]> git.proxmox.com Git - mirror_qemu.git/commitdiff
ivshmem: validate incoming_posn value from server
authorStefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Mon, 15 Sep 2014 16:40:06 +0000 (18:40 +0200)
committerPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Fri, 31 Oct 2014 16:01:59 +0000 (17:01 +0100)
Check incoming_posn to avoid out-of-bounds array accesses if the ivshmem
server on the host sends invalid values.

Cc: Cam Macdonell <cam@cs.ualberta.ca>
Reported-by: Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
[AF: Tighten upper bound check for posn in close_guest_eventfds()]
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
hw/misc/ivshmem.c

index caeee1ebf562883fb338ebf17f9d30dd5dbce5cf..24f74f6f5821b50522460ff04bdc16e9aacc82f6 100644 (file)
@@ -389,6 +389,9 @@ static void close_guest_eventfds(IVShmemState *s, int posn)
     if (!ivshmem_has_feature(s, IVSHMEM_IOEVENTFD)) {
         return;
     }
+    if (posn < 0 || posn >= s->nb_peers) {
+        return;
+    }
 
     guest_curr_max = s->peers[posn].nb_eventfds;
 
@@ -455,6 +458,11 @@ static void ivshmem_read(void *opaque, const uint8_t *buf, int size)
         }
     }
 
+    if (incoming_posn < -1) {
+        IVSHMEM_DPRINTF("invalid incoming_posn %ld\n", incoming_posn);
+        return;
+    }
+
     /* pick off s->server_chr->msgfd and store it, posn should accompany msg */
     tmp_fd = qemu_chr_fe_get_msgfd(s->server_chr);
     IVSHMEM_DPRINTF("posn is %ld, fd is %d\n", incoming_posn, tmp_fd);