]> git.proxmox.com Git - mirror_ubuntu-eoan-kernel.git/commitdiff
trusted-keys: rename trusted_defined files to trusted
authorMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tue, 18 Jan 2011 14:07:11 +0000 (09:07 -0500)
committerJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Sun, 23 Jan 2011 23:14:22 +0000 (10:14 +1100)
Rename trusted_defined.c and trusted_defined.h files to trusted.c and
trusted.h, respectively. Based on request from David Howells.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
security/keys/Makefile
security/keys/trusted.c [new file with mode: 0644]
security/keys/trusted.h [new file with mode: 0644]
security/keys/trusted_defined.c [deleted file]
security/keys/trusted_defined.h [deleted file]

index 6c941050f5734d79354e657d0aec167d50923276..ad8da87653cf4809a9587c740a128207e937d8e4 100644 (file)
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ obj-y := \
        request_key_auth.o \
        user_defined.o
 
-obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted_defined.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted_defined.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..3066f56
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,1180 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * See Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
+ */
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/tpm.h>
+#include <linux/tpm_command.h>
+
+#include "trusted.h"
+
+static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)";
+static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1";
+
+struct sdesc {
+       struct shash_desc shash;
+       char ctx[];
+};
+
+static struct crypto_shash *hashalg;
+static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg;
+
+static struct sdesc *init_sdesc(struct crypto_shash *alg)
+{
+       struct sdesc *sdesc;
+       int size;
+
+       size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(alg);
+       sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+       if (!sdesc)
+               return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+       sdesc->shash.tfm = alg;
+       sdesc->shash.flags = 0x0;
+       return sdesc;
+}
+
+static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int datalen,
+                   unsigned char *digest)
+{
+       struct sdesc *sdesc;
+       int ret;
+
+       sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
+       if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
+               pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
+               return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
+       }
+
+       ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest);
+       kfree(sdesc);
+       return ret;
+}
+
+static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
+                      unsigned int keylen, ...)
+{
+       struct sdesc *sdesc;
+       va_list argp;
+       unsigned int dlen;
+       unsigned char *data;
+       int ret;
+
+       sdesc = init_sdesc(hmacalg);
+       if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
+               pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hmac_alg);
+               return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
+       }
+
+       ret = crypto_shash_setkey(hmacalg, key, keylen);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto out;
+       ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto out;
+
+       va_start(argp, keylen);
+       for (;;) {
+               dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+               if (dlen == 0)
+                       break;
+               data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *);
+               if (data == NULL) {
+                       ret = -EINVAL;
+                       break;
+               }
+               ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen);
+               if (ret < 0)
+                       break;
+       }
+       va_end(argp);
+       if (!ret)
+               ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest);
+out:
+       kfree(sdesc);
+       return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM
+ */
+static int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
+                       unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1,
+                       unsigned char *h2, unsigned char h3, ...)
+{
+       unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+       struct sdesc *sdesc;
+       unsigned int dlen;
+       unsigned char *data;
+       unsigned char c;
+       int ret;
+       va_list argp;
+
+       sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
+       if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
+               pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
+               return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
+       }
+
+       c = h3;
+       ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto out;
+       va_start(argp, h3);
+       for (;;) {
+               dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+               if (dlen == 0)
+                       break;
+               data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *);
+               if (!data) {
+                       ret = -EINVAL;
+                       break;
+               }
+               ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen);
+               if (ret < 0)
+                       break;
+       }
+       va_end(argp);
+       if (!ret)
+               ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest);
+       if (!ret)
+               ret = TSS_rawhmac(digest, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+                                 paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1,
+                                 TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0);
+out:
+       kfree(sdesc);
+       return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * verify the AUTH1_COMMAND (Seal) result from TPM
+ */
+static int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
+                         const uint32_t command,
+                         const unsigned char *ononce,
+                         const unsigned char *key,
+                         unsigned int keylen, ...)
+{
+       uint32_t bufsize;
+       uint16_t tag;
+       uint32_t ordinal;
+       uint32_t result;
+       unsigned char *enonce;
+       unsigned char *continueflag;
+       unsigned char *authdata;
+       unsigned char testhmac[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+       unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+       struct sdesc *sdesc;
+       unsigned int dlen;
+       unsigned int dpos;
+       va_list argp;
+       int ret;
+
+       bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
+       tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0);
+       ordinal = command;
+       result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET);
+       if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND)
+               return 0;
+       if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND)
+               return -EINVAL;
+       authdata = buffer + bufsize - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
+       continueflag = authdata - 1;
+       enonce = continueflag - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
+
+       sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
+       if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
+               pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
+               return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
+       }
+       ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto out;
+       ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result,
+                                 sizeof result);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto out;
+       ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal,
+                                 sizeof ordinal);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto out;
+       va_start(argp, keylen);
+       for (;;) {
+               dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+               if (dlen == 0)
+                       break;
+               dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+               ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen);
+               if (ret < 0)
+                       break;
+       }
+       va_end(argp);
+       if (!ret)
+               ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto out;
+
+       ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, paramdigest,
+                         TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce,
+                         1, continueflag, 0, 0);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto out;
+
+       if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+               ret = -EINVAL;
+out:
+       kfree(sdesc);
+       return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM
+ */
+static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
+                         const uint32_t command,
+                         const unsigned char *ononce,
+                         const unsigned char *key1,
+                         unsigned int keylen1,
+                         const unsigned char *key2,
+                         unsigned int keylen2, ...)
+{
+       uint32_t bufsize;
+       uint16_t tag;
+       uint32_t ordinal;
+       uint32_t result;
+       unsigned char *enonce1;
+       unsigned char *continueflag1;
+       unsigned char *authdata1;
+       unsigned char *enonce2;
+       unsigned char *continueflag2;
+       unsigned char *authdata2;
+       unsigned char testhmac1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+       unsigned char testhmac2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+       unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+       struct sdesc *sdesc;
+       unsigned int dlen;
+       unsigned int dpos;
+       va_list argp;
+       int ret;
+
+       bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
+       tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0);
+       ordinal = command;
+       result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET);
+
+       if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND)
+               return 0;
+       if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND)
+               return -EINVAL;
+       authdata1 = buffer + bufsize - (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1
+                       + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+       authdata2 = buffer + bufsize - (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+       continueflag1 = authdata1 - 1;
+       continueflag2 = authdata2 - 1;
+       enonce1 = continueflag1 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
+       enonce2 = continueflag2 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
+
+       sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
+       if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
+               pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
+               return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
+       }
+       ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto out;
+       ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result,
+                                 sizeof result);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto out;
+       ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal,
+                                 sizeof ordinal);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto out;
+
+       va_start(argp, keylen2);
+       for (;;) {
+               dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+               if (dlen == 0)
+                       break;
+               dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
+               ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen);
+               if (ret < 0)
+                       break;
+       }
+       va_end(argp);
+       if (!ret)
+               ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto out;
+
+       ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac1, key1, keylen1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+                         paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1,
+                         TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto out;
+       if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
+               ret = -EINVAL;
+               goto out;
+       }
+       ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac2, key2, keylen2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+                         paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce2,
+                         TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto out;
+       if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+               ret = -EINVAL;
+out:
+       kfree(sdesc);
+       return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our
+ * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function.
+ */
+static int trusted_tpm_send(const u32 chip_num, unsigned char *cmd,
+                           size_t buflen)
+{
+       int rc;
+
+       dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
+       rc = tpm_send(chip_num, cmd, buflen);
+       dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
+       if (rc > 0)
+               /* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */
+               rc = -EPERM;
+       return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * get a random value from TPM
+ */
+static int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_buf *tb, unsigned char *buf, uint32_t len)
+{
+       int ret;
+
+       INIT_BUF(tb);
+       store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
+       store32(tb, TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE);
+       store32(tb, TPM_ORD_GETRANDOM);
+       store32(tb, len);
+       ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, sizeof tb->data);
+       if (!ret)
+               memcpy(buf, tb->data + TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE, len);
+       return ret;
+}
+
+static int my_get_random(unsigned char *buf, int len)
+{
+       struct tpm_buf *tb;
+       int ret;
+
+       tb = kmalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL);
+       if (!tb)
+               return -ENOMEM;
+       ret = tpm_get_random(tb, buf, len);
+
+       kfree(tb);
+       return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR.
+ *
+ * Prevents a trusted key that is sealed to PCRs from being accessed.
+ * This uses the tpm driver's extend function.
+ */
+static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum)
+{
+       unsigned char hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+       int ret;
+
+       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+               return -EPERM;
+       ret = my_get_random(hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               return ret;
+       return tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an object specific authorisation protocol (OSAP) session
+ */
+static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
+               const unsigned char *key, uint16_t type, uint32_t handle)
+{
+       unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+       unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+       int ret;
+
+       ret = tpm_get_random(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               return ret;
+
+       INIT_BUF(tb);
+       store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
+       store32(tb, TPM_OSAP_SIZE);
+       store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OSAP);
+       store16(tb, type);
+       store32(tb, handle);
+       storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+
+       ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               return ret;
+
+       s->handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
+       memcpy(s->enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)]),
+              TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+       memcpy(enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) +
+                                 TPM_NONCE_SIZE]), TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+       return TSS_rawhmac(s->secret, key, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
+                          enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session
+ */
+static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
+{
+       int ret;
+
+       INIT_BUF(tb);
+       store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
+       store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE);
+       store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OIAP);
+       ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               return ret;
+
+       *handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
+       memcpy(nonce, &tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)],
+              TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+       return 0;
+}
+
+struct tpm_digests {
+       unsigned char encauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+       unsigned char pubauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+       unsigned char xorwork[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2];
+       unsigned char xorhash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+       unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+};
+
+/*
+ * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the trusted key, possibly based on
+ * Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). AUTH1 for sealing key.
+ */
+static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
+                   uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth,
+                   const unsigned char *data, uint32_t datalen,
+                   unsigned char *blob, uint32_t *bloblen,
+                   const unsigned char *blobauth,
+                   const unsigned char *pcrinfo, uint32_t pcrinfosize)
+{
+       struct osapsess sess;
+       struct tpm_digests *td;
+       unsigned char cont;
+       uint32_t ordinal;
+       uint32_t pcrsize;
+       uint32_t datsize;
+       int sealinfosize;
+       int encdatasize;
+       int storedsize;
+       int ret;
+       int i;
+
+       /* alloc some work space for all the hashes */
+       td = kmalloc(sizeof *td, GFP_KERNEL);
+       if (!td)
+               return -ENOMEM;
+
+       /* get session for sealing key */
+       ret = osap(tb, &sess, keyauth, keytype, keyhandle);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto out;
+       dump_sess(&sess);
+
+       /* calculate encrypted authorization value */
+       memcpy(td->xorwork, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+       memcpy(td->xorwork + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, sess.enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+       ret = TSS_sha1(td->xorwork, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, td->xorhash);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto out;
+
+       ret = tpm_get_random(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto out;
+       ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL);
+       datsize = htonl(datalen);
+       pcrsize = htonl(pcrinfosize);
+       cont = 0;
+
+       /* encrypt data authorization key */
+       for (i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; ++i)
+               td->encauth[i] = td->xorhash[i] ^ blobauth[i];
+
+       /* calculate authorization HMAC value */
+       if (pcrinfosize == 0) {
+               /* no pcr info specified */
+               ret = TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+                                  sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont,
+                                  sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+                                  td->encauth, sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize,
+                                  sizeof(uint32_t), &datsize, datalen, data, 0,
+                                  0);
+       } else {
+               /* pcr info specified */
+               ret = TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+                                  sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont,
+                                  sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+                                  td->encauth, sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize,
+                                  pcrinfosize, pcrinfo, sizeof(uint32_t),
+                                  &datsize, datalen, data, 0, 0);
+       }
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto out;
+
+       /* build and send the TPM request packet */
+       INIT_BUF(tb);
+       store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND);
+       store32(tb, TPM_SEAL_SIZE + pcrinfosize + datalen);
+       store32(tb, TPM_ORD_SEAL);
+       store32(tb, keyhandle);
+       storebytes(tb, td->encauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+       store32(tb, pcrinfosize);
+       storebytes(tb, pcrinfo, pcrinfosize);
+       store32(tb, datalen);
+       storebytes(tb, data, datalen);
+       store32(tb, sess.handle);
+       storebytes(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+       store8(tb, cont);
+       storebytes(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+       ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto out;
+
+       /* calculate the size of the returned Blob */
+       sealinfosize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t));
+       encdatasize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) +
+                            sizeof(uint32_t) + sealinfosize);
+       storedsize = sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(uint32_t) + sealinfosize +
+           sizeof(uint32_t) + encdatasize;
+
+       /* check the HMAC in the response */
+       ret = TSS_checkhmac1(tb->data, ordinal, td->nonceodd, sess.secret,
+                            SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, storedsize, TPM_DATA_OFFSET, 0,
+                            0);
+
+       /* copy the returned blob to caller */
+       if (!ret) {
+               memcpy(blob, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET, storedsize);
+               *bloblen = storedsize;
+       }
+out:
+       kfree(td);
+       return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * use the AUTH2_COMMAND form of unseal, to authorize both key and blob
+ */
+static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
+                     uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth,
+                     const unsigned char *blob, int bloblen,
+                     const unsigned char *blobauth,
+                     unsigned char *data, unsigned int *datalen)
+{
+       unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+       unsigned char enonce1[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+       unsigned char enonce2[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+       unsigned char authdata1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+       unsigned char authdata2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+       uint32_t authhandle1 = 0;
+       uint32_t authhandle2 = 0;
+       unsigned char cont = 0;
+       uint32_t ordinal;
+       uint32_t keyhndl;
+       int ret;
+
+       /* sessions for unsealing key and data */
+       ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle1, enonce1);
+       if (ret < 0) {
+               pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret);
+               return ret;
+       }
+       ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle2, enonce2);
+       if (ret < 0) {
+               pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret);
+               return ret;
+       }
+
+       ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
+       keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE);
+       ret = tpm_get_random(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+       if (ret < 0) {
+               pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
+               return ret;
+       }
+       ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata1, keyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
+                          enonce1, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t),
+                          &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               return ret;
+       ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata2, blobauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
+                          enonce2, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t),
+                          &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               return ret;
+
+       /* build and send TPM request packet */
+       INIT_BUF(tb);
+       store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND);
+       store32(tb, TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE + bloblen);
+       store32(tb, TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
+       store32(tb, keyhandle);
+       storebytes(tb, blob, bloblen);
+       store32(tb, authhandle1);
+       storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+       store8(tb, cont);
+       storebytes(tb, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+       store32(tb, authhandle2);
+       storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+       store8(tb, cont);
+       storebytes(tb, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+       ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
+       if (ret < 0) {
+               pr_info("trusted_key: authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret);
+               return ret;
+       }
+
+       *datalen = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
+       ret = TSS_checkhmac2(tb->data, ordinal, nonceodd,
+                            keyauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+                            blobauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+                            sizeof(uint32_t), TPM_DATA_OFFSET,
+                            *datalen, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), 0,
+                            0);
+       if (ret < 0) {
+               pr_info("trusted_key: TSS_checkhmac2 failed (%d)\n", ret);
+               return ret;
+       }
+       memcpy(data, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), *datalen);
+       return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the symmetric key
+ */
+static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
+                   struct trusted_key_options *o)
+{
+       struct tpm_buf *tb;
+       int ret;
+
+       tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL);
+       if (!tb)
+               return -ENOMEM;
+
+       /* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */
+       p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable;
+
+       ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth,
+                      p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len,
+                      o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               pr_info("trusted_key: srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+
+       kfree(tb);
+       return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Have the TPM unseal(decrypt) the symmetric key
+ */
+static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
+                     struct trusted_key_options *o)
+{
+       struct tpm_buf *tb;
+       int ret;
+
+       tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL);
+       if (!tb)
+               return -ENOMEM;
+
+       ret = tpm_unseal(tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len,
+                        o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               pr_info("trusted_key: srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+       else
+               /* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */
+               p->migratable = p->key[--p->key_len];
+
+       kfree(tb);
+       return ret;
+}
+
+enum {
+       Opt_err = -1,
+       Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update,
+       Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth,
+       Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable
+};
+
+static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
+       {Opt_new, "new"},
+       {Opt_load, "load"},
+       {Opt_update, "update"},
+       {Opt_keyhandle, "keyhandle=%s"},
+       {Opt_keyauth, "keyauth=%s"},
+       {Opt_blobauth, "blobauth=%s"},
+       {Opt_pcrinfo, "pcrinfo=%s"},
+       {Opt_pcrlock, "pcrlock=%s"},
+       {Opt_migratable, "migratable=%s"},
+       {Opt_err, NULL}
+};
+
+/* can have zero or more token= options */
+static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
+                     struct trusted_key_options *opt)
+{
+       substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+       char *p = c;
+       int token;
+       int res;
+       unsigned long handle;
+       unsigned long lock;
+
+       while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) {
+               if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t')
+                       continue;
+               token = match_token(p, key_tokens, args);
+
+               switch (token) {
+               case Opt_pcrinfo:
+                       opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
+                       if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
+                               return -EINVAL;
+                       hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from, opt->pcrinfo_len);
+                       break;
+               case Opt_keyhandle:
+                       res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
+                       if (res < 0)
+                               return -EINVAL;
+                       opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype;
+                       opt->keyhandle = handle;
+                       break;
+               case Opt_keyauth:
+                       if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
+                               return -EINVAL;
+                       hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+                       break;
+               case Opt_blobauth:
+                       if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
+                               return -EINVAL;
+                       hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+                       break;
+               case Opt_migratable:
+                       if (*args[0].from == '0')
+                               pay->migratable = 0;
+                       else
+                               return -EINVAL;
+                       break;
+               case Opt_pcrlock:
+                       res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock);
+                       if (res < 0)
+                               return -EINVAL;
+                       opt->pcrlock = lock;
+                       break;
+               default:
+                       return -EINVAL;
+               }
+       }
+       return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data and fill in the
+ *                 payload and options structures
+ *
+ * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
+ */
+static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p,
+                         struct trusted_key_options *o)
+{
+       substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+       long keylen;
+       int ret = -EINVAL;
+       int key_cmd;
+       char *c;
+
+       /* main command */
+       c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+       if (!c)
+               return -EINVAL;
+       key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args);
+       switch (key_cmd) {
+       case Opt_new:
+               /* first argument is key size */
+               c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+               if (!c)
+                       return -EINVAL;
+               ret = strict_strtol(c, 10, &keylen);
+               if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
+                       return -EINVAL;
+               p->key_len = keylen;
+               ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o);
+               if (ret < 0)
+                       return ret;
+               ret = Opt_new;
+               break;
+       case Opt_load:
+               /* first argument is sealed blob */
+               c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+               if (!c)
+                       return -EINVAL;
+               p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2;
+               if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
+                       return -EINVAL;
+               hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len);
+               ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o);
+               if (ret < 0)
+                       return ret;
+               ret = Opt_load;
+               break;
+       case Opt_update:
+               /* all arguments are options */
+               ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o);
+               if (ret < 0)
+                       return ret;
+               ret = Opt_update;
+               break;
+       case Opt_err:
+               return -EINVAL;
+               break;
+       }
+       return ret;
+}
+
+static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
+{
+       struct trusted_key_options *options;
+
+       options = kzalloc(sizeof *options, GFP_KERNEL);
+       if (options) {
+               /* set any non-zero defaults */
+               options->keytype = SRK_keytype;
+               options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
+       }
+       return options;
+}
+
+static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key)
+{
+       struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL;
+       int ret;
+
+       ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof *p);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               return p;
+       p = kzalloc(sizeof *p, GFP_KERNEL);
+       if (p)
+               p->migratable = 1; /* migratable by default */
+       return p;
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key
+ *
+ * Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a
+ * random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key,
+ * adding it to the specified keyring.
+ *
+ * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
+ */
+static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data,
+                              size_t datalen)
+{
+       struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL;
+       struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
+       char *datablob;
+       int ret = 0;
+       int key_cmd;
+
+       if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+       if (!datablob)
+               return -ENOMEM;
+       memcpy(datablob, data, datalen);
+       datablob[datalen] = '\0';
+
+       options = trusted_options_alloc();
+       if (!options) {
+               ret = -ENOMEM;
+               goto out;
+       }
+       payload = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
+       if (!payload) {
+               ret = -ENOMEM;
+               goto out;
+       }
+
+       key_cmd = datablob_parse(datablob, payload, options);
+       if (key_cmd < 0) {
+               ret = key_cmd;
+               goto out;
+       }
+
+       dump_payload(payload);
+       dump_options(options);
+
+       switch (key_cmd) {
+       case Opt_load:
+               ret = key_unseal(payload, options);
+               dump_payload(payload);
+               dump_options(options);
+               if (ret < 0)
+                       pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+               break;
+       case Opt_new:
+               ret = my_get_random(payload->key, payload->key_len);
+               if (ret < 0) {
+                       pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
+                       goto out;
+               }
+               ret = key_seal(payload, options);
+               if (ret < 0)
+                       pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+               break;
+       default:
+               ret = -EINVAL;
+               goto out;
+       }
+       if (!ret && options->pcrlock)
+               ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
+out:
+       kfree(datablob);
+       kfree(options);
+       if (!ret)
+               rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, payload);
+       else
+               kfree(payload);
+       return ret;
+}
+
+static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+{
+       struct trusted_key_payload *p;
+
+       p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu);
+       memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len);
+       kfree(p);
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values
+ */
+static int trusted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+       struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data;
+       struct trusted_key_payload *new_p;
+       struct trusted_key_options *new_o;
+       char *datablob;
+       int ret = 0;
+
+       if (!p->migratable)
+               return -EPERM;
+       if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+       if (!datablob)
+               return -ENOMEM;
+       new_o = trusted_options_alloc();
+       if (!new_o) {
+               ret = -ENOMEM;
+               goto out;
+       }
+       new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
+       if (!new_p) {
+               ret = -ENOMEM;
+               goto out;
+       }
+
+       memcpy(datablob, data, datalen);
+       datablob[datalen] = '\0';
+       ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o);
+       if (ret != Opt_update) {
+               ret = -EINVAL;
+               goto out;
+       }
+       /* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */
+       new_p->migratable = p->migratable;
+       new_p->key_len = p->key_len;
+       memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len);
+       dump_payload(p);
+       dump_payload(new_p);
+
+       ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o);
+       if (ret < 0) {
+               pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+               kfree(new_p);
+               goto out;
+       }
+       if (new_o->pcrlock) {
+               ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock);
+               if (ret < 0) {
+                       pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
+                       kfree(new_p);
+                       goto out;
+               }
+       }
+       rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, new_p);
+       call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
+out:
+       kfree(datablob);
+       kfree(new_o);
+       return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex.
+ * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size.
+ */
+static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
+                        size_t buflen)
+{
+       struct trusted_key_payload *p;
+       char *ascii_buf;
+       char *bufp;
+       int i;
+
+       p = rcu_dereference_protected(key->payload.data,
+                       rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->sem));
+       if (!p)
+               return -EINVAL;
+       if (!buffer || buflen <= 0)
+               return 2 * p->blob_len;
+       ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+       if (!ascii_buf)
+               return -ENOMEM;
+
+       bufp = ascii_buf;
+       for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
+               bufp = pack_hex_byte(bufp, p->blob[i]);
+       if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) {
+               kfree(ascii_buf);
+               return -EFAULT;
+       }
+       kfree(ascii_buf);
+       return 2 * p->blob_len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * trusted_destroy - before freeing the key, clear the decrypted data
+ */
+static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key)
+{
+       struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data;
+
+       if (!p)
+               return;
+       memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len);
+       kfree(key->payload.data);
+}
+
+struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
+       .name = "trusted",
+       .instantiate = trusted_instantiate,
+       .update = trusted_update,
+       .match = user_match,
+       .destroy = trusted_destroy,
+       .describe = user_describe,
+       .read = trusted_read,
+};
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted);
+
+static void trusted_shash_release(void)
+{
+       if (hashalg)
+               crypto_free_shash(hashalg);
+       if (hmacalg)
+               crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
+}
+
+static int __init trusted_shash_alloc(void)
+{
+       int ret;
+
+       hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+       if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) {
+               pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
+                       hmac_alg);
+               return PTR_ERR(hmacalg);
+       }
+
+       hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+       if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) {
+               pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
+                       hash_alg);
+               ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg);
+               goto hashalg_fail;
+       }
+
+       return 0;
+
+hashalg_fail:
+       crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
+       return ret;
+}
+
+static int __init init_trusted(void)
+{
+       int ret;
+
+       ret = trusted_shash_alloc();
+       if (ret < 0)
+               return ret;
+       ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               trusted_shash_release();
+       return ret;
+}
+
+static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
+{
+       trusted_shash_release();
+       unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
+}
+
+late_initcall(init_trusted);
+module_exit(cleanup_trusted);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.h b/security/keys/trusted.h
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..3249fbd
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+#ifndef __TRUSTED_KEY_H
+#define __TRUSTED_KEY_H
+
+/* implementation specific TPM constants */
+#define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE               64
+#define MAX_BUF_SIZE                   512
+#define TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE             14
+#define TPM_OSAP_SIZE                  36
+#define TPM_OIAP_SIZE                  10
+#define TPM_SEAL_SIZE                  87
+#define TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE                        104
+#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET                        2
+#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET              6
+#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET                        10
+
+#define LOAD32(buffer, offset) (ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]))
+#define LOAD32N(buffer, offset)        (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])
+#define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset]))
+
+struct tpm_buf {
+       int len;
+       unsigned char data[MAX_BUF_SIZE];
+};
+
+#define INIT_BUF(tb) (tb->len = 0)
+
+struct osapsess {
+       uint32_t handle;
+       unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+       unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
+};
+
+/* discrete values, but have to store in uint16_t for TPM use */
+enum {
+       SEAL_keytype = 1,
+       SRK_keytype = 4
+};
+
+struct trusted_key_options {
+       uint16_t keytype;
+       uint32_t keyhandle;
+       unsigned char keyauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+       unsigned char blobauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+       uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
+       unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
+       int pcrlock;
+};
+
+#define TPM_DEBUG 0
+
+#if TPM_DEBUG
+static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
+{
+       pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
+       pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
+       pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
+       pr_info("trusted_key: pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
+       print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+                      16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
+{
+       pr_info("trusted_key: key_len %d\n", p->key_len);
+       print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+                      16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0);
+       pr_info("trusted_key: bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len);
+       print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+                      16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0);
+       pr_info("trusted_key: migratable %d\n", p->migratable);
+}
+
+static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
+{
+       print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+                      16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0);
+       pr_info("trusted-key: secret:\n");
+       print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+                      16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
+       pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n");
+       print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+                      16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
+{
+       int len;
+
+       pr_info("\ntrusted-key: tpm buffer\n");
+       len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
+       print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0);
+}
+#else
+static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline void store8(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char value)
+{
+       buf->data[buf->len++] = value;
+}
+
+static inline void store16(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint16_t value)
+{
+       *(uint16_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htons(value);
+       buf->len += sizeof value;
+}
+
+static inline void store32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint32_t value)
+{
+       *(uint32_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htonl(value);
+       buf->len += sizeof value;
+}
+
+static inline void storebytes(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char *in,
+                             const int len)
+{
+       memcpy(buf->data + buf->len, in, len);
+       buf->len += len;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted_defined.c b/security/keys/trusted_defined.c
deleted file mode 100644 (file)
index 2836c6d..0000000
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1180 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
- *
- * Author:
- * David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
- *
- * See Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
- */
-
-#include <linux/uaccess.h>
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/init.h>
-#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/parser.h>
-#include <linux/string.h>
-#include <linux/err.h>
-#include <keys/user-type.h>
-#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
-#include <linux/key-type.h>
-#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
-#include <linux/crypto.h>
-#include <crypto/hash.h>
-#include <crypto/sha.h>
-#include <linux/capability.h>
-#include <linux/tpm.h>
-#include <linux/tpm_command.h>
-
-#include "trusted_defined.h"
-
-static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)";
-static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1";
-
-struct sdesc {
-       struct shash_desc shash;
-       char ctx[];
-};
-
-static struct crypto_shash *hashalg;
-static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg;
-
-static struct sdesc *init_sdesc(struct crypto_shash *alg)
-{
-       struct sdesc *sdesc;
-       int size;
-
-       size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(alg);
-       sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
-       if (!sdesc)
-               return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-       sdesc->shash.tfm = alg;
-       sdesc->shash.flags = 0x0;
-       return sdesc;
-}
-
-static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int datalen,
-                   unsigned char *digest)
-{
-       struct sdesc *sdesc;
-       int ret;
-
-       sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
-       if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
-               pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
-               return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
-       }
-
-       ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest);
-       kfree(sdesc);
-       return ret;
-}
-
-static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
-                      unsigned int keylen, ...)
-{
-       struct sdesc *sdesc;
-       va_list argp;
-       unsigned int dlen;
-       unsigned char *data;
-       int ret;
-
-       sdesc = init_sdesc(hmacalg);
-       if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
-               pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hmac_alg);
-               return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
-       }
-
-       ret = crypto_shash_setkey(hmacalg, key, keylen);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               goto out;
-       ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               goto out;
-
-       va_start(argp, keylen);
-       for (;;) {
-               dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
-               if (dlen == 0)
-                       break;
-               data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *);
-               if (data == NULL) {
-                       ret = -EINVAL;
-                       break;
-               }
-               ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen);
-               if (ret < 0)
-                       break;
-       }
-       va_end(argp);
-       if (!ret)
-               ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest);
-out:
-       kfree(sdesc);
-       return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM
- */
-static int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
-                       unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1,
-                       unsigned char *h2, unsigned char h3, ...)
-{
-       unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-       struct sdesc *sdesc;
-       unsigned int dlen;
-       unsigned char *data;
-       unsigned char c;
-       int ret;
-       va_list argp;
-
-       sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
-       if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
-               pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
-               return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
-       }
-
-       c = h3;
-       ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               goto out;
-       va_start(argp, h3);
-       for (;;) {
-               dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
-               if (dlen == 0)
-                       break;
-               data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *);
-               if (!data) {
-                       ret = -EINVAL;
-                       break;
-               }
-               ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen);
-               if (ret < 0)
-                       break;
-       }
-       va_end(argp);
-       if (!ret)
-               ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest);
-       if (!ret)
-               ret = TSS_rawhmac(digest, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-                                 paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1,
-                                 TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0);
-out:
-       kfree(sdesc);
-       return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * verify the AUTH1_COMMAND (Seal) result from TPM
- */
-static int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
-                         const uint32_t command,
-                         const unsigned char *ononce,
-                         const unsigned char *key,
-                         unsigned int keylen, ...)
-{
-       uint32_t bufsize;
-       uint16_t tag;
-       uint32_t ordinal;
-       uint32_t result;
-       unsigned char *enonce;
-       unsigned char *continueflag;
-       unsigned char *authdata;
-       unsigned char testhmac[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-       unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-       struct sdesc *sdesc;
-       unsigned int dlen;
-       unsigned int dpos;
-       va_list argp;
-       int ret;
-
-       bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
-       tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0);
-       ordinal = command;
-       result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET);
-       if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND)
-               return 0;
-       if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH1_COMMAND)
-               return -EINVAL;
-       authdata = buffer + bufsize - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
-       continueflag = authdata - 1;
-       enonce = continueflag - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
-
-       sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
-       if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
-               pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
-               return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
-       }
-       ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               goto out;
-       ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result,
-                                 sizeof result);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               goto out;
-       ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal,
-                                 sizeof ordinal);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               goto out;
-       va_start(argp, keylen);
-       for (;;) {
-               dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
-               if (dlen == 0)
-                       break;
-               dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
-               ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen);
-               if (ret < 0)
-                       break;
-       }
-       va_end(argp);
-       if (!ret)
-               ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               goto out;
-
-       ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, paramdigest,
-                         TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce,
-                         1, continueflag, 0, 0);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               goto out;
-
-       if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
-               ret = -EINVAL;
-out:
-       kfree(sdesc);
-       return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM
- */
-static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
-                         const uint32_t command,
-                         const unsigned char *ononce,
-                         const unsigned char *key1,
-                         unsigned int keylen1,
-                         const unsigned char *key2,
-                         unsigned int keylen2, ...)
-{
-       uint32_t bufsize;
-       uint16_t tag;
-       uint32_t ordinal;
-       uint32_t result;
-       unsigned char *enonce1;
-       unsigned char *continueflag1;
-       unsigned char *authdata1;
-       unsigned char *enonce2;
-       unsigned char *continueflag2;
-       unsigned char *authdata2;
-       unsigned char testhmac1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-       unsigned char testhmac2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-       unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-       struct sdesc *sdesc;
-       unsigned int dlen;
-       unsigned int dpos;
-       va_list argp;
-       int ret;
-
-       bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
-       tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0);
-       ordinal = command;
-       result = LOAD32N(buffer, TPM_RETURN_OFFSET);
-
-       if (tag == TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND)
-               return 0;
-       if (tag != TPM_TAG_RSP_AUTH2_COMMAND)
-               return -EINVAL;
-       authdata1 = buffer + bufsize - (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1
-                       + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
-       authdata2 = buffer + bufsize - (SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
-       continueflag1 = authdata1 - 1;
-       continueflag2 = authdata2 - 1;
-       enonce1 = continueflag1 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
-       enonce2 = continueflag2 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
-
-       sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
-       if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
-               pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
-               return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
-       }
-       ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               goto out;
-       ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result,
-                                 sizeof result);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               goto out;
-       ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal,
-                                 sizeof ordinal);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               goto out;
-
-       va_start(argp, keylen2);
-       for (;;) {
-               dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
-               if (dlen == 0)
-                       break;
-               dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
-               ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen);
-               if (ret < 0)
-                       break;
-       }
-       va_end(argp);
-       if (!ret)
-               ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               goto out;
-
-       ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac1, key1, keylen1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-                         paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1,
-                         TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               goto out;
-       if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
-               ret = -EINVAL;
-               goto out;
-       }
-       ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac2, key2, keylen2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-                         paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce2,
-                         TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               goto out;
-       if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
-               ret = -EINVAL;
-out:
-       kfree(sdesc);
-       return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our
- * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function.
- */
-static int trusted_tpm_send(const u32 chip_num, unsigned char *cmd,
-                           size_t buflen)
-{
-       int rc;
-
-       dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
-       rc = tpm_send(chip_num, cmd, buflen);
-       dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
-       if (rc > 0)
-               /* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */
-               rc = -EPERM;
-       return rc;
-}
-
-/*
- * get a random value from TPM
- */
-static int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_buf *tb, unsigned char *buf, uint32_t len)
-{
-       int ret;
-
-       INIT_BUF(tb);
-       store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
-       store32(tb, TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE);
-       store32(tb, TPM_ORD_GETRANDOM);
-       store32(tb, len);
-       ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, sizeof tb->data);
-       if (!ret)
-               memcpy(buf, tb->data + TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE, len);
-       return ret;
-}
-
-static int my_get_random(unsigned char *buf, int len)
-{
-       struct tpm_buf *tb;
-       int ret;
-
-       tb = kmalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL);
-       if (!tb)
-               return -ENOMEM;
-       ret = tpm_get_random(tb, buf, len);
-
-       kfree(tb);
-       return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR.
- *
- * Prevents a trusted key that is sealed to PCRs from being accessed.
- * This uses the tpm driver's extend function.
- */
-static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum)
-{
-       unsigned char hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-       int ret;
-
-       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-               return -EPERM;
-       ret = my_get_random(hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               return ret;
-       return tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Create an object specific authorisation protocol (OSAP) session
- */
-static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
-               const unsigned char *key, uint16_t type, uint32_t handle)
-{
-       unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
-       unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
-       int ret;
-
-       ret = tpm_get_random(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               return ret;
-
-       INIT_BUF(tb);
-       store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
-       store32(tb, TPM_OSAP_SIZE);
-       store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OSAP);
-       store16(tb, type);
-       store32(tb, handle);
-       storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
-
-       ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               return ret;
-
-       s->handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
-       memcpy(s->enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)]),
-              TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
-       memcpy(enonce, &(tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) +
-                                 TPM_NONCE_SIZE]), TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
-       return TSS_rawhmac(s->secret, key, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
-                          enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 0, 0);
-}
-
-/*
- * Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session
- */
-static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
-{
-       int ret;
-
-       INIT_BUF(tb);
-       store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
-       store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE);
-       store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OIAP);
-       ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               return ret;
-
-       *handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
-       memcpy(nonce, &tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)],
-              TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
-       return 0;
-}
-
-struct tpm_digests {
-       unsigned char encauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-       unsigned char pubauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-       unsigned char xorwork[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2];
-       unsigned char xorhash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-       unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
-};
-
-/*
- * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the trusted key, possibly based on
- * Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). AUTH1 for sealing key.
- */
-static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
-                   uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth,
-                   const unsigned char *data, uint32_t datalen,
-                   unsigned char *blob, uint32_t *bloblen,
-                   const unsigned char *blobauth,
-                   const unsigned char *pcrinfo, uint32_t pcrinfosize)
-{
-       struct osapsess sess;
-       struct tpm_digests *td;
-       unsigned char cont;
-       uint32_t ordinal;
-       uint32_t pcrsize;
-       uint32_t datsize;
-       int sealinfosize;
-       int encdatasize;
-       int storedsize;
-       int ret;
-       int i;
-
-       /* alloc some work space for all the hashes */
-       td = kmalloc(sizeof *td, GFP_KERNEL);
-       if (!td)
-               return -ENOMEM;
-
-       /* get session for sealing key */
-       ret = osap(tb, &sess, keyauth, keytype, keyhandle);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               goto out;
-       dump_sess(&sess);
-
-       /* calculate encrypted authorization value */
-       memcpy(td->xorwork, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
-       memcpy(td->xorwork + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, sess.enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
-       ret = TSS_sha1(td->xorwork, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, td->xorhash);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               goto out;
-
-       ret = tpm_get_random(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               goto out;
-       ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL);
-       datsize = htonl(datalen);
-       pcrsize = htonl(pcrinfosize);
-       cont = 0;
-
-       /* encrypt data authorization key */
-       for (i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; ++i)
-               td->encauth[i] = td->xorhash[i] ^ blobauth[i];
-
-       /* calculate authorization HMAC value */
-       if (pcrinfosize == 0) {
-               /* no pcr info specified */
-               ret = TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-                                  sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont,
-                                  sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-                                  td->encauth, sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize,
-                                  sizeof(uint32_t), &datsize, datalen, data, 0,
-                                  0);
-       } else {
-               /* pcr info specified */
-               ret = TSS_authhmac(td->pubauth, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-                                  sess.enonce, td->nonceodd, cont,
-                                  sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-                                  td->encauth, sizeof(uint32_t), &pcrsize,
-                                  pcrinfosize, pcrinfo, sizeof(uint32_t),
-                                  &datsize, datalen, data, 0, 0);
-       }
-       if (ret < 0)
-               goto out;
-
-       /* build and send the TPM request packet */
-       INIT_BUF(tb);
-       store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND);
-       store32(tb, TPM_SEAL_SIZE + pcrinfosize + datalen);
-       store32(tb, TPM_ORD_SEAL);
-       store32(tb, keyhandle);
-       storebytes(tb, td->encauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
-       store32(tb, pcrinfosize);
-       storebytes(tb, pcrinfo, pcrinfosize);
-       store32(tb, datalen);
-       storebytes(tb, data, datalen);
-       store32(tb, sess.handle);
-       storebytes(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
-       store8(tb, cont);
-       storebytes(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
-
-       ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               goto out;
-
-       /* calculate the size of the returned Blob */
-       sealinfosize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t));
-       encdatasize = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t) +
-                            sizeof(uint32_t) + sealinfosize);
-       storedsize = sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(uint32_t) + sealinfosize +
-           sizeof(uint32_t) + encdatasize;
-
-       /* check the HMAC in the response */
-       ret = TSS_checkhmac1(tb->data, ordinal, td->nonceodd, sess.secret,
-                            SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, storedsize, TPM_DATA_OFFSET, 0,
-                            0);
-
-       /* copy the returned blob to caller */
-       if (!ret) {
-               memcpy(blob, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET, storedsize);
-               *bloblen = storedsize;
-       }
-out:
-       kfree(td);
-       return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * use the AUTH2_COMMAND form of unseal, to authorize both key and blob
- */
-static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
-                     uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth,
-                     const unsigned char *blob, int bloblen,
-                     const unsigned char *blobauth,
-                     unsigned char *data, unsigned int *datalen)
-{
-       unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
-       unsigned char enonce1[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
-       unsigned char enonce2[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
-       unsigned char authdata1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-       unsigned char authdata2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-       uint32_t authhandle1 = 0;
-       uint32_t authhandle2 = 0;
-       unsigned char cont = 0;
-       uint32_t ordinal;
-       uint32_t keyhndl;
-       int ret;
-
-       /* sessions for unsealing key and data */
-       ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle1, enonce1);
-       if (ret < 0) {
-               pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret);
-               return ret;
-       }
-       ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle2, enonce2);
-       if (ret < 0) {
-               pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret);
-               return ret;
-       }
-
-       ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
-       keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE);
-       ret = tpm_get_random(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
-       if (ret < 0) {
-               pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
-               return ret;
-       }
-       ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata1, keyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
-                          enonce1, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t),
-                          &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               return ret;
-       ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata2, blobauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE,
-                          enonce2, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t),
-                          &ordinal, bloblen, blob, 0, 0);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               return ret;
-
-       /* build and send TPM request packet */
-       INIT_BUF(tb);
-       store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND);
-       store32(tb, TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE + bloblen);
-       store32(tb, TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
-       store32(tb, keyhandle);
-       storebytes(tb, blob, bloblen);
-       store32(tb, authhandle1);
-       storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
-       store8(tb, cont);
-       storebytes(tb, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
-       store32(tb, authhandle2);
-       storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
-       store8(tb, cont);
-       storebytes(tb, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
-
-       ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
-       if (ret < 0) {
-               pr_info("trusted_key: authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret);
-               return ret;
-       }
-
-       *datalen = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
-       ret = TSS_checkhmac2(tb->data, ordinal, nonceodd,
-                            keyauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-                            blobauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-                            sizeof(uint32_t), TPM_DATA_OFFSET,
-                            *datalen, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), 0,
-                            0);
-       if (ret < 0) {
-               pr_info("trusted_key: TSS_checkhmac2 failed (%d)\n", ret);
-               return ret;
-       }
-       memcpy(data, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), *datalen);
-       return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the symmetric key
- */
-static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
-                   struct trusted_key_options *o)
-{
-       struct tpm_buf *tb;
-       int ret;
-
-       tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL);
-       if (!tb)
-               return -ENOMEM;
-
-       /* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */
-       p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable;
-
-       ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth,
-                      p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len,
-                      o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               pr_info("trusted_key: srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
-
-       kfree(tb);
-       return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Have the TPM unseal(decrypt) the symmetric key
- */
-static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
-                     struct trusted_key_options *o)
-{
-       struct tpm_buf *tb;
-       int ret;
-
-       tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL);
-       if (!tb)
-               return -ENOMEM;
-
-       ret = tpm_unseal(tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len,
-                        o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               pr_info("trusted_key: srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
-       else
-               /* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */
-               p->migratable = p->key[--p->key_len];
-
-       kfree(tb);
-       return ret;
-}
-
-enum {
-       Opt_err = -1,
-       Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update,
-       Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth,
-       Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable
-};
-
-static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
-       {Opt_new, "new"},
-       {Opt_load, "load"},
-       {Opt_update, "update"},
-       {Opt_keyhandle, "keyhandle=%s"},
-       {Opt_keyauth, "keyauth=%s"},
-       {Opt_blobauth, "blobauth=%s"},
-       {Opt_pcrinfo, "pcrinfo=%s"},
-       {Opt_pcrlock, "pcrlock=%s"},
-       {Opt_migratable, "migratable=%s"},
-       {Opt_err, NULL}
-};
-
-/* can have zero or more token= options */
-static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
-                     struct trusted_key_options *opt)
-{
-       substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
-       char *p = c;
-       int token;
-       int res;
-       unsigned long handle;
-       unsigned long lock;
-
-       while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) {
-               if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t')
-                       continue;
-               token = match_token(p, key_tokens, args);
-
-               switch (token) {
-               case Opt_pcrinfo:
-                       opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
-                       if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
-                               return -EINVAL;
-                       hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from, opt->pcrinfo_len);
-                       break;
-               case Opt_keyhandle:
-                       res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
-                       if (res < 0)
-                               return -EINVAL;
-                       opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype;
-                       opt->keyhandle = handle;
-                       break;
-               case Opt_keyauth:
-                       if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
-                               return -EINVAL;
-                       hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
-                       break;
-               case Opt_blobauth:
-                       if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
-                               return -EINVAL;
-                       hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
-                       break;
-               case Opt_migratable:
-                       if (*args[0].from == '0')
-                               pay->migratable = 0;
-                       else
-                               return -EINVAL;
-                       break;
-               case Opt_pcrlock:
-                       res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock);
-                       if (res < 0)
-                               return -EINVAL;
-                       opt->pcrlock = lock;
-                       break;
-               default:
-                       return -EINVAL;
-               }
-       }
-       return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data and fill in the
- *                 payload and options structures
- *
- * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
- */
-static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p,
-                         struct trusted_key_options *o)
-{
-       substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
-       long keylen;
-       int ret = -EINVAL;
-       int key_cmd;
-       char *c;
-
-       /* main command */
-       c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
-       if (!c)
-               return -EINVAL;
-       key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args);
-       switch (key_cmd) {
-       case Opt_new:
-               /* first argument is key size */
-               c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
-               if (!c)
-                       return -EINVAL;
-               ret = strict_strtol(c, 10, &keylen);
-               if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
-                       return -EINVAL;
-               p->key_len = keylen;
-               ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o);
-               if (ret < 0)
-                       return ret;
-               ret = Opt_new;
-               break;
-       case Opt_load:
-               /* first argument is sealed blob */
-               c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
-               if (!c)
-                       return -EINVAL;
-               p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2;
-               if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
-                       return -EINVAL;
-               hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len);
-               ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o);
-               if (ret < 0)
-                       return ret;
-               ret = Opt_load;
-               break;
-       case Opt_update:
-               /* all arguments are options */
-               ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o);
-               if (ret < 0)
-                       return ret;
-               ret = Opt_update;
-               break;
-       case Opt_err:
-               return -EINVAL;
-               break;
-       }
-       return ret;
-}
-
-static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
-{
-       struct trusted_key_options *options;
-
-       options = kzalloc(sizeof *options, GFP_KERNEL);
-       if (options) {
-               /* set any non-zero defaults */
-               options->keytype = SRK_keytype;
-               options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
-       }
-       return options;
-}
-
-static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key)
-{
-       struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL;
-       int ret;
-
-       ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof *p);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               return p;
-       p = kzalloc(sizeof *p, GFP_KERNEL);
-       if (p)
-               p->migratable = 1; /* migratable by default */
-       return p;
-}
-
-/*
- * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key
- *
- * Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a
- * random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key,
- * adding it to the specified keyring.
- *
- * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
- */
-static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data,
-                              size_t datalen)
-{
-       struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL;
-       struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
-       char *datablob;
-       int ret = 0;
-       int key_cmd;
-
-       if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
-               return -EINVAL;
-
-       datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-       if (!datablob)
-               return -ENOMEM;
-       memcpy(datablob, data, datalen);
-       datablob[datalen] = '\0';
-
-       options = trusted_options_alloc();
-       if (!options) {
-               ret = -ENOMEM;
-               goto out;
-       }
-       payload = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
-       if (!payload) {
-               ret = -ENOMEM;
-               goto out;
-       }
-
-       key_cmd = datablob_parse(datablob, payload, options);
-       if (key_cmd < 0) {
-               ret = key_cmd;
-               goto out;
-       }
-
-       dump_payload(payload);
-       dump_options(options);
-
-       switch (key_cmd) {
-       case Opt_load:
-               ret = key_unseal(payload, options);
-               dump_payload(payload);
-               dump_options(options);
-               if (ret < 0)
-                       pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
-               break;
-       case Opt_new:
-               ret = my_get_random(payload->key, payload->key_len);
-               if (ret < 0) {
-                       pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
-                       goto out;
-               }
-               ret = key_seal(payload, options);
-               if (ret < 0)
-                       pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
-               break;
-       default:
-               ret = -EINVAL;
-               goto out;
-       }
-       if (!ret && options->pcrlock)
-               ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
-out:
-       kfree(datablob);
-       kfree(options);
-       if (!ret)
-               rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, payload);
-       else
-               kfree(payload);
-       return ret;
-}
-
-static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
-{
-       struct trusted_key_payload *p;
-
-       p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu);
-       memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len);
-       kfree(p);
-}
-
-/*
- * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values
- */
-static int trusted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen)
-{
-       struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data;
-       struct trusted_key_payload *new_p;
-       struct trusted_key_options *new_o;
-       char *datablob;
-       int ret = 0;
-
-       if (!p->migratable)
-               return -EPERM;
-       if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !data)
-               return -EINVAL;
-
-       datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-       if (!datablob)
-               return -ENOMEM;
-       new_o = trusted_options_alloc();
-       if (!new_o) {
-               ret = -ENOMEM;
-               goto out;
-       }
-       new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key);
-       if (!new_p) {
-               ret = -ENOMEM;
-               goto out;
-       }
-
-       memcpy(datablob, data, datalen);
-       datablob[datalen] = '\0';
-       ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o);
-       if (ret != Opt_update) {
-               ret = -EINVAL;
-               goto out;
-       }
-       /* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */
-       new_p->migratable = p->migratable;
-       new_p->key_len = p->key_len;
-       memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len);
-       dump_payload(p);
-       dump_payload(new_p);
-
-       ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o);
-       if (ret < 0) {
-               pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
-               kfree(new_p);
-               goto out;
-       }
-       if (new_o->pcrlock) {
-               ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock);
-               if (ret < 0) {
-                       pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
-                       kfree(new_p);
-                       goto out;
-               }
-       }
-       rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, new_p);
-       call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
-out:
-       kfree(datablob);
-       kfree(new_o);
-       return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex.
- * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size.
- */
-static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
-                        size_t buflen)
-{
-       struct trusted_key_payload *p;
-       char *ascii_buf;
-       char *bufp;
-       int i;
-
-       p = rcu_dereference_protected(key->payload.data,
-                       rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)key)->sem));
-       if (!p)
-               return -EINVAL;
-       if (!buffer || buflen <= 0)
-               return 2 * p->blob_len;
-       ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL);
-       if (!ascii_buf)
-               return -ENOMEM;
-
-       bufp = ascii_buf;
-       for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
-               bufp = pack_hex_byte(bufp, p->blob[i]);
-       if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) {
-               kfree(ascii_buf);
-               return -EFAULT;
-       }
-       kfree(ascii_buf);
-       return 2 * p->blob_len;
-}
-
-/*
- * trusted_destroy - before freeing the key, clear the decrypted data
- */
-static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key)
-{
-       struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data;
-
-       if (!p)
-               return;
-       memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len);
-       kfree(key->payload.data);
-}
-
-struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
-       .name = "trusted",
-       .instantiate = trusted_instantiate,
-       .update = trusted_update,
-       .match = user_match,
-       .destroy = trusted_destroy,
-       .describe = user_describe,
-       .read = trusted_read,
-};
-
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted);
-
-static void trusted_shash_release(void)
-{
-       if (hashalg)
-               crypto_free_shash(hashalg);
-       if (hmacalg)
-               crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
-}
-
-static int __init trusted_shash_alloc(void)
-{
-       int ret;
-
-       hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
-       if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) {
-               pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
-                       hmac_alg);
-               return PTR_ERR(hmacalg);
-       }
-
-       hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
-       if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) {
-               pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
-                       hash_alg);
-               ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg);
-               goto hashalg_fail;
-       }
-
-       return 0;
-
-hashalg_fail:
-       crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
-       return ret;
-}
-
-static int __init init_trusted(void)
-{
-       int ret;
-
-       ret = trusted_shash_alloc();
-       if (ret < 0)
-               return ret;
-       ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
-       if (ret < 0)
-               trusted_shash_release();
-       return ret;
-}
-
-static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
-{
-       trusted_shash_release();
-       unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
-}
-
-late_initcall(init_trusted);
-module_exit(cleanup_trusted);
-
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted_defined.h b/security/keys/trusted_defined.h
deleted file mode 100644 (file)
index 3249fbd..0000000
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
-#ifndef __TRUSTED_KEY_H
-#define __TRUSTED_KEY_H
-
-/* implementation specific TPM constants */
-#define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE               64
-#define MAX_BUF_SIZE                   512
-#define TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE             14
-#define TPM_OSAP_SIZE                  36
-#define TPM_OIAP_SIZE                  10
-#define TPM_SEAL_SIZE                  87
-#define TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE                        104
-#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET                        2
-#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET              6
-#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET                        10
-
-#define LOAD32(buffer, offset) (ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]))
-#define LOAD32N(buffer, offset)        (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])
-#define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset]))
-
-struct tpm_buf {
-       int len;
-       unsigned char data[MAX_BUF_SIZE];
-};
-
-#define INIT_BUF(tb) (tb->len = 0)
-
-struct osapsess {
-       uint32_t handle;
-       unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-       unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
-};
-
-/* discrete values, but have to store in uint16_t for TPM use */
-enum {
-       SEAL_keytype = 1,
-       SRK_keytype = 4
-};
-
-struct trusted_key_options {
-       uint16_t keytype;
-       uint32_t keyhandle;
-       unsigned char keyauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-       unsigned char blobauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-       uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
-       unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
-       int pcrlock;
-};
-
-#define TPM_DEBUG 0
-
-#if TPM_DEBUG
-static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
-{
-       pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
-       pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
-       pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
-       pr_info("trusted_key: pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
-       print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-                      16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
-}
-
-static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
-{
-       pr_info("trusted_key: key_len %d\n", p->key_len);
-       print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-                      16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0);
-       pr_info("trusted_key: bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len);
-       print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-                      16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0);
-       pr_info("trusted_key: migratable %d\n", p->migratable);
-}
-
-static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
-{
-       print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-                      16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0);
-       pr_info("trusted-key: secret:\n");
-       print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-                      16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
-       pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n");
-       print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-                      16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
-}
-
-static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
-{
-       int len;
-
-       pr_info("\ntrusted-key: tpm buffer\n");
-       len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
-       print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0);
-}
-#else
-static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
-{
-}
-
-static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
-{
-}
-
-static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
-{
-}
-
-static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
-{
-}
-#endif
-
-static inline void store8(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char value)
-{
-       buf->data[buf->len++] = value;
-}
-
-static inline void store16(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint16_t value)
-{
-       *(uint16_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htons(value);
-       buf->len += sizeof value;
-}
-
-static inline void store32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint32_t value)
-{
-       *(uint32_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htonl(value);
-       buf->len += sizeof value;
-}
-
-static inline void storebytes(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char *in,
-                             const int len)
-{
-       memcpy(buf->data + buf->len, in, len);
-       buf->len += len;
-}
-#endif