if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ hdr = (void *)skb->data;
+
data = skb->data + hdrlen;
data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ /* it may be possible to optimize this a bit more */
+ if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ hdr = (void *)skb->data;
+
/*
* Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption.
* In the case where hardware checks the IV as well,
if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
+ if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN))
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ } else {
+ if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ }
+
ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
queue = rx->security_idx;
memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
/* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
- skb_trim(skb, skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN);
+ if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN))
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
memmove(skb->data + CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
skb_pull(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN);
if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
return RX_CONTINUE;
+ /* management frames are already linear */
+
if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
return RX_CONTINUE;
}
+
+ieee80211_tx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_hw_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
+ struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = NULL;
+
+ skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
+ info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
+
+ /* handle hw-only algorithm */
+ if (!info->control.hw_key)
+ return TX_DROP;
+ }
+
+ ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
+
+ return TX_CONTINUE;
+}