#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
-#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include "objsec.h"
#include "netif.h"
#include "xfrm.h"
-#include "selinux_netlabel.h"
+#include "netlabel.h"
#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- isec = kmem_cache_alloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
+ isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!isec)
return -ENOMEM;
- memset(isec, 0, sizeof(*isec));
mutex_init(&isec->lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
isec->inode = inode;
sbsec->initialized = 1;
if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) {
- printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
}
else {
- printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
}
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (inode)))
+ return 0;
+
tsec = tsk->security;
isec = inode->i_security;
return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
}
+static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
+{
+ int buflen, rc;
+ char *buffer, *path, *end;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buffer)
+ goto out;
+
+ buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
+ end = buffer+buflen;
+ *--end = '\0';
+ buflen--;
+ path = end-1;
+ *path = '/';
+ while (table) {
+ const char *name = table->procname;
+ size_t namelen = strlen(name);
+ buflen -= namelen + 1;
+ if (buflen < 0)
+ goto out_free;
+ end -= namelen;
+ memcpy(end, name, namelen);
+ *--end = '/';
+ path = end;
+ table = table->parent;
+ }
+ buflen -= 4;
+ if (buflen < 0)
+ goto out_free;
+ end -= 4;
+ memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
+ path = end;
+ rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
+out_free:
+ free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
{
int error = 0;
tsec = current->security;
- rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ?
- SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
+ rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
+ SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
if (rc) {
/* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
if (rc == 0)
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
- SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
- CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
- NULL);
+ SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
+ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
+ 0,
+ NULL);
if (rc == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
}
}
file_list_unlock();
-
- /* Reset controlling tty. */
- if (drop_tty)
- proc_set_tty(current, NULL);
}
mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
+ /* Reset controlling tty. */
+ if (drop_tty)
+ no_tty();
/* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
}
static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
- unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+ unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
+ unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
{
- int rc;
+ int rc = 0;
+ u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct*)(current->security))->sid;
- rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
- if (rc)
+ if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
+ MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
+ if (rc || addr_only)
return rc;
if (selinux_checkreqprot)
struct file_security_struct *fsec;
/* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
- file = (struct file *)((long)fown - offsetof(struct file,f_owner));
+ file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
tsec = tsk->security;
fsec = file->f_security;
int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
- offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
+ offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
if (ih == NULL)
goto out;
int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
- offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
+ offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
if (ip6 == NULL)
goto out;
return ret;
}
+/**
+ * selinux_skb_extlbl_sid - Determine the external label of a packet
+ * @skb: the packet
+ * @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only external labels
+ * @sid: the packet's SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Check the various different forms of external packet labeling and determine
+ * the external SID for the packet.
+ *
+ */
+static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u32 base_sid,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ u32 xfrm_sid;
+ u32 nlbl_sid;
+
+ selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
+ if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
+ (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL ?
+ base_sid : xfrm_sid),
+ &nlbl_sid) != 0)
+ nlbl_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+ *sid = (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL ? xfrm_sid : nlbl_sid);
+}
+
/* socket security operations */
static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
u32 perms)
if (sock && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
else if (skb)
- security_skb_extlbl_sid(skb,
- SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
- &peer_secid);
+ selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &peer_secid);
if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
err = -EINVAL;
u32 newsid;
u32 peersid;
- security_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &peersid);
+ selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &peersid);
if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
req->secid = sksec->sid;
req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
{
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- security_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &sksec->peer_sid);
+ selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &sksec->peer_sid);
}
static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
- nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data;
+ nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
if (err) {
static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
{
if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
- printk(KERN_INFO "%s: There is already a secondary security "
+ printk(KERN_ERR "%s: There is already a secondary security "
"module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
return -EINVAL;
}
static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
{
if (ops != secondary_ops) {
- printk (KERN_INFO "%s: trying to unregister a security module "
+ printk(KERN_ERR "%s: trying to unregister a security module "
"that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
- char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+ char *name, char **value)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
u32 sid;
int error;
+ unsigned len;
if (current != p) {
error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
if (!sid)
return 0;
- return selinux_getsecurity(sid, value, size);
+ error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ return len;
}
static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
SECCLASS_PROCESS,
- PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd);
+ PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
if (!error)
tsec->sid = sid;
task_unlock(p);
panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
if (selinux_enforcing) {
- printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
} else {
- printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
void selinux_complete_init(void)
{
- printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
/* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
- printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
spin_lock(&sb_lock);
spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
next_sb:
if (!selinux_enabled)
goto out;
-
- printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
-
+
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
+
err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
if (err)
panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
{
- printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
projects / mirror_ubuntu-bionic-kernel.git / blobdiff