evm: prohibit userspace writing 'security.evm' HMAC value

Calculating the 'security.evm' HMAC value requires access to the
EVM encrypted key.  Only the kernel should have access to it.  This
patch prevents userspace tools(eg. setfattr, cp --preserve=xattr)
from setting/modifying the 'security.evm' HMAC value directly.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 73baf71688431c4903f0acf9eec53136152b0912..3bcb80df4d01f1ca30927c7e61c6b2b19b5ca15f 100644 (file)
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -300,12 +300,20 @@ out:
  * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
  * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
  *
- * Updating 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that
- * the current value is valid.
+ * Before allowing the 'security.evm' protected xattr to be updated,
+ * verify the existing value is valid.  As only the kernel should have
+ * access to the EVM encrypted key needed to calculate the HMAC, prevent
+ * userspace from writing HMAC value.  Writing 'security.evm' requires
+ * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges.
  */
 int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
                       const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
 {
+       const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value;
+
+       if ((strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0)
+           && (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC))
+               return -EPERM;
        return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
                                 xattr_value_len);
 }