};
struct smp_chan {
- struct l2cap_conn *conn;
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn;
+ struct delayed_work security_timer;
+ struct work_struct distribute_work;
+
u8 preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
u8 prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */
u8 prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */
return 0;
}
-bool smp_irk_matches(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 irk[16],
- bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
+bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
u8 hash[3];
int err;
+ if (!chan || !chan->data)
+ return false;
+
+ tfm = chan->data;
+
BT_DBG("RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
return !memcmp(bdaddr->b, hash, 3);
}
-int smp_generate_rpa(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
+int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
int err;
+ if (!chan || !chan->data)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ tfm = chan->data;
+
get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */
return err;
}
-static struct sk_buff *smp_build_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code,
- u16 dlen, void *data)
+static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
{
- struct sk_buff *skb;
- struct l2cap_hdr *lh;
- int len;
-
- len = L2CAP_HDR_SIZE + sizeof(code) + dlen;
-
- if (len > conn->mtu)
- return NULL;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp;
+ struct kvec iv[2];
+ struct msghdr msg;
- skb = bt_skb_alloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!skb)
- return NULL;
+ if (!chan)
+ return;
- lh = (struct l2cap_hdr *) skb_put(skb, L2CAP_HDR_SIZE);
- lh->len = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(code) + dlen);
- lh->cid = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_CID_SMP);
+ BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code);
- memcpy(skb_put(skb, sizeof(code)), &code, sizeof(code));
+ iv[0].iov_base = &code;
+ iv[0].iov_len = 1;
- memcpy(skb_put(skb, dlen), data, dlen);
+ iv[1].iov_base = data;
+ iv[1].iov_len = len;
- return skb;
-}
+ memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
-static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
-{
- struct sk_buff *skb = smp_build_cmd(conn, code, len, data);
+ msg.msg_iov = (struct iovec *) &iv;
+ msg.msg_iovlen = 2;
- BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code);
+ l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len);
- if (!skb)
+ if (!chan->data)
return;
- skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX;
- hci_send_acl(conn->hchan, skb, 0);
+ smp = chan->data;
- cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
- schedule_delayed_work(&conn->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
+ if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags))
+ schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
}
static __u8 authreq_to_seclevel(__u8 authreq)
struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp, __u8 authreq)
{
- struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
{
- struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
if ((max_key_size > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE) ||
(max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE))
return 0;
}
+static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ bool complete;
+
+ BUG_ON(!smp);
+
+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
+ /* In case the timeout freed the SMP context */
+ if (!chan->data)
+ return;
+
+ if (work_pending(&smp->distribute_work)) {
+ cancel_work_sync(&smp->distribute_work);
+ if (!chan->data)
+ return;
+ }
+
+ complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
+ mgmt_smp_complete(conn->hcon, complete);
+
+ kfree(smp->csrk);
+ kfree(smp->slave_csrk);
+
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
+
+ /* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
+ if (!complete) {
+ if (smp->ltk) {
+ list_del(&smp->ltk->list);
+ kfree(smp->ltk);
+ }
+
+ if (smp->slave_ltk) {
+ list_del(&smp->slave_ltk->list);
+ kfree(smp->slave_ltk);
+ }
+
+ if (smp->remote_irk) {
+ list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list);
+ kfree(smp->remote_irk);
+ }
+ }
+
+ chan->data = NULL;
+ kfree(smp);
+ hci_conn_drop(conn->hcon);
+}
+
static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason)
{
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp;
if (reason)
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
mgmt_auth_failed(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
- cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
+ if (!chan->data)
+ return;
+
+ smp = chan->data;
if (test_and_clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
smp_chan_destroy(conn);
u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
{
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
- struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
u8 method;
u32 passkey = 0;
int ret = 0;
return 0;
}
+static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+ bool persistent;
+
+ if (smp->remote_irk) {
+ mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk);
+ /* Now that user space can be considered to know the
+ * identity address track the connection based on it
+ * from now on.
+ */
+ bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
+ hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
+ l2cap_conn_update_id_addr(hcon);
+
+ /* When receiving an indentity resolving key for
+ * a remote device that does not use a resolvable
+ * private address, just remove the key so that
+ * it is possible to use the controller white
+ * list for scanning.
+ *
+ * Userspace will have been told to not store
+ * this key at this point. So it is safe to
+ * just remove it.
+ */
+ if (!bacmp(&smp->remote_irk->rpa, BDADDR_ANY)) {
+ list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list);
+ kfree(smp->remote_irk);
+ smp->remote_irk = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* The LTKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if both sides
+ * had the bonding bit set in their authentication requests.
+ */
+ persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_BONDING);
+
+ if (smp->csrk) {
+ smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+ bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+ mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);
+ }
+
+ if (smp->slave_csrk) {
+ smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+ bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+ mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent);
+ }
+
+ if (smp->ltk) {
+ smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+ bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+ mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);
+ }
+
+ if (smp->slave_ltk) {
+ smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+ bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+ mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);
+ }
+}
+
+static void smp_distribute_keys(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan,
+ distribute_work);
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+ __u8 *keydist;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
+ return;
+
+ rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+
+ /* The responder sends its keys first */
+ if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & 0x07))
+ return;
+
+ req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+
+ if (hcon->out) {
+ keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
+ *keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
+ } else {
+ keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
+ *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
+ }
+
+ BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
+
+ if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
+ struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
+ struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
+ struct smp_ltk *ltk;
+ u8 authenticated;
+ __le16 ediv;
+ __le64 rand;
+
+ get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk));
+ get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
+ get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
+
+ authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+ ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+ SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk,
+ smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
+ smp->slave_ltk = ltk;
+
+ ident.ediv = ediv;
+ ident.rand = rand;
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);
+
+ *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
+ }
+
+ if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
+ struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
+ struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
+
+ memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
+
+ /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address
+ * after the connection has been established.
+ *
+ * This is true even when the connection has been
+ * established using a resolvable random address.
+ */
+ bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src);
+ addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type;
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
+ &addrinfo);
+
+ *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+ }
+
+ if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
+ struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
+ struct smp_csrk *csrk;
+
+ /* Generate a new random key */
+ get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
+
+ csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (csrk) {
+ csrk->master = 0x00;
+ memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
+ }
+ smp->slave_csrk = csrk;
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
+
+ *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+ }
+
+ /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */
+ if ((smp->remote_key_dist & 0x07))
+ return;
+
+ clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags);
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
+ smp_notify_keys(conn);
+
+ smp_chan_destroy(conn);
+}
+
+static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan,
+ security_timer.work);
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ l2cap_conn_shutdown(conn, ETIMEDOUT);
+}
+
static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
struct smp_chan *smp;
smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC);
}
smp->conn = conn;
- conn->smp_chan = smp;
+ chan->data = smp;
+
+ INIT_WORK(&smp->distribute_work, smp_distribute_keys);
+ INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout);
hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
return smp;
}
-void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
-{
- struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
- bool complete;
-
- BUG_ON(!smp);
-
- complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
- mgmt_smp_complete(conn->hcon, complete);
-
- kfree(smp->csrk);
- kfree(smp->slave_csrk);
-
- crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
-
- /* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
- if (!complete) {
- if (smp->ltk) {
- list_del(&smp->ltk->list);
- kfree(smp->ltk);
- }
-
- if (smp->slave_ltk) {
- list_del(&smp->slave_ltk->list);
- kfree(smp->slave_ltk);
- }
-
- if (smp->remote_irk) {
- list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list);
- kfree(smp->remote_irk);
- }
- }
-
- kfree(smp);
- conn->smp_chan = NULL;
- hci_conn_drop(conn->hcon);
-}
-
int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
{
struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan;
struct smp_chan *smp;
u32 value;
if (!conn || !test_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
return -ENOTCONN;
- smp = conn->smp_chan;
+ chan = conn->smp;
+ if (!chan)
+ return -ENOTCONN;
+
+ smp = chan->data;
switch (mgmt_op) {
case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
- if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags))
+ if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags)) {
smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
- else
- smp = conn->smp_chan;
+ } else {
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ smp = chan->data;
+ }
if (!smp)
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
- struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
u8 key_size, auth = SMP_AUTH_NONE;
int ret;
static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
- struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data;
- struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
struct smp_ltk *ltk;
rp->ediv, rp->rand);
smp->ltk = ltk;
if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY))
- smp_distribute_keys(conn);
+ queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->distribute_work);
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
return 0;
static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct smp_cmd_ident_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
- struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
BT_DBG("");
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
- struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
bdaddr_t rpa;
BT_DBG("");
smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa);
distribute:
- smp_distribute_keys(conn);
+ queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->distribute_work);
hci_dev_unlock(hcon->hdev);
static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
- struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
struct smp_csrk *csrk;
memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
}
smp->csrk = csrk;
- smp_distribute_keys(conn);
+ queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->distribute_work);
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
return 0;
}
-int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
__u8 code, reason;
int err = 0;
return 0;
}
- if (skb->len < 1) {
- kfree_skb(skb);
+ if (skb->len < 1)
return -EILSEQ;
- }
if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ &&
!test_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags)) {
BT_ERR("Unexpected SMP command 0x%02x. Disconnecting.", code);
- kfree_skb(skb);
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+ err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto done;
}
switch (code) {
done:
if (reason)
smp_failure(conn, reason);
-
- kfree_skb(skb);
+ if (!err)
+ kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
-static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
{
- struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
+
+ BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+
+ if (test_and_clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags))
+ smp_chan_destroy(conn);
+
+ conn->smp = NULL;
+ l2cap_chan_put(chan);
+}
+
+static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+{
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
- struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
- struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
- bool persistent;
- if (smp->remote_irk) {
- mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk);
- /* Now that user space can be considered to know the
- * identity address track the connection based on it
- * from now on.
- */
- bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
- hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
- l2cap_conn_update_id_addr(hcon);
+ BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
- /* When receiving an indentity resolving key for
- * a remote device that does not use a resolvable
- * private address, just remove the key so that
- * it is possible to use the controller white
- * list for scanning.
- *
- * Userspace will have been told to not store
- * this key at this point. So it is safe to
- * just remove it.
- */
- if (!bacmp(&smp->remote_irk->rpa, BDADDR_ANY)) {
- list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list);
- kfree(smp->remote_irk);
- smp->remote_irk = NULL;
- }
- }
+ if (!smp)
+ return;
- /* The LTKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if both sides
- * had the bonding bit set in their authentication requests.
- */
- persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_BONDING);
+ cancel_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer);
- if (smp->csrk) {
- smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
- bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
- mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);
- }
+ if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
+ queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->distribute_work);
+}
- if (smp->slave_csrk) {
- smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
- bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
- mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent);
- }
+static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+{
+ struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
- if (smp->ltk) {
- smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
- bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
- mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);
- }
+ BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
- if (smp->slave_ltk) {
- smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
- bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
- mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);
- }
+ conn->smp = chan;
+ l2cap_chan_hold(chan);
}
-int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
- struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
- struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
- struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
- __u8 *keydist;
+ int err;
- BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+ BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
- if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
- return 0;
+ err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb);
+ if (err) {
+ struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
- rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+ if (smp)
+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
- /* The responder sends its keys first */
- if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & 0x07))
- return 0;
+ l2cap_conn_shutdown(chan->conn, -err);
+ }
- req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+ return err;
+}
- if (hcon->out) {
- keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
- *keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
- } else {
- keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
- *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
- }
+static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
+ unsigned long hdr_len,
+ unsigned long len, int nb)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
- BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
+ skb = bt_skb_alloc(hdr_len + len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!skb)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
- struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
- struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
- struct smp_ltk *ltk;
- u8 authenticated;
- __le16 ediv;
- __le64 rand;
+ skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX;
+ bt_cb(skb)->chan = chan;
- get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk));
- get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
- get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));
+ return skb;
+}
- smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
+static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = {
+ .name = "Security Manager",
+ .ready = smp_ready_cb,
+ .recv = smp_recv_cb,
+ .alloc_skb = smp_alloc_skb_cb,
+ .teardown = smp_teardown_cb,
+ .resume = smp_resume_cb,
+
+ .new_connection = l2cap_chan_no_new_connection,
+ .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
+ .close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
+ .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
+ .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
+ .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
+ .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
+ .memcpy_fromiovec = l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec,
+};
- authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
- ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
- SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk,
- smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
- smp->slave_ltk = ltk;
+static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan;
- ident.ediv = ediv;
- ident.rand = rand;
+ BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan);
- smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);
+ chan = l2cap_chan_create();
+ if (!chan)
+ return NULL;
- *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
- }
+ chan->chan_type = pchan->chan_type;
+ chan->ops = &smp_chan_ops;
+ chan->scid = pchan->scid;
+ chan->dcid = chan->scid;
+ chan->imtu = pchan->imtu;
+ chan->omtu = pchan->omtu;
+ chan->mode = pchan->mode;
- if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
- struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
- struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
+ BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan);
- memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
+ return chan;
+}
- smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
+static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = {
+ .name = "Security Manager Root",
+ .new_connection = smp_new_conn_cb,
+
+ /* None of these are implemented for the root channel */
+ .close = l2cap_chan_no_close,
+ .alloc_skb = l2cap_chan_no_alloc_skb,
+ .recv = l2cap_chan_no_recv,
+ .state_change = l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
+ .teardown = l2cap_chan_no_teardown,
+ .ready = l2cap_chan_no_ready,
+ .defer = l2cap_chan_no_defer,
+ .suspend = l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
+ .resume = l2cap_chan_no_resume,
+ .set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
+ .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
+ .memcpy_fromiovec = l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec,
+};
- /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address
- * after the connection has been established.
- *
- * This is true even when the connection has been
- * established using a resolvable random address.
- */
- bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src);
- addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type;
+int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
- smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
- &addrinfo);
+ BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
- *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+ tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
+ int err = PTR_ERR(tfm_aes);
+ BT_ERR("Unable to create crypto context");
+ return err;
}
- if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
- struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
- struct smp_csrk *csrk;
+ chan = l2cap_chan_create();
+ if (!chan) {
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
- /* Generate a new random key */
- get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
+ chan->data = tfm_aes;
- csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (csrk) {
- csrk->master = 0x00;
- memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
- }
- smp->slave_csrk = csrk;
+ l2cap_add_scid(chan, L2CAP_CID_SMP);
- smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
+ l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan);
- *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
- }
+ bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
+ chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
+ chan->state = BT_LISTEN;
+ chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC;
+ chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU;
+ chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops;
- /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */
- if ((smp->remote_key_dist & 0x07))
- return 0;
+ hdev->smp_data = chan;
- clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags);
- cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
- set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
- smp_notify_keys(conn);
+ return 0;
+}
- smp_chan_destroy(conn);
+void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
+{
+ struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
- return 0;
+ if (!chan)
+ return;
+
+ BT_DBG("%s chan %p", hdev->name, chan);
+
+ tfm_aes = chan->data;
+ if (tfm_aes) {
+ chan->data = NULL;
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
+ }
+
+ hdev->smp_data = NULL;
+ l2cap_chan_put(chan);
}
projects / mirror_ubuntu-hirsute-kernel.git / blobdiff