KEYS: trusted: fix writing past end of buffer in trusted_read()

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1732698
commit a3c812f7cfd80cf51e8f5b7034f7418f6beb56c1 upstream.

When calling keyctl_read() on a key of type "trusted", if the
user-supplied buffer was too small, the kernel ignored the buffer length
and just wrote past the end of the buffer, potentially corrupting
userspace memory.  Fix it by instead returning the size required, as per
the documentation for keyctl_read().

We also don't even fill the buffer at all in this case, as this is
slightly easier to implement than doing a short read, and either
behavior appears to be permitted.  It also makes it match the behavior
of the "encrypted" key type.

Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type")
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index 222db148a96b5a6c6a0eeab71428c64f22a635b3..4ba2f6b912421fec98448b4c7376337b17f1d2ee 100644 (file)
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -1147,20 +1147,21 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
        p = rcu_dereference_key(key);
        if (!p)
                return -EINVAL;
-       if (!buffer || buflen <= 0)
-               return 2 * p->blob_len;
-       ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL);
-       if (!ascii_buf)
-               return -ENOMEM;
 
-       bufp = ascii_buf;
-       for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
-               bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);
-       if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) {
+       if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) {
+               ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+               if (!ascii_buf)
+                       return -ENOMEM;
+
+               bufp = ascii_buf;
+               for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
+                       bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);
+               if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) {
+                       kzfree(ascii_buf);
+                       return -EFAULT;
+               }
                kzfree(ascii_buf);
-               return -EFAULT;
        }
-       kzfree(ascii_buf);
        return 2 * p->blob_len;
 }