]> git.proxmox.com Git - mirror_ubuntu-bionic-kernel.git/blobdiff - arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
x86/speculation: Clean up various Spectre related details
[mirror_ubuntu-bionic-kernel.git] / arch / x86 / kernel / cpu / bugs.c
index e4dc26185aa70bcdecf8ca932b6c720121819558..4acf16a76d1e4587a3d9a0831fe15fe40bea9522 100644 (file)
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/utsname.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
 
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 #include <asm/cmdline.h>
@@ -23,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <asm/alternative.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/set_memory.h>
+#include <asm/intel-family.h>
 
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
 
@@ -89,20 +91,41 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
 };
 
 #undef pr_fmt
-#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 mitigation: " fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 : " fmt
 
 static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
 
+#ifdef RETPOLINE
+static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
+
+bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
+{
+       if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline)
+               return true;
+
+       pr_err("System may be vulnerable to spectre v2\n");
+       spectre_v2_bad_module = true;
+       return false;
+}
+
+static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void)
+{
+       return spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : "";
+}
+#else
+static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; }
+#endif
+
 static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason)
 {
        if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
-               pr_info("%s\n", reason);
+               pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason);
 }
 
 static void __init spec2_print_if_secure(const char *reason)
 {
        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
-               pr_info("%s\n", reason);
+               pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason);
 }
 
 static inline bool retp_compiler(void)
@@ -117,42 +140,82 @@ static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
        return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len);
 }
 
+static const struct {
+       const char *option;
+       enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd;
+       bool secure;
+} mitigation_options[] = {
+       { "off",               SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE,              false },
+       { "on",                SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,             true },
+       { "retpoline",         SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,         false },
+       { "retpoline,amd",     SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD,     false },
+       { "retpoline,generic", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false },
+       { "auto",              SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,              false },
+};
+
 static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 {
        char arg[20];
-       int ret;
-
-       ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg,
-                                 sizeof(arg));
-       if (ret > 0)  {
-               if (match_option(arg, ret, "off")) {
-                       goto disable;
-               } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "on")) {
-                       spec2_print_if_secure("force enabled on command line.");
-                       return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE;
-               } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline")) {
-                       spec2_print_if_insecure("retpoline selected on command line.");
-                       return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE;
-               } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,amd")) {
-                       if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
-                               pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n");
-                               return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
-                       }
-                       spec2_print_if_insecure("AMD retpoline selected on command line.");
-                       return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD;
-               } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,generic")) {
-                       spec2_print_if_insecure("generic retpoline selected on command line.");
-                       return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC;
-               } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "auto")) {
+       int ret, i;
+       enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+
+       if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
+               return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
+       else {
+               ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
+               if (ret < 0)
+                       return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+
+               for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) {
+                       if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option))
+                               continue;
+                       cmd = mitigation_options[i].cmd;
+                       break;
+               }
+
+               if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) {
+                       pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option);
                        return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
                }
        }
 
-       if (!cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
+       if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE ||
+            cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD ||
+            cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) &&
+           !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
+               pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option);
                return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
-disable:
-       spec2_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line.");
-       return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
+       }
+
+       if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD &&
+           boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
+               pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n");
+               return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+       }
+
+       if (mitigation_options[i].secure)
+               spec2_print_if_secure(mitigation_options[i].option);
+       else
+               spec2_print_if_insecure(mitigation_options[i].option);
+
+       return cmd;
+}
+
+/* Check for Skylake-like CPUs (for RSB handling) */
+static bool __init is_skylake_era(void)
+{
+       if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
+           boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6) {
+               switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
+               case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE:
+               case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP:
+               case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X:
+               case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE:
+               case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP:
+                       return true;
+               }
+       }
+       return false;
 }
 
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
@@ -173,10 +236,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
                return;
 
        case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
-               /* FALLTRHU */
        case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
-               goto retpoline_auto;
-
+               if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
+                       goto retpoline_auto;
+               break;
        case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD:
                if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
                        goto retpoline_amd;
@@ -190,14 +253,14 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
                        goto retpoline_auto;
                break;
        }
-       pr_err("kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
+       pr_err("Spectre mitigation: kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
        return;
 
 retpoline_auto:
        if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
        retpoline_amd:
                if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
-                       pr_err("LFENCE not serializing. Switching to generic retpoline\n");
+                       pr_err("Spectre mitigation: LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n");
                        goto retpoline_generic;
                }
                mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD :
@@ -213,13 +276,36 @@ retpoline_auto:
 
        spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
        pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
+
+       /*
+        * If neither SMEP nor PTI are available, there is a risk of
+        * hitting userspace addresses in the RSB after a context switch
+        * from a shallow call stack to a deeper one. To prevent this fill
+        * the entire RSB, even when using IBRS.
+        *
+        * Skylake era CPUs have a separate issue with *underflow* of the
+        * RSB, when they will predict 'ret' targets from the generic BTB.
+        * The proper mitigation for this is IBRS. If IBRS is not supported
+        * or deactivated in favour of retpolines the RSB fill on context
+        * switch is required.
+        */
+       if ((!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI) &&
+            !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) || is_skylake_era()) {
+               setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
+               pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
+       }
+
+       /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
+       if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
+               setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
+               pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
+       }
 }
 
 #undef pr_fmt
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
-ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
-                         struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 {
        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
                return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
@@ -228,20 +314,20 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
        return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
 }
 
-ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
-                           struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 {
        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
                return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
-       return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+       return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
 }
 
-ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
-                           struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 {
        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
                return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 
-       return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]);
+       return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+                      boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "",
+                      spectre_v2_module_string());
 }
 #endif