xfrm: Workaround incompatibility of ESN and async crypto

ESN for esp is defined in RFC 4303. This RFC assumes that the
sequence number counters are always up to date. However,
this is not true if an async crypto algorithm is employed.

If the sequence number counters are not up to date on sequence
number check, we may incorrectly update the upper 32 bit of
the sequence number. This leads to a DOS.

We workaround this by comparing the upper sequence number,
(used for authentication) with the upper sequence number
computed after the async processing. We drop the packet
if these numbers are different.

To do this, we introduce a recheck function that does this
check in the ESN case.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h
index 976a81abe1a231de348085a92c8f3110a21fc3fa..639dd1316d375aeb2802c73032cc4cae6dcb8b0c 100644 (file)
--- a/include/net/xfrm.h
+++ b/include/net/xfrm.h
@@ -273,6 +273,9 @@ struct xfrm_replay {
        int     (*check)(struct xfrm_state *x,
                         struct sk_buff *skb,
                         __be32 net_seq);
+       int     (*recheck)(struct xfrm_state *x,
+                          struct sk_buff *skb,
+                          __be32 net_seq);
        void    (*notify)(struct xfrm_state *x, int event);
        int     (*overflow)(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb);
 };

diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
index 54a0dc2e2f8d45d7a842be98882969f696c07ec2..ab2bb42fe094b7390d5135ec6e37b9113ea8219b 100644 (file)
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ resume:
                /* only the first xfrm gets the encap type */
                encap_type = 0;
 
-               if (async && x->repl->check(x, skb, seq)) {
+               if (async && x->repl->recheck(x, skb, seq)) {
                        XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINSTATESEQERROR);
                        goto drop_unlock;
                }

diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_replay.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_replay.c
index 2f6d11d04a2b29910a1f284d3e3af8b0db1bfcce..3efb07d3eb27425c8b9b5114c925eb9e7f402c9e 100644 (file)
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_replay.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_replay.c
@@ -420,6 +420,18 @@ err:
        return -EINVAL;
 }
 
+static int xfrm_replay_recheck_esn(struct xfrm_state *x,
+                                  struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 net_seq)
+{
+       if (unlikely(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.input.hi !=
+                    htonl(xfrm_replay_seqhi(x, net_seq)))) {
+                       x->stats.replay_window++;
+                       return -EINVAL;
+       }
+
+       return xfrm_replay_check_esn(x, skb, net_seq);
+}
+
 static void xfrm_replay_advance_esn(struct xfrm_state *x, __be32 net_seq)
 {
        unsigned int bitnr, nr, i;
@@ -479,6 +491,7 @@ static void xfrm_replay_advance_esn(struct xfrm_state *x, __be32 net_seq)
 static struct xfrm_replay xfrm_replay_legacy = {
        .advance        = xfrm_replay_advance,
        .check          = xfrm_replay_check,
+       .recheck        = xfrm_replay_check,
        .notify         = xfrm_replay_notify,
        .overflow       = xfrm_replay_overflow,
 };
@@ -486,6 +499,7 @@ static struct xfrm_replay xfrm_replay_legacy = {
 static struct xfrm_replay xfrm_replay_bmp = {
        .advance        = xfrm_replay_advance_bmp,
        .check          = xfrm_replay_check_bmp,
+       .recheck        = xfrm_replay_check_bmp,
        .notify         = xfrm_replay_notify_bmp,
        .overflow       = xfrm_replay_overflow_bmp,
 };
@@ -493,6 +507,7 @@ static struct xfrm_replay xfrm_replay_bmp = {
 static struct xfrm_replay xfrm_replay_esn = {
        .advance        = xfrm_replay_advance_esn,
        .check          = xfrm_replay_check_esn,
+       .recheck        = xfrm_replay_recheck_esn,
        .notify         = xfrm_replay_notify_bmp,
        .overflow       = xfrm_replay_overflow_esn,
 };