This ignores %n in printf again, as was originally documented.
Implementing %n poses a greater security risk than utility, so it should
stay ignored. To help anyone attempting to use %n, a warning will be
emitted if it is encountered.
Based on an earlier patch by Joe Perches.
Because %n was designed to write to pointers on the stack, it has been
frequently used as an attack vector when bugs are found that leak
user-controlled strings into functions that ultimately process format
strings. While this class of bug can still be turned into an
information leak, removing %n eliminates the common method of elevating
such a bug into an arbitrary kernel memory writing primitive,
significantly reducing the danger of this class of bug.
For seq_file users that need to know the length of a written string for
padding, please see seq_setwidth() and seq_pad() instead.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
break;
case FORMAT_TYPE_NRCHARS: {
- u8 qualifier = spec.qualifier;
+ /*
+ * Since %n poses a greater security risk than
+ * utility, ignore %n and skip its argument.
+ */
+ void *skip_arg;
- if (qualifier == 'l') {
- long *ip = va_arg(args, long *);
- *ip = (str - buf);
- } else if (_tolower(qualifier) == 'z') {
- size_t *ip = va_arg(args, size_t *);
- *ip = (str - buf);
- } else {
- int *ip = va_arg(args, int *);
- *ip = (str - buf);
- }
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "Please remove ignored %%n in '%s'\n",
+ old_fmt);
+
+ skip_arg = va_arg(args, void *);
break;
}