arm64: Always enable spectre-v2 vulnerability detection

Ensure we are always able to detect whether or not the CPU is affected
by Spectre-v2, so that we can later advertise this to userspace.

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
index 60cf87c4deb73b6c1af65b9811b66c7b8ae87b92..a9c3ad4f794865c99b54df36347244676c93c429 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -109,7 +109,6 @@ cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
 
 atomic_t arm64_el2_vector_last_slot = ATOMIC_INIT(-1);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 
@@ -270,11 +269,11 @@ static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void)
            ((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) == MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1))
                cb = qcom_link_stack_sanitization;
 
-       install_bp_hardening_cb(cb, smccc_start, smccc_end);
+       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR))
+               install_bp_hardening_cb(cb, smccc_start, smccc_end);
 
        return 1;
 }
-#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
 DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
@@ -513,7 +512,6 @@ cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
        .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,                 \
        CAP_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(midr_list)
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 /*
  * List of CPUs that do not need any Spectre-v2 mitigation at all.
  */
@@ -545,6 +543,12 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
        if (!need_wa)
                return false;
 
+       if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) {
+               pr_warn_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by kernel configuration\n");
+               __hardenbp_enab = false;
+               return false;
+       }
+
        /* forced off */
        if (__nospectre_v2) {
                pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
@@ -556,7 +560,6 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
 
        return (need_wa > 0);
 }
-#endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS
 
@@ -731,13 +734,11 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
                ERRATA_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
        },
 #endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
        {
                .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
                .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
                .matches = check_branch_predictor,
        },
-#endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS
        {
                .desc = "EL2 vector hardening",