ccid: Fix buffer overrun in handling of VSC_ATR message

ATR size exceeding the limit is diagnosed, but then we merrily use it
anyway, overrunning card->atr[].

The message is read from a character device.  Obvious security
implications unless the other end of the character device is trusted.

Spotted by Coverity.  CVE-2011-4111.

Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>

diff --git a/hw/ccid-card-passthru.c b/hw/ccid-card-passthru.c
index 2cbc81b9f455cbc1088cb5befb78f4b0f2624ccd..9f51c6cb0590efc72c168bc33223b9966a573f85 100644 (file)
--- a/hw/ccid-card-passthru.c
+++ b/hw/ccid-card-passthru.c
@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ static void ccid_card_vscard_handle_message(PassthruState *card,
             error_report("ATR size exceeds spec, ignoring");
             ccid_card_vscard_send_error(card, scr_msg_header->reader_id,
                                         VSC_GENERAL_ERROR);
+            break;
         }
         memcpy(card->atr, data, scr_msg_header->length);
         card->atr_length = scr_msg_header->length;