kvm/x86: Export MDS_NO=0 to guests when TSX is enabled

commit e1d38b63acd843cfdd4222bf19a26700fd5c699e upstream

Export the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bit MDS_NO=0 to guests on TSX
Async Abort(TAA) affected hosts that have TSX enabled and updated
microcode. This is required so that the guests don't complain,

  "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode"

when the host has the updated microcode to clear CPU buffers.

Microcode update also adds support for MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL which is
enumerated by the ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL bit in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
Guests can't do this check themselves when the ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL bit is
not exported to the guests.

In this case export MDS_NO=0 to the guests. When guests have
CPUID.MD_CLEAR=1, they deploy MDS mitigation which also mitigates TAA.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
CVE-2019-11135

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 283cb89338b72dc6348a5daed1bbf065bac1f434..176c54b0a03f1bd35e3b1e4f201457ede96256d9 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1092,6 +1092,25 @@ u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
                data |= ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO;
 
+       /*
+        * On TAA affected systems, export MDS_NO=0 when:
+        *      - TSX is enabled on the host, i.e. X86_FEATURE_RTM=1.
+        *      - Updated microcode is present. This is detected by
+        *        the presence of ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR and ensures
+        *        that VERW clears CPU buffers.
+        *
+        * When MDS_NO=0 is exported, guests deploy clear CPU buffer
+        * mitigation and don't complain:
+        *
+        *      "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode"
+        *
+        * If TSX is disabled on the system, guests are also mitigated against
+        * TAA and clear CPU buffer mitigation is not required for guests.
+        */
+       if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) &&
+           (data & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+               data &= ~ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO;
+
        return data;
 }