-linux (4.13.0-43.48) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
-
- CHANGELOG: Do not edit directly. Autogenerated at release.
- CHANGELOG: Use the printchanges target to see the curent changes.
- CHANGELOG: Use the insertchanges target to create the final log.
-
- -- Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Mon, 14 May 2018 11:57:33 +0200
+linux (4.13.0-43.48) artful; urgency=medium
+
+ * CVE-2018-3639 (powerpc)
+ - SAUCE: rfi-flush: update H_CPU_* macro names to upstream
+ - SAUCE: rfi-flush: update plpar_get_cpu_characteristics() signature to
+ upstream
+ - SAUCE: update pseries_setup_rfi_flush() capitalization to upstream
+ - powerpc/pseries: Support firmware disable of RFI flush
+ - powerpc/powernv: Support firmware disable of RFI flush
+ - powerpc/64s: Allow control of RFI flush via debugfs
+ - powerpc/rfi-flush: Move the logic to avoid a redo into the debugfs code
+ - powerpc/rfi-flush: Always enable fallback flush on pseries
+ - powerpc/rfi-flush: Differentiate enabled and patched flush types
+ - powerpc/pseries: Add new H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS flags
+ - powerpc: Add security feature flags for Spectre/Meltdown
+ - powerpc/powernv: Set or clear security feature flags
+ - powerpc/pseries: Set or clear security feature flags
+ - powerpc/powernv: Use the security flags in pnv_setup_rfi_flush()
+ - powerpc/pseries: Use the security flags in pseries_setup_rfi_flush()
+ - powerpc/pseries: Fix clearing of security feature flags
+ - powerpc: Move default security feature flags
+ - powerpc/pseries: Restore default security feature flags on setup
+ - powerpc/64s: Add support for a store forwarding barrier at kernel entry/exit
+
+ * CVE-2018-3639 (x86)
+ - SAUCE: Add X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
+ - SAUCE: x86: Add alternative_msr_write
+ - x86/nospec: Simplify alternative_msr_write()
+ - x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown
+ - x86/bugs: Concentrate bug detection into a separate function
+ - x86/bugs: Concentrate bug reporting into a separate function
+ - x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs
+ - x86/bugs: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits
+ - x86/bugs, KVM: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS
+ - x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypass
+ - x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RDS
+ - x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable
+ mitigation
+ - x86/bugs/intel: Set proper CPU features and setup RDS
+ - x86/bugs: Whitelist allowed SPEC_CTRL MSR values
+ - x86/bugs/AMD: Add support to disable RDS on Fam[15,16,17]h if requested
+ - x86/KVM/VMX: Expose SPEC_CTRL Bit(2) to the guest
+ - x86/speculation: Create spec-ctrl.h to avoid include hell
+ - prctl: Add speculation control prctls
+ - x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass
+ - x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation
+ - nospec: Allow getting/setting on non-current task
+ - proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations
+ - seccomp: Enable speculation flaw mitigations
+ - SAUCE: x86/bugs: Honour SPEC_CTRL default
+ - x86/bugs: Make boot modes __ro_after_init
+ - prctl: Add force disable speculation
+ - seccomp: Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE
+ - seccomp: Add filter flag to opt-out of SSB mitigation
+ - seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch code
+ - x86/speculation: Make "seccomp" the default mode for Speculative Store
+ Bypass
+ - x86/bugs: Rename _RDS to _SSBD
+ - proc: Use underscores for SSBD in 'status'
+ - Documentation/spec_ctrl: Do some minor cleanups
+ - x86/bugs: Fix __ssb_select_mitigation() return type
+ - x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static
+
+ * LSM Stacking prctl values should be redefined as to not collide with
+ upstream prctls (LP: #1769263) // CVE-2018-3639
+ - SAUCE: LSM stacking: adjust prctl values
+
+ -- Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Tue, 15 May 2018 07:39:26 +0200
linux (4.13.0-42.47) artful; urgency=medium