]> git.proxmox.com Git - mirror_ubuntu-bionic-kernel.git/commit
ALSA: seq: oss: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
authorGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Wed, 20 Mar 2019 23:42:01 +0000 (18:42 -0500)
committerStefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Wed, 24 Apr 2019 08:09:12 +0000 (10:09 +0200)
commit77151e5755fc89cd2034b79c924d530d7d9c0cdd
tree0f70940db2914d6e7dcddf952b39c1670f0747f6
parent006cb81a8d353c32b1befe0d86c0d29f12647adb
ALSA: seq: oss: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability

dev is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c:626 snd_seq_oss_synth_make_info() warn: potential spectre issue 'dp->synths' [w] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing dev before using it to index dp->synths.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180423164740.GY17484@dhcp22.suse.cz/

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CVE-2017-5753

(cherry picked from commit c709f14f0616482b67f9fbcb965e1493a03ff30b)
Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c