userns: Fix link restrictions to use uid_eq

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 1b464390dde85ecd783eb45f64aee1f89f6c3ff1..05480a64d7b7acec9446db567b9c3560ff0f5762 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd)
 
        /* Allowed if owner and follower match. */
        inode = link->dentry->d_inode;
-       if (current_cred()->fsuid == inode->i_uid)
+       if (uid_eq(current_cred()->fsuid, inode->i_uid))
                return 0;
 
        /* Allowed if parent directory not sticky and world-writable. */
@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd)
                return 0;
 
        /* Allowed if parent directory and link owner match. */
-       if (parent->i_uid == inode->i_uid)
+       if (uid_eq(parent->i_uid, inode->i_uid))
                return 0;
 
        path_put_conditional(link, nd);
@@ -757,7 +757,7 @@ static int may_linkat(struct path *link)
        /* Source inode owner (or CAP_FOWNER) can hardlink all they like,
         * otherwise, it must be a safe source.
         */
-       if (cred->fsuid == inode->i_uid || safe_hardlink_source(inode) ||
+       if (uid_eq(cred->fsuid, inode->i_uid) || safe_hardlink_source(inode) ||
            capable(CAP_FOWNER))
                return 0;