703
4704 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission),
4705 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, smack_ipc_getsecid),
4706
4707 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security),
4708 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, smack_msg_msg_free_security),
4709
4710 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, smack_msg_queue_alloc_security),
4711 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, smack_msg_queue_free_security),
4712 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, smack_msg_queue_associate),
4713 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, smack_msg_queue_msgctl),
4714 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, smack_msg_queue_msgsnd),
4715 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv),
4716
4717 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, smack_shm_alloc_security),
4718 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, smack_shm_free_security),
4719 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, smack_shm_associate),
4720 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, smack_shm_shmctl),
4721 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, smack_shm_shmat),
4722
4723 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, smack_sem_alloc_security),
4724 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, smack_sem_free_security),
4725 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, smack_sem_associate),
4726 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, smack_sem_semctl),
4727 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, smack_sem_semop),
4728
4729 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, smack_d_instantiate),
4730
4731 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, smack_getprocattr),
4732 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, smack_setprocattr),
4733
4734 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, smack_unix_stream_connect),
4735 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send),
4736
4737 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create),
4738 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4739 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind),
4740 #endif
4741 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, smack_socket_connect),
4742 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, smack_socket_sendmsg),
4743 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
4744 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
4745 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
4746 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
4747 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
4748 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
4749 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
4750 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
4751
4752 /* key management security hooks */
4753 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4754 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
4755 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free),
4756 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
4757 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
4758 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4759
4760 /* Audit hooks */
4761 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4762 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, smack_audit_rule_init),
4763 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, smack_audit_rule_known),
4764 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, smack_audit_rule_match),
4765 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4766
4767 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
4768 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
4769 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
4770 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
4771 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
4772 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
4773 };
4774
4775
4776 static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
4777 {
4778 /*
4779 * Initialize rule list locks
4780 */
4781 mutex_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules_lock);
4782 mutex_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules_lock);
4783 mutex_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules_lock);
4784 mutex_init(&smack_known_star.smk_rules_lock);
4785 mutex_init(&smack_known_web.smk_rules_lock);
4786 /*
4787 * Initialize rule lists
4788 */
4789 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules);
4790 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules);
4791 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_star.smk_rules);
4792 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules);
4793 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_web.smk_rules);
4794 /*
4795 * Create the known labels list
4796 */
4797 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_huh);
4798 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_hat);
4799 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_star);
4800 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_floor);
4801 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_web);
4802 }
4803
4804 /**
4805 * smack_init - initialize the smack system
4806 *
4807 * Returns 0
4808 */
4809 static __init int smack_init(void)
4810 {
4811 struct cred *cred;
4812 struct task_smack *tsp;
4813
4814 if (!security_module_enable("smack"))
4815 return 0;
4816
4817 smack_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(inode_smack, 0);
4818 if (!smack_inode_cache)
4819 return -ENOMEM;
4820
4821 tsp = new_task_smack(&smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor,
4822 GFP_KERNEL);
4823 if (tsp == NULL) {
4824 kmem_cache_destroy(smack_inode_cache);
4825 return -ENOMEM;
4826 }
4827
4828 smack_enabled = 1;
4829
4830 pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
4831 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4832 pr_info("Smack: Netfilter enabled.\n");
4833 #endif
4834 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4835 pr_info("Smack: IPv6 port labeling enabled.\n");
4836 #endif
4837 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4838 pr_info("Smack: IPv6 Netfilter enabled.\n");
4839 #endif
4840
4841 /*
4842 * Set the security state for the initial task.
4843 */
4844 cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
4845 cred->security = tsp;
4846
4847 /* initialize the smack_known_list */
4848 init_smack_known_list();
4849
4850 /*
4851 * Register with LSM
4852 */
4853 security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
4854
4855 return 0;
4856 }
4857
4858 /*
4859 * Smack requires early initialization in order to label
4860 * all processes and objects when they are created.
4861 */
4862 security_initcall(smack_init);