#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/sched/smt.h>
-#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
#include <asm/cmdline.h>
#include <asm/bugs.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/vmx.h>
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+#include <asm/e820/api.h>
+#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
+
+/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
+u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
+
+/*
+ * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
+ * x86_spec_ctrl_base.
+ */
+static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
/*
- * Our boot-time value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR. We read it once so that any
- * writes to SPEC_CTRL contain whatever reserved bits have been set.
+ * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control.
+ * x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
*/
-static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
+u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
+
+/* Control conditional STIBP in switch_to() */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
+/* Control conditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
+/* Control unconditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
+
+/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before returning to user space */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_user_clear);
+/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before idling (halt, mwait) */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
void __init check_bugs(void)
{
identify_boot_cpu();
+ /*
+ * identify_boot_cpu() initialized SMT support information, let the
+ * core code know.
+ */
+ cpu_smt_check_topology_early();
+
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) {
pr_info("CPU: ");
print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
/*
* Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may
- * have unknown values.
+ * have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD
+ * init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family.
*/
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+ /* Allow STIBP in MSR_SPEC_CTRL if supported */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
+ x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
+
/* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */
spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
+ /*
+ * Select proper mitigation for any exposure to the Speculative Store
+ * Bypass vulnerability.
+ */
+ ssb_select_mitigation();
+
+ l1tf_select_mitigation();
+
+ mds_select_mitigation();
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
#endif
}
-/* The kernel command line selection */
-enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
- SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE,
- SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,
- SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,
- SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,
- SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
- SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD,
-};
+void
+x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
+{
+ u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+ struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
-static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
- [SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
- [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL] = "Vulnerable: Minimal generic ASM retpoline",
- [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD] = "Vulnerable: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline",
- [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline",
- [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline",
-};
+ /* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
+ /*
+ * Restrict guest_spec_ctrl to supported values. Clear the
+ * modifiable bits in the host base value and or the
+ * modifiable bits from the guest value.
+ */
+ guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
+ guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
-#undef pr_fmt
-#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt
+ /* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
+ static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
+ hostval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
-static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+ /* Conditional STIBP enabled? */
+ if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp))
+ hostval |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
-void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64 val)
-{
- if (val & ~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS)
- WARN_ONCE(1, "SPEC_CTRL MSR value 0x%16llx is unknown.\n", val);
+ if (hostval != guestval) {
+ msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If SSBD is not handled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL on AMD, update
+ * MSR_AMD64_L2_CFG or MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL if supported.
+ */
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD) &&
+ !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * If the host has SSBD mitigation enabled, force it in the host's
+ * virtual MSR value. If its not permanently enabled, evaluate
+ * current's TIF_SSBD thread flag.
+ */
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE))
+ hostval = SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
else
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base | val);
+ hostval = ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
+
+ /* Sanitize the guest value */
+ guestval = guest_virt_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+
+ if (hostval != guestval) {
+ unsigned long tif;
+
+ tif = setguest ? ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(guestval) :
+ ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(hostval);
+
+ speculation_ctrl_update(tif);
+ }
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_set);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_virt_spec_ctrl);
-u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void)
+static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
{
- return x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+ u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
+ wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
+ else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
+ wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_get_default);
-void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_spec_ctrl)
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MDS: " fmt
+
+/* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */
+static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+static bool mds_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
+
+static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
+ [MDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
+ [MDS_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
+ [MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV] = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
+};
+
+static void mds_select_mitigation(void)
{
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
return;
- if (x86_spec_ctrl_base != guest_spec_ctrl)
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, guest_spec_ctrl);
+ }
+
+ if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
+
+ static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+
+ if (mds_nosmt && !boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
+ cpu_smt_disable(false);
+ }
+
+ pr_info("%s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest);
-void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 guest_spec_ctrl)
+static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
{
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
- return;
- if (x86_spec_ctrl_base != guest_spec_ctrl)
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "full"))
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+ mds_nosmt = true;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host);
+early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt
+
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
+ SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+
+static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user __ro_after_init =
+ SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
-#ifdef RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; }
#endif
-static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason)
+static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
{
- if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
- pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason);
+ int len = strlen(opt);
+
+ return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len);
}
-static void __init spec2_print_if_secure(const char *reason)
+/* The kernel command line selection for spectre v2 */
+enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD,
+};
+
+enum spectre_v2_user_cmd {
+ SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO,
+ SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL,
+ SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB,
+ SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP,
+ SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB,
+};
+
+static const char * const spectre_v2_user_strings[] = {
+ [SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE] = "User space: Vulnerable",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP protection",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP always-on protection",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP via prctl",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP via seccomp and prctl",
+};
+
+static const struct {
+ const char *option;
+ enum spectre_v2_user_cmd cmd;
+ bool secure;
+} v2_user_options[] __initdata = {
+ { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO, false },
+ { "off", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE, false },
+ { "on", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE, true },
+ { "prctl", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL, false },
+ { "prctl,ibpb", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB, false },
+ { "seccomp", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP, false },
+ { "seccomp,ibpb", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB, false },
+};
+
+static void __init spec_v2_user_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
{
- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
- pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason);
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) != secure)
+ pr_info("spectre_v2_user=%s forced on command line.\n", reason);
}
-static inline bool retp_compiler(void)
+static enum spectre_v2_user_cmd __init
+spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
{
- return __is_defined(RETPOLINE);
+ char arg[20];
+ int ret, i;
+
+ switch (v2_cmd) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
+ return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
+ return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2_user",
+ arg, sizeof(arg));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(v2_user_options); i++) {
+ if (match_option(arg, ret, v2_user_options[i].option)) {
+ spec_v2_user_print_cond(v2_user_options[i].option,
+ v2_user_options[i].secure);
+ return v2_user_options[i].cmd;
+ }
+ }
+
+ pr_err("Unknown user space protection option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
}
-static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
+static void __init
+spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
{
- int len = strlen(opt);
+ enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
+ bool smt_possible = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP);
+ enum spectre_v2_user_cmd cmd;
- return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len);
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
+ return;
+
+ if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED ||
+ cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED)
+ smt_possible = false;
+
+ cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(v2_cmd);
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE:
+ goto set_mode;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE:
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT;
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB:
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL;
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB:
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP;
+ else
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, an STIBP mode other than "off" has been set.
+ * If STIBP support is not being forced, check if STIBP always-on
+ * is preferred.
+ */
+ if (mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON))
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED;
+
+ /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB:
+ static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_always_ibpb);
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP:
+ static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("mitigation: Enabling %s Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n",
+ static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb) ?
+ "always-on" : "conditional");
+ }
+
+ /* If enhanced IBRS is enabled no STIBP required */
+ if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * If SMT is not possible or STIBP is not available clear the STIBP
+ * mode.
+ */
+ if (!smt_possible || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
+set_mode:
+ spectre_v2_user = mode;
+ /* Only print the STIBP mode when SMT possible */
+ if (smt_possible)
+ pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_user_strings[mode]);
}
+static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = {
+ [SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
+};
+
static const struct {
const char *option;
enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd;
bool secure;
-} mitigation_options[] = {
- { "off", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE, false },
- { "on", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, true },
- { "retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, false },
- { "retpoline,amd", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD, false },
- { "retpoline,generic", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false },
- { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false },
+} mitigation_options[] __initdata = {
+ { "off", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE, false },
+ { "on", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, true },
+ { "retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, false },
+ { "retpoline,amd", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD, false },
+ { "retpoline,generic", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false },
+ { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false },
};
+static void __init spec_v2_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) != secure)
+ pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason);
+}
+
static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
{
+ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
char arg[20];
int ret, i;
- enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
- else {
- ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
- if (ret < 0)
- return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) {
- if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option))
- continue;
- cmd = mitigation_options[i].cmd;
- break;
- }
+ ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
- if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) {
- pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
- return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
- }
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) {
+ if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option))
+ continue;
+ cmd = mitigation_options[i].cmd;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) {
+ pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE ||
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
- if (mitigation_options[i].secure)
- spec2_print_if_secure(mitigation_options[i].option);
- else
- spec2_print_if_insecure(mitigation_options[i].option);
-
+ spec_v2_print_cond(mitigation_options[i].option,
+ mitigation_options[i].secure);
return cmd;
}
-/* Check for Skylake-like CPUs (for RSB handling) */
-static bool __init is_skylake_era(void)
-{
- if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
- boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6) {
- switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
- case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE:
- case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP:
- case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X:
- case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE:
- case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP:
- return true;
- }
- }
- return false;
-}
-
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
{
enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED;
+ /* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
+ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+ goto specv2_set_mode;
+ }
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
goto retpoline_auto;
break;
pr_err("Spectre mitigation: LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n");
goto retpoline_generic;
}
- mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD :
- SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD;
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD;
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD);
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
} else {
retpoline_generic:
- mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC :
- SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL;
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC;
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
}
+specv2_set_mode:
spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
/*
- * If neither SMEP nor PTI are available, there is a risk of
- * hitting userspace addresses in the RSB after a context switch
- * from a shallow call stack to a deeper one. To prevent this fill
- * the entire RSB, even when using IBRS.
+ * If spectre v2 protection has been enabled, unconditionally fill
+ * RSB during a context switch; this protects against two independent
+ * issues:
*
- * Skylake era CPUs have a separate issue with *underflow* of the
- * RSB, when they will predict 'ret' targets from the generic BTB.
- * The proper mitigation for this is IBRS. If IBRS is not supported
- * or deactivated in favour of retpolines the RSB fill on context
- * switch is required.
+ * - RSB underflow (and switch to BTB) on Skylake+
+ * - SpectreRSB variant of spectre v2 on X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 CPUs
*/
- if ((!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI) &&
- !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) || is_skylake_era()) {
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
- pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
- }
-
- /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
- pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
- }
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
+ pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
/*
* Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect
- * branches. But firmware isn't, so use IBRS to protect that.
+ * branches. Enhanced IBRS protects firmware too, so, enable restricted
+ * speculation around firmware calls only when Enhanced IBRS isn't
+ * supported.
+ *
+ * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because
+ * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if
+ * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not
+ * enable IBRS around firmware calls.
*/
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && mode != SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
}
+
+ /* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */
+ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(cmd);
+
+ /* Enable STIBP if appropriate */
+ arch_smt_update();
+}
+
+static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)
+{
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+}
+
+/* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */
+static void update_stibp_strict(void)
+{
+ u64 mask = x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
+
+ if (sched_smt_active())
+ mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
+
+ if (mask == x86_spec_ctrl_base)
+ return;
+
+ pr_info("Update user space SMT mitigation: STIBP %s\n",
+ mask & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP ? "always-on" : "off");
+ x86_spec_ctrl_base = mask;
+ on_each_cpu(update_stibp_msr, NULL, 1);
+}
+
+/* Update the static key controlling the evaluation of TIF_SPEC_IB */
+static void update_indir_branch_cond(void)
+{
+ if (sched_smt_active())
+ static_branch_enable(&switch_to_cond_stibp);
+ else
+ static_branch_disable(&switch_to_cond_stibp);
+}
+
+/* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
+static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Enable the idle clearing on CPUs which are affected only by
+ * MDBDS and not any other MDS variant. The other variants cannot
+ * be mitigated when SMT is enabled, so clearing the buffers on
+ * idle would be a window dressing exercise.
+ */
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
+ return;
+
+ if (sched_smt_active())
+ static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
+ else
+ static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
+}
+
+void arch_smt_update(void)
+{
+ /* Enhanced IBRS implies STIBP. No update required. */
+ if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
+ return;
+
+ mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+
+ switch (spectre_v2_user) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED:
+ update_stibp_strict();
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP:
+ update_indir_branch_cond();
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch(mds_mitigation) {
+ case MDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
+ case MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV:
+ update_mds_branch_idle();
+ break;
+ case MDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Speculative Store Bypass: " fmt
+
+static enum ssb_mitigation ssb_mode __ro_after_init = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
+
+/* The kernel command line selection */
+enum ssb_mitigation_cmd {
+ SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE,
+ SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO,
+ SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON,
+ SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL,
+ SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP,
+};
+
+static const char * const ssb_strings[] = {
+ [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
+ [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE] = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled",
+ [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL] = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl",
+ [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP] = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl and seccomp",
+};
+
+static const struct {
+ const char *option;
+ enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
+} ssb_mitigation_options[] __initdata = {
+ { "auto", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO }, /* Platform decides */
+ { "on", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass */
+ { "off", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE }, /* Don't touch Speculative Store Bypass */
+ { "prctl", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass via prctl */
+ { "seccomp", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass via prctl and seccomp */
+};
+
+static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
+{
+ enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+ char arg[20];
+ int ret, i;
+
+ if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable")) {
+ return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
+ } else {
+ ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
+ arg, sizeof(arg));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options); i++) {
+ if (!match_option(arg, ret, ssb_mitigation_options[i].option))
+ continue;
+
+ cmd = ssb_mitigation_options[i].cmd;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options)) {
+ pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
+ return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return cmd;
+}
+
+static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ enum ssb_mitigation mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
+ enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
+ return mode;
+
+ cmd = ssb_parse_cmdline();
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS) &&
+ (cmd == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE ||
+ cmd == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO))
+ return mode;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO:
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP:
+ /*
+ * Choose prctl+seccomp as the default mode if seccomp is
+ * enabled.
+ */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
+ mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP;
+ else
+ mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
+ break;
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON:
+ mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE;
+ break;
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL:
+ mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
+ break;
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here:
+ * - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.
+ * - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
+ * - X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE - engage the mitigation
+ */
+ if (mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE);
+ /*
+ * Intel uses the SPEC CTRL MSR Bit(2) for this, while AMD may
+ * use a completely different MSR and bit dependent on family.
+ */
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) &&
+ !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
+ x86_amd_ssb_disable();
+ } else {
+ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+ x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return mode;
+}
+
+static void ssb_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ ssb_mode = __ssb_select_mitigation();
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
+ pr_info("%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
}
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Speculation prctl: " fmt
+
+static void task_update_spec_tif(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ /* Force the update of the real TIF bits */
+ set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE);
+
+ /*
+ * Immediately update the speculation control MSRs for the current
+ * task, but for a non-current task delay setting the CPU
+ * mitigation until it is scheduled next.
+ *
+ * This can only happen for SECCOMP mitigation. For PRCTL it's
+ * always the current task.
+ */
+ if (tsk == current)
+ speculation_ctrl_update_current();
+}
+
+static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+ if (ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL &&
+ ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP)
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ switch (ctrl) {
+ case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
+ /* If speculation is force disabled, enable is not allowed */
+ if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
+ return -EPERM;
+ task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task);
+ task_update_spec_tif(task);
+ break;
+ case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
+ task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
+ task_update_spec_tif(task);
+ break;
+ case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
+ task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
+ task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task);
+ task_update_spec_tif(task);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+ switch (ctrl) {
+ case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
+ if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict
+ * mode.
+ */
+ if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+ spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
+ return -EPERM;
+ task_clear_spec_ib_disable(task);
+ task_update_spec_tif(task);
+ break;
+ case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
+ case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
+ /*
+ * Indirect branch speculation is always allowed when
+ * mitigation is force disabled.
+ */
+ if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+ spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
+ return 0;
+ task_set_spec_ib_disable(task);
+ if (ctrl == PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE)
+ task_set_spec_ib_force_disable(task);
+ task_update_spec_tif(task);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
+ unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+ switch (which) {
+ case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
+ return ssb_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
+ case PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH:
+ return ib_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
+ default:
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP)
+ ssb_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
+ if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP)
+ ib_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ switch (ssb_mode) {
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE:
+ return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP:
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL:
+ if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
+ if (task_spec_ssb_disable(task))
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+ default:
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
+ return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+ return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
+ }
+}
+
+static int ib_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
+ return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
+
+ switch (spectre_v2_user) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
+ return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP:
+ if (task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
+ if (task_spec_ib_disable(task))
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED:
+ return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+ default:
+ return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
+ }
+}
+
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
+{
+ switch (which) {
+ case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
+ return ssb_prctl_get(task);
+ case PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH:
+ return ib_prctl_get(task);
+ default:
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+}
+
+void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+
+ if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
+ x86_amd_ssb_disable();
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "L1TF: " fmt
+
+/* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */
+enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_mitigation);
+
+enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_vmx_mitigation);
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * These CPUs all support 44bits physical address space internally in the
+ * cache but CPUID can report a smaller number of physical address bits.
+ *
+ * The L1TF mitigation uses the top most address bit for the inversion of
+ * non present PTEs. When the installed memory reaches into the top most
+ * address bit due to memory holes, which has been observed on machines
+ * which report 36bits physical address bits and have 32G RAM installed,
+ * then the mitigation range check in l1tf_select_mitigation() triggers.
+ * This is a false positive because the mitigation is still possible due to
+ * the fact that the cache uses 44bit internally. Use the cache bits
+ * instead of the reported physical bits and adjust them on the affected
+ * machines to 44bit if the reported bits are less than 44.
+ */
+static void override_cache_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (c->x86 != 6)
+ return;
+
+ switch (c->x86_model) {
+ case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP:
+ if (c->x86_cache_bits < 44)
+ c->x86_cache_bits = 44;
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ u64 half_pa;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
+ return;
+
+ override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
+
+ switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
+ case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
+ case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
+ case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
+ break;
+ case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
+ case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
+ cpu_smt_disable(false);
+ break;
+ case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE:
+ cpu_smt_disable(true);
+ break;
+ }
+
+#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS == 2
+ pr_warn("Kernel not compiled for PAE. No mitigation for L1TF\n");
+ return;
+#endif
+
+ half_pa = (u64)l1tf_pfn_limit() << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ if (e820__mapped_any(half_pa, ULLONG_MAX - half_pa, E820_TYPE_RAM)) {
+ pr_warn("System has more than MAX_PA/2 memory. L1TF mitigation not effective.\n");
+ pr_info("You may make it effective by booting the kernel with mem=%llu parameter.\n",
+ half_pa);
+ pr_info("However, doing so will make a part of your RAM unusable.\n");
+ pr_info("Reading https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/l1tf.html might help you decide.\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV);
+}
+
+static int __init l1tf_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+ l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "flush,nowarn"))
+ l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "flush"))
+ l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "flush,nosmt"))
+ l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "full"))
+ l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "full,force"))
+ l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("l1tf", l1tf_cmdline);
+
#undef pr_fmt
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
-ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
- char *buf, unsigned int bug)
+#define L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG "Mitigation: PTE Inversion"
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
+static const char * const l1tf_vmx_states[] = {
+ [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO] = "auto",
+ [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER] = "vulnerable",
+ [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND] = "conditional cache flushes",
+ [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS] = "cache flushes",
+ [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED] = "EPT disabled",
+ [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED] = "flush not necessary"
+};
+
+static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO)
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG);
+
+ if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED ||
+ (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER &&
+ sched_smt_active())) {
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
+ l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation]);
+ }
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s, SMT %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
+ l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation],
+ sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+#else
+static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG);
+}
+#endif
+
+static ssize_t mds_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ if (!hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_NATIVE)) {
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
+ mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
+ }
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY)) {
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation],
+ sched_smt_active() ? "mitigated" : "disabled");
+ }
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation],
+ sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+
+static char *stibp_state(void)
+{
+ if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
+ return "";
+
+ switch (spectre_v2_user) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
+ return ", STIBP: disabled";
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
+ return ", STIBP: forced";
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED:
+ return ", STIBP: always-on";
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP:
+ if (static_key_enabled(&switch_to_cond_stibp))
+ return ", STIBP: conditional";
+ }
+ return "";
+}
+
+static char *ibpb_state(void)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
+ if (static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb))
+ return ", IBPB: always-on";
+ if (static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb))
+ return ", IBPB: conditional";
+ return ", IBPB: disabled";
+ }
+ return "";
+}
+
+static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf, unsigned int bug)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(bug))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
- return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "",
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+ ibpb_state(),
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
+ stibp_state(),
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
spectre_v2_module_string());
+ case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
+
+ case X86_BUG_L1TF:
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV))
+ return l1tf_show_state(buf);
+ break;
+
+ case X86_BUG_MDS:
+ return mds_show_state(buf);
+
default:
break;
}
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_L1TF);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MDS);
+}
#endif