D: bug fixes, documentation, minor hackery
N: Paul Moore
-E: paul.moore@hp.com
-D: NetLabel author
-S: Hewlett-Packard
-S: 110 Spit Brook Road
-S: Nashua, NH 03062
+E: paul@paul-moore.com
+W: http://www.paul-moore.com
+D: NetLabel, SELinux, audit
N: James Morris
E: jmorris@namei.org
LiveCD-based tutorials are available at
-http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/1.7/1st-step/ubuntu10.04-live/
-http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/1.7/1st-step/centos5-live/
+http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/1.8/ubuntu12.04-live.html
+http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/1.8/centos6-live.html
Though these tutorials use non-LSM version of TOMOYO, they are useful for you
to know what TOMOYO is.
Build the kernel with ``CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO=y`` and pass ``security=tomoyo`` on
kernel's command line.
-Please see http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/2.3/ for details.
+Please see http://tomoyo.osdn.jp/2.5/ for details.
Where is documentation?
=======================
User <-> Kernel interface documentation is available at
-http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/2.3/policy-reference.html .
+http://tomoyo.osdn.jp/2.5/policy-specification/index.html .
Materials we prepared for seminars and symposiums are available at
-http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/?category_id=532&language_id=1 .
+http://osdn.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/?category_id=532&language_id=1 .
Below lists are chosen from three aspects.
What is TOMOYO?
TOMOYO Linux Overview
- http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/lca2009-takeda.pdf
+ http://osdn.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/lca2009-takeda.pdf
TOMOYO Linux: pragmatic and manageable security for Linux
- http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/freedomhectaipei-tomoyo.pdf
+ http://osdn.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/freedomhectaipei-tomoyo.pdf
TOMOYO Linux: A Practical Method to Understand and Protect Your Own Linux Box
- http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/PacSec2007-en-no-demo.pdf
+ http://osdn.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/PacSec2007-en-no-demo.pdf
What can TOMOYO do?
Deep inside TOMOYO Linux
- http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/lca2009-kumaneko.pdf
+ http://osdn.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/lca2009-kumaneko.pdf
The role of "pathname based access control" in security.
- http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/lfj2008-bof.pdf
+ http://osdn.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/lfj2008-bof.pdf
History of TOMOYO?
Realities of Mainlining
- http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/lfj2008.pdf
+ http://osdn.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/lfj2008.pdf
What is future plan?
====================
SELinux/SMACK/AppArmor etc. when you want to use TOMOYO.
We hope that LSM becomes stackable in future. Meanwhile, you can use non-LSM
-version of TOMOYO, available at http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/1.7/ .
+version of TOMOYO, available at http://tomoyo.osdn.jp/1.8/ .
LSM version of TOMOYO is a subset of non-LSM version of TOMOYO. We are planning
to port non-LSM version's functionalities to LSM versions.
F: net/netfilter/
F: net/bridge/br_netfilter*.c
-NETLABEL
-M: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
-W: http://netlabel.sf.net
-L: netdev@vger.kernel.org
-S: Maintained
-F: Documentation/netlabel/
-F: include/net/netlabel.h
-F: net/netlabel/
-
NETROM NETWORK LAYER
M: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
L: linux-hams@vger.kernel.org
F: include/net/ip*
F: arch/x86/net/*
-NETWORKING [LABELED] (NetLabel, CIPSO, Labeled IPsec, SECMARK)
+NETWORKING [LABELED] (NetLabel, Labeled IPsec, SECMARK)
M: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+W: https://github.com/netlabel
L: netdev@vger.kernel.org
+L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
+F: Documentation/netlabel/
+F: include/net/calipso.h
+F: include/net/cipso_ipv4.h
+F: include/net/netlabel.h
+F: include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h
+F: include/uapi/linux/netfilter/xt_CONNSECMARK.h
+F: net/netlabel/
+F: net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c
+F: net/ipv6/calipso.c
+F: net/netfilter/xt_CONNSECMARK.c
+F: net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
NETWORKING [TLS]
M: Ilya Lesokhin <ilyal@mellanox.com>
M: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
M: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
L: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov (moderated for non-subscribers)
-W: http://selinuxproject.org
-T: git git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux
+W: https://selinuxproject.org
+W: https://github.com/SELinuxProject
+T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git
S: Supported
F: include/linux/selinux*
F: security/selinux/
*
* Author : Etienne BASSET <etienne.basset@ensta.org>
*
- * All credits to : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * All credits to : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* All BUGS to : Etienne BASSET <etienne.basset@ensta.org>
*/
#ifndef _LSM_COMMON_LOGGING_
*
* Security hooks for task operations.
*
- * @task_create:
- * Check permission before creating a child process. See the clone(2)
- * manual page for definitions of the @clone_flags.
- * @clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @task_alloc:
* @task task being allocated.
* @clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared.
int (*file_receive)(struct file *file);
int (*file_open)(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
- int (*task_create)(unsigned long clone_flags);
int (*task_alloc)(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags);
void (*task_free)(struct task_struct *task);
int (*cred_alloc_blank)(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
struct list_head file_send_sigiotask;
struct list_head file_receive;
struct list_head file_open;
- struct list_head task_create;
struct list_head task_alloc;
struct list_head task_free;
struct list_head cred_alloc_blank;
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig);
int security_file_receive(struct file *file);
int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
-int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags);
int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags);
void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task);
int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
static inline int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
unsigned long clone_flags)
{
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
- retval = security_task_create(clone_flags);
- if (retval)
- goto fork_out;
-
retval = -ENOMEM;
p = dup_task_struct(current, node);
if (!p)
for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++) {
struct security_class_mapping *map = &secclass_map[i];
for (j = 0; map->perms[j]; j++) {
+ if (j >= 32) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Too many permissions to fit into an access vector at (%s, %s).\n",
+ map->name, map->perms[j]);
+ exit(5);
+ }
fprintf(fout, "#define %s__%s", map->name,
map->perms[j]);
for (k = 0; k < max(1, 40 - strlen(map->name) - strlen(map->perms[j])); k++)
fprintf(fout, " ");
- fprintf(fout, "0x%08xUL\n", (1<<j));
+ fprintf(fout, "0x%08xU\n", (1<<j));
}
}
* common LSM auditing functions
*
* Based on code written for SELinux by :
- * Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
* Author : Etienne Basset, <etienne.basset@ensta.org>
*
return fsnotify_perm(file, MAY_OPEN);
}
-int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
-{
- return call_int_hook(task_create, 0, clone_flags);
-}
-
int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
{
return call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
/*
* Implementation of the kernel access vector cache (AVC).
*
- * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
*
* Update: KaiGai, Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node;
struct extended_perms_decision *xpd;
- xpd_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_decision_cachep,
- GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+ xpd_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_decision_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT);
if (!xpd_node)
return NULL;
xpd = &xpd_node->xpd;
if (which & XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
xpd->allowed = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
- GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+ GFP_NOWAIT);
if (!xpd->allowed)
goto error;
}
if (which & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
xpd->auditallow = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
- GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+ GFP_NOWAIT);
if (!xpd->auditallow)
goto error;
}
if (which & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
xpd->dontaudit = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep,
- GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+ GFP_NOWAIT);
if (!xpd->dontaudit)
goto error;
}
{
struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node;
- xp_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_cachep,
- GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+ xp_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT);
if (!xp_node)
return xp_node;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
{
struct avc_node *node;
- node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+ node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT);
if (!node)
goto out;
*
* This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
*
- * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
* Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
* James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
- !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
if (!sbsec->behavior) {
case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
case SOCK_DGRAM:
+ case SOCK_RAW:
return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
}
break;
int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
int rc;
+ u32 av;
if (!nnp && !nosuid)
return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
return 0; /* No change in credentials */
/*
- * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid
- * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are
- * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions
- * of the current SID.
+ * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
+ * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
+ * policy allows the corresponding permission between
+ * the old and new contexts.
*/
- rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
- if (rc) {
- /*
- * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
- * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
- * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
- */
+ if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition) {
+ av = 0;
if (nnp)
- return -EPERM;
- else
- return -EACCES;
+ av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
+ if (nosuid)
+ av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
+ rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
+ if (!rc)
+ return 0;
}
- return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
+ * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
+ * of the permissions of the current SID.
+ */
+ rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
+ if (!rc)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
+ * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
+ * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
+ */
+ if (nnp)
+ return -EPERM;
+ return -EACCES;
}
static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
/*
* Access vector cache interface for object managers.
*
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*/
#ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_H_
#define _SELINUX_AVC_H_
/*
* Access vector cache interface for the security server.
*
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*/
#ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_
#define _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_
"setrlimit", "rlimitinh", "dyntransition", "setcurrent",
"execmem", "execstack", "execheap", "setkeycreate",
"setsockcreate", "getrlimit", NULL } },
+ { "process2",
+ { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", NULL } },
{ "system",
{ "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod",
"syslog_console", "module_request", "module_load", NULL } },
*
* This file contains the SELinux security data structures for kernel objects.
*
- * Author(s): Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Author(s): Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
* Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
* James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
/*
* Security server interface.
*
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*
*/
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS,
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK,
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL,
+ POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION,
__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX
};
#define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)
extern int selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
extern int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
extern int selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel;
+extern int selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition;
/*
* type_datum properties
/*
* Implementation of the access vector table type.
*
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*/
/* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
* table is used to represent the type enforcement
* tables.
*
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*/
/* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
* process from labeling an object with a different user
* identity.
*
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*/
#ifndef _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_
#define _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_
* security server and can be changed without affecting
* clients of the security server.
*
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*/
#ifndef _SS_CONTEXT_H_
#define _SS_CONTEXT_H_
/*
* Implementation of the extensible bitmap type.
*
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*/
/*
* Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
* an explicitly specified starting bit position within
* the total bitmap.
*
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*/
#ifndef _SS_EBITMAP_H_
#define _SS_EBITMAP_H_
/*
* Implementation of the hash table type.
*
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
* functions for hash computation and key comparison are
* provided by the creator of the table.
*
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*/
#ifndef _SS_HASHTAB_H_
#define _SS_HASHTAB_H_
/*
* Implementation of the multi-level security (MLS) policy.
*
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*/
/*
* Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
/*
* Multi-level security (MLS) policy operations.
*
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*/
/*
* Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
/*
* Type definitions for the multi-level security (MLS) policy.
*
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*/
/*
* Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
/*
* Implementation of the policy database.
*
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*/
/*
* A policy database (policydb) specifies the
* configuration data for the security policy.
*
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*/
/*
/*
* Implementation of the security services.
*
- * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
*
* Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
"open_perms",
"extended_socket_class",
"always_check_network",
- "cgroup_seclabel"
+ "cgroup_seclabel",
+ "nnp_nosuid_transition"
};
int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
int selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
int selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel;
+int selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition;
static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel =
ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL);
+ selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition =
+ ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
+ POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names); i++)
pr_info("SELinux: policy capability %s=%d\n",
/*
* Implementation of the security services.
*
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*/
#ifndef _SS_SERVICES_H_
#define _SS_SERVICES_H_
/*
* Implementation of the SID table type.
*
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
* A security identifier table (sidtab) is a hash table
* of security context structures indexed by SID value.
*
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*/
#ifndef _SS_SIDTAB_H_
#define _SS_SIDTAB_H_
/*
* Implementation of the symbol table type.
*
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
* is arbitrary. The symbol table type is implemented
* using the hash table type (hashtab).
*
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
*/
#ifndef _SS_SYMTAB_H_
#define _SS_SYMTAB_H_
projects / mirror_ubuntu-bionic-kernel.git / commitdiff