]> git.proxmox.com Git - mirror_ubuntu-kernels.git/commitdiff
efi/efi_test: Lock down /dev/efi_test and require CAP_SYS_ADMIN
authorJavier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Tue, 29 Oct 2019 17:37:55 +0000 (18:37 +0100)
committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Thu, 31 Oct 2019 08:40:21 +0000 (09:40 +0100)
The driver exposes EFI runtime services to user-space through an IOCTL
interface, calling the EFI services function pointers directly without
using the efivar API.

Disallow access to the /dev/efi_test character device when the kernel is
locked down to prevent arbitrary user-space to call EFI runtime services.

Also require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to open the chardev to prevent unprivileged
users to call the EFI runtime services, instead of just relying on the
chardev file mode bits for this.

The main user of this driver is the fwts [0] tool that already checks if
the effective user ID is 0 and fails otherwise. So this change shouldn't
cause any regression to this tool.

[0]: https://wiki.ubuntu.com/FirmwareTestSuite/Reference/uefivarinfo

Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191029173755.27149-7-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.c
include/linux/security.h
security/lockdown/lockdown.c

index 877745c3aaf2833fed62659aa38c52c0f3b2eb1c..7baf48c01e72f2f63e65e802609059da9cdb12ee 100644 (file)
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
 #include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 
@@ -717,6 +718,13 @@ static long efi_test_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 
 static int efi_test_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
+       int ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST);
+
+       if (ret)
+               return ret;
+
+       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+               return -EACCES;
        /*
         * nothing special to do here
         * We do accept multiple open files at the same time as we
index a8d59d612d274bdb5df8cbd13245b35fc2e08908..9df7547afc0cb783883b5c5c7b32b2956a650d7a 100644 (file)
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
        LOCKDOWN_NONE,
        LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
        LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM,
+       LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST,
        LOCKDOWN_KEXEC,
        LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION,
        LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS,
index 8a10b43daf74e5c3b86a06e19b4856b684dacc66..40b790536defaf8dcdad0655d4423f33c94dcd06 100644 (file)
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ static const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
        [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none",
        [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading",
        [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port",
+       [LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access",
        [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images",
        [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation",
        [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access",