--- /dev/null
+From edc243851279e3393000b28b6b69454cae1190ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 11 Apr 2014 15:18:08 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] virtio-net: fix guest-triggerable buffer overrun
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/744221
+
+When VM guest programs multicast addresses for
+a virtio net card, it supplies a 32 bit
+entries counter for the number of addresses.
+These addresses are read into tail portion of
+a fixed macs array which has size MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES,
+at offset equal to in_use.
+
+To avoid overflow of this array by guest, qemu attempts
+to test the size as follows:
+- if (in_use + mac_data.entries <= MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES) {
+
+however, as mac_data.entries is uint32_t, this sum
+can overflow, e.g. if in_use is 1 and mac_data.entries
+is 0xffffffff then in_use + mac_data.entries will be 0.
+
+Qemu will then read guest supplied buffer into this
+memory, overflowing buffer on heap.
+
+CVE-2014-0150
+
+Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+Message-id: 1397218574-25058-1-git-send-email-mst@redhat.com
+Reviewed-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
+Backported-to-1.7: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
+---
+ hw/net/virtio-net.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/hw/net/virtio-net.c
++++ b/hw/net/virtio-net.c
+@@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ static int virtio_net_handle_mac(VirtION
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+- if (n->mac_table.in_use + mac_data.entries <= MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES) {
++ if (mac_data.entries <= MAC_TABLE_ENTRIES - n->mac_table.in_use) {
+ s = iov_to_buf(iov, iov_cnt, 0,
+ &n->mac_table.macs[n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN],
+ mac_data.entries * ETH_ALEN);