]> git.proxmox.com Git - mirror_ubuntu-hirsute-kernel.git/commitdiff
bus: mhi: core: Add range check for channel id received in event ring
authorHemant Kumar <hemantk@codeaurora.org>
Thu, 21 May 2020 17:02:38 +0000 (22:32 +0530)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fri, 22 May 2020 07:35:41 +0000 (09:35 +0200)
MHI data completion handler function reads channel id from event
ring element. Value is under the control of MHI devices and can be
any value between 0 and 255. In order to prevent out of bound access
add a bound check against the max channel supported by controller
and skip processing of that event ring element.

Signed-off-by: Hemant Kumar <hemantk@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Bhaumik Bhatt <bbhatt@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Hugo <jhugo@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200521170249.21795-4-manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
drivers/bus/mhi/core/main.c

index 605640c3094e6f1757104a5561593e4e5cdd5514..30798ec3950ac0a286faa6f0e4e38d98508a89f1 100644 (file)
@@ -775,9 +775,18 @@ int mhi_process_ctrl_ev_ring(struct mhi_controller *mhi_cntrl,
                }
                case MHI_PKT_TYPE_TX_EVENT:
                        chan = MHI_TRE_GET_EV_CHID(local_rp);
-                       mhi_chan = &mhi_cntrl->mhi_chan[chan];
-                       parse_xfer_event(mhi_cntrl, local_rp, mhi_chan);
-                       event_quota--;
+
+                       WARN_ON(chan >= mhi_cntrl->max_chan);
+
+                       /*
+                        * Only process the event ring elements whose channel
+                        * ID is within the maximum supported range.
+                        */
+                       if (chan < mhi_cntrl->max_chan) {
+                               mhi_chan = &mhi_cntrl->mhi_chan[chan];
+                               parse_xfer_event(mhi_cntrl, local_rp, mhi_chan);
+                               event_quota--;
+                       }
                        break;
                default:
                        dev_err(dev, "Unhandled event type: %d\n", type);
@@ -820,14 +829,23 @@ int mhi_process_data_event_ring(struct mhi_controller *mhi_cntrl,
                enum mhi_pkt_type type = MHI_TRE_GET_EV_TYPE(local_rp);
 
                chan = MHI_TRE_GET_EV_CHID(local_rp);
-               mhi_chan = &mhi_cntrl->mhi_chan[chan];
-
-               if (likely(type == MHI_PKT_TYPE_TX_EVENT)) {
-                       parse_xfer_event(mhi_cntrl, local_rp, mhi_chan);
-                       event_quota--;
-               } else if (type == MHI_PKT_TYPE_RSC_TX_EVENT) {
-                       parse_rsc_event(mhi_cntrl, local_rp, mhi_chan);
-                       event_quota--;
+
+               WARN_ON(chan >= mhi_cntrl->max_chan);
+
+               /*
+                * Only process the event ring elements whose channel
+                * ID is within the maximum supported range.
+                */
+               if (chan < mhi_cntrl->max_chan) {
+                       mhi_chan = &mhi_cntrl->mhi_chan[chan];
+
+                       if (likely(type == MHI_PKT_TYPE_TX_EVENT)) {
+                               parse_xfer_event(mhi_cntrl, local_rp, mhi_chan);
+                               event_quota--;
+                       } else if (type == MHI_PKT_TYPE_RSC_TX_EVENT) {
+                               parse_rsc_event(mhi_cntrl, local_rp, mhi_chan);
+                               event_quota--;
+                       }
                }
 
                mhi_recycle_ev_ring_element(mhi_cntrl, ev_ring);