vsprintf: kptr_restrict is okay in IRQ when 2

[mirror_ubuntu-artful-kernel.git] / lib / vsprintf.c

diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index 48ff9c36644d64c324c5c243212f282e406dce2f..f44e178e6edec22e2f7c405f8cb433b2be935f83 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -1590,22 +1590,23 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
                        return buf;
                }
        case 'K':
-               /*
-                * %pK cannot be used in IRQ context because its test
-                * for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless.
-                */
-               if (kptr_restrict && (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() ||
-                                     in_nmi())) {
-                       if (spec.field_width == -1)
-                               spec.field_width = default_width;
-                       return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec);
-               }
-
                switch (kptr_restrict) {
                case 0:
                        /* Always print %pK values */
                        break;
                case 1: {
+                       const struct cred *cred;
+
+                       /*
+                        * kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context
+                        * because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless.
+                        */
+                       if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi()) {
+                               if (spec.field_width == -1)
+                                       spec.field_width = default_width;
+                               return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec);
+                       }
+
                        /*
                         * Only print the real pointer value if the current
                         * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the
@@ -1615,8 +1616,7 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
                         * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using
                         * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it.
                         */
-                       const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-
+                       cred = current_cred();
                        if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) ||
                            !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
                            !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid))